Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (15-11-2017)

TKiran · Post by **TKiran** » 11 Dec 2017 08:52

Germany is one country which resisted China and is still producing automobiles and engineering products and giving tough competition to China in world markets. China's aim is to subjugate Germany and surrender their manufacturing provess to China. World markets should not have any alternative to Chinese products.

Kashi · Post by **Kashi** » 11 Dec 2017 09:50

TKiran wrote:Germany is one country which resisted China and is still producing automobiles and engineering products and giving tough competition to China in world markets. China's aim is to subjugate Germany and surrender their manufacturing provess to China. World markets should not have any alternative to Chinese products.

So is Japan and also SoKo. The rest is not far from truth, Chinese do want pre-dominance in every sphere.

chola · Post by **chola** » 11 Dec 2017 12:22

Japan, SoKo and Germany all trade massively with Cheen. They contribute mightily to growing PRC power as a mercantilist trading superpower year after year.

So what resistance?

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 11 Dec 2017 13:40

China cannot be the sole supplier of everything from toys to high-precision engineering goods to the whole world. Already, China is realizing the futility of its manufacturing strategy (which was a good entry point to push up its volume of external trade, foreign exchange and decrease the domestic poverty levels etc) and is planning to push them out to countries along the BRI route. There is space and scope for other countries too in all these spheres of activities.

The problem in countering China comes from the fact that China makes a holistic approach in accumulating technology through legitimate and illegitimate means as the various cases in the US prove or as the German spy agency report above says or the Australian intel agencies feared a few days back. For example, Pakistan has given China access to the downed stealth Black Hawk helicopter. Earlier, it had given China access to unexploded Tomahawk missiles in Af-Pak. Even the US has turned the other way as China got US technology through Pakistan. This is besides the massive cyber war China has unleashed against the US to clandestinely gather technology. The US continues to transfer high-technology items to China as commercial deals. India, for example, imports critical telecom equipment from China because it costs less. It is such advantages that enables China to mount cyber attacks against others.

panduranghari · Post by **panduranghari** » 11 Dec 2017 19:33

TKiran wrote: Both these assessments are wrong.

1.There's no private sector in China.

2. It's not dictatorship type of govt in China.

You are correct about 1. I am unsure about 2.

WRT point no.1 - https://deep-throat-ipo.blogspot.hk/201 ... -hand.html and https://deep-throat-ipo.blogspot.hk/201 ... -blob.html

Long read but its good. Also read the comments.

nam · Post by **nam** » 11 Dec 2017 19:53

SSridhar wrote:https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/in-first-winter-stay-1800-chinese-troops-camping-at-doklam/articleshow/62014175.cms

Good. Now the Hans can freeze on their backside and spend money on maintaining presence.

The Chinis cannot do any more nibbling without creating another world crisis in this area. Like previously 10 PLA soldiers and some herdsmen was all it required to capture land.

They were having it quite cheap. The more they build up, the more Delhi has take our modernization seriously.

periaswamy · Post by **periaswamy** » 11 Dec 2017 22:33

India China russia terrorism meet

ven as China continues to block consensus over Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Maulana Masood Azhar at the United Nations Security Council, the India-China-Russia trilateral, for the first time, called for cooperation to take decisive and concerted action against globally-proscribed terrorists and terror entities on Monday.
External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, however, did not mention Jaish-e-Mohammad in the list of terror groups, although she mentioned Lashkar-e-Taiba, Taliban, Islamic State and al-Qaeda. In her bilateral meeting with Wang Yi on Monday, she stressed the need to meet more frequently and without any agenda to strengthen mutual trust.

periaswamy · Post by **periaswamy** » 12 Dec 2017 05:40

Shipping insurance companies consider Hambantota as a high risk port

Shipping insurance companies have dubbed Hambantota port in South Sri Lanka as a “high risk” one after local striking workers detained two vessels, including a large Japanese vessel carrying vehicles, for several days last week, the Sri Lankan Minister of Ports and Shipping, Arjuna Ranatunga, told newspersons here on Wednesday.

He also said that two or three foreign shipping lines have told the government that they will not be using Hambantota hereafter because detentions by harbour workers amount to piracy.

“But we are trying to convince them that the workers’ actions cannot be described as piracy. It was only a strike over possibility of retrenchment. We hope to convince them about this in a few days,” Ranatunga said.

After the departure of the two ships which were released by the navy by the use of force, no ship has berthed in Hambantota.

Sri Lanka is going to privatize port management to get past this.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 12 Dec 2017 09:08

The power play in peacekeeping - Manmohan Bahadur, The Hindu

The India, China jostling extends everywhere.

Media coverage of peacekeeping operations is an area with many gaps. Consider for example, an incident last week, where at least 15 peacekeepers and five soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were killed and numerous peacekeepers wounded by armed militants in one of the worst attacks on United Nations personnel. A local Islamist extremist group overran the remote base. Most of the dead and wounded are from Tanzania. Was there any media coverage in India? It would have been a different story had they been troops from the West. In the midst of this, one must focus on China as its grip on UN affairs tightens and it starts deciding policy, to the detriment of India.

China rising

Amid the buzz around Beijing taking centre stage in world affairs, the import of China’s deployment of its first peacekeeping helicopter unit in the peacekeeping mission in Darfur has been lost sight of. Having made a reluctant entry in peacekeeping, when it sent a small cadre of soldiers to Cambodia in 1992, Beijing has become the largest troop contributor among the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). More importantly, China is now the third-largest contributor to the UN’s regular budget and the second-largest contributor to the peacekeeping budget. News of any country supporting peacekeeping is good, but what does this portend in Beijing’s quest for great power status? In a September 2017 report, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) says: “China’s participation in UN operations offers... a low-cost means of demonstrating their commitment to global stability... and allay(s) fears about its military and economic strength.” But is the picture that simple for India in geopolitical power play?

The UN, especially the UNSC, is a blue-blooded political body, notwithstanding its charter of considering all countries as equals. In practice, a nation’s voice is in proportion to what it contributes towards the UN, especially funds — India’s contribution is only 0.737% when compared to China’s 7.92% and the U.S.’s 22%. Troop contributions to peacekeeping do not get their due in UN power politics. Having led a peacekeeping contingent, in 2005, I have seen first hand how pivotal posts in UN missions have always been with major fund contributors. China is indeed a part of the picture.

Veto power

The CSIS report states that China has used its veto only 12 times, but two were cast where its economic interests were involved, like in Myanmar and Zimbabwe despite these being low on human rights records. What is more worrisome, however, is that two vetoes were also cast “over concerns over territorial integrity pertaining to Taiwan”. China was against sending UN peacekeepers to Guatemala and Macedonia because they had established diplomatic ties with Taiwan. When this self-serving act is linked with Beijing’s other recent coercive actions such as against Mongolia due to a Dalai Lama visit, and against Japan when it is said to have halted exports of rare minerals following the arrest of a Chinese trawler captain, the increasing front-lining of China in international affairs via the UN has an ominous ring.

In 2015, China committed a standby force of 8,000 peacekeepers and a permanent police squad for UN operations. In addition, there is a 10-year $1 billion China-U.N. peace and development fund and $100 million in military assistance to the African Union. It is no coincidence that Africa is where China has large economic interests. Peacekeeping is said to be a cover for China to test its strengths in overseas deployments. The deployment of a People’s Liberation Army Navy submarine off the Africa coast for anti-piracy patrolling is to train its seamen in long-distance operations.

Impacting India

Chinese involvement in peacekeeping, along with its higher funding contributions will put Beijing in the driver’s seat in formulating peacekeeping mandates, thereby affecting India in more ways than one.

Is India losing out despite having provided almost 200,000 troops in nearly 50 of the 71 UN peacekeeping missions over the past six decades? We have also sent scarce aviation assets including Canberra bombers to a UN Mission in Congo in the 1960s and helicopters to Somalia, Sierra Leone and Sudan. The truth is that though our troops have been on the front line of facing danger (168 soldiers lost in UN operations, till May 2017), the returns in UN power play have been low. It was perhaps not a troublesome issue until now considering India’s good relations with the other four permanent UNSC members, but will this continue with China rise in the UN, especially with U.S. President Donald Trump’s preoccupation elsewhere? Chinese opposition to India’s candidature for a UNSC seat and its repeated vetos on the Masood Azhar issue are unwelcome indicators.

Peacekeeping missions are the raison d’etre of the UN and India’s generous contributions as far as peacekeeping troops are concerned should be key in its argument to have a greater say in the affairs of the UN. India must demand its pound of flesh.

Manmohan Bahadur, a retired Air Vice Marshal, is a Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi

A_Gupta · Post by **A_Gupta** » 13 Dec 2017 03:49

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/worl ... -port.html
Sri Lanka, Struggling With Debt, Hands a Major Port to China

Struggling to pay its debt to Chinese firms, the nation of Sri Lanka formally handed over the strategic port of Hambantota to China on a 99-year lease last week, in a deal that government critics have said threatens the country’s sovereignty.

In recent years, China has shored up its presence in the Indian Ocean, investing billions of dollars to build port facilities and plan maritime trade routes as part of its “One Belt, One Road” initiative to help increase its market reach.

Along the way, smaller countries like Sri Lanka have found themselves owing debts they cannot pay. Sri Lanka owes more than $8 billion to state-controlled Chinese firms, officials say.

Sri Lankan politicians said the Hambantota deal, valued at $1.1 billion, was necessary to chip away at the debt, but analysts warned of the consequences of signing away too much control to China.

A_Gupta · Post by **A_Gupta** » 13 Dec 2017 03:52

https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3318737

Officials in India's northeast are complaining that Chinese construction activity on the upper reaches of one of Asia's largest river that flows into India are likely turning the waters downstream turbid and unfit for human consumption.

Over the weekend, Sarbananda Sonowal, the chief minister of India's Assam state, said the Brahmaputra river was contaminated with bacteria and iron, with laboratory tests declaring its waters unfit for human consumption. Sonowal asked that the Indian government take up the matter with Beijing.

Hari Seldon · Post by **Hari Seldon** » 13 Dec 2017 06:59

Interconnected world, so, interconnected threats only.

Beijing Develops Plan to Counter Trump Tax Overhaul (WSJ)

Under the plan, the people say, the People’s Bank of China stands ready to deploy a combination of tools—higher interest rates, tighter capital controls and more-frequent currency intervention—to keep money at home and support the yuan.

An official involved in Beijing’s deliberations called Washington’s tax plan a “gray rhino,” an obvious danger in China’s economy that shouldn’t be ignored. “We’ll likely have some tough battles in the first quarter,” the official said.

Central to officials’ fear is the yuan, which has just regained its footing after enormous government efforts to prop it up. Should the yuan lose steam again, the thinking goes, it could further exacerbate capital outflows in a vicious cycle.

And

While the tax overhaul isn’t directly aimed at Beijing, it is another way China will be squeezed.

Under the tax plan now going through the U.S. legislative process, America’s corporate levy could drop to about 20% from 35%. Over the next few years, economists say, that could spur manufacturers—whether American or Chinese—to opt to set up plants in the U.S. rather than China, where total tax burdens on companies are among the highest of major economies.

A lot of US 'units' in India are cost centers - R&D centers, cust service centers and the like. Little if any manufacturing capacity built by the amreekis here, IIRC.

nandakumar · Post by **nandakumar** » 13 Dec 2017 09:02

Hari Seldon
Even though these units are cost centres (R&D customer support etc.) a profit element is imputed and subject to tax as per Indian tax law. In tax parlance it is called 'transfer pricing'. Of course if they are set up in an SEZ or otherwise eligible for tax Incentive for export turnover under the law they are eligible to avail of it. I should think China also has some such provision although I am not aware of the details.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 13 Dec 2017 11:17

Raj47 has published evidence that Cheen is preparing to completely steal the Tsangpo waters via some pipelines.

TKiran · Post by **TKiran** » 13 Dec 2017 14:36

^^^for China, Tibet is a place to exploit, water, minerals etc, that was first predicted by me, now evidence is showing up.

Actually it's advantage India. India can't go back and open Tibet independence, as long as China doesn't exploit natural resources of Tibet, even if they killed Tibetan culture and language. Now if India wants to open Tibet independence, there's reason.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 13 Dec 2017 15:00

India, Australia call for ‘open’ Asia-Pacific zone - The Hindu

Continuing with the strategic bilateral discussion, Australia and India on Tuesday discussed the need to maintain the Asia-Pacific region as a “free” and “open” zone under the “2+2” dialogue model which includes the foreign and defence secretaries of both sides. The discussion was the first meeting of this level since the two sides participated in the quadrilateral discussion for a new strategic partnership targeting the Asia-Pacific region.

“Both sides agreed that a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region serves the long-term interests of all countries in the region and of the world at large. There is a growing convergence of strategic perspectives between the two countries,” said a press statement from the Ministry of External Affairs.

Freedom of navigation

The “2+2” dialogue of Tuesday was held between Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar and Defence Secretary Sanjay Mitra and their Australian counterparts Frances Adamson and Greg Moriarty. The dialogue indicated that the focus remains on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, where China has been reclaiming land for infrastructure, boosting its maritime influence.

“All aspects of bilateral relations with a focus on strategic and defence relations between the two countries were reviewed,” the MEA said. Australian PM Malcolm Turnbull and PM Modi had met on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Manila in November.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 13 Dec 2017 16:46

US elevated its ties with India for free, open Indo-Pacific: Rex Tillerson - PTI

The US has elevated its engagement with India as part of its effort of a free and open Indo-Pacific, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has said amid China's increasing assertiveness in the region.

The US for long has been favouring a larger role for India in the Indo-Pacific region to pursue common interests in the strategically key area.

"As part of the free and open Indo-Pacific, we have elevated our engagement with India," Tillerson said.

"We've long had a trilateral relationship in the Indo- Pacific between Japan, Australia, and the US, and we're now working towards whether this will become a quad relationship to include India because of the importance of India's rising economy as well and I think shared national security concerns that we have with India," he said. {So, guys, it is not India which is admitting Australia in but the others who are letting India in. That puts a full stop to some discussion we have had here on this issue. But, is that true?}

On America's relationship with China, he said the administration now have a very active mechanism in which it can put complex issues on the table.

"And we have differences, such as the South China Sea and China's building of structures, militarisation of these structures, and how that affects our allies in the region as well in terms of free and open trade," he said.

China claims almost all of the South China Sea but Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan have counter claims over the waterway.

The Indo-Pacific includes South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

"As we've said to the Chinese, we hope we can find a way to freeze this particular activity. Whether we can reverse, it remains to seen. But it is not acceptable to us that these islands continue to be developed, and certainly not for military purposes," Tillerson said.

"In Southeast Asia, we put forth a policy here not too long ago of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and this was built on the back of some of our views about China's One Belt, One Road policy. China's One Belt, One Road, we understand, is a policy they have to continue their economic development, and our policies do not seek to contain China's economic development," Tillerson said.

Tillerson said the US is paying a close attention to Beijing's 'One Belt, One Road' (OBOR) initiative, but sought to clarify that the Trump administration does not intend to contain China's economic growth.

"But China's economic development, in our view, should take place in the system of international rules and norms, and One Belt, One Road seems to want to define its own rules and norms," he added.

The Secretary of State borrowed a quote from Defence Secretary Jim Mattis: "China has One Belt, One Road; the United States and the global economy has many belts and many roads, and no one country gets to choose the belt or the road.

Tillerson said that a free and open Indo-Pacific means all countries have access to continue their economic development and free access for trade through the region.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 13 Dec 2017 17:18

Peace in border areas essential for bilateral relations, India tells China - ToI

In a recent meeting with her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj stressed the importance of peaceful borders as "an essential prerequisite" for relations between the two countries, the Ministry of External Affairs said on Wednesday.

"The Chinese foreign minister conveyed that the peaceful resolution of the Doklam issue reflects the political maturity on both sides. While agreeing with this, the external affairs minister reiterated that maintenance of peace in border areas is an essential prerequisite for the smooth development of bilateral relations," ANI quoted the MEA as saying.

It added that the ministers of the two countries had "noted" the challenge the Doklam issue had posed, even as they "expressed satisfaction" at its resolution.

Both sides credited "concerted diplomatic communications" for the end of the standoff.

The MEA statement said that Swaraj had stressed the need to handle differences "with due consideration to each other's sensitivities and concerns."

The meeting also saw India and China agree to enhance their strategic communication at all levels.

The Chinese foreign minister, who was in New Delhi to attend the Russia-India-China (RIC) Foreign Ministers' meeting, admitted that the Doklam standoff had put "severe pressure" on the ties+ between the two countries, PTI had reported yesterday.

He also cautioned that lessons must be learned and efforts must be made to avoid such an incident in the future, according to comments posted on the Chinese Foreign Ministry's website.

Wang's visit to New Delhi was the first by a top Chinese official after the long-drawn Doklam standoff and after the second five-year term of President Xi Jinping began.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 13 Dec 2017 19:05

So, guys, it is not India which is admitting Australia in but the others who are letting India in. That puts a full stop to some discussion we have had here on this issue. But, is that true?

Yes and no.

The US and Japan have always had a tight relationship with Australia. The US and Japan have had a relationship with India too, but at a lower level.

So a "quad" could be include India in the first trilateral or include Australia in the second.

Including India makes more political sense. China has no argument now to keep Australia outside the "quad". That trilateral already existed and China never raised any objections.

The problem?

"But China's economic development, in our view, should take place in the system of international rules and norms, and One Belt, One Road seems to want to define its own rules and norms," he added.

China is very busy in making the world in her own image. And is striving to get control without firing a shot.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 13 Dec 2017 22:21

India to push for deeper strategic cooperation with ASEAN - PTI

Eyeing to play a more pro active role in the Indo-Pacific, India is expected to push for a deeper strategic cooperation with ASEAN to balance the China- dominated power dynamics in the region when the two sides hold talks here [New Delhi] next month.

A range of key issues including effectively tackling threat of terrorism, boosting maritime security cooperation and enhancing connectivity will be the other areas of deliberations at the India-ASEAN commemorative summit to be held on January 25, sources said.

They said there is no friction point between India and ASEAN over formation of the proposed quadrilateral coalition comprising India, the US, Japan and Australia which is seen as a move to counter China's expansionist behaviour in the Indo- Pacific region.

All the 10 ASEAN member countries have already confirmed that their participation at the summit as well as at the Republic Day celebrations will be at the level of heads of state, they said. The summit is being hosted by India to celebrate 25 years of India-ASEAN engagement.

The sources, while referring to the evolving security situation in the Indo-Pacific, said India supports the ASEAN's centrality and the bloc's unity in the regional security architecture, in the wake of "emergence" of China.

They also said, at the same time India believes there must be a balancing factor in the regional security architecture when there have been competing claims of various countries in maritime disputes, in a clear reference to South China Sea issue.

The sources said India's benign presence in the Indo- Pacific region would be a welcome one considering its historical and civilisational links with the resource rich region.

India's presence definitely helps balance the power dynamics in the region, they said.

A number of ASEAN member countries have territorial disputes with China over the South China Sea.

Widening the security cooperation under the proposed quadrilateral coalition, officials of India, the US, Japan and Australia had held extensive talks on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila for pursuing common interests in the strategically important Indo-Pacific region.

The sources said India wants to see further deepening of ties between India and ASEAN in the strategic and political spheres, besides rekindling its focus on "commerce, connectivity and culture" with the bloc.

While attending the India-ASEAN summit in Manila last month, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had invited the leaders of the 10 South East Asian countries to attend India's next Republic Day celebrations as well as participate at the commemorative summit marking 25th anniversary of the country's ties with the bloc.

Modi is also expected to have separate bilateral meetings with all ASEAN leaders.

India has also invited groups from all the ASEAN countries for performance on themes based on Ramayana as it reflected India's civilisational links with the bloc.

The ties between India and ASEAN have been on an upswing, particularly in the areas of trade and investment.

The ASEAN region along with India together comprises combined population of 1.85 billion people, which is one fourth of the global population and their combined GDP has been estimated at over USD 3.8 trillion.

Investment from ASEAN to Indian has been over USD 70 billion in the last 17 years accounting for more than 17 per cent of India's total FDI. India's investment in ASEAN during the same period has been more than USD 40 billion.

India had hosted an India-ASEAN commemorative summit in December 2012 to mark 20 years of engagement between the two sides.

The sources said India is the only dialogue partner of ASEAN with which it has agreed to hold a second such commemorative summit. A number of major countries including the US, Russia and China are dialogue partners of ASEAN.

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 14 Dec 2017 04:31

A_Gupta · Post by **A_Gupta** » 14 Dec 2017 04:57

FYI.
https://www.buzzfeed.com/meghara/china- ... .xa2gYVo5j
China Is Vacuuming Up DNA Samples From Xinjiang's Muslims

A Human Rights Watch investigation found the Chinese government is gathering DNA samples, fingerprints, iris scans, and blood types of millions of people in the country's far west.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 14 Dec 2017 17:54

X-posted from the Indian Foreign policy thread

A 3-nation Indo-Pacific compact - Suhasini Haidar, The Hindu

India, Japan and Australia have “growing convergences” in the Indo-Pacific region, said officials of the three countries after meeting for a trilateral in New Delhi on Wednesday.

“The three sides stressed the need for greater collaboration on maritime security and domain awareness and disaster response capabilities. They also renewed their resolve to fight the scourge of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and stressed the need for enhanced cooperation on counter-terrorism,” a statement issued by the External Affairs Ministry said.

Connectivity issues

Briefing presspersons after the meeting, Australian Foreign Secretary Frances Adamson said the three countries had discussed regional connectivity issues, at the meeting.

“Each of us has a very strong commitment to transparency around these projects, financing arrangements scrutiny, environmental standards and labour standards. Irrespective of under whose auspices these projects are held under,” Ms. Adamson said, when asked if concerns about China’s Belt and Road initiative, which India opposes, had been discussed.

The fourth trilateral between Foreign Secretaries S. Jaishankar and his counterparts, Ms. Adamson and Japanese Vice-Minister Shinsuke Sugiyama, was held in Delhi a month after the first meeting of the Quadrilateral, or Quad, which includes the U.S., was held in Manila. Ms. Adamson said the two processes would continue to “exist together”.

Significantly, the statement issued after the trilateral also underlined “support for ASEAN centrality in the political and security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region”, indicating the possibility of trilateral military cooperation along with East Asian nations as well.

ASEAN-India summit

India is hosting a commemorative ASEAN-India summit in Delhi on January 25, while all 10 ASEAN-nation leaders will be the chief guests at the coming Republic Day parade.

Sources said the theme of the engagement this year would focus on the three “C’s” of Commerce, Connectivity and Culture, and would also underline similar convergence on issues in the Indo-Pacific, as the East Pacific-Indian Ocean region is popularly referred to.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 15 Dec 2017 11:32

China summons Australian envoy amid meddling row - AFP

China has summoned the Australian ambassador amid a growing row over allegations of Chinese meddling in politics in Australia.

“Officials of our Ministry had an important dialogue with the Australian ambassador,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang said on Thursday, without specifying when the meeting took place.

“The Australian side is very clear with our position on bilateral relations and the relevant issue,” Mr. Lu told a regular news briefing.

Beijing lodged an official protest with Canberra last week after Australia’s Parliament singled out China as a focus of concern when it proposed laws on foreign interference.

The legislation followed an inquiry ordered by Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull after media reports that Australia’s spy agency had warned politicians two years ago about taking donations from two billionaires with links to China.

An Australian senator quit Parliament on Tuesday over his relationship with a wealthy political donor associated with the Chinese Communist Party.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 16 Dec 2017 09:14

While focus is on North Korea, Beijing continues South China Sea buildup - AP, ToI

Tensions over China's island-building in the South China Sea may have eased in the past year, but Beijing has kept busy.

New satellite imagery shows China has built infrastructure covering 72 acres (28 hectares) in the Spratly and Paracel islands during 2017 to equip its larger outposts to be air and naval bases.

The Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative closely tracks developments in the South China Sea, where China and several Asian governments have conflicting territorial claims. It said on Thursday there has been construction of hangars, underground storage, missile shelters, radar arrays and other facilities.

The activity comes as China joins what are likely to be protracted negotiations with Southeast Asian nations on a "code of conduct" for South China Sea. Tensions with the US on the issue have also eased, despite Washington's criticism of Beijing's conduct.

The construction is the follow-up phase to a campaign of land reclamation that was completed by early 2016 in the Spratlys, an island chain where Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei also have claims. According to the Pentagon, China has added more than 3,200 acres (1,248 hectares) of land to the seven land features it occupies in the area.

China also seems to have halted smaller-scale operations to expand islands in the Paracels that lie farther north, the initiative said.

The US and others have accused Beijing of further militarizing the region and altering geography to bolster its sweeping claims across the South China Sea. China says the man-made islands in the Spratlys, which are equipped with airstrips and military installations, are mainly for civilian purposes and to boost safety for fishing and maritime trade.

Greg Poling, the initiative's director, said China had seized a diplomatic opening after the election of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who adopted a conciliatory stance toward Beijing over their territorial dispute. It's also been less of a focus for President Donald Trump's administration, preoccupied by North Korea's nuclear threat and trade disputes with China.

"It's gotten off the front pages, but we shouldn't confuse that with a softening in China's pursuit of its goals. They are continuing all the construction they want," Poling said.

The most construction has been on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys, including hangars alongside its 10,000-foot (3,000-meter) airstrip, underground structures likely intended to house munitions or other materiel, hardened shelters for missile platforms, and communication and radar facilities, the initiative said.

It also noted that China has deployed new military aircraft at Woody Island in the Paracels. At the end of October, the Chinese military released images of J-11B fighter planes there for drills. In mid-November, Y-8 transport aircraft were spotted on the same island that may be capable of electronic intelligence gathering.

Marine Lt. Col. Christopher Logan, a Pentagon spokesman, said Thursday that he could not comment in detail on US assessments of the region but that "further militarization of outposts will only serve to raise tensions and create greater distrust among claimants."

The United States does not claim territory in the South China Sea but has declared it has a national interest in ensuring that the territorial disputes there are resolved peacefully in accordance with international law and that freedom of navigation and overflight are guaranteed. China has opposed what it calls US meddling in an Asian dispute.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 16 Dec 2017 14:31

Will Beijing be a stakeholder in Modi's SAGAR vision for Asia? - Uday Baskar, Economic Times

Prime Minister Narendra Modi outlined India's maritime potential and current profile in a commendable manner at the commissioning ceremony of INS Kalvari, a Scorpene-class diesel-electric submarine, in Mumbai on Thursday (December 14). Modi's fluency and grasp over the fine-print of the Indian Ocean is indicative of the maritime/naval empathy that South Block has exuded in recent years.

However, the abiding challenge for India's aspirations in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) and the realisation of the Modi acronym SAGAR (security and growth for all in the region) will depend to a large extent on the Chinese footprint and intent in this domain.

In the last week, Beijing dropped anchor in Hambantota, the Sri Lankan port astride the Indian Ocean, and, earlier this year, China set up its first overseas military base in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa.

Why is China in the IOR? To briefly recall the big picture, as it were, in the maritime domain -- in the post-Hiroshima/World War II period -- the Indian Ocean had a relatively dormant and below the median strategic relevance in the global context. During the Cold war decades (1945 to 1991), the global maritime focus, shaped as it was by the two superpowers (the US and former the USSR), was on the Atlantic-Pacific ocean combine. This progressively shifted towards East Asia in the post-Cold War years and was symbolised by the phrase "Asia-Pacific" -- however incongruous the yoking of an ocean with a continent may be.

Towards the late 1990s, the economic relevance of Asia began to rise, powered by the growth of China and India. Over the next decade, the trade dependency of major economies in East, Southeast and South Asia increased in a visible manner and two phrases were introduced to the regional security lexicon.

Then Chinese President Hu Jintao spoke about the "Malacca dilemma", a reference to China's high dependency, hence vulnerability, to hydrocarbon imports from the Persian Gulf. This was the resurrection of the centuries-old Silk Route that became the New Silk Route in the 21st century. This denoted the growing white-shipping trade transit from the Hormuz towards the Malacca and onward to Southeast and East Asia.

The enormity of 9/11 and what followed by way of the US-led war on global terror added to the security dimension and very soon the global maritime focus shifted from the Atlantic-Pacific continuum towards the Pacific-Indian and has now become the extended to what is being called the Indo-Pacific region.

The entry of Chinese naval ships in December 2008 into the IOR as part an anti-piracy effort was an event of deep strategic import and this has been corroborated by more recent events. Chronologically, the two initiatives of Beijing in 2017 that can be deemed "strategic" in relation to the IOR and of considerable relevance to the powers that be in Delhi are: First, the setting up of a Chinese military facility in Djibouti; and Second, the priority accorded to the OBOR (One Belt-One Road) by Chinese President Xi Jinping at his "coronation" speech at the 19th Party Congress.

In dispatching PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) marines to Djibouti (July 12) by amphibious ships, from the southern port of Zhanjiang, China has taken a significant step in enhancing its trans-border military footprint in the IOR. A permanent Chinese military presence in Djibouti marks the first overseas military base for Beijing and the strategic location of Djibouti in proximity of the Red Sea will make China a credible Indian Ocean power with its attendant implications, with a high degree of salience for India.

It is instructive that Beijing embarked upon its Djibouti initiative even as India, the US and Japan were commencing the operational phase of their joint naval exercise, Malabar 2017, on July 14. The image of three flat-tops (carriers) operating in tandem in the Indian Ocean even as a PLA navy amphibious ship en route to Djibouti joined other PLA navy units, including a surveillance ship, may well be the abiding template for the Indian Ocean in the years ahead.

China's public narrative marks December 2008 as a historical punctuation when Beijing sent three naval ships to join the international anti-piracy effort off the coast of Somalia. For the naval professional, there was a certain symbolism in PLA naval ships transiting the Straits of Malacca. The Chinese military base in Djibouti, when fully established with appropriate assets, will be yet another punctuation -- this time in bold font!

The logic from the Chinese perspective is compelling -- to break out of the US-shaped military constraints along its Pacific Ocean seaboard, it has to access the Indian Ocean. Overseas bases have been long favoured by major powers and China is not the first extra-regional power to seek a military foothold in the Horn of Africa and adjoining regions.

The US and France are already resident in Djibouti and India has also just established high-level political contact.

The second major development of 2017 with a strategic connotation, relevant to Delhi, is the manner in which President Xi Jinping has framed the OBOR initiative. It may be recalled that Beijing held a major summit meeting to unveil the OBOR in May 2017 and India was the only major nation that chose not to participate. This decision was arrived at by Delhi after due consideration, since Beijing was seen as indifferent to the Indian sensitivity about the disputed territory of POK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) through which one strand of the OBOR traverses.

The priority accorded to the OBOR was reflected in the speech of President Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress on October 18. If India remains opposed to joining the OBOR and the Xi vision has accorded this macro-connectivity project a high degree of centrality, as part of realising the China Dream, the undercurrents of tension and related political-military dissonance between Delhi and Beijing will be palpable over the next few years.

This OBOR dissonance is a factor that could have potentially discordant strategic consequences -- particularly if the US, Japan and perhaps Australia or Singapore come together in a maritime/naval partnership in the extended Indo-Pacific region.

China's presence and footprint in the IOR is likely to grow over the next five years and Beijing may feel encouraged to assertively display its comprehensive national power and related capability.

The strategic imponderable is how this power index will be utilised. For the greater common good or in defiance of the prevailing status quo? Will Beijing agree to become a stakeholder in Modi's SAGAR vision?

(C. Uday Bhaskar is Director, Society for Policy Studies. The views expressed are personal. The article is in special arrangement with South Asia Monitor)

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 17 Dec 2017 20:33

Hoping to extend maritime reach, China lavishes aid on Pakistan town - Reuters

China is lavishing vast amounts of aid on a small Pakistani fishing town+ to win over locals and build a commercial deep-water port that the United States and India suspect may also one day serve the Chinese navy.

Beijing has built a school, sent doctors and pledged about $500 million in grants for an airport, hospital, college and badly-needed water infrastructure for Gwadar, a dusty town whose harbour juts out into the Arabian Sea, overlooking some of the world's busiest oil and gas shipping lanes.

The grants include $230 million for a new international airport, one of the largest such disbursements China has made abroad, according to researchers and Pakistani officials.

The handouts for the Gwadar project is a departure from Beijing's usual approach in other countries. China has traditionally derided Western-style aid in favour of infrastructure projects for which it normally provides loans through Chinese state-owned commercial and development banks.

"The concentration of grants is quite striking," said Andrew Small, an author of a book on China-Pakistan relations and a Washington-based researcher at the German Marshall Fund think tank.

"China largely doesn't do aid or grants, and when it has done them, they have tended to be modest."

Pakistan has welcomed the aid with open hands. However, Beijing's unusual largesse has also fuelled suspicions in the United States and India that Gwadar is part of China's future geostrategic plans to challenge US naval dominance.

"It all suggests that Gwadar, for a lot of people in China, is not just a commercial proposition over the longer term," Small said.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry did not respond to a request for comment from Reuters.

Beijing and Islamabad see Gwadar as the future jewel in the crown of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship of Beijing's Belt and Road initiative to build a new "Silk Road" of land and maritime trade routes across more than 60 countries in Asia, Europe and Africa.

The plan is to turn Gwadar into a trans-shipment hub and megaport to be built alongside special economic zones from which export-focused industries will ship goods worldwide. A web of energy pipelines, roads and rail links will connect Gwadar to China's western regions.

Port trade is expected to grow from 1.2 million tonnes in 2018 to about 13 million tonnes by 2022, Pakistani officials say. At the harbour, three new cranes have been installed and dredging will next year deepen the port depth to 20 metres at five berths.

But the challenges are stark. Gwadar has no access to drinking water, power blackouts are common and separatist insurgents threaten attacks against Chinese projects in Gwadar and the rest of Balochistan, a mineral-rich province that is still Pakistan's poorest region.

Security is tight, with Chinese and other foreign visitors driven around in convoys of soldiers and armed police.

Beijing is also trying to overcome the distrust of outsiders evident in Balochistan, where indigenous Baloch fear an influx of other ethnic groups and foreigners. Many residents say the pace of change is too slow.

"Local people are not completely satisfied," said Essar Nori, a lawmaker for Gwadar, adding that the separatists were tapping into that dissatisfaction.

Pakistani officials are urging Gwadar residents to be patient, vowing to urgently build desalination plants and power stations.

Cautionary tale

China's Gwadar project contrasts with similar efforts in Sri Lanka, where the village of Hambantota was transformed into a port complex - but was saddled with Chinese debt.

Last week, Sri Lanka formally handed over operations to China on a 99-year lease in exchange for lighter debt repayments, a move that sparked street protests over what many Sri Lankans view as an erosion of sovereignty.

The Hambantota port, like Gwadar, is part of a network of harbours Beijing is developing in Asia and Africa that have spooked India, which fears being encircled by China's growing naval power.

But Pakistani officials say comparisons to Hambantota are unfair because the Gwadar project has much less debt.

On top of the airport, Chinese handouts in Gwadar include $100 million to expand a hospital by 250 beds, $130 million towards upgrading water infrastructure, and $10 million for a technical and vocational college, according to Pakistani government documents and officials.

"We welcome this assistance as it's changing the quality of life of the people of Gwadar for the better," said Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed {Mandela}, chairman of the parliamentary committee that oversees CPEC, including Gwadar.

China and Pakistan jointly choose which projects will be developed under the CPEC mechanism, Sayed added. {liar}

When China suggested a 7,000 metre runway for the new airport, Pakistan pushed for a 12,000 metre one that could accommodate planes as large as the Airbus 380 and be used for military purposes, according to Sajjad Baloch, a director of the Gwadar Development Authority.

The scale of Chinese grants is extraordinary, according to Brad Parks, executive director of AidData, a research lab at the US-based William and Mary university that collected data on Chinese aid across 140 countries from 2000-2014.

Since 2014, Beijing has pledged over $800 million in grants and concessional loans for Gwadar, which has less than 100,000 people. In the 15 years before that, China gave about $2.4 billion in concessional loans and grants during this period across the whole of Pakistan, a nation of 207 million people.

"Gwadar is exceptional even by the standards of China's past activities in Pakistan itself," Parks said.

Hearts and minds

There are early signs China's efforts to win hearts and minds are beginning to bear fruit in Gwadar.

"Baluchistan is backward and underdeveloped, but we are seeing development after China's arrival," said Salam Dashti, 45, a grocer whose two children attend the new Chinese-built primary school.

But there are major pitfalls ahead.

Tens of thousands of people living by the port will have to be relocated.

For now, they live in cramped single-story concrete houses corroded by sea water on a narrow peninsula, where barefoot fishermen offload their catch on newly-paved roads strewn with rubbish. Many of the fishermen say they fear they'll lose their livelihoods once the port starts operating.

Indigenous residents' fear of becoming a minority is inevitable with Gwadar's population expected to jump more than 15-fold in coming decades. On the edge of town, mansions erected by land speculators are popping up alongside the sand dunes.

Analysts say China is aware that previous efforts to develop Gwadar port failed partly due to the security threat posed by Baloch separatists, so Beijing is trying to counter the insurgents' narrative that China wants to exploit Baluchistan.

"That weighs heavily on the minds of the Chinese," Parks added. "It's almost certainly true that they are trying to safeguard their investments by getting more local buy-in."

Chinese officials, meanwhile, are promoting the infrastructure development they are funding.

"Every day you can see new changes. It shows the sincerity of Chinese for development of Gwadar," Fijian Zhao, the deputy chief of mission at the Chinese embassy in Islamabad, tweeted last month.

Naval facility

For its investment in Gwadar, China will receive 91 percent of revenues until the port is returned to Pakistan in four decades' time. The operator, China Overseas Ports Holding Company, will also be exempt from major taxes for more than 20 years.

Pakistan's maritime affairs minister, Hasil Bizenjo, said the arrival of the Chinese in the region contrasted with the experience of the past two centuries, when Russia and Britain, and later the United States and the Soviet Union, vied for control of the warm water ports of the Persian Gulf.

"The Chinese have come very smoothly, they have reached the warm waters," Bizenjo told Reuters. "What they are investing is less than a peanut for access to warm waters."

When a US Pentagon report in June suggested Gwadar could become a military base for China, a concern that India has also expressed, Beijing dismissed the idea.

"Talk that China is building a military base in Pakistan is pure guesswork," said a Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman, Wu Sian.

Bizenjo and other Pakistani officials say Beijing has not asked to use Gwadar for naval purposes.

"This port, they will use it mostly for their commercial interests, but it depends on the next 20 years where the world goes," Bizenjo said.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 17 Dec 2017 20:51

Wang Yi’s India visit was meant to deter anotherDoklam: Chinese blog - Atul Aneja, The Hindu

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s message to India for maintaining border peace has been supplemented with fresh troop deployments to deter a confrontation in the Doklam area, says a Chinese blog.

Two postings in Xilu.com—an online publication covering Chinese military affairs — assert that Chinese troop presence has been permanently beefed up in the Doklam area, where Chinese and Indian troops were engaged in a 70-day standoff this summer.

The publication’s contributor Zhan Hao, underscores that during his visit to India earlier this month, Mr. Wang wanted “to remind India not to create problems and not to worsen the bilateral relations”.

Simultaneously, China has been positioning additional forces and building new infrastructure in the Doklam area. It is also strengthening rear support, in tune with China’s on-going military reforms.

The blog points point that’s China had first deployed “number 76 group in the [Doklam] plateau”. “As the standoff with India-China border progressed, number 77 group also came up to the plateau.” The posting added that, “It is obvious China has more than 20,000 to 30,000 troops in Tibet”.

It earlier quoted Indian media reports as saying that around 1600-1800 soldiers had been deployed in the Sikkim, Bhutan, Tibet border area.

China built two helicopter platforms, dozens of houses and stores, and upgraded roads to cope with the very severe winter.

“It is as if we are planting islands in the South China Sea. If Philippines provokes, then China will have very sufficient reason to build an island there,” the posting observed.

The emergence of a new base in the Doklam area will necessitate the construction of a “wide road in the rear”— a move that will have major implications for Bhutan.

“This road will not be just for military supply but also the pathway for Chinese and Bhutanese people. Simply put, in the future, the Bhutan people not need to connect to the world through India…”

“We will have [an] airport and railway station at Yadong County [in Tibet]. So this will be more convenient, compared with travelling through India.” Yodong is a town in Tibet’s Chumbi valley, only 34 km from the border crossing of Nathu La.

The posting highlighted that following fresh Chinese deployments, India was likely to scale down “provoking” China, though surveillance drone flights may continue. “In my perspective on one hand (India) will not provoke China as easily as last time. At the same time, they will not stop provoking, although unmanned aircraft crossing the border — this kind of thing, will happen again,” the blogger said, referring to the recent crash of an Indian drone on the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The write-up asserted that the flight of the unmanned aircraft was a reflection of India’s anxiety about China’s new deployments in the Doklam area.

The revival of the road construction, which triggered the Doklam standoff, could not be ruled out following the winter months, the posting warned. “First, the standoff in Doklam is having a pause.

Since winter is here, is spring far away? And when the spring comes, will china build the road again, and will India stop China again? And will China be so restrained? These are all unknown factors.”

The blog highlighted the vulnerability of the “Siliguri corridor” that connects the ethnically diverse northeast with the rest of India. It underscored that India’s northeast is an “agriculturally backward region,” and would “immediately fall into chaos” if deprived of material supplies, passing through the Siliguri corridor, from the rest of India.

chola · Post by **chola** » 17 Dec 2017 22:35

IMHO, these two articles should make us better understand where the Chinese threat is most dangerous. It is not their military even though that occupies center place in our perception of the Lizard:

http://m.scmp.com/news/china/society/ar ... e-children

China calls off controversial hunt for Chinese ‘warrior gene’ in children
Poor results rather than ethical issues stopped studies focused on blood samples from violent juveniles, source says

LOL.
Scary chit though if you think about it but they weren’t able to find anything. They have proven to themselves they are not warriors. SYRE is what they are and they know it which brings us to what is, in my humble opinion, the real reptilian threat.

http://m.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazi ... ned-itself

From Made in China to Created in China: how nation turned itself from world’s sweatshop to global innovator in just one decade

BY ZIGOR ALDAMA
17 DEC 2017

While the ‘Made in China’ label has long held negative connotations, the newly embraced ‘Created in China’ designation celebrates a nation that is blazing a trail in manufacturing, technology and the new economy

This is the actual scary chit of Xi’s China in the coming decades. The PRC is on the edge of a technological and innovation takeoff much like Japan, Taiwan and SoKo before them.

TKiran · Post by **TKiran** » 18 Dec 2017 10:22

Han have turned around the "Doklam" defeat to "strategic gain" for themselves.

Only option India is left with is it's claim on PoK.

Can't blame anybody, army did well, but couldn't hold on because of political pressure. Can't blame political leadership either as they are not prepared for war with China.

Expect some action close to Tawang.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 18 Dec 2017 13:29

TKiran wrote:Han have turned around the "Doklam" defeat to "strategic gain" for themselves.

How?

BTW, you still haven't elaborated on your China claims of the past e.g. Yuan will become THE reserve currency of the world.

YET you keep making claims after claim on behalf of China on this forum. While your China *bhakti* is admirable [and I have no problems with that] you still need to back your assertions with facts or logic. Understand that such a shoot and scoot tactics does become tiring after a while.

TKiran · Post by **TKiran** » 18 Dec 2017 13:58

^^^^
https://mobile.twitter.com/Chellaney/st ... 0453486592

@chellaney

"While India was content with a tactical win at Doklam, China has shown the guile and determination to win at the strategic level. It didn't make sense for India to win the battle at the standoff site, only to lose the war over the Doklam Plateau's future"

https://m.timesofindia.com/india/in-fir ... ssion=true

@rajfortyseven

"#China has amassed division of troops&equipment&deployed ahead of #Yadong town.
2 mech units,atleast 9 inf battalions,>300 large vehicles,earth moving eqpt,construction material.
Gun position hardened,new gun position,infantry mortars&signal center upgrade
(link: https://theprint.in/2017/12/12/china-tr ... increases/) theprint.in/2017/12/12/chi…

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 18 Dec 2017 14:03

TKiran wrote:^^^ once CPEC is operational, China doesn't have to worry about Malacca, if we block Malacca, they will close Arabian sea for India, time is now to cut off CPEC, whether some excuse exists or not. Reintegration of PoK NA has to be done now.

Laughable to say the least

1. Comparing closing of the Arabian "sea" to closing of Malacca "strait". Shows the depth of your knowledge or the extent of your China "Bhakti" that you choose to compare the incomparable.
2. Chinese cannot match the India in the IOR region for at least 2 decade.
3. The Chinese bases far away from the mainland in the Indian neighborhood will be advantage India even if India is unable to match them ship for ship. Our land based defense/offense will come into play against fixed and limited Chinese bases in the IOR region. BTW this is in line with the Chinese strategy of the past when faced with a superior USN in its own backyard.

The last factor is not to be relied upon solely but will be a factor from the Chinese POV. A joint Indo-US squeeze will work on any current and future Chinese play in the IOR region especially wrt "Strait of Hormuz". Lets consider the case of Chinese trying to block the "Strait of Hormuz" from Gwadar. India from the Arabian sea and US from the Persian gulf side acting in tandem can crush China operating from Gwadar unless China can deploy a task force larger than the combined deployment of US and Indian naval assets.

The above scenario is simplistic and does not account for manpower skill or technological gaps but why would China initiate a hostile action when it can't be assured of a success. In any event the Chinese will have to build such a humongous task force before action starts otherwise Malacca bottleneck will come into play hampering a buildup. But a build up without a logical reason has its own dynamics i.e. India and US are unlikely to ignore any sizable buildup at Gwadar and are likely to take counter measures much before such a force can be assembled.

BUT China will win regardless of facts. When it comes to China facts don't matter for some folks.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 18 Dec 2017 14:12

TKiran wrote:^^^^
https://mobile.twitter.com/Chellaney/st ... 0453486592

@chellaney

"While India was content with a tactical win at Doklam, China has shown the guile and determination to win at the strategic level. It didn't make sense for India to win the battle at the standoff site, only to lose the war over the Doklam Plateau's future"

https://m.timesofindia.com/india/in-fir ... ssion=true

Selective reading can take you anywhere you want. From your link

Presence of Chinese troops perpetuated with construction of two helipads, upgraded roads, scores of pre-fabricated huts, shelters and stores

Apart from constructing accommodation for troops and helipads, China has also upgraded its existing motorable road in Doklam around 10 km north and east of the earlier face-off site. "But the PLA has not undertaken any fresh road construction activity southwards towards the Jampheri ridge," said a source.

1. Road construction that India objected to has stopped.
2. Road upgraded about 10 km from the disputed site.
3. Pre-fabricated huts, shelters and stores setup at the disputed site.

What has not changed. NO construction at the disputed site.

What has changed. Presence of Chinese troops at the disputed site and they have brought in pre-fabricated huts and shelters.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 18 Dec 2017 14:19

TKiran wrote:@rajfortyseven

"#China has amassed division of troops&equipment&deployed ahead of #Yadong town.
2 mech units,atleast 9 inf battalions,>300 large vehicles,earth moving eqpt,construction material.
Gun position hardened,new gun position,infantry mortars&signal center upgrade
(link: https://theprint.in/2017/12/12/china-tr ... increases/) theprint.in/2017/12/12/chi…

Again put up as proof of

TKiran wrote:Han have turned around the "Doklam" defeat to "strategic gain" for themselves.

Strategic gain for China
1. Greater deployment at #Yadong. [DO you know where Yadong is?]
2. vehicles,earth moving eqpt,construction material at #Yadong.
3. Gun position hardened,new gun position,infantry mortars&signal center upgrade

I have only read what you quoted here. BTW, I don't recall GOI objecting to their doing the above on what India too recognizes as Chinese territory. If that is the sum total of "strategic gain" for China, I am happy for them and you.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 18 Dec 2017 16:50

How China got a U.S. senator to do its political bidding

In its effort to cultivate foreign influence, the Chinese Communist Party boldly mixes economic incentives with requests for political favors. Its dealings with Sen. Steve Daines (R-Mont.) this year offer a success story for Beijing.

Last month Daines announced a breakthrough in his long-standing effort to win access for Montana’s beef exports to China — a $200 million deal with a leading Chinese retailer.

Then, on Dec. 5, the regime of Xi Jinping got something at least as valuable from Daines. The senator hosted a delegation of Chinese Communist Party officials who oversee Tibet, at the request of the Chinese Embassy — thereby undercutting a simultaneous visit to Washington by the president of the Tibetan government in exile.

Lobsang Sangay, the Tibetan leader regarded as an enemy by Beijing, was in Washington to meet with lawmakers and members of the Tibetan community. The House Foreign Affairs Asia subcommittee held a hearing Dec. 6 on Chinese repression in Tibet.

The rival meeting hosted by Daines the day before included Sen. John Barrasso (R-Wyo.). After the meetings, the state-owned China Daily claimed the congressmen had praised Chinese officials in Tibet for doing “a good job in environmental protection and traditional cultural preservation.”

The episode illustrated China’s growing practice of enlisting Western politicians to blunt criticism of the regime — and also its determination to haunt its opponents wherever they travel. “Everywhere I go, I’m followed by a high-level Chinese delegation” denying human rights abuses in Tibet, Sangay told me, adding that Chinese officials pressure governments across the world not to meet with him.

Sangay was in town to push legislation calling for foreigners to have the same access to Tibet that Chinese officials who oversee Tibet have here. The Chinese Communist Party did allow one congressional delegation to visit Tibet in April — led by Daines — which met top Chinese officials.

...............

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 18 Dec 2017 16:53

Google to open artificial intelligence centre in China

TKiran · Post by **TKiran** » 18 Dec 2017 18:06

https://mobile.twitter.com/jmohanmalik/ ... 3680828416

@jmohanmalik

The Scarborough model applied on the Doklam plateau:
“Disengagement of troops happened on August 28 once the Chinese agreed to stop constructing that road. Indian soldiers withdrew from Doklam; the Chinese did not.”

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 18 Dec 2017 19:23

Very strange.

China is desperately trying to develop people-to-people & cultural relationship

On the 60th anniversary of China-Sri Lanka diplomatic relationship, 50 Chinese couples, clad in traditional Chinese, Western and Sri Lankan costumes, were married at a mass ceremony in Colombo on Sunday to mark the 60th anniversary. The ceremony was attended by Sri Lankan politicians and diplomats from both nations.

TKiran · Post by **TKiran** » 18 Dec 2017 19:48

https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/china-a ... hostility/

China and India: The Roots of Hostility
Beijing and New Delhi’s rivalry has deep roots.

By Mohan Malik
September 12, 2017

Up until the “disengagement agreement” of August 28 which led to withdrawal of Indian troops and an end to Chinese road construction in the disputed Doklam (Donglang in Chinese) plateau at the China-Bhutan-India tri-junction, China’s official media and spokespersons had unleashed a daily barrage of vitriol and warnings of an imminent “short and swift war” to teach India a “bitter lesson” and inflict “greater losses” than the Sino-Indian War of 1962.

Contending that Doklam was “Chinese territory,” Beijing’s media, along with its foreign affairs and defense spokespersons, demanded India’s unconditional withdrawal. New Delhi was adamant that road building was in violation of several bilateral agreements (agreements in 1988, 1998, and 2012 specifically) with Bhutan and India. To independent observers, Beijing’s behavior in the Himalayas seemed consistent with its incremental expansion of strategic frontiers by drawing new lines around China’s periphery in the land, air, water, sand, and snow. Troop mobilization along their disputed frontiers saw tempers running high, and for the first time since the 1987 Sumdorong Chu valley face-off, violent clashes occurred in the Ladakh sector. The confrontation was the worst in decades between Asia’s old rivals.

Thanks to a negotiated settlement on the eve of the BRICS Summit in China, the two-month Doklam standoff has ended in such a fashion as to allow the media in both countries to claim “victory.”

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“If it wasn’t for the BRICS meeting happening so soon,” said Zhang Guihong, an India expert at Shanghai’s Fudan University, “the stand-off would have lasted much longer.”

Though a war has been averted, Beijing has not compromised on its sovereignty claims. As the entire Sino-Indian border from Kashmir to Burma remains undemarcated and unsettled, Zhao Gancheng, director of South Asian studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, believes that “it is unrealistic to expect China and India to have high political trust or to exclude the possibility of another incident.”

India’s army chief, General Bipin Rawat, agrees and cautions against complacency because Doklam-style encroachments are likely to “increase in the future.”

But two weeks after the standoff appeared to end, Indian and Chinese troops remain on the plateau, separated by 150 meters, according to Indian media reports. The reports also claim that Chinese troops have built bunkers on a ridge near the disputed area and there are concerns that the standoff could resume.

Neither side is going to lower its guard by pulling troops back too far. Reputational costs weigh heavily. New Delhi cannot abandon Bhutan — India’s only treaty ally in South Asia — to Beijing’s bullying and blandishments. For Beijing, the central message of India’s defiance — “China will stop only when it’s stopped” — could encourage further acts of defiance by other adversaries. Having been outmaneuvered and outwitted by Delhi, Beijing may seek to bolster its military capabilities in Doklam. Whether imperial or communist, China has a long history of lashing out at states that hurt its pride and interests. It seems the so-called Pacific Century may turn out to be just another hundred bloody years in Asia.

In fact, skirmishes and military face-offs have been a regular feature on their contested borders, rife with disputed histories. Numerous pacts and border management mechanisms established over the decades have failed to maintain peace and Asia’s giants have come close to fighting for a second round along their long, disputed Himalayan border at least once a decade since the late 1960s. Never close, a chill has descended on Sino-Indian ties in recent years over a whole range of issues including India’s membership in global institutions, territorial disputes, Pakistan-based terror groups, water, trade, maritime, and India’s public opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also ‘One Belt, One Road,’ or OBOR) as China embarked upon a path to regional hegemony.

From New Delhi’s perspective, China’s BRI narrative in a sense seeks to rewrite Asian history and shape Eurasia’s future without recognizing India’s historical, cultural, religious, and commercial links to the world. Thus, at a time when the whole world is China’s oyster, India is the only Asian country standing athwart China’s march to glory and greatness. Not surprisingly, the enemy most often spoken of in Beijing’s strategic circles today is India. The censors encourage alarmingly frank discussion of the merits of another war against India.

In particular, China has been concerned about India moving too close to the United States and Japan for Beijing’s comfort. From Beijing’s perspective, as long as India understands that China is the preeminent great power in Asia, and New Delhi keeps its subordinate place in the hierarchy, both will enjoy a mutually beneficial relationship. However, should India challenge or aspire to emerge as China’s equal or peer competitor — and to do so with help from Japan and the United States — then the entire gamut of contentious bilateral issues are open for review and recasting.

Convinced that India has opted for the latter course, the Chinese government has hardened its stance and unleashed a shrill media campaign against India. Not very accustomed to weaker powers pushing back, Chinese official statements have been among the most belligerent and contemptuous since the 1960s. China’s defense ministry spokesman repeatedly called on India to “correct its mistakes and stop its provocations.” This campaign — unusual in its sarcasm and ridicule of Indian aspirations with daily threats and warnings — has mobilized Chinese public support for punitive action against its southern rival at an appropriate time and place. It is worth remembering that several military stand-offs and skirmishes eventually culminated in the Sino-Indian War of 1962.

The periodic Himalayan standoffs have their origins in the deep-seated hostility and suspicion that China and India have for one another. My book China and India: Great Power Rivals argued that given the fundamental clash of interests rooted in their history, strategic cultures and geopolitics, the threat of another war is ever present. For Asia has never known both China and India growing strong simultaneously in such close proximity with overlapping spheres of influence. India perceives itself in southern Asia much as China has traditionally perceived itself in relation to eastern Asia — as the preeminent power. Both aspire to the same things at the same time on the same continental landmass and its adjoining waters. As their need for resources, markets and bases grows, Asia’s rising powers are also increasingly running into each other in third countries. China’s global clout is manifesting itself in a millennia-old sense of superiority in Chinese behavior as Beijing seeks to recast the world in its own image.

India’s rise presents serious challenges to China. Their power rivalry and their self-images as natural great powers and centers of civilization drive them to support different countries and causes. Since India was never part of the Sinic world order, but a civilization-empire in and of itself, it remains genetically ill-disposed to sliding into China’s orbit without resistance. It is the only Asian power that has long been committed to balancing China. Economic, military and demographic trends over the long term tend to favor India. Compared with the United States, Russia and Japan — all in relative decline, India is the only country whose power and influence vis-à-vis China is increasing over time. New economic prosperity and military strength is reawakening nationalist pride in India, which could bring about a clash with the Chinese, if not handled skillfully. The emergence of a democratic, but at-times chaotic, India as the fastest growing world economy undercuts “the China model” of development-without-democracy. Add to this mix India’s growing military cooperation with the United States, Japan and Australia, and growing strategic ties with countries that fall within China’s sphere of influence (Mongolia, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines and Myanmar). All of these “new irritants” reinforce Beijing’s fears about India’s growing role in the U.S.-led containment of China. Furthermore, Chinese diplomats have discerned a certain degree of assertiveness, confidence and arrogance in their Indian counterparts that was missing in the 1980s and 1990s. When Chinese and Indian leaders meet, there is little meeting of the minds.

Many analysts believe that growing power asymmetry, in particular Beijing’s global economic clout, is the reason for Chinese derision and bellicosity toward India. However, I argue that the roots of Chinese hostility toward its southern rival are deep-seated and actually pre-date Beijing’s acquisition of economic and military muscle. An understanding of Chinese perceptions of India insofar as they influence policy is important because the present tensions may or may not erupt in a hot war, but will surely make their cold war colder. These perceptions have led five successive generations of post-Mao Chinese leadership to contemplate “teach[ing] India a lesson again” at least once every decade since the 1962 War (Zhou Enlai in 1971, Deng Xiaoping in 1987, Jiang Zemin in 1999, Hu Jintao in 2009 and Xi Jinping in 2017).

India is “an artificial British creation”

Since Mao’s days, Chinese leaders have entertained doubts about the historical authenticity of the Indian nation. They have shown contempt for India’s great power ambitions, perceived their southern rival as a pawn in Western designs to contain China, and worried about the strategic ramifications of India’s power with regard to Tibet’s future. Official rhetoric of Asian solidarity or millennia-old civilizational bonds notwithstanding, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) stereotype of India is of a loathsome, backward neighbor that sold opium to China, sent soldiers to crush the Boxer rebellion, provided Sikh policemen for the pre-1949 international settlements in Shanghai, copied British parliamentary democracy, adopted English as its official language, gave refuge to the Dalai Lama and Tibetan “splittists,” and, last but not least, pursued British India’s expansionist policies. The 1962 War and the Sino-Pakistan military nexus helped to tilt the regional power balance in China’s favor.

If anything, the gulf between the two countries — in terms of their perceptions, attitudes, and expectations of each other — has widened in recent years. Despite growing economic ties, there is little or nothing positive about India’s history, economy, or society in Chinese school textbooks. Official media portrays India as “a backward country full of horrific stories.” Amid reports of an Indian consumer boycott of Chinese goods, many Chinese netizens joked that they could find nothing produced by India that they could boycott. When he was vice-foreign minister, Wang Yi described India as “a tribal democracy whose long-term existence was far from a certainty.”

Many Chinese analysts maintain that “India as a nation never really existed in history,” and urge Beijing to remove an emerging security threat by initiating the balkanization of India into 20-30 independent states with the aid of friendly countries. A Huanqiu commentary on July 28, 2017, warned India not to mess with China: “China has the capacity to make each of India’s northeastern states independent.” Many believe that “China and India cannot really deal with each other harmoniously” because “there cannot be two Suns in the sky.”

The opinion pieces in Renmin Ribao, Xinhua, China Daily and nationalistic Global Times provide invaluable insights into Chinese elite thinking on India. Some may argue that the war-mongering rhetoric is not representative of China’s official policy and that sensational press articles represent the shrill voice of those who advocate a tougher line toward India. After all, similar commentaries have appeared against Japan, Vietnam, South Korea and the Philippines in the recent past. The most plausible explanation is that Chinese government encourages this nationalistic outpouring to pressure New Delhi to comply with its demands. It also reflects a new consensus on hardline policy toward rising India. In short, there exists in the Chinese commentariat a deep distrust and dislike of India — with the converse also holding true.

“India cannot compete with China”

Another dominant Chinese belief is that there is more hype than substance to India’s rise, generated mostly by the Western media. While Indians benchmark themselves against China, the Chinese see their country as not just an Asian power but a global power on par with the United States while making disparaging comments about India’s “unrealistic and unachievable big power dreams” (daguomeng). Whilst China already struts the world stage as a superpower, India remains far behind in all indices of power. Official China loathes being spoken of in the same breath as India. India plays no part in the vision projected by Beijing of the 21st century as a Chinese one — albeit except as a junior partner. Given China’s growing global footprint and the West’s current disarray, Beijing feels no need to play the anti-West, Asian solidarity card, or make any concessions to keep India on its side. Traditionally, China has long looked at India merely as an upstart wannabe that likes to punch above its weight and needs to be constantly reminded of its place. Much of Beijing’s strategic penetration deep into South Asian and the Indian Ocean has clearly been at India’s expense. What irks the Chinese elite apparently is the international praise showered on India’s democratic model. China’s economy and military are both nearly five times the size of India’s. The Chinese contend that their economic success proves the superiority of “the China model.” The PLA judges the Indian military inferior to the Chinese in combat, logistics, equipment, and war-fighting capability.

Meanwhile, the potential emergence of India as an alternative pole worries Beijing. A main objective of China’s Asia policy is to prevent the rise of a rival to challenge its status as the Asia-Pacific’s sole “Middle Kingdom.” China’s strategic culture necessitates a distrust of strong, powerful neighbors and a preference for small, weak, and subordinate or client buffer states. Few, if any, of China’s strategic thinkers hold positive views of India for China’s future. India’s efforts to take counter-balancing measures are perceived as challenging and threatening in China. Much to China’s chagrin, India’s “Act East” policy and naval activism have encouraged many countries to “view India as a counterweight to China in Southeast Asia.” The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor to promote growth and connectivity proposed together by India and Japan has drawn negative media commentary for “trying to trip China’s OBOR.”

Those who see India’s rise as China’s “Thucydides Trap” favor nipping it in the bud before it’s too late. Others favor leveraging mistrust and conflict in relations between India and its smaller South Asian neighbors and engaging in long-term strategic competition to sap India’s will and prevent it from spreading its wings. Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative seeks to integrate Asia’s natural resources, markets, and bases into China’s national development strategy. Moderate voices who want Beijing to accommodate a rising India in order to leverage its economic growth and partner with it to build a multipolar world are often drowned out by more hawkish voices.

Chinese leaders seem confident that China’s growing economic and military might would eventually enable Beijing to re-establish a Sino-centric a hierarchical order as the United States remains disoriented and Japan shrinks economically and demographically, while India is subdued by Beijing’s “all-weather relationships” with its South Asian neighbors. For Chinese diplomats and strategists, some resistance (“frictions” or “nuisances” from pesky neighbors, as Global Times put it) in China’s march toward glory and greatness is to be expected, but resistance will eventually give way to accommodation followed by reconciliation on China’s terms.

As such, the goal is to convince neighboring countries that the overall balance of power has shifted in Beijing’s favor, and their long-term interests lie in cutting bilateral deals with China. The kowtowing of Filipino, Thai, Cambodian and Malaysian leaders vindicates this approach. Chinese officials openly talk of buying off smaller countries instead of invading them. Strategically-located countries with resources, markets and naval bases are usually the largest recipients of Chinese largesse. Whether imperial, nationalist or communist, the aim of Chinese policy has been that neighbors must be respectful, obedient, and in areas immediately adjacent to the Chinese lands, preferably impotent and sufficiently weak. Overawed by China’s growing wealth and power, India and other Chinese neighbors are expected to acquiesce to China’s primacy and accept Beijing as their “benevolent big brother.” Those who seek to contain China by banding together or aligning with the United States and allies would invariably incur Beijing’s wrath. The policy of using territorial disputes to seek subservience creates contradictions that lead Beijing to support the 1890 Qing-British Treaty that demarcated borders with Sikkim and Tibet but to oppose the 1914 Simla Convention, to uphold the watershed principle on the Sikkim boundary demarcation but oppose it on the China-India border in Arunachal Pradesh.

Xi’s Dream: China as Number One

Last but not least, China has always seen itself as a superior, unrivaled civilization-state. The CCP leadership consciously conducts itself as the heir to China’s imperial legacy, often employing the symbolism and rhetoric of empire. From primary school textbooks to television historical dramas, the state-controlled media has force-fed generations of Chinese a diet of nationalist bluster and imperial China’s grandeur. One lesson Chinese school textbooks teach is that “strength leads to expansion and weakness to contraction.” That is why Beijing no longer feels constrained by bilateral or multilateral pacts or treaties that it signed on to “when China was weak.” A common refrain is that “other countries need to ‘get used to’ its assertive posture and Chinese maritime forays, whether they like it or not.” So “history” battles over territorial disputes are essentially about the future of regional order: Pax Sinica versus Pax Americana. Beijing’s assessment of the United States as being distracted internally, and weakened diplomatically, has emboldened Chinese leadership to be aggressive. In the past six months alone, Beijing has threatened war with Vietnam, the Philippines, and India. As Martin Jacques puts it: “Imperial Sino-centrism shapes and underpins modern Chinese nationalism.” The CCP’s version of history — a benign and benevolent China at the center of Asia — commanding obeisance from less civilized is imagined, self-serving version, and constructed to serve the Party’s domestic legitimacy and foreign policy goals.

Hyper-nationalism, a belief in Han exceptionalism, and of the inevitability of a post-American Sino-centric world now shape Beijing’s India policy. Chinese leaders are cautious but also known risk-takers. And the PLA’s proclivity to tolerate risk on the border with India is much greater. As in the late 1950s, rising India is once again being viewed by PLA generals as an ambitious power with whom China may have to have a day of reckoning. Chinese strategic thinkers feel that a limited war with India would send a resounding message to those who are again courting and counting on India as a balancer or counterweight to China in the 21st century. The demonstrative effect of a short and swift victory over India would buttress the need for other Asian countries to accommodate China’s growing power by aligning with, rather than against China. Instead of challenging China, Indian leaders will then be much more deferential. Even more tantalizing is the prospect of several weak and warring states in South Asia — all vying for Chinese aid and support.

In short, even though neither side wants a war, small skirmishes ending in a military confrontation due to miscalculation or hubris cannot be completely ruled out. Short of a hot war, Beijing could make the line of actual control (LAC) as “hot” as India’s line of control (LOC) is with Pakistan. For the foreseeable future, the China-India cold war will continue to be characterized by incursions, tensions and scuffles, interspersed with endless talks until both sides work out new rules of engagement and mechanisms to enforce them.

Mohan Malik is a professor at Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu. His recent books include China and India: Great Power Rivals (Lynne Rienner, 2011) and Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). The views expressed here are his own.