Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

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Vayutuvan
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Vayutuvan »

NRao wrote: The US military will oppose that tooth and nail.
So too the neocons who want a two front war, right now.
NRao garu, so everybody is after wartime profits? Is that your reading?
Pratyush
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Pratyush »

NRao wrote:
That is the old Obama G-2 idea that China had then rejected. I doubt that it will work, especially now that the EU is gutted. In fact, there are scenarios in which EU nations join China.

The US military will oppose that tooth and nail.

So too the neocons who want a two front war, right now.

When has the US ever given up on a bad idea.

A quote attributed to Churchill in it's different forms is provided below.
(1) Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing…after they have exhausted all other possibilities.

(2) The Americans can always be trusted to do the right thing, once all other possibilities have been exhausted.

(3) You can always count on Americans to do the right thing – after they’ve tried everything else.

(4) The Americans will always do the right thing… after they’ve exhausted all the alternatives.
This may have been true once upon a time.

It's now certain that once they have exhausted all other options. They will double down on it.

G2 makes too much sense for both US and PRC in Asia.

Russia was goaded into a war in Ukraine during a time when it didn't represent any to anyone else.

India is a nation that because of it's very nature cannot be controlled by any external power.

Focus PRC against India. Offer accomodation to PRC with Taiwan. The energy and mineral resources of post collapse Russia and PRC should be happy.

India and PRC neutralize each other. US remains king of hill.

Remember that the US has a history of trying to use PRC against India, right from 71 to turning a blind eye to PRC proliferation of nuclear weapons to TSP.
SRajesh
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SRajesh »

Pratyushji
I am of an opinion (I am maybe sticking my neck out for Guillotine here) that the present dispensation in India have gamed all these (Doval EMJ and shadowy figures hidden behind)
I don't think a Bi-polar world will ever emerge
My personal feeling is that events will come to pass, and China and US (and their poodles) will clash
chetak
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by chetak »

Vayutuvan wrote:
NRao wrote: The US military will oppose that tooth and nail.
So too the neocons who want a two front war, right now.
NRao garu, so everybody is after wartime profits? Is that your reading?
what other kind is there....

many of these conglomerates have been in existence over the past two or three centuries

during the the WW, the britshits were paying royalty to a german company

the french supplied exocet missiles to argentina, as well as, the britshits during the falkland war

The 2011 war in Libya saw arms from one company in use by Gaddafi’s forces, the Libyan rebels and the UK and French military. The company was MBDA, a missile producing joint venture between BAE Systems, Airbus and Finmeccanica. (edited once to add this paragraph)
As early as 1896, the leading German arms firm Krupp Works had been earning royalties on each ton of armour plate produced by Harvey United Steel, an international cartel which, in 1902, counted directors from British, American, French and German firms on its board. The implications of this case study are more disturbing still – German troops were torn to shreds by shells with fuzes stamped ‘Krupp Patent Zünder’ throughout the First World War.

Vickers – the second best capitalised arms firm in the UK (according to 1913 statistics) – and Krupp traded in weapons from 1902. Vickers cut deals allowing them to use the Krupp blueprints for time and percussion shell fuzes (no. 80 and no. 82 to be precise) in 1902, and for fuze-related machinery in 1908. They were contractually obliged to pay patent royalties for 15 years for each contract and communicate any improvements in design and manufacture to Krupp. Payments of royalties were contracted beyond the actual patent expiry date in 1914.
Last edited by chetak on 17 Nov 2022 15:45, edited 1 time in total.
SSridhar
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

ramana wrote:SSridhar
Have you come across any website that has a compilation of China News and opeds on a weekly basis?
Something like a China News Digest?
ramana, Look here at our Chennai Center for China Studies (C3S) website. We publish a newsletter once a fortnight.

You may be aware of China Project.
ramana
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Folks stop posting speculations. This is a data-driven thread.
Thank you.
ramana
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

SS Thanks. Will look at them.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

https://twitter.com/WarOnTheRocks/statu ... OyoYg5wLXw


Link: Listen to XJP about Taiwan

Since we cant read Chinese its the next best thing to access reports by those who can.
LISTEN TO XI JINPING ABOUT TAIWAN
LYLE MORRIS
NOVEMBER 18, 2022
COMMENTARYXi Jinping


A Chinese invasion of Taiwan is not imminent. If we listen to the words of China’s leader, Xi Jinping, that is.

{XJP body language and interaction at G-20 in Bali validate this conclusion.}

Xi’s much-anticipated Party Congress work report, delivered last month at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, offered sinologists the most authoritative assessment of the Chinese Communist Party’s approach to a range of domestic and foreign policy issues, to include Taiwan. Like forensic evidence, each word of the speech should be dissected, scrutinized, and analyzed for clues — and possible changes — to China’s approach to Taiwan.

Such a fine-toothed comb approach is warranted. The Party Congress work report is vetted and approved by Xi himself, cognizant that his words will be examined closely by a domestic and global audience on edge for signs of policy shifts.

That is why what Xi said — and didn’t say — on Taiwan was noteworthy. In this latest document, Xi signaled more continuity than change over China’s overall approach to Taiwan. Most importantly, he did not signal a heightened sense of urgency to “solve” the Taiwan issue using military means. This should reassure a jittery global audience increasingly skeptical of Xi’s designs over Taiwan.

{ Yet XJP is a scholar and practitioner of ancient Chinese Classics. Sun Tzu was very clear about the guiding policy of deception and bide time. So the real conclusion should be Taiwan is safe at this time.}

That hasn’t stopped a chorus of predictions these days from senior U.S. government officials about an invasion “timeline.” It started with the now-infamous “Davidson window,” in which the former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Philip Davidson, suggested during testimony to Congress in March 2021 that the threat of military action against Taiwan may manifest “in the next six years.” Similar predictions followed from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, CIA Director Bill Burns and Deputy Director David Cohen, and Undersecretary of Defense Colin Kahl. The latest voice from inside the U.S. government expressing concern about Beijing’s designs on Taiwan came from Secretary of State Blinken, who said last month that China wants to seize Taiwan on a “much faster timeline.”

{Sadly US military sees every opportunity to ask for more funds. And the rest are just heightening the rhetoric to exert pressure. And also could be broken clock(which is right at least twice) and boy who cried wolf(who pretended to be guarding the flock) syndromes at work.}


Certainly, assessments from senior government officials should be taken seriously. These officials undoubtedly have access to intelligence and feel compelled to raise public concerns over Xi’s thinking regarding Taiwan. But absent access to classified materials, and the ability to read Xi’s mind, the voice we should be paying closest attention to is that of Xi himself. And the bottom line is if Xi wanted to change course or tone on Taiwan, he could have done so in his speech. But he didn’t. That should be cause for relief in the near term.
{Biden has had Foreign Policy experience since he was a US Senator in 1976. And know how to read the tea leaves(Western technique) and bones (Chinese Zhou dynasty technique). He has said XJP does not intend to invade Taiwan now, after his 3-hour meeting at Bali. Should trust his assessment.}


But the long-term military threat from China’s government will not disappear anytime soon. That is why the United States must continue to meaningfully support Taiwan’s defense capabilities, to include asymmetric capabilities that will materially affect outcomes on the battlefield, coupled with economic and diplomatic initiatives that ensure Taiwan’s participation in international fora, while at the same time assuring Beijing that the United States does not seek to move fundamentally away from its “One China” policy premised on “strategic ambiguity.” No easy task, to be sure.

Parsing The Taiwan Section of the Speech

Every work report features a section dedicated to Taiwan and cross-strait relations. This section merits the most scrutiny and should be compared to the Taiwan sections of prior work reports for changes in language and tone.

{This is the old Hong Kong China Watcher brigade technique. Useful in absence of real intentions.}


A review of this year’s section yields several core themes: most importantly, it highlighted Xi’s preference for “peaceful unification” (和平统一) on the basis of the “one country, two systems” model, and warned “secessionist forces” that Beijing would not renounce the use of force to safeguard China’s interests. This formula, which is repeated in the 19th work report, reaffirmed longstanding policy towards Taiwan.

The first sentence, for example, repeats almost verbatim what was written previously:

Solving the Taiwan question and realizing the complete reunification of the Motherland is the unswerving historical task of the Party, the common aspiration of all Chinese sons and daughters, and an inevitable requirement for realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

The latest report then devotes the bulk of the section to China’s need to pursue “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan.

Some highlights include:

The policies of peaceful reunification and One Country, Two Systems are the best way to realize reunification across the Taiwan Strait; this best serves the interests of Chinese people on both sides of the Strait and the entire Chinese nation.

We adhere to the one-China principle and the “1992 Consensus.” On this basis, we will advance extensive and in-depth consultations on cross-Strait relations and national reunification with people from all political parties and groups in Taiwan, and jointly promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the peace of the motherland.

We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.


This [warning] is directed solely at interference by outside forces and the few separatists seeking ‘Taiwan independence’ and their separatist activities; it is by no means targeted at our Taiwan compatriots.

Most noteworthy in these passages is the continuity of emphasis to solve the Taiwan issue using “peaceful” means — meaning not using military force to compel or otherwise persuade Taipei to unify with Mainland China. Had Xi intended to signal a shift from this goal, he would have done so with tougher language, warnings, or the removal of the term “peaceful” from the above phrases.

To be sure, Xi reiterated that China would not renounce the use of force — a warning repeated by every General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party since Mao Zedong. Thus, this phrase was not a surprise to China watchers who follow Party Congress work reports closely.

{ I think the preferred approach is peaceful unification under the "One Country-Two Systems" approach barring external support for declaring Taiwan Independence. The latter can happen only if US-Chian relations break down completely but even during MAo Zedong's time the US did not support Taiwan's Independence. So we can rule this as a remote 9 sigma event.}

A Warning to “External Forces”

Despite Xi’s assurances to pursue “peaceful unification,” other issues are clearly bothering him. Namely, U.S. policy towards Taiwan.

This year’s work report included the judgement that “interference by external forces” (外部势力干涉) in Taiwan affairs continue to pose “serious provocations” (严重挑衅) for the Chinese government. Xi used this phrase three different times in the report. In contrast, he did not use this term once in the 19th Party Congress work report.

Xi elevates the gravity of said “outside forces” by mentioning the issue early in the report — in the fifth paragraph, in fact — a clear signal that he believes that the United States and its allies and partners are exacerbating the Taiwan problem more than in the past. For Xi and other government strategists, the U.S. factor of aiding and supporting “independence forces” in Taiwan has increased, not decreased, greatly complicating any effort to coerce Taiwan back to the negotiating table. At the top of the list of actions that China regards as “outside interference” undoubtedly include U.S. arms sales and congressional delegation visits to Taiwan.

{I think that the pandemic and the economic sanctions during Trump Administration have unnerved China and not just XJP. As I said before even during Mao's hostile regime the US did not support Taiwan's Independence. So waht changed? I think its the aggressive Trump policy and fearing loss of post-Cold War dominance.}


Xi follows the assessment about external forces with equal parts triumphalism and deterrence, by saying:

We resolutely carried out major struggles against separatism and interference, demonstrating our strong determination and determination to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity and oppose “Taiwan independence”.

In other words, independence forces were thwarted once again by Xi and the People’s Liberation Army. Even here, though, Xi could have been more aggressive in his delivery. At the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, 2021, for example, Xi dropped this phrase to would-be foreign provocateurs and oppressors:

The Chinese people will never allow any foreign forces to bully, oppress, or enslave us. Anyone who dares try to do so will have their heads bashed bloody against the Great Wall of Steel forged by the flesh and blood of 1.4 billion Chinese people!

In the context of current cross-strait relations, how long Xi can forestall Taiwanese and foreign “forces,” and how much patience Xi has for the perceived independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party government in Taipei, remain key questions going forward.

History and Initiative are on China’s Side

Two phrases made appearances in this year’s Party Congress work report that were particularly noteworthy. First, Xi made two references of the need to grasp “strategic initiative/dominance” (主动权/主导权) over Taiwan.

The need to “seize the initiative” has a long history in China’s Communist Party political and military orthodoxy, made famous, of course, by Mao Zedong. But it’s inclusion in the report — and not in the last work report — merits further examination.

Two examples from the report include:

Adhere to the party’s overall strategy for resolving the Taiwan issue in the new era, firmly grasp the dominance and initiative in cross-strait relations, and unswervingly advance the great cause of national reunification.

Resolutely oppose “Taiwan independence” separatist acts, resolutely oppose interference by external forces, and firmly grasp the dominance and initiative of cross-strait relations.

It is noteworthy that this phrase is invoked entirely in the context of reunification with Taiwan. Likely, Xi conceives of this “grasping initiative” strategy in whole-of-government terms, to include military counter-measures in response actions by “external forces,” such as the missile tests near Taiwan after U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit in August, but also long-term political and economic measures to tempt Taiwan into political talks with Beijing in the future.

Finally, Xi concludes the Taiwan section of the speech with a metaphor:

The historical wheels of national reunification and national rejuvenation are rolling forward and will certainly be achieved.


This is a new twist to an oft-repeated phrase in Party work reports that historical trends are pushing the two sides closer together. While some may interpret a coercive undertone of “inevitability” in unifying Taiwan with China, it is nonetheless a softer pitch for cross-strait reproachment than previous formulations.

Continuity Prevails

Pessimists will dismiss Xi’s speech as nothing more than Communist propaganda whose jargon is meant to conceal more than reveal and provide diplomatic cover to bide time for when China has the military capability to “solve” the Taiwan question by force. To be fair, Xi’s words should be continually compared against facts on the ground. And the facts, no doubt, suggest a much more coercive and muscular military posture around Taiwan.

But it would be a mistake to not take seriously the words of Xi in a major speech crafted for both domestic and international audiences. For Xi and China, the 20th Party Congress work report represents the most authoritative assessment of China’s policy towards Taiwan. It also sets the tone for Taiwan policy in the next several years during Xi’s third term as General Secretary.

And nowhere in the 20th work report does Xi suggest a more belligerent, impatient, or coercive policy towards Taiwan. Nor does it suggest that Xi has a set a timeline for reunification. What it does suggest is that Xi cares more about signaling policy continuity highlighted by “peaceful unification” with Taiwan in the near term.

But the United States and other like-minded countries should not interpret this as a sign that time is on their side. For peace to prevail — and for the risks of military conflict with Taiwan to continue to outweigh the benefits for Xi — countries must continue to send unambiguous signals to Xi and his government that any military aggression to compel unification of Taiwan will be met with a forceful military, economic, and diplomatic response.

{It's the "chicken and egg" or "action-reaction" diplomacy. China sees the US's aggressive moves against China of which Taiwan's Independence is one move. XJP is saying till it moves to the next stage China won't use force.

One point to note is Taiwan is a continuation of the interrupted neo-Warring States period of the Chinese Republic from 1910 to 1948. The US is an ideological partner for KMT in declaring the Republic of China by Sun Yat Sen. And this is really an unfinished ideological conflict for over a century in China.}



Lyle J. Morris is a senior fellow for foreign policy and national security at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.
I would like to thank Lyle Morris for providing the Taiwan-related parts of XJP's speech.

Hope we find the full text in English.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

A Tweet from John F. Sullivan on ancient Chinese soldier's anxieties.

https://twitter.com/JohnF_Sullivan/stat ... 7494835201
ramana
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

We missed this USI Journal paper in September 2022
20th Congress CCP Possible Changes
20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party: Possible changes in Leadership
Author: Swayamsiddha Samal


Period: Jul - Sep 2022

The 20th Party Congress is one of the most significant events for China. The power is concentrated in the hands of a few on the top in any authoritarian system. In the case of China, President Xi Jinping (1) undoubtedly holds the most power. He currently has the three highest posts in the nation, namely, the President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). He has abolished the age criteria for the President, so we can be sure that he will come to power for the third time. He would likely not choose an heir in this or even in the next Party Congress. Xi will be the first President after Mao Zedong to be elected for the third time. However, confusion and chaos might arise in case of Xi’s sudden death.

Criteria for promotion of officials

Officials in the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and Politburo will retire, and new ones will take their place. The criteria for promoting leaders are Age, Associations or Networks and Job Expertise. The informal rule regarding the age that has existed since the 1990s is the “seven up, eight down” rule. This means that officials at the age of 67 can continue, whereas officials at 68 will retire. This norm has been enforced regularly, except for the secretary general.[1]

The second criterion, Associations or Networks, are the intersections between top-level officials and mid-level cadres in either educational institutes or when they held party positions together. These linkages significantly influence the chances of advancement for the officials. At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, most newly promoted Politburo members had previously worked or attended school with Xi. Xi’s faction was moulded by four important events in his career: Fujian, Zhejiang, Shanghai and Tsinghua University. He also gained a few faction members in northwest China through familial connections.[2] We can either expect full-blown Xi faction members in the PSC and the Politburo, or there might be some balancing by Xi as he might include leaders from other factions.

Finally, professional experience is still significant, even though age and network may be the most crucial factors for promotions. Technocrats hold importance, and Xi sees that as an asset and promotes them. Though they do not appear to be part of any clear political alliances, technocrats have developed their cohort among provincial and ministerial leaders. Since 2017, the percentage of technocrat local officials (party secretaries and governors) has increased more than twofold, from 35% to 74%. Over the past year, technocrats have also been elevated to lead ministries.[3] Technocrats with experience, plus if they fall into a category of Xi’s liking for a field, such as Aerospace, are likely to get promoted.

Possible changes and implications

Although the 19th Party Congress was not wholly Xi-dominated, his power has only increased since then, and he might wield more power in the 20th Party Congress. Two PSC leaders, Li Zhanshu (72) and Han Zheng (68), will retire according to the age criteria. Other officials should continue with a reshuffling in ministries. Li Keqiang (67) should be able to continue, and if he does, he will remain the Premier of China. We can expect a continuation of the tussle between Xi and Li on the economic front, with Li wanting to go forward with pro-market policies, whereas Xi wants to see a pro-state economy. Li has, however, announced that he will retire from the Premier position in 2023. He should continue as a member of the PSC even after retiring as Premier. Wang Yang and Wang Huning (2) (both aged 67) are the Chairmen of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the secretary of the CCP’s Secretariat, respectively. They should continue in the same positions as well. Wang Huning has worked with three Chinese leaders (Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping) and has played a significant role in forming their central ideologies. Zhao Leji (3) (65), who rose to prominence as the secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), is well below the age of 68 and should continue in the same post.

According to Victor Shih at Columbia University, Xi favourites Ding Xuexiang(4) (Director of the General Office of the CCP) and Li Qiang(5) (Party Secretary of Shanghai) should take the place of Li Zhanshu and Han Zheng.[4] According to Jane Cai at SCMP, other potential candidates for the PSC are Chen Min’er, Hu Chunhua, Chen Quanguo, Cai Qi,(6) Li Hongzhong, Li Xi,(7) and Huang Kunming (all from the Xi faction).[5] They all hold crucial portfolios as either party secretaries of provinces or municipalities or heads of essential party organs.

However, some analysts suspect Xi Jinping might change the age criterion from “seven up, eight down” to “six up, seven down”. He might do this so that all leaders who are not part of the Xi faction will have to step down (Li Keqiang, Wang Yang and Wang Huning). Xi can then usher in leaders only from his faction. Wang Yang and Wang Huning enjoy Xi’s support even though they are not from the Xi faction. Experts are divided on whether Xi will choose leaders from only his faction or he will take candidates from non-Xi factions, resulting in a diverse cabinet.

As far as the Politburo is concerned, 8 out of the 25 members are set to retire per the age criterion. They are Wang Chen, Liu He, Xu Qiliang, Sun Chunlan, Yang Jiechi, Yang Xiaodu, Zhang Youxia and Chen Xi. Among them, Xu Qiliang and Zhang Youxia are military personnel, whereas Sun Chunlan is the only female member of this group.

Professor Lee Jonghyuk at the Nanyang Technological University (NTU) says that the position left vacant by Sun Chunlan might be filled by either Shen Yiqin (Guizhou Party Secretary) or Xian Hui (Ningxia Chairperson). Both are non-Han female minorities, so appointing them would also help Xi preserve some diversity in the group. Miao Hua and Zhang Shengmin are most likely candidates to fill the place of military-affiliated positions. Both are high-ranking officials close to Xi, so they are most likely to be selected. The remaining positions are supposed to be taken by Han, male, and civilian candidates. Professor Lee has predicted that Hu Heping, Lou Yangsheng, Wang Dongfeng, Wang Zhimin and Chen Jining can take the vacant portfolios.[6] They are all close to Xi and hold essential party positions.

Endnotes

1 Shih, Victor (2022). Age, Factions and Specialisation in the Path to the New Leadership at the 20th Party Congress. In F. N. Pieke and B. Hofman (Ed.), CPC Futures: The New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (pp. 26-32)

2 Ibid

3 Ma, Damien. Almost Here: The Most Consequential Political Event of the Year. 23 Aug, 2022. Macro Polo. https://macropolo.org/analysis/most-con ... -the-year/

4 Shih, CPC Futures: The New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (pp. 26-32).

5 Cai, Jane. Why size matters when it comes to China’s new leadership line-up. 9 Sep, 2022. SCMP. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politic ... rship-line

6 Jonghyuk, Lee (2022). A Data-driven Assessment of the CPC Leadership. In F. N. Pieke and B. Hofman (Ed.), CPC Futures: The New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (pp. 33-37)

* Swayamsiddha Samal is a research assistant at the United Services Institution (USI), New Delhi. She has a B.A. from Jawaharlal Nehru University in Mandarin and an M.A. from Pondicherry University in Politics and International Relations.
Am going to see how many of her predictions were correct in the top seven (7) PSC positions.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

I think she is the winner for guessing the 6 7/ 7 PSC members.
Amazing.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by VinodTK »

China's anti-lockdown protest reaches Wuhan, where Covid pandemic began | 5 points
Hundreds of people took to the streets of China's Wuhan – the city where the deadly coronavirus pandemic originated in 2019 – as the anti-Covid lockdown protests gained momentum for the third day on Sunday. A wave of civil disobedience spread across major cities like Beijing and Shanghai as public anger grew against the hardline norms to abide by China's zero-Covid policy.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by vijayk »

Protests have broken out in several major cities in China over President Xi Jinping's zero-tolerance approach to Covid-19, a highly unusual show of defiance
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-pr ... 1669516403
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Interesting show of defiance. Almost like a Yellow Turban rebellion in times of distress.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by gakakkad »

Personally I hope the protests die down . We need another decade of sriman 11 to ensure it's Indian century .
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

China signals no change to zero-Covid-19 policy amid mass protests that challenge Xi
In a front-page editorial on Sunday, the Communist Party’s official People’s Daily said China would “unwaveringly persist” in its Covid-19 policies and that “victory will be attained only by persisting to the end”. {Hope XJP ends before COVID ends in China}

The editorial emphasised correcting wrong attitudes, including “underestimating the problem, indifference and self-righteousness”.

The article said: “Our prevention and control policies can stand the test of history... (and they) are scientific and effective... There is no doubt about this, and we should have full confidence in this.”
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Cyrano »

Bravado in the press is fine. But a popular uprising that can spread across the country is the CCP's worst nightmare. Chinese who are seeing the World Cup football are befuddled why China is still in draconian lockdowns while the whole world seems to have moved on. Since the next breakout can strike anywhere, Chinese from all regions will be anxious.

CCP has lot of practice in quelling such protests. I suspect they will quietly loosen up its policies in cities where there are significant uprisings and try to smother the fires locally. Social media filtering and clean up must already be happening.

The worrying part is, there is very little public info on what mutations have occurred in China and how any vaccines or treatments are able to deal with it. Travel to and from china is once again fluid, so a 2.0 outbreak outside China might be a real possibility.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by gakakkad »

^ the Chinese vaccines never worked to begin with . One thing which is almost not talked about and won't ever be admitted but china is that persistent zero covid is because there vaccines were duds .

Which is why they are worse off than even Pakistan by now . Most places did fine by a combination of herd immunity and working vaccines .
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Folks, situation in China is too fluid to comment on as things change every day.
Let things settle down.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Vayutuvan »

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/has-xi-j ... economist/
Has Xi Jinping pushed China’s people too far?
Published on November 28, 2022

Hello from London,
I was thinking this weekend about Churchill’s joke about democracy. In 1947, quoting an unknown wit, he called it the worst form of government—the worst, that is, apart from all the others. Despite democracies’ mess and imperfections, they at least let ordinary people vent frustrations. Elected rulers are compelled to adjust, to be ready to step back from a policy—such as endlessly prolonging mass lockdowns to fight covid-19—when voters can’t bear it.
Is there big trouble brewing in China? A perennial threat to the country is that Communist autocrats, in power for so many decades, become unbending. In turn the masses could suddenly snap and reject the legitimacy of those in charge—especially when economic conditions are gloomy. So change, when it comes, risks being disruptive or even violent. At the most extreme think of the painful, bloody years of the Arab Spring that followed decades of brittle, autocratic rule in much of north Africa. Look, too, at what is unfolding as protests in Iran potentially threaten that regime.
I’m not suggesting China actually faces such a moment—but it is fascinating to see how protests have grown more common in recent months. By one estimate this is already the toughest political test for the government since 1989 and Tiananmen Square. In the past couple of days these have erupted in Beijing, Shanghai, Urumqi and elsewhere, amid popular fury over those lockdowns. More notable, some people are calling for democratic freedoms, like free speech, and even daring to say Xi Jinping should go. In Xinjiang there’s a particular cause of anger: it appears covid restrictions slowed the response of fire services in tackling a blaze that killed at least 10 people on Thursday.
I’ll be fascinated to see what comes next. Does Mr Xi adjust his repressive covid policy? Reportedly some lockdowns are being eased “in stages” in Xinjiang. Or might this be a moment for harsher crackdowns and repression? And could those who protested once start to get a taste for more? I’ll rely on the reporting of our team in China: we have published our latest analysis of the situation on the ground, including our correspondents’ experience of witnessing protests this weekend. More will follow soon.
Elsewhere, we have our eye on Venezuela, where the regime of Nicolás Maduro may be coming in from the cold. America’s government has started to adjust its stance there. It has agreed that Chevron can start operating there, again. Talks between Mr Maduro and the opposition signal some frostiness is easing. The bigger context? As the West has tried to isolate Russia, and seeks alternative sources of oil, it naturally has an interest in warming to a country with 20% of the world’s proven oil reserves.
I’ll be watching other stories too. Emmanuel Macron heads to Washington this week for a state visit. This is a chance to discuss how the West can better support Ukraine in the winter months—and more broadly to think about the best ways to bolster western Europe at a difficult time. The knock-on effects of the war, and high energy prices, could yet lead to unusually large numbers of deaths of many elderly Europeans. We’ve calculated that, in the worst scenario, Europe could see more deaths than there have been combat killings inside Ukraine so far.
And there’s plenty to occupy my colleagues who write about business, finance and economics—in addition to the protests in China. We have just published a look at which businesses turned out to be winners (and which losers) from the past few years of upheaval caused by covid, war, inflation and more. We’ve also got our eyes on Microsoft, and whether antitrust concerns would scupper its purchase of Activision. And there’s the ongoing saga of the crypto collapse. Some parts of the crypto world may yet emerge stronger from the current fray.
I’d like to hear what you think. On China, in particular, do you see reasons to believe bigger upheavals are looming? Might Mr Xi be ready to bend after all, on his covid policy, or will he opt for ever stricter repression and control? Send your thoughts to us here: ...
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Anujan »

SSridhar wrote:China signals no change to zero-Covid-19 policy amid mass protests that challenge Xi
In a front-page editorial on Sunday, the Communist Party’s official People’s Daily said China would “unwaveringly persist” in its Covid-19 policies and that “victory will be attained only by persisting to the end”. {Hope XJP ends before COVID ends in China}

The editorial emphasised correcting wrong attitudes, including “underestimating the problem, indifference and self-righteousness”.

The article said: “Our prevention and control policies can stand the test of history... (and they) are scientific and effective... There is no doubt about this, and we should have full confidence in this.”
Pre-protests they were indicating that they might relax zero covid. Even spoke about importing Moderna vaccines and MRNA technology. But now, after protests, relaxing zero covid is a sign of weakness. If protests had not happened, they would have relaxed zero covid.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Cyrano »

After a BBC reporter was manhandled, UK pulls back its envoy and Sunak has upped anti China rhetoric.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by chetak »

Image
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

Cyrano wrote:After a BBC reporter was manhandled, UK pulls back its envoy and Sunak has upped anti China rhetoric.
Cyrano, any link to withdrawing the envoy? Haven't seen one yet.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by gakakkad »

^ i think he meant UK summoned Chinese ambassador to UK. i highly doubt roughing up a journalist would provoke measures such as closing the embassy..

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/bri ... 022-11-29/
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by Cyrano »

You're right gakakkad ji. Thank you for the correction.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Anujan wrote:....

Pre-protests they were indicating that they might relax zero covid. Even spoke about importing Moderna vaccines and MRNA technology. But now, after protests, relaxing zero covid is a sign of weakness. If protests had not happened, they would have relaxed zero covid.
I think protests were encouraged by the XJP opposing faction which wants to reduce his aura/sheen as second most powerful leader after Mao Zedong.
Nevertheless it will make XJP focus inwards to reduce internal friction.

At anytime India needs to be wary as past history shows when there is internal turmoil China tends to escalate along LAC.

And am sure with new CDS things are moving along.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by gakakkad »

https://www.dw.com/en/uk-removes-china- ... a-63926813

UKistan did remove PRC from nuclear reactor. probably unrelated to protests and roughing up on BBC journalist..

The patriarch of shanghai faction of CCP passes away.

anyone seen Hu Jintao after he was taken for a "covid swab" in the politburo meeting?
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

ramana
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

ramana wrote:Jian Zemin passes away age 96.

https://twitter.com/OliviaWong123/statu ... oj11A&s=19
SS, If Jiang Zemin was ill for quite some time. most likely Hu Jintao had taken over his group during the 20th Congress.
If so his being forced out on the last day has quite a lot of significance.
We need to think about this.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

World Press Review has this article by a Chinese scholar

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/xi- ... jI7KumIgKj

"Xi’s Grip on Power Is Now China’s Biggest Domestic Challenge"

"Haemin Jee is an assistant professor of international relations at the United States Military Academy at West Point. The views expressed here are her own and not those of the U.S. Military Academy, U.S. Army or Department of Defense."

China is an autocratic country an without reasserting grip, how can XJP shape the economy to meet his domestic challenges?
Pagal hain!
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Israel sources say KSA is getting new Chinese missiles to replace old stock.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

ramana wrote:
ramana wrote:Jian Zemin passes away age 96.

https://twitter.com/OliviaWong123/statu ... oj11A&s=19
SS, If Jiang Zemin was ill for quite some time. most likely Hu Jintao had taken over his group during the 20th Congress.
If so his being forced out on the last day has quite a lot of significance.
We need to think about this.
ramana, Hu Jintao himself is unwell and is 80 now. When asked to leave the podium in that now famous video footage, we could see that he was quite confused.

I would say that XJP has smothered the CYL & Shanghai cliques.

As I said in this post here, it is Ding Xuexiang who is the un-announced successor of XJP. XJP wouldn't want to explicitly announce him as heir-apparent because he would like to have at least one more term. Ding was the prominent face in the just-concluded Riyadh meetings.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

ramana wrote:Israel sources say KSA is getting new Chinese missiles to replace old stock.
In the 80s, it was the liquid-fuelled IRBM CSS-2 (DF-3) which China supplied as the delivery platform for KSA's nukes for its CHIC-4-based nukes that would be supplied to KSA through Pakistan, the storekeeper of KSA bombs; much, much later the Chinese supplied the solid-fueled DF-21. A few years back, we found out that China had setup a solid-fuel engine plant near Riyadh. So, China has been a big proliferator and violator of MTCR & NSG. Of course, it is not a member of MTCR and will never become one unless & until it relents on Indian membership to NSG, but its application to MTCR membership was based on its 'impeccable' record and tight domestic laws! In the case of sales to KSA, China didn't even pretend that the missiles were NoDongs from North Korea !!

Now China is trying to mediate between Iran and GCC on the Iranian nuclear aspirations.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

SS let's not get clouded by PRC.
It was the US that allowed PRC to supply missiles to KSA in the 1980s as a counter to Iran and Iraq.

This is still under US watch. The proviso is no nukes on these missiles.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by ramana »

Post the 20th Congress, XJP has consolidated outside China and his outreach shows where he felt he had to reduce friction.

At the G-20 Bali meeting, he met NaMo (and probably in Urumqi) and a host of European and US leaders. He chastised Trudeau, and at ASEAN the Thai PM.

Recently he traveled to West Asia and got a state visit and many agreements with KSA, UAE, and Oman.

These moves ensure reliable energy supplies.
And Germany was supposed to visit China and I didn't keep track.
Germany is a major economic partner with two-way trade.

What is all this about?
In my simple mind, the Chinese four-layer society is transforming due to the global economy. I won't call that globalization which has its own meaning.
The bottom layers of artisans and traders have prospered due to the global economy. And recent disruption hurts these two layers. The farmers too with higher prices for farm inputs and the scholars get access to foreign utys cut off. So all his outreach helps to restore xi or balance.
He clearly said won't use force wrt Taiwan unless outsiders make moves. And even Biden acknowledged it.

Economic data shows to trade with India is back to a $52 B imbalance with China in the positive. Need to see the composition of this for if its consumption goods the imbalance is not sustainable.

As for security, India is reducing indecision through the CDS appointment, the 81 Rafale decision, and the IAF exercises all of which are indicators of preparedness. Also, 27 RafaleM shows India is not in the US camp.

Let us see what the new year brings.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

ramana wrote:SS let's not get clouded by PRC.
It was the US that allowed PRC to supply missiles to KSA in the 1980s as a counter to Iran and Iraq.

This is still under US watch. The proviso is no nukes on these missiles.
ramana, it doesn't matter whether the US allowed it or not. I have also heard that the nose cone was modified so that it couldn't carry a nuke! All I am saying is that China is a big proliferator and it is neither constrained by any commitments it makes nor the consequences of its actions. The Chinese have their own mind.

As for US watch, we all know what that means. No arms supplied to Pakistan could be used against India, Pakistan had no nukes, no Chinese missile was transferred to Pakistan, no F-16 was involved on Feb. 27, no F-16 was shot-down, the list is just too long. We have heard it all and suffered forever.
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Re: Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

Post by SSridhar »

ramana wrote:Post the 20th Congress, XJP has consolidated outside China and his outreach shows where he felt he had to reduce friction.
My feeling, ramana, is that as trade picks up following easing of Covid and container-shortage, trade imbalance with China will also reach pre-Covid levels or even surpass that due to pent-up demand. In India, there is still a significant component of consumption goods. I have no figures but that's what I hear from relevant departments.

Geopolitically, I feel that XJP is further emboldened that USA has weakened even further and this is the time to forge ahead with its traditional allies in West Asia and undercut the US influence in one more region. And, undercut dollar dominance. There is a linear correlation between waning US influence and waxing Chinese benefits not only politically but in many other areas as well. For example, XJP wants KSA to be part of its ILRS on the moon. Of course KSA has also signed the Artemis Accords. In every sphere of activity, there is competition. This is Cold War 2.0 in a new avtar.

The future would resemble the past, but not in all respects - Thucydides
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