2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

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pankajs
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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby pankajs » 10 Apr 2020 15:39

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7800&start=4840#p2426119
pankajs wrote:https://twitter.com/sidhant/status/1247388612615798787
Sidhant Sibal @sidhant

Just in: India says Hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) will be kept in a licensed category & the stock position "could allow our companies to meet the export commitments that they had contracted."
Export while not banned will need export license henceforth .. effectively GOI permission for all exports. This AFTER the current contracted obligations are discharged .. US and Brazil orders put in just prior to the ban.

https://twitter.com/SiddiquiMaha/status ... 4881849345
Maha Siddiqui @SiddiquiMaha

Sources:After a comprehensive stock taking was completed, #India has lifted restrictions on a case-by-case basis, covering requests for commercial sales & aid to up to 25 countries.
So, this includes #hydroxychloroquine & #paracetamol exports in view #COVIDー19.

1. "comprehensive stock taking" is the correct phraseology as was suggested earlier.

2. "commercial sales" is the right way as was suggested earlier.

3. "case-by-case basis" means "effectively GOI permission for all {each} exports {order}"

Funny thing ...

a. Exports will still need license i.e. to say IF the bakis or the turks want any, they have to raise a "request" with GOI perhaps with Modi himself! They cannot just buy it from the companies themselves.

b. "case-by-case basis" also implies that there will be NO blanket exemption for any country. Therefore, each fresh order will need a NEW request with GOI/Modi <<ROTFL>>. May not apply to "special friends" like US but will apply to most countries/leaders.

c. Just because someone requested 50 million tabs does not mean they will get more than a say 10 million. Rationing very likely given the demand. Effectively means that to get the 50 million all many countries will have to "request" GOI/Modi multiple times.

Bahut hard .. bahut hard.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby SriKumar » 10 Apr 2020 17:38

Sachin wrote:Condemnation of Jamaat's proclivities muted: Manish Tewari
From the report.
Tewari rued that the “condemnation of proclivities of Tablighi Jamat by progressives was muted” in India while “reaction against them was stronger in Pakistan & Islamic Nations.”....
He said if mainstream Muslims do not speak strongly against such incidents then it gives bigots a chance to equate Tablighi Jamaat with all Muslims.
THe bolded part is a very carefully-worded statement and a piece of sophistry. His main concern is that Tablighi Jamaat's actions would be equated with the actions of other Muslims, and nothing more. His concern for the reduced criticism of Jamaat in India is solely because other Islamic countries have critized more- his own words (reminds me of the journalists who were calling for an end to Shaheen Bagh protests because it was polarizing the Delhi electorate prior to an election). And if you do condemn the action of other Muslims, by default it is bigoted. :roll: Well, what does one say about the 5000-strong anti-CAA protest in Chennai...not to be condemned? And SHaheen Bagh went on...until the police broke it up. ANd then there are cases where namaaz in public was stopped by police (based on govt orders, mind you) who were chased away or beaten up (which is absolutely unacceptable). All these guys were endangering themselves and the rest of the population in their mohalla and city. If these are condemned, you are bigoted. NIce logic, Tewari saab.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby chetak » 10 Apr 2020 21:27

Modi should send malaysia just one tablet of hydroxychloroquine.

one half for mahatir mohamad and the other half for zakir naik. :mrgreen:


Malaysia requests hydroxychloroquine from India https://wionews.com/india-news/malaysia-requests-hydroxychloroquine-from-india-291304 @wionews


we should be watchful that these fakers don't divert a large number of tablets
to the pakis

or the paki embassy in India does not buy large amounts of hydroxychloroquine and ship them out via the diplomatic bags

pankajs
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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby pankajs » 10 Apr 2020 22:14

https://twitter.com/republic/status/1248278941493628931
Republic @republic

#FightToWin | Nothing is more important than the lives of our people, we can revive the economy at a later date. We can't make the same mistakes that the US has made, we have to have an India strategy: @SachinPilot - Deputy CM, Rajasthan
http://republicworld.com/livetv.html

As someone else pointed out, Pilot, in speaking with Republic TV, went against the party dictates. This is a very minor infraction but infraction nonetheless and a deliberate one. He wasn't cornered into giving a bite to Republic tv.

Is Pilot sending a signal to the high command wrt Rajhasthan?

pankajs
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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby pankajs » 10 Apr 2020 23:17

Jamatis continue with their games

https://twitter.com/nisheethsharan/stat ... 0377133064
Nisheeth Sharan @nisheethsharan

BIG NEWS:
Bhopal Police has just now arrested 64 foreign, 10 Indian Jamatis of the #TablighiJamat.
13 locals who gave support and hid them have also been arrested.
The 87 prople are being tested and isolated.
This happened after expiry of the self revelation time.
#CoronaJihad

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby vijayk » 10 Apr 2020 23:52

pankajs wrote:https://twitter.com/republic/status/1248278941493628931
Republic @republic

#FightToWin | Nothing is more important than the lives of our people, we can revive the economy at a later date. We can't make the same mistakes that the US has made, we have to have an India strategy: @SachinPilot - Deputy CM, Rajasthan
http://republicworld.com/livetv.html

As someone else pointed out, Pilot, in speaking with Republic TV, went against the party dictates. This is a very minor infraction but infraction nonetheless and a deliberate one. He wasn't cornered into giving a bite to Republic tv.

Is Pilot sending a signal to the high command wrt Rajhasthan?


Doesn't he understand by now that Italian sh1t gang is an anti-Indian world BIF mafia gang? He knows and he is trying to wriggle out.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby CRamS » 11 Apr 2020 00:45

Looks like a lot of action along the LoC. And its the same old script playing out:

1. Indian army reports hitting a TSP arms depo and releases video
2. White media citing TSP media reporting that TSP shot down an Indian drone while India denies. Of course with loads of equal equal and scary scenarios. Nothing new there

Leaving aside these details, what it tells you is TSP's Kashmir game plan is active as usual. Which in a nutshell is to throw India off balance with its pigLeTs, have white media do equal equal and paint scary nuke flash-point scenarios, have their 5th columns in India berate ModiJi and RSS for their Kashmir policy, turn on the charm with their RAPE who have a lot of slavish fans in India (e.g., ex kirket players), and then last but not the least, call for talks. Haven't we seen this script before? Onle thing new is that TSP is now using its PR machine to paint a dire COVID situation in Kashmir valley and attributing that to India's lock down there.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby darshan » 11 Apr 2020 00:57

Just saw an ad on YouTube by Israel about how it's helping world deal with Wuhan virus. For example, supplying millions of HCQ tablets.

Very good positive campaign being run that directly talks to the audience.

Suresh S
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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby Suresh S » 11 Apr 2020 01:09

India should start preparing for a war with china. In the medium and long term China,s economy is going to take a massive hit as nobody in their hearts is going to trust them. All this talk of both India and china can prosper together is bull.China will not want it, it has been bleeding us since independence and is not going to change ever just like the paki attitude will not change until the state of pakistan is no more.

Make every effort to create a massive military industrial complex , our survival is going to depend on it in the coming generation more than ever.

This corona virus has changed the world order without a shot being fired. But shots are going to be fired in a big way and India will be the target, make no mistake. United states remain militarily too powerful for the chinks to handle.

I believe war is coming sooner rather than later between India and china. It will be initiated by Chinks but we should be proactive and not reactive for once in our life , the fate of dharmic civilization is at stake. This is going to be a major conflict and not some pinprick and limited 1 week war.

All this Indian habit of chalta ha must end if we are to survive the coming onslaught. No more 8 fighters a year and 100 orders for Arjuns. These nos have to be in the hundreds and thousands.

Their is a Mongol saying, "there can only be one sun" from the time of Genghis Khan it applies to India vs Chinks.

A massive increase in military expenditure in India must happen as soon as economy starts to improve within the next 1-2 years. I expect the Indian economy to hit the 5th gear in the coming years as china,s economy tanks and the chances of war will rise exponentially.

We must finish of the pakis before taking on the chinks in the next 5-6 years. It will require chanakyan strategy.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby shaun » 11 Apr 2020 01:24

darshan wrote:Just saw an ad on YouTube by Israel about how it's helping world deal with Wuhan virus. For example, supplying millions of HCQ tablets.

Very good positive campaign being run that directly talks to the audience.

If they are supplying HCQ tablets , why the hack they are asking for the same from India !!??

chetak
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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby chetak » 11 Apr 2020 01:28

all dynasts, commies, naxals and caste based politicos are weeping tears of blood.

they have lost tens of hundreds of crores worth of commissions they would have grabbed from the poor by way of commissions/bribes/extortions and theft :mrgreen:

Modi must go. sickularism will never survive like this.


Varun Jhaveri@Varun_Jhaveri·2h
When Jan Dhan Yojana started in 2014, a lot of ppl mocked it saying poor don't use bank accounts. Today, within minutes, 7825 Cr was deposited in accounts of 15.65 Cr women. No middleman, no delays, no begging for approvals! That's the power of right intent & implementation.




@Varun_Jhaveri
Officer on Special Duty to CEO, Ayushman Bharat (@AyushmanNHA) || Lead Consultant @innovcorps || Frmly w/h@NITIAayog ||

vimal
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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby vimal » 11 Apr 2020 01:41

shaun wrote:
darshan wrote:Just saw an ad on YouTube by Israel about how it's helping world deal with Wuhan virus. For example, supplying millions of HCQ tablets.

Very good positive campaign being run that directly talks to the audience.

If they are supplying HCQ tablets , why the hack they are asking for the same from India !!??


Because our government sucks at setting the narrative. This should've been done with a joint video conference, MSM and social media blitz. All you have is a single tweet from head of states which no one will remember.

Only thing that everyone will remember a few years from now is how Modi capitulated to the demands of Trump.
Last edited by vimal on 11 Apr 2020 01:49, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby vimal » 11 Apr 2020 01:44

Israel PM Netanyahu Thanks PM Modi For Sending Medicines To Israel


darshan
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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby darshan » 11 Apr 2020 02:02

Not debating on how correct or incorrect the ad was. One can donate million and import 10 millions but exporter no one is going to remember.

The point is about how to run PR campaign.

Old donation
https://www.jewishpress.com/news/us-new ... 020/03/20/

SaiK
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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby SaiK » 11 Apr 2020 02:30

Breapers, I am posting here as I'm unable to find the right thread. Please feel free to repost or delete

____________


https://carnegietsinghua.org/2020/04/08 ... -pub-81456

How the United States Should Deal With China in Pakistan
DANIEL MARKEY
APRIL 08, 2020
ARTICLE
Source: Getty
Summary: The Trump administration holds a decidedly critical view of China’s infrastructure initiatives in Pakistan. Although there is much to criticize in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the administration’s fixation on commercial and economic issues threatens to distract U.S. policymakers from deeper concerns.

INTRODUCTION
By the end of 2019, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China’s high-profile development initiative in Pakistan, had shifted to a new phase. Whereas the first CPEC projects were mainly devoted to building new physical infrastructure, like power plants and highways, the next iteration of CPEC will tackle a wider array of projects intended to spur economic development and job creation.

Changes in CPEC were motivated by Pakistan’s political and institutional realities as well as by the broader evolution of China’s globe-spanning Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which CPEC has always been a prominent part. Yet the early stages of CPEC were themselves slowed or stymied by Pakistan’s own weak institutions and domestic political cleavages. The next phase is almost certain to yield similar if not greater frustrations.

In the midst of CPEC’s transition, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has unveiled a decidedly more critical view of China’s infrastructure initiatives in Pakistan, one aligned with Washington’s tougher posture in the global competition with China. Although there is much to criticize in CPEC, the administration’s current fixation on commercial and economic issues threatens to distract U.S. policymakers from deeper concerns, including how Chinese political influence contributes to illiberal governance and undermines personal freedoms in Pakistan. Washington needs to keep one eye on the prize of regional stability, especially in the context of deepening hostility between India and Pakistan, and the other eye on the longer-term geopolitical challenges posed by China’s increased involvement throughout the region.

U.S. policymakers should also remember that even when China’s overseas policies are dangerously flawed, foreign leaders and citizens will respond better to a United States that does less finger-wagging and more concrete problem-solving. For Pakistan as for so many other states around the world, the U.S.-China global competition is in itself of little practical concern when compared to other pressing needs, such as economic development, public health, and security. Until U.S. officials hone their messages and policies to better appeal to the interests of overseas audiences, they are likely to be greeted with lackluster, even dismissive, responses.

PLAYING CPEC POLITICS
Amid much fanfare, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Islamabad in April 2015 to announce the launch of CPEC. Pakistan’s leaders characterized the initiative as nothing less than a “fate changer,” a transformative development package that would simultaneously deliver economic growth, political stability, and security to Pakistan. By extension, CPEC would also help address China’s concerns about the threat of Islamist ideology along its western border. Even if China’s official statements were more circumspect about Beijing’s specific funding plans, promises of $40 billion–$60 billion or more in Chinese investment, with an emphasis on Pakistan’s troubled energy sector, stole the headlines in Pakistan.

Although CPEC is unlikely to live up to these early claims, the achievements of the past five years should not be dismissed. Pakistan received at least $19 billion in new infrastructure, including Chinese-built power plants that have reduced, if not eliminated, the country’s once debilitating rolling blackouts. Beijing claims that its projects have created jobs for an estimated 75,000 Pakistani workers, and other China-backed infrastructure improvements are literally set in concrete, such as roads, rails, and the new deep-sea port of Gwadar in Balochistan Province. These are significant accomplishments for Pakistan, which has been challenged by a difficult business environment, contentious politics, and long-standing domestic and regional security threats.

Daniel Markey
Daniel Markey is the author of China’s Western Horizon: Beijing and the New Geopolitics of Eurasia (Oxford University Press, 2020). He is also a senior research professor in international relations and the academic director of the Master of Arts in Global Policy program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
For its part, the administration of former U.S. president Barack Obama initially voiced a cautious welcome to Chinese infrastructure investments in Pakistan as a means to advance the shared aim of developing Pakistan’s economy and, over time, delivering economic opportunities to its people that, the argument went, would undercut the appeal of radical ideologies. Instead of opposing CPEC, U.S. officials even sought ways to harmonize initiatives from the United States Agency for International Development in Pakistan with new Chinese-sponsored ones.

Of late, however, the Trump administration has adopted a very different stance on CPEC. In November 2019, the most senior official in the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Ambassador Alice Wells, took the stage at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, and delivered a forceful critique of CPEC. Applying the Trump administration’s general assessment of the BRI to Pakistan, Wells cited several U.S. concerns about CPEC: its relatively high costs, the long-term effects of its debt burden on Pakistan’s economy, the lack of transparency in its bidding processes that has fueled allegations of corruption, and the paucity of new jobs it has created for Pakistani workers.

Rather than seeking to harmonize U.S. and Chinese development efforts, the Trump team now seems intent on highlighting their differences in a bid to raise Pakistani awareness and stir skepticism about China’s aid offerings. In the ambassador’s words, “After four years of CPEC, people in Pakistan are beginning to ask tough questions about what kind of deals their prior government struck with Communist China and what Pakistan really gains.”

Washington’s policy shift as articulated in the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy documents reflects a toughened line on great power competition, especially with regard to China. Trump administration officials have expressed similar views in other instances as well. For example, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo used his February 2020 trip to Kazakhstan to warn local audiences about the dangers posed by business deals with China.

Not surprisingly, Chinese and Pakistani officials responded harshly to the tougher U.S. line. Beijing was especially keen to refute U.S. officials’ arguments that China had ensnared Pakistan in debt traps. Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Yao Jing publicly complained that Wells made use of inaccurate information and propaganda and went on to claim that China, unlike the U.S.-backed International Monetary Fund, would never force Pakistan to repay loans on a strict timeline if doing so would harm Pakistan’s interests. From Beijing, Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry Information Department and Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang also rejected U.S. “smears,” observing that half of Pakistan’s outstanding debts are from multilateral financial institutions and that “more than 80 percent of CPEC projects are funded by direct investment or grants from China.”

Pakistan’s response took a similar tone. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Aisha Farooqui also pushed back on U.S. claims, highlighting the CPEC projects that had already been built and the “enormous economic benefits for the people of Pakistan.” The Senate of Pakistan passed a resolution declaring the U.S. statement “uncalled for, unwarranted and unprecedented” and claiming Washington was “promoting fiction and presenting a biased perspective.”

Prominent political backers of Pakistan’s close ties with China, like Senator Mushahid Hussain, explained that “CPEC is central to Pakistan’s future, and it’s a pivot of our strategic relationship with China and for which Pakistan has benefited already.” Even Shehbaz Sharif, the opposition leader in the National Assembly and brother of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, fell in line. In a tweet, he declared, “I believe President Xi’s Belt & Road Initiative, based on the idea of win-win partnerships, shows the way forward & is an incredible model of interstate relations. Pakistanis will remain grateful to their Iron Brother for not only CPEC but also being an ally & all-weather friend!”

These responses are critically important for what they reveal about the politics of CPEC. Neither Beijing nor Islamabad is eager to air any frustrations about the other in public, much less to accept Washington’s criticism of initiatives that enjoy the personal backing of both Xi and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Qamar Javed Bajwa. Moreover, each of the three successive Pakistani political parties that has held power since the end of Pervez Musharraf’s military rule in 2008 bought into CPEC and supports tighter relations with Beijing. Few prominent Pakistanis are willing or able to backtrack or disavow Beijing now.

SHIFTING MOODS IN PAKISTAN
That said, just underneath the Pakistani and Chinese desire to defend CPEC for political reasons lie specific grievances and concerns. These have shifted perspectives on both sides over the past five years. German Marshall Fund fellow Andrew Small goes so far as to argue that the period from 2015 to 2020 encapsulated both the rise and fall of CPEC.1 He explains that “the story of the last few years has been one of the two sides rediscovering their limitations” and anticipates that the future will return both countries to an earlier pattern of lower-profile ambition on the economic development front, even if “closed, secretive” cooperation on sensitive security matters continues.

Small is right to emphasize that both sides’ CPEC ambitions underwent dramatic downsizing. Neither Beijing nor Islamabad is discussing new Chinese initiatives or investments in Pakistan at a scale close to the magnitude touted in 2015. However, China-Pakistan relations are also unlikely to have come entirely full circle as the two sides will more than likely build on the CPEC foundation. Their relationship has matured in ways that cannot be undone.

In Pakistan, the most readily identifiable shift on CPEC came during the 2018 national elections, when Prime Minister Imran Khan’s party defeated the incumbent leadership. For years leading up to the national campaign, Khan played the outsider card and repeatedly criticized the government for cutting unfavorable and opaque deals with Beijing. He called for a greater commitment to job creation and social programs rather than heavy infrastructure projects. Khan largely muted his criticism soon after assuming office, however, in large part because Pakistan’s economy had fallen into crisis and his government required external bailouts to stay afloat. Lacking leverage with Beijing, Khan failed to renegotiate the CPEC deals struck by the previous government.

Khan was hardly alone as a disgruntled Pakistani critic of CPEC. As this author recently argued, the benefits of Chinese investments were unevenly distributed across Pakistani society, yielding predictable jealousies and frustrations.2 For some among Pakistan’s elite, from business tycoons to establishment politicians to military leaders, CPEC held the promise of business opportunities and new resources. For many others, including ethnic minorities like the Baloch, who have often found themselves marginalized from Pakistan’s political and economic decisionmaking, CPEC looked like another exploitative raw deal, unlikely to offer them economic development or new social welfare benefits commensurate with its costs, which were likely to include population displacement and environmental degradation. Lacking transparency about the terms of the Chinese deals, some Pakistani critics began to grumble about China as a new “East India Company,” bent on using its economic heft to exploit Pakistan in a new version of imperialism. In short, rather than alleviating Pakistan’s socioeconomic disparities or mitigating long-standing political grievances, CPEC threatened to exacerbate them. As a consequence, initial public euphoria over CPEC dimmed. Similarly, Pakistan’s generals gradually shifted gears from excessive optimism in 2015 to a more careful pragmatism, though they remain firmly committed to a close strategic partnership with China.

Driving Pakistan’s careful pragmatism has been a string of Chinese diplomatic moves demonstrating that China would not back Pakistan unconditionally. For instance, in September 2017, China joined India in signing a BRICS summit antiterror declaration that included specific mentions of Pakistan-based groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba. Beijing’s departure from a long-standing practice of shielding Pakistan from such criticism surprised Islamabad. Similarly unwelcome were Beijing’s February 2018 and 2020 votes to gray-list Pakistan on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its April 2019 capitulation to pressure in the United Nations for blacklisting Pakistani terrorist Masood Azhar. In each instance, Islamabad would have preferred Beijing to have more forcefully taken Pakistan’s side. Moreover, the April 2018 summit in Wuhan between Xi and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi put Pakistan’s leaders on notice that China had no immediate interest in seeing another flare-up in its own border tensions with India. That message surely disappointed Pakistan’s generals, who have for decades seen China-India tensions as a means to force India to prepare for a two-front war rather than focusing only on Pakistan.

Pakistani army concerns about China have been reinforced by an abiding determination to avoid overdependence on any outside partner if it might threaten Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty. Senior military officials in the Pakistani city of Rawalpindi claim to have reached the conclusion that although Beijing is a valuable friend, it is not a treaty-bound ally that would step into a military conflict on Islamabad’s side. To the contrary, one senior Pakistani official noted how “every nation must be prepared to win its own battles,” and Pakistan is no exception.3

Beijing’s shifting stance on CPEC has been similarly understated yet significant. Some of its moves have been consistent with a global recalibration on the BRI that was discussed extensively during Beijing’s second Belt and Road Forum in April 2019. At that meeting, China sought to address widespread concerns among other BRI partners about how Chinese investments could impose excessive debt burdens, contribute to corruption, exacerbate environmental degradation, and advance China’s own strategic aims without necessarily contributing to local economic development.

Beijing has also recalibrated its involvement in CPEC as a consequence of Pakistan-specific frustrations. According to a 2017 long-term plan, both Beijing and Islamabad have long planned to shift investment from infrastructure to industrialization, but delays on CPEC projects and concerns about the financial viability of future projects raised or reinforced doubts among Chinese companies and policymakers. At a November 2019 meeting of the Pakistan-China Joint Cooperation Committee, the Chinese side decided not to announce any new financial commitments until previous projects were completed. With Pakistan’s GDP growth slowing from a high of 5.2 percent in 2018 to 3.3 percent in 2019 to an estimated 2.4 percent in 2020, the country’s already difficult business environment has begun to look even less attractive to Chinese investors.

Beijing has shifted from touting CPEC as a flagship for the BRI to describing it as a pilot project. This move reveals a trimming of expectations and ambitions driven mainly by Pakistan’s on-the-ground realities rather than China’s own strategy or plans. Such a reclassification offers the important lesson that Beijing’s overseas initiatives are heavily dependent on the politics and interests of its partners, even if they are all smaller and less powerful than China.

In short, CPEC is changing, both tangibly and rhetorically. Yet the CPEC game is far from over. CPEC cannot fail—that is a political and diplomatic impossibility. For Pakistan, China remains an important partner and lifeline. For China, CPEC remains both a closely watched test case for the export of China’s development model and a prestige project for Xi.

Reflecting the persistence of these close ties between China and Pakistan, leaders on both sides are quick to note that new CPEC initiatives are under way, informally dubbed “CPEC 2.0.” These efforts are expected to focus on “industrialization, agriculture, and socioeconomic development, with a particular emphasis on special economic zones” in order to better address the desire of Khan’s government to create more jobs for Pakistani workers. At the same time, China is ramping up its public diplomacy in Pakistan by starting an Urdu-language news service, undoubtedly as a means to pump out a steady stream of positive stories about CPEC and tamp down public frustrations and suspicions.

Despite these commitments, there are many reasons to anticipate that CPEC’s second phase could run into even more challenging headwinds than did the first. Building physical infrastructure was challenging, but with Chinese enterprises, engineers, and workers in the lead, it was not entirely at the mercy of Pakistan’s own governing institutions and human capital. By contrast, many of the core elements of CPEC 2.0 will touch politically sensitive and contentious issues, from land rights and education to economic and institutional reform. Even quite measured expectations could go unmet unless both sides take a patient, long-term perspective.

A SMARTER U.S. POLICY
U.S. policymakers are correct to sense that under CPEC’s surface lies a degree of frustration, uncertainty, and reduced ambition in both Islamabad and Beijing. Even if Trump administration officials only aim to give voice to concerns quietly shared by many Pakistanis, however, Washington’s approach has been too heavy-handed, tone deaf to the political and diplomatic exigencies facing Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders.

Moving forward, Washington’s policy should take two ground realities into account. First, Pakistani leaders—like those across Asia—have no particular desire to take a side in the brewing geopolitical competition between the United States and China. Self-interested more than ideological, they would prefer to extract benefits from both Beijing and Washington, even to play them off of each other. Moreover, many Pakistanis tend to question U.S. motivations, doubting Washington’s noble, liberal rhetoric about freedom and assuming those words mask ulterior aims, from safeguarding commercial and security interests to practicing outright imperialism. To be sure, Chinese rhetoric about noninterference in the sovereign affairs of other states strains credulity for many Pakistanis, but in the aftermath of a terribly fraught two decades of dealing with the United States, Washington’s claims of beneficence ring equally hollow.

Second, U.S. policymakers should keep in mind that CPEC is only one slice of the China-Pakistan relationship. Moreover, different infrastructure projects are likely to have different political consequences. Rather than framing the U.S. policy response as a narrow competition over the commercial and economic issues of “cost, debt, transparency, and jobs,” U.S. policymakers should train their focus on three broader aspects of China’s relationship with Pakistan.

The first and most immediate concern should be with respect to China’s impact on regional stability, especially between India and Pakistan, but also in the context of U.S. plans for a complete military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Second, now and for the foreseeable future, Washington should come up with more effective ways to compete with Beijing’s growing political influence, including its role in strengthening repressive, illiberal governance in Pakistan. Third, over the long run, the United States will want to weigh the geopolitical implications of the China-Pakistan defense partnership, including how China’s presence in Pakistan will better enable it to project military power into South Asia and the Middle East.

REGIONAL STABILITY
Over the past year, India and Pakistan have again reached the brink of war. Another India-Pakistan military crisis may be brewing this summer. Even as Trump administration officials perceive China as a global competitor, they would also be smart to appreciate Beijing’s role as a potential diplomatic partner when it comes to restraining India and Pakistan from war. If tensions in China-U.S. relations inhibit cooperation in the midst of a South Asian crisis, all sides will lose.

At present, U.S. and Chinese officials appear to hold different views on how to assign responsibility (and blame) for tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad, which could lead them to work at cross-purposes in the event of a crisis. Whereas Washington tends to see Indian military strikes against Pakistan as justified responses to terrorist outrages on Indian soil, Beijing emphasizes Pakistan’s strategic obligation to respond forcefully to aggression by its much larger neighbor. This mismatch is dangerous and warrants an intensive round of strategic stability talks between U.S. and Chinese diplomats, during which the two sides could at least share their assessments and discuss processes for better choreographing future diplomatic engagements with New Delhi and Islamabad.

In Afghanistan, the United States would also benefit from improved information-sharing with Beijing as U.S. diplomats navigate the tricky dual issues of an intra-Afghan peace process and a U.S. military drawdown. Washington has long perceived Beijing’s close ties with Islamabad as a point of potential leverage with Kabul, specifically as a means to encourage Pakistan to place greater pressure on its friends among the Taliban. Although China never delivered a breakthrough in support of U.S. war aims in Afghanistan, neither has it played a spoiler.

Both China and the United States fear the implications of an all-out Afghan civil war or even the return of a 1990s-style Taliban-led regime that would serve as a haven for al-Qaeda or other international terrorists. With these common interests in mind, Washington should open a regular dialogue with Beijing on Afghanistan, if only as a means to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings as the two powers deal separately with the Taliban, the government in Kabul, Pakistani officials, and representatives from other major regional players like Russia and Iran.

COMPETING FOR INFLUENCE
China’s political influence is growing in Pakistan as it is elsewhere in Asia. To the extent that the United States aims to remain politically relevant on the continent, it should above all avoid the traps of competing on Beijing’s terms or focusing on an explicit comparison between U.S. and Chinese development models as an “us or them” choice.

Rather than aping Chinese infrastructure investments, U.S. officials should instead think more broadly about what makes the United States an especially attractive partner. U.S.-style education, scientific research, and technological innovation tend to land at the top of that list. All are widely valued by Pakistanis because they offer a means to address real-life needs. The United States has wisely invested in Fulbright scholarships for thousands of Pakistanis to study in the United States, and the Pakistani government has reciprocated with millions of dollars in scholarships to support Pakistani PhD students in the United States. Unfortunately, Trump administration visa and immigration policies threaten to restrict Pakistanis from traveling and working in the United States, and the overall number of Pakistani students in American schools already pales (even in per capita terms) in comparison to those in India and China.4 With due consideration of security issues, these policies should be reconsidered.

Similarly, Pakistanis have much to gain from trade with the United States. Washington has for decades failed to offer Pakistan’s textile industry favorable access to U.S. markets, owing mainly to protectionist policies. More than Obama-era U.S. taxpayer–funded aid or even the Trump administration’s federally backed financing for investment, enhanced trade in textiles would kickstart economic growth, create jobs, and improve Pakistan’s trade balance. It would also drive greater Pakistani demand for imports of cotton and LNG from the United States to power its factories.

The United States should work to help a wider cross section of Pakistanis benefit from outside investments, even if some of those investments began with CPEC. Working bilaterally or through multilateral institutions, the United States should encourage Pakistan’s government to enact market-opening reforms and offer technical assistance where possible. During his February 2020 visit to Islamabad, U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross correctly highlighted the need to improve “Pakistan’s business environment, including through developing a consistent tax framework, promoting regulatory transparency, and strengthening the intellectual property ecosystem.” Beyond exhortations and encouragement, the United States should share its considerable technical expertise on all of these issues with Pakistan by, for instance, expanding aid projects focused on Pakistan’s business climate.

In addition to new policies on education, trade, and investment, the United States should aim to compete with Chinese influence in Pakistan in smaller ways that nonetheless show how a can-do approach can address everyday problems faced by millions of Pakistanis. An example of one such successful U.S. policy was the decision by the U.S. embassy and consulates throughout Pakistan to publicize reliable air quality data from their own monitoring equipment. In a country where roughly 128,000 people die annually from air pollution and where official state sources tend to downplay the severity of the issue, the move has had a disproportionate and positive effect. The publication of U.S. data advances the cause of Pakistani environmental activists who are working to raise awareness about air pollution, promote healthier practices among children and the elderly, reduce emissions by encouraging different commuting patterns, and pressure local authorities to do more to address environmental issues. U.S. policymakers should consider whether there are other, analogous policies that would leverage and highlight U.S. technologies, data, and free access to reliable information.

Washington should also reflect on which aspects of Chinese influence in Pakistan are likely to have the most detrimental consequences for U.S. interests in the region over the long run. Certain types of infrastructure carry with them more political influence than others. Big-budget Chinese power plants or railway lines are, in this context, likely less worrisome than fiber-optic cables and telecommunications hardware. In January 2019, Chinese telecom giant Huawei installed a 510-mile fiber-optic line from the western Chinese city of Kashgar to Islamabad, just one piece in a larger network that will tie Pakistani data flows to China. Chinese telecommunications technologies bring with them the potential for Beijing to gain greater control over data, more effectively censor and surveil communications, and erode freedoms, including Pakistan’s freedom to oppose ever closer and more exclusive ties with China. In other words, the main U.S. challenge is not related to infrastructure or industrial competition between Chinese and Western firms; instead, it is a story about political influence, illiberal governance, and technological trends that undermine freedom.

U.S. officials have made their concerns about Huawei abundantly clear, but not even close allies like the United Kingdom are entirely willing or able to forego Chinese equipment. Pakistan and other cash-strapped states are even more likely to buy from China. In countries like Pakistan, the United States would be smart to develop and disseminate technological tools—both hardware and software—that enable Pakistani journalists, politicians, and academics to access reliable information and data and safely share their ideas with others. In partnerships with American technology companies, the U.S. government can benefit from efforts like Project Shield, a free service developed by Jigsaw (a company owned by Google parent Alphabet) designed to protect the websites of journalists and activists from distributed denial of service attacks that would otherwise shut them down. Furthermore, U.S. support for Pakistan’s defenders of human rights and liberal values need not be limited to the online world. The U.S. government should also expand its assistance to programs like Scholars at Risk, an organization that partners with academic institutions to offer temporary refuge to academics threatened by harassment or incarceration.

LONG-TERM GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Over nearly six decades, ties between Beijing and Islamabad have centered on military and strategic cooperation far more than on economic development. As Pakistan’s all-weather ally and main external balancer against India, China has supplied the Pakistani military with important components in its nuclear, missile, and conventional arsenals.

Looking to the future, a core question for U.S. policymakers will be how Chinese arms, from tanks and jets to tactical nuclear-capable missiles and drones, are likely to affect the India-Pakistan military balance. U.S. planners need to keep a close eye on the evolution of China-Pakistan defense cooperation, especially in the nuclear realm, but also in new areas like cyberwar, where Chinese assistance to Pakistan could tip the balance against India in a future conflict. China has historically been willing to circumvent arms control agreements to help its friends in Pakistan, so as tensions grow between Washington and Beijing, the obstacles to new arms transfers may diminish.

This issue assumes greater strategic relevance to Washington as policymakers are increasingly eager to bolster India as a partner and counterweight to China in Asia. U.S. policymakers will need to consider the net effect of U.S. support to India and Chinese support to Pakistan, bearing in mind that New Delhi may be inclined to train its new arms on Pakistani targets rather than on Chinese ones. A South Asian arms race could turn into a costly—and exceedingly dangerous—distraction from Washington’s competition with Beijing.

At the same time, Washington should consider the long-term potential that Pakistan offers China in terms of military power projection. There are many reasons to anticipate that China will eventually establish a permanent naval presence on Pakistan’s coast at or near Gwadar. A second military base of the sort that the People’s Liberation Army opened in 2017 in Djibouti is not something that, in itself, should inspire undue concern at the Pentagon. Still, it would offer China the strategic benefit of an overland route to the Arabian Sea, a critical point on the way to the hydrocarbon-rich Persian Gulf.

This is but one facet in the wider story of China’s expanding presence in the Middle East, a new development with uncertain consequences for the United States, whose own interest in the region appears to be waning. Even so, American military planners will need to assess the implications of these developments for U.S. forces in the region.

CONCLUSION
It is not surprising that the Trump administration aims to sharpen the distinctions between Chinese ventures like CPEC and the United States’ own overseas initiatives. Indeed, Washington has every reason to make sure that international audiences understand that Beijing’s BRI projects often come with hefty price tags and may not deliver on promises of jobs or sustainable economic growth. U.S. diplomats are correct to sense that audiences in countries like Pakistan are now more sensitive to the limitations of partnership with China than they were in the recent past. Future phases of CPEC are likely to be more fraught with difficulty than was the first.

Yet the Pakistani case is illustrative; although Pakistan’s own enthusiasm for CPEC has waned over the past five years, Washington’s criticism of the China-Pakistan relationship is unlikely to win friends or influence in Islamabad. Too many Pakistanis are politically and financially beholden to China. Rather than publicly talk down China’s initiatives, U.S. diplomats should talk up U.S. ones. Rather than competing on Chinese terms, U.S. officials should focus on the United States’ unique advantages. Rather than being distracted by the terms of CPEC’s investments in physical infrastructure, Washington should keep an eye on strategic and political developments in China-Pakistan relations of greater long-term significance.

The United States has little to lose from new Pakistani roads, power plants, or railways. Even a new Chinese-built port at Gwadar is unlikely to deliver significant strategic advantage to China in the near term. However, where Chinese involvement in Pakistan’s telecommunications, security, and defense technologies tilts the balance toward repressive, illiberal rule and regional instability, U.S. policymakers should take action. Along the way, they should also aim to find a balance between outcompeting China in political and strategic terms and pursuing tactical cooperation with Beijing on issues of immediate importance, such as preventing war between India and Pakistan and countering international terrorism in Afghanistan.

This will not be an easy balance to strike. But in South Asia as elsewhere around the world, U.S. policymakers would be better off grappling with the complexity of the challenge posed by China’s growing influence than by merely railing against it.

Daniel Markey is the author of China’s Western Horizon: Beijing and the New Geopolitics of Eurasia (Oxford University Press, 2020). He is also a senior research professor in international relations and the academic director of the Master of Arts in Global Policy program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

NOTES
1 Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Politics (London: Hurst Publishers, 2020), 186, 183, https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/th ... stan-axis/.

2 Daniel Markey, China’s Western Horizon: Beijing and the New Geopolitics of Eurasia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), https://global.oup.com/academic/product ... 0190680190.

3 Author’s meetings with senior Pakistani military officials, October 2019, Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

4 Pakistan student total in 2018–2019 was 7,957, compared with 202,014 from India and 369,548 from China. See “2019 Fast Facts” from the report “Open Doors,” Institute for International Education, https://www.iie.org/-/media/Files/Corpo ... A0C7302C42. On new U.S. visa restrictions for Pakistan, see Ashfaq Ahmed, ed., “U.S. Drastically Reduces Visa Validity for Pakistanis in Certain Categories,” Gulf News: Pakistan, March 6, 2019, https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakista ... 1.62487952. On visa application rejection rates (Pakistan at 47.9 percent, India at 26.1 percent), see Natasha Frost and Dan Kopf, “What Are the Chances of Being Rejected For a Travel Visa to the U.S.?,” Quartz, August 28, 2019, https://qz.com/1696508/what-are-the-cha ... ness-visa/. On the Trump administration’s spike in rates of denial for work visas, see “H-1B Denial Rates: Past and Present,” National Foundation for American Policy, April 2019, https://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/201 ... l-2019.pdf.

End of document

Bart S
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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby Bart S » 11 Apr 2020 04:01

pankajs wrote:Jamatis continue with their games

https://twitter.com/nisheethsharan/stat ... 0377133064
Nisheeth Sharan @nisheethsharan

BIG NEWS:
Bhopal Police has just now arrested 64 foreign, 10 Indian Jamatis of the #TablighiJamat.
13 locals who gave support and hid them have also been arrested.
The 87 prople are being tested and isolated.
This happened after expiry of the self revelation time.
#CoronaJihad


This must be why they attacked health workers doing a door to door survey of the area.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby Bart S » 11 Apr 2020 04:02

shaun wrote:
darshan wrote:Just saw an ad on YouTube by Israel about how it's helping world deal with Wuhan virus. For example, supplying millions of HCQ tablets.

Very good positive campaign being run that directly talks to the audience.

If they are supplying HCQ tablets , why the hack they are asking for the same from India !!??


For all you know, they got APIs from India and their companies are making finished products and supplying to the world at a profit, at our expense.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby vera_k » 11 Apr 2020 06:24

Teva has manufacturing facilities in India.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby pankajs » 11 Apr 2020 06:48

I don't like this humanitarian business. Better would have been to supply HCQ on commercial basis to all and extend soft loan to the needy. With extremely friendly countries, we could have assured them of turning the soft loan into aid at a later date.

https://twitter.com/sidhant/status/1248587370607177739
Sidhant Sibal @sidhant

India will be giving Hydroxychloroquine to SAARC, Indian ocean, Latin American & African countries on humanitarian bases, while outside this area, India will be given HCQ on commercial basis.
#COVID


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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby Kaivalya » 11 Apr 2020 07:06

Bart S wrote:
pankajs wrote:Jamatis continue with their games

https://twitter.com/nisheethsharan/stat ... 0377133064


This must be why they attacked health workers doing a door to door survey of the area.


The onion probably has several layers - like misinformation that linked polio vaccine and having kids etc. The next layer needs to be why were 64 foreigners hidden. The next layer has to be what they were doing around the world.The next layer has to be what were they doing in India.

There are still about 400+ known TJ people who are missing from the grid. God knows how many more escaped in the initial melee from Delhi...

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby Sanju » 11 Apr 2020 07:40

Bart S wrote:
pankajs wrote:Jamatis continue with their games

https://twitter.com/nisheethsharan/stat ... 0377133064


This must be why they attacked health workers doing a door to door survey of the area.


Saar this is Bhopal and the place where they were attacked was in Indore. For all we know there maybe more such "hidden" cases.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby Bart S » 11 Apr 2020 07:45



So what was the context in which such a statement was not a call for genocide?

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby vimal » 11 Apr 2020 08:57

pankajs wrote:I don't like this humanitarian business. Better would have been to supply HCQ on commercial basis to all and extend soft loan to the needy. With extremely friendly countries, we could have assured them of turning the soft loan into aid at a later date.

https://twitter.com/sidhant/status/1248587370607177739
Sidhant Sibal @sidhant

India will be giving Hydroxychloroquine to SAARC, Indian ocean, Latin American & African countries on humanitarian bases, while outside this area, India will be given HCQ on commercial basis.
#COVID


Agree 100%.

Modi and co are still steeped in Gandhivaadi-Nehruvian panchsheel and other nonsense. India should supply the drugs but with a hefty markup to make up for some lost revenue and economic damage that his virus has done. I can bet my behind that each and every one of these countries will tow Chinese line when the time comes to protect their national interest. BTW does SAARC include Pakis? I know we are sending help to these ungrateful BDs.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby pankajs » 11 Apr 2020 17:04

^^
I actually support supplies at commercial rates to all. I am a person with a soft heart.

Just that I want "humanitarian" aid to be tied to good behavior at least for a while. My model is for supply of HCQ on commercial rates + Soft loan to buy, to be followed by conversion of the soft loan to aid at sufficient later date in exchange for good behavior in the interim.

This also prevents us from having to bail out leeches like Bakis, who will inevitably approach India for supplies at some stage and will ask to be treated to the same terms as Nepal or Bhutan. My formulation avoids the mess that will invariably happen then by front-loading cost and back-loading waiver in exchange of good behavior towards India.

Mean-e-while, Tabliqui continue to work their magic
https://twitter.com/KanchanGupta/status ... 5947841537
Kanchan Gupta @KanchanGupta

In #Delhi 183 new cases of #Covid19 . 154 of the afflicted are linked to #TablighiJamaat event at #NizamuddinMarkaz
Glad to see @ANI is not sanitising facts in old Soviet style. @smitaprakash

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby chetak » 11 Apr 2020 18:00

Looks like MAH has extended the lockdown till the April 30th.

the PR onslaught of thackerays' pere et fils, has failed to beat back the chinese virus and they seem to have lost control of the situation, buried as they are in the venal coalition morass.

no sigh of ajit pawar or any pawar at all, for that matter and the congis are also in the maun mode thus allowing the thackerays' to take all the blame.

If only things were so simple as paying for favorable tweets.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby pankajs » 11 Apr 2020 18:17

Modi will address the nation again today .. perhaps talk about the future plan including lock-down extension and exemption.

Mean-e-while states have started to move on their own.
https://twitter.com/PoulomiMSaha/status ... 0753610752
Poulomi Saha @PoulomiMSaha

After Odisha and Punjab, Maharashtra and West Bengal announce extension of lockdown till April 30th

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby vijayk » 11 Apr 2020 20:30

So Rahul Kanwal & India Today did some corona hot spot which seems to have focussed on TJs ...

So this chinese virus lady was crapping all over ...

https://twitter.com/kavita_krishnan/sta ... 1761746946

so some one replied her

Image

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby Ambar » 11 Apr 2020 21:03

There is a coordinated campaign being conducted by break India islamo-fascists and their Paki counterparts using a rabid India hating 'Gulf News' journalist. These people are scourging the social media platforms for pro-hindu , pro-India and criticism of the behavior of some muslims messages, identifying the posters who work in Middle East, and then tagging their employers and the local police to get them in trouble. I hope Hindus will understand that the "freedom of speech" which is encouraged and welcomed in India is an alien concept in these islamic nations no matter how modern they claim to be. Its also a great irony where RoP in India never tire talking about India's "intolerance" towards its minority but yet routinely riot, murder, display unabated bigotry against the nation and other religions, are trying to harm hindus working/living in RoP nations for exercising their opinions on social media. Please inform your friends/family who live and work in the middle east to refrain posting any messages that can be used against them .

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby CRamS » 11 Apr 2020 21:08

vimal wrote:
Only thing that everyone will remember a few years from now is how Modi capitulated to the demands of Trump.


Yes indeed. With this COVID shit being used to target ModiJi, I have opted out of many whatsapp groups sending me messages from the libaranadu variety. There is a group thrill among these folks that Trump twisted ModiJi's balls, and he capitulated. Of course, they couch it as 'insult to India'. My bloody balls. When BIF like Saba Naqi, talk about 'insult to India', I know how fake it is.

But that said, I for one am glad that ModiJi kept US happy, irrespective of whether he capitulated or not. Maybe the optics could have been better.

Because after this shit ends, man, lets not be jingoistic, but partnership with US, US investment is critical to lift Indian economy.

I mean one can sit all day like useless libarandus do and talk about the 'poor' as if the rest of us don't care, but there are times when trickle down economy is essential. I mean if there are mass layoff among Indian industry, where are all these poor going to earn the livelihood from?

Don't expect libarandus to understand all this. And Indian middle class economy depends on US and its western lackeys. So as far as I am concerned, a little bit of H&D loss in the manner in which that ass hole Trump threatened India is a small price to pay to keep him on our side.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby chetak » 11 Apr 2020 22:08

When Donald Trump said there would be retaliation, he sure wasn’t kidding!
:mrgreen:



NDTV@ndtv · 23h
CoronavirusOutbreak | "The answer is a straight forward yes": Raghuram Rajan tells @PrannoyRoyNDTV on whether he would come back to help India.




Image

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby vimal » 12 Apr 2020 00:14

https://www.opindia.com/2020/04/indian- ... ddle-east/

Bunch of Indian Muslims handles gang up to target Hindus living in Middle East, send them to jail by branding them ‘Sanghis’ and accusing them of Islamophobia


There appears to be a sinister attempt underway to target Hindus by a section of Indian Muslims on Twitter, especially Hindus living in Gulf countries. Recently, they had managed to get a Hindu man in UAE in trouble for making comments against Muslims in TikTok who were claiming that offering Namaz for five times a day was enough to ward off the threat off the Wuhan Coronavirus. Rakesh B. Kitturmath, who worked as a team leader at Emrill Services, an integrated facilities management (FM) headquartered in Dubai, was terminated from his job on Thursday. He is currently facing the prospect of doing jail time in Dubai for allegedly insulting Islam. This, while he had not insulted ‘Islam’ rather mocked the people on Tik Tok saying that doing Namaz regularly will save them from Coronavirus, which is indeed, a mockworthy assertion to begin with.

Even so, it appears that the bloodlust of Islamists hasn’t been satisfied and they are yearning for more. One Twitter User, Rizwan, who uses the username @RizwanRzaKhan, a 21 year old from Delhi as per his account, is compiling a list of ‘Islamophobic Expat living in Islamic countries’. In other words, it appears to be a concerted attempted at jeopardizing the health of Indians abroad who are remotely critical of Islam.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby Mort Walker » 12 Apr 2020 01:53

vimal wrote:https://www.opindia.com/2020/04/indian-muslims-twitter-target-hindus-middle-east/

Bunch of Indian Muslims handles gang up to target Hindus living in Middle East, send them to jail by branding them ‘Sanghis’ and accusing them of Islamophobia


There appears to be a sinister attempt underway to target Hindus by a section of Indian Muslims on Twitter, especially Hindus living in Gulf countries. Recently, they had managed to get a Hindu man in UAE in trouble for making comments against Muslims in TikTok who were claiming that offering Namaz for five times a day was enough to ward off the threat off the Wuhan Coronavirus. Rakesh B. Kitturmath, who worked as a team leader at Emrill Services, an integrated facilities management (FM) headquartered in Dubai, was terminated from his job on Thursday. He is currently facing the prospect of doing jail time in Dubai for allegedly insulting Islam. This, while he had not insulted ‘Islam’ rather mocked the people on Tik Tok saying that doing Namaz regularly will save them from Coronavirus, which is indeed, a mockworthy assertion to begin with.

Even so, it appears that the bloodlust of Islamists hasn’t been satisfied and they are yearning for more. One Twitter User, Rizwan, who uses the username @RizwanRzaKhan, a 21 year old from Delhi as per his account, is compiling a list of ‘Islamophobic Expat living in Islamic countries’. In other words, it appears to be a concerted attempted at jeopardizing the health of Indians abroad who are remotely critical of Islam.


This is actually the strategy of leftists all around the world. The Islamists are being guided by the leftists. I expect the same would happen if the INC or left parties get control of government in India. They will threaten them with jail and lawsuits.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby Rony » 12 Apr 2020 02:08

Similar thing happened in US among Andhra/Telugu NRIs.

One Swathi Devineni, supposedly a Telugu anchor based in US posted a selfie video comparing US and Indian situation in the context of Chinese virus and talked favorably towards India and how India is better managing it than US.

There is nothing objectionable in what she said. But leftist Telugus launched a vicious lies and propaganda against her for "spreading hatred against America" (which she did not do in her video). Some leftist Telugus even went ahead and complained about her to Homeland security and launched police complaint against her that she is "spreading hatred against America".

Here is her video





Below is the moron idiot who filed police case against her for "spreading hatred against America"




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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby Jay » 12 Apr 2020 02:22

Rony wrote:Similar thing happened in US among Andhra/Telugu NRIs.

Below is the moron idiot who filed police case against her for "spreading hatred against America"



Rony garu, who is this moron? I did not catch his name. Least we can do is to categorize these cucksters and take action when its ripe. To start with I want to have a look at this idiots Linkedin. Any info will be helpful.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby Rony » 12 Apr 2020 04:53

Jay wrote:
Rony wrote:
Rony garu, who is this moron? I did not catch his name. Least we can do is to categorize these cucksters and take action when its ripe. To start with I want to have a look at this idiots Linkedin. Any info will be helpful.


From the video, i heard it like Sravanth Po Reddy. Searched in Linkedin on that name and got this. But cant verify because there is no picture in the profile.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/sravanth-po ... 9940bf686f

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby KJo » 12 Apr 2020 05:11

Rony wrote:
Jay wrote:


From the video, i heard it like Sravanth Po Reddy. Searched in Linkedin on that name and got this. But cant verify because there is no picture in the profile.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/sravanth-po ... 9940bf686f


They are all overseas Khangressis.

http://www.indialife.us/article.php?id=114083

We have seen the ferocious attack on our chair and a great patriot Sam Pitroda :D , who asked a few questions about the Balakot attack. They cannot even reply in a civilized manner. Corruption is rampant in the government. The prime minister never answers to the public which is not the way of democracy. There is an unequal distribution of wealth, and a few people control most of it. The Congress Party has come out with a new program for equitable distribution of wealth benefiting the poor. :roll: If BJP comes back, we do not know whether this would be the last election in the country :lol: . This is the time to support the young visionary, Rahul Gandhi, who works tirelessly for the country :rotfl: , he said.


Sravanth Poreddy, KC Reddy, Ravi Peddi, Shiva Reddy, Ramesh Maganti, Vijaya Nadella, Anjan Karnati, Anna Reddy, Khursheed, Srinivas , Dhruva Chowdary too spoke.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby CRamS » 12 Apr 2020 05:25

Rony wrote:From the video, i heard it like Sravanth Po Reddy. Searched in Linkedin on that name and got this. But cant verify because there is no picture in the profile.


By being such a pathetic Uncle Tom, maybe he is hoping that he will get his green card faster :-).

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby sanjaykumar » 12 Apr 2020 05:50




Tarek Fatah reads the writing on the wall.

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Re: 2020 Strategic and Political Analysis-1

Postby Rony » 12 Apr 2020 06:04

KJo wrote:They are all overseas Khangressis.

Sravanth Poreddy, KC Reddy, Ravi Peddi, Shiva Reddy, Ramesh Maganti, Vijaya Nadella, Anjan Karnati, Anna Reddy, Khursheed, Srinivas , Dhruva Chowdary too spoke.


Excellent catch KJo. Not just that Po Reddy guy but even this Vijaya Nadella which is present in your list was ranting about that Anchor Swathi Devineni and posted a video criticizing her.

Here is her video

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gLuP7eOYu9E

I was trying to find her details too. Now it all makes sense. In this case at least its a coordinated Oversees Congress cucks of Telugu origin who are outing other Telugu people who they believe to be "nationalists/Sanghis".


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