Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

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Rudradev
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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Rudradev » 11 Feb 2021 12:50

Means "pivot to Asia" is toast.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby NRao » 11 Feb 2021 19:18

"Pivot to Asia" is the golden egg for US MIC. Biden has no say in that matter.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby nvishal » 11 Feb 2021 19:45

Rudradev wrote:Means "pivot to Asia" is toast.

What does "pivot to Asia" mean?

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Rudradev » 11 Feb 2021 22:13

Google it in relation to Obama's foreign and security policy. Essentially moving focus away from middle east (as it was during Bush years) to Western Pacific, Indo-Pacific etc.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Rudradev » 11 Feb 2021 22:35

NRao wrote:"Pivot to Asia" is the golden egg for US MIC. Biden has no say in that matter.


He seems to. Consider:

https://www.politico.com/newsletters/po ... ons-491709

'Extreme competition' is now the watchword in U.S.-China relations
By DAVID WERTIME 02/11/2021 08:41 AM EST

The frosty silence your host described between Washington and Beijing last week has quickly turned into what might be called frosty dialogue. President Joe Biden and Chinese ruler Xi Jinping had a call Wednesday evening, U.S. time, on the cusp of China’s major Lunar New Year holiday. The White House readout stressed Biden's focus on American interests, maintaining a "free and open Indo-Pacific," and Washington's "fundamental concerns" over the situations in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and "assertive actions" toward Taiwan. Analysts were generally quick to praise the readout for namechecking major U.S. complaints.

Beijing's readout, which appeared as the top headline on state mouthpiece People's Daily, was longer, less specific and more conciliatory in tone, with a focus on controlling and isolating areas of “disagreement.” It predictably referred to Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Taiwan as "internal affairs." Xi also called for the re-establishment of "various dialogue mechanisms." Perhaps with this point in mind, Biden stressed in a post-call tweet that "I will work with China when it benefits the American people." The implication: when, and only when. Call it “America First 2.0,” without the shredding of alliances the term came to connote under Trump.

Secretary of State Tony Blinken and top Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi also a had a call last Friday, widely understood as a precursor to the Biden-Xi call, although the readouts differed so widely that they seem to describe two different conversations, with Washington stressing the need to “hold the PRC accountable for its efforts to threaten stability in the Indo-Pacific” and Beijing “[urging] the United States to rectify its mistakes.” Viewed against that benchmark, Biden’s call on Wednesday was a mild improvement.


White House Readout of Biden-Xi call: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-roo ... -of-china/

Beijing Readout of Biden-Xi call: http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0 ... 28755.html

Few things to note: the report is from David Wertime, who is very much a pro-China voice projected by Beijing to advance Chinese interests in US media, think-tank and policymaking circles. LinkedIn:
David is building Protocol | China, a news and information service backed by the publisher of POLITICO and focused on the people, power and politics of Chinese technology, and how those factors impact U.S. tech and society. We're hiring for multiple roles. Learn more here: http://www.protocol.com/china



More appearances of Biden's conciliatory behavior towards China from the Politico report:
POTUS: We’re in an era of “extreme competition” with China. In a Sunday interview with CBS, Biden called Xi “bright” and “tough,” but also profoundly undemocratic. “I’ve said to him all along that we need not have a conflict. But there’s going to be extreme competition. And I’m not going to do it the way that he knows. And that’s because he’s sending signals, as well. I’m not going to do it the way Trump did. We’re going to focus on international rules of the road.

Key to competition: leverage. Blinken told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer on Monday that “We have to engage China from a position of strength. And whether it’s the adversarial aspects of the relationship, the competitive ones, or the cooperative ones which are there in our mutual interest, we have to deal with it from a position of strength.”

"Strategic competition is the frame through which we see that relationship,” State Department spokesperson Ned Price said on Friday, which suggests Blinken's ordering of terms — adversarial, competitive, then cooperative — is not accidental.

The forced sale of social media app TikTok has been shelved. The Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday that the sale, which the Trump administration said it would force to ensure data security on the Chinese-owned platform, was on hold “indefinitely” as Biden undertakes "a broad review of his predecessor’s efforts to address potential security risks from China.” The plan is to “develop a comprehensive approach to securing U.S. data that addresses the full range of threats we face,” National Security Council spokeswoman Emily Horne told the Journal.


To me this suggests that Biden Raj is hankering for a reset and rapprochement with China (probably egged on by Wall Street interests with investments there). Meanwhile Xi is (for the moment) doing the same thing he did during Modi's initial outreach-- his statements are somewhat conciliatory but his actions are provocative. He wants to see if Biden will call him out for duplicity.

Every indication so far is that Biden will turn a blind eye to the provocations, and take Xi at his word on all matters of serious policy. Meanwhile Biden will continue mouthing inanities about "human rights issues" in the vain hope that this will gain him some leverage-- it will not, because it's an open secret that the US will never actually take action regarding these issues.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Rudradev » 11 Feb 2021 22:52

Another report from Natasha Bertrand (who is more of a genuine journalist and less of a China-mouthpiece like Wertime)

https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/1 ... all-468544

Biden confronts China’s Xi in first call
The new administration staked out a hard line on human rights and coercive trade practices, while opening the door for collaboration on climate and Covid-19.

President Joe Biden held his first official phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Wednesday night, marking an end to weeks of conspicuous silence between the leaders.
...

The call, which came three weeks after Biden’s inauguration, was the product of extensive consultations with U.S. allies in Europe and Asia about constructing a new China strategy, two senior administration officials said on Wednesday.

Biden had spoken to more than a dozen other heads of state, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, before calling Xi, raising questions about whether Washington was giving Beijing a head start on ramming through its foreign policy and trade initiatives. The officials acknowledged that the new administration is “being very careful in our initial interactions with China,” but said the preparatory discussions with allies had put Biden in a “strong position” to negotiate with his Chinese counterpart.

The official argued that while there was “merit in the basic proposition” of a strategic competition with China, there were “deep problems”’ with how the Trump administration had gone about it—specifically, Trump’s reluctance to engage with key allies on the issue and bungling of the pandemic response.


In other words:
Trump is bad
Whatever Trump did was bad
Whatever Trump did regarding China was wrong
We must do the opposite of whatever Trump did regarding China
Therefore we must ignore all other inputs from the real world and aim to achieve a "reset" with Xi Jinping's China.

At some point of course the "reset" is going to go sour because Xi Jinping will continue to do whatever he wants with complete indifference to any terms agreed upon with Washington. At some (even later) point the Biden administration is going to slowly realize that they have been hoodwinked by their own eagerness for a reset. By the time the blinkers fall off and enough thought is put into recalibrating China policy it will be time for the next Presidential election.

What does this mean for India?

Well, over the last week Lloyd Austin spoke to Rajnath Singh, Anthony Blinken spoke to S Jaishankar, and Joe Biden spoke to Modiji. Yesterday Rajnath Singh ji announced that there is going to be a pull-back of troops from their positions at the Pangong Tso shoreline (at the very least). Connecting the dots, it seems that the new US administration may have discouraged India from continuing with its resolute military posture at LAC.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby NRao » 11 Feb 2021 23:10

What is new in that narrative? Trump WRT China was bad for Wall Street. That is nothing to be surprised about, or is it? Biden is bending to Dimon (visited WH last week) and Wall Street. In Trump era it was Steve Mnuchin (and Elain Chao) who batted for China, but managed to keep it under the radar. Biden gives Wall Street to reset the supply chain that was leaving China (because of Trump's policies? Perhaps)



However, do not discount the DoD. Let us see what compromise they arrive at in filling the various spots within the DoD. Recall the first SecDef option - for Biden (and Hillary) - was Flournoy (of sink *all* Chinese (not just PLA) ships in SCS in 72 hrs fame). Austin is not too far behind - but he does not have a game plan like she had. There are some who want USN to take over some islands in the SCS, or at least unload a boat load of ammo!!!!

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby NRao » 11 Feb 2021 23:20

Well, over the last week Lloyd Austin spoke to Rajnath Singh, Anthony Blinken spoke to S Jaishankar, and Joe Biden spoke to Modiji. Yesterday Rajnath Singh ji announced that there is going to be a pull-back of troops from their positions at the Pangong Tso shoreline (at the very least). Connecting the dots, it seems that the new US administration may have discouraged India from continuing with its resolute military posture at LAC.


Hmmm.....

I thought India got what she wanted - a pull back by both India and China. Are you saying only India is pulling back? IF only India is pulling back, then I can agree that the US pressure is in play. But, if both nations are pulling back, then that is what India wanted.

FWIW: I had tried to find out if the pull back applied to Depsang too and got back a response (from an Amm admi) that the pull back even from Pangong Tso was only for armour - I took it to mean that the troops stay put (on hill tops)

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Cyrano » 11 Feb 2021 23:33

Rudradev ji,
What did Trump actually do to contain China besides just screaming China-China-China virus? Instead of walking out of WHO he should have wrested back control and got the Chinese stooge fired, should have rammed a bunch of inspectors down the dragon's throat last March itself etc etc. but would have taken too much focus and effort. I've not seen the details of the trade deal that he signed with China, but seeing no one from either side is talking about it, I'm inclined to think either Chinese are a bit better off or made some inconsequential concessions - a piece of candy to keep the petulant lad quiet.

The strengthening of Quad, sustained military deployment in South China Sea, rapprochement with India are a result of continued policies supported by career officers in the Pentagon (besides Shinjo Abe's push), though Trump can take some credit for not **cking everything up while being consumed by his re-election in Y4.

Having listened to some recent WH briefings and Q&A on this subject, my reading is this:
Biden Admin doesn't want to take on China on its own like Trump did, ignoring US Allies. They seem to think that US putting up lone resistance while EU is signing trade deals is not good. They also do not want to limit the issues with China to trade & tariffs and on Covid optics - both of which are beyond prime utility now. That said, they don't have a complete grasp of the various competition/threat areas with China TODAY and how things have changed since Obama days. Under Trump, intelligence briefings and strategic assessments were reduced to 3 slides with 2 bullet points each, so the officaldom has to be kicked out of slumber and bad habits of the past 4 years. So Biden admin will buy some time and talk about human rights, democracy and keep things as they are on Taiwan. The newly announced Taskforce for China policy will reach out to EU, Japan, US, Korea, India and others to come up with a revised assessment in a few months (April/May I think) and that will help set the future course. India has to be active and influence this exercise with it diplomats and experts.

I don't see what Biden has to gain by getting India to back off on the borders, nor India by acquiescing to it, even assuming NaMo is willing to do it against national interest and risk massive loss of support internally while the farm laws fire is still burning. Just connecting events is equating concurrence with correlation and causation, unless you have some more analysis/insight to share.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Rudradev » 12 Feb 2021 00:08

Cyrano ji, the merits of Trump's approach to China can be debated indefinitely. There is no question, however, that certain very specific signaling from the Trump administration's Pentagon came into play during the standoff, notably the deployment of B2 bombers to Diego Garcia (presumably as a deterrent against China escalating with an SRBM/CM barrage upon our positions along the Kailash ridge lines, or worse). Indian defence experts have attested to this. So yes, there were visible indications that the Trump administration was going to back us to the hilt if push came to shove-- and very likely a lot more happening beyond public view as well.

Today we find ourselves in a position where after having borne the brunt of a difficult and dangerous deployment through the harshest of winter, Indian troops are being pulled back. We are told Chinese troops are also to be pulled back (though of course, whether they actually are isn't under our control, and PLA is hardly the most trustworthy of interlocutors).

We have also been told only about Indian troops being pulled back to the Finger 3 area on the Pangong Tso shoreline, while the Chinese have supposedly committed to pulling back past Finger 8 on their side. Nothing has been said about the tactically valuable Kailash heights overlooking Spanggur bowl that Indian troops occupied in a surprise move last August-September: after spending all winter up there, are we pulling back from there too, or are we continuing to hold those? In addition, nothing has been said about Depsang-DBO, Demchok, or any other sector where things were looking hairy at different points last year.

So yes, many questions remain open on what exactly we are pulling back, from where, and why. And of course, there's the question of why a high-profile announcement of pullback from Raksha Mantri ji was called for in the event.

In the absence of a fly-on-the-wall recording device, correlation between the timing of conversations between US & Indian officials and the timing of the withdrawal announcement is the best I have to go on. All one can do is try and contextualize this in terms of other public-domain information, including official statements by the Biden administration to indicate the direction of their (long-awaited, haltingly articulated) China policy.

In terms of the overall question of "did India want to pull back?" Sure we did, in general terms, because such deployments are difficult and expensive to maintain-- but surely not without assurances that China would also pull back to mutually agreed-upon positions in a verifiable manner.

Therefore one of three things is likely to have happened: (1) Some mutually acceptable mechanism of verification and assurance has been established regarding troop positions between India and China; (2) Some third party or parties acceptable to both India and China have stepped in to offer their good offices for monitoring and verification of troop positions; or (3) India no longer has the level of assurance that we once did of allied support in the event of things taking an escalatory turn, and in recalculating contingencies, has determined the best available option is to accept a face-saving climbdown on the best terms we can get... at least for now.

Because (1) is improbable given the existing trust deficit and (2) is virtually impossible, it seems to me that the third possibility is most likely. We have recalibrated our posture based on loss of assurances from an ally or allies that we were counting on previously, necessitating a new assessment of risk levels. Beyond that, of course, everything is correlation. But it's also the best information that (I, at least) have.
Last edited by Rudradev on 12 Feb 2021 00:25, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Cyrano » 12 Feb 2021 00:25

India no longer has the level assurance that we once did of allied support in the event of things taking an escalatory turn, and in recalculating contingencies, has determined the best available option is to accept a face-saving climbdown on the best terms we can get.


India did not get into this confrontation based on assurances of US support, though any support in terms of public statements, intelligence sharing is welcome. After occupying Kailash range and the heights above Finger 4, which effectively put Chinese aggression into a cul de sac, GoI will no way fritter away the tactical advantages gained.

RM Rajnath's statement on disengagement raises a lot of questions, hopefully more info will come out in the coming days. We should take this line further on the Mil Forum thread.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Rudradev » 12 Feb 2021 00:32

India did not "get into this confrontation" in a day either. Patrolling and interception led to more aggressive patrolling, which led to the establishment of temporary and then more permanent-looking infrastructure at various locations. The buildup on both sides occurred over several months.

If we did not have assurances of US support on the first day of confrontation in Ladakh (which itself is hardly a certainty, given the prologue of Doklam)-- it is perfectly reasonable to assume that we had acquired substantial assurances by August-September 2020, when we seized heights in the Kailash range and the B2s were deployed as a signal.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Rudradev » 12 Feb 2021 00:50

One possibility of course is that India has not pulled back at all but in fact reinforced existing positions with the capacity to push further; and that Rajnath Ji's statement of disengagement is, some form of "अश्वत्थामा हताहत, नरोवा कुंजरोवा” :mrgreen:

Internally, it's not really much of a political risk for RM to make such a statement-- after all, the Pappu-jeevis are going to wail that we are scared of (and losing to) the Chinese no matter what, and their credibility is thin to say the least.

Externally, it stymies pro-China voices in the Biden administration (and also other Quad and/or EU administrations) from making the case that India is the one behaving provocatively and aggressively here. We can point back to this statement and say "we openly declared at the highest level that we wanted disengagement. But PLA didn't go along with the selfless overture we made in the interest of international peace and stability, so we're staying put, vely solly".

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Y I Patel » 12 Feb 2021 01:13

RM is known to choose words very carefully, so I am very intrigued that IA is pulling back from South Bank of Pangong Tso.

I know India has occupied positions on the North Bank, and also on the Kailash Range. I also know Rechin La is several kilometers away from the South Bank of Spangur Tso. So can someone please enlighten me what positions IA held on the South Bank of Pangong Tso?

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby NRao » 12 Feb 2021 01:26

China Is Creating a New Master Race

* "U.S. intelligence shows that China has conducted human testing on members of the People's Liberation Army in hope of developing soldiers with biologically enhanced capabilities," wrote then Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe, in a December 3 Wall Street Journal op-ed titled "China Is National Security Threat No. 1."

* All these Chinese moves are meant to obtain "biological dominance." "There are," as Ratcliffe noted, "no ethical boundaries to Beijing's pursuit of power."

* The experiment evoked the eugenics program of the Third Reich to create a "master race."

* Shenzhen's He [Jenkui], after an international uproar caused by news of his dangerous and unethical work, was fined and jailed for "illegally carrying out human embryo gene-editing," but in the Communist Party's near-total surveillance state he obviously had state backing for his experiments.... Beijing's prosecution of He, therefore, looks like an attempt to cool down the furor and prevent the international scientific community from further inquiry into China's activities.

* "What is most disturbing about these endeavors is that China has gleaned access to CRISPR and advanced genetic and biotech research, thanks to their relationship with the United States and other advanced Western nations. American research labs, biotech investors, and scientists have all striven to do research and business in China's budding biotech arena... because the ethical standards for research... are so low." — Brandon Weichert, author of The Weichert Report and Winning Space, interview with Gatestone Institute, February 2021.

...................


Greed.

Wall Street mentality.

Even Elon Musk has mentioned it is easier to work with the Chinese. And, that the Chinese are ahead in AI.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Cyrano » 12 Feb 2021 01:43

if we are speculating, might as well speculate that NaMo told Biden that American lefty support to farmer agitation has pissed him off, and he will attack across the border to get some political space, which alarmed Biden and he agreed to squeeze Xi's mustard grains hard enough that the Chinese agreed to back off and allow India to disengage !

Howz that for a change? :)

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby asgkhan » 12 Feb 2021 15:18

https://twitter.com/aajtak/status/1359928236537380864

Hmmm, so MEA mandarins were dictating the response to limp dcik cheenis for every trangressions. Need to get the names of these anti-national yellow bellied bustards who were responsible for the mess and loss of land.

Bikram Singh is dropping quite a few pearls in this interview.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Rsatchi » 12 Feb 2021 16:15

Cyrano wrote:if we are speculating, might as well speculate that NaMo told Biden that American lefty support to farmer agitation has pissed him off, and he will attack across the border to get some political space, which alarmed Biden and he agreed to squeeze Xi's mustard grains hard enough that the Chinese agreed to back off and allow India to disengage !

Howz that for a change? :)

No wonder the 'Dimwit Old/Young' Leader is calling NaMo coward etc!!!
Either Leftist/Soros bile venting or Chini/Pindi Chana gas belching :lol: :lol:
Take your pick

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby darshan » 13 Feb 2021 00:45

Does US want to compete with chinese rather than defeat and destroy chinese?

Biden quietly nixes Trump-era rule combating Chinese Communist-funded 'propaganda' centers
https://www.campusreform.org/article?id=16784
President Donald Trump tried to enact a policy that would put pressure on American universities to reveal cooperation with China’s Confucius Institute.
On January 26, President Biden quietly nixed the policy.
A spokesperson for ICE confirmed to Campus Reform that the policy was rescinded.
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoDetails?rrid=131811
...

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby SSridhar » 14 Feb 2021 21:01

From SupChina

Chinese officials appear to believe that there’s a decline of manliness among the nation’s overprotected schoolboys: The country’s National Ministry of Education in January issued a set of guidelines (in Chinese) that contains four fitness- and health-related measures to enhance teenage boys’ “masculine energy.”

The Ministry’s plan was a response to a proposal last year from Sī Zéfū 斯泽夫, a delegate of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the country’s top political advisory body, which raised concerns about the “feminization of teenage boys in China,” saying that their “unmasculine qualities” could jeopardize “the development and survival” of China if left untreated.

In its reply to Si’s proposal, the ministry concurred that Chinese teenage boys have become increasingly feminine, lacking physical strength and willpower to overcome adversities.

While most social media users who commented on the news agreed that getting teenagers to exercise regularly is beneficial regardless of gender, many people criticized the ministry for reinforcing old-fashioned gender norms.

“The ministry should offer support and guidance to boys who are confronting outdated notions of masculinity, rather than shaming them and asking them to behave in certain ways that it wants them to,” a Weibo user wrote (in Chinese).

Chinese authorities have long been obsessed with the idea that there’s a crisis of masculinity among adolescent boys and young men in China. Over the years, the government has proposed a variety of solutions to this perceived problem, including distributing textbooks purporting to teach schoolboys how to act manly and encouraging schools to hire more male teachers.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Philip » 15 Feb 2021 19:04

The ET have a few reports on the drawback of forces in the Fingers area, Galwan,etc., happening but will take time,etc.
An idea struck me. The LAC is not marked, both sides having differing perceptions. Where there is general agreemeng and fven in the contested areas, we could erect a large pavilion where at regular intervals, perhaps monthly, officers froom both sides could meet cordially and enjoy a nice lunch.The Chinese with Chin food and our crowd Indian delicacies, drinking chai too. These pavilions dotting the LAC could be looked at as informal points of agreement and stringing the dots together could at least underscore traditional patrol areas. It however takes 2 hands to clap and requires considerable give and take. But these regular buffets I feel could fo a lot to teduce the tension.

Meanwhile,we still (mis) trust and verify and keep our powder dry.
With the increased US military activity the PRC and its Xitler is mighty worried that it is going to be squeezed in its own backyard by the US &Co. with India bayoneting Xitler in his rear.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby darshan » 18 Feb 2021 17:38

One more February and one more buying spree in US that will result in lot of imports. This time it's due to winter damages and various utility overhauls. What will be the import share from china?

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby NRao » 18 Feb 2021 19:35

asgkhan wrote:https://twitter.com/aajtak/status/1359928236537380864

Hmmm, so MEA mandarins were dictating the response to limp dcik cheenis for every trangressions. Need to get the names of these anti-national yellow bellied bustards who were responsible for the mess and loss of land.

Bikram Singh is dropping quite a few pearls in this interview.


A few months back I bumped into a rather well known author on Indian defense related topics. One of his comments still haunts me. He mentioned that one of the reasons why the mountain strike Corp (facing China) was not fully staffed (there is a better word that escapes me) was because the MEA felt they could better control China through diplomacy and did everything to keep this Corp from full staffing. MMS Era.

Under Modi this has changed. In fact, as mentioned in that clip, one Corp facing West has been tasked to face East too.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby asgkhan » 18 Feb 2021 21:10

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gLX3Mtw ... e=emb_logo

Northern Army Commander Lt Gen YK Joshi during the interview mentions that prior to the cowardly attack on our boys in Galwan, we had only 2 battalions worth of men guarding the border.

Now they have 95000 + troops, fully equipped, logistically supplied and adapted to the conditions on the border. If this is not a facepalm moment for winnie da poo, I dont know what is.

Army should gradually ramp up with enough equipment (preferably desi) to keep springing surprises on these femboys. The biggest fear of these ****** addicted wolf warriors is to see the sugarbois coming back in inferior quality body bags.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby nam » 19 Feb 2021 00:45

2 battalion in 2010. Then 30K in peace time. Post build up 90K.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby darshan » 19 Feb 2021 21:18

One batti at a time. It would also be helpful if within Indian parliament, Modi govt provides explanation about how and why for each batti so public also knows names of decision makers.

Assam Agarbatti Unit To Curb Import, Generate Jobs
https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/assa ... erate-jobs
In a major step towards achieving Aatmanirbhar Bharat goals, an agarbatti (incense sticks) making unit, Keshari Bio Products, was inaugurated in Assam to increase local production through the Prime Minister Employment Generation Programme.

Setting up of these units in Assam assumes great significance in the wake of Narendra Modi government’s decision to restrict import of raw agarbatti from China and Vietnam, and also a hike in import duty on round bamboo sticks for agarbatti.

The initiatives would curb the huge import of agarbatti and bamboo sticks that had crippled the Indian agarbatti industry.

Apart from making agarbatti, a huge quantity of waste bamboo would be utilised to make bio-fuel and various other products – a major example of a ‘waste to wealth’ effort.

It is noteworthy that only 16 per cent of bamboo is being used to make agarbatti while the remaining 84 per cent of bamboo goes waste.
...

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Hari Seldon » 20 Feb 2021 17:33

China: The bubble that never pops. What Beijing gets right.

Interesting read, more from an econ POV however.


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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Rudradev » 23 Feb 2021 02:56

US Establishment view:

China Is the Myanmar Coup’s ‘Biggest Loser’

A relationship decades in the making is now in jeopardy.

https://www.theatlantic.com/internation ... na/618101/


China, Myanmar’s largest neighbor, maintained cozy relations with the previous junta for decades, even as Western countries cut off contact and imposed withering economic sanctions, isolating the country and throwing unwavering support behind the opposition leader and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. When Myanmar’s generals began cautiously opening up the country a decade ago, the move brought a rush of new foreign businesses, eager to move into a long-closed, underdeveloped market, as well as renewed diplomatic ties. China’s near monopoly on Myanmar appeared all but finished.

Thus, the military’s return to power in the country, popular thinking seemed to go, would be welcomed by China, happy to see itself again as Myanmar’s staunchest ally in a drastically depleted pool of diplomatic friends.
...The more isolated Myanmar becomes, the better for Chinese exploitation.

Yet this narrative, although enticingly straightforward in a country where little is, is a dramatic oversimplification that ignores numerous factors: the coup’s destabilizing effects, including on major Chinese-backed projects; the Burmese military’s long-held wariness of China, including the junta leader’s personal distrust; and perhaps most important, the surprisingly friendly relationship that the National League for Democracy, Suu Kyi’s party, had cultivated with Beijing. A sharp rise in anti-Chinese sentiment in the days since the military’s takeover has made quick work of years of confidence building between Suu Kyi, a once-vaunted prodemocracy icon, and her authoritarian neighbor. The undercurrents of Sinophobia held at bay as she touted China as an ally have come flooding back with her detention by the military.

...
Geopolitically, “China is the biggest loser from this coup,” Enze Han, an associate professor at the University of Hong Kong who studies China’s relationship with Myanmar, told me. “The PR that it has done to improve its image over the past five years working with the NLD has all gone to waste.” Last Tuesday, the Chinese ambassador to Myanmar appeared to back this position, saying “the current development in Myanmar is absolutely not what China wants to see,” though, as is common with Chinese diplomatic statements, he left room for interpretation. He also dismissed rumors that China had aided the military, saying he hoped people could “distinguish right from wrong and guard against political manipulation, so as to avoid undermining the friendship between the two peoples.”

...
Through the more than two decades that followed [the 1990 military coup in which Suu Kyi's election victory was overturned] —China remained the junta’s staunchest backer.

Then, prompted in part by a wariness of China’s dominance, the military began a calibrated reentry into the broader world.
The generals understood that “the more isolated they are, the more dependent they will be [on China] and the more influence China will exert over their country,” Yun Sun, the director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, in Washington D.C., told me. In 2011, a year after a quasi-civilian government was elected, the administration suspended a highly contentious Chinese-backed dam project that had met fierce resistance from ethnic groups and Suu Kyi. The same year, Suu Kyi met a Chinese ambassador for the first time since her final meeting with Cheng. Ambassadorial appointments are rarely noteworthy affairs, but the discussion garnered headlines in the international press and Chinese state media.

Cautiously, China began to adapt.
...
Beijing, perhaps sensing that Suu Kyi’s immense popularity would translate into victory at the polls two years later, began courting members of her party. While not as brazen as other countries, which seconded diplomats to Suu Kyi’s office and had little time for the ruling administration, China invited NLD officials on nationwide tours. Beijing also undertook public outreach, much of it around highly contentious projects, and although not always the most sophisticated or successful, those efforts marked a change in tactics. When Suu Kyi’s party won in a landslide, China’s outreach accelerated. “It turns out that China can work very well with the NLD government,” Sun said, “probably even better than with the military government.”

The NLD’s enthusiasm was not matched by the military’s, however. Although China is the largest arms supplier to Myanmar, the military suspects Beijing's involvement in the country’s multitude of internal conflicts. The issue is particularly personal for Min Aung Hlaing, the junta leader and commander in chief of Myanmar’s armed forces, who in 2009 commanded forces along the Chinese border against an ethnic Chinese minority rebel group, driving tens of thousands across the border into China. The group’s leader resurfaced five years later in The Global Times, a Chinese state newspaper, sparking speculation that Beijing was providing a haven for him and his troops, who launched renewed attacks against Myanmar shortly after.

Min Aung Hlaing “chafed at China’s role in Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations,” a former senior diplomat who has met him on multiple occasions told me, asking not to be named because of the current political situation. “I did not see him as particularly friendly to China.” The suspicion extends beyond just one general: The military complained last year to Chinese President Xi Jinping about China’s financing of rebel groups, a charge that Xi denied.


There are, however, points of agreement: When Myanmar was receiving full-throated criticism from other countries over its treatment of the Rohingya minority in Rakhine State, China backed the military and Suu Kyi’s narrative that the allegations were overblown and the authorities were responding to a terrorist threat (despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary) :roll: . “Myanmar values China’s understanding of the Rakhine issue, which is complicated and delicate,” Suu Kyi said during a trip to China in 2017. Beijing, along with Moscow, stood by Myanmar at the United Nations, shielding it from the harshest condemnation. China’s position appears to have been doubly beneficial to Myanmar, as the U.S. was reportedly reluctant to declare the Rohingya crisis a genocide for fear of driving Myanmar toward China. [b]Myanmar, for its part, aligned with China on Beijing’s priority issues of Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan, and last year threw its support behind China’s implementation of a sweeping national-security law in Hong Kong, meant to snuff out the city’s prodemocracy protests.

This lack of “moral judgment,” as Sun described it, offered Beijing an economic opening.
...

The [NLD] government at the time signed highly secretive contracts for dozens of projects as part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, a grand plan of connectivity meant to link China to strategic points via Myanmar. These projects, worth billions of dollars, are now likely facing delays as the country roils with protests and civil-disobedience movements meant to disrupt government operations and services, again raising questions as to why Beijing would prefer working with the military.
...
The tensions, and the opportunities, between Myanmar and China are particularly pronounced in Kachin State, where logging and jade mining of varying degrees of legality are prevalent, and the spoils spirited over the border. Recently a border dispute with China and ever-expanding banana plantations run by Chinese firms have caused consternation.

Many in Kachin felt that Suu Kyi’s government was “selling out the whole country” to China, Khon Ja, a longtime activist who lives in the area, told me. But at the same time, she said, Myanmar had to deal with the economic realities of being a poorer, less developed country in the shadow of a rising power. “They don’t like Chinese companies,” she said, “but there are no other options.”

Su San, a 24-year-old medical student, told me that no one should trust what China says and that the military wouldn’t have dared act without China’s blessing. As long as Myanmar was moving toward democracy, she said, Beijing would try to forestall it. “It is,” she added, “a curse for Myanmar to be a neighbor of China.”


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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby darshan » 26 Feb 2021 18:48

At least we know that it will be chinese stoking US moving forward. Good job chinese for getting hold of American dolls.
China forces US diplomats to undergo anal swab tests, Biden administration calls it undignified: Reports
https://www.opindia.com/2021/02/china-a ... d-reports/
On Thursday, the Chinese government promised the United States government that they will stop carrying out anal swab tests on US diplomats to test for Covid-19 after Washington complained that such practices were ‘undignified’, as per reports.

According to reports in US media, the US State Department had protested with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Thursday after the Chinese authorities had subjected US diplomats to anal swab tests for Covid-19.

The authorities in a few Chinese provinces have been ordering anal swabs for people under quarantine, including travellers from abroad. China has now reportedly enforced anal swab tests for Covid-19 as they think throat or nasal swabs can miss infections
....

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby NRao » 27 Feb 2021 11:05

U.S. to Impose Sweeping Rule Aimed at China Technology Threats

By John D. McKinnon
Updated Feb. 26, 2021 6:10 pm ET

WASHINGTON—The Biden administration plans to allow a sweeping Trump-era rule aimed at combating Chinese technology threats to take effect next month, over objections from U.S. businesses, according to people familiar with the matter.

The rule, initially proposed in November, enables the Commerce Department to ban technology-related business transactions that it determines pose a national security threat, part of an effort to secure U.S. supply chains. Companies in technology, telecommunications, finance and other industries say the rule could stifle innovation and hurt competitiveness, and had expected it to be delayed as the administration undertakes a broad review of U.S. policy on Chinese technology.

Now the administration is planning to go forward with the rule, the people said. Administration officials are concerned that blocking or diluting the rule would send the wrong message about the new administration’s approach to China, potentially fueling criticism that it is taking a weaker approach, according to the people.

One person familiar with the matter said administration officials have signaled to the business community that they won’t enforce the rule aggressively. That could soften the impact, although business representatives say the rule will still subject firms—especially smaller ones—to significant new compliance costs and uncertainty. Another person familiar with the matter said the administration hasn’t said it would hold back in enforcing the rule.

A Commerce Department representative said the agency continues to accept public comment on the rule through March 22, adding that the rule becomes final then.

“Trustworthy information and communications technology and services are essential to our national and economic security and remain a top priority for the Biden/Harris administration,” the representative said.

The White House didn’t respond to requests to comment.

The rule could affect as many as 4.5 million American businesses of all sizes, according to a Commerce Department estimate, potentially requiring them to get government clearance for purchases and deals involving sophisticated technology with what the regulation calls a “foreign adversary,” or face potential unwinding of the deals or other enforcement.

The new government oversight would apply to technology transactions involving critical U.S. infrastructure, networks and satellite operations, large data hosting operations, widely used internet connectivity software, and technology used in advanced computing, drones, autonomous systems or advanced robotics, according to a draft rule. It could affect sales or, in some circumstances, use of a technology.

In early January, then-President Donald Trump signed an executive order banning financial transactions with eight Chinese software companies, including Alipay.

The telecommunications and financial-services industries are viewed as particularly affected by the rule because they are heavy users of information-technology services and handle sensitive consumer data, but many other consumer-facing businesses also have a lot at stake.

The rule’s fate is being closely watched as a bellwether of the Biden administration’s policy direction on China. Washington has seen a solidifying consensus about the security and economic risks posed by Chinese tech equipment manufacturers and internet platforms. Republicans in Congress have grilled Biden cabinet nominees about taking a tough line on China.

Asked for comment, the Chinese Embassy in Washington referred to remarks by a Foreign Ministry spokesman in Beijing responding to President Biden’s order this week to review the security of supply chains for critical materials. The spokesman said that “altering economic law with political force is an unrealistic approach” that won’t solve domestic problems or benefit global supply chains.

Beijing has previously accused Washington of unfairly discriminating against Chinese companies and has tried to leverage access to the large Chinese market to pressure foreign businesses to ignore and lobby against U.S. restrictions.

Allowing the rule to go ahead could signal further trouble for U.S. businesses, which find themselves increasingly caught in the middle of Washington’s effort to confront China over its economic policies and Beijing’s retaliation for the U.S. moves.

The Trump administration issued bans on doing business with several Chinese tech giants ranging from telecommunications maker Huawei Technologies Co. to platforms such as WeChat, although some of those measures have been blocked by courts. It also sought to compel the Chinese owner of the short-video app TikTok to sell its U.S. operations to American companies, though that effort stalled and has been shelved for now.

The impending Commerce Department rule was in some respects the most far-reaching of the Trump administration actions against Chinese tech. It would give the department sweeping powers to require licenses for the wide range of technology transactions or to ban them outright.

Huawei, whose business has been crimped by previous U.S. restrictions and which could be hit again by the new rule, questioned the regulation’s legality in its comment, and urged the government to adopt a “holistic risk-management” approach instead of a “bar on specific participants.”

In recent weeks, business leaders have expected the rule to be postponed at least temporarily, as the Biden administration conducts a review of the Trump administration’s targeting of Chinese tech companies, according to several business representatives who are following the issue.

Many business leaders acknowledge the risks posed by technology from China and other adversary nations, and the need to address them. Those include stealing intellectual property, health data and personal financial information, as well as tracking Americans’ locations and conducting corporate espionage from inside the U.S., according to a draft of the rule.

Many business leaders worry that the new rule places too much of the responsibility for mitigating those risks on firms, along with potentially big costs and uncertainty. Some businesses worry they will be required to replace equipment already in use, for instance.

Total compliance costs could reach as much as $52 billion in the first year after implementation, according to the Commerce Department estimate, with annualized costs of as much as $20 billion.

Dozens of business groups, including several leading tech groups, have filed comments urging the administration to scale back or postpone the rule.

“We view the proposed rule as vague and highly problematic because as written, it would provide the department with nearly unlimited authority to intervene in virtually any commercial transaction between U.S. companies and their foreign counterparts that involves technology, with little to no due process, accountability, transparency, or coordination with other government programs that are also designed to protect national security,” one group of more than 30 business associations wrote in a letter in mid-January, just before President Biden took office. That group included major tech and foreign-trade associations as well as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, retailers, restaurants and electric utilities.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby SSridhar » 27 Feb 2021 11:10

Rudradev wrote:US Establishment view:

China Is the Myanmar Coup’s ‘Biggest Loser’
The [NLD] government at the time signed highly secretive contracts for dozens of projects as part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, a grand plan of connectivity meant to link China to strategic points via Myanmar. These projects, worth billions of dollars, are now likely facing delays as the country roils with protests and civil-disobedience movements meant to disrupt government operations and services, again raising questions as to why Beijing would prefer working with the military.

China has invested close to USD 20B in Myanmar.

China has commissioned, by c. 2015, a 2400 Km gas and oil pipeline from Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu and Maday island respectively to its Yunnan and Chongqing provinces. The carriers from West Asia disgorge at these ports for the 10 M tonne refinery in Yunnan. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) which was signed in September, 2018 will connect Kunming, the capital of China’s Hunan province to the Bay of Bengal at a deep sea port in Kyaukphyu, Rakhine State through a 1700-Km long rail-cum-road corridor that touches Mandalay and Yangon as well. The Myitsone Dam and the 810- Km long Kyakphyu-Kunming Railway (as part of the rail-cum-road project) projects remain suspended since c. 2011 & 2014 respectively over various concerns.

In June 2020, the Government of Myanmar formed a tribunal to investigate irregularities surrounding a controversial China-backed city development project, the Shwe Kokko urban development project, in Karen State that involves construction of villas and a controversial Casino. Earlier, the Myanmarese Auditor General had warned the government over continued dependence of the Chinese funds.


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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Manish_Sharma » 27 Feb 2021 19:57

Rudradev wrote:Another report from Natasha Bertrand (who is more of a genuine journalist and less of a China-mouthpiece like Wertime)

https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/1 ... all-468544


Well, over the last week Lloyd Austin spoke to Rajnath Singh, Anthony Blinken spoke to S Jaishankar, and Joe Biden spoke to Modiji. Yesterday Rajnath Singh ji announced that there is going to be a pull-back of troops from their positions at the Pangong Tso shoreline (at the very least). Connecting the dots, it seems that the new US administration may have discouraged India from continuing with its resolute military posture at LAC.


Bharat didn't bend to american pressure wrt S400 and CAATSAW, and wilted under pressure to pull back troops? difficult to digest.

If true than congratulations to BRFite biden-harris supporters cyrano amber types ....

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby Manish_Sharma » 27 Feb 2021 20:04

NRao wrote:
Hmmm.....

I thought India got what she wanted - a pull back by both India and China. Are you saying only India is pulling back? IF only India is pulling back, then I can agree that the US pressure is in play. But, if both nations are pulling back, then that is what India wanted.

FWIW: I had tried to find out if the pull back applied to Depsang too and got back a response (from an Amm admi) that the pull back even from Pangong Tso was only for armour - I took it to mean that the troops stay put (on hill tops)


Utterly disklike this guy but thought it should be dissected here:


On LAC, India partially achieved its political aim. Now, it must go for final settlement
India has forced stalemate on China but must finish the 1959 border business.

Lt Gen H S Panag (retd) 25 February, 2021 12:31 pm IST

Military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz famously said: “War is merely the continuation of politics by other means.” Thus, the starting point of a conflict or war is the political aim from which the strategic and operational-level military aims flow out. Tactical level is focused on a series of military actions/battles, synergised at the operational level to achieve the military aims. As per military theory, political aim must amplify the end state that is sought to be achieved.

Since nothing is absolute in war due to innumerable variables and a dynamic enemy, another relevant term is conflict termination — ending the conflict due to diminishing returns or for peace on favourable terms. Conflict termination is a very difficult decision for nations, particularly when political aim has either not been achieved or only partially achieved as it can have an adverse impact on national prestige, territorial integrity and domestic politics.

What we are witnessing in eastern Ladakh is conflict termination by India and China, with only partial achievement of political aims. This reflects statesmanship by the political leadership of both countries. Unfortunately, the current focus of the political and military leadership of both the extreme nationalism-driven civilisation States is on tactical triumphalism targeting the domestic audience to justify the compromises with respect to political aims. We can only hope that the leadership does not let the historic opportunity for lasting or at least better peace on the Himalayan borders go begging after six decades of conflict.

I analyse the progress of the disengagement process, rival political aims, their modification for conflict termination, and the way forward for better peace.

Progress of the disengagement process

India and China are on the cusp of diffusing the 11-month-old crisis in eastern Ladakh. The disengagement from the north and south bank of Pangong Tso, with a buffer zone between Finger 4 and Finger 8 where no patrolling deployment/development of infrastructure will take place, was completed smoothly on 19 February.

The 10th Corps Commander-level talks were held for 16 hours on 20 February at Moldo. The joint press release is indicative of similar disengagement likely taking place in Depsang Plains, Hot Springs-Gogra and Demchok in a few weeks after more deliberations on the modalities. This will be followed by verified deescalation from the battle zone. However, I must caution that having already withdrawn from the Kailash Range, we do not have any leverage left for negotiations for disengagement on favourable terms in the remaining areas.

In Hot Springs-Gogra, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) coincides with the 1959 Claim Line, and Chinese intrusions were due to our development of roads along Kugrang river and Changlung Nala that open up approaches to upper reaches of Galwan river. The Chinese are very sensitive to this developing threat and are likely to insist on a buffer zone or a moratorium on development of infrastructure to ward off the potential threat to upper reaches of Galwan river. This would be difficult for India to concede.

Negotiations with respect to Depsang Plains and Demchok are going to be even more problematic. In the northern half of Depsang Plains, from Karakoram to 6 km south of Chip Chap river, the LAC coincides with the 1959 Claim Line. In the southern half, the 1959 Claim Line is up to Bottle Neck/Y Junction, and the LAC is 18-23 km to the east — along Patrolling Points 10, 11, 12 and 13. East of Bottle Neck/Y Junction, the Chinese have prevented our patrolling since May 2020. The buffer zone will cover an area of approximately 600-800 square km. For India, this area is vital for the security of the entire Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) Sector as the choke point at Burtse is only 7 km from Bottle Neck/Y Junction. China views Depsang Plains as a launch pad for an Indian offensive into Aksai Chin, thus essential for its security.

In Demchok, the intrusion area is south of Demchok in Charding — Ninglung Nala. However, the 1959 Claim Line is up to Fukche almost 30 km to the west in the Indus Valley. From Demchok, China perceives a threat to Ngari, 60 km east of LAC, through which the Tibet-Xinjiang highway passes. China had captured the heights to the north of Demchok in 1962. By holding the heights to the north and south of Demchok, China can neutralise any Indian offensive. In my view, since Demchok, Fukche and Koyul Valley are inhabited, Chinese will not like to disturb these areas. It may agree to a buffer zone south of Demchok and agree to disagree on the 1959 Claim Line in the Indus Valley pending final settlement.

If during further negotiations, China adopts an absolute position and refuses to compromise with respect to disengagement in the remaining areas, then the conflict termination process would come to a grinding halt.

Why China opted for conflict termination

At the root of the current crisis is the area between the LAC — as perceived by India and as it existed at the time of the 1993 agreement — and China’s 1959 Claim Line for which the term (LAC) itself was coined. India never recognised this line. The coordinates of the alignment of this line were revealed during talks between officials of both countries held in 1960. This line is a marvel of terrain analysis as it foreclosed any potential threat to Aksai Chin and other areas that were usurped by China before and during the 1962 war. India had gradually started patrolling in these areas, beyond the 1959 Claim Line, as it adopted forward posture during and post-Sumdorong Chu incident in 1986-87. So long as India did not deploy troops or develop infrastructure in these areas peace prevailed. These areas of differing perceptions were only subject of talks held by Special Representatives and at Joint Secretary-level under the Joint Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs. There are 8-10 such areas in eastern Ladakh, the larger ones being in the southern half of Depsang Plains, between Finger 4 and Finger 8 north of Pangong Tso and Demchok area.

However, once India started developing border infrastructure in the vicinity of these areas and became more assertive in exercising its control, it was perceived by China as India’s new “forward policy” and a potential threat. The first indication of Chinese concerns manifested in Depsang Plains in 2013. Thereafter, the confrontations increased and led to unarmed jostling by rival troops in these areas. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government with effect from 2014 gave impetus to development of border infrastructure with special focus on these areas and political rhetoric highlighted its long-term intent to regain India’s lost territories. The Doklam crisis further alarmed China. This was the primary trigger for the current crisis in eastern Ladakh.

Apart from its long-term aim of imposing hegemony over India by undermining its international/regional status, China’s immediate political aim was securing the 1959 Claim Line in areas of differing perceptions to regain its strategic advantage and prevent development of border infrastructure. Militarily, its strategy was to preemptively secure these strategic areas and thereafter put the onus on India to escalate. I am surprised and disappointed that, politically and militarily, we did not anticipate this strategy. Both the political and military hierarchy are on record to admit that they still do not know why the Chinese precipitated this crisis.

Strategically surprising India, China secured these areas in May without firing a shot. However, India’s rapid overwhelming response to prevent further ingress, Galwan Valley incident of 15-16 June 2020, and securing of the dominating heights of Kailash Range, stalemated China. Despite having achieved its major terrain objectives, it could not impose its will on India and declare victory without escalating to a limited war that it did not want. A prolonged confrontation, in an extremely difficult terrain and climate, was offering diminishing returns. Keeping this in mind, it opted for conflict termination on as favourable terms as could be managed during negotiations.

So what has China achieved? Let there be no doubt that de facto it has secured the 1959 Claim Line in all areas except Demchok albeit with buffer zones. And empirically, buffer zones are an advantage for a superior power. India has been denied patrolling/deployment/infrastructure development and China, with its superior military power and better infrastructure, can always exercise strategic preemption. India as the weaker power will have to think twice before initiating such an action.

Why India opted for conflict termination

First, India had made a cardinal mistake of not deploying troops before developing infrastructure in sensitive areas, thereby offering a low-cost option for preemption. Second, it made the mistake of politically issuing threats without having the military capability to execute them — something that was difficult to digest by China, which also practices extreme nationalism. Third, it was India’s strategic and tactical intelligence failure to assess the Chinese intent.

India’s initial response was to wish the problem away by denial and obfuscation. It relied on past experience, hoping that China would eventually pull back. However, once Chinese intent became clear, India appreciated that it lacked the military capability to take China head on, risking a limited war. A setback would have been politically catastrophic. Hence, militarily, India opted to contain and stalemate China with overwhelming deployment of forces.

India’s stated political aim was restoration of status quo ante April 2020. Though never stated, India probably also aimed for persuading China to demarcate the LAC. India lacked the military capability to restore status quo ante through a limited war — to which any direct military action would escalate. Hence, it decided to pursue a dissuasive strategy with massive deployment of forces backed by diplomatic negotiations.

In order to put pressure on China, India relied on a brilliant manoeuvre to secure the dominating heights on the Kailash Range on 29-30 August 2020. The 1959 Claim Line and the LAC coincide, and pass over the crest of the Kailash Range. Crossing it would have led to a limited war. Consequently, the Chinese also came on to Kailash Range, which has a gradual sloping plateau towards the east. This resulted in an eyeball-to-eyeball deployment at Rechin La, Rezang La and Mukhpari with the potential for an inadvertent escalation to a limited war.

Both sides did not want a war. China as a superior power could not afford a setback for the untested PLA. India did not have the capability to win a limited war. With further confrontation offering diminishing returns, China opted for conflict termination. India wisely followed suit.

In my assessment, India has partially achieved its political aim. It has forced China to terminate the conflict, and status quo ante has been restored with concessions in terms of buffer zones predominantly on our side of the LAC as perceived by us. More than that, it has restored its international prestige by not buckling in and forcing a stalemate on China, which in terms of international relations is a defeat for a superior power. However, there should be no doubt that militarily, buffer zones are an advantage for a superior power.

Conflict termination opens a strategic opportunity

I must reiterate the caution as highlighted earlier. Having withdrawn from the Kailash Range, India has lost the military leverage for negotiations for disengagement on favourable terms from Depsang Plains, Hot Springs – Gogra and Demchok. It can only rely upon the trust it has reposed in China for conflict termination.

On an optimistic note, if disengagement happens as envisaged, the crisis in eastern Ladakh has opened up a bigger opportunity for India and China to demarcate the disputed border to maintain peace and tranquilly, and pave the way for a final settlement of the boundary dispute.

The 1959 Claim Line and LAC coincide in all areas except those of differing perceptions. The buffer zones in major areas of differing perceptions have been or will be marked by default during the written disengagement agreements between the militaries. Special Representatives and diplomats must now negotiate to formally demarcate the disputed border for peace and tranquility. A similar exercise can then be undertaken with respect to the central sector and northeast.

Both the civilisation states have been chastened by the experience of being on brink of a war for the last 11 months. They clearly understand the limitations of use of force, and that maps cannot be redrawn now. It may be prudent to consider a final settlement of the entire boundary dispute along the demarcated border.

We missed this opportunity in 1959, we must not miss it now.

Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.


https://theprint.in/opinion/on-lac-indi ... nt/611287/

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby SSridhar » 28 Feb 2021 16:37

Did China Build a Spy Network in Kabul? - The Diplomat
The Afghan intelligence agency, which had received tips from the Indian intelligence agency about the Chinese nationals, speculated that the Xu and the others built ties with the Haqqani Network in order to track down Uyghur extremists.

A tip from India led the Afghan intelligence agency to arrest Xu. The Indian foreign spy agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), told the Afghan intelligence agency about the presence of Chinese nationals in Kabul, according to one Afghan official who spoke to Foreign Policy. The detention of Chinese nationals exposed the growing intelligence sharing between Kabul and New Delhi in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal. Kabul and New Delhi are getting closer to defy their common foes in the region.
. . .
There are two narratives regarding the allegations faced by Xu and other Chinese nationals. One claims that they offered bounties for the killing of American soldiers. The other narrative about the Chinese nationals is different. The Hindustan Times, the Indian newspaper that first reported on the detention of the Chinese nationals, said in a report that they were creating a fake cell of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Afghanistan in order to entrap Uyghur fighters.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby asgkhan » 28 Feb 2021 16:45

So the cheeni femboi POGS and anal-(c)-yst duffers are claiming that Col. Santosh Babu went rogue and started the Cheeni kutai to gain promotion.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby fanne » 28 Feb 2021 20:38

asgkhan wrote:So the cheeni femboi POGS and anal-(c)-yst duffers are claiming that Col. Santosh Babu went rogue and started the Cheeni kutai to gain promotion.


If this is what is being presented to Chinese people - maybe they are preparing for a hot April (summer till November 2021). It could very well be some rearguard action to mollify public anger, but more looks like it is instigating the public and painting India as an aggressor that has gotten away so far.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby TKiran » 28 Feb 2021 22:01

In Feb 2020, the number of PLA in LAC was 0 (zero).

In April 2020 number of PLA in LAC
1. Depsang Area - 5000
2. Ghagra Hot Spring Area - 5000
3. Galwan Area - 2000
3. Pongong Tso Area - 0

In June 2020 number of PLA at LAC

1. Depsang Area - 5000
2. Ghagra Hot Spring Area - 5000
3. Galwan Area - 2000
4. Pongong Tso Area - 500

In End August 2020 number of PLA at LAC

1. Depsang Area - 10,000
2. Gagra Hot Springs Area - 10,000
3. Galwan Area - 5000
4. Pongong Tso & Moldo Garrison - 10,000

In February 2021 number of PLA at LAC

1. Depsang Area - 20,000
2. Gaghra Hotspring Area - 10,000
3. Galwan Area - 5000
4. Pongong Tso & Moldo Garrison - 0


I am not able to understand why PLA redistributed PLA in Aksai Hind? (The figures above are approx. based on open source)

In my opinion, this move by PLA is not intended for permanently reduce their presence in Aksai Hind and bring back the normalcy which means 0 PLA at LAC during winter.

Its a tactical retreat by PLA as they saw that even though IA is brilliant in War strategies and valor, they can be defeated at table a 'la Zulfikar Bhutto & Indira Gandhi style.

Now the next move by PLA would be Rapid deployment of PLA at Pongong Tso, Moldo Garrison and Kailash Range with the pretext that India did not keep its promise etc., and before we can move they would have occupied Kailash Range.

That would be the lesson they are going to teach India. They already did this at Doka La 2017. We went away in good faith, but they occupied the whole of Doka La.

So its too premature to celebrate the disengagement at Pongong Tso. They may not come again till finger 4 at Pongong Tso, so that India can still say, "we made sure that PLA will never come back to Pongong Tso fingers " , just like some analysts are still saying that "we made sure that PLA never come back to the disputed site at Doka La, but they only occupied all around that place, but did not dare come to the disputed site, so India won".

No amount of Intelligence can prevent a well planned thrust by PLA. (Some people are arguing that we have advance Intelligence with cooperation from CIA, satellite real time monitoring etc)

No, PLA will not disengage any more, expect more reinforcements on their side and no war.

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Re: Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

Postby darshan » 01 Mar 2021 00:12

DRDOs Sindhu Netra surveillance satellite deployed in space, will help to monitor Indian Ocean Region
https://www.wionews.com/india-news/drdo ... ion-366878
...
The Sindhu Netra satellite has been developed by the young scientists of the DRDO and is capable of automatically identifying the warships and merchant ships operating in the IOR. The satellite has also started communicating with the ground systems, government sources told ANI.

The satellite, if required, can also help in carrying out surveillance in specific areas such as the South China Sea or the pirate-infested areas near the Gulf of Aden and the African coast, the sources said.

They added that the Sindhu Netra is one of the first in the series of satellites that would help the nation in enhancing its surveillance capabilities on land in areas such as the Ladakh region with China and the border areas with Pakistan.

Seeking to keep a closer eye on the activities of the Chinese military both near the Indian territory as well as in its depth areas all along the 4,000 kilometre Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Indian security agencies feel there is a requirement of four to six dedicated satellites which can help them keep a check on the adversary`s moves.
....


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