The article provides a nice summary of the events so far.
The wounded Khan, worried Generals and political chaos
The winds changed when Musharraf imposed a national emergency by suspending the Constitution and his popularity nosedived. Facing a mass movement for the restoration of the judiciary, Musharraf was compelled to negotiate the return of his political rivals.
The General met with Benazir Bhutto in a palatial residence in the Gulf state, with the meeting said to be brokered by his own close aide, the then chief of ISI, Gen Pervez Ashfaq Kyani, who later succeeded him as COAS. Kyani had previously served Benazir as her military secretary when she was prime minister. Subsequently, the, Saudis pressured the military ruler to accept Nawaz Sharif, who was in exile in Saudi Arabia after the coup.
Benazir’s tragic assassination paved the way for Musharraf’s ouster and Bhutto’s party coming into power. During those days, rumours were rife that the establishment believed Pakistan needed a third force to counter the Sharifs’ PML-N and Bhuttos’ PPP. Imran, who was then struggling to find political momentum, thus became an alternative choice for the establishment.
He was nurtured as a political poster boy, tapping into his acclaimed fame in the cricketing world and his heroic image among the younger generation after winning the 1992 World Cup. He gained support among many Pakistanis for setting up a cancer hospital in Lahore, which earned him the image of a social reformist.
In the years that followed, Imran probably hit a jackpot as his own bitter political rival, the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif chose Gen Bajwa as the new army chief, superseding other more senior generals.
Gen Bajwa, himself a cricket lover, was already in awe of Imran’s cricketing accomplishments. The two bonded over a common vision, with Gen Bajwa reportedly inspired by Imran’s passion for elimination of corruption and in turn, Khan sharing Gen Bajwa’s views on what was required for the country’s stability. The ‘one page’ mantra echoed across the public domain.
Differences surfaced when Gen Bajwa wanted to transfer Lt Gen Faiz Hameed — one of the main proponents of the ‘one page’ narrative — from the post of ISI chief to the head of the Peshawar corps. Khan not only opposed the move, but delayed the process, saying it was his discretion to appoint a new ISI chief. What was interesting was that Imran had not intervened on the two previous occasions when the ISI chief was appointed in his own tenure. So Khan’s stance was merely seen as wanting Lt Gen Faiz around to fulfil his ‘political whims’ and to make him the next army chief.
The alliance of opposition parties, PDM, found the space they had been looking for to increase the wedge between the establishment and Imran’s regime. They feared that if Imran were to appoint Lt Gen Faiz as the next army chief, he would secure election outcomes in the PTI’s favour and Imran’s rule be secured for the next 10 years. Thus came about the efforts to oust Khan through a vote of no confidence.
Subsequently, Imran launched a countrywide protest campaign against his ouster. He built a narrative of an alleged conspiracy of regime change, though the National Security Council found no evidence of such a conspiracy. Imran’s peddled theory helped him make inroads into various layers of society. His protest meetings swelled manifold and his party defeated political rivals in the majority of seats in by-polls.
The former premier has recently gained massive support, but in the process, his aggressive posturing has probably burnt bridges with the establishment. Be it the killing of journalist Arshad Sharif, the recent by-elections or the alleged custodial torture of his close aide, Shahbaz Gill, Khan targeted elements within the establishment.
Imran idealises Erdogan and believes he could rule like him after securing a two-third majority in the next polls. He feels powerful vis-à-vis the establishment, now drawing political legitimacy from massive public support and silencing his detractors’ claims that he was a puppet with no autonomous power or support. He is likely to become more aggressive in his protest campaign and so far, it is clear to see that his confrontational approach is working for his support base.
The wounded Imran wants to convey a message: either face the fury of protests or hold early polls and meet his previously stated demand of putting the appointment of the military chief on hold. If Khan cannot appoint the new army chief in accordance to his liking, he feels that at the very least, he can make the government cautious about who it selects or make the appointment controversial.
Imran’s demands will likely not be acceptable to either the government or to the establishment. The government doesn’t want to hold early elections because Imran has gained considerable popularity since his ouster. And for the current guardians of the establishment, it’s akin to surrendering the state before Imran who proved unpredictable, and they feel he betrayed them and is trying to taint the image of the institution.
Imran, the government, and the establishment seem to have taken extreme positions, leaving no room for rapprochement for the time being, plunging Pakistan into political chaos.