Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by SSridhar »

We fully support India's efforts to control the situation': US on India-China border clash
The Pentagon has said that the US Department of Defense is keeping a close watch on developments along the line of actual control (LAC) at the India-China border in Tawang as the People's Republic of China (PRC) continues to amass forces and build military infrastructure along the contested border. The Pentagon also asserted that the US fully supports India in its efforts to control the situation.

"The Department of Defense continues to closely watch developments along the line of actual control, LAC." "We have seen the People’s Republic of China continue to amass forces and build military infrastructure along the LAC," Pentagon Press Secretary Pat Ryder said during a press briefing.

"It does reflect the growing trend by the PRC to assert itself and to be provocative in areas directed towards US allies and our partners in Indo-Pacific." " We will continue to remain steadfast in our commitment to ensuring the security of our partners. We fully support India’s ongoing efforts to de-escalate the situation," the Pentagon spokesperson added.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by Cyrano »

India was highly active, much sought after by many big and small countries and played a central role in steering different threads of dialogue during the Bali G20, right under the nose of Xi and the Chinese delegations, who would have turned very jealous and irritated by India's mounting good will. And India now has the baton of G20 presidency and is mobilising like never before to use this opportunity to shine and soar on the world platform.

One reason for the current Chinese incursion is to throw a spanner into our "Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam" narrative. A googly that will, the Chinese hope, keep India distracted with a nuisance at home and hold it back on the international stage. If this is the case, this will not be a one off attempt, there will be more such incursions throughout the year. Even if they get a beating, take casualties, lose a few sq kms of land here and there, even a repeat of Galway like scenarios, they will think its worth the nuisance it creates for India. And they must be spouting confident that they can grab more land at will in the future so these little gambles are worth the fun they get out of it.

Will they go even further to engage in actual hostilities to mire India in an open conflict during its G20 presidency year? Time will tell.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

Cyrano,

All those are macro or global factors. Lets look at tactical/local factors.
Ladakh was already tried in Galwan in 2020.
Am sure they would have tried in Arunachal too but in April it is not feasible. And the response at Galwan might have led to shelving any further plans.

So why now and in Arunachal?
Well from tourist sites, Arunachal has good weather from September to November. Even in 1962, the Arunachal Pradesh attack was in November.
So early December is just ten days past November.

Timing wise it is both internal and external.
Internal: XJP is not the supreme leader and has minions biting his heels.
External: Signal India that Tawang is a core interest.
BTW after Bali speech where he swore off Taiwan, it's expected that he will make a move on Tawang.

He got a good conduct certificate from ice cream-eating Biden vis a vis Taiwan!

Looks like IA read him right and was ready.

And Sela tunnel will be opened in January 2023.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by SSridhar »

The Chinese always operate with multiple objectives and try to achieve at least a few of them without any risk. So, there are many possible reasons. As their system is so opaque, we can never say anything with much certainty.
  1. XJP's image is dented and needs repair. Taiwan is impossible to capture now. Pushing India is a low-hanging fruit. Braggadocio.
  2. Salami-slicing is a constant Chinese approach. This could have been another such 'regular' activity with no particular 'grand plan'. Accumulate real-estate at every opportunity. Unfortunately for them, they were painfully surprised that the IA had anticipated this and were prepared.
  3. Tawang is always important in the Chinese scheme of things for the next Dalai Lama, the Fifteenth.
  4. Keep India engaged in a high-level military operation for years together at high altitudes to drain her. Sap her of will & resources. Unfortunately for them again, India is just doing the opposite.
  5. Put the raw PLA recruits through the grind before the decisive Taiwan war though there are only dissimilarities between the two theaters.
  6. The Chinese feel that through constant pressure and costly military deployments, they could threaten and coerce India into seeking a settlement with PRC in which PRC could dictate terms.
  7. It is China's thinking that India is the weakest link in the QUAD (there is truth in this). Chinese commentaries always sing the tune that 'QUAD is inconsistent with the strategic autonomy concept of a proud India'.By tying India up with PRC militarily in the East and with Pakistan terroristically in the West, India can be weaned away from any meaningful participation in the anti-China QUAD. Once that happens, the concept of QUAD would stand discredited to deter any other Asian country especially East & South-East Asian countries from contemplating joining such a grouping or even offering facilities the US. It is Chinese thinking that the keeling over of India would be a crucial event that would decisively terrorize all other Asian nations. This is a sine qua non for XJP's decisive push to unseat the USA followed by a chain of events. Make no mistake. India could be only tactical and a small blip on the Chinese radar at present. The two priorities for PRC are Taiwan and displacing the USA.
  8. We don't know what is happening between the South Block and the Foreign Office of PRC. Last time when the IA made a decisive move on the Kailash ranges (Aug/Sep 2020) which eventually forced PLA to move back in Pangong Tso, the Chinese immediately unleashed malware in the Mumbai power grid that brought large parts of Mumbai to a halt for 12 hours. Now, just before this Yangtse attack, the AIIMS servers have been hacked by the Chinese and were down for a week. China sends us such signals. It may be that something is brewing because India has been standing firm for over two years now. Action is being taken against Chinese firms & individuals. Huawei is banned as India moves large-scale into 5G. Apps remain banned. As India seems set for economic growth, China is being denied big-ticket items. China is certainly angered by that.
  9. Anyone or multiple of the above.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by SSridhar »

Cyrano wrote:One reason for the current Chinese incursion is to throw a spanner into our "Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam" narrative.
'Vasudhaiva Khutumbakam' is a great idea, no doubt, but in the current anarchic world where States matter and Power matters for the States, where interests of states collide all the time, this idea is flawed. Of course, we must chant this mantra whenever it suits us like China using 'Panchsheel' every now and then while doing everything contrary to that. Or, the West using the phrase 'liberal rules-based international order'. 'Strategic Autonomy' is another term that must be employed to suit our tactical situation. Let's be realists.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by Cyrano »

Agree Cheen doing stupid things for multiple reasons.

NaMo's vasudhaiva kutumbakam narrative is neither naive nor wishful, it also serves multiple objectives, none of them are stupid, and not aimed only at Cheen!
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by surinder »

PRC is following the policy of keeping the pot boiling and striking below the escalation level and at the same time tire the opponent.

They did that with USSR in border clash, they are doing that with other countries. While they want to prepare for a big war and scare the opoonents, they don't have a stomach for a hot, long war. That kit is for show and threaten.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

SS, you need to put a lock on your fingers.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

People are saying the missile test is the response to Tawang incursion.

Missile tests take months to plan. It's coincidental.
OTH the NOTAM was issued long ago.
Maybe PLA staged #Yangtse knowing the Test was imminent.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by SSridhar »

ramana wrote:SS, you need to put a lock on your fingers.
You have got PM
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by chetak »

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=viLYdnFdVG0



Indian Diplomacy: China-India-USA Triangle







10 Dec 2022
Analysis of the geopolitical drivers of the triangular dynamics in Asia and the Indo-Pacific, and the emerging future equations among China, India and the USA.

Anchored by Dr.Sreeram Chaulia and featuring expert commentary by Dr. Srikanth Kondapalli, Dean, School of International Studies, JNU.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

Good. Wish there is transcript.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

The headline is stupid but the content is superb.
Its details of Operation Falcon and Sumdrong Chu confrontation in 1986 near Tawang.

https://theprint.in/opinion/for-operati ... rs/421730/
...From a woefully defensive posture in the summer of 1986, by Spring of 1987, Jimmy had the contours of a neo-forward posture that was assisted by tracks and had engineer support, adequate logistics stocking, and a well-oiled air maintenance network.

Building on the success of the proactive defensive posture, Narahari and Jimmy also thought about the unthinkable as the winter crept along — a limited offensive to evict the Chinese from Wangdung and secure the Thagla ridge and the PLA base across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at Le. In sync with this idea, Sundarji moved one brigade from Shillong and placed it under Jimmy’s command for counter-attack and counter-offensive tasks, and practiced it in this role in tough winter conditions. Jimmy recollects that he “had 100 guns ready to boom in support of his initial offensive with a total of 37 fire units (222 guns) and 1,200 tons of gun ammunition available to him for a sustained operation.”

While the operation was shelved as the Chinese did not continue with any provocative moves, Sundarji firmly stood by Narhari and Jimmy as he injected the idea of sustained helicopter-based maintenance in the mountains and provided resources to test this concept successfully.

Operation Falcon was followed up with Exercise Chequer Board, a table-top exercise that introduced the concept of a Reorganised Army Mountain Division (RAMID) and laid the foundations for offensive joint operations in mountainous terrain. Operation Falcon was undoubtedly one of Sundarji’s successes as Army chief. Jimmy is certain that had it flared up into a localized conflict, the PLA would have got a bloody nose, if not across the LAC, but certainly in the Tawang sector.

RAMID needed helicopter strength. However, with new BRO and motorized transport RAMIDs are revived as mountain IBGs by the IA.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by RaviB »

I am doing a more thorough thread like some I did way back when I had some free time. My main understanding comes from my surfing of Chinese social media, some Chinese writers, new laws, etc. apart from my previous work in and with China.

Our responses need to account for the big vulnerabilities of China. The way to identify these is to see where they put their money. Their biggest spend is on internal security, a slightly less amount on military expenditure, which has two main factors: USA and securing trade routes.

The most important thing our enemy is not China, but the CCP. They fear their people and distrust them. That is our angle

Internal security
Our biggest card here is Tibet. The Chinese consider Tibet pacified, partly because India accepted Tibet as part of China. Naturally, the Chinese are experts at grabbing the hand if you offer them a finger. So they started their claim on "South Tibet" because obviously India has accepted Tibet as part of China, so they should also accept South Tibet as China.

The operation on Kailash range created a lot of anxiety in China not just because of the tactical defeat but even more because of the Snow Lion flag that was used in the operation. One small thing India can do is start referring to any clashes as clashes on the India-Tibet boundary. There is no reason not to symbolically retreat even more on the recognition of Tibet. One public security incident in Xigaze will give India peace on LAC for one year. India should (and does) cultivate HUMINT in Tibet. It's time to use plausibly deniable subversion. Forum member often speak of the vulnerability of Chinese military installations to missiles, etc. (which I have hardly any understanding of). However, the big vulnerability of the Chinese in Tibet is Tibetans. Their ammunition stores are vulnerable to sabotage and the PLA doesn't trust the locals one bit. All it takes is to stoke some suspicion and you have reduced the troop strength of PLA by a 1000. Chinese control of Tibet is built on extensive surveillance, you increase their paranoia and you tie them down.

Our second biggest card is Bollywood or rather Indian media. China is a country in which people are news hungry but have little access to it. Another thing is that your average Chinese doesn't trust anything the government says. Almost all news in China about India-China relations comes from Indian sources. Of course people reinterpret it through the lens of Chinese nationalism but still for them Baba Banaras and Republic TV are more believable than Xi Jinping and often go viral on weibo before they are scrubbed. We don't really need to do much here, just release footage that shows the PLA in a bad light or plain misinformation. Surely our Bollywood directors can create some 30 one-minute clips to be released as needed. They should be focused on emotional manipulation of your Average Zhou.

Some movie ideas off the top of my head:
  • - A scene of PLA soldiers running away abandoning their camp. Indian soldiers trashing their tents and show the ***** mags, disorder and garbage piled up inside the tents. The terrible conditions under which the PLA works. Shot on shaky handheld mobile phones

    - Tibetans throwing stones at a PLA bus while soldiers inside cry

    - Stabbing attack in some Tibetan small town. The news will spread and even the central government will trust the Indian news channels more over the provincial officials.

    - PLA soldiers bleeding and crying. One child families don't like their princelings hurt.

    - Story about PLA soldiers attacking the political commissar due to terrible food.
Each clash started by China should have a price in terms of their internal public tranquility. Each stone will be answered by a movie clip.

This might sound ridiculous but the CCP fears the Chinese more than Indians. Let's use it.

I got carried away, so I will continue in another post.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by sanjaykumar »

Indian discourse on the LAC is incorrigible. It is the India -Tibet border. It isn’t the Tibetan autonomous region. It is occupied Tibet.

I am wary of recent generations of tibetans. With language banned, Dalai lama banned, opportunities in China, are they too pacified to put up any opposition?
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by RaviB »

sanjaykumar wrote:Indian discourse on the LAC is incorrigible. It is the India -Tibet border. It isn’t the Tibetan autonomous region. It is occupied Tibet.
Completely agree
I am wary of recent generations of tibetans. With language banned, Dalai lama banned, opportunities in China, are they too pacified to put up any opposition?
This is largely the case among young, urban folk in Lhasa and other big cities. They have gotten prosperity and there has been tremendous pressure for assimilation. But at the same time, there is a lot of racism against them by the Han, even against prosperous Tibetans. So there is definitely discontent and divisions. However, in the more rural areas, there are neither opportunities nor prosperity. They are also not as assimilated. Tibet is still much poorer than other provinces and there is anger that comes along with it. Rich people have something to lose, poor people have nothing to lose but their Hans.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

Thinking about the #Yangtse attack, it's doubtful if India can trust China at all for foreseeable future.
Just less than a month before XJP had met NaMo at Bali and appeared to put Galwan behind them.

Either he is not fully in control of PRC or does not want to have a peaceful India-Tibet border the end result is the same he can't be trusted.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by RaviB »

ramana wrote:Thinking about the #Yangtse attack, it's doubtful if India can trust China at all for foreseeable future.
Just less than a month before XJP had met NaMo at Bali and appeared to put Galwan behind them.

Either he is not fully in control of PRC or does not want to have a peaceful India-Tibet border the end result is the same he can't be trusted.
As per almost all analyses I have read, Xi has much stronger control of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and also has a much greater direct contact with the PLA compared to Hu Jintao. Jiang Zemin apparently had a similar level of control.

Based on what we know about Chinese military decision making, the CMC probably laid down a plan with detailed directions for the Western Theater Command for 3-4 years with detailed guidelines after a discussion lasting around 1 year. They will stick to the plan unless it escalates to a crisis, which it possibly did at the time of Galwan due to Chinese domestic reaction.Xi will personally get involved again when it is at a crisis management stage. As the leader of China, he has to deal with multiple crises and the India-Tibet border will only be brought to his notice occasionally (see Luttwak's concept of "strategic autism"). China simply has too many things going on, it was the A4 protests last month and now it's the management of public perception due to Corona that is at the top of the list of things the CCP has to deal with.

If it wasn't for our Dharmic nature, now would be the right time to salami slice or land grab and make some counter moves while they are in crisis mode. This is what China did to take advantage of our crisis when they escalated in Galwan.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by RaviB »

Related to my previous post on making movies to be released following each clash, it might have come across as non-serious. So, I would like to add some quotes from the PLA's own doctrine on psy-ops to show how this reflects what the PLA itself will almost certainly do.

These excerpts are all drawn from 2020 Science of Military Strategy the current document on PRC’s current military strategy prepared by China’s Academy of Military Sciences faculty. It is important to understand that this document goes through several rounds of censoring and review, so what is released is what PLA is fine with getting released.

A machine translated version of this document is available here https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portal ... rategy.pdf

The following excerpts are all from the Section Ten: Public Opinion Jurisprudence Struggle and Psychological Attack and Defense


Definition
Public opinion struggle is a public opinion confrontation activity in which the hostile parties use public opinion
as a weapon to control and use various communication tools and information resources to conduct oriented
propaganda on major issues involving war. The struggle of public opinion is a multiplier of political influence,
mental lethality, and military deterrence. It is a war action with special power. It has an important position
and role in guiding and controlling public opinion and creating a public opinion situation that is beneficial to
oneself and not to the enemy. The main tasks of the public opinion struggle are to unify the military and
civilian ideological will, weaken and disintegrate the enemy's fighting will, create a favorable environment for
public opinion, and control and discuss information.
Importance
Under the conditions of the new era, with the development of mass media and its simultaneous
dissemination of war situations in all directions and in large quantities, public opinion has become an
important field for both sides of the war and an important factor that influences the development of the war.
Psychological offense and defense is a combat action that uses specific information and media to influence
the psychology and behavior of the target object through rational propaganda, deterrence and emotional
guidance based on strategic intentions and combat missions. Psychological offense and defense affect the
understanding and decision-making system of the enemy country and its military, and spiritually disintegrate
the enemy
.
Its purpose is to attack the enemy's heart, exert an influence on the opponent's psychology,
disintegrate its morale, and exchange a small price for a big victory or direct realization: a soldier who
surrenders without a fight
.

Strategic psychological offensive and defensive actions are not only a method of
war action, but also an important means to cooperate with the country's political and diplomatic struggles.
The main tasks of psychological offense and defense are to weaken and disintegrate the enemy's combat
effectiveness, influence and divide the enemy's camp, establish and consolidate one's own psychological
defense line, and serve the national strategy and military action decision-making
. Psychological offense and
defense can be implemented independently and exert great combat effectiveness, and it is also regarded as
"the fourth combat style different from land, sea, and air combat."
the struggle of public opinion emphasizes grasping the first
opportunity of the struggle of public opinion to compete for and maintain the dominance...
Psychological offense and defense emphasizes the use of various means to comprehensively exert
pressure and continuously break through the psychological defense line. In terms of application methods,
they all belong to the category of political warfare of non-armed forces, belong to non-violent "soft strikes,”
and act on the field of human cognition. They also use and rely on information and information technology to
conduct operations. The difference is that the main means of warfare in public opinion struggles are various
media, including newspapers, radio and television, and the Internet; the main means of psychological
offense and defense are psychological means such as mental deterrence, emotional inducement, and
fraudulent conspiracy.
In terms of the mechanism of action, they are all pluralistic, which not only reflect
direct attack and confrontation, but also reflect indirect and circuitous attack and confrontation. Public
opinion struggles and legal struggles mainly focus on influencing the international society and public opinion,
while psychological offensive and defensive actions, in addition to affecting national society and public
opinion, often act more directly on opponents’ military and public opinion.
This is the money quote
It is necessary to grasp the opponent’s important spiritual support and public opinion support, and directly attack its shortcomings, pain points, and unknowable places to shock and disturb the enemy, weaken the enemy's command authority,
disrupt the combat plan, shake the morale of the army, and defeat the opponent spiritually.
This is what the PLA intends to do. Can we learn something from them?
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by sanjaykumar »

Yeah, only I noticed dozens of Chinese cowering before the spiritually degraded panjabi soldiers in that leaked video.

One advantage of GoI reticence is that when they do leak information, it has a significant impact. Recall those hints of 300 dead cell phones at Balakot.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

China resents India not signing RCEP.

Piyush Goyal says recent signing of FTA with Australia makes that FTA with 13 out of the 15 countries in RCEP. The two hold outs are New Zealand and China.
Bilateral trade with NZ is $300M and not much upside potential.

China offcourse has its own issues.

https://twitter.com/Vamsee9002/status/1 ... MCvYA&s=19
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by IndraD »

https://www.reuters.com/technology/chin ... 022-12-30/ China's Huawei sees 'business as usual' as U.S. sanctions impact wanes
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by RaviB »

Posting an article on the use of Special Forces in Tibet against China from 2017. It is remarkable that it already talks about the use of SFF, 3 years before it was actually done. Also discusses the use of proxy forces in Tibet (and the dangers associated with it).

Also discusses the use of Garud to attack enemy airfields

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/v ... nwc-review
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

Gen V.P. Malik writes in Indian Express

https://indianexpress.com/article/opini ... a-8354107/

His five suggestions after the litany of blaming govt are:
First, the rules of engagement (ROE): China has repeatedly flouted all five agreements on LAC/border issues, signed with India since 1993. There is neither peace nor tranquillity for the soldiers posted on the LAC. Why, then, is the Indian army being made to follow the ROE which was drawn as a follow-up of these broken agreements? It is wrong to expect the army, any army, to get involved in physical melees, brawls and scuffles with its adversary. No army is expected to fight with crude sticks. Even on sentry duty, a soldier is expected to stop any stranger at a distance. If that person continues to advance, the soldier on duty is expected to fire for effect. It is high time that we follow the same norms on the LAC. Our soldiers should be allowed to fire if, despite warning, the adversary continues to advance toward our position. No politicians will then be able to say that “Hamare soldiers ki pitayee ho rahee hai”.

{First the troops at LAC do have permission to fire if they see the need. The politician who said those remarks is a great-grandson of Nehruji of whom the less said the better! Furthermore, if the good general noticed our troops were ready and had their own non-firearm combat weapons and gave more than was expected. So basically a repeat of Galwan surprise was avoided.}

Second, LAC perceptions: Why do we continue to use terms like “our” and “their” perceptions of the LAC? When the government of India has given maps on which the LAC is marked and expects the military to ensure that no territory is lost, such little known perceptions of the LAC invariably cause a fiasco while explaining the situation in Parliament and to the public. The Chinese do not use the terminology of perception in their statements. In fact, it gives them a handle to continue with their aggression activities as happened post Galwan. In the geographically transparent environment which prevails today, we must give out our version of the LAC subject to a final resolution of the boundary dispute with China. We need to be straightforward and remain firm on the ground.

]{Good idea to use more forceful language. And Jaishankar has been using such language. Wang Yi's statement was in response to JS statement.}

Third, intelligence and surveillance: Intelligence is a nation’s first line of defence. This, with our surveillance structure, is a critical constituent of safety, security and also grand strategy. In the kind of terrain where the military is operating, it is almost impossible to defend “every inch of territory”. We need reliable and timely information to mobilise adequate forces where the adversary is expected to strike or intrude. It requires a round-the-clock, high level of intelligence, all-weather surveillance capabilities and assessments for the troops on the ground. In 2020, despite satellite imagery, high altitude UAVs and availability of a host of modern surveillance equipment, we failed to assess and react to the Chinese troops’ movements in Eastern Ladakh. Our intelligence and surveillance structure along the northern border requires urgent focus and improvement wherever gaps exist.

{Good realization from Kargil intrusion when Pakis occupied IA bunkers vacated for winter. The fact that IA troops were ready and able to call upon reinforcements at #Yangtse shows there was awareness due to surveillance and contingency planning. A little credit to the boys in the field would be nice. As for 2020 Galwan, what the general says is not a lack of surveillance but assessment. And assessment is quite tricky wrt PRC. As study after study shows the probability of their attack is a certainty but the location and timing are uncertain. To deal with such 'black swan' events IA has reinforced its troops at vulnerable points and the proof is the repelling of the #Yangtse incursion. And give local commanders authority to use force as required.}

Fourth, dual command and control: The Western and Central sectors of the LAC are guarded by the Indo-Tibetan Border Patrol (ITBP) backed by the army. However, both work under different ministries. Despite several discussions, there is no unified command and control, which often leads to a lack of coordination, responsibility, and accountability. The ITBP units deployed on the LAC, now hot, need to be placed under the operational control of the army.

{Point noted but ITBF are trip wire forces and it's standard practice to use CAPF as border forces to ensure no "hot war" between nuclear powers happens. I think the general is erroneous here. Yangtse is not an ITBF matter and injecting his remarks here is not needed.}


Fifth, offensive spirit: During training, we diligently inculcate and imbibe an offensive spirit in our military. And yet, most of the time, we expect the military to remain defensive and passive on the border. Our frontline military formations should not only be capable of defending intrusions but also plan and be prepared to retaliate proactively — Kailash Range style — taking advantage of the high altitude mountainous terrain.

{As the general wrote Kailash Ranges operation is an example of proactive offensive spirit already shown in 2020 itself. Further the fact that at Yangtse the troops anticipated, deployed, and armed themselves shows the offensive spirit is still there. So please give a different suggestion.}


The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

Link: https://stratnewsglobal.com/china/india ... ntentions/

‘India Lacks Sufficient Understanding Of China And Its Intentions’
ramana
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

Mao Zedong's primary goal was to occupy Sinkiang and Tibet.
After occupying Tibet, he came up with arbitrary claim lines to claim Tawang which is the source of Tibet Buddhism and Ladakh.
He thus created border problems that did not exist since ancient times.
PRC is still pursuing those claim lines.

Note he agreed to hill crest lines with all other Himalayan states but does not with India.
There is an old Chinese saying. "If you want a window, tell them to remove the roof!"
So his second claim line is to make India accept the first claim line!
And between Aksai Chin and Tawang/Arunachal Pradesh, since Chou Enlai onwards they always offered to give up Aksai Chin and take Arunachal Pradesh.

China is scared of what after Communism, what next?
Historically people revert to earlier orders. Eg. Russia reverted to Orthodox Church.
For China that would be the Qing dynasty adoption of Tibetian Buddhism.
That makes Tawang THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE for China.
Sadly our secular leaders and scholars don't understand that.
RaviB
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by RaviB »

ramana wrote:Link: https://stratnewsglobal.com/china/india ... ntentions/

‘India Lacks Sufficient Understanding Of China And Its Intentions’
I know Hemant Adlakha personally, he's a total sinophile and JNU leftie. I haven't watched the talk but I think I know what he will say: India is misunderstanding China and hurting their feelings.

If you want to see how the Chinese misunderstand Indian intentions, you can read this article by Hu Shisheng from 2020 (english translation, some slight mistakes). Hu is very influential when he talks about India and is considered an expert inside China. In this article he puts the blame squarely on India for escalating and the reason for it being domestic Indian political compulsions (Hindu nationalism), the desire of India for accelerating economic decoupling from China and pressure from USA to contain China. Plus he sees a continuation of Nehru's forward policy under Modi.

Warning: Do not read this if you have high blood pressure, I'm sharing it only to increase understanding of how the Chinese view/misunderstand India.

http://www.cicir.ac.cn/UpFiles/file/202 ... 072987.pdf

One of the worst things is that he more or less replicates the worst thinking of our most Indophobic english speaking elite.
ramana
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

Thank you. Do you read Chinese?
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by V_Raman »

China is scared of what after Communism, what next?
Historically people revert to earlier orders. Eg. Russia reverted to Orthodox Church.
For China that would be the Qing dynasty adoption of Tibetian Buddhism.
That makes Tawang THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE for China.
Sadly our secular leaders and scholars don't understand that.
This is a light bulb moment for me - thx ramanaji!
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by SSridhar »

Japan, India hold first joint air drill as China concerns grow - South China Morning Post
Japan and India held their first joint air drills in an area outside Tokyo as both countries step up military exercises with other countries amid worries about China’s assertiveness.

About four F-2 and four F-15 fighters are expected to take part in the drills that started on Monday and will run through around January 26 at an airbase in Ibaraki prefecture, northeast of Tokyo, Japan’s Defence Ministry said. While the two have trained together before in other countries, this is the first one-on-one training of its sort, it said.

The exercise comes as Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida completed a trip this month to Italy, the UK, Canada and the US to bolster his country’s alliances to help deter China. Japan is also a member of the Quad grouping that includes India, Australia and the US and is seen as a check on Beijing’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific.

The joint drills with India grew out of a security meeting in New Delhi in November 2019 but had been put on hold due to the coronavirus pandemic, Kyodo News reported. Kyodo added India is the fifth country Japan has hosted in this type of bilateral exercise after the US, Australia, Britain and Germany, citing the Defence Ministry.

India is fielding Russian-made fighters, Su-30Mki and US-made C-17 Globemaster heavy lift transport aircraft in the maiden exercise, air force spokesman Wing Commander Ashish Moghe said. The two sides will carry out air complex combat drills and exchange best practices reflecting their growing defence cooperation, he said.
KL Dubey
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by KL Dubey »

ramana wrote: China is scared of what after Communism, what next?
Historically people revert to earlier orders. Eg. Russia reverted to Orthodox Church.
For China that would be the Qing dynasty adoption of Tibetian Buddhism.
That makes Tawang THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE for China.
Sadly our secular leaders and scholars don't understand that.
That may be partly true, but more importantly a post-commie china will experience wholesale onslaught of western X-men/missionaries (possibly proxied by koreans)....and mass conversions.

The hans did not have a cohesive "religion" before communism...it was a mishmash of various practices. That will make them even more receptive to conversion than the koreans. The vast majority of chinese who have immigrated to the US have become X-men, with zero interest in buddhism. All of them have been targeted by X-men and mostly converted. Tibetan buddhists will find it an uphill battle to compete with the X-men.

Yes, China does want to tame its western flank and snuff out any "buddhist" resistance...but its primary objective is to "defeat" the west.

I agree with a previously active poster "chola" that the best thing for Bharat is for CCP/PLA and the West to foolishly continue their "cold war". If nothing else, it provides a "few kicks to the backside" to the Bharat goremint and armed forces to transform our military and economic supply chains.

All Bharat really needs to do is to resolutely defend the borders, build up national strength, act as an independent pole, and let the US-China conflict exhaust both of them and thus clear the ground for our return to rightful #1 place.
Last edited by KL Dubey on 16 Jan 2023 23:42, edited 2 times in total.
NRao
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by NRao »

RaviB wrote: Warning: Do not read this if you have high blood pressure, I'm sharing it only to increase understanding of how the Chinese view/misunderstand India.

http://www.cicir.ac.cn/UpFiles/file/202 ... 072987.pdf
One has to expect the BP part.

The problem is that China has gamed the system exceptionally well. Around 2021 the US Congress wanted to constitute a committee to find out the "truth" behind Covid-19 - origins, etc. China shut it down in a heartbeat, by telling the US (under Trump) that China would stop sending essential medicines (vit C, Tylenol, Asprin, etc type). And, the US never did investigate.

Similarly, India too has precious little leverage over China. IMO, as long as India buys more than they sell and the products they buy are essential commodities (which I think they are), India is in a permanent weak position. China will pump such articles and send Indian BP going through the roof.

That article is 2+ years old. Do you know if he has penned a more recent one on the same topic?
ramana
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

https://tnsr.org/2022/12/chinas-brute-f ... ing-field/

Twenty years ago I wrote in BRM China is an Economy challenge. Now West is realizing it.

BRF was always ahead. Now less so, as its just posting drivel.
ramana
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

Revisiting Thyucidides

https://t.co/4z7249carp

TRAPPED BY THUCYDIDES? UPDATING THE STRATEGIC CANON FOR A SINOCENTRIC ERA
JOHN SULLIVAN


DECEMBER 28, 2020
COMMENTARYZuozhuan-2

Ancient Greek roots run deep in America. “What Athens was in miniature,” Thomas Paine predicted, “America will be in magnitude.” From the beginning of the American experiment, Thucydides’ history of the war between Athens and Sparta provided useful lessons for the nation’s founding fathers. John Adams wrote to his ten year old son, John Quincy, that his future country “may require other Wars, as well as Councils and Negotiations,” adding, “[t]here is no History, perhaps, better adapted to this usefull Purpose than that of Thucydides.” Nearly two centuries later as an emerging Cold War threatened America’s sense of security, Secretary of State George Marshall declared, “I doubt seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding certain of the basic international issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the Fall of Athens.”

The end of the Cold War did not result in Thucydides’ retirement. “Whenever we get a new war, we get a new Thucydides,” Joseph Lane astutely noted. Most recently, the text was repurposed in the 21st century by Harvard professor Graham Allison to describe the risks of war with a rising China in terms of a supposed “Thucydides Trap.” In its latest reprise, the analogy comes off more strained than illuminating. Neither the United States nor China fits neatly into the old Athens-Sparta antagonist roles, nor does the current international system resemble the system of ancient Greece: two roughly equal alliance structures vying for dominance within the confines of a zero-sum competition. Thucydides examines one possible outcome of an extended contest between two great powers not possessing powerful incentives to prefer coexistence over unilateral dominance. The persistent use (and misuse) of Thucydides has led to problematic thinking about great-power competition with China. It is time to expand our thinking beyond Western perspectives by considering historical works on strategy and rivalry in addition to Thucydides.


Fortunately, a viable candidate already exists within the Chinese canon, a work roughly contemporaneous with Thucydides. This text, known as the Zuozhuan, is China’s oldest historical narrative and chronicles the decline of the Zhou dynasty from 722 to 468 BCE. Describing the machinations of various rulers, ministers, and military commanders over a span of 255 years, this complex masterpiece traces the difficult strategic choices faced by regional powers during this chaotic period as they struggled to adjust to an uncertain security structure. In particular, its description of the competition between the two greatest powers of its time, the states of Jin and Chu from roughly the mid-7th to mid-6th centuries, provides interesting parallels with the current state of Sino-U.S. relations. The Jin-Chu rivalry reflected the multi-faceted challenge of two competing powers navigating a multi-state system neither side sought to destroy or overthrow, but instead hoped to co-opt and lead on its own terms. Moreover, the length of the historical arc measured in centuries rather than decades better facilitates analysis of the long-term strategic impact of great-power competition.

International relations scholars might find much food for thought through the study of this classic text. As central authority retreated, the former Zhou system reflected many traits similar to anarchy, with dozens of regional states resorting to hegemony, balancing, or bandwagoning to mitigate threats to survival. Leaders on the central plains of ancient China, it turns out, practiced balance-of-power politics just as energetically as their European counterparts. Powerful countervailing incentives also existed within the system, particularly a desire to return to the rules and norms that moderated interstate behavior under the old Zhou governing rubric. These incentives tended to limit the scope and scale of warfare and opened up potential avenues for cooperation and coexistence. This combination of realpolitik coupled with a desire for predictable norms in some ways mirrors the contemporary security environment. While we should continue to study Thucydides intensely, we would benefit by pairing his text with this near-contemporary classic from China.

A (Chinese) Possession for All Time?

The Zuozhuan is technically a commentary to another work, The Spring and Autumn Annals. Believed by some to be written or edited by Confucius himself, the Annals were developed in the regional state of Lu as a record of significant political, military, diplomatic, and other events. While the entries in the Annals are laconic and sparse, the Zuozhuan supplements them by providing extensive background through narrative and dialogue constructions. It provides the meat and connective sinews to the Annals’ skeletal structure. For example, in 632 BCE the Annals simply record that the Prince of Jin and his allies “did battle with a Chu leader at Chengpu.” It is only through the Zuozhuan narrative that we recognize this as one of the most famous battles in Chinese history. As described in the text, Jin deceives the Chu army by tying wooden logs to the back of their chariots and stirring up dust to feign a retreat. When the Chu force falls for this ruse and rushes forward in pursuit, the Jin army decisively defeats them in what the text labels a “pincer attack” (夹攻) — a double envelopment successfully executed four centuries before Cannae.

The Zuozhuan remains an important cultural touchstone in China. The historical vignettes from the text are referenced extensively in the works of iconic Chinese philosophers from the Warring States period, such as Mencius, Mozi, Xunzi, Zhuangzi, and Han Feizi. Sima Qian, the famed scholar writing during the Han dynasty also relied heavily on the work to construct his own history of the period. Prominent stories from the text live on as colorful idioms (chengyu) in modern Chinese, and Xi Jinping references Zuozhuan passages in his speeches. Discussing its strategic merit, Yao Nai, a scholar writing during the Qing dynasty, noted that the text “excels in discourses on the art of war and strategies.”

While certainly not unexamined in the West — there have been several excellent books discussing the Zuozhuan’s literary, historiographical, and philosophical value — it has rarely been embraced by those studying war, diplomacy, and strategy. One major reason has been its inaccessibility. The first full-length English translation, completed by James Legge in 1872, was marred by archaic Victorian phrasings, a confusing transliteration system, and lack of necessary context, leaving the text nearly impossible to follow. Recently, though, a team of renowned contemporary scholars of ancient China published a lucid and comprehensive English translation, with excellent commentaries and useful indexes. There is no longer any good excuse — besides its astronomical price — for Western political scientists and military strategists to avoid this complicated but highly rewarding classical text.

Adjusting to Zhou Decline

The Zuozhuan opens in an era of momentous historical import. Confucius considered the opening decades of the longstanding Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) to be the golden age of Chinese cultural development, but by the early 8th century, feckless Zhou rulers coupled with internal and external threats quickly led to disaster. In 771 BCE the Zhou capital was sacked by nomadic tribes and the Zhou ruling elite relocated their palaces eastward with the assistance of local Zhou regional leaders. Although safely ensconced in its new capital, the Zhou’s reversal of fortune resulted in subordinate domains paying less deference to the weakened central court and focusing more on aggrandizing their own internal sources of power. Early in the Zuozhuan narrative the ruler of the central state of Zheng defeats the Zhou army in battle and wounds the king with an arrow. Zhou rule nominally continues throughout the period covered in the text, but the relationship between the center and periphery is irreparably altered, resulting in near-constant tension and strife.

The domains left in the wake of Zhou’s political retreat show several hallmarks of modern sovereign states. They each possess their own territory and ruler, establish their own governing bureaucracies and laws, maintain their own armies, and conduct independent diplomacy. War remained a central feature of political life during the entire period covered in the Zuozhuan. The text catalogs 584 examples of interstate military conflict as well as dozens of devastating internal rebellions.

Despite the prevalence of violence, overthrowing the old Zhou system was not the primary goal of these competing states. In one of the text’s most famous stories, the ruler of Chu conducted a successful military campaign against the Rong tribes that often threatened the Zhou capital. When an official of the Zhou court went out to meet him at the end of the campaign, the Chu leader hinted at ambitions of usurping Zhou authority by inquiring about the weight of the Zhou king’s cauldrons — the ceremonial symbols of Zhou rule. The Zhou representative explained why this question was premature:

"Size and weight depend on virtue, not on the cauldrons . . . When virtue is bright and resplendent, the cauldrons, though small, are heavy. When virtue is distorted, dimmed, and confused, the cauldrons, though large, are light . . . Although Zhou virtue is in decline, the heavenly command has not yet changed. The question of whether the cauldrons are light or heavy may not be asked yet."

{Very beautiful description of the Mandate of Heaven. The cauldrons are heavy during the reign of virtuous rulers. Just as Zhou virtue is on the decline XJP's virtue is also on the decline but the heavenly mandate has not changed yet! SS will see why I posted this paper!}


In other words, the power of the Zhou king rested not in his land, army, or economic might, but in the legitimacy his position at the apex of the hierarchy conferred. As one of the translators of the text explicates, the “king is defined not as an individual with power but as the occupant of a special position within an inherited hierarchy … [this] power, although neither grounded in military force nor entirely under [the king’s] control, is nonetheless quite real.” Throughout the text, no one state would fully usurp Zhou legitimacy, but the political reality of the period necessitated a new player in the hierarchy, one possessing the material power that the king lacked, that of the “hegemon” or “overlord” (霸).

Anointed by the king, the position of hegemon conferred tangible benefits — the hegemon could set the agenda for interstate meetings, enlist subordinate states for assistance, or punish other states for transgressions. However, the status of hegemon was not permanent, and deference to the position was conferred not just by the king’s authority, but also through acquiescence from the other lesser domains. In interesting ways this parallels the current international system: Neither the United States nor China seeks to rule over the globe directly, but instead hopes to be viewed as the legitimate leader of the international system, one whose rules and norms other member states still view as beneficial and legitimate. Possessing the power and authority to lead this loose organization, particularly the ability to set agendas, modify rules in one’s favor, and adjudicate disputes, confers tangible material benefits to the modern “hegemon.” Yet the ephemerality of the hegemon’s position and the need for other states to support its status as leader also pushes the most powerful members to seek ways to reach consensus and limit the scale and scope of armed conflict.

A Contest for Allegiance, Not Survival

Although the text describes many examples of the rise and fall of various states, one of the most interesting narratives concerns the extended contest for hegemonic status waged between the states of Jin and Chu from roughly 632 to 546 BCE. The state of Jin, situated just north of the Yellow River, was a powerful and influential domain within the Zhou system since its founding. The state of Chu, centered on the southern Yangtze River, begins as an outsider to the established system, often chided for not being “kith and kin” to the other Zhou domains. As Chu gains in power, though, it not only seeks to exert influence in the other domains, but willingly embodies many of the Zhou’s governing norms to the point where other states begin viewing it as the rightful defender of Zhou legitimacy.

The Jin-Chu rivalry mirrors the dynamics of the Sino-U.S. rivalry better than the Athens-Sparta construct. Like Jin, the United States was instrumental in shaping and leading the current international system and has the most to lose in being displaced from its position at the top of the hierarchy. Like Chu, China initially existed outside this system, but as its power expands, the benefit of co-opting, modifying, and potentially leading the existing system on its own terms drives its quest for international status.

Neither Jin nor Chu, though, was in a position to effectively destroy their greatest rival. Their fear was not that their opponent might gain military superiority sufficient to threaten their survival, but rather that their adversary might become perceived as the legitimate leader amongst the other states. Warfare, therefore, was generally limited and focused on efforts to either protect or poach the allegiance of weaker domains. Jin and Chu were direct belligerents in three major battles during this period: Chengpu (632 BCE), Bi (597), and Yanling (575). Each of these battles was fought over the allegiance of smaller states. At no time did either Jin or Chu venture a full-scale assault into the home territory of their primary opponent. Even during periods of intense fighting, they maintained diplomatic relations and sought ways to mitigate conflicts.


While the territories of Jin and Chu were largely insulated from the devastation of constant warfare, the hapless states wedged between these two great powers were not so fortunate. In the decade preceding the Battle of Bi, for example, the government in the state of Zheng switched its allegiance no less than seven times, resulting in a combined eleven invasions from one or the other great power as punishment. In 594 BCE, Chu, hoping to expand its power even more, besieged the capital of the state of Song. Holding out for over a year, the desperate residents of the besieged city exchanged their children with neighbors in mutual acts of cannibalism and resorted to using human bones to kindle fires. The exhausted central states insisted that all of the existing powers meet in 546 BCE to codify the Peace of Song. The covenant established Jin, Chu, Qi, and Qin as the four most powerful states in the system, with the smaller states required to submit to both Jin and Chu in equal measure. Jin and Chu also committed to jointly develop “plans to benefit the small domains.” Having temporarily eased the tension caused by extended great-power competition, the remaining unanswered question was how long the truce would last.

Great-Power Competition Measured in Generations

As noted by Thucydides, the Spartan king Archidamus presciently predicted at the outset of the war that its conclusion would be left as a “legacy to our children.” But neither Thucydides nor Archidamus could anticipate what legacy would be left for his grandchildren. By the time Archidamus III assumed kingship of Sparta in 360 BCE, the great victory over Athens in 404 was already a distant mirage. In 371, Spartan supremacy in Greece was decisively crushed at the hands of Thebes, its erstwhile ally during the Peloponnesian War. Archidamus III took the reins of Sparta only two years after the second Battle of Mantinea, whose outcome left the Greek world with “more uncertainty and disturbance after the battle than there had been before.” Great-power competition often leaves a legacy best measured in generations, and the ultimate victor is not always one of the two original antagonists. The Zuozhuan’s widened temporal scope highlights the long-term strategic impact of great-power competition.

{Great Britain and Germany competition for Western Europe}

In many ways the Peace of Song accomplished its objective. It reduced the threat of direct conflict between Jin and Chu waged on the backs of the smaller central states. The two great powers refrained from engaging each other directly in battle over the next 67 years, until a new dispute over the allegiance of Zheng resulted in a minor skirmish. Competition between Jin and Chu, though, was not extinguished. It simply evolved in new and unexpected ways. For Chu, a dangerous new front opened on its eastern border. Shortly after its defeat at the hands of Chu at the Battle of Bi in 597 BCE, Jin dispatched emissaries to the state of Wu, a non-Zhou domain centered on the mouth of the Yangtze River. Jin provided military assistance to the fledgling Wu state and encouraged them to begin attacking Chu. What began as minor raids evolved in the decades after the Peace of Song into near annual large-scale invasions. This culminated in the disastrous Boju campaign of 506 BCE, in which the significantly smaller Wu force decisively defeated the Chu army and temporarily occupied its capital. Although Chu would regain its territory and maintain its status as a major power, these proxy wars and conflict on multiple fronts left it in a weakened state.

Jin, though, would not find itself in a position to capitalize on the military misfortunes of its greatest rival. In the opening decades of the Zuozhuan, Jin was wracked with internal strife as the traditional ruling clan was decimated by a secondary lineage, which managed to seize control of the state in 678 BCE. It is under the leadership of this usurping clan that Jin rapidly rose to power within the Zhou system. While the Jin-Chu conflict often served to suppress this internal unrest, conflict between the various Jin clans came to the fore in the decades following the Peace of Song. Six powerful lineages within Jin vied for control of the domain, and the Zuozhuan foreshadows the rift that would result in three lineages being completely decimated, with the remaining three breaking away to form their own separate states: Zhao, Wei, and Han. This partition of Jin in 453 BCE heralded a new phase in Chinese history known as the Warring States period, in which seven roughly equal states vied for total control of the Zhou system. The goal of reestablishing the norms of the former Zhou system faded into the background, as a zero-sum competition raged for the next two centuries. This bloody period ended in 221 BCE when the state of Qin finally exterminated the Zhou state, conquered the remaining powers, and established a brutal dictatorship of one.

The lessons from the Zuozhuan imply that great-power permanence rests on two pillars: internal domestic stability and skillfully managed alliances. Despite China’s impressive economic and military growth, its domestic support remains brittle and it struggles to form lasting and mutually beneficial partnerships. Although the United States has traditionally been relatively strong in these two areas, since at least the turn of this century, the bases of these pillars have eroded quickly. If America hopes to avoid a zero-sum conflict with China over the fate of the international system, it would be prudent to begin repairing and strengthening these supports.

Conclusion

This brief survey only scratches the surface of potential areas of inquiry illuminated through study of the Zuozhuan. Another subject ripe for additional research is military theory. In the West, the study of ancient Chinese military thinking rarely ventures beyond Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. This is unfortunate because the context provided by the Zuozhuan can help Westerners better understand many of Sun Tzu’s more vague pronouncements. The few historical references found in The Art of War, such as the rivalry between the states of Wu and Yue or the courage of figures like Cao Gui and Zhuan Zhu, are explained within the Zuozhuan narratives. Moreover, the text allows us to expand our scope of analysis beyond one individual viewpoint. The Zuozhuan references other military texts extant at that time, such as the Book of Military Maxims (軍志), reminding us that a rich body of strategic thinking existed in China outside the confines of Master Sun’s work.

Alas, the Zuozhuan demands much of any potential reader, particularly one not well versed in its specific milieu. It will resist easy inclusion into any university or war college syllabus. Similar to Thucydides’ work, fierce millennia-old debates exist over its authorship, date of composition, historical accuracy, as well as every aspect of its purported meaning. It can also be a frustrating book. Those attempting to make sense of its temporally fractured narratives or cast of several thousand individuals and locations (some with at least a half-dozen variations on their name) will long for the simplicity of trying to discover if Thucydides is referencing Naxos in Sicily or the one in the Aegean. But those who persist will be rewarded with a complex and rich historical narrative of no less impressive depth and breadth than the most venerated works of their Hellenic cousins.

Thucydides’ work has earned its exalted status in the study of strategic thought. However, analysis of other cultures’ struggles to achieve peace and security in roughly comparable eras of great-power competition might stimulate new thinking on old problems. As Confucius once noted, “If you can revive the ancient and use it to understand the modern, then you’re worthy to be a teacher.” In that effort, we should resist limiting the scope of our inquiries to only Western historical examples. Through study and synthesis of the failures and shortcomings of all of our distant forefathers, we might gain wisdom to forge a new and better path forward.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

I would like to cast India and China in the Jin-Chu struggle and see the common and the differences.
And Wu as Pakistan!!!

And Zhou as Asia.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by Atmavik »

ramana wrote:I would like to cast India and China in the Jin-Chu struggle and see the common and the differences.
And Wu as Pakistan!!!

And Zhou as Asia.
3 kingdoms ?
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by ramana »

Three kingdoms is much later and quite fractured.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by sanjaykumar »

Yi Fuxian, an obstetrics and gynaecology researcher at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and expert on China’s population changes, said the decline in population was occurring almost a decade earlier than the country’s government and the United Nations had projected.

“Meaning that China’s real demographic crisis is beyond imagination and that all of China’s past economic, social, defence, and foreign policies were based on faulty demographic data,” Yi said on Twitter.

“China’s demographic and economic outlook is much bleaker than expected. China will have to undergo a strategic contraction and adjust its social, economic, defence, and foreign policies. China will improve relations with the West.”


https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/ ... %20Tuesday.


India needs to stick to its guns. Literally.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by NRao »

sanjaykumar wrote:Yi Fuxian, an obstetrics and gynaecology researcher at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and expert on China’s population changes, said the decline in population was occurring almost a decade earlier than the country’s government and the United Nations had projected.

“Meaning that China’s real demographic crisis is beyond imagination and that all of China’s past economic, social, defence, and foreign policies were based on faulty demographic data,” Yi said on Twitter.

“China’s demographic and economic outlook is much bleaker than expected. China will have to undergo a strategic contraction and adjust its social, economic, defence, and foreign policies. China will improve relations with the West.”


https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/ ... %20Tuesday.


India needs to stick to its guns. Literally.
Wonderful find. I think China will collapse by 2025 or so. Recall I had posted in some other thread that the IAF would thank the PLA for all the wonderful upgrades in Tibet.

However, I do think the US/China will have a very intense, but very short conflict, in which both sides will lose between 20-25% of their armed forces. And, that India should print $50 billion and produce common arms. Along with that, the markets will crash.
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Re: Challenge of China_ Political, Economic & Military Responses

Post by vimal »

Could it be just a blip in Chinese population due to Covid. They've hidden true numbers and it wont be surprising if they've lost more than a million by now and as usual underreported. JMT
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