Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

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ramana
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Today brings news of another non-weapons combat flareup near Tawang.
It shows XJP is not interested in a peaceful LAC. He still probes to find a weak spot.
The weather is not conducive to operations yet the flareup happened.
Most likely a signal, but for what?
I think they had to signal urgently for something.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by NRao »

^^^^^

There is only one signal that Xi can send to India: Xi/PLA is the sole power in the region and India should heel.

And, after a very successful 3-day visit to Saudi Arabia, where there were a number of other nations, why would he not send a message to India? Xi is on a roll and I bet he feels he is unstoppable. IF SA agrees to oil-for-Yuan then Xi will get far more aggressive.

I am betting it will get worse. India will be spending more and more on items they never planned on and not making progress in containing Xi.

Unless India is able to totally deter - read completely prevent Xi - from using the PLA, it will be a losing battle for India. A victory for India would mean Xi forgets the LAC for 30 years.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Cyrano »

NRao ji,
Please see the video of JD posted in the other China thread. Even if half of it is true (actually my own beliefs over the years concur with nearly all of it) China can at best become a nuisance for today's rising India. They try anything more and the resulting loss of face will topple Xi and fissure CCP.

CCP will feel compelled to try and contain/muzzle India now (in vain), because in 5 years something like that cant even be contemplated and they will have to live with it for ever.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by yensoy »

ramana wrote:Today brings news of another non-weapons combat flareup near Tawang.
It shows XJP is not interested in a peaceful LAC. He still probes to find a weak spot.
This tactic predates Xi, and is how the PLA does its job. Better we learn to play their game (looks like we already have) and outwit them with their own so-called rules. Now whether Xi wanted to telegraph something... not entirely sure why he has decided to go rogue against every other civilization. We may be giving him too much credit; his zero-covid has famously unravelled, maybe the rest of the house of cards will come crashing down too.
NRao wrote:^^^^^
There is only one signal that Xi can send to India: Xi/PLA is the sole power in the region and India should heel.
And, after a very successful 3-day visit to Saudi Arabia, where there were a number of other nations, why would he not send a message to India? Xi is on a roll and I bet he feels he is unstoppable. IF SA agrees to oil-for-Yuan then Xi will get far more aggressive.
Again I think we are overestimating this fellow. SA or you or I can purchase oil in renminbi, that is a unit of currency and basically irrelevant apart from tying the price of oil to said currency. But will we store our wealth in renminbi? If we were to store our excess funds in renminbi, what can we do with it? Can we convert it at will to any other currency so we can take a vacation in Fiji or send the kid to study at EPFL? Renminbi has too many restrictions. Since China is a net exporter to almost every country, there is no easy way to "generate" renminbi - which is probably why the Chinese want the Saudis to export in renminbi so they can "prime the pump" and spend the renminbi worldwide and circulate the money. Saudis are not going to stockpile renminbi, I will bet on that.

Xi is getting unmasked. He is a weak guy today and taking down his country with him.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Anujan »

https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-lea ... _lead_pos7
The Chinese government is shifting back to growth mode, as a rapid deterioration in economic conditions prompts alarmed officials to turn more of their focus to development after years of criticizing cadres who gave priority to growth at the expense of social stability and fiscal prudence.

He Lifeng, who was added to the Communist Party’s top policy-making body, the Politburo, at a party conclave in October, is drafting a growth plan of more than 5% for next year, according to people familiar with the matter.

In an internal meeting shortly after the Communist Party congress, Mr. He, as head of the National Development and Reform Commission, China’s top economic-planning body, called for policies to ease Covid controls, boost the real-estate sector and re-instill confidence among entrepreneurs, the people said.
I am wondering if this whole "Ideology before economic growth" thing is like Zia being pious just to stay in power, or if emperor eleven really believes it. Or did he use it as a convenient excuse to get rid of competition to his absolute power?

Now that he has eliminated all challenges, is he going back on zero covid and business as usual?
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

China cranks up propaganda defending Xi Jinping as Covid cases explode
With Covid-19 running rampant after President Xi Jinping’s government swiftly abandoned its zero-tolerance policy, the Communist Party is still insisting its strategy will “stand the test of history.”
China made fun of everyone else in the last two years after gifting the world generously with its Wuhan Corona virus, going to the obnoxious extent of comparing pyres of dead Covid patients in India with the flame of its LM-5B rocket. Even then, we had seen photos of Covid patients on pavements in Hong Kong streets or chaotic hospitals or HK morgues overflowing or bodies being kept in containers etc. We know nothing about what exactly happened within Mainland China. Like the horrors of the Great Leap & Cultural Revolution, they will come out one day. Since more civilized societies like India do not stoop to the level of the barbaric Chinese, we shall not thrive on schadenfreude.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by sanjaykumar »

Yes I well remember that odious and gratuitous comparison.

I hope I never fall so much that I celebrate schadenfreude, but I will not be commiserating too fully in the coming horror.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Atmavik »

From looking at the Covid situation in Beijing zero covid has been abandoned, will have to see how other cities will cope
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

India must not let in Chinese visitors without PCR test taken within 48 hours before boarding a flight, they have to quarantine themselves for 5 days at their cost in an Indian quarantine facility upon arrival, in any case. In fact, I urge MEA to suspend all Chinese visas & flights until further notice. Let's protect ourselves.

We shouldn't be caught napping a second time around.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by IndraD »

ramana wrote:Today brings news of another non-weapons combat flareup near Tawang.
It shows XJP is not interested in a peaceful LAC. He still probes to find a weak spot.
The weather is not conducive to operations yet the flareup happened.
Most likely a signal, but for what?
I think they had to signal urgently for something.
is Taiwan off the table now?
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Pratyush »

Taiwan was not on the table. The PRC lacks the capacity to successfully invade.

15 years of build up and you never know.

Even now Taiwan is not open to declaring independence.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

SS, A good paper in Pacific Focus journal from Wiley

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/ful ... pafo.12006

'Contemplating Chinese Foreign Policy: Approaches to the Use of Historical Analysis†
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Kun-Chin Lin'
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

IndraD wrote:
ramana wrote:Today brings news of another non-weapons combat flareup near Tawang.
It shows XJP is not interested in a peaceful LAC. He still probes to find a weak spot.
The weather is not conducive to operations yet the flareup happened.
Most likely a signal, but for what?
I think they had to signal urgently for something.
is Taiwan off the table now?

I answered this question three months ago to the date!!!

viewtopic.php?p=2564318#p2564318

Yes way before the 20th Congress.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

ramana wrote:SS, A good paper in Pacific Focus journal from Wiley
Thanks, ramana. Really excellent piece of work by several authors. Going through it.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

I can put this in the other thread but for continuity, this is the right thread.

https://twitter.com/JohnF_Sullivan/stat ... qxuCARWz8A

Chinese concept of Wu Wei which is similar to Asana of Chanakya
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

2015 article on Debating on the direction of the Chinese Grand Strategy

https://theasiadialogue.com/2015/05/04/ ... -strategy/

Written by Lukas K. Danner.

In the past couple of years a heated debate on what China’s grand strategy is, or should be, has flared up among academics and policy analysts. With the so-called rise of China, and with an allegedly rising assertiveness on China’s part since 2008, its grand strategy has come into focus even more. The question on everyone’s mind is whether China actually has a cohesive grand strategy, and whether incoherence could be a sign of China being in the process of changing to another grand strategic course.

Grand strategy refers to a country’s general foreign and security policy and determines how a country projects itself on the world stage. Isolationism would is an example of a grand strategy which is extremely inward-looking, while imperialism is an example of outward facing grand strategy. Grand strategies the privilege of the most important powers in the international system to which China certainly belongs.

The Chinese government has emphasized a grand strategy focusing on “Peaceful Development”, a vision set out in two white papers in 2005 and 2011, previously articulated as “Peaceful Rise“.

“Peaceful Development” was not a completely novel idea and strategists like Zheng Bijian have heavily borrowed from Deng Xiaoping’s twenty-four-character foreign policy doctrine of which the most prominently remembered phrase remains “conceal one’s capacities and bide one’s time, keep a low profile”. The key internationally relevant goals of this grand strategy are defending Chinese territorial integrity, reunifying China, and resolving territorial disputes. Of lesser importance are following a policy of anti-hegemonism, maintaining an international environment favorable to economic growth in China and avoiding creating the perception that China is a threat to international security. Ultimately the goal is to rise to great power status.

With the onset of the Global Financial Crisis 2008 and after, Chinese decision-makers seem to have somewhat changed their perception of China’s capabilities relative to a seemingly declining U.S. China feels less compelled to conceal its capacities and bide its time, and is convinced that China’s time has come. This is what inspired the debate on China’s rising assertiveness which in turn also influenced the present debate on the nature and course of its grand strategy.

There are several different viewpoints about China’s grand strategy represented by different factions. First, some scholars believe that China either has no grand strategy and is still in search of one, or is merely acting pragmatically. Second, there is an argument that China does have a grand strategy but it is a contradictory one. Third, some observers have argued that it is not in China’s culture to have one coherent grand strategy but rather to seek a middle way. And fourth, China may be shifting from “Peaceful Development” to another grand strategy.

The first group of scholars think of China as either having no grand strategy or that its grand strategy is to be pragmatic. These scholars are grouped together since to “be pragmatic” implies ad hoc adjustments and a lack of consistency, which means there is no “grand strategy.” Many policy scholars believe that China is a pragmatic power practicing realpolitik. Opposed to this would be most theoretical scholars who argue that every great power has a grand strategy—no matter if it is concealed or proclaimed, and no matter if it is contradictory or cohesive. Eric Hyer with his recent published book The Pragmatic Dragon (2015) would be a representative of this group.

The second group believes that China does have a grand strategy but that it is contradictory. Barry Buzan recently published “The Logic and Contradictions of ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ as China’s Grand Strategy,” and Denny Roy equally aligned himself with this strand of the debate in “China’s Grand Strategy Not Absent, Just Contradictory.” The contradictions that they see are, for example, China claiming to engage in foreign relations promoting international peace yet showing no hesitance in utilizing hard power capabilities in territorial disputes, while continuously increasing its military budget.

The third strand of the debate emphasizes the distinctiveness of Chinese culture. While Western powers may have one single grand strategy, China has developed very differently in its long history and thus its worldview is not the same. Qin Yaqing may be said to be the spearhead of this group explaining such an argument in his recent “Continuity through Change: Background Knowledge and China’s International Strategy.” Qin’s approach highlights the cultural importance of China being inclined to using the “middle way” between two strategies, always having a grand strategy in flux.

Yan Xuetong’s “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement” is an example for the fourth strand, arguing that China should change, is in the process of changing, or has already changed its grand strategy from “Peaceful Development” to something else. In Yan’s case that is “Striving for Achievement,” a more active international strategy. Wang Jianwei and Chen Dingding call for a lighter version of this calling it “Selective Leadership,” i.e., a grand strategic approach that is not quite as active as that suggested by Yan.

Whether we are witnessing a dramatic shift in China’s grand strategy remains to be seen. Recent developments like the foundation of the AIIB and the “One Road, One Belt” strategy, as well as rising assertiveness in territorial disputes since the late 2000’s may or may not be a sign that China is slowly becoming a more outward-looking and more active stakeholder in international politics.

Lukas K. Danner is a PhD student in Politics and IR at Florida International University. He is a CPI Blog emerging scholar. Image Credit: CC by Ronald Sarayudej/Flickr
Basically, XJP speech at the 2017 Ninteenth Congress laid out the Chinese Grand Strategy. Its described in the first few pages.

A good study by this young scholar.

How come the select China studies groups in India don't even produce such informative short articles but produce pages of bokwas at IDSA?

Most directors of Indian China watch groups should introspect on what's wrong with their approach.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Faction Politics in China and its Implications for the 20th Party Congress
By – Omkar Bhole

Most countries in the world have a political system where like-minded people from similar groups or parties run the country. However, such a system is largely open and transparent in democratic countries. In the case of China, this system, referred to as factionalism, is too opaque and thus, leaves much room for speculation."
Basically Deng Xiaoping created the CPC Party System just like Nehruji created Congress Party System described by Rajini Kothari.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by RaviB »

There are heavy rumours on the Chinese internet that Ding Xuexiang has resigned from the politburo or committed suicide or most likely has died from Covid. Ding is a close aide of Xi, number 6 in the politburo and was being considered as a potential successor to Xi, so this is big if true.

Also Zhao Lijian the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry is MIA for the last one month, possibly in ICU.

Link in Chinese https://news.creaders.net/china/2023/01/06/2564682.html
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by venkat_kv »

RaviB wrote:There are heavy rumours on the Chinese internet that Ding Xuexiang has resigned from the politburo or committed suicide or most likely has died from Covid. Ding is a close aide of Xi, number 6 in the politburo and was being considered as a potential successor to Xi, so this is big if true.

Also Zhao Lijian the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry is MIA for the last one month, possibly in ICU.

Link in Chinese https://news.creaders.net/china/2023/01/06/2564682.html
Ravi B Saar,
Googling Zhao Lijian gives me a result that he has been moved from his wolf warrior diplomatic position to Department of Boundary and Ocean affairs. I did find some online chatter of Zhao lijian being in ICU during the covid cases in china. But can't confirm or disprove that with this new news with China great fire wall on information.

no news on Ding Xuexiang as of now with google. Remember seeing similar news about Xi not stepping out for more than a year and rumors of palace coup and house arrest went for a while. Could this also be the same where they have whisked away the probable/potential future ruler to a safe place?

You might be able to gleam any info about Ding based on your reading of Chinese social media to get more info? thanks in advance.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Ravi B, There isnt much further news of D2X and yes Zhao Linjian was re-assigned sometime back.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by RaviB »

Venkat saar and Ramana garu: I was too quick regarding Zhao Lijian and I suppose should have waited before sharing rumors. The situation with him is that apparently his wife posted about the lack of medicines which embarrassed him, he was unable to respond to questions regarding the A4 protests, China wants to cut down on wolf warrior diplomacy and/or Qin Gang didn't want him. He has basically been demoted through his shift.

China is very opaque so there is never any proper information to go on, hence sharing rumors. Even in case of covid, People's Daily had an editorial about the wisdom of zero covid and the importance of struggle one day and then an editorial about the wisdom of changing policies in the face of changing conditions 4 days later.

Regarding Ding, the rumors were wrong because it was reported that he attended a public meeting along with Xi yesterday.
https://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews ... e54b6.html

My apologies for sharing rumors.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Thanks. However, the fact that such a rumor about D2X emerged is itself significant.
There is still leadership turmoil in the CPC.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

I wonder how long did it take the Habsburgs to realize the magnitude of Turkish defeat at Vienna.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Taiwan and Japanese news reports say Wang Huning (PSC member and councilor since Deng Xiaopeng) is tasked by XJP to look at the Taiwan issue.

And Western commentators debunk this citing various reasons.
However, if it is true, then it means XJP has made a decision wrt Taiwan.
It's the how that is being sought.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900-1795 (Warfare and History)
Peter Lorge

This comprehensive survey of Chinese military history is the only book in English to span the significant years from 900 – 1795. Peter Lorge questions current theories on China’s relationship to war, and argues that war was the most important tool used by the Chinese in building and maintaining their empire. Emphasizing the relationship between the military and politics, chapters are organised around specific military events and, Lorge argues, the strength of territorial claims and political impact of each dynasty were determined by their military capacity. Ideal as a course adoption text for Asian military studies, this is also valuable for students of Chinese studies, military studies and Chinese history.
Critical book as even Mao Zedong used war to expand and consolidate China in the Civil War, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. They would have rolled into Nepal and the five fingers but were constrained by the PLA's capability. They still tried with regard to Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by yensoy »

China is pumping $3T, yes 3 trillion dollars which is around our GDP on "infrastructure spending" to boost their economy. This is a huge amount of money to be spent in a year; especially in a country which already has reasonably good infra. Instead of social spending (better schools & hospitals, paying teachers, professors, doctors and nurses higher salaries, more welfare and state sponsored childcare,...) they are using the only tool they know which is to splurge on state sponsored employment generation schemes. The marginal debt to GDP raio (how much additional debt for every dollar of additional GDP) is through the roof and not showing any signs of moderation.

This can't end well.

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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Also shows how bad the Chinese economy sank since 2020.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

We should map the old Confucian order to the new CPC order and see how they leapfrogged and how that creates problems now.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Cyrano »

Make a bigger bubble to gobble up the one about to burst !

Chinese continue to have high savings rates, for their old age or only child because there is never a predictably stable future under the CCP regime. Consumption led growth remains weak/moderate. Govt tried to get them to consume more but they preferred to invest mostly in real estate - hard asset. That created a bubble with Tofu Dreg projects and Evergrand type bankruptcies. Covid killed consumption and scared people will only save not spend.

$3T infra spend for what? Replace high speed trains with maglevs? Pave streets with gold? Or reduce a good part of USD reserves before the $ begins to slide ? LoL !
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Cyrano »



How many more such scam companies are there in China ? :roll:
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by NRao »

China is moving/acting .....

From the CPC web site:

US Hegemony and Its Perils

Feb 20, 2023
Introduction

Since becoming the world's most powerful country after the two world wars and the Cold War, the United States has acted more boldly to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, pursue, maintain and abuse hegemony, advance subversion and infiltration, and willfully wage wars, bringing harm to the international community.

The United States has developed a hegemonic playbook to stage "color revolutions," instigate regional disputes, and even directly launch wars under the guise of promoting democracy, freedom and human rights. Clinging to the Cold War mentality, the United States has ramped up bloc politics and stoked conflict and confrontation. It has overstretched the concept of national security, abused export controls and forced unilateral sanctions upon others. It has taken a selective approach to international law and rules, utilizing or discarding them as it sees fit, and has sought to impose rules that serve its own interests in the name of upholding a "rules-based international order."

This report, by presenting the relevant facts, seeks to expose the U.S. abuse of hegemony in the political, military, economic, financial, technological and cultural fields, and to draw greater international attention to the perils of the U.S. practices to world peace and stability and the well-being of all peoples.
I. Political Hegemony—Throwing Its Weight Around

II. Military Hegemony—Wanton Use of Force 

III. Economic Hegemony—Looting and Exploitation

IV. Technological Hegemony—Monopoly and Suppression

V. Cultural Hegemony—Spreading False Narratives
Conclusion

While a just cause wins its champion wide support, an unjust one condemns its pursuer to be an outcast. The hegemonic, domineering, and bullying practices of using strength to intimidate the weak, taking from others by force and subterfuge, and playing zero-sum games are exerting grave harm. The historical trends of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit are unstoppable. The United States has been overriding truth with its power and trampling justice to serve self-interest. These unilateral, egoistic and regressive hegemonic practices have drawn growing, intense criticism and opposition from the international community.

Countries need to respect each other and treat each other as equals. Big countries should behave in a manner befitting their status and take the lead in pursuing a new model of state-to-state relations featuring dialogue and partnership, not confrontation or alliance. China opposes all forms of hegemonism and power politics, and rejects interference in other countries' internal affairs. The United States must conduct serious soul-searching. It must critically examine what it has done, let go of its arrogance and prejudice, and quit its hegemonic, domineering and bullying practices.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

The missing Chinese banker was setting up a family fund in Singapore.

https://www.ft.com/content/d5f8a388-dcd ... f74a057d40

XJP system got to him.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

Many Chinese & Hong Kongers have setup family business units in Singapore. Don’t know why it created a problem for this guy. Singaporeans are suffering because of these very HNIs.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

China Position Paper presented on Ukraine

https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/ ... 30713.html

At the outset, it reads like a pro-Russia stance but it's China looking out for itself.


China is finally realizing that it is not the island chains that are shackling it but integration with Asia and Europe.
China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis
2023-02-24 09:00
1. Respecting the sovereignty of all countries. Universally recognized international law, including the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, must be strictly observed. The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community. All parties should jointly uphold the basic norms governing international relations and defend international fairness and justice. Equal and uniform application of international law should be promoted, while double standards must be rejected. 

2. Abandoning the Cold War mentality. The security of a country should not be pursued at the expense of others. The security of a region should not be achieved by strengthening or expanding military blocs. The legitimate security interests and concerns of all countries must be taken seriously and addressed properly. There is no simple solution to a complex issue. All parties should, following the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security and bearing in mind the long-term peace and stability of the world, help forge a balanced, effective and sustainable European security architecture. All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent.

3. Ceasing hostilities. Conflict and war benefit no one. All parties must stay rational and exercise restraint, avoid fanning the flames and aggravating tensions, and prevent the crisis from deteriorating further or even spiraling out of control. All parties should support Russia and Ukraine in working in the same direction and resuming direct dialogue as quickly as possible, so as to gradually deescalate the situation and ultimately reach a comprehensive ceasefire. 

4. Resuming peace talks. Dialogue and negotiation are the only viable solution to the Ukraine crisis. All efforts conducive to the peaceful settlement of the crisis must be encouraged and supported. The international community should stay committed to the right approach of promoting talks for peace, help parties to the conflict open the door to a political settlement as soon as possible, and create conditions and platforms for the resumption of negotiation. China will continue to play a constructive role in this regard. 

5. Resolving the humanitarian crisis. All measures conducive to easing the humanitarian crisis must be encouraged and supported. Humanitarian operations should follow the principles of neutrality and impartiality, and humanitarian issues should not be politicized. The safety of civilians must be effectively protected, and humanitarian corridors should be set up for the evacuation of civilians from conflict zones. Efforts are needed to increase humanitarian assistance to relevant areas, improve humanitarian conditions, and provide rapid, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access, with a view to preventing a humanitarian crisis on a larger scale. The UN should be supported in playing a coordinating role in channeling humanitarian aid to conflict zones.

6. Protecting civilians and prisoners of war (POWs). Parties to the conflict should strictly abide by international humanitarian law, avoid attacking civilians or civilian facilities, protect women, children and other victims of the conflict, and respect the basic rights of POWs. China supports the exchange of POWs between Russia and Ukraine, and calls on all parties to create more favorable conditions for this purpose.

7. Keeping nuclear power plants safe. China opposes armed attacks against nuclear power plants or other peaceful nuclear facilities, and calls on all parties to comply with international law including the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) and resolutely avoid man-made nuclear accidents. China supports the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in playing a constructive role in promoting the safety and security of peaceful nuclear facilities.

8. Reducing strategic risks. Nuclear weapons must not be used and nuclear wars must not be fought. The threat or use of nuclear weapons should be opposed. Nuclear proliferation must be prevented and nuclear crisis avoided. China opposes the research, development and use of chemical and biological weapons by any country under any circumstances.

9. Facilitating grain exports. All parties need to implement the Black Sea Grain Initiative signed by Russia, Türkiye, Ukraine and the UN fully and effectively in a balanced manner, and support the UN in playing an important role in this regard. The cooperation initiative on global food security proposed by China provides a feasible solution to the global food crisis.

10. Stopping unilateral sanctions. Unilateral sanctions and maximum pressure cannot solve the issue; they only create new problems. China opposes unilateral sanctions unauthorized by the UN Security Council. Relevant countries should stop abusing unilateral sanctions and “long-arm jurisdiction” against other countries, so as to do their share in deescalating the Ukraine crisis and create conditions for developing countries to grow their economies and better the lives of their people.

11. Keeping industrial and supply chains stable. All parties should earnestly maintain the existing world economic system and oppose using the world economy as a tool or weapon for political purposes. Joint efforts are needed to mitigate the spillovers of the crisis and prevent it from disrupting international cooperation in energy, finance, food trade and transportation and undermining the global economic recovery.

12. Promoting post-conflict reconstruction. The international community needs to take measures to support post-conflict reconstruction in conflict zones. China stands ready to provide assistance and play a constructive role in this endeavor.
Anujan
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Anujan »

Probably window dressing before they supply lethal aid to Russia

They want to appear as a responsible power, but will most probably prolong the war, by supplying aid to Russia.

It is a win-win for them. If Russia wins, it becomes more cojoined with China. If the war prolongs, they are trying to run out NATO's weapons supplies, so it will take time to replenish them and they can attack taiwan in the meanwhile.

Biggest strategic mistake by the west was pointless wars with Iraq and Afghanistan. It was clear in 2001 during Hainan Island incident that China was a threat. It took 20 years to act.
ricky_v
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ricky_v »

https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/who-is- ... -minister/
Gen. Li Shangfu, with deep ties to China’s military space enterprises, is widely expected to become China’s next minister of defense.

The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2022 China Military Report described Li Shangfu as the general officer who offers “technical expertise on military modernization and space issues” to Xi Jinping’s newly selected seven-person Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest military decision-making authority of the Chinese party-state.
Moreover, Li was the inaugural deputy commander and chief of staff of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), an innovative organization created on December 31, 2015 – at the start of Xi’s signature military reform – to facilitate organizational changes the PLA needed to become a modern fighting force. In that capacity, Li likely played a key role in realigning China’s space and missile research, development, and acquisition (RD&A) processes and standards.
Finally, Li is unique in his experience in both space operations and acquisition. He served for almost 31 years at the PLA’s Xichang Satellite Launch Center from 1982-2013 – including serving as its commander from 2003-2013. Li was directly involved in China’s successful launch of its first anti-satellite missile test in 2007 and presided over the successful launch of China’s first lunar probe in the same year.
ricky_v
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ricky_v »

https://archive.is/8Ppsf
Tang Renjian, China’s minister of agriculture and rural affairs, accounted that, every day, China’s 1.4 billion people consume a staggering 700,000 tons of grain, 98,000 tons of edible oil, 1.92 million tons of vegetables, and 230,000 tons of meat.
interesting numbers, do we have a comparable number for india or pakistan?
This year is no exception, as the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council jointly released the highly anticipated No. 1 document for 2023 on Feb. 13. The document, which carries enormous weight, sets forth two critical priorities: safeguarding national food security and protecting farmland. While previous No.1 documents touched on these issues between 2004 and 2012, it was not until 2013, when Xi Jinping assumed leadership, that the annual No. 1 document established a consistent and resolute focus on food security and farmland preservation.
Xi’s steadfast prioritization of food security is not misplaced, as China’s political system remains vulnerable to food insecurity. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, collective grievances aggravated by disruptions in the food supply and lockdown-induced food shortages sparked a wave of protests in more than a dozen cities, with demonstrators demanding, “We want food, not COVID tests.”
as an aside
https://www.cfr.org/article/china-incre ... ts-problem
Despite its domestic production, China has been a net importer [DOC] of agricultural products since 2004. Today, it imports more of these products—including soybeans, corn, wheat, rice, and dairy products—than any other country. Between 2000 and 2020, the country’s food self-sufficiency ratio decreased from 93.6 percent to 65.8 percent.
s. The most recent land use survey showed that China’s total arable land decreased from 334 million acres in 2013 to 316 million acres in 2019, a loss of more than 5 percent in just six years. Shockingly, more than one-third of China’s remaining arable land (660 million mu, a traditional unit of land measurement in China and equal to roughly 109 million acres, slightly larger than Montana) suffers from problems of degradation, acidification, and salinization.
Yet, however necessary it might be, Xi’s prioritization of food security and farmland protection does not and cannot come for free. Implementing restrictive farmland protection policies will inevitably reduce local governments’ fiscal capacity because revenue from land-use-right sales constitutes the majority of local government revenue—as it has done since fiscal reforms in the 1990s left regular tax income flowing toward the central government, not local authorities. In 2022, local governments’ land-related income fell for the first time in six years, primarily due to declined revenue from land-use-right sales.
According to China’s Ministry of Finance, local government revenue from land-use-right sales fell from a record high of 8.7 trillion yuan in 2021 to 6.68 trillion yuan in 2022, a reduction of 23.3 percent. Given that revenue from land-use-right sales remained as high as 51.29 percent of local government revenue, any further decrease in this revenue source will worsen their fiscal capability to finance public expenditures, including funding the development of high-quality farmland urged by Xi.

Stripped of financial resources, local governments are more incentivized to boost land sales and increase revenue than to abandon selling farmland, especially when the immediate priority is to jump-start an economic rebound. To this end, in November 2022, the People’s Bank of China and China’s Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission jointly issued a set of 16 measures to revive the country’s distressed property market and help developers secure financing. This policy change suggests the party-state is once again betting on the property market’s recovery to restore growth.
local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). LGFVs allow local governments to raise off-balance-sheet debt through bond issuance to fund long-term infrastructure investment without increasing their on-the-book leverage ratio. A report by Haitong Securities, a Shanghai-based securities brokerage firm, showed that in 2022 more than 80 percent of the 100 largest land-purchasing companies were state-owned enterprises.
The share of LGFVs’ land purchases in local government land sale revenue increased to nearly 20 percent in 2022, up from 14.5 percent in 2021, suggesting that LGFVs likely have provided a false revenue source and exacerbated local governments’ off-balance-sheet debt problem. Similarly, The Wall Street Journal reported cases in Zhengzhou, Shenyang, and Suzhou where half to three-quarters of land sold by the city governments were bought by local government-controlled companies, many of which were set up just days or weeks after the announcement of the land auctions. In essence, local authorities are borrowing illicitly to fund their own revenue, mortgaging their financial and pastoral future in order to stay afloat.
According to Land Matrix, a European land-monitoring organization, Chinese companies have gained control of 6.48 million hectares (16 million acres) in foreign territories, which is nearly the size of Ireland. This number dwarfs the combined 1.56 million hectares controlled by British companies, the 860,000 hectares held by U.S. companies, and the 420,000 hectares owned by Japanese companies. Chinese investment in U.S. farmland has already triggered concerns in Washington, even though China currently only holds less than 1 percent of foreign-owned U.S. farmland. Republican lawmakers have already drafted a bill to ban Chinese purchases of American farmland, while in states like Texas measures are even more advanced. China not only owns farmland in the United States but also in U.S. allies’ territory, such as the United Kingdom, France, and Australia.

If China’s economic recovery and its continued growth are fueled by land sales and its property market, Xi’s prioritization of food security means Chinese entities will have to embark on more aggressive overseas land purchases.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

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China’s Qin Gang seeks to cool Indian tensions at G20 amid intensifying US stand-off - SCMP
Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang will attend a G20 gathering in New Delhi on Thursday, in his first official visit to India as Beijing seeks to mend ties with its Himalayan neighbour.

The Chinese foreign ministry on Tuesday confirmed the visit, which according to observers will be a test for Beijing’s balancing act between the US-led West and Russia in the midst of the protracted Ukraine war.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and soaring tensions between China and the United States are expected to dominate the Delhi meeting, which will also be attended by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and senior diplomats from 40 countries.

Foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning urged the multilateral gathering to focus on global economic recovery and international economic cooperation.

“China stands ready to work with all parties to ensure that the G20 foreign ministers meeting will send a positive signal on multilateralism, food and energy security and development cooperation,” she said in Beijing on Tuesday.

Qin’s visit will come after Beijing painted a grim picture of the country’s external challenges on Tuesday at the end of a meeting of the Communist Party’s elite Central Committee, which China’s new diplomatic head also attended.

Without referring to strained US-China ties, an official readout said the country “must be prepared to withstand the great test of high winds and even rough seas” as China entered “a period of strategic opportunities and risks and challenges”.


While Qin – China’s former ambassador to the US who was promoted to foreign minister two months ago – was expected to have a one-on-one with his Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar, it was not clear if he would have separate meetings with Blinken or Lavrov.

According to Wang Dehua, head of the Institute for South and Central Asia Studies at the Shanghai Municipal Centre for International Studies, Qin’s visit to Delhi could help ease bilateral tensions over the prolonged border stand-off between China and India.

“It is an important move for bilateral ties and although it’s impossible to see a breakthrough in their border disputes any time soon, it will at least help repair their damaged ties and stabilise the situation near the disputed areas,” he said.

Chinese and Indian officials held talks in Beijing last week on their military stand-off, which began after a fatal clash on their disputed Himalayan border in the Galwan Valley in the Ladakh region in June 2020.

It was the first face-to-face talks since July 2019 for the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on China-India Border Affairs, led by Hong Liang, the chief of the foreign ministry’s boundary and oceanic affairs department, and his Indian counterpart Shilpak Ambule.

Like numerous other diplomatic and military talks over the past three years, the two sides exchanged views in “an open and constructive manner”, with New Delhi insisting that disengagement of border troops should come before restoration of normalcy in bilateral ties.

The 31-month border stand-off has taken a heavy toll on bilateral ties. When Qin’s predecessor Wang Yi made a surprise visit to New Delhi in March last year, the first since the 2020 clash, he failed to secure a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Although President Xi Jinping and Modi exchanged pleasantries at the G20 summit in Bali in November, the two leaders have not held a bilateral meeting since the border dispute erupted in May 2020.

And while both Beijing and New Delhi remain ambivalent about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s repeated efforts to capitalise on India’s divergence from the US over the war have so far failed to stem the deterioration in bilateral ties.

Both China and India abstained last week from a United Nations General Assembly vote demanding that Russia immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Ukraine.

At a G20 gathering of financial chiefs in Bangalore last week, China helped Russia block a joint communique condemning Moscow’s aggression.

According to Wang Dehua, Modi’s government appears to partly share Beijing’s concerns and also wants to avoid having the Ukraine crisis dominate the G20 gatherings this year, which could give Beijing an opportunity to seek common ground with Delhi.

Citing various Indian officials, Reuters also reported last week that although Western countries wanted to use the G20 to rally support for further sanctions against Russia, Delhi was reluctant to play along because of the negative global impact of existing sanctions.

But Wang also cautioned that with the border dispute remaining the top challenge for bilateral ties, it would be difficult to expect to see rapid improvement in those relations.

“While Beijing still sees Delhi as a swing country in the US-China rivalry, Delhi is actively trying to forge partnerships with various countries, including the US, the UK, Japan, and other Western powers [to counterbalance China],” he said.

Apart from the border disputes, bilateral ties were also marred by India’s joint military exercise with the US near the disputed China-India border, and its participation in the US-led Quad, a security alliance with Australia and Japan targeting China.

While the US and the European Union mull a ban on TikTok over national security concerns, India has issued a sweeping ban on the popular social media app, in addition to bans on dozens of other Chinese apps imposed soon after the deadly border clash in 2020.

Meanwhile, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi looked set to skip this week’s G20 meeting due to a scheduling conflict over a parliamentary session he was required to attend, according to Kyodo. Japan will host the Group of Seven summit in Hiroshima in May.

It remained unclear, however, if Hayashi would attend a gathering of foreign ministers of the Quad nations on Friday.
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