Understanding New China after 19th Congress

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ramana
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby ramana » 11 Feb 2018 09:48

SSridhar,

Let's discuss what impact such a thing would mean to world economy?

I think a war chest of $3Trillion among world powers is needed over ten years. So $300B a year.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby panduranghari » 24 Feb 2018 13:57

Xilit Anbang and the dirt is gone

(Reuters) - The Chinese government on Friday seized control of Anbang Insurance Group Co Ltd and said its chairman had been prosecuted, dramatically illustrating Beijing's willingness to curtail big-spending conglomerates as it cracks down on financial risk.

Anbang [ANBANG.UL] had violated laws and regulations which "may seriously endanger the solvency of the company", the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) said in a statement announcing the seizure, without giving details.

The CIRC also said Anbang's chairman and key shareholder, Wu Xiaohui, had been prosecuted for economic crimes. Wu was arrested in June as troubles mounted for one of China's most aggressive buyers of overseas assets.


Wu Xiaohui is married to grand daughter of Deng Xioping. Wu's arrest seems like the purge continues. The reports of possible coup may not necessarily be untrue.

Some China watchers on Twitter claim Anbang was a government approved investor in OBOR, Confucius institutes- but also most of the board is comprised of card carrying CCP apparatchiks. One group at odds with Eleven also use this route to take their wealth out of China.

Anbang going down or brought down? I think it is the former. Their economy is a few snowflakes away from an avalanche. The new central bank head to be installed at PBoC will make old marm Janet Yellen feel like a hawk.

We shall continue watching this space.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby ramana » 28 Feb 2018 00:36

China has removed the two term restriction for the President.
So Xi Jinping marches forwards to greater glory.

Also Bloomberg Radio was reporting China is facing headwinds but I couldn't stay on to listen.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby ramana » 28 Feb 2018 00:40

ramana wrote:Looks like Xi Jinping launched his own coup.



my post on page 2.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby chola » 28 Feb 2018 00:56

Long-term single dictatorship can transform Cheen into another NoKo. So good prospect for us in the long term.

Short-term though, Xi is a technocrat with a heavy emphasis on science and technology and right now has the PRC humming in everything from AI to quantum communications to railguns to hypersonics to supercomputers. He personally can drive a huge and growing technology gap between the PRC and India as he races with Unkil.

So it will be between Xi and our License Raj babus. Guess who will win race in forcing/allowing new groundshaking technology to permeate society and the armed forces?

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby rhytha » 01 Mar 2018 22:21

This site has regular updates and newsletter on PRC, highly recommended

https://www.axios.com/newsletters/axios-china

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby Philip » 02 Mar 2018 04:09

Simple understanding.China has its first "fuhrer" Chinko style.Like Hitler's demand for " lebensraum" ( living space), we see China's outrageous assertion that Ar.Pradesh is " Southern Tibet", is a repetition of the Anschluss annexation of Austria .Then came Czechoslovakia and eventually Poland.The annexation of the Spratlys has taken place in the ICS with a little whining and whimpering from the great superpower, which like Gt.Britain did b*gger all to prevent Hitler's initial conquests without a shot being fired.Curious to see the Chins following the same strategy in Asia too!

After the Spratlys the new Chin fuhrer has his beady slit eye firmly on the Maldives.A mere fart from his nether orifice warning Delhi against intervention saw India (apparently) shut shop, with mere verbal protest leaving the tyrant tadpole delirious with joy like a latter-day " gauleiter" of the Nazi era.The Pakis have urged the Chin fuhrer to accept Gwadar and also Jiwani as tribute for favours received, while Sri Lanka have also paid tribute for the greed and profligacy of its former pretender of an emperor , Rajapakse, leaving it reelinng in debt, handing over HTota port and thousands of hectares adjoining yet to come.

The big Q is who will talk to fuhrer Chin and restrain him from his disastrous "drago-naut"which could very well lead to WW3.Time is running out fast.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby ramana » 02 Mar 2018 10:09

Philip, China is about to see a lot of turbulence. XI made all these moves after meeting Trump and sees how Putin has consolidated Russian position. This two term limit was in earlier times of succession after Mao.
Economist wrote China is moving from autocracy to dictatorship without realising bo th are same in effect!!!

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby panduranghari » 02 Mar 2018 14:04

Xi could have chosen to be CCP Secretary General for life thus be in the most powerful position in China. However he chose to be President for life, which is more of a governance position. Secretary General controls the gates letting oligarchs live comfortably and thus keeps factions at peace. By eliminating factions by undertaking anti corruption drives and going for the presidential post, has he effectively signalled the CCP does not matter?
If that is the case, it also suggests the suppression of dissent is rife. Does this also mean Xi's position is under threat? The murmuring of coup as posted in the earlier pages by another poster could be true.

By 2021, Xi was expected (as per the CCP manifesto) to deliver economic parity with USA for the Chinese. Now that he does not need to worry about passing over the baton in 2022, he perhaps will pull a rabbit out of the hat. If he does not, it does not really matter anymore.

I think Xi is perhaps today most powerful head of state. It's not the president of USA anymore. The baton has been reluctantly passed.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby Philip » 02 Mar 2018 17:40

As long as XI advances,criticism will stay silent.The moment he stumbles,say with India,the hawks and vultures will sharpen their claws. He has to maintain China's momentum on all fronts.This can easily be disrupted by a combined force of nations providing an eco alternative to his OBOR and a loose military confederation that will work together if the Chins spat with a member nation. The eco alternative using SoKo,Japan,Taiwan,SASEAN<esp. SPore,Malaysia,Indonesia and India as a route to the Gulf and beyond,is a very doable one esp. in the maritime sphere. Sri Lanka has excellent ties with the Japanese and they could be used to persuade the Lankans to come aboard,esp. as the largest trade that Lanka has is with India.Sri lanka geographically is a pivotal nation and one that under no circumstances be allowed to fall into Chin hands.

Even if that slimeball Rajapakse returns to power,the riot act must be read out to him.He was at Tirupati just a couple of days ago praying for a return to power! The audacity of that bugger! Comes to India to seek the blessings at our most popular temple while plotting anti-India moves with the Chins behind our back! May he get the reward such duplicity deserves from the gods!

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby ramana » 02 Mar 2018 22:47

Krishna works in mysterious ways.
Rajapakse ended the Prabhakaran nemesis for SL.
And by defeating him in elections took the sting out.
Now its a new day.


Philip, Nehruji scared our neighborhood right after Independence that they could be assimilated politically.

It could be eventual but by actions, he scared them off to become outposts for all outside powers like UK, US, and now China.

By time SAARC came by including recalcitrant Pak, Rajiv Gandhi scored a self goal and made it useless.
Real Hamlet.

Still picking pieces.
These small countries willingly enslaved themselves to prevent getting under Indian/ Gandhi family orbit.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby ramana » 04 Mar 2018 01:27

Heard long discussion on BBC on Xi JinPing between an UK and a Chinese experts.

UK expert was hung up on term limit, no consolidation of personality, etc., etc.

The Chinese expert said China needs to have Xi at this juncture to ensure stability.

My tajje is the two term.limit was created after Mao to ensure no single person takes over and prevent power struggles between the old guard. The age limitation of 70 year old was also another way to remove concentration of power in individuals.
As I said before China has foreseen coming turbulence and does not want more chaos. Hence this extension for Xi who needs time to implement thev19th Congress resolutions.

Also there is example of Putin while pulled Russia out of doldrums and could do that only by being in power. Even Medvedev term was Putin as PM.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby Bart S » 04 Mar 2018 01:44

ramana wrote:Heard long discussion on BBC on Xi JinPing between an UK and a Chinese experts.

UK expert was hung up on term limit, no consolidation of personality, etc., etc.

The Chinese expert said China needs to have Xi at this juncture to ensure stability.

My tajje is the two term.limit was created after Mao to ensure no single person takes over and prevent power struggles between the old guard. The age limitation of 70 year old was also another way to remove concentration of power in individuals.
As I said before China has foreseen coming turbulence and does not want more chaos. Hence this extension for Xi who needs time to implement thev19th Congress resolutions.

Also there is example of Putin while pulled Russia out of doldrums and could do that only by being in power. Even Medvedev term was Putin as PM.


That might well be the intention, though whether it will enable them to deal with turbulence is another thing altogether. In fact it could be argued that a more agile system where leaders could change to meet changing requirements, but still within the umbrella of the CCP would be better in riding out turbulence that an dictator type system with a single power center.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby panduranghari » 04 Mar 2018 02:10

I thought the 2 term limit was ushered in by Deng. Irrespective the dice is cast. China will need more than Xi to control internal turmoil, secessionist movements, coalition of external threats and financial catastrophe equal to (1989 Japan+2008 AngloSaxon west)^2 all coming towards it like a runaway train.

BartS ji,
I agree. The 2 term limit was to prevent Mao era chaos recurring.


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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby Rudradev » 06 Mar 2018 01:24

Many interesting insights here from Pei Minxin.

1) The Wilsonian Globalists were wrong in their assumption that allowing China into the circle of international trade and economic prosperity would encourage political "reform" towards "democratic" governance.

2) On the contrary, the CPC is likely to adopt policies that actively curb economic growth over the coming years, as a means of maintaining political authority.

3) A key stressor that has emerged in China after 40 years of partially embracing market economics with state control: there is now a fissure between CPC central authority in Beijing, and local CPC satraps who formed nexuses with local capitalists/entrepreneurs to exploit mechanisms of wealth production. Apart from getting rid of rivals, Xi's "crackdown on corruption" must be seen as a move to reassert central CPC authority over local CPC satrap/capitalist nexuses. To a large extent Beijing has succeeded in subduing the provinces.

4) The current trajectory of maintaining growth via increasing debt and leverage will inevitably lead China to economic stagnation, Japan style, but with a far lesser extent of individual prosperity than the Japanese enjoyed in 1989.

5) The biggest investment the Xi regime has made is in increasing the central CPC's authority by the establishment of a technologically sophisticated surveillance state.

6) International adventurism and encouraging an increasingly militarized nationalism is one way for CPC to maintain its authority, but actually going to war is a very risky prospect for it, because (as often asserted by Chola here) PRC losing a war could very well lead to the CPC losing power altogether.


https://www.theatlantic.com/internation ... nt/554795/


China Is Not a Garden-Variety Dictatorship


It is far more ruthless and determined to protect its power.
DAVID FRUM


...

Twelve years ago, at a time when those hopes still burned bright, a dissenting China expert named Minxin Pei published an arresting argument. Not only would the Chinese Communist Party never willingly liberalize, he argued, but rather than permit liberalization, the party would eventually smother China’s economic growth too. I read China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy shortly after it was first published. Pei and I have kept in touch over the years since. Pei now serves as the director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont-McKenna College.

On March 2, I spoke with Pei via Google Doc to inquire how it felt to deliver one of modern political science’s most powerful and resounding “I told you so”s.

David Frum: A decade ago, you broke ranks with almost all conventional China expertise and predicted that the People’s Republic would not successfully transition toward true economic and political freedom. Why were so many people so wrong? These were knowledgeable and intelligent people. What misled them so badly?

Minxin Pei: I would say many people were too dazzled by the superficial changes, especially economic changes, to realize that the Communist Party’s objective is to stay in power, not to reform itself out of existence. Economic reform or, to be more exact, adopting some capitalist practices and embracing market in some areas, is only a means to a political end. In fact, Deng Xiaoping made it crystal clear when he started the reform, but unfortunately many observers, including China-watchers, failed to read him correctly. They have made other mistakes as well. For example, they overlooked the nature of the Chinese regime. It is not your garden-variety dictatorship, but a successor to a totalitarian regime. It is both far more ruthless and determined to protect its power than an average dictatorship and far more capable of doing so.

Frum: Some of them might have said, “Well, whatever the regime may imagine it is doing, in fact it is opening a door it will not be able to close. Liberalization has an irresistible logic all its own.” Was that an unreasonable thing to think?

Pei: In the Chinese case, the door was never fully open in the first place. So the forces that try to make it less open or close it have a less difficult time to do so. Additionally, when China was forced to keep the door more open, it was in a weaker position relative to the forces outside—the West in general and the U.S. in particular. But when the conservative forces inside China gain strength while the West appears to be in decline, those forces are far more likely and able to close the door again, as is happening right now. So, while the logic of irresistible liberalization appears to be reasonable on the surface, it overlooks the underlying reality of power.

Frum: Has the door closed? How decisively has China turned toward profounder authoritarianism with this grab by President Xi for lifetime rule?

Pei: Politically, the door is probably 90-95 percent closed. Substantive exchanges between China and the outside in the so-called sensitive areas—especially involving serious academic exchanges and civil society—are a fraction today compared with the pre-Xi era. Economically, the door is much less open, probably the least open since the reform era began nearly four decades ago. There is a growing consensus that China today is the least open since the end of the Cultural Revolution. That is a very devastating comment on the political conditions there.

Frum: Now let’s step back in time. You published in 2006, before the Great Recession, at a time when the Chinese state reported economic growth in excess of 10 percent per year. At that time, it was a popular game to calculate when China would overtake the U.S. in absolute economic size. That was the year you warned: This will all soon slow, and perhaps even halt, because of pressure from above motivated by fear of power-competitors below. What did you then perceive to lead you to this conclusion?

Pei: I was following mainly China’s political change at that time. The puzzle people like me were grappling with was whether economic reform was leading to political change. The trend starting in the late 1990s showed divergence between economic progress and political change. While China was getting richer, its political system exhibited signs of stagnation. So I wondered what was the real cause and whether autocratic politics could infect economic reform. My conclusion was that China by the early 2000s reached the sweet spot for its one-party state. Its economic reform was half-complete but had already delivered enough political benefits for it to retain legitimacy. It could use the growing economic resources to strengthen its repressive capacity to defend its political monopoly. It does not want to reform the economy further because doing so would also risk losing control over the economy and all the benefits it can generate for the party. So there is a hard limit to how far the party would push economic reform.

In a fully “marketized” economy—in the Chinese case that would mean very few state-owned enterprises—the Communist Party would have no real economic means to protect its political monopoly. But if the economy is not fully marketized, inefficiency will eventually doom economic growth. That’s why I applied the concept of “trapped transition”—the continuation of the status quo leading eventually to stagnation.

Frum: You also laid special stress on the tension between the anxieties of the rulers at the political center—and the ambitions of local rulers closer to the creation of wealth.

Pei: Like my colleagues, I have long wondered how Chinese rulers, who came to power vowing to destroy private property and largely accomplished their goal during the Mao era, would deal with the rise of large private wealth. Based on the experience of the last two decades, during which large private wealth emerged, we get a complex picture. As a whole, the Communist Party remains worried that creators of wealth could be a threat. So there are definitely tensions between the party and capitalism. But individual members of the regime and individual capitalists have formed alliances, or crony networks if you will, to extract wealth from China’s hybrid economy. This has become a real headache for the regime because these networks erode the regime’s internal discipline and integrity. That is part of the reason for Xi Jinping to launch his crackdown on corruption. He and his colleagues feared that the party was being eaten hollow from inside by this alliance between local officials and tycoons.

Frum: So crackdowns on “corruption” are actually assertions of national Communist hegemony over local Communist officeholders?

Pei: This was one of the motivations, and apparently Xi has accomplished this objective. China today is going through re-centralization, especially re-centralization of political authority. Of course, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has other objectives, including the purge of his rivals. And he has accomplished that goal as well.

...

Frum: What if anything would you revise, amend, or enlarge in your 2006 statement from the vantage point of 2018?

Pei: I would revise one of the scenarios for change in the conclusion. Although one of the scenarios—depicting the rise of a hard authoritarian leader vowing to save the regime with more conservative policies—unfortunately turns out to be true, I also constructed a more optimistic scenario in which provinces led the way of reform in a “middle-up” model. The changes in the last five years, during which provinces quickly fell in line with Beijing, show that the potential for generating systemic changes in China provinces is much less than expected.

Frum: Has China now arrived at the “trap” you foresaw? Is it stuck? If yes, does any further economic progress remain possible, or will China now succumb to Japanese-like stagnation at a vastly below-Japanese level of prosperity?

Pei: In terms of systemic or institutional change, China probably entered the trap a decade ago. Although China has maintained ostensibly reasonable growth rate, it has done so mainly by increasing debt or leverage. Future economic progress is doubtful without real and radical economic change, but what has happened in the last five years under Xi, who promised radical reforms but has not delivered on his promise, is discouraging. So the prospect of a Japanese-like stagnation is real. But because the party’s legitimacy depends on prosperity, such a scenario would be fatal to its survival.


Frum: If economic stagnation is fatal to regime survival—but the fuller reforms necessary to economic growth are regarded as unacceptable—what happens? In particular, does the regime turn to foreign adventurism as a new mode of legitimation? China’s foreign policy has become increasingly assertive over the past decade, to the point of provocation, even bellicosity. Is that the future to be faced?

Pei: Foreign adventurism in the context of declining economic performance is a distinctive possibility, but it is also very risky for the regime. If it succeeds, it will gain domestic legitimacy, but should it lose a war, it could lose power quickly. In the short to medium term, the Communist Party’s real strategy is to strengthen the security state, including the building of a powerful surveillance state. The strategic thinking behind it is that, since we can no longer deliver carrots, we will have to rely on sticks more. This explains the rising degree of repression in China, and things could get a lot worse if the economy performs more poorly. At the moment, China’s assertive foreign policy is partly designed to burnish the regime’s image at home, but it would be premature to say that Chinese leaders would be rash enough to decide to go to war with a neighbor and risk a military defeat (if the U.S. intervenes).

Frum: But the responsible international problem-solving hoped for by Presidents Bush and Obama from China—that seems equally out of the question?

Pei: Sadly, that is out of the question at least for the foreseeable future. In fact, U.S.-China relations are entering a very difficult period and the two countries could become strategic adversaries should the current dynamics continue.

...



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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby anupmisra » 06 Mar 2018 01:39

Eleven Gin Peg - president - dictator (or presitator) for life (that is, his life).


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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby chola » 06 Mar 2018 12:42

So what the fudge does Eleven intend to do with all this power?

Create Cheen into an even greater power. He wants the PRC to have triple the Amreeki GDP by 2050. He’ll be 96 then.

https://qz.com/1218961/what-xi-jinping-wants-to-do-with-his-unrivalled-power/amp/

Once he’s strengthened the party, and his spot at the top of it, Xi’s most pressing agenda is the realization of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”—also known as the “Chinese Dream”—a term Xi put forward shortly after taking power in 2012.

To fulfill this great dream, Xi must accomplish the “two centennial goals” inherited from earlier leaders. The first involves building a “moderately prosperous society,” wiping out poverty and reaching a per capita GDP of $10,000 by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the party’s founding, which is almost certain to be achieved. The second and more challenging goal is to turn China into a “fully developed nation” by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic. If it succeeds, China’s economy would be triple the US’s, according to an IMF estimate. At the party congress in October, Xi for the first time outlined a specific timetable for reaching the second centennial goal.

He said the party will first lead China to realize “socialist modernization” by 2035—which will involve, among other things, reducing inequality and improving the environment. In the second stage, from 2035 to 2050, China will become a leading global power.


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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby Raja Ram » 07 Mar 2018 10:56

India and China – Reading the Tea Leaves – A new start?

The events related to Dalai Lama are a signal that needs to be understood. I have tried to piece together if the GoI’s reticence of late is a function of certain international understandings and developments. It is not easy to piece together a narrative based on observed actions on this but a few things have to be considered carefully:


1. PRC have time and again protested vehemently about Dalai Lama visiting Arunachal Pradesh and GoI has not paid heed to any such noise and simply went ahead with it.


2. PRC was vehemently opposing the development projects, especially road and rail links in Arunachal Pradesh; the GOI not only went ahead but doubled the intensity and pace


3. PRC vehemently opposed visit by PM, not only did the PM visit he also toured extensively and made sure a Cabinet Minister was touring the place every month


4. Dalai Lama accorded a traditional and ceremonial welcome in Arunachal Pradesh with full government support


5. There were more than one instance of intense standoff both during visit by Xi and during Modi's visit to PRC across different theatres and the IA did not back down. On more than one instance, it demonstrated speed and increased ability to bring in force capability to theatre zone and never backed down


6. The CPEC - Not only did the GOI register objections, but acted swiftly to circumvent through Char Bahar. GOI also clearly stated that it would not allow CPEC in disputed territory and activated a Balochistan campaign across the world as a message to China on what can happen.


7. Surgical strike inside Myanmar and then on Pakistan clearly demonstrated the willingness and operational capability to strike across border if needed


8. Doklam - This was a test case where India, in a sense, initiated a stand off, by not acting as per established pattern. It was India which went in and stopped construction activity at force. The Chinese did not expect this (since 1950, India only used to take up such protests over border meetings - old Nehru era policy, which it sought to break away from in 1962 disastrously) change of policy. Tried all their tricks bilaterally, trilaterally and internationally. PRC failed in both diplomatic and military fronts to make India budge.


9. China's Israel - Pakistan has been isolated and is being hounded through a series of well-timed interventions, the latest being the FATF. Whenever Pakistan has tried to break free or tried to inflict high cost, India has publicly punished Pakistan with Surgical Strikes being the latest. In this one fact that needs to be noted, that Indian punishment has been almost always following any act by the Chinese in supporting Pakistan.


10. Well planned series of demonstration of both Theatre Defence and improved arsenal and delivery capability in the nuclear sphere have been made to the Chinese with China specific missile capability.


11. Straight challenge to Chinese assertions to South China Sea area with increased participation and patrolling jointly and bilaterally with nations of the region and coordinating with Indo Pacific powers to provide a strong counter point to China power projections and ambitions


12. On the engagement side too, there has been a lot of activity to build better people to people relationship with China, growing exchange of views and common stance wherever possible such as environmental and trade and investment arrangements; strong pitch for mutual investments in each other's economy, bringing up and nurturing a financial network to balance the stranglehold of the west on international financial network through initiatives like BRICS Bank


13. Energy is another area where, besides competition for energy sources, there has also been cooperation in terms of Solar energy
.

It is in this light, that we can and must evaluate and examine the Dalai Lama celebrations being moved out of Delhi and the governmental "non-endorsement".

The steps mentioned above have had a deep impact on Chinese governmental positions. Coupled with the internal and international dynamics at play inside China and the tough economic choices it faces, there has been a recalibration of Chinese attitude towards India.
Chinese culture and their sense of history does not allow for any overt acceptance of change in policy and acceptance of the reality that India is not a pushover anymore. The concept of "face" will not allow for the same. However, equally important is the innate Chinese penchant for being realistic and practical.
It is this aspect, along with the other factors mentioned above, that I believe, that has forced the Chinese government to reach out to India.


1. China, for the first time, started acknowledging that the Indian economy is on a strong path of growth and it called out that India is emerging as a leading power in Asia. In typical back handed fashion, it "advised" India that it should not believe that it can be a power by throwing its weight around.


2. China has time and again, tried to reiterate that it is not opposed to India's economic growth and development and said it wants to partner with India. It has reiterated its desire to close out difference on border at the earliest.


3. China's has called for CPEC to be even renamed and invited India to its OBOR initiative and officially went on record to state that any misgivings on this with India can be discussed and solved.


4. Despite bravado and crude threats, it backed down on Doklam and agreed to a practical resolution after its failure to elicit support against India


5. Despite its many attempts to support Pakistan against India, especially on designation of Masood Azhar and Hafeez Saeed as terrorists, it has stopped short of antognising India by going too far despite many attempts by Pakistan - latest being its refusal to stall Pakistan entry into grey list at FATF


These are real changes in Chinese stand and posture, despite their strenuous attempts to mask it, the same has been acknowledged by India and the rest of the world.


In this context, China perceives that Tibet will reach an inflexion point sometime in the future and the trigger could be the inevitable demise of Dalai Lama at some point. An increasingly powerful and willing India can create tremendous challenges for China, if China tries to harm India through proxy (Pakistan) or directly.

Contrary to the facade of stability, China too has simmering and strong fault lines that can explode. Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan and the existing disparity of wealth, corruption and tremendous economic improvements that leads to an increasingly aware and demanding population are all there.

Added to this is the generational change in leadership and the new elite power struggles. All this in the context of economic long term issues coming to roost.


This assessment and reality has, I believe, forced China to not only recalibrate its equation with India but also engage discreetly with a powerful Indian government to push through a broad arrangement that allows for the peaceful rise of China as a rival to the US in the world order.

In this recalibration, China may have finally come to the conclusion that it is far better to have a good relationship with India rather than trying to compete or contain India, thereby pushing it away to the US side and making India a rallying point across ASEAN and Indo-Pacific region for other powers who are wary of China's ambitious plans.

In my view, this could mean preparing for a post Dalai Lama settlement for Tibet that is supported and endorsed by India. Now only India can make that happen, as it is one country that has the leverage over Dalai Lama. Dalai Lama too would be anxious to see some sort of an arrangement that allows for him a modicum of self-rule in Tibet in his lifetime.
That can happen very well if there is a Sino-Indian detente. If the benefits of such a detente far outweigh a the so called benefits of containing/breaking India with the help of the likes of Pakistan, then China and India have the civilizational maturity to actually make it happen.


It is this logical extension that gives meaning and a reasonable explanation to the "downgrading" of Dalai Lama anniversary and the governmental sponsorship of the same. The indications are that China and India have engaged themselves to recalibrate their relationship and there is some kind of rapprochement planned with regard to Tibet. I am also venturing to guess that this is being done with the Dalai Lama being kept in the loop as is evidenced by the lack of any official disappointment on the GOI stance from the side of the Tibetan Government in Exile.


As usual a ramble, take it for what it is worth!

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby A Deshmukh » 07 Mar 2018 11:25

Raja Ram wrote:India and China – Reading the Tea Leaves – A new start?

+1. Very good analysis connecting the dots.
SS visit to Chin would also be a dot in the chain.
Lets see how things pan out.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby rhytha » 08 Mar 2018 14:01

By Jacob L. Shapiro

This week will be an auspicious one in China’s long and storied history. Chinese lawmakers are expected to rubber stamp a proposal by top Chinese Communist Party officials to abolish term limits on the presidency
. It is a major break with more than 40 years of Chinese political norms, and it puts an inordinately large amount of power in the hands of a single person: President Xi Jinping, who is already a peerless figure of authority in China and who, after all, presumably initiated the abolition of term limits in the first place.

How Xi wields this power will have a profound effect on China’s future, and the early signs of his intentions have been strange, to say the least. At a gathering to celebrate what would have been the 120th birthday of Zhou Enlai, the first premier of the People’s Republic of China, Xi gave a long and effusive speech, during which he praised Zhou as a model of Chinese virtue. (When the speech was over, Premier Li Keqiang – whose power Xi has methodically curtailed in the last five years – praised Xi’s leadership of the CPC into the future.) This stands in stark contrast to the speech Xi delivered in 2013 on what would have been Mao Zedong’s 120th birthday. In so many words, Xi said Mao was a human being like any other who should be held accountable just as much for his failures as for his successes.

On the one hand, Xi is raising the possibility that he might become the first Chinese leader since Mao to govern China as dictator-for-life. On the other hand, Xi has gone out of his way to criticize Mao and praise Zhou, Mao’s closest and most loyal comrade, who, despite his service and devotion, was purged from power for trying to curb Mao’s excesses. Like I said, strange to say the least.

A Man Like Mao

Mao was a leader of world-historical importance, but it’s perfectly reasonable for Xi to point out his failures. There are many such failures to choose from, including ignoring his military commanders during the Korean War and the brutal purges of the Cultural Revolution. But none of Mao’s missteps were more destructive or more representative of his leadership style than the Great Leap Forward, Mao’s ambitious plan to vault China into the top industrial powers of the world. The Great Leap Forward failed for many reasons, but among the most important was that provincial Chinese bureaucrats were so terrified of Mao’s retribution that they falsified the data they gave the CPC. Seeing only what he was provided, Mao thought China was becoming stronger when in fact it was falling deeper into disrepair. By the time he got wise to reality, more than 45 million were dead.

The irony is that the paranoia and ambition that led to mistakes such as the Great Leap Forward were also responsible for Mao’s overall success. Mao believed that China could be free and strong only if it abandoned its past. He blamed China’s weakness in part on Chinese culture, and he sought to obliterate that culture and to replace it with a new resilient spirit of Chinese nationalism. Mao distrusted China’s vast bureaucracy because it had collaborated with foreign invaders, only to realize upon coming to power that China was too vast to rule without a bureaucracy. This led to a never-ending cycle of chaos, whereby Mao would carry out wide-ranging purges even if it meant rendering policy initiatives ineffective because China was more important than any single policy initiative. By the end of Mao’s rule, China was in chaos, but China was also independent and united.

The price China had paid for its sovereignty was extremely expensive. After Mao died, presidential term limits were instituted in 1982 in China as part of a broader effort to prevent men like Mao from coming to power ever again. The CPC still admires Mao, but the party line is that 70 percent of what he did was right and 30 percent was wrong – a remarkable party line in a country where political dissent is so carefully regulated. The CPC saw that a man like Mao, necessary as he was to unite China under the rule of one government, could not make China a world-class power. In fact, at a certain point, a man like Mao only prevented China from reaching its true potential. Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, himself purged by Mao three different times, knew firsthand how destructive Mao’s leadership style was, and it was Deng who decided that the most important thing he could give China was a model for a peaceful and orderly transition of power to a younger generation. In place of these men now stands Xi, who is erasing Deng’s model as he claims the throne of the Middle Kingdom.

Xi is not Mao, and his praise of Zhou is meant to make sure the Chinese people know it. Mao ruled by chaos; Xi rules with orderliness. Mao destroyed the bureaucracy; Xi is molding it to serve his purposes. Mao purged friends and foes alike; Xi purges only his foes. Mao was a fervent communist; Xi is a communist in name only, who in the same breath speaks of Lenin and of supply-side reform. Mao was the son of a wealthy farmer. Xi is a “princeling” whose father was purged during the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, no one knows the depredations and bloodletting that Mao oversaw better than Xi, who had a front row seat for all of it.

A Different Turn

And yet, despite Xi’s intimate experience with tyranny’s discontents, he has deemed it necessary to tear down the safeguards erected to prevent a man like him from seizing power comparable to Mao’s. The fact that Xi is compelled to praise Zhou, who tried to protect the Chinese people from Mao while still paying fealty to the Chairman, shows just how nervous Xi is. Xi is not claiming the mantle of power because he is a power-hungry megalomaniac but because he believes that China is in just as precarious a situation today as it was in 1949, when no one knew if the republic would last more than a decade.

Xi does not face the same challenges Mao did, of course. The country Mao conquered was a poor, abused, humiliated mass of people in the throes of civil war and governed by warlords. Forging the republic out of such a country required a man with Mao’s unique virtues and vices. The country Xi leads is proud and more united than China has been in centuries. Xi’s China is a major power, boasting the world’s second-largest economy and a rapidly improving military. But it is also a country rife with corruption and inequality. If Xi is to redistribute wealth to the 350 million people still living on less than five dollars a day, the government-by-consensus model that has governed China will not be enough. Xi needs to show those who stand in his way that he will crush them if they don’t bend the knee.

China is about to embark on a period of intense internal change, albeit a different kind of change than Mao wrought. Xi will aim to create the legitimacy of change not with revolution but with national pride. And nothing is more generative of national pride than powerful enemies abroad. It is not a coincidence that as Xi claims more and more power for himself, China is engaging in provocative behavior in the South and East China Seas, is attempting to upend the U.S. security alliance in Asia, and is presenting the One Belt, One Road initiative as a way to return China to its rightful place at the center of the world. China’s peaceful rise is over – its confrontation with the world is beginning. Xi will use that confrontation to justify the excesses he will have to oversee if the PRC is to survive his presidency.

In his speech about Zhou, Xi said that, were he able to speak with Zhou, he would tell him “the Chinese nation that experienced great hardships for a long time since the start of modern times has ushered in a great leap from standing up and getting prosperous to becoming strong.” Mao propped China up. Deng made China prosperous. Xi means to make China strong, and he means to do so in his own way. Mao turned on the Chinese people. Xi will turn the Chinese people on the world.

----
No link since its newsletter

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby ramana » 09 Mar 2018 07:11


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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby ramana » 09 Mar 2018 07:12

Rytha I put the link.in Twitter.
Glad you are on the ball.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby SSridhar » 18 Mar 2018 18:51

Xi Jinping’s long-term gamble - Atul Aneja, The Hindu
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s decision to stay in power indefinitely has generated a heated debate. On either side of the aisle, his supporters and detractors are digging into China’s far and near history, to make their case. A blogger who goes by the name, Chan Kai Yee, links the decision of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to free Mr. Xi of a maximum presidential tenure of 10 years to China’s time-tested tradition. He argues that Mr. Xi’s tenure without limits restores the essence of China’s old Yao-Shun ‘system of succession’. Under its template, merit and moral integrity alone are the criteria for exercising power.

The blogger cites the Chinese classic, The Book of History , which claims that more than 4,000 years ago, Emperor Yao first tested the calibre of Shun, his eventual successor. Shun was first assigned a high official position. Once he had proved his competence, Yao decided that Shun should succeed him. “Shun was chosen as candidate of succession due to his moral integrity but was finally chosen when he had proved competent in performing the official duties assigned to him by Emperor Yao,” says the post. Shun applied the same merit-based principle to choose Yu as his successor for an indefinite tenure. The decision to consolidate power behind Mr. Xi also echoes the Yao- Shun principle, which was highly praised by Confucius, says the blog.

Supporters of Mr. Xi point out that he faced the cascading impact of Deng Xiaoping’s political reforms, including setting two five-year term limits to the presidential tenure. Deng wanted to flush out the system of die-hard loyalists of Mao Zedong as they did not fit into his reform plan. One way of getting rid of them was by setting specific time limits to their stay in office. But the two-term condition also had some unintended consequences. It led to the exit after two terms, in 2003, of Jiang Zemin, Deng’s chosen successor. This brought in Hu Jintao to the helm.

Legacy problems

Critics of Mr. Hu say it was under him that problems that Mr. Xi was later to confront ballooned. A surge in debt-fuelled growth created bubbles in a highly leveraged economy. Corruption rocketed, posing a serious threat to the CPC. Mr. Xi, thus, has been engaged in house-cleaning since 2012, which has included the launch of his massive anti-corruption drive. But the work remains only half done, demanding the President, in the classical Yao-Shun tradition, to remain in office for as long as it takes.

But critics draw comparison of Mr. Xi’s consolidation of power with the career path of Yuan Shikai. Yuan was an ambitious military commander of the early 20th century who rose to become emperor, before his fall from grace.

“After the 1911 revolution, the Chinese empire was turned into a Republic. It was then that Yuan Shikai, who had nodes in the imperial palace, because of his military influence, made a deal with the revolutionaries. Yuan became the President of China indefinitely, in return for forcing the Emperor to step down,” says political commentator Roger Woo. But political ambition, including a crisis of legitimacy, was to lead to Yuan’s fall.

Many tech-savvy netizens say Chinese censors are swiftly sniping references to Yuan from Sina Weibo, China’s version of Twitter. With opinion divided, it remains to be seen whether the Yin and Yang — the Taoist principle of the unity of opposites — of reconciling the Yao-Shun system, with fears over the revival of Yuan style despotism, can harmoniously emerge.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby SSridhar » 19 Mar 2018 07:46

China President Xi's key economic adviser Liu He nominated as a vice premier - Reuters
Liu He, a key economic adviser of China's President Xi Jinping, was nominated to be a vice premier.

Yi Gang, a vice central bank governor, was nominated to become the head of the People's Bank of China, while Liu Kun was nominated to be the new finance minister.

The nominations were read out at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Monday during a parliamentary session, with journalists in attendance.

Already, Li Keqiang has remained as a puppet of a PM. Now, a close confidante of Xi becomes a Vice-PM.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby SSridhar » 19 Mar 2018 15:07

Wang Yi promoted as State Councillor; China’s foreign policy shifts gears - Atul Aneja, The Hindu
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi has been elevated to the post of State Councilor, signaling a revamp of China’s foreign policy establishment, which is likely to influence New Delhi-Beijing ties.

Mr. Wang will continue to retain the post of Foreign Minister. The State Councilor, attached to the State Council, China’s cabinet, is of a higher rank than Foreign Minister. Mr. Wang’s new assignment was cleared by lawmakers who had assembled for an annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s parliament.

Prior to Mr. Wang, Yang Jiechi held the post of State Councilor on foreign affairs. {Yang Jiechi is now the Special Representative for India-China Border talks & CBM} He was also the senior most official in the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs — a powerful body within the Communist Party of China (CPC) that has been headed by President Xi Jinping.

Apart from the Leading Group, the International Department of the CPC has been another nodal institution that has been shaping China’s foreign policy.

India-China border talks

In his capacity as State Councilor, Mr. Wang is likely to serve as China’s Special Representative on boundary talks with National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. However, the Chinese foreign ministry responded cautiously when asked on Monday, whether Mr. Wang’s role as Special Representative has been affirmed.

“As I have said, China attached great importance to this (SR) mechanism and as (to) who will be the Special Representative; we will wait and see, “Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said.


During a press conference on March 8, Mr. Wang had lauded Indian and Chinese leaders for demonstrating a “strategic vision” which had helped defuse last year’s Doklam crisis, and acknowledged that ties between the two countries were poised for a rapid transition. He also
said that, “The Chinese dragon and the Indian elephant must not fight each other but dance with each other. If China and India are united, one plus one will not only include two, but also 11.”

Analysts said that Mr. Wang’s elevation is part of an overhaul, which would allow China to play a more influential overseas role in tune with President Xi Ping’s vision for China, which is embarking on a “new era”.

“China’s foreign policy establishment is going through tremendous change and expansion, which correlates with the rapid expansion of China’s economic interests and influence in the world,” says Victor Gao, Vice President, Center for China and globalisation, in a conversation with The Hindu.

The South China Morning Post had earlier reported that the powerful international department of the CPC and the Party’s Leading Group on Foreign Affairs, were expected to merge.

It is likely that the new body will be headed by Mr. Yang, who has been a politburo member, under the overall supervision of Wang Qishan, the newly appointed Vice President, widely acknowledged as President Xi’s right-hand man.


Yet, Mr. Yang’s name did not feature in the list of four Vice Prime Ministers whose names were endorsed by the NPC on Monday. In response to a question, the foreign ministry spokesperson said: “We all know that Yang Jiechi is the member of Politburo and he will continue to play role in China’s diplomacy.”

Observers point out that President Xi is personally leading the projection China’s overseas influence, which includes his signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). “President Xi Jinping himself, who over the past five years has visited 57 countries on state visits and has met with more than 110 heads of state and government during their visits to China. In a sense the ‘head of state diplomacy’ has become a key feature of China’s diplomacy over the past five years and will continue to be the most important feature of Chinese diplomacy in the coming years,” observed Mr. Victor Gao.
Pos

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby panduranghari » 19 Mar 2018 15:14

As Liu He is the vice premier, Yi Gang is appointed as PBoC governor. Yi is a west educated PhD. He is not a princeling. Yi was recommended by Liu. If Yi fails, will Liu fall?

Zhou Xiaochuan who was a princeling could not deliver from 2002 to 2018. Can Yi Gang do it?

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby SSridhar » 20 Mar 2018 11:30

Xi's Speech in NPC, 2018
He [Xi Jinping] also expressed his heartfelt gratitude to the trust placed on him by all deputies and Chinese people of all ethnic groups.

"It is a glorious mission and weighty responsibility to take on this great position of the President of the People's Republic of China. I will, as always, faithfully fulfill my responsibilities empowered by the Constitution, be loyal to the motherland and the people, perform my duty scrupulously, do all my best, be diligent at work, and stay devoted and dedicated," he said.

"I will continue to serve as a servant of the people, accept supervision by the people, and will absolutely not betray the great trust from all deputies and Chinese people of all ethnic groups," he added.

"No matter how high a position one holds, all personnel of state organs should keep firmly in mind that our republic is the People's Republic of China," Mr Xi noted.

He asked all personnel of state organs to always put the people in the most prominent place in their hearts, always serve the people wholeheartedly, and always work hard for the people's interests and happiness.

Mr Xi was re-elected Chinese President by nearly 3,000 deputies of the National People's Congress last Saturday, days after the lifting of presidential term limits allowed him to stay in office indefinitely.

Mr Xi also said only by adhering to and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics can the Chinese nation realise its great rejuvenation.

“We are having a favourable development environment that was unimaginable before, but we are also facing unprecedented difficulties and challenges,” he said.

At its 19th National Congress, the Communist Party of China (CPC) drew up a blueprint for securing a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, embarking on a new journey to fully build a modern socialist country and realising the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, he said.

Comparing the process to materialize the blueprint to “another Long March,” Mr Xi warned the whole nation against being satisfied with the status quo, indulging oneself in ease and comfort, or letting delight dispel worries.

He called on everyone to stay true to the original aspiration, hold on to the mission, and strive to accomplish it.

Mr Xi said the country will uphold the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and fully implement the spirit of the 19th Party Congress and the second and third plenary sessions of the 19th CPC Central Committee.

He stressed the underlying principle of pursuing progress while ensuring stability, the people-centered development vision, the notion of “great struggle, great project, great cause, and great dream,” and coordinated implementation of the five-sphere integrated plan [ promoting coordinated economic, political, cultural, social and ecological advancement] and the four-pronged comprehensive strategy [making comprehensive moves to finish building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, deepen reform, advance law-based governance and strengthen Party governance].

“We have full confidence in our future,” he said.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby SSridhar » 20 Mar 2018 12:37

NPC 2018: Ex-chief of strategic missile force named China's defence minister - Straits Times
China has named its former strategic missile force chief as defence minister, completing a shake-up of its top military brass that began in October last year.

General Wei Fenghe's appointment on Monday (March 19) underscored the firm grip that President Xi Jinping now has over the People's Liberation Army (PLA), said analysts.

Gen Wei, 63, was the first officer to be promoted to full general when Mr Xi took office in 2012 and also the youngest to hold the rank at the time.


A career artillery officer, he rose through the ranks of the Second Artillery Force, which oversees China's land-based nuclear arsenal, and became its commander in 2012.

That year, Gen Wei was among the first in the PLA's senior leadership to both pledge allegiance to Mr Xi and actively execute his military reform agenda
, which included a sweeping reorganisation of the PLA and its command structure.

Under his watch, the Second Artillery Corps was split into the Strategic Support Force and the PLA Rocket Force, with Gen Wei becoming the commander of the latter.

"Wei actually provided Xi with the plan to reorganise the Second Artillery Corps in an innovative way, even though it wasn't in his personal interests," a source told the South China Morning Post.

"That sacrifice did not go unnoticed by Xi, and it also convinced other senior officials in the strategic missile force to make similar concessions."


At the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) national congress last October, Gen Wei was among six generals and an admiral named to a smaller, seven-member Central Military Commission (CMC), the top body overseeing the PLA and headed by Mr Xi.

"The downsizing of the CMC (from 11 members) and its appointment of Xi's favoured generals endorsed his status as China's new strongman," said China expert James Char of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

Mr Char noted that Gen Xu Qiliang and Gen Zhang Youxia, who were confirmed as CMC vice-chairmen on Sunday, had shared a long history with Mr Xi. The remaining four had either served in the former Nanjing Military Region that covers Mr Xi's former Fujian and Zhejiang strongholds, or been groomed for higher office.

Gen Wei's appointment as defence minister on Monday puts him at No. 4 in the military hierarchy, after Mr Xi and the vice-chairs, and ahead of the other three CMC members, namely Chief of Joint Staff Li Zuocheng, head of political work Miao Hua, and head of the military discipline commission Zhang Shengmin.

The scaled-down CMC signals a group that has Mr Xi's trust and is expected to deepen his military modernisation efforts and tighten discipline, said PLA expert Arthur Ding of the Taipei-based Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies.


"The anti-corruption campaign in the previous five years and the removal of term limits to the State presidency have also sent a strong signal... that Xi will stay on longer and there is no way for corrupt bureaucrats to escape," he added.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby ramana » 01 Apr 2018 01:29

Latest pictures of Xi JinPing with Kim Jong Un show Xi has aged a lot.

Shows the stress of running China.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby SSridhar » 01 Apr 2018 08:07

ramana wrote:Shows the stress of running China.

Apart from running China which is in itself a huge task, all his cunning and scheming to grab every power, fighting various factions and palace-coups must add a great deal more.

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby Singha » 01 Apr 2018 14:48

https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-03- ... ad-dollars

china to pay for oil imports using yuan

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby Singha » 01 Apr 2018 15:19

so it seems alibaba has taken over south china morning post and lavishly funding it to write soft power articles on beijing and on the side about jack ma
a swank office even has a pub serving fresh craft beer

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/worl ... icle-click

this the alibaba which has big stakes in paytm , zomato, snapdeal and bigbasket
https://yourstory.com/2018/02/alibaba-d ... ecosystem/

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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby ramana » 24 Apr 2018 19:07

US book reviews on Rise of China:

LINK


Perspectives on China’s Rise

Thomas Cavanna

Spring 2018

Thomas Cavanna is a Visiting Assistant Professor in Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School at Tufts University.


The prodigious rise of China in the last few decades has stirred intense debates about the scale of America’s relative decline and the risk of a catastrophic hegemonic war between Beijing and Washington. Graham Allison and Richard McGregor’s recent studies offer superb analyses of the powerful forces underpinning those dynamics and of the latter’s threatening implications for international stability.

Destined for War is a brilliant exercise in “applied history,” a method of enquiry that seeks to “illuminate current predicaments and choices by analyzing historical precedents and analogues.” The starting point of the book is the “Thucydides trap,” named after the Athenian general whose study of the Peloponnesian war (fifth century B.C.) constitutes a foundational bedrock of the disciplines of history and international relations. According to Allison, the most fundamental lesson to draw from Thucydides is that beyond the immediate sparks that triggered the famous conflict between Athens and Sparta, the key problem was “the severe structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one.” As Athens bridged the gap with its rival, the two city-states and their respective allies found themselves on a seemingly unstoppable path to collision. Some of their leaders made diplomatic gestures while trying to reason with radical domestic forces on both sides. But these initiatives were defeated by the deadly combination of three primary conflict drivers: “interests, fear, and honor.” The result was a ruinous war that terminated the golden age of the Greek civilization. Allison’s book then explores sixteen power transitions that unfolded in the last five centuries and argues that the same structural rifts between declining and aspiring hegemons emerged again and again. In twelve cases, those tensions triggered major military encounters. The case of Britain and Germany before World War I receives particularly close attention. However, building on the four transitions that occurred peacefully, Allison explains how a combination of contextual factors (economic interdependence, cultural affinities, etc.) and enlightened leadership can help reduce “transitional frictions” and steer away from disaster. The other half of the book applies this analytical framework to the U.S.-China competition, contending that war is more likely than we think, but not inevitable. The current policy options, ranging from accommodation to aggressive moves, are described objectively. Allison’s recommendations (differentiating vital interests from secondary ones, fixing problems at home, etc.) rightly call for drastic course corrections in U.S. grand strategy. Unfortunately, the pivot/rebalance to Asia seems no more than a futile continuation of Washington’s post-Cold War “engage but hedge” approach, which may prove both self-defeating and dangerous.


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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby chetak » 27 Apr 2018 13:43

We didn't pay much attention to the old china, in fact, we misunderstood it entirely and paid the price for our then leadership's unsavoury politics.

Hope that we have a better understanding of this latest avatar

Thick as two bricks.

banditji, at his strategic best.


THE FATE OF A VISIONARY DIPLOMAT

Thursday, 26 April 2018 | Claude Arpi |

The fate of a visionary diplomat

Had Nehru followed the advice of Sumul Sinha, the Indian official who had warned him about the intentions of communist China, the destiny of the nation could have been different

One does not often pay homage to unknown diplomats: Had their advice been followed, the destiny of the nation could, perhaps, have been different. This is the case of Sumul Sinha, the official in-charge of the Indian Mission in Lhasa between 1950 and 1952.

Five months after forcing a 17-Point Agreement on Tibetan delegates (and forging the seals of the Lhasa Government), the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) entered the Tibetan capital in September 1951. During the first months, the Red generals were pure honey. Sinha witnessed their changing behaviour and reported to his bosses in New Delhi.

The young Mandarin-speaking diplomat noted that the Tibetans had started to ‘shed their fears’ and they have again ‘acquired confidence for the future’. Though 11 months earlier, the PLA had brutally smashed an ill-prepared and disorganised Tibetan Army in eastern Tibet, perhaps the Chinese were not so bad after all, believed many Tibetans.

Sinha explained to Delhi: “Credit is due to the Chinese [general] who with patience and delicacy are handling the problem of leading Tibet into the fold. They had struck terror into the hearts of Tibetans, when the offensive began, and it was then essential to pulverise resistance and gain victory. …The struggle has begun for the mind and soul of Tibet in ways that are subtle and hardly perceptible.” The Chinese largesse at that time was phenomenal.

This type of language deeply irritated the Indian Prime Minister; according to Nehru, Sinha could not grasp that the Chinese had come to help the Tibetans to abandon their medieval mindset and in any case, the destiny of India and China were forever bound together for the good of humanity.

“Mr Sinha needs to be enlightened”, he once wrote; poor Sinha was only trying to report, as faithfully as possible, the situation on the ground.

On October 7, 1950, the Chinese had walked into eastern Tibet. While the population in Lhasa had started panicking, the Tibetan Government reacted ‘cautiously’ to the invasion at the beginning; they did not want to ‘upset’ the Chinese.

India’s Tibet policy had recently been taken a radical change under the guidance of KM Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, who was suddenly promoted as Nehru’s chief advisor for Tibet affairs. Conflict with China had to be avoided at any cost, world peace was the only objective were the new mottos …and Tibet could be sacrificed in the process.

The situation rapidly soured between the Indian Representative in Tibet and the Prime Minister. On November 23, Nehru wrote to Sinha: “Government of India have noticed that certain communications from Lhasa and Sikkim regarding Tibet are dogmatic, disputatious and admonitory. We want of course our representatives to give us full information …[But] once a decision has been taken by Government [read to abandon Tibet to its fate], it should be accepted gracefully and followed faithfully; any insinuation that Government have been acting wrongly or improperly is objectionable.”

Sinha saw another angle to the dramatically-unfolding Tibetan issue; India was suddenly acquiring a new neighbour; the Indian borders could soon be endangered. But Sinha’s reports did not fit into Nehru’s ‘larger’ vision of the world. Further, for Delhi, Sinha expressed too much sympathy for the Tibetan people at a time when their nation was being erased from the world map.

Sincere and competent officers often suffered because of Nehru’s admonishing tendencies; the Prime Minister was particularly harsh on those who tried to warn him of the consequences of his ‘friendship at any cost’ policy with China.

The reaction to Sinha’s cable has to be understood against backdrop of the letter on Tibet sent on November 7 by Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Patel to Nehru.

In the same cable, the Prime Minister said that diplomats should: “avoid as far as possible strong language and condemnation …of nations which only increases international tension.” In other words, don’t call a spade, a spade, even in internal ‘top secret’ correspondence.

The cable continued eulogizing China’s revolution: “This may be factor for stability and peace of the world or danger to us and to world peace. For this reason we tried to cultivate friendly relations with China and we believe that this became a stabilising factor when Korean war started.”

On November 27, 1950, Sinha cabled the Foreign Secretary (a young officer could not answer directly to the Prime Minister, though copies were marked for the PMO): “My short-coming is inexperience. I know, however, that I have striven to carry out Government of India’s policy to the letter. In my telegrams which had to be TERSE, I tried to reflect faithfully the reactions of Tibetan Government to situation facing them in the belief Government of India would like to know.”

In the following years, Sinha would be blasted again and again for warning Nehru of the true intentions of Communist China. Sadly, he finished a dejected man.

Just before the end of his tenure in Lhasa in Summer 1952, Sinha did it again; he upset the Prime Minister. Sinha had the unfortunate idea to ask for a loan of two lakh rupees to help the forces fighting for Tibetan independence.

Nehru was furious. In a cable sent to the Mission in Lhasa, the Prime Minister told off Sinha; it would be “improper and unwise for our representative to get involved in Tibetan domestic affairs or intrigues.”

He added that India was naturally friendly towards Tibetans, but this should not give anyone the impression of possible interference or help. He concluded by telling his Representative: “We have to judge these matters from larger world point of view which probably our Tibetan friends have no means of appreciating.”

On March 5, 1953, Nehru again got irritated by a memo prepared by Sinha, who was now posted as Officer on Special Duty in the Ministry. Retrospectively, Sinha’s note was prophetic; it was titled ‘Chinese designs on the North-East Frontier of India.’

But one can imagine that the title was not to the Prime Minister’s liking.

The Prime Minister again criticised the approach of the former Indian Representative in Tibet. He noted: “I find Mr Sinha’s approach to be coloured very much by certain ideas and conceptions which prevent him from taking an objective view of the situation. The note starts by reference to the lust for conquest of the Chinese and is throughout based on this.”

Nehru asserted that Sinha: “looks back with a certain nostalgia to the past when the British exercised a good deal of control over Tibet and he would have liked very much for India to take the place of the British of those days.”

Six years later, when the Chinese intruded in NEFA and Ladakh, the Prime Minister probably realised that Sinha was right, but it was too late. Ever since, every summer, the Chinese cross the line and ‘transgress’ into Indian territory.

(The writer is an expert on India-China relations and an author)

ramana
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby ramana » 27 Apr 2018 18:25


ramana
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby ramana » 27 Apr 2018 19:37

https://twitter.com/MEAIndia/status/989 ... 31138?s=19

delegation level talks with picture.

Note NaMo delegation members.


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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Postby ramana » 03 May 2018 19:36

Elizabeth Economy, A US scholar on China has written a new book

"The Third Revolution

Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State "


Image

One review;

In The Third Revolution, eminent China scholar Elizabeth C. Economy provides an incisive look at the transformative changes underway in China today. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has unleashed a powerful set of political and economic reforms: the centralization of power under Xi, himself, the expansion of the Communist Party’s role in Chinese political, social, and economic life, and the construction of a virtual wall of regulations to control more closely the exchange of ideas and capital between China and the outside world. Beyond its borders, Beijing has recast itself as a great power, seeking to reclaim its past glory and to create a system of international norms that better serves its more ambitious geostrategic objectives. In so doing, the Chinese leadership is reversing the trends toward greater political and economic opening, as well as the low-profile foreign policy that had been put in motion by Deng Xiaoping’s “Second Revolution” thirty years earlier. Through an exploration of Xi Jinping’s top political, economic, and foreign policy priorities—fighting corruption, managing the Internet, reforming the state-owned enterprise sector, improving the country’s innovation capacity, enhancing air quality, and elevating China’s presence on the global stage—Economy identifies the tensions, shortcomings, and successes of Xi’s reform efforts over the course of his first five years in office, assesses their implications for the rest of the world, and provides recommendations for how the United States and others should navigate their relationship with this vast nation in the coming years.


Her point is Xi Jin Ping is a different kind of Chinese leader and he has launched a new Chinese Revolution.

I wish I had sat down an written my thoughts for that was precisely my views too when I started this thread.!!!


One more review: https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/xi-jinp ... evolution/

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Re: The Xi Phenomenon

Postby SSridhar » 04 May 2018 21:32

ramana, I have not read that book, 'Third Revolution' yet. All in good time.

But, I will summarize my assessment of the Xi phenomenon.

The fact remains that Mao wanted to consolidate China after the revolution and eliminate threats from the periphery and from inside as well. Though China had wars with Russia, India and Vietnam during Mao's period, it was practically an inward-looking enterprise.

Mao's successor in the party, Deng, wanted to ensure that another Mao-like cult figure did not occupy the seat; removed the party from the task of governance and launched an export-based economy (through SEZs and some privatisation of state-owned enterprises, SOEs). Deng perhaps wanted to establish the Imperialistic China but was practical enough to wait. This was the second revolution. Jiang Zemin followed suit with a second economic revolution when liberalization was accelerated and doing business in China was tremendously eased for non-Chinese enterprises.

Neither Deng nor Jiang felt that they were indispensable. But, Xi has a diametrically opposite approach. Xi has undone Deng's political moves. He *is* the self-anointed cult figure; he has usurped all powers and has become stronger than the Chairman himself; he wants the Party to be ubiquitous - from controlling the government to formulating policies; he wants a consumer-based local economy while not giving up on the export-based economy though there is now realization that the latter is no longer sustainable. If Hu Jintao wanted to relax party's hold on China (which was strongly opposed by Jiang), Xi has gone in the opposite direction and has even surpassed Jiang in making CPC the most authoritative entity. Xi has been a quintessential party man and it was his putting down of the Shanghai corruption scandal in 2005-2006 that catapulted him within the party and to the position he holds now. Even then, he only narrowly beat his opponent, Li Keqiang (the Hu man who is now a dummy Premier). Therefore, it is remarkable that he has accumulated all the power and reached a seemingly unassailable pinnacle today. (Xi has a reputation for being an anti-corruption crusader though he has also used it to smother opposition to him as well.)

Xi's concept of 'China Dream' which he has successfully sold to the CPC as well as the people at large is premised on four pillars, viz., the centrality of CPC, Chinese nationalism (which includes Chinese Pride or, in other words establishing a worldwide Middle Kingdom), launching of a third economic revolution (which includes not only the bread-and-butter BRI but also emerging areas such as AI apart from innovation etc) and fourthly displacing the US as the sole superpower (though the last is couched in terms of military might, modernization etc).

Xi is completely convinced of his belief systems, namely China will & shall be the benign sole superpower and Sinification is the panacea for all ills of the world and his actions would achieve the China Dream for his citizens. He has no compunction in smashing any opposition on the way, in order to achieve that.

But, he is well aware of how some other genuine attempts fell by the wayside and the leader had to exit unceremoniously, especially in the FSU. He is supposed to have expressed Gorbachev's 'glasnost' that led to his downfall in meetings of the inner circles of the Party. That is another reason that he has accumulated all powers, has stuffed all positions with hand-picked loyalists and has made the party stronger. This also underpins his 'social credit' scheme for Chinese citizens. That's the 'centrality of the CPC', his first principle. He is cleverly claiming that the CPC is the natural inheritor of Chinese culture!

As for nationalism, his second principle, it is nothing new. It is something that all Chinese leaders have always attempted. There is a draconian Chinese law in existence for decades now that awards death as the only punishment for anyone who concedes Chinese territory to the enemy. Something akin to Blasphemy in Islam. For a communist country, the number of card-carrying communists is low in China, less than a hundred million. For the Chinese, social-engineered by Confucius and the imperial dynasties, nationalism is thoroughly accepted as an essential part of life and harmony. What Xi has done though, to differentiate his purpose of nationalism, is to effectively intertwine three ideas: his by-now Constitutionally enshrined 'socialism with Chinese characteristics', the need to avenge the 'Century of Shame' and of course, the hoary concept of 'Middle Kingdom'.

Xi's clever economic advisors have suggested to him that the Chinese economic efforts should drastically alter their trajectory as the cost arbitrage effects that so far sustained its export-oriented mass production is irreversibly strained. This forms therefore his third pillar. So, Xi is embarking on three aspects now: domestic consumption-driven economy, knowledge-driven economy and the services sector. All three of them are relatively new to the practices that China had followed so far. Xi has specially focussed therefore on science, technology & innovation.

The fourth, but not the least of the four, is to make China replace the US as the sole pole. Xi has dished out deadlines too for various milestones. His deadline for this replacement is 2049, the hundredth year of the establishment of Communist China. Deng & Jiang might have entertained the very same idea too, but they never showed it. Xi is brash about it and that is another significant difference.

Simply put, no Chinese leader before him has undertaken such sweeping changes both domestically & internationally, not taken so many enemies all around, and not so openly attempted to establish the worldwide dominance of China. That's the third revolution.


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