Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

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ramana
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Link:
China Used to be a One-Way Street of Happiness and Rising Prosperity, But That’s Over Now
China Used to be a One-Way Street of Happiness and Rising Prosperity, But That’s Over Now»
Joerg Wuttke, President of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China, sums up the 20th Party Congress and shares his views on the future economic and foreign policy under Xi Jinping.

Mark Dittli
25.10.2022, 06.23 Uhr
Deutsche Version

Few Western observers have a more intimate knowledge of China than Joerg Wuttke. The current president of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China has lived in the People’s Republic for forty years, and during this time he has experienced China’s opening and rise at first hand.

Wuttke has followed the 20th Party Congress, which ended on Saturday, with some disillusionment. General Secretary and President Xi Jinping has cemented his power, and the pro-business faction of the Party has been cast out, says Wuttke in an in-depth interview with The Market NZZ, which has been lightly edited for clarity. «The echo chamber around Xi will become even tighter», says Wuttke. «You have to get used to the fact that everything will become much more autocratic in China.»


Mr. Wuttke, what are your most important findings from the 20th Party Congress?

The most important fact is the President’s absolute, unrestricted power. Xi Jinping has managed to de facto lock out the entire Party faction of the Youth League. This was not to be expected on this scale. He has practically tailored the Politburo to himself and filled it with loyalists. A man may now become Prime Minister who previously had no national job at all and who has not grown into the office as Vice Premier. This is a break with the previous model: Premier Wen Jiabao had learned from his predecessor Zhu Rongji, and Li Keqiang had learned from Wen Jiabao. We have to state clearly today: Ideology is once again taking precedence over the interests of the economy in China.

You are referring to Li Qiang, who will probably take over as Prime Minister in March. What do we need to know about him?

He has had a usual Party career, with stations in economically strong provinces, most recently as Party Secretary of Shanghai. At the beginning, he was very pro-business there. The big break came in spring, with the omicron covid outbreak in Shanghai. Li then implemented Xi Jinping’s instructions ruthlessly and forced the metropolis into a lockdown lasting several weeks. Loyalty to the President has now elevated him to a top post in the Politburo.

In spring, there were voices saying that the lockdown fiasco in Shanghai could end Li Qiang’s career.

This episode has not harmed him; on the contrary, it has earned him the President’s favour. A fundamental change has taken place in the Party: People no longer get into top positions on the basis of meritocratic qualities, but through their loyalty to the President. The entire new Politburo is filled with men who have shown high loyalty to the President. This, of course, makes Xi’s job easier: He now has a toolbox he can handle well, and he no longer has to deal with internal Party dissenters. At the same time, the echo chamber around him is getting even denser than it already was before. That is a big problem.

Li Keqiang or Wang Yang, people with a more pro-business and pro-reform background, have left the Politburo. Has this faction been cast out?

The reformers have been totally cut off. They are veterans, they have certainly dissented with the President from time to time, but in the end, they simply belonged to the wrong circle. Even more disappointing, in my view, is that Vice Premier Hu Chunhua has also been cast out. I think very highly of him, he has done a lot of good for the investment climate for foreign companies. He is only 59, but now he didn’t even get into the Politburo, which would have been normal after two terms as Vice Premier.

What do you read into this?

It shows me that the opening up of the Chinese economy is not going to continue. We are now dealing with a situation where, in the next five months, the entire economic policy elite, which includes highly respected figures like Liu He, will step down in one fell swoop. This is dangerous, especially at a time when the Chinese economy is already crippled.

Is there anyone left in the Politburo who can be said to have a pro-business background and is not primarily a loyalist to the President?

No. The Party leader has presented his programme, you really have to pay close attention to his words now. Xi means what he says and he does what he says. We have to get away from the idea that China’s policy is still basically tailored to economic growth. In his speech to the Party Congress, the President mentioned Karl Marx fifteen times. The word «market» appeared only three times.

So ideology clearly takes precedence over the market?

Yes. Many observers have thought until today that although the Party calls itself Communist, it is basically pursuing a form of Manchester Capitalism. That is over.

What does that mean for the future of the world’s second largest economy?

We have been used to economic growth, reform and opening up for almost forty years. China was the world’s economic engine. Now the country is taking a completely new path.

Here and there you can already read about a «Return to Mao». Do you share this view?

No, I wouldn’t say that. The Mao era was characterised by instability and uncertainty for years. Xi Jinping abhors instability and uncertainty. But we have to assume that China is setting itself apart from other countries and will build a counter-model to the liberal, market-oriented model of the West. We also have to come to terms with the idea that Xi was not elected for five more years, but de facto for another ten or fifteen years.

But you would say that the growth model that has driven China over the last three to four decades is dead?

Yes. That was brought home to us symbolically with the forced departure of ex-president Hu Jintao.

How did you interpret this moment when Hu Jintao was led out of the Great Hall of the People on Saturday?

For me, it was the symbolic end of the old era. This also means that the old model, which was based on consensus between the different Party factions, is dead. Now the President has set his direction and he no longer tolerates dissent. The removal of Hu is symbolic of the fact that Xi has done away with the old politics and that de facto only he is in charge now. No senior Party official budged, no one supported Hu Jintao. Everyone sat there with a petrified expression. This was not a case of ill health on Hu’s part. I guess you have to get used to the fact that everything will become much more autocratic in China.

Only 40 years have passed since the Party under Deng Xiaoping decided, after the experience with Mao, to no longer allow a personality cult. Why has it come to this now anyway?

40 years is long enough to erode the memories of many people. But what is very important is that Xi always says what he thinks. He has always done that, but for a long time it was not noticed in the Western world. The collapse of the Soviet Union had a fundamental impact on him, and he described the three Russian traumas early in his term in office: First, Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin was the original sin for him. Xi would never do such a thing with Mao, and he did so consistently. The old formula of «70% good, 30% bad» set up by Deng with regard to Mao was never heard of again under Xi. Secondly, Perestroika and Glasnost were, in Xi’s view, the catastrophe that led to the failure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The third Russian trauma for Xi were the oligarchs who became filthy rich under Boris Yeltsin and became a countervailing power to the state. That scenario was out of the question for Xi, which he consistently demonstrated, especially with Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba. Xi is extremely consistent, you have to admire that, and at the same time he is also driven by history. He has studied the fall of the Soviet Union, and he has drawn the conclusion that this will not happen under his rule in China. On the contrary, he wants to show that communism will become a counter-model to capitalism.

What does this mean for China’s relationship with the rest of the world?

China’s foreign policy will become even more assertive and confrontational. Xi used the word «struggle» seventeen times in his speech to the Party Congress, twelve times in an international context, mostly directed at the USA. China wants to be unassailable and more self-sufficient, it wants to fight for future markets and technologies. In this context, the term struggle also has an absolute claim: There are only winners and losers. Rhetoric and propaganda are used to rally the people behind the Party. The Party leadership shows a similar self-confidence as Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. Just as imperial Germany rubbed up against England back then, China is rubbing up against America today. One could say that Xi Jinping is a man in a hurry: He wants to go down in the history books as the statesman who reestablished China as a great power.

A few weeks ago, the Biden Administration significantly tightened sanctions in the field of high-end semiconductor technology. Was that a shock for Beijing?

Yes, that was the mother of all sanctions imposed on China so far. It is a hard blow to the Chinese attempt to become a high-tech country. China is being cut off from top-end technologies in semiconductors and will not be able to close that gap for the foreseeable future. This is hitting them hard. The Chinese have perceived the American action as an escalation; in my view, the rift between the US and China can hardly be mended anymore.

So far, China has not taken any countermeasures. Why?

This sanctions battle is about David and Goliath, with China for once being the David vis-à-vis the US. What should they do? If they punish American companies in China, it will cost jobs in China. The most likely thing Beijing will try is to impose restrictions on rare earths. At the same time, they know that Washington can always go one step further with their sanctions. In the past, China has tried to deepen its economic ties with Europe to cushion the sanctions from the US. But the hardening of foreign policy rhetoric makes a rapprochement with Europe almost impossible, especially since China’s position in the Ukraine war does not go down well at all in European public opinion.

How is the war in Ukraine being handled in public discussion in China today, eight months since it broke out?

You can already feel that Russia is now being praised less and NATO is being insulted less. The proposed NATO accession of Sweden and Finland has impressed many people here in China. It is also becoming clear that they have completely misjudged Russia. Seeing how Putin is on the losing side and how his big army fails to win against the technologically highly equipped, motivated Ukrainians is a kind of realism shock for China. China and Russia are not allies from a strategic point of view. The only thing that unites them is their anti-Americanism.

Regarding the zero-tolerance policy on covid, there was some hope that China’s leadership would find its way to a more pragmatic approach to the pandemic after the Party Congress. What do you think of that?

That is wishful thinking. It's completely unrealistic to think that China can abandon the zero-tolerance policy. The elderly are not vaccinated enough for that. It would take a huge vaccination campaign, with a different mix of vaccines, but that has not been done so far. The Party Secretary from Shanghai has made a career out of his tough lockdown policy: that tells you everything. But of course it is a disastrous policy, which is also increasingly met with incomprehension among the population. People are starting to get nervous about whether this is going to continue for the next years. You can’t really travel around the country. When I travel from Beijing to Tianjin, I have to go into quarantine for seven days after my return. If my colleague wants to go from Chengdu to Chongqing, which is two hours by train, he has to quarantine for two days in Chongqing and then again for two days in Chengdu. This is a disaster for the service sector, where we see an increasing number of unemployed.

Under these circumstances, it is probably impossible for the economy to get going again, right?

The economy is guaranteed to remain depressed. The industrial sector is relatively well positioned, there we know the principle of «closed loops», people live partly in the factory. But the service sector has a big problem, and that weighs on people’s sentiment. China used to be a one-way street of happiness and rising prosperity, but that’s over now. People are holding back their consumption spending because they don’t know where the journey is going. This is also evident in the property market, which has plummeted by 25 to 30% in some cases and which accounts for almost 30% of China’s gross national product. The government can’t fix that so easily by building some new highways and opera houses. A lot really would need to be done, especially in the area of insurance systems, so that people feel secure in case of unemployment or illness. At the moment, China lives primarily from its export boom; exports to Europe create 16 million jobs here. Some segments that are also doing quite well thanks to state subsidies, for example the automotive sector. But consumer sentiment is bad. In his Sunday speech, the President did not once mention the word consumption as a stimulus tool for the economy. Not once.

How's the unemployment situation?

The officially reported figures are problematic because they only include urban areas. 50% of the population is not counted at all. Some economists here believe that unemployment among young people aged between 16 and 24 is around 30%. Nobody can really prove it. The young generation has an incredibly hard time entering the workforce. If you can’t find a job, you’re being sidelined, and next year another 10 to 11 million young people are coming out of colleges. The idea that so many young people, especially young men, don’t have a job worries me. In the medium term, that can become a problem.
looks like XJP struck/purged the political factions that kept Jack Ma type of traders going.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

Thanks, Ramana for posting this illuminating interview by a very long term China-watcher. It tallies with what we have discussed here in the last few days.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ricky_v »

XJP has certainly made things more interesting in an international dimension, will the middle kingdom enter a semi-hermit mode, who can say truly, but the question must be asked:
what is xi's long-term goal? will his successor be wedded to his polity? by all accounts he kept his mildly serene looks plastered on his face for the majority of his junior career, though he was a princeling, it was his apparent vagueness that propelled him to stardom. Fast forward so many years, and we now have a court of Jingping, the Xi emperor reborn? how did it come to pass that 2 factions that were beginning to solidify their hold on the top echelons for decades to come perhaps are now utterly decimated? by any quirk of fate, Xilai, Zhengcai, or any of the others who quietened seeing the mood would have had the reigns and china would be so very different, did he always have a plan, or did he wing it?

The question must also be asked: what were the expectations of the people who appointed XJP as the heir-in-waiting all those years ago, so utterly fascinating; just before covid times, XJP had released many initiatives aimed at the common folk, the majority who make the middle-class of the nation, were they cynical as usual or was there some element of sincerity at the time? his future policies would tell.

Any government that works towards the common denominator and tries to maintain pride and societal wellbeing and structure, upholds its end of the societal contract basically, on the broadest scale possible is a-ok in my books, if he has his "na khaunga, na khaane dunga" policy, why begrudge the common people of a focussed government? what if after all the stories of stasi and witch-hunting, there was actually corruption in china, and xjp was simply trying his best to bring justice, and it is the jack mas of the world who deemed themselves powerful enough to openly "mock" the establishment who are wrong?

The loudest bemoaners have so far been the usual suspects, globalists, dissidents, the wider lugenpresse, by pattern recognition itself, xjp has done something right (inb4 causation!= correlation) for his people.
Mayhaps the reason the western watchers got it so wrong on their predictions was that they morphed their societal outlook onto a society without fully grasping its dynamic multi-faceted nuances, something they are wont to do for "other" countries as well such as india, and end up surprised when reality asserts against wishful thinking.

Usual articles have been dregs, as was to be expected, the real analyses will come from nimble thinkers, but only after recalibration
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

From SCMP
The Chinese envoy also dismissed media speculation over why Hu was unexpectedly escorted out of the Great Hall of the People during the closing ceremony of the 20th party congress on Saturday.

“The media reports have been completely skewed. [Hu] is an aged man. He had to step outside for a break. That was all there was to it,” Xing said, according to the Korea JoongAng Daily.
Did he come back after the bio break?
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

ricky_v,

I do not for a moment believe that the anti-corruption drives (by Wang Qishan & Zhao Leji) were purely political witch-hunts just in order to consolidate XJP's hold on power and nip any opposition.

Corruption in China had been a very huge problem during all Imperial Dynasties and it continues. Therefore, not all arrests are politically motivated.

The other question that is usually asked - and you have hinted too - is why should the Chinese masses take all the hardship without even demurring.

There is one common answer to both the above, i.e. corruption and suffering, in my opinion. It is that XJP has cleverly welded the the two-stage 'China Dream' (moderately prosperous xiaokang; and, 'prosperous & strong' fuqiang) with a dozen things. He did this in c. 2013 as soon as he assumed power. This was a Confucian pyramid of nation, society and individual. He demanded that these should be followed so that he could deliver the promise. And, he has been systematically emphasizing these ever since.

At the national level, the objectives were prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony. At the societal level, the objectives were freedom, equality, justice, and rule of law. And, at an individual level, these were patriotism, professionalism, integrity, and friendship.

On the external front, he identified the complete integration of Hong Kong and the burial of the 'One Country, Two System' anachronism, subsuming Taiwan within Mainland without waiting indefinitely, and confronting the biggest threat, the US. He has been constantly reminding his subjects that these are difficult paths but they need to be traversed in order to achieve the Chinese Dream. He has achieved the first one, is unable to make much progress in the second one, and has made some progress in the third. So, it is the Taiwan issue that is the laggard and which needs to be attended to asap.

In the last ten years, the Chinese have really seen their standard of living improve, so many millions being lifted out of poverty etc. They have also been highlighted the fading of the West, especially the US and the superiority of the Chinese system of governance to those of the West. The social-engineering on a wide scale has worked. So, people at large have faith in XJP to a large extent. Besides, the Hans are used for thousands of years to a strong single central leader.

The objectives that I have highlighted above appeal to the people and allow the XJP administration to explain away harsh measures and actions as essential for achieving the China Dream. The masses seem to have largely bought into this.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Looks like the big idea is catching on in the chatterati!!!

XJP rise could be beginning of the end of China
...
So much for China achieving greatness and dethroning America. Under current circumstances, it actually faces decline.
Whiton is right that XJP could be the last Emperor but his reasoning is incorrect.
In the 19th Congress XJP made CPC the State.
In 20th Congress he made himself the CPC.

So he introduced fragility into the PRC ruling structure.
Any loss of face would hurt the image of the CPC dynasty.
So now the success of China is linked to the success of XJP.

I have more thoughts on the remaking of the 20th Congress power circle and zero-covid lockdowns but for later.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ricky_v »

SSridhar sir,
Indeed, the most common complaint of the watchers is that of autocracy, they never mention any fidelity to the masses, which should be the first concern. Does a leader have fidelity to the masses, or to the political system, increasingly, it has become very difficult in certain countries to combine both; in a sense, XJP is following his rajasya dharma with a nimble enough political setup to mould as to best cater to the wider populace.

In Wang Huning's America vs America, he remarked on the decadence of the political system, but curiously remarked that communism is not ideal, but in the place and time that we are in, it is the most suited tool to deliver on the ambitions of the masses; it can always morph into a different beast once the needs modify; the banshees screeching about autocracy have taken the worship of democracy to heart, so we have one camp that says that the needs of the people come first and then the methodology to deliver on those needs comes after, while the other camp says the exact opposite, as globalism increases, this dichotomy across all democracies will also increase.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ricky_v »

Meet the new members of the 20th politburo:
Image
1) Ding Xuexiang - in PSC, chief-of-staff of XJP, possible first vice-premier

2) XJP - no intros necessary

3) Ma Xingrui - CPC secretary of Xinjiang, prior to that Shenzen, and deputy and mayor of Guangdong, Aerospace engineer, regarded as one of the main scientists

4) Wang Yi - foreign minister since 2012, state councillor (immediately below vice-premiers who are 4 in number) since 2018, winner of the most coveted, Hilale pakistan

5) Wang Huning - PSC

6) Yin Li - CPC secretary of Fujian, health background

7) Shi Taifeng - head of United Front Work, former CPC sec Inner Mongolia, before Suzhou, junior: deputy sec, governor of Jiangsu

united front
is a department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which is officially tasked with "united front work". For this endeavor, it gathers intelligence on, manages relations with, and attempts to influence elite individuals and organizations inside and outside China, including in Hong Kong and Taiwan.[1][2] The UFWD focuses its work on people or entities that are outside the CCP, especially in overseas Chinese communities, who hold political, commercial, or academic influence, or who represent interest groups.[3][4] Through its efforts, the UFWD seeks to ensure that these individuals and groups are supportive of or useful to CCP interests and that potential critics remain divided.


8 ) Liu Guozhong - party sec Shaanxi, prior dep party sec Sichuan, before governor of Jillin and Shannxi, technocrat, background in artillery systems

9) Li Xi - PSC, sec of CCDI (central commission of discipline inspection), prior sec of Guangdong, deputy party sec Shangahi, governor Liaoning

10) Li Qiang - PSC, soon to be premier, prior party sec Shanghai, before Jiangsu, governor of Zhejiang

11) Li Ganjie - party sec Shandong, technocrat background in nuclear, before head of national nuke safety, deputy party sec Hebei, minister of environment

12) Li Shulei - head of publicity / propaganda department, background in academia, Wang Huning part 2

13) Li Hongzhong - party sec Tianjin, before party sec Shenzen, Hubei

14) He Weidong - general of PLA, vice chairman of CMC, commander of the eastern theater command
Image

15) He Lifeng - head of National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China, formerly state planning commission, economy admin and planning, called the mini-state council in itself, economist background, before, party sec of Tianjin (new areas)

16) Zhang Youxia - general PLA, 2nd vice-premier of the CMC, prior head mil equipment development

17) Zhang Guoqing - party sec Liaoning, before mayor of Tianjin, Chongqin, background in economics, served as head of a military contractor company

18) Chen Wenqing - sec Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Central Committee (CPLA) / zhongfawei, top security body in china, minister of state security, background in intelligence, MSS tasked with providing security to all obor acitivities in all countries
Soon after the MSS' selection for the program, Chen met with the heads of the intelligence services of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Spain, Germany and Turkey. Intelligence Online reported that Chen sought to strengthen MSS efforts in island nations that are crossed by the maritime component of the BRI, such as the Seychelles and the Maldives, in an effort to counter Indian influence, and deepen cooperation with the Turkish Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT), key to the MSS' efforts to identify Uyghur jihadists which remain a top concern of senior Chinese officials.[6]
MSS is the secret police of the CCP, chief promoted to politburo for first time in history

19) Chen Jining - party sec Shanghai, environmental engineer, prior mayor Beijing

20) Chen Min'er - party sec Chongqing, before party sec Guizhou, vice-governor Zhejiang

21) Zhao Leji - PSC, head of CCDI (anti-corruption) before, now head of NSC

22) Yuan Jiajun - party sec Zhejiang, aerospace engineer

23) Huang Kunming - party sec Guangdong, propaganda department

24) Cai Qi - PSC, replaces Wang Huning, prior party sec Beijing,
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ricky_v »

Also found interesting,
China has theoretically 9 political parties, though the CCP is the central one, and the 8 parties must accept the leading role of CCP, have no power but act as an advisory body, their co-ordination is managed by the united front workers association. Wonder why anyone would join any other party than the CCP then?
Barring the CCP, the others are more of a guild than a proper political party
NPC - annual rubber stamping session

1) CCP - big dog - head - XJP, NPC seat strength - 2091 / 2980

2) CZGP - China Zhi Gong Party, NPC seat strength - 38/ 2980
As part of the CCP's reorganisation of the minor aligned parties, the CZGP was designated as the party of returned overseas Chinese, their relatives, and noted figures and scholars who have overseas ties.
3) CPWDP - Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, NPC seat strength - 54/ 2980
most members work in fields of public health, medicine

4) CDL - China Democratic League - NPC seat strength - 57/ 2980
The League is mainly made up of senior intellectuals in the fields of culture, education, natural and social sciences, and technology. As of the end of 2012, the party had a membership of more than 282,000. Of this total, 22.8% were from the field of advanced education, 30.2% were from the field of compulsory education, 17.4% were in science and technology, and 5.8% were in art and the press
5) Jiusan Society - NPC seat strength - 63/ 2980
The party's main focus is scientific and educational development. The party had a membership of 183,710 members by 2019,[4] mostly high- and medium-level intellectuals in the fields of science, technology, and education.
6) CNDCA - China National Democratic Construction Association - NPC seat strength - 57/ 2980
Members are chiefly entrepreneurs from the building, manufacturing, construction, financial, or commercial industries in both private and state sectors, and others in the field of economics.
7) CAPD - China Association for Promoting Democracy - NPC seat strength - 58/ 2980
and mainly represents high-level intellectuals engaged in education and cultural publishing media.
8 ) TDSGL - Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League - NPC seat strength - 13/ 2980
The Taiwan Democratic Self Government League has a membership of 3,000 people, most of whom are prominent people from Taiwan or are of Taiwanese heritage but now reside on the mainland.
9) RCCK - Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang - NPC seat strength - 44/ 2980
Among the officially sanctioned political parties of the People's Republic of China, the Revolutionary Committee is seen as second in status to the CCP. Thus, the Revolutionary Committee is allotted the second highest number of seats in the People's Political Consultative Conference (30%). It also owns numerous assets, some formerly owned by the Kuomintang, throughout mainland China. The Revolutionary Committee operates a range of party-owned institutions, such as party schools.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

https://hongkongfp.com/2022/10/31/china ... evolution/

XJP goes to Yunan after the 20th Congress.
Basically invoking Mao Zedong.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Madame Sun Yat Sen was a honored member of PRC till her death.
RCCK - Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang - NPC seat strength - 44/ 2980
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

^ The COMINTERN (Communist International) that oversaw, from Moscow, the spread of communism worldwide struck a deal with Chiang Kai-shek. This caused heartburn among the hardcore Communists and when they protested, Moscow told them that Communist Revolution was a 2-stage process and the collaboration with CKS would prepare the first stage and prepare the masses to be receptive for a 'classless, stateless' society. This continued for six years until 1927 when CKS purged the Communists, arresting and hanging them. Mao himself was more into KMT than CCP early on. After 1949, when the Chinese Communists recalled to the Russian leaders the early proximity between COMINTERN and KMT even at the cost of the CPC, the Russian leaders are said to have sheepishly accepted that they probably went too far !
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

X-posting as its a Western response than Indian response:
NRao wrote:The Quad Shouldn’t Ignore India’s China Concerns
If the Quad is going to move forward, both as a strategic dialogue and perhaps more, it is time that all its members side unequivocally with India.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

BTW, both XJP and Li Keqiang both expressed condolences for the loss of life in the Morbi bridge collapse in Gujarat.
This could sign of a thaw.
By the same token Putin and Biden also expressed condolences.
Go figure.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Insightful article on the 20th Congress and aftermath by Marina Yue Zhang

https://theconversation.com/to-understa ... ory-193303
After he secured an unprecedented third term as the leader of both Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the country’s Central Military late last month, Xi Jinping led the seven-member Standing Committee of the Politburo on a visit to Yan’an. This is the CCP’s sacred revolutionary base from where the first-generation of CCP leaders, including his father, led the war against the Japan and then the civil war against the National Party. It is also where Xi lived and worked during the Cultural Revolution, under the campaign of “educating the youth up into the mountains and down into the villages”.

While the visit may not have seemed to be of significance, it conveyed important messages. First, Xi invoked the revolutionary spirit of Yan’an to underscore the “red gene” in the CCP which, he believes, is required to achieve China’s national rejuvenation.

Second, the visit sent a strong signal to China’s youth that they need to focus on “traditional virtues”, including being educated “up into the mountains and down into the villages”.
Many have interpreted this visit as a hallmark of China entering a “new era” in which the party will tighten its control over society and the economy under Xi’s unbridled power.

Making sense of the structural changes in political power being made in this “new era” is critical, given China’s position of economic and trade strength. To understand China’s often opaque politics, it is often instructive to focus on what seem to be relatively insignificant historical events, to gather clues from under seemingly calm surfaces.
....
The emergence of Xi

Xi came to power in 2012 after a steady, meritorious rise through the ranks of the CCP and his “education” in Yan’an. In contrast to Jiang and Hu, however, he carries the “red genes” of the CCP. Xi is the son of a Mao-era revolutionary, and heavily influenced by that. He is a strong adherent to orthodox Marxism and believes power belongs to the revolutionaries.

He immediately launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign: according to China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, since Xi took office, over 38 million petty offenders at lower levels “(flies)” and more than 22,000 senior officials in both the party and the military “(tigers)” have been punished.

Xi’s anti-corruption campaign was welcomed by the population at large. However, a consequence of this was that local governments have less power and autonomy. Fearful of making mistakes, many local party leaders and government officials chose to tang ping– lie flat – or di ji hong gai ji hei – be “red” (politically correct) on the surface but “black” underneath, deliberately undermining the party’s beliefs with vicious intentions.

While corrupt officials were punished, the campaign also hurt the vested interest groups – often very powerful ones – behind them. Since 2020, Xi has carefully selected his inner circle from loyalists around the country. Personal loyalty to Xi has been an essential requirement to get ahead. Power is now firmly back in Zhongnanhai and Xi is in absolute control. This is something not seen since Mao.

So the question is, if power concentrated at the local level led to corruption, what is going to happen now that power is concentrated at the top?

...
Xi’s grand mission is to achieve the rejuvenation of China in the global arena. While this mission may sound hollow to Westerners, a more powerful and assertive China is critical in legitimising the CCP’s rule domestically.

A powerful fight against a nation’s enemy – be it a foreign entity, a natural disaster or a pandemic – has always been a useful tool for a ruling party to unite its people and strengthen its legitimacy. China’s “wolf warrior” style of diplomacy under Xi is such a tool.

A rising China with a strongly different political ideology is challenging the current world order dominated by the United States. What are the implications for Australia in its relations with China?
As a “middle power” straddled between the US and China, Australia will face an even tougher political and economic balancing act between the two.

The memory of Australia being trapped in a diplomatic impasse and trading conflicts with China under the Morrison government has hardly faded. Though there were some initial moves towards rapprochement in the early days of the Albanese government, the revelation on the ABC’s Four Corners program that the Australian government has agreed to the US funding an upgrade of the Tindal air base in the Northern Territory to house six American B-52H strategical bombers by 2026, it is clear that Australia has chosen a side. This will make it very difficult for the country to be part of independent states trying to restore trust and collaboration between China and the US.

Australia should avoid being caught in the middle of any China-US conflict. Instead, it should choose to maintain self-reliance and pursue “strategic autonomy”, as Germany has chosen to do.

An unequivocal “strategic alignment” with Washington based on political convergence and shared values may not bring the long-term security Canberra has hoped for.
While Marina Yue Zhang does not say it its quite possible that US and China will makeup and the little fish will be thrown to the Wolf.

The way in which Biden administration has been dealing with China: Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. semiconductors, threats to cancel visas, and citizenship for those working there all point to their no fear of retaliation from China. This also means they don't need the little fish.
So her advise is timely.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Also, Mao Zedong retreated to Yunan just as Zhuge Liang advised Liu Bei to create a firm base in the mountain territory that led to the creation of the Shu Han kingdom.
Mao's retreat to Yunan or Long March eventually led to the creation of the PRC.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Actually, Marina Yue Zhang confirms Xi Jinping is an Emperor and not a seat warmer like the previous ones.
He is a true 'red'.
He wants to restore the legacy of the CPC dynasty/regime created by the revolutionaries. This crackdown on corruption is a cleanup of the provincials common in Chinese history.
Imagine a Chinese pagoda.
Its base is Chinese society.
It has three pillars of Confucius, Lao-Tze, and Han Fei
On this is a slab of Chinese Buddhism.
Over this is the cupola of Marxism with Sinic characteristics.*
This is the edifice that Xi Jinping is building.

* By the way even Deng Xiaopeng mentioned transforming Marxism with Sinic characteristics but this got interrupted by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ramana »

ricky_v wrote:blast from the past, with a handy table

SS and ricky_v,

The 20th Congress PSC members are from Forever Xi (XJP, Li Xi, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning) and New Internationalists (Li Qiang and Cao Qi).
This means the majority of the PSC are known leaders.
Ding Xuexiang is a new one.

Most likely will be the future leader.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by SSridhar »

ramana wrote: Ding Xuexiang is a new one.

Most likely will be the future leader.
Ramana, I posted here comparing how the 17th Congress was conducted and now.

From that post,
In the 20th Congress, the ages of members of PSC are:
Li Qiang, 63; Zhao Leji, 65; Wang Huning, 67; Cai Qi, 66; Ding Xuexiang, 60; Li Xi, 66

This means that except for Ding, the rest will retire by the 21st Congress. If Li Qiang becomes Premier now, then Ding Xuexiang is the likely successor for XJP, provided XJP relinquishes. Ding is also supposed to be a close confidante of XJP and their association goes back to XJP's Shanghai days. It is said that he attends all sensitive meetings along with XJP, unsurprising because he is his Chief of Staff or Cabinet Secretary or similar ranking.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Great.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by chetak »

Image
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ricky_v »

Kevin Rudd with an interesting take
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/return-red-china
In many respects, it was clear that “reform and opening” was on its way out at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, when Xi proclaimed “a new era” in which the party would rectify the ideological, political, and policy “imbalances” left over from his predecessors.
Most countries, including many in the West, are predisposed to think that when China’s leaders speak in ideological terms, it is not to be taken seriously (or that if it is, the ideology purely applies to the party’s domestic politics). But that is no longer the case. As I wrote in Foreign Affairs shortly before the party congress, “Under Xi, ideology drives policy more often than the other way around.”
He is a true believer in Marxism-Leninism; his rise represents the return to the world stage of Ideological Man. This Marxist-Nationalist ideological framework drives Beijing’s return to party control over politics and society with contracting space for private dissent and personal freedoms. It also drives Beijing’s born-again statist approach to economic management, and its increasingly assertive foreign and security policies aimed at changing the international status quo.
his vision calls for decoupling economic modernity from Western political and social norms and underlying cultural beliefs. It offers a new international order anchored in Chinese rather than U.S. geopolitical power. And it involves creating a set of institutions and norms that are compatible with China’s own interests and values rather than with those of the West. It is a Manichaean worldview, pitting China’s blend of Confucian and Marxist-Leninist values against the liberal democracy and liberal internationalism of the West and some (but not all) of the rest of the world.
Mao’s famous attack on “capitalist roaders,” for example, went along with the party’s overwhelming nationalization campaigns and its opposition to small-scale private enterprises. Jiang Zemin’s ideological writings on the “three represents”—which included a need to harness the Chinese economy’s “productive forces”—was a clear signal to party leaders to bring private entrepreneurs into the party’s ranks (which they then did).
In the report that came out of the 14th Party Congress in 1992, when Deng still ruled, the term “economy” was used 195 times. In this year’s report, the economy is cited on only 60 occasions. Deng’s mantra of “reform and opening” was mentioned 54 times in 1992; at the 20th Party Congress, the phrase was invoked on only nine occasions. In 1992, the term “national security” appeared once, and it was used just four times in 2012. But at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi’s first as leader, the term had 18 appearances. This year, it is mentioned 27 times. Meanwhile, the Chinese term for powerful state, qiangguo, appears 23 times this year, compared with 19 in 2017 and only two in 2002. Overall, these changes indicate that the party is now focused on Chinese nationalism and national security.
the most important bit
The term “Marxism” also makes multiple appearances in the 2022 report, and it is surrounded by other language suggesting that Xi is girding for conflict. The Marxist-Leninist concept of “struggle”—striving through violent or nonviolent means to resolve what Marxist-Leninists deem to be “contradictions” in domestic and international society, is mentioned 22 times. By ideological definition, the concept authorizes Xi to engage in various forms of confrontation to advance his revolutionary cause.
And Xi used the report to ingrain his earlier statements about the need for a “total security” agenda to ensure that the country has ideological security, political security, economic security, and strategic security. Indeed, it calls for the “securitization” of virtually every aspect of society. He also directed the party to apply this concept of total security across all of the party’s internal processes
he party constitutionally entrenched Xi as “the core leader of the Central Committee” and declared “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” to be “the new Marxism of the 21st century.”
Xi’s Marxist economic turn is underscored in his work report’s emphasis on the need for “common prosperity” and in its directive for China to find ways of “regulating the mechanisms of wealth accumulation.”
The work report states that party members are now required to “grasp both the worldview and the methodology of Marxism-Leninism” and apply the “analytical tools of dialectical and historical materialism” to understand “the great challenges of the time.” In reinforcing once again this traditional Marxist ontological and epistemological framework for understanding and responding to the world, Xi has also called on the party to “develop a new form of human civilization.”
he question for all is whether his plans will prevail or generate their own political antibodies, both at home and abroad, that begin to actively resist Xi’s vision for China and the world. But then again, as a practicing Marxist dialectician, Xi Jinping is probably already anticipating that response—and preparing whatever countermeasures may then be warranted.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ricky_v »

A beginning of a framework to understand new China after the 20th congress:

Aim: Formation of a state / empire based on Marxism-Leninism as guiding principles.

Ideology working: through violent or non-violent STRUGGLE AGAINST CONTRADICTIONS: domestic and international

Supporting methodology: Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era

Requirement of adherents: well-versed on Marxism-Leninism + Xi Jingping thought

Requirement of commoners: stiff-spine, belief in acche din on the horizon, wealth distribution, no egregious concentration / capture of wealth by elites

Notice to adversaries: preparation of a long struggle against the resolution of contradictions, vasudaiave kutambhakam cannot co-exist with such ideology, the ideology is paramount

Scope of ideology: TBA

As an aside, India should utilise both, its Daeva and Rakshash niti (both are its heritage) to combat such and all other inimical forces, it is not possible to withstand a war of attrition with such measured focus by utilising only one side of the coin.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ricky_v »

https://asiasociety.org/policy-institut ... ange-china
In other words, within Xi Jinping’s ideological worldview, as I have argued for some time now, politics continues to move to the Leninist left; the economy to the Marxist left; and Chinese foreign and security policy to a much more assertive nationalist right.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Anujan »

Aim: Formation of a state / empire based on Marxism-Leninism as guiding principles.
That is a path to the goal. The goal is

"CCP should hold power in perpetuity"

It is very key to understand this concept. In countries like India, most people do not question the democratic system, neither is there any fear or urgency that the democratic system should prevail. People contest within the democratic system to gain power.

In a monarchy (not the modern monarchy, the old ones), dictatorship or one party rule -- the primary fear is that the system will die. That is, the monarchy would die. This is what drives Saudi hostility to Iran (Iran's revolution overthrew the monarchy), North Korea's hostility to the west (the family will get wiped out), pretty much every dynasty's fears "our dynasty will get replaced by another dynasty" and China's fears -- CCP will get overthrown.

Take the simple matter of a country's army. In India they take an oath
I do swear in name of God that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by the law established
The army serves the constitution. Not the ruling party. In China, the army serves the party, not the country, they declare an oath to serve the Communist party of China. Not China. You see this in most non-democratic countries -- some "revolutionary guard" that serves the ruling dispensation, Not the country. Why is this the case? If the Army serves the country, and not the CCP, they can overthrow the CCP in the interests of the country. In democratic countries, if the army overthrows the government, they have committed treason against the constitution.

Communist regimes (dictatorship, monarchy etc) are primarily about protecting themselves from getting overthrown, influenced or corrupted.

Take for example rich people. Once rich businessmen get very powerful, they will try to influence, corrupt, overthrow or otherwise control politics. How do you prevent that? Jiang Zemin realized this, and tried to make CCP "representative" through his "three represents" policy -- CCP will "Represent the rich people, represent the aspiration of china's population, represent china's tradition and culture". He liked the "Representative" part but not "democracy" part in "representative democracy". In short "democracy with Chinese characteristics within the CCP framework". If CCP weren't representative, they would pick up fights with powerful people inside China and ultimately not serve all the stake holders.

Xi is different: If you analyze this primary fear "CCP will get overthrown", who can overthrow the CCP?

1. The rich and powerful who can form a cabal and introduce a new system -- which means arrest the rich, break up factions, and ensure that people cannot become too rich or too powerful. If you are Jack Ma and give a speech about how banks should be reformed, you disappear.

2. The people who get fed up by some misstep of CCP -- build a surveillance based society, brainwash people on "ideology", suppress dissent. If you protest zero covid policy, you disappear. In India (an even on BRF) if you criticize a government's policy, you are not criticizing the country, you are criticizing the ruling party. So critique all you want! In twitter, blogs, news shows etc. In China if you protest zero covid, you are protesting the CCP and not China. You are not committing treason, why should you be penalized? Well, the schizophrenic CCP will disappear you for criticizing the CCP.

3. The countries outside China -- Build a strong military, defeat US and Taiwan.

This is exactly what Xi is doing. He is moving from Jiang Zemin's "CCP will be representative, and that is how CCP will hold its power" to "CCP will vanquish all its threats -- from rich people, from general population, from countries outside China". The vanquishing threats needs a "struggle", everything else -- economy, sane policies, relationship with west, peace etc are all secondary to this "struggle".


The Aims of the CCP should be seen through the lens of preserving and strengthening the CCP, not through the lens of preserving and strengthening the country. The former is the everlasting goal. The latter is one of the things they'd like to achieve. Like Saudi Arabia. Their primary objective is to ensure the survival of the monarchy. Their secondary objective is a strong and prosperous Saudi Arabia. The second objective is useful, only in as much as it contributes to the first objective. If it goes against the first objective, they will not pursue the second objective.

This also explains the US China relationship. US thinks
The Chinese are so pragmatic! They want to develop their country. We should help them develop, get some mutual benefit through trade. In time the society will open up and they will become democratic!
From Massa's point of view they are not hostile towards China. They want to help China prosper, they think this help will be rewarded with market access and and friendship. Like Japan or Germany.

CCP hears
In time the society will open up and they will become democratic!
And correctly interprets it as
We want to destroy the CCP!
If Market access or good relationship comes at the benefit of country's prosperity, but weakening the CCP, they will never take the deal.

Remember the old saying
Most countries have an army. In Pakistan, the army has a country.
In China's context
Most countries have political parties. In China, the political party has a country.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

The last part Hegel said long ago "In China, the State has a Nation"

Philospohy of History, Georg Hegel

Our JNU teachers promote Hegel but haven't read him.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

So in that sense Pak and China have commnalities. But that is where it ends.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Atmavik »

In Pak the army has the nation and can cook up a party as needed. In cheen the party has a nation and army
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Anujan »

ramana wrote:So in that sense Pak and China have commnalities. But that is where it ends.
This is for another thread. Politicians do not have inviolable principles. Only Mullah and Marx do. Both these countries want to create an ideological state, for different reasons. One chose mullah and the other chose marx.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Now that XJP has consolidated his power what do we think he will do with the power?
I would like folks who have studied XJP to come up with four or five scenarios.
From benign to belligerent.
Use this format that I wrote in another thread.

posting.php?mode=edit&f=3&p=2099443

On suggested template:


Unlikely Event


Background


Events and Triggers


Pathways to Unlikely Outcome

Indicators to Watch For

Factors to Encourage Positive Outcome


Probability of this Event High Medium Low

SS, Ricky-V, and Chetak Please each come out with a scenario.
I will also do so, which gives us four.
As SS is the most qualified China expert he gets two!
Say three weeks?
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

ramana, I will work on 'Political' scenario and if time permits on either 'Climate' or 'Military'.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ricky_v »

ramana sir, i cannot see this post, what scenarios are we looking at?
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

The 20th Congress is past and resulted in XJP consolidation of power. Yes, he has some minor pinpricks here and there.
Now that he has the power what will he do with that power?
A guide will be his long speech in 2017 in the 19th Congress.
So we should try to identify four to five different paths that he can take from here.
Sort of identifying them like a decision tree.

Take your time as it is a good couple of months exercise.

I asked you as you have been following China news for sometime.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Is anybody following XJP-Biden bonhomie in the G-20 meeting at Bali?
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Cyrano »

Saw the clip. The body language was funny. Biden smiling and at ease, Xi stiff as a board and grumpy, torso away from Biden.

Others may say Biden eager to please and Xi the aloof emperor condescendingly shaking hands.

One outcome is Blinken is going to China soon.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Vayutuvan »

Cyrano wrote:Saw the clip.
I saw a clip of Biden presser after the 3.5 hour meeting with Xi. Quite possibly Russia is going to be sacrificed by Xi and Biden will pump up Paxis at the cost of India. Essentially trying to make China the Asian hegemon.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by NRao »

Biden/Xi know each other personally. So, do not read too much into the body language.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SRajesh »

Vayutuvan wrote:
Cyrano wrote:Saw the clip.
Quite possibly Russia is going to be sacrificed by Xi and Biden will pump up Paxis at the cost of India. Essentially trying to make China the Asian hegemon.
Slowly things falling into place isn't it
All that noise about QUAD and Taiwan
SSN/SSBN to Oz
pumping millions into Paxatan
rapping India's knuckles
All BIF.s activated for a 2024 to try and change regime
Get rid of twitter and FB(or at least try and make it irrelevant)
who knows Taiwan's days maybe numbered???
on the other side EAM and The Duo
and an unpredictable Putinwa
interesting times ahead
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

SSridhar
Have you come across any website that has a compilation of China News and opeds on a weekly basis?
Something like a China News Digest?
Looks like VIF has Daily Scan on China

https://t.co/QraNqhCWbq



Am thinking articles from SCMP, Economist etc.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by NRao »

Rsatchi wrote:
Vayutuvan wrote: Quite possibly Russia is going to be sacrificed by Xi and Biden will pump up Paxis at the cost of India. Essentially trying to make China the Asian hegemon.
Slowly things falling into place isn't it
All that noise about QUAD and Taiwan
SSN/SSBN to Oz
pumping millions into Paxatan
rapping India's knuckles
All BIF.s activated for a 2024 to try and change regime
Get rid of twitter and FB(or at least try and make it irrelevant)
who knows Taiwan's days maybe numbered???
on the other side EAM and The Duo
and an unpredictable Putinwa
interesting times ahead
That is the old Obama G-2 idea that China had then rejected. I doubt that it will work, especially now that the EU is gutted. In fact, there are scenarios in which EU nations join China.

The US military will oppose that tooth and nail.

So too the neocons who want a two front war, right now.
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