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Cruise Missile Test in Pakistan: News and Discussions
Oddities in the test so far.
1) General Musharraf is not present at the site which odd since the whole test is being passed off as his "birthday present". Gen. Ehsan ul Haq is. You may recall that Ehsan was Corps Commander XI corps at Peshawar at the time of the Sept 11 attacks and AOSS in an interview claimed that he had personally told Ehsan ul Haq a week or so before Sept 11 that OBL was planning an attack on the US using airplanes.
2) There was no talk on the internet fora about a Pakistani cruise missile development of any kind. There was talk about reverse engineering a cruise missile based on a failed attack on the Bin Laden camps but nothing more than that.
3) The missile was not displayed at the national day parade. Perhaps not so odd but given that this is such a huge huge success as they claim why not put a plastic mockup for the aam janta to see?.
4) Note that Samar Mubarakmand of PAEC is in the picture the director of KRL is not. Recall the credit war between PAEC and KRL after the nuclear tests in 1998?. Are we seeing more of the same?
1) General Musharraf is not present at the site which odd since the whole test is being passed off as his "birthday present". Gen. Ehsan ul Haq is. You may recall that Ehsan was Corps Commander XI corps at Peshawar at the time of the Sept 11 attacks and AOSS in an interview claimed that he had personally told Ehsan ul Haq a week or so before Sept 11 that OBL was planning an attack on the US using airplanes.
2) There was no talk on the internet fora about a Pakistani cruise missile development of any kind. There was talk about reverse engineering a cruise missile based on a failed attack on the Bin Laden camps but nothing more than that.
3) The missile was not displayed at the national day parade. Perhaps not so odd but given that this is such a huge huge success as they claim why not put a plastic mockup for the aam janta to see?.
4) Note that Samar Mubarakmand of PAEC is in the picture the director of KRL is not. Recall the credit war between PAEC and KRL after the nuclear tests in 1998?. Are we seeing more of the same?
Last edited by Sunil on 13 Aug 2005 01:26, edited 1 time in total.
A couple of early thoughts:
Serious missile development is a moderately prolonged process - so there is little that is indigenous about this missile. Any earlier tests would have been picked up by sat recce and other snooping methods.
FWIW I would like o point out that the ideology of Pakistan involves keeping up with India and maintaining the feeling that India is being held at bay. The maintnance of honor is of prime importance. Theerfore it was necessary to demonstrate a "cruise" missile.
I have unrelated thoughts about Pakistan and nuclear missiles. It is all very well for us to talk about rationality and other sane blah blahs. But with Pakistan India's reaction should be only to signal to the Pakistanis that the Hindu is totally mad and is willing to risk nuclear war beacuse his multiple Gods give him multiple lives. Pakistan should spend more more more on a better and better defence or it will be obliterated by the mad Hindu.
Serious missile development is a moderately prolonged process - so there is little that is indigenous about this missile. Any earlier tests would have been picked up by sat recce and other snooping methods.
FWIW I would like o point out that the ideology of Pakistan involves keeping up with India and maintaining the feeling that India is being held at bay. The maintnance of honor is of prime importance. Theerfore it was necessary to demonstrate a "cruise" missile.
I have unrelated thoughts about Pakistan and nuclear missiles. It is all very well for us to talk about rationality and other sane blah blahs. But with Pakistan India's reaction should be only to signal to the Pakistanis that the Hindu is totally mad and is willing to risk nuclear war beacuse his multiple Gods give him multiple lives. Pakistan should spend more more more on a better and better defence or it will be obliterated by the mad Hindu.
If there are significant circumstantial differences between this and earlier "birthday presents" and "confidence boosters", perhaps the reason is that this time it is not Pakistan who is trying to send us a message with the test. It is China.
China are extremely nervous about the US-India nuclear and military deals under discussion. Supplying this cruise missile to the Pakis for a test may be intended to signal us that they could proliferate far worse to the Pakis than they have already, should we get too close to the US.
We may be intended to compare and contrast this outright handover of a Chinese cruise missile to the Pakistanis vs. the miles of red tape, NPT-lobby opposition etc. that will come into play before we get anything from the US. Maybe that is what the "suddenness" of the development, with the lack of normal associated chatter from Paki sources, is designed to impress upon us.
It may also be intended to remind us that the US has wanted to/ been able to do squat about Chinese proliferation to NoKo, Pakistan and beyond. Message being, we are fools to think we can put our eggs in the US basket without facing far more dangers than advantages.
As for Musharraf, maybe he stayed away from the test so as not to incur the wrath of his GUBO masters? I imagine he wants to keep as much distance from AQ-Khanesque doings as possible, in the service of his public image in Washington. If Washington does turn out to see this test as a Chinese ploy, maybe Musharraf wanted to send the message that he himself is on Washington's side but there are certainly others in the TSPA establishment who prefer to go with China?
The queer thing here is Ehsan Ul Haq. From what I remember he was quite America's blue-eyed boy... wasn't he pegged to replace Mahmood Ahmed as DG ISI during Mushy's great purge of 2001-2?
China are extremely nervous about the US-India nuclear and military deals under discussion. Supplying this cruise missile to the Pakis for a test may be intended to signal us that they could proliferate far worse to the Pakis than they have already, should we get too close to the US.
We may be intended to compare and contrast this outright handover of a Chinese cruise missile to the Pakistanis vs. the miles of red tape, NPT-lobby opposition etc. that will come into play before we get anything from the US. Maybe that is what the "suddenness" of the development, with the lack of normal associated chatter from Paki sources, is designed to impress upon us.
It may also be intended to remind us that the US has wanted to/ been able to do squat about Chinese proliferation to NoKo, Pakistan and beyond. Message being, we are fools to think we can put our eggs in the US basket without facing far more dangers than advantages.
As for Musharraf, maybe he stayed away from the test so as not to incur the wrath of his GUBO masters? I imagine he wants to keep as much distance from AQ-Khanesque doings as possible, in the service of his public image in Washington. If Washington does turn out to see this test as a Chinese ploy, maybe Musharraf wanted to send the message that he himself is on Washington's side but there are certainly others in the TSPA establishment who prefer to go with China?
The queer thing here is Ehsan Ul Haq. From what I remember he was quite America's blue-eyed boy... wasn't he pegged to replace Mahmood Ahmed as DG ISI during Mushy's great purge of 2001-2?
All rumbling a side CM was deliver to pakis about a week ago.Right after all the news started appearning in western media about pakis playing double game with west on war on terror, and How pakis become terrorist central & new Al-keeda play ground
Can gurus make any connection regarding CM test & Fazlur Rehman busting mushy's mushraaf
Can gurus make any connection regarding CM test & Fazlur Rehman busting mushy's mushraaf
After the POK II We are on nuclear highway, it doesnt matter if some one honks( message) or not we keep cruising the way we want, based on our hp (economic) under the hood.
If PRC wants to change lanes and speeds so what ?
If TSP wants to be towed on high way by PRC it wont last unless unkil keeps pumping money as TSP axle weight is restricted by its GDP.
The real problem is unkil and PRC combo in tying down India with sops to TSP,
This is where "Babu samjho ishaare, horn pukare" Chalti ka Naam Gadi
If PRC wants to change lanes and speeds so what ?
If TSP wants to be towed on high way by PRC it wont last unless unkil keeps pumping money as TSP axle weight is restricted by its GDP.
The real problem is unkil and PRC combo in tying down India with sops to TSP,
This is where "Babu samjho ishaare, horn pukare" Chalti ka Naam Gadi
Paki missile import data (Russian sources)
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/ ... /3297.html
Could it be an variant of AS 15(kent) exported by Ukraina to Iran and China
http://wmilitary.neurok.ru/h55.html
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/ ... /3297.html
Could it be an variant of AS 15(kent) exported by Ukraina to Iran and China
http://wmilitary.neurok.ru/h55.html
Last edited by rsingh on 12 Aug 2005 23:16, edited 1 time in total.
the ideal 'model' to apply is consider Pak as just another province of PRC. we are behind PRC in weapons industry like missiles and nuclear. where in PRC the weapons are deployed Rawalzhou, Lahorezhen or Tibet doesnt matter - a nuke would take me down all the same.
PRC-MKK gains about 150mil population and $70b in economy. similarly North korea should also be folded into PRC-MKK.
PRC-MKK gains about 150mil population and $70b in economy. similarly North korea should also be folded into PRC-MKK.
What guarantees this? I mean, the current proof of the pudding is the absence of Jehadi fervor in PRC. But long term? What is PRC's counterweight?Sagar wrote:A rational PRC then has to make the assumption that no matter what, TSP will not be allowed in the future bite the hand that feeds it. A TSP dominant subcontinent is PRC's nightmare.Singha wrote:the ideal 'model' to apply is consider Pak as just another province of PRC.
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Musharraf f@rts about it being completely indigeneous, the effect of which is only to make people laugh. I don't think even the ferocious yelper on the UMFs, while outwardly he braggs like the street dog defending his lamp post, might believe that claim. It doesn't matter if they begged it, bought it, stolen it or traded his mother for it. They got it, and that is what counts.
And the generalASSimo claims it to be superior to Brahmos. So WHAT? Didn't he claim the paklish being superior? And what about the concept of TFTA? should we run out with a vernier caliper to prove them wrong?
And what about the threat? They had the dongless and other vaans that (if fired properly) can hit any of our cities. We don't have any defence against them (yet). So is having a CM that a big deal. If they become so foolish to send one down our way, the 300Km Brahmos would be more than enough to make a barbeque fest.
We should - not NOW because they tested one CM now - but as a matter of national defense plan, should think of defending our territory against ANY threat. We should think of what systems are available, and what can we develop. Those activites need not have bearing on this test specifically. We already knew that we will have to face CMs at some point of time.
The question is, do we have any plans/projects for CM defense? Or are we scrambling to look for the crapper when you feel your rear end is about to blow? (for want of better translation of a Malayalam Idiom), and if so, THAT my friends would be a problem.
And the generalASSimo claims it to be superior to Brahmos. So WHAT? Didn't he claim the paklish being superior? And what about the concept of TFTA? should we run out with a vernier caliper to prove them wrong?
And what about the threat? They had the dongless and other vaans that (if fired properly) can hit any of our cities. We don't have any defence against them (yet). So is having a CM that a big deal. If they become so foolish to send one down our way, the 300Km Brahmos would be more than enough to make a barbeque fest.
We should - not NOW because they tested one CM now - but as a matter of national defense plan, should think of defending our territory against ANY threat. We should think of what systems are available, and what can we develop. Those activites need not have bearing on this test specifically. We already knew that we will have to face CMs at some point of time.
The question is, do we have any plans/projects for CM defense? Or are we scrambling to look for the crapper when you feel your rear end is about to blow? (for want of better translation of a Malayalam Idiom), and if so, THAT my friends would be a problem.
so did this missile have folding wings ? until the end of video no wings folded out. how soon after tomahawk launch does the wings deploy ? this page says 5 secs to wing unfold, 14 secs to turbofan start...
http://www.peterson.af.mil/hqafspc/Libr ... hChoice=88
The missile housing was then elevated to 45 degrees by a hydraulic ram and a solid propellant booster blasted the missile out. Five seconds after launch the missiles wings flipped out. By fourteen seconds the turbofan had fired and the missile was flying on inertial guidance to the Initial Timing Control Point.
The Initial Timing Control Point was a pre-set place in the sky where the GLCM descended to low level to evade fighters and radar. TERCOM (Terrain-Contour Matching) cut in, scanning terrain pre-mapped by satellites, analyzed by computer to upgrade the accuracy of the inertial guidance.
Arming only occurred after 24 separate events took place in the correct order. On final approach, it would swoop upward to avoid any physical barriers and then plunge down onto the designated impact point.
.
http://www.peterson.af.mil/hqafspc/Libr ... hChoice=88
The missile housing was then elevated to 45 degrees by a hydraulic ram and a solid propellant booster blasted the missile out. Five seconds after launch the missiles wings flipped out. By fourteen seconds the turbofan had fired and the missile was flying on inertial guidance to the Initial Timing Control Point.
The Initial Timing Control Point was a pre-set place in the sky where the GLCM descended to low level to evade fighters and radar. TERCOM (Terrain-Contour Matching) cut in, scanning terrain pre-mapped by satellites, analyzed by computer to upgrade the accuracy of the inertial guidance.
Arming only occurred after 24 separate events took place in the correct order. On final approach, it would swoop upward to avoid any physical barriers and then plunge down onto the designated impact point.
.
> Or are we scrambling to look for the crapper when you feel your rear end
> is about to blow?
pro_active moves from GOI have been few and far between. as of now there little to no defence against cruise missiles or BMs. so this is not a new situation. as my old room-mate used to say "Mai to hamesha g***d khula hi chorta hu"
> is about to blow?
pro_active moves from GOI have been few and far between. as of now there little to no defence against cruise missiles or BMs. so this is not a new situation. as my old room-mate used to say "Mai to hamesha g***d khula hi chorta hu"
After all the chest thumping, I would take the discussion to the following aspects:
1. What types of payload TSP or China capable of mounting on the missile?
2. In short time this weapon will be deployed in TSPA/TSPN. How does its deployment change the war figting tactics.
3. What counter measures options India has/needs to limit/curtail the threat posed by the new weapon both in opening surprise salvo and sustained phase of war?
===========================
Having said that my take to the above is as follws:
>>1. What types of payload TSP or China capable of mounting on the missile?
I do not think it would be nuclear given the following:
>>2. In time this weapon will be deplyed in TSPA/TSPN. How does its deployment change the war figting tactics.
The C missile be used for deep attack in India where otherwise TSPAF be used. Perticularly where TSPAF pilots piss in their pants (or brown pants). I.e the frequency of attack (I..e final probability of success) and the breadth of such tragets could increase. E.g. SEAD, POL, Command center, Logistics centers, strategic industrial centers.
>>3. What counter measures options India has/needs to limit/curtail the threat posed by the new weapon both in the opening surprise salvo and sustained phase of war?
1. What types of payload TSP or China capable of mounting on the missile?
2. In short time this weapon will be deployed in TSPA/TSPN. How does its deployment change the war figting tactics.
3. What counter measures options India has/needs to limit/curtail the threat posed by the new weapon both in opening surprise salvo and sustained phase of war?
===========================
Having said that my take to the above is as follws:
>>1. What types of payload TSP or China capable of mounting on the missile?
I do not think it would be nuclear given the following:
- A) TSP has more assured way in form of of Ballistic missiles (If in deed they getback Chinese nuclear warhead).
- B ) Also because Packaging nukes in a small 1500Kg cruise missile is very difficult.
- C) Cruise missile have great utility as tactical weapons to used in quantity. Optionally using it for nuclear role that means crossing the red line to the enemy, makes it use for non-conventioal use invites nuclear retailiation and escalation.
- A) the simple uniary HE warhead.
- B ) Fragmented munition
- C) Chemical warhead (that would invite Indian Nuclear retailation given Indian MND doctrine)
>>2. In time this weapon will be deplyed in TSPA/TSPN. How does its deployment change the war figting tactics.
The C missile be used for deep attack in India where otherwise TSPAF be used. Perticularly where TSPAF pilots piss in their pants (or brown pants). I.e the frequency of attack (I..e final probability of success) and the breadth of such tragets could increase. E.g. SEAD, POL, Command center, Logistics centers, strategic industrial centers.
>>3. What counter measures options India has/needs to limit/curtail the threat posed by the new weapon both in the opening surprise salvo and sustained phase of war?
- a) More intesive AWACS petrolling before outbreak of hostelities
- b) Pre-emptively take out all enemy assetts on the first round by over whelming attack by many hudered Brhmos (explosives & EMP). Key to success is Satellite survillance, Air ELINT survillance, HumenInt.
- c) Integrated Battfile Management with Network centric warfare connection to point defense systems on high value assetts. Large quantities of Trishul will become essential along with integrated Survillance Radars and Weapon Guidence Radar
- d) EMP beam to immobalize enemy CM. This is what the new F18 AESA radar is now capable of{by vitue of extreamly narrow beam it can create to focus the RF energy}. India could use such radars on ground for both survilance and attack/disabling enemy systems with EMP
- e) Cyber warfare to corrupt the Barber system before it is available for launch
Last edited by Arun_S on 13 Aug 2005 00:51, edited 1 time in total.
Singha wrote:the ideal 'model' to apply is consider Pak as just another province of PRC. we are behind PRC in weapons industry like missiles and nuclear. where in PRC the weapons are deployed Rawalzhou, Lahorezhen or Tibet doesnt matter - a nuke would take me down all the same.
PRC-MKK gains about 150mil population and $70b in economy. similarly North korea should also be folded into PRC-MKK.
Mirza Aslam Beg had the periodical revelation of this phenomenon earlier this week. He was preparing the ground work for this "model". Lets wait for Iranian to test their Chindigenous "Tomahawk".
Arun,
Given the fact that they have announced (true or not) that their cruise missile may carry a nuclear warhead, its use in a conventional arena becomes improbable. If our AWACS or Ground-based radars detect an incoming cruise missile headed for a target near a populated area, we will be forced to assume that it's nuclear. Essentially, TSP cannot (same with India) use BMs or CMs against land targets with conventional munitions.
Given the fact that they have announced (true or not) that their cruise missile may carry a nuclear warhead, its use in a conventional arena becomes improbable. If our AWACS or Ground-based radars detect an incoming cruise missile headed for a target near a populated area, we will be forced to assume that it's nuclear. Essentially, TSP cannot (same with India) use BMs or CMs against land targets with conventional munitions.
The PLA's interest in land attack cruise missiles actually stems from their concern about American and other ballistic missile defences in places like Taiwan.
Detecting a cruise missile launch and low level penetration is not that easy, even with AWACS. So a nuclear role is not out of the question.
Radar performance, or rather processing is improving though. Cruise missile defence is a fairly hot area of interest.
Detecting a cruise missile launch and low level penetration is not that easy, even with AWACS. So a nuclear role is not out of the question.
Radar performance, or rather processing is improving though. Cruise missile defence is a fairly hot area of interest.
Last edited by Johann on 13 Aug 2005 00:57, edited 1 time in total.
Another Interesting Series of Questions ..
a. We know the LIZARD keeps adding 50 Missiles (BM, CM) per year --- 2006/2007 is When they are expected to reach goal (650 Missiles) set by Analysts to overwhelm Taiwan in a massive First Strike ...!!
b. What is their EXCESS production Capacity for CMs and all the attached TELs, C3 stuff etc etc ...???
c. We DO KNOW one THING ----> PAKISTAN's industrial CAPACITY is DISMAL --- if the LIZARD has TRANSFERRED full PRODUCTION CAPACITY (which I doubt, they do want to SQUEEZE MUSHYs GOLAs ever so often) !!!!
So What are the NUMBERS they are ADDING per YEAR into their inventory ???
d. How do they Plan to provide REAL-TIME data into the CM --- without any dedicated Mil Sat or Sat for that Matter ???
e. What are the Critical Numbers needed to be reached before the PAKIS do a KARGIL with CMs ???
f. Who will have operational Control of CMs --- Battlefield Units ???
CORPSE Kammandu's ??? (what's to stop a Corpse Kammandu from Firing one up MUSHY's bu$$ if he misses the Promotion Bus ???)
g. If the PAKIs produce 500+ Nos at $ 5-10 Mill a piece ---> that's a Cool $2.5 -> $ 5Billion (Costs go UP as #of units go DOWN !!!)
Note Each Tomahawk Costs $580K ---- BUT this with a PRODUCTION ORDER of 4200 Missiles --- Cost of $11.2 Billion
a. We know the LIZARD keeps adding 50 Missiles (BM, CM) per year --- 2006/2007 is When they are expected to reach goal (650 Missiles) set by Analysts to overwhelm Taiwan in a massive First Strike ...!!
b. What is their EXCESS production Capacity for CMs and all the attached TELs, C3 stuff etc etc ...???
c. We DO KNOW one THING ----> PAKISTAN's industrial CAPACITY is DISMAL --- if the LIZARD has TRANSFERRED full PRODUCTION CAPACITY (which I doubt, they do want to SQUEEZE MUSHYs GOLAs ever so often) !!!!
So What are the NUMBERS they are ADDING per YEAR into their inventory ???
d. How do they Plan to provide REAL-TIME data into the CM --- without any dedicated Mil Sat or Sat for that Matter ???
e. What are the Critical Numbers needed to be reached before the PAKIS do a KARGIL with CMs ???
f. Who will have operational Control of CMs --- Battlefield Units ???
CORPSE Kammandu's ??? (what's to stop a Corpse Kammandu from Firing one up MUSHY's bu$$ if he misses the Promotion Bus ???)
g. If the PAKIs produce 500+ Nos at $ 5-10 Mill a piece ---> that's a Cool $2.5 -> $ 5Billion (Costs go UP as #of units go DOWN !!!)
Note Each Tomahawk Costs $580K ---- BUT this with a PRODUCTION ORDER of 4200 Missiles --- Cost of $11.2 Billion
Hi,
Shiv and Rudradev I agree with your views here.
Rudradev,
Ehsan ul Haq managed to turn the ISI's relationship with the US around. At a time when Mehmood's double dealing approach had alienated the ISI's old friends in DC, Ehsan helped calm people down. Why exactly AOSS's testimony Ehsan ul Haq's about the Sept 11 attacks was never used against him is not clear to me but Ehsan ul Haq is a very complicated character. In the old days Corps Commander Peshawar had only one responsibility - to tax and manage the heroin trade - is it fair to say that things have changed? In the later part of 1990s the bulk of the job of managing the Taliban's military machine fell to the XI Corps and whoever sat on top there was effectively the head of the Taliban's army. Ehsan ul Haq was very much a part of that. How and why the Americans "trust" him is a complete mystery to me.
In an offline discussion after Haq was promoted to CJCSC and Hayat was made VCOAS, we had concluded that Musharraf was separating the Jihadi/Irregular side of things from the regular army. The promotions at the top were merely an expression of this splitting policy. Musharraf wanted to be the only one who could instruct both arms of Pakistan's security machinery, i.e. the Jihadi arm (under ISI) and the regular arm under GHQ. Hayat with his "proper military" background could make good VCOAS keeping the regular army from marching on Musharraf and Haq with his experience as Corps Commander XI would make a good boss of the Jihad machinery which used to come under CJCSC Aziz Khan earlier.
I am still working on Ehsan's bio, and I don't have any data points on it before 1997 when he was GOC at Pano Aqil.
Singha,
The message to India is we can arbitrarily raise your BMD costs - stick to the S300 system we have - do not shift to the US aegis. The message to America is don't force us to proliferate to Pakistan.
Shiv and Rudradev I agree with your views here.
Rudradev,
Ehsan ul Haq managed to turn the ISI's relationship with the US around. At a time when Mehmood's double dealing approach had alienated the ISI's old friends in DC, Ehsan helped calm people down. Why exactly AOSS's testimony Ehsan ul Haq's about the Sept 11 attacks was never used against him is not clear to me but Ehsan ul Haq is a very complicated character. In the old days Corps Commander Peshawar had only one responsibility - to tax and manage the heroin trade - is it fair to say that things have changed? In the later part of 1990s the bulk of the job of managing the Taliban's military machine fell to the XI Corps and whoever sat on top there was effectively the head of the Taliban's army. Ehsan ul Haq was very much a part of that. How and why the Americans "trust" him is a complete mystery to me.
In an offline discussion after Haq was promoted to CJCSC and Hayat was made VCOAS, we had concluded that Musharraf was separating the Jihadi/Irregular side of things from the regular army. The promotions at the top were merely an expression of this splitting policy. Musharraf wanted to be the only one who could instruct both arms of Pakistan's security machinery, i.e. the Jihadi arm (under ISI) and the regular arm under GHQ. Hayat with his "proper military" background could make good VCOAS keeping the regular army from marching on Musharraf and Haq with his experience as Corps Commander XI would make a good boss of the Jihad machinery which used to come under CJCSC Aziz Khan earlier.
I am still working on Ehsan's bio, and I don't have any data points on it before 1997 when he was GOC at Pano Aqil.
Singha,
Brilliant summary.china --> message ---> (india, usa)
pakistan ---> message ----> (usa,uk) {lay off or this might leak to NoKo and Iran soon}
The message to India is we can arbitrarily raise your BMD costs - stick to the S300 system we have - do not shift to the US aegis. The message to America is don't force us to proliferate to Pakistan.
Chinese provided ground map from sats. Could haev some (but not high trust) hight (cartographic) information. And then it is simple laser hight tracking and terrain mapping (day flight only?). No need to trust the GPS/GLONSS data.d. How do they Plan to provide REAL-TIME data into the CM --- without any dedicated Mil Sat or Sat for that Matter ???
The key it how do they accurately determine target co-ordinates & target image? That is where national advances in science & engineering is required? Optical/Radar sensors etc.
Or send a Jihadi spy to get the differntial from an approximate local datum/landmark and then reference the target from the point in terms of range and azimuth.
Bill Gertz that the Lizard Trojans hate with a Passion --
http://www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/ring060801.html
http://www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/ring060801.html
June 8, 2001
Notes from the Pentagon
China tests ALCM
China test-fired a new air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) for the first time last month, according to U.S. intelligence officials. The weapon, China�s first land-attack cruise missile, is Beijing�s answer to the ship-launched U.S. Tomahawk.
The ground-hugging, air-to-surface missile was launched from a B-6 bomber and was deemed successful by defense and intelligence agencies, according to officials familiar with the test.
The missile is assessed to be capable of carrying a 1,100-pound warhead -- either high-explosive or nuclear to an unknown range. It was the first time China test-fired its new land-attack cruise missile.
Military analysts said China has been working secretly on the cruise missile, which is an extended-range version of the C-802 anti-ship missile. The missile is said to be powered by a turbojet engine and is expected to have a range of at least 111 miles.
Richard Fisher, a specialist on the Chinese military with the private Jamestown Foundation, said his research has shown the new ALCM will have �substantial range� and will be fitted with television-camera precision guidance.
Mr. Fisher said the new missile has been dubbed variously the �Hong Niao,� or Red Bird, and �Chang Feng,� or Long Wind. The missile is said to be a hybrid of three missiles: the Russian Kh-55 cruise missile, the Tomahawk <\m> obtained clandestinely from recent U.S. attacks -- and a cruise missile purchased from Israel.
�This has been expected for some time,� said Mr. Fisher, who is writing a book on the Chinese military. China is said by defense officials to be aggressively developing a land-attack cruise missile capability to match the U.S. Navy�s famed Tomahawk and Air Force�s ALCM. It has been receiving assistance in the program from Russia, which has provided hardware and technical assistance.
The Air Force recently moved a stockpile of ALCMs to Guam for the first time to make the missiles more available for use in a regional conflict.
Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman declined to comment on the test. But he said: �Like many countries, China is developing an air-launched, land-attack cruise missile capability.�
Arun_S wrote:Chinese provided ground map from sats. Could haev some (but not high trust) hight (cartographic) information. And then it is simple laser hight tracking and terrain mapping (day flight only?). No need to trust the GPS/GLONSS data.d. How do they Plan to provide REAL-TIME data into the CM --- without any dedicated Mil Sat or Sat for that Matter ???
The key it how do they accurately determine target co-ordinates & target image? That is where national advances in science & engineering is required? Optical/Radar sensors etc.
Or send a Jihadi spy to get the differntial from an approximate local datum/landmark and then reference the target from the point in terms of range and azimuth.
That would WORK only for STATIC targets ....!!!
If they plan to attack Mobile Strike Columns, RAPIDs, etc etc they do need REAL-TIME Sat info.
What about Battle Ships, Subs to DDG, etc etc --- these need Real-Time Stuff ...
Note ---> Most MIL units are in Hardened Shelters --- > Only Civilian, and Industrial Targets would be HVT., for using the JIHADI Doctrine.
TSP has made sure that PRC knows very well that there are plenty of uighurs at Gitmo.Sam CS wrote:What guarantees this? I mean, the current proof of the pudding is the absence of Jehadi fervor in PRC. But long term? What is PRC's counterweight?Sagar wrote: A rational PRC then has to make the assumption that no matter what, TSP will not be allowed in the future bite the hand that feeds it. A TSP dominant subcontinent is PRC's nightmare.
PRC needs India to contain TSP, and TSP and others to contain India. Doing all this and then getting India's acceptance of PRC as a hegemon is up there on the Chinese wish list.
From Google's Cache
Is it Hong Niao-1
The Hong Niao-1 (X-600) cruise missile first entered service in 1992 with a range of 600 km.
Upgraded versions probably use Tomahawk-derived technology: the Hong Niao-2, deployed in 1996 with a range of 1,400 or 1,800 for submarine-launched or ground-launched versions, respectively;
and the Hong Niao-3, under development with a range of 2,500 km.
Is it Hong Niao-1
The Hong Niao-1 (X-600) cruise missile first entered service in 1992 with a range of 600 km.
Upgraded versions probably use Tomahawk-derived technology: the Hong Niao-2, deployed in 1996 with a range of 1,400 or 1,800 for submarine-launched or ground-launched versions, respectively;
and the Hong Niao-3, under development with a range of 2,500 km.
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I can imagine the RE of the propulsion unit, but what about guidance? And software for terrain following? and for target aquisition? How can you RE those? That takes real development effort, even for Chinks.
Maybe what they fired is a demo unit with just inertial or GPS guidance, considering the fact that it was suddenly from Mush's Mush.
Maybe what they fired is a demo unit with just inertial or GPS guidance, considering the fact that it was suddenly from Mush's Mush.
R, This is quite perplexing. What is the role and mission for this vehicle given that TSP has a first strike doctrine? Both the US and FSU had IRBM treaty which included denuclearizing the cruise missiles. Hence its clear that an incoming C/M from either is not a nuke. This is one reason for the non-emergence of Lakshya based C/M and the limiting of Brahmos to sea based platforms. Whats the point of the TSP bombast that it can carry any payload? Has TSP finally scored self goal?Rangudu wrote:Arun,
Given the fact that they have announced (true or not) that their cruise missile may carry a nuclear warhead, its use in a conventional arena becomes improbable. If our AWACS or Ground-based radars detect an incoming cruise missile headed for a target near a populated area, we will be forced to assume that it's nuclear. Essentially, TSP cannot (same with India) use BMs or CMs against land targets with conventional munitions.
Pak warns of missile build up against India :
==============================
http://www.intelligenceonline.net/allin ... 4200282531
1 August 2005: Pakistan has said that US sales of missile defence systems to India would alter the military balance in the sub-continent, and Pakistan would have to build up its inventory of missiles to counter it.
General Parvez Musharraf who was contacted by the Pentagon and US national security council over the London bombings and general issue of terrorism hinted to the Americans that Pakistan could deploy missiles and develop and establish a missile shield with countries other than the US.
Apparently, General Musharraf and foreign minister Khursheed Mahmoud Kasuri have contacted China about the missile shield, and diplomats said China could take advantage of the recent Indo-US defence and nuclear agreements to enhance military ties with Pakistan.
In June 2005, two top Pakistani generals were present when China demonstrated its missile shield capacity in the Lop Nor test facility and how to protect a city from missile attack.
China is already deploying such missile defence systems in select coastal cities in Eastern China against possible Taiwanese attacks.
Diplomats said Pakistan wanted to convey that missile defence systems sales to India would hurt Pakistan-US relations, since missiles are publicly viewed as symbols of military strength, and therefore General Musharraf could not afford to ignore this development.
Musharraf reminded the Americans about their commitment under the MNNA alliance with Pakistan, which makes Pakistan eligible to ask for advanced military hardware, and there is also a clause in the MNNA deal under which Pakistan can prevent missile defense systems sales to a country hostile to it.
==============================
http://www.intelligenceonline.net/allin ... 4200282531
1 August 2005: Pakistan has said that US sales of missile defence systems to India would alter the military balance in the sub-continent, and Pakistan would have to build up its inventory of missiles to counter it.
General Parvez Musharraf who was contacted by the Pentagon and US national security council over the London bombings and general issue of terrorism hinted to the Americans that Pakistan could deploy missiles and develop and establish a missile shield with countries other than the US.
Apparently, General Musharraf and foreign minister Khursheed Mahmoud Kasuri have contacted China about the missile shield, and diplomats said China could take advantage of the recent Indo-US defence and nuclear agreements to enhance military ties with Pakistan.
In June 2005, two top Pakistani generals were present when China demonstrated its missile shield capacity in the Lop Nor test facility and how to protect a city from missile attack.
China is already deploying such missile defence systems in select coastal cities in Eastern China against possible Taiwanese attacks.
Diplomats said Pakistan wanted to convey that missile defence systems sales to India would hurt Pakistan-US relations, since missiles are publicly viewed as symbols of military strength, and therefore General Musharraf could not afford to ignore this development.
Musharraf reminded the Americans about their commitment under the MNNA alliance with Pakistan, which makes Pakistan eligible to ask for advanced military hardware, and there is also a clause in the MNNA deal under which Pakistan can prevent missile defense systems sales to a country hostile to it.
Taiwan's Approaches in dealing with the Lizard's LACMs ...
Taiwan's Approach
Page 1
Taiwan’s Strategy on Cruise Missile Defense
Holmes LIAO, Ph.D. Advisor Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Background
Taiwan is not in the best position to observe the recent U.S. war on Iraq. Lacking first-hand observation and relying solely on public reports, any attempts to draw critical lessons from the campaign would fail miserably. Therefore, rather than reiterating voluminous record of conclusions drawn by others, I would instead concentrate on the emerging threat that Taiwan faces—China’s land attack cruise missiles (LACMs).
In the past, discussions about China’s missiles have primarily focused on its ballistic missile forces. Deployed PLA ballistic missiles include submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), such as CSS-N-3/JL-1, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), such as CSS-4/DF-5, intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), such as CSS-3/DF-4, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), such as CSS-5/DF-21, and
short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), such as CSS-6/M-9 and CSS-7/M-11.
While ballistic missiles are tools for political intimidation and coercion, they are generally more costly and less accurate than cruise missiles with the same range. China’s LACM Capabilities The PLA must have learned the lessons of the U.S. Tomahawk LACM, which demonstrated its lethal capability in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The tremendous
success of this potent weapon seems to be an incentive for China to acquire LACM capabilities. LACMs have evolved and improved immensely since the German V-1’s first use in London towards the end of World War II. Modern LACM capabilities include low-altitude flight profile, long standoff ranges, all-aspect attack, small radar cross section, low infrared signature, variable launch options, not to mention its
1. Anthony Cordesman, “The Lessons of the Iraq War,” CSIS, July 2003.
2 .Ted Carpenter, “Avoiding Bogus Lessons from the Iraq War,” CATO Institute, April 2003.
3 .John Ferris, “A New American Way of War? C4ISR in Operation Iraqi Freedom, A Provisional
Assessment,” Center for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, 2003.
4.James Dunnigan, “Why American Infantry Casualties Were so Low,” Strategy Page, May 2003.
Page 2
pinpoint accuracy.
As shown in the above-mentioned wars, sophisticated LACMs are capable of striking targets across the full depth of the battlefield. Missions of LACMs may include destroying seaports or airfields to prevent entry and expansion, striking valuable targets such as headquarters, logistical depots, and command and control posts. Additionally, they can prevent or limit movement of maneuvering forces. Consequently, PLA’s ballistic missiles and future LACM forces can be used to open the way for follow-on operations, thereby playing a critical role in its military campaign and complicating the tasks of Taiwan’s defending forces.
In order to boost its credibility in precision engagement and strategic deterrence, the PLA has given the development of LACMs a high priority for theater and strategic missions. China already has a number of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), either through direct purchase from foreign countries or indigenous development.
Indigenous PLA ASCMs currently in service at least include: HY-2/C-201 [CSS-N-3 Silkworm], HY-3/C-301 [CSS-X-6 Sawhorse], YJ-1/C-801 [CSS-N-4 Sardine], and YJ-2/C-802 [CSS-X-8 Saccade] . China also imported Raduga 3M-80 [SS-N-22 Sunburn] supersonic ASCMs from Russia along with four Sovremenny-class destroyers and Zezda Strela Kh-31A [AS-17 Krypton] ASCMs to equip Sukhoi Su-30 multi-role combat aircraft. With improvements in propulsion and guidance technologies and by modifying existing ASCMs, China will have little difficulty to
develop LACMs.
In September 2001, Washington Times reported that U.S.
intelligence equipment detected a PLA test of a new LACM that is believed to be an extended-range version of an ASCM.
Open source information on China’s LACM is sketchy and often contains accounts of uncertain reliability. Chinese LACM research and development efforts are aided by aggressive acquisition of foreign technology and subsystems, particularly from Russia. Similar to Russian Kh-101 strategic LACM, the Chinese version is expected to employ technologies such as GLONASS/GPS/Inertial mid-course guidance and most critically, terrain counter matching (TERCOM) technology for terminal guidance to
increase its precision.
China reportedly transported cruise missile production facilities from Russia to a location in the vicinity of Shanghai in 1993, and recruited cruise missile engineering 5 At least one extended range version YJ-2 is under development and may become China's first air-launched subsonic LACM.2
Page 3
Specialists from Russia in 1995.
Some reports also indicated that China has obtained technical data of a Russian LACM guidance system. Known indigenous Chinese LACMs under development include Chang Feng, Chang Feng-JIA, and Hong Niao-1/2/3,
6 with a range between 400 km and 1,800 km and circular error of probabilities (CEP) between 5 m to 15 m, though the numbers appear
to be rather optimistic. The Hong Niao LACM is reportedly a derivative of the Russian Kh-65/Kh-SD, a shorter-range version of the Russian Kh-55 [AS-15 Kent] 3,000-kilometer-range strategic cruise missile.
Active Defense
Technically speaking, active defense against incoming missiles involves searching, detection, tracking, prediction, and interception. Unlike ballistic missiles, which are relatively easy to detect due to their flight trajectories, LACMs may be misidentified as aircraft because of similarities in their flight characteristics. Furthermore, even if the defending force fields a network of ground and elevated sensors, LACMs’ small radar cross section (RCS) and low infrared (IR) signature complicate the tasks of searching, detection, and tracking.
The AN/APS-145 radar on Taiwan’s E-2T Hawkeye early warning aircraft is adequate for these tasks, so will the SPY-1 radar on Aegis Combat System (ACS) which Taiwan may acquire in the future. Nevertheless, Taiwan may still need to procure and integrate additional airborne sensors, such as aeroflot, tethered aerostat, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for better round-the-clock surveillance. Since command, control, and battle management (C2/BM) is the core of missile defense, the existing infrastructure of Taiwan’s air defense system needs to be evolved into an
integrated air and missile defense network. Effective active defense requires close coordination among joint organizations and integration of sensors and weapon systems. The ultimate objective is to create a single integrated air picture (SIAP) by orchestrating various sensors and command posts across the three services.
This engineering task poses serious challenge in system integration, interoperability, survivability, and joint command structure. Yet the force multiplier makes SIAP very attractive for military planners.
To better utilize limited air defense assets, force deployment requires thorough studies6
Statement of Richard D. Fisher, Jr., on Military Capabilities of the People's Republic of China, 19 July 2000, House Armed Services. 3
Page 4
of Taiwan’s terrain.
By employing quantitative tools such as dynamic programming,
optimization, modeling and simulation, the military can predict, with certain degree of confidence, the paths of incoming LACMs and deploy critical assets accordingly. The three figures below show basic techniques of dynamic programming.
7
Step 1. Initialize 2-D Terrain Map
Step 2. Scoring and Traceback
Step 3. Optimized Path
Taiwan’s weapon systems suitable for missions to defend against LACM include MIM-72 Chaparral FAADS, Avenger PMS (pedestal-mounted stinger), FIM-92 DMS (dual-mounted stinger), MIM-23 Hawk surface-to-air missiles, flak, and fighter jets armed with air-to-air missiles.
Passive Defense
Though active defense measures are conspicuous and attract much attention, passive defense measures are less expensive and can provide certain degree of protection for civilians. Passive defense involves measures taken to posture vital assets to reduce vulnerability and minimize the effects of a missile attack. The measures are taken to
4,7
Note that this is only one of the many tools available for path prediction. There are alternative methods that can yield different solutions. Simply put, force planning and deployment involves more art than science.
Page 5
warn the military force and the general public, reduce enemy targeting effectiveness, enhance personnel and equipment survivability, and recover and reconstitute after attack.
8
When we discuss passive defense, questions such as the ones below will inevitably be raised: What level of protection does Taiwan need? Does it want to further protect the military forces that are somewhat protected? Or does it simply want to address the psychological preparedness issue among the civilians? Answers to these questions may not be intuitive, though they are obviously connected to the distribution of
defense resources. As Taiwan adopts the “no first strike” doctrine, one of the primary purposes for passive defense is to maintain an assured second-strike capability. For example, military installations may use camouflage, emission control, thermal masking, and other techniques to avoid being detected and targeted by PLA’s reconnaissance assets.
As such, Taiwan can deploy feint, decoys and operations security (OPSEC) measures to induce confusion as to whether a site is an actual target. Additionally, China's counter-C 2, operations can be made less effective by Taiwan's employment of system redundancy. For example, if half of the communication bandwidth is sufficient for operational purposes, the communications systems can sustain 50 percent interdiction.
Countermeasures can be explained by introducing how the guidance component in a LACM functions. A LACM’s in-flight guidance typically relies on inertial navigation systems (INS) using gyroscopes to ascertain the missile’s position. A long-range LACM requires supplemental information, such as terrain contour matching (TERCOM) and Global Positioning System (GPS), to make up for inherent INS’s inaccuracy. China’s missiles are known to strap GPS, Russian GLONASS, and/or its indigenous Twin Star satellite positioning receivers. The U.S. Tomahawk also uses an
additional set of precise terminal navigation updates known as the digital scene matching area correlator (DSMAC), a two-dimensional, map-matching concept that employs an onboard sensor to obtain a sequence of images of the ground slightly ahead of the missile.
Among all these guidance technologies, gyroscope is a self-enclosed unit and probably the most difficult to interfere from outside of the missile. Its cumulative drift, 8 As required by the U.S. FM 100-12 titled “Army Theater Missile Defense Operations,” planning for passive defense should begins with a comprehensive TMD intelligence preparation of the battlespace
(IPB) that defines the battlefield environment, describes the battlefield’s effects, evaluates the threat, and determines threat courses of actions.
5
Page 6
moreover, does not make it an attractive candidate to interfere. Satellite positioning unit receives updates from radio frequency (RF) signal and is susceptible to jamming. In fact, the electromagnetic energy radiating from a cellular phone is powerful enough to jam the U.S. GPS signal which is measured at only 10 -5 watts on the ground.
TERCOM and DSMAC units can both be dealt with by employing carefully planned thermal sources and large balloon edifices to confuse the matching/correlation algorithms in LACM’s onboard computers. Again, tools such as dynamic programming and optimization can be employed to perfect the deployment of feintand decoys.
Measures for passive defense are in fact risk-management strategies that first requires an intimate knowledge of the missions, services, and assets that need to be protected. Military planners can develop a set of survivable scenarios to verify the soundness of strategies and corresponding measures. Subsequently, passive defense depends not only on the engineering disciplines, but also on scenario-driven “what-if” analyses
and contingency planning. Therefore, passive defense depends at least as much upon the risk management skills of an organization as it does upon the technical expertise.
Attack Operations: Counterforce
U.S. FM 100-12 states that “to create a coherent Army theater missile defense, active defense operations must complement passive defense, attack operations, and C4I.” Consequently, Taiwan should probably emphasize more on air offensive operations and on unconventional warfare, such as Special Operations (SPOPS), to neutralize missile launch sites and airbases in China. Special operations may also serve as an
important cornerstone of Taiwan’s deterrent. Without sufficient long-range strike assets, the special force may be the only way to strike targets while minimizing collateral damages. Such doctrinal shift from the country’s traditionally defensive thinking will require at least two elements: near real-time reconnaissance intelligence and long-range precision strike assets. In recent years, high-resolution commercial satellite imagery offers much more detailed information than is currently available from the LANDSAT and Spot systems.
The two major military benefits from commercial imagery are (1) the ability to better visualize the battlefield, and (2) precision targeting of weapons. With computer-aided photo-interpretation, laborious tasks such as precise location, target identification, and change detection can be accomplished more easily. Moreover, mission planning, route 6
Page 7
planning, and air defense penetration, which are essential to successful air strike operations, can be carried out more swiftly. As such, Taiwan is taking advantage of the orbital space, which is rapidly becoming
commercialized. The country reportedly has an agreement with the Israel Aircraft Industries to acquire 1.8-meter resolution imagery from its EROS-1 satellite and is authorized to fully control the satellite whenever it flies within 1,000 km of the ground station.
9
Ikonos satellite from Space Imaging also offers Taiwan 1-meter
panchromatic and 4-meter multi-spectral imagery. 10 In order to exploit the benefits from space reconnaissance, Taiwan is planning to launch a remote sensing satellite offering less than 2-meter resolution imagery by the end of 2003. 11 Though 1.5-meter resolution is sufficient for general identification for most military targets, revisit time of the above-mentioned satellites—ranging from 1.5 days to 3 days, will make it difficult to keep track of enemy’s movement in the battlefield.
Therefore, Taiwan may attempt to maximize the advantages of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence to combat aircraft for post-launch neutralization of missile sites. From reconnaissance UAVs, ships are not hard to spot; airfields and concentration of ground troops are unlikely to escape destruction in the face of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) furnished with precise
spatial and temporal information. As proved in Iraq and in Kosovo, PGMs can effectively convert a target's visibility into demise. Because most Chinese logistics facilities and C 2 centers are not well camouflaged, they seem vulnerable to precision strikes.
Conclusion: Counter-Value?
A reasonable assumption is that, unlike many Third World regimes, the current Chinese leadership values the Chinese population and economy. China’s economy, like most around the world, requires a labor force and industrial base to produce and sustain national power. China’s urban centers in the coastal regions have become even 9
Taiwan Plugs Into Eros A1, SAT News Asia, August 15, 2001, available at
http://www.satnewsasia.com/Stories/539.html
10
Taiwan Taps Into Private US Spy Satellite, Space Daily, April 30, 2000, available at
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-00w.html
11
Taiwan in October 1991 launched a 15-year space program at an estimated cost of US$560 million. Its first fully-owned satellite ROCSAT-1 went into orbit in January 1999. Its second satellite, named
ROCSAT-2, would be sent into orbit in late 2003. Although Taipei insisted it would be designed for scientific research, its imaging payload implies its potential for military applications. Taiwan also aims to put into orbit six micro-satellites weighing about 40 kilograms each for meteorological missions.
7
Page 8
8
more vital to the nation’s focal points of industrial and economic development. Therefore, Taiwan can base its deterrent strategy, in part, on a threat to destroy a significant portion of China’s prosperous and productive coastal region, such as Shanghai and Hong Kong. Nonetheless, since weapons in Taiwan’s possession are largely “defensive” in nature—lacking range, lethality, and precision, China may not
be able to determine the magnitude of Taiwan’s deterrence based on conventional weapons.
Consequently, longer-range precision-strike LACM may be one of the solutions Taiwan can and should pursue. Taiwan's military-industrial complex has demonstrated its capabilities to develop ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. By some estimates, a LACM without TERCOM costs only 30% of a ballistic missile and 70% with TERCOM. The cost-effectiveness of a LACM seems rather appealing. With Taiwan’s world-class electronics industry, engineers will find integrating sub-components such
as gyroscopes, radar altimeter, laser range-finder, solid-state accelerometer, GPS receiver, digital servo, and electro-optical sensor into a LACM guidance system not difficult. Though converting satellite imagery into digital terrain model and designing flexible pattern matching algorithms for embedded TERCOM and DSMAC is more challenging, commercially available software tools will make the engineering task
within reach of an R&D institution.
So the remaining question may be why Taiwan has yet to field any LACMs. One reasonable explanation is the propulsion system. The country’s mechanical engineering industry does not seem adequate to produce fuel-efficient engines with high thrust-to-weight ratio comparable to Williams Research’s F107-WR-101 turbofan engine used in American AGM-86B/C/D cruise missile or Microturbo TRI 60-30 turbofan engine used in British Storm Shadow conventionally armed stand-off cruise missile (CASOM). The fact that only a handful of countries can manufacture
this type of engine proves how formidable the challenge is. Nonetheless, if offensive operation is a critical pillar of missile defense, Taiwan will have to put emphasis on the yet-to-be-defined doctrine and come up with “creative means” to overcome the technological obstacle.
Taiwan's Approach
Page 1
Taiwan’s Strategy on Cruise Missile Defense
Holmes LIAO, Ph.D. Advisor Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Background
Taiwan is not in the best position to observe the recent U.S. war on Iraq. Lacking first-hand observation and relying solely on public reports, any attempts to draw critical lessons from the campaign would fail miserably. Therefore, rather than reiterating voluminous record of conclusions drawn by others, I would instead concentrate on the emerging threat that Taiwan faces—China’s land attack cruise missiles (LACMs).
In the past, discussions about China’s missiles have primarily focused on its ballistic missile forces. Deployed PLA ballistic missiles include submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), such as CSS-N-3/JL-1, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), such as CSS-4/DF-5, intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), such as CSS-3/DF-4, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), such as CSS-5/DF-21, and
short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), such as CSS-6/M-9 and CSS-7/M-11.
While ballistic missiles are tools for political intimidation and coercion, they are generally more costly and less accurate than cruise missiles with the same range. China’s LACM Capabilities The PLA must have learned the lessons of the U.S. Tomahawk LACM, which demonstrated its lethal capability in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The tremendous
success of this potent weapon seems to be an incentive for China to acquire LACM capabilities. LACMs have evolved and improved immensely since the German V-1’s first use in London towards the end of World War II. Modern LACM capabilities include low-altitude flight profile, long standoff ranges, all-aspect attack, small radar cross section, low infrared signature, variable launch options, not to mention its
1. Anthony Cordesman, “The Lessons of the Iraq War,” CSIS, July 2003.
2 .Ted Carpenter, “Avoiding Bogus Lessons from the Iraq War,” CATO Institute, April 2003.
3 .John Ferris, “A New American Way of War? C4ISR in Operation Iraqi Freedom, A Provisional
Assessment,” Center for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, 2003.
4.James Dunnigan, “Why American Infantry Casualties Were so Low,” Strategy Page, May 2003.
Page 2
pinpoint accuracy.
As shown in the above-mentioned wars, sophisticated LACMs are capable of striking targets across the full depth of the battlefield. Missions of LACMs may include destroying seaports or airfields to prevent entry and expansion, striking valuable targets such as headquarters, logistical depots, and command and control posts. Additionally, they can prevent or limit movement of maneuvering forces. Consequently, PLA’s ballistic missiles and future LACM forces can be used to open the way for follow-on operations, thereby playing a critical role in its military campaign and complicating the tasks of Taiwan’s defending forces.
In order to boost its credibility in precision engagement and strategic deterrence, the PLA has given the development of LACMs a high priority for theater and strategic missions. China already has a number of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), either through direct purchase from foreign countries or indigenous development.
Indigenous PLA ASCMs currently in service at least include: HY-2/C-201 [CSS-N-3 Silkworm], HY-3/C-301 [CSS-X-6 Sawhorse], YJ-1/C-801 [CSS-N-4 Sardine], and YJ-2/C-802 [CSS-X-8 Saccade] . China also imported Raduga 3M-80 [SS-N-22 Sunburn] supersonic ASCMs from Russia along with four Sovremenny-class destroyers and Zezda Strela Kh-31A [AS-17 Krypton] ASCMs to equip Sukhoi Su-30 multi-role combat aircraft. With improvements in propulsion and guidance technologies and by modifying existing ASCMs, China will have little difficulty to
develop LACMs.
In September 2001, Washington Times reported that U.S.
intelligence equipment detected a PLA test of a new LACM that is believed to be an extended-range version of an ASCM.
Open source information on China’s LACM is sketchy and often contains accounts of uncertain reliability. Chinese LACM research and development efforts are aided by aggressive acquisition of foreign technology and subsystems, particularly from Russia. Similar to Russian Kh-101 strategic LACM, the Chinese version is expected to employ technologies such as GLONASS/GPS/Inertial mid-course guidance and most critically, terrain counter matching (TERCOM) technology for terminal guidance to
increase its precision.
China reportedly transported cruise missile production facilities from Russia to a location in the vicinity of Shanghai in 1993, and recruited cruise missile engineering 5 At least one extended range version YJ-2 is under development and may become China's first air-launched subsonic LACM.2
Page 3
Specialists from Russia in 1995.
Some reports also indicated that China has obtained technical data of a Russian LACM guidance system. Known indigenous Chinese LACMs under development include Chang Feng, Chang Feng-JIA, and Hong Niao-1/2/3,
6 with a range between 400 km and 1,800 km and circular error of probabilities (CEP) between 5 m to 15 m, though the numbers appear
to be rather optimistic. The Hong Niao LACM is reportedly a derivative of the Russian Kh-65/Kh-SD, a shorter-range version of the Russian Kh-55 [AS-15 Kent] 3,000-kilometer-range strategic cruise missile.
Active Defense
Technically speaking, active defense against incoming missiles involves searching, detection, tracking, prediction, and interception. Unlike ballistic missiles, which are relatively easy to detect due to their flight trajectories, LACMs may be misidentified as aircraft because of similarities in their flight characteristics. Furthermore, even if the defending force fields a network of ground and elevated sensors, LACMs’ small radar cross section (RCS) and low infrared (IR) signature complicate the tasks of searching, detection, and tracking.
The AN/APS-145 radar on Taiwan’s E-2T Hawkeye early warning aircraft is adequate for these tasks, so will the SPY-1 radar on Aegis Combat System (ACS) which Taiwan may acquire in the future. Nevertheless, Taiwan may still need to procure and integrate additional airborne sensors, such as aeroflot, tethered aerostat, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for better round-the-clock surveillance. Since command, control, and battle management (C2/BM) is the core of missile defense, the existing infrastructure of Taiwan’s air defense system needs to be evolved into an
integrated air and missile defense network. Effective active defense requires close coordination among joint organizations and integration of sensors and weapon systems. The ultimate objective is to create a single integrated air picture (SIAP) by orchestrating various sensors and command posts across the three services.
This engineering task poses serious challenge in system integration, interoperability, survivability, and joint command structure. Yet the force multiplier makes SIAP very attractive for military planners.
To better utilize limited air defense assets, force deployment requires thorough studies6
Statement of Richard D. Fisher, Jr., on Military Capabilities of the People's Republic of China, 19 July 2000, House Armed Services. 3
Page 4
of Taiwan’s terrain.
By employing quantitative tools such as dynamic programming,
optimization, modeling and simulation, the military can predict, with certain degree of confidence, the paths of incoming LACMs and deploy critical assets accordingly. The three figures below show basic techniques of dynamic programming.
7
Step 1. Initialize 2-D Terrain Map
Step 2. Scoring and Traceback
Step 3. Optimized Path
Taiwan’s weapon systems suitable for missions to defend against LACM include MIM-72 Chaparral FAADS, Avenger PMS (pedestal-mounted stinger), FIM-92 DMS (dual-mounted stinger), MIM-23 Hawk surface-to-air missiles, flak, and fighter jets armed with air-to-air missiles.
Passive Defense
Though active defense measures are conspicuous and attract much attention, passive defense measures are less expensive and can provide certain degree of protection for civilians. Passive defense involves measures taken to posture vital assets to reduce vulnerability and minimize the effects of a missile attack. The measures are taken to
4,7
Note that this is only one of the many tools available for path prediction. There are alternative methods that can yield different solutions. Simply put, force planning and deployment involves more art than science.
Page 5
warn the military force and the general public, reduce enemy targeting effectiveness, enhance personnel and equipment survivability, and recover and reconstitute after attack.
8
When we discuss passive defense, questions such as the ones below will inevitably be raised: What level of protection does Taiwan need? Does it want to further protect the military forces that are somewhat protected? Or does it simply want to address the psychological preparedness issue among the civilians? Answers to these questions may not be intuitive, though they are obviously connected to the distribution of
defense resources. As Taiwan adopts the “no first strike” doctrine, one of the primary purposes for passive defense is to maintain an assured second-strike capability. For example, military installations may use camouflage, emission control, thermal masking, and other techniques to avoid being detected and targeted by PLA’s reconnaissance assets.
As such, Taiwan can deploy feint, decoys and operations security (OPSEC) measures to induce confusion as to whether a site is an actual target. Additionally, China's counter-C 2, operations can be made less effective by Taiwan's employment of system redundancy. For example, if half of the communication bandwidth is sufficient for operational purposes, the communications systems can sustain 50 percent interdiction.
Countermeasures can be explained by introducing how the guidance component in a LACM functions. A LACM’s in-flight guidance typically relies on inertial navigation systems (INS) using gyroscopes to ascertain the missile’s position. A long-range LACM requires supplemental information, such as terrain contour matching (TERCOM) and Global Positioning System (GPS), to make up for inherent INS’s inaccuracy. China’s missiles are known to strap GPS, Russian GLONASS, and/or its indigenous Twin Star satellite positioning receivers. The U.S. Tomahawk also uses an
additional set of precise terminal navigation updates known as the digital scene matching area correlator (DSMAC), a two-dimensional, map-matching concept that employs an onboard sensor to obtain a sequence of images of the ground slightly ahead of the missile.
Among all these guidance technologies, gyroscope is a self-enclosed unit and probably the most difficult to interfere from outside of the missile. Its cumulative drift, 8 As required by the U.S. FM 100-12 titled “Army Theater Missile Defense Operations,” planning for passive defense should begins with a comprehensive TMD intelligence preparation of the battlespace
(IPB) that defines the battlefield environment, describes the battlefield’s effects, evaluates the threat, and determines threat courses of actions.
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moreover, does not make it an attractive candidate to interfere. Satellite positioning unit receives updates from radio frequency (RF) signal and is susceptible to jamming. In fact, the electromagnetic energy radiating from a cellular phone is powerful enough to jam the U.S. GPS signal which is measured at only 10 -5 watts on the ground.
TERCOM and DSMAC units can both be dealt with by employing carefully planned thermal sources and large balloon edifices to confuse the matching/correlation algorithms in LACM’s onboard computers. Again, tools such as dynamic programming and optimization can be employed to perfect the deployment of feintand decoys.
Measures for passive defense are in fact risk-management strategies that first requires an intimate knowledge of the missions, services, and assets that need to be protected. Military planners can develop a set of survivable scenarios to verify the soundness of strategies and corresponding measures. Subsequently, passive defense depends not only on the engineering disciplines, but also on scenario-driven “what-if” analyses
and contingency planning. Therefore, passive defense depends at least as much upon the risk management skills of an organization as it does upon the technical expertise.
Attack Operations: Counterforce
U.S. FM 100-12 states that “to create a coherent Army theater missile defense, active defense operations must complement passive defense, attack operations, and C4I.” Consequently, Taiwan should probably emphasize more on air offensive operations and on unconventional warfare, such as Special Operations (SPOPS), to neutralize missile launch sites and airbases in China. Special operations may also serve as an
important cornerstone of Taiwan’s deterrent. Without sufficient long-range strike assets, the special force may be the only way to strike targets while minimizing collateral damages. Such doctrinal shift from the country’s traditionally defensive thinking will require at least two elements: near real-time reconnaissance intelligence and long-range precision strike assets. In recent years, high-resolution commercial satellite imagery offers much more detailed information than is currently available from the LANDSAT and Spot systems.
The two major military benefits from commercial imagery are (1) the ability to better visualize the battlefield, and (2) precision targeting of weapons. With computer-aided photo-interpretation, laborious tasks such as precise location, target identification, and change detection can be accomplished more easily. Moreover, mission planning, route 6
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planning, and air defense penetration, which are essential to successful air strike operations, can be carried out more swiftly. As such, Taiwan is taking advantage of the orbital space, which is rapidly becoming
commercialized. The country reportedly has an agreement with the Israel Aircraft Industries to acquire 1.8-meter resolution imagery from its EROS-1 satellite and is authorized to fully control the satellite whenever it flies within 1,000 km of the ground station.
9
Ikonos satellite from Space Imaging also offers Taiwan 1-meter
panchromatic and 4-meter multi-spectral imagery. 10 In order to exploit the benefits from space reconnaissance, Taiwan is planning to launch a remote sensing satellite offering less than 2-meter resolution imagery by the end of 2003. 11 Though 1.5-meter resolution is sufficient for general identification for most military targets, revisit time of the above-mentioned satellites—ranging from 1.5 days to 3 days, will make it difficult to keep track of enemy’s movement in the battlefield.
Therefore, Taiwan may attempt to maximize the advantages of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence to combat aircraft for post-launch neutralization of missile sites. From reconnaissance UAVs, ships are not hard to spot; airfields and concentration of ground troops are unlikely to escape destruction in the face of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) furnished with precise
spatial and temporal information. As proved in Iraq and in Kosovo, PGMs can effectively convert a target's visibility into demise. Because most Chinese logistics facilities and C 2 centers are not well camouflaged, they seem vulnerable to precision strikes.
Conclusion: Counter-Value?
A reasonable assumption is that, unlike many Third World regimes, the current Chinese leadership values the Chinese population and economy. China’s economy, like most around the world, requires a labor force and industrial base to produce and sustain national power. China’s urban centers in the coastal regions have become even 9
Taiwan Plugs Into Eros A1, SAT News Asia, August 15, 2001, available at
http://www.satnewsasia.com/Stories/539.html
10
Taiwan Taps Into Private US Spy Satellite, Space Daily, April 30, 2000, available at
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-00w.html
11
Taiwan in October 1991 launched a 15-year space program at an estimated cost of US$560 million. Its first fully-owned satellite ROCSAT-1 went into orbit in January 1999. Its second satellite, named
ROCSAT-2, would be sent into orbit in late 2003. Although Taipei insisted it would be designed for scientific research, its imaging payload implies its potential for military applications. Taiwan also aims to put into orbit six micro-satellites weighing about 40 kilograms each for meteorological missions.
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more vital to the nation’s focal points of industrial and economic development. Therefore, Taiwan can base its deterrent strategy, in part, on a threat to destroy a significant portion of China’s prosperous and productive coastal region, such as Shanghai and Hong Kong. Nonetheless, since weapons in Taiwan’s possession are largely “defensive” in nature—lacking range, lethality, and precision, China may not
be able to determine the magnitude of Taiwan’s deterrence based on conventional weapons.
Consequently, longer-range precision-strike LACM may be one of the solutions Taiwan can and should pursue. Taiwan's military-industrial complex has demonstrated its capabilities to develop ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. By some estimates, a LACM without TERCOM costs only 30% of a ballistic missile and 70% with TERCOM. The cost-effectiveness of a LACM seems rather appealing. With Taiwan’s world-class electronics industry, engineers will find integrating sub-components such
as gyroscopes, radar altimeter, laser range-finder, solid-state accelerometer, GPS receiver, digital servo, and electro-optical sensor into a LACM guidance system not difficult. Though converting satellite imagery into digital terrain model and designing flexible pattern matching algorithms for embedded TERCOM and DSMAC is more challenging, commercially available software tools will make the engineering task
within reach of an R&D institution.
So the remaining question may be why Taiwan has yet to field any LACMs. One reasonable explanation is the propulsion system. The country’s mechanical engineering industry does not seem adequate to produce fuel-efficient engines with high thrust-to-weight ratio comparable to Williams Research’s F107-WR-101 turbofan engine used in American AGM-86B/C/D cruise missile or Microturbo TRI 60-30 turbofan engine used in British Storm Shadow conventionally armed stand-off cruise missile (CASOM). The fact that only a handful of countries can manufacture
this type of engine proves how formidable the challenge is. Nonetheless, if offensive operation is a critical pillar of missile defense, Taiwan will have to put emphasis on the yet-to-be-defined doctrine and come up with “creative means” to overcome the technological obstacle.
For ships or DDG they can use an active radar seeker. However, they will seriously need RT info for attacking mobile strike columns etc... as you have pointed out.Leonard wrote:
That would WORK only for STATIC targets ....!!!
If they plan to attack Mobile Strike Columns, RAPIDs, etc etc they do need REAL-TIME Sat info.
What about Battle Ships, Subs to DDG, etc etc --- these need Real-Time Stuff ...
Note ---> Most MIL units are in Hardened Shelters --- > Only Civilian, and Industrial Targets would be HVT., for using the JIHADI Doctrine.
I don't have time to read trough the whole thread but I have some questions that may be redundant:
Pakeeland doesn't have the resources to build such a missile not even from a wrecked US cruise missile.
So where did they get it from?
Are we still certain given the testing of this missile, that the Pakees do not have control of their nukes anymore?
Pakeeland doesn't have the resources to build such a missile not even from a wrecked US cruise missile.
So where did they get it from?
Are we still certain given the testing of this missile, that the Pakees do not have control of their nukes anymore?
The telegraph, 13 Aug. , 2005
Anyway whats the GOI reaction to this test?
The name Samar Mubarak Mand is a clear link to China. He is the main guy with respect to nukes, missles and anything else.September date for Babur
IMTIAZ GUL
Islamabad, Aug. 12: Pakistan will begin serial production of its first locally-developed ground-launched cruise missile Babur from September, a media report said today.
The nuclear-capable Babur or Hatf VII, which was test-fired for the first time yesterday from the newly-developed missile testing range in southwestern Baluchistan province, can hit a target 500 km away with pinpoint accuracy.
The missiles will be handed over to the armed forces with the commencement of their serial production, Samar Mubarakmand, the chairman of the National Engineering and Scientific Commission of Pakistan, told The News.
Pakistani scientists have already handed over different types of short- and medium-range missiles, including the Hatf III (Ghaznavi), Hatf IV (Shaheen-1) and Hatf V (Ghauri), to the Pakistan Army’s Strategic Force Command.
The country began test-firing versions of short- and medium-range missile in 1998 with the nuclear-capable Ghauri missile, which can hit targets up to 1,500 km. Mubarakmand, who heads the missile development programme, said Babur landed on its target in the southwestern Baluchistan province with an accuracy of centimetres.
“Pakistan joined a select group of countries which have the capability to design and develop cruise, by conducting Babur’s test,” said an official statement issued yesterday after the test.
Pakistani officials and scientists were upbeat over their latest achievement, but the Japanese government regretted the test-fire. “The government of Japan regrets the test-fire,” said a statement issued by the Japanese embassy in Islamabad today, adding Tokyo hoped that Pakistan will sincerely respond to the efforts of the international community aimed at promoting disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
The statement comes a day after Pakistan Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz concluded his official four-day visit to the country, which restored its Official development Assistance package of approximately $500 million dollars for Islamabad in March. The package had been suspended after Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998.
Anyway whats the GOI reaction to this test?
Ramana,
May be TSP's ballistic missiles have doubtful accuracy or reliability.
Nuclear bombast could also be meant to show that they have another way to hit India with nukes even if India gets an anti ballistic-missile capability courtesy uncle.
May be TSP's ballistic missiles have doubtful accuracy or reliability.
Nuclear bombast could also be meant to show that they have another way to hit India with nukes even if India gets an anti ballistic-missile capability courtesy uncle.
Last edited by Kumar on 13 Aug 2005 03:02, edited 1 time in total.
China's New Strategic Cruise Missiles: From the Land, Sea and Air
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by Richard Fisher, Jr.
Published on June 3rd, 2005
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by Richard Fisher, Jr.
Published on June 3rd, 2005
ARTICLES
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LOTs of Pictures ...
...
LACM Development
China has long employed cruise missiles for naval attack missions, building three families of anti-ship missiles. These include two series of anti-ship missiles which derive from the early pioneering Soviet P-21 STYX anti-ship missile developed in the late 1950s. One series starts with the small (Hai Ying-HY) HY-1, basically a copy of the STYX, and extends to longer range rocket and turbojet powered variants. For example, the (Ying Ji-YJ) YJ-6 is an air-launched variant with 100km and 200km range versions. The (Fei Long-FL) FL series includes subsonic and supersonic rocket powered anti-ship missiles. There are indications that there are air-launched versions of this missile as well. A third family is based on technology obtained from French Exocet anti-ship missiles and include ship, submarine and air launched versions of the rocket-powered 40km range YJ-81 (C-801) and the 120km range turbojet-powered YJ-82 (C-802). There are reports of a development of this missile called the YJ-83 with a 250km air-launched range. This missile, plus a version of the YJ-6 may be equipped with terminal seekers to enable precision ground attack. The submarine launched versions of the YJ-81 and YJ-82 are launched via canister, and thus provide a technological base for future submarine launched LACMs.
The C-802 is an turbojet-powered anti-ship missile that is not co-produced in Iran. Credit: RD Fisher
This model of the sub-launched version of the C-802 was distributed at the 2004 Zhuhai Airshow. It demonstrates that the PLA has mastered capsule launch technology which it can also use to launch LACMs from its submarines.
PLA interest in strategic cruise missiles dates back to the 1970s, when the U.S. and the former Soviet Union began developing these long-range, accurate and relatively inexpensive weapons. The Chinese believe there is a 9:1 defense-offense cost ratio advantage for developing and maintaining cruise missiles over the cost of defending against them.[2] LACMs also cost about one third the price of a short-range ballistic missile. The successful U.S. employment of non-nuclear aircraft and ship-launched cruise missiles during the 1990 war against Iraq spurred more intensive development by the China Aerospace Corporation�s Third Academy, the chief designer/producer of Chinese cruise missiles.[3] The Third Academy has since moved under the management of the China Aerospace Industries Corporation (CASIC), formed after 1998 to promote competition within the PLA weapons sector.
The PLA has invested heavily in all aspects of cruise missile design, guidance, and power plants. According to Third Academy officials a future Chinese cruise missile will have multiple guidance systems, like terrain-following (TERCOM) and satellite navigation systems[4] that will enable very high accuracy. In the late 1980s Third Academy engineers produced a study on combining guidance systems for cruise missiles. In 2002 these officials noted that they had mastered TERCOM technology long ago.[5] Their apparent success in mastering this complex technology is a testament to the priority and resources devoted toward LACM development.
By the late 1980s the Third Academy was testing experimental LACMs like the X-600, pictures of which were revealed in 1999.[6] Other unconfirmed Chinese reports indicate the PLA developed, and even fielded initial versions of LACMs in the mid 1990s.[7] Some sources call this LACM series "Hong Niao," though the most recent PLA LACM is referred to as the "Dong Hai," or DH-10. Internet source photos of purported LACM transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) indicate that land-based version will use truck platforms. Their light weight allows for air-transport should the PLA demand rapid and long-distance deployment. New LACMs are also expected to be launched by PLA Air Force bombers, like new versions of the Xian H-6 and by the PLA Navy�s new Type 093 nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN).
This picture, which emerged on Chinese television in the late 1990s, is believed to be the X-600, a test bed for LACM development that may have flown in the early 1990s. Credit: CCTV
According to various reports, the range for new PLA LACMs extends from 1,200km up to 4,000km. And like PLA short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), new LACMs can be expected to be armed with a variety of warheads. These could include tactical nuclear warheads, high explosive, thermobaric or directed energy warheads. The later might include high power microwave (HPM) warheads, which have received great attention by the PLA.[8]
To guide and target its LACMs the PLA is investing in multiple reconnaissance and navigation systems that will eventually allow global LACM employment. Targeting against Taiwan will soon be assisted by new medium range unmanned reconnaissance aircraft in development. The PLA is also building new Russian-designed electro-optical and radar satellites to provide "realtime" imagery of prospective targets. PLA LACMs are expected to use Russian GLONASS or European GALILEO navigation satellites to provide continuous navigation signals that will enable pin-point strike accuracy comparable to the U.S. TOMAHAWK. China is a "full partner" in the European Galileo navigation satellite constellation, which may be operational by the 2008 to 2009 time frame. By this time the PLA is also expected to have lofted its first Russian-designed high resolution electro-optical and radar satellites.
China has invested heavily in space and airborne surveillance systems that will provide global targeting data for new LACMs.These include new radar satellites, new electro-optical satellites and new UAV reconnaissance systems. Credit: RD Fisher
In early 2003 the first Chinese-source picture emerged to confirm the direction of PLA LACM development. While the picture showed only a partial LACM fuselage and wing assembly in a stress-testing rig, it confirmed the PLA LACM�s broad similarity to U.S. and Russian LACM designs. Chinese press reports note that in early August 2004 a test for a "new missile" capable of "extreme precision" was attended by none other than Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan, who as former Director of the Central Military Commission�s General Armament Department, would have exercised leadership over cruise missile developments during most of the last decade.[9] Other reports note this was a test for a new strategic cruise missile, or what is referred to as the DH-10.[10] These reports at least add credence to Taiwan intelligence statements that the PLA�s deployment of LACMs is imminent.
This is the clearest picture available from open sources indicating the progress the PLA has made in developing a modern LACM. This shows a fuselage and wing assembly in a stress testing rig, and the picture is probably from a brochure from the testing organization. It confirms earlier estimation that a PLA LACM will bear a distinct resemblence to current US and Russian LACMs. Source: via Internet
Foreign Cruise Missile Technology Sources
The broad similarity of the 2003 picture of a PLA cruise missile and existing U.S. and Russian designs is not surprising given the intense PLA effort to acquire foreign cruise missile technology over the last 15 years.
Russian and Ukraine From Russia and the Ukraine the PLA has obtained substantial modern cruise missile technology. In 1997 sources in Taiwan reported that Russia had marketed its Kh-65SE cruise missile in China.[11] At the time this was alarming because the Kh-65 was a proposed short-range version of the Kh-55 (AS-15 �Kent�) 3,000 km-range strategic cruise missile. The Kh-55 has been in Russian service since 1984 as a nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile. They have the same inertial and terrain-following guidance but the latter may also have GLONASS satellite navigation capability.[12] It was feared that from the Kh-65SE China could obtain several technologies to build Tomahawk-like cruise missiles with potentially as much tactical flexibility. China would gain much desired cruise missile design, engine, fuel and guidance technology.
But it has recently been revealed that these fears became even more real. According to Ukrainian investigators, in April 2000 Ukrainian defense officials, assisted by Russian, sold China at least 6 Kh-55 LACMs[13] out of hundreds left in the Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union. Revelations last February held that former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma knew of but concealed knowledge of this sale.[14] However, some sources believe there is a good possibility that Ukrainian officials sold more than just 6 Kh-55s to China. Between 1980 and 1987 over 1,000 Kh-55s were produced in Kharkiv. In addition, the Kh-55�s R95-300 turbofan engine was also produced in the Ukraine.[15] Besides technical information about the Kh-55 the Ukrainians may be a source of design advice, inasmuch as they have reportedly developed a new version of the Kh-55. Called the Korshun, this Kh-55 development features a fixed engine at the end of the fuselage, versus the Kh-55�s podded engine which deployed under the rear fuselage.[16] As such, the Korshun offers advantages of simplicity and proves that Ukrainian engineers have the competence to assist in many aspects of LACM design.
The AS-15 is a Soviet era strategic LACM. The Ukraine is believed to have sold 6 or maybe more AS-15s to China in 2000. However, the Ukraine has modified this LACM, raising the possibility of having sold China more than just the missiles. Access to AS-15 technologies would have provided the PLA LACM with a crucial boost. Credit: via Internet
In addition, there are reports that the PLA has purchased the Russian Novator 3M-14E[17], a recently revealed land-attack version of the 300km range 3M-14E1 anti-ship missile. This missile is part of the "CLUB-S" package for China�s new batch of eight KILO 636M submarines. This is a cruise missile that while smaller, resembles the U.S. TOMAHAWK in shape, and is small enough to be launched from a standard 533mm torpedo tube. It uses navigation satellite signals for mid-course guidance and a radar for terminal attack.[18] Use of a radar for guidance pre-supposes the user has detailed three-dimensional imagery-derived digital data on the target.
It is possible that Novator would sell China considerable technical expertise as part of any weapon sales package, which might then be applied to Chinese-designed LACMs. But in the 3M-14E the PLA would not gain only an actual weapon for use against Asian land-based targets, including US and allied forces, it would also gain considerable experience in applying Russian operational and targeting doctrine and tactics. Novator is also marketing a land-based version of the 3M-14E which carries seven missiles per TEL vehicle. However, China�s reluctance to purchase Russian SRBMs like the Iskander-E may point to a similar reluctance to purchase a land-based version of the 3M-14E while China is investing heavily in its own LACM programs.
Novator's new LACM is reported to have been sold to China, initially to arm new KILO submarines that will soon arrive in China. This LACM also comes in a ground-launched version, shown here. Credit: RD Fisher
Israel In 1995 Flight International reported that China was providing funding to develop an air-launched cruise missile based on the TAAS DELILAH anti-radiation attack-drone.[19] The report noted also that China would be a customer for the new cruise missile. Reports of this co-development program persist though no official or unofficial statements confirm that China has yet received the cruise missile product of this cooperation. TAAS began promoting a warhead-equipped version as a stand-off cruise missile in 1995.[20] It is reported that a deep-penetrating warhead is being developed for the new Chinese version of the DELILAH.[21] In is also noteworthy that the U.S. Navy may buy a version of the DELILAH to arm helicopters.
In the early to mid-1990s Israel is reported to have sold to China some aspect of its then new DELILAH anti-radar missile, which was subsequently developed into a LACM.
The DELILAH is reportedly based on the Northrop MQM-74 Chukar target drone which first flew in 1965. It has been in Israeli service since the late 1980s as an anti-radar system. It is powered by a Williams Co. J400-WR-401 turbojet engine, producing 170 lbs of thrust.[22] Larger Williams Co. turbojets also power the longer-range TOMAHAWK and Air Force ALCMs. Versions of the DELILAH are equipped with aircraft-simulating features and electronics to trigger enemy radar transmissions, which are then located and attacked with ECM or chaff. If the DELILAH has been acquired by the PLA, it would have provided a new electronic attack weapon and another source of potentially useful cruise missile technologies. If, as reported, the PLA funded the development of later versions, it is logical to assume that the PLA was given those technologies. It is possible that the PLA would have benefited in the areas of design, engines, fuel, and guidance.
United States In addition the PLA has aggressively sought American cruise missile technology in the form of U.S. TOMAHAWK cruise missiles, or parts thereof, lost during conflicts in Iraq, Bosnia and Afghanistan.[23] Both Saddam Hussein and the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan are believed to have traded U.S. TOMAHAWK parts to China in exchange for military and diplomatic support. Other types of U.S. technology may be aiding China�s cruise missile program. There are also reports that the PLA has converted U.S.-made Boeing 737 transport aircraft to support new strategic cruise missile testing. At least one report notes that the U.S. is investigating the possibility that the conversion of the Boeing 737 for military purposes represents an illegal diversion of U.S. technology, which could lead to economic sanctions against China.[24]
This is the latest version of the U.S. Navy's TOMOHAWK LACM. The PLA is suspected of having purchased parts of destroyed TOMOHAWKs from several countries to which they have been delivered in the last 15 years. Credit: RD Fisher
Arun, should'nt it be possible to easily reverse engineer a target drone like the Chukar into a cruise missile? This is what Israel did with the Northrop Chukar-I IAF and got the Delilah. With the Chukar-III, you could acheive something between 600 and 1000 km. The IN and IAF should still operate Chukar-IIs. (looks very similar to the Tomahawk)
The lethality of the Baa..bur would depend on onboard navigation systems. Even so, a primitive cruise missile would be the most important packistani acquistion ever, barring their ballistic missile capability.
The lethality of the Baa..bur would depend on onboard navigation systems. Even so, a primitive cruise missile would be the most important packistani acquistion ever, barring their ballistic missile capability.
Did the Brahmos give India a covert, deniable counter-terror capability (as in covert attack of a freedom fighter camp or a healing meeting of the faithfulramana wrote:Whats the point of the TSP bombast that it can carry any payload? Has TSP finally scored self goal?
) if India so intended (of course, hell might freeze over before this is ever implemented)?If yes, isn't TSP clearly pre-empting that by saying "since my CM can carry nukes, I will assume so does yours"? An excellent goal to achieve?