Light Tanks for the Indian Army

[Michael]

I'm all for the idea of having a larger number of light vehicles armed with a good AT missile like the Nag or Milan. <P>When I was in the US Army, in an anti-tank unit, we used a lightly armored version of the HUMVEE utility vehicle (if you don't know what a HUMVEE is, picture a big, glorified Jeep with huge tires that runs on diesel instead of gasoline). Anyway, the HUMVEE was equipped with a TOW-2 missile launcher and carried six missiles in the back (seven if you left one loaded in the launcher). This was very cheap and very effective weapons system, costing only a tiny fraction of what a tank like the M1A1 costs. The TOW had greater range than the main gun of any MBT and the HUMVEE was very robust and easy to maintain compared to any tracked vehicle. And the HUMVEE, while not able to smash through larger trees like a tank, was still very good at getting through difficult terrain. <P>The main limitation was the smoke signature created when you fire a missile. An enemy tanker might see the puff of smoke, and lay down fire around to throw off your aim before the missile can get to the target (the TOW is wire-guided, you have to keep the crosshairs on the target until impact). This is the theory, anyway, in practice an enemy tank commander is very good if he notices a puff of smoke from over a mile away and successfully directs his gunner in time. In real combat conditions, small, mobile anti-tank units using Milans, TOW's, and Saggers mounted on trucks and jeeps have proven very effective in the Libya-Chad wars in the 80's, the '73 Yom Kippur War, and Desert Storm. <P>Anyway, I'd like to see light anti-tank units in the IA, comprised of some kind of good 4x4 utility vehicle with a mounted Milan-II. These kinds of light anti-tank units are very good for defense, or for overwatching advancing armored formations. And the Milan-II will blow away a T-80U easily. Replace the Milan-II with a fire-and-forget AT missile that uses smokeless propellent, and you've got a very cost-effective and deadly little system. <p>[This message has been edited by Michael Baxter (edited 06-11-1999).]

[vram]

Baxter,<P>the Nag does everything that you say a anti-tank guided missile should do and better. It is far superior to the TOW, it is a top attack, fire and forget missile with tandem warhead. No wire to worry about.<P>Gobind, Janes featured a russian mobile rocket launcher recently, quite similar to what you describe. The rocket launcher is placed on a tank chassis. the problem with the Arjun gun is that it is rifle bored, so you can't launch any missiles from it.

[Sukumar]

Gobind, good points. The American M-551 Sheridan, the Russian PT-76 and the French AMX-13 embody the philosophy of being light and highly mobile tanks.<P>The Russians with their latest tanks the T-72 to T-90 have also adopted the same philosophy. The T-72 for example is much lighter than any of the western MBTs, has a very low profile and is highly mobile. The T-72's strength is not in its armor but its lightfooted mobility. Both the Russians and the Swedes have been experimenting with turretless tanks for an even lower profile.<P>The US Army had an Armored Gun System (AGS), the M8 on its design boards to replace the Sheridan. This was supposed to have been a light tank with aluminum and composite armor, capable of launching shells as well as missiles. It got cancelled due to budgetary reasons.<P>I do agree that the days of the tank are getting numbered on a highly mobile, digitally networked battlefield. The future will belong to chopper gunships (the aerial tanks), troop transport choppers, fast & light low profile smart weapon launchers, to build very agile but well armed units backed up by IW and electronic force multipliers.<P>The US 101st Air Assault Division is one such unit in evolution. Its objectives are to be able to push a brigade sized unit up to 150 miles in a day. This kind of mobility is unsurpassed. In Desert Storm, the 101st moved east <I>across</I> the XVIII and VII corps advance towards Basra to swing the gate shut. Such a move had never been tried before.<BR><p>[This message has been edited by R Sukumar (edited 07-11-1999).]

[Kuttan]

From the AE perspective: <P>Tank = Target.<P>Jeep = small target.<P>Humvee = target with more bodies inside.<P>Of course the "AE perspective" is rather transient, because <P>Helicopter = Future wreckage.

[Sukumar]

I was wondering what the hell an AE was among the vast compendium of military terms. Then I figured it stood for Aerospace Engineers.<P>So now I guess we oughta think of just space based wreckage !!

[Kuttan]

In any future war, the side with a large number of helicopters will massacre the side with large numbers of tanks etc. No contest. Tanks may shoot missiles at helicopters, and hit them with high frequency, but every infrared signature of a tank firing is one more stationary or slow-moving target for the other helicopters' missiles and cannon. Helicopters can stay hidden below tree level and just pop up for reconnaissance and firing cannon. In the near future, such helicopters may also be unmanned, so they can carry larger payload and be deployed in larger numbers. <P>Its basically a waste of people and money to go build more "advanced" tanks. Jeeps, OK, Humvees, maybe, to scare infantry, but tanks are a waste.

[Michael]

narayanan - I wouldn't fully agree that tanks are useless on the modern battlefield. There is nothing in the world that can stand before a full assault of an American armored division. On the right terrain, the shock effect of a well executed armored attack is hard to appreciate unless you see it in execution. What's important on the modern battlefield is that an armored thrust be overwatched by gunships with CAS aircraft and artillery on call at a moment's notice. When handled properly (ie: not sending tanks into cities, swamps, etc) armor is still a very decisive weapon on the modern battlefield. And when you supplement armored formations with a large number of small, cheap anti-tank vehicles with longer range, your armor will do even better. I could go into a long explanation of how the tactics work but suffice to say, properly supported armored divisions can really tear through tough enemy defenses and wreak serious havoc.

[Sukumar]

Michael, I assume you are referring to the performance of the US heavy divisions in Desert Storm.<P>To be fair, it was not just the heavy divisions alone, but the combined arms effect of air superiority, information superiority, intelligence superiority, technological superiority, tactical surprise and strategy that helped them win.<P>A US heavy division without this combined arms support can be made mincemeat of.<P>To reinforce the point, one of the big winners of the Storm was the AH-64 Apache and its effectiveness as a strike weapon. Today's gunships are aerial artillery/tanks which are highly mobile.

[Johann]

The Sheridan was a failure, though much of that has to do with the difficulties over the Shillelagh gun fired missile; the PT-76 is a death trap; it can't stop anything more than 7.62mm rounds.<P>I'd say better examples would be the LAV, MOWAG , and Panhard variants and some of those excellent South African bush fighting wheeled vehicles with 90mm-105mm armed traversible turrets. Much of this has to do with what you want to do with you're forces, and whom you're facing, and the terrain you will be working with. <P> ATGW's are great equalizers, but your vehicle must be able to survive common light infantry weapons such as .50 cals and lightweight anti tank weapons such as RPG-7's or even a Carl Gustaf MAW-64 if it is to have any value whatsoever. <P><BR> The US Army is looking into transitioning into a wheeled 'medium' force because it is expeditionary in nature and the frequency with which it has had to deploy has shown that the M1s/Bradleys are too logistically demanding to put down in force on the timescale they'd like, and the Air Force has basically told them that it given the limit's of strategic airlift, the Army is going to have to redesign it's vehicles and asociated support systems to fit better if wants to improve OPTEMPO.<P> In India's case, it's facing an armour heavy foe, and has few all weather/night attack anti armour attack helicopters, and is unlikely to get more soon. The IAF alone cannot be relied upon to stem an armoured thrust. In short it needs it's Main Battle Tanks until those other factors change<P> Narayanan, few people are going to be able to afford the Commanche, or even the AH-64D in numbers that will make them effective. We know the limits of the Ah-64A, we saw them in Kosovo where they were unable to operate except without significant support. Besides which, even the Commanche despite it's tremendous array of advanced technologies depends on 'seeing' while not being 'seen'. That state of affairs can and will change as sensors and counter measures see saw for advantage. The Commanche isn't going to stay invisible for ever, and when sensors regain the edge the air defence environment will become far too hostile for the Commanche unless air superiority is gained and enemy air defences are thoroughly supressed.<P> As in Kosovo, unless you have forces to draw your enemy out, any competant commander will do the sensible thing and go to ground with visual and EM camouflage. Those forces are going to need to defend themselves from all sorts of nasty munitions out there, popping out of the sky and earth. You're still going to need MBT's, just nowhere as many as before. <p>[This message has been edited by Johann (edited 08-11-1999).]

[Sukumar]

Qquincy, this is what the BR Army ORBAT page has to say:<P>• T-55: 13 regts. @ 55 tanks each, (700+) with L7/105mm gun + Vijayanta standard upgrade<BR>• T-72M1: 35 regts. @ 55 tank each, (1900+) upgrade program to T-72S standard in progress<BR>• Vijayanta: 14 regts. @ 72 tanks each, (1000+) upgraded with FCS and night fighting<BR>equipment<P>AFAIK, an Indian Armd regt has 45 tanks in three squadrons (15 each). Then there are attrition reserves typically of 10-15 tanks.<P>Johann, wheeled turreted vehicles may be great for the S African Veldt, but in the plains of Punjab, flooded by the Pakis these would bog down and become sitting ducks (literally).<P>Light, fast, low profiled, tracked tanks with good sensors and carrying smart weapons like laser guided shells, missiles etc supported by gunships are the way to go. That has been the general trend in tank design over the last few years also. The 70 ton M-1 will be the last heavy tank.<P>As I like to say, for any tank with any anount of armor, there will be a shell or missile to pierce it. A lesson only too well learnt by the battleship afficionados in WWII.

[Johann]

The last MBT? it will probably be the Black Shark if the Russians can scrape the funds together to complete the project.<P> Certainly in the west the LeClerc is likely to be the last from-scratch-new-design MBT. However given how much money has been sunk into them, and given their lead, it will take at least 25-30 years for them to cycle out of the inventory, which means you're going to see them engaged in any major land operation for the medium future. <P> You are likely to see the MBT remaining the TO & E of the FSU, Asian and African nations for even longer, unless the price of smart artillery and smart battlefield rockets, utility and attack helicopters decline dramatically. The most irresistable assaults in terms off speed and firepower will continue to be mutually supporting mechanised infantry and MBTs. The best way to kill an MBT other than Engineers is another MBT.<P> Yes I agree, the mobility of wheeled vehicles is inferior to tanks but not significantly so except for the very worst mud, snow and shifting sand, but if a force was trying to transition to a lighter force, wheeled vehicles would be important inkeeping down cost and optimising a force for urban and bush combat (Lahore? Karachi? Rajasthan?)

[Sukumar]

I said the M-1 would be the last heavy tank, no more 70 ton monsters. I am sure more MBTs are to follow from all the major powers. However, they will be lighter, low profile, fast and agile, carrying a variety of weapons including smart munitions - like the M-8 AGS which got cancelled.<P>Lahore is the theater where Pakistan has built an extensive canal network which can be used both as anti-tank defenses and flooding the flat plains around. The desert sands of Rajasthan are a killer on the tyres of wheeled armored vehicles. The marshes to the east of Karachi would bog down anything not on tracks.<P>Wheeled vehicles are good for running on roads and the flat South African Veldt. Maybe the UK too , but that's it. Plus they cant keep up with tracked vehicles in rough terrain. Very hard lesson learnt from WWII.<p>[This message has been edited by R Sukumar (edited 10-11-1999).]

[abhischekcc]

I remember , in the anti-militancy operations in Punjab , KPS Gill had used armour plated tractors to chase militants in the sugar cane fields .<BR> The tractor is a very capable vehicle for traversing rough and uneven terrain , and , <BR>obviously , can also carry heavy loads . <BR>IMO , the tractor is better suited , at least for Indian conditions , as as anti-tank weapon platform .<BR>What do you guys think ?

[S Bajwa]

<BR>Johann, wheeled turreted vehicles may be great for the S African Veldt, but in the plains of Punjab, flooded by the Pakis these would bog down and become sitting ducks (literally).<BR><P>If Pakistan tries to flood the plains of Punjab it is itself going to get drowned. The best strategy for India to stop a pakistan's conventional offensive is to hit Chakala Dam (on river Jhelum or Ravi and is about 150 kms from Indian border at Jammu) with couple of Prithvis, that will flood the whole plains of Punjab (at least upto Lahore, including Sialkote, etc), then unleash Chetaks and Cheetahs carrying their TOWS on the stranded Pakistani armoured columns.<P>It will not flood Indian punjabi plains at all (there are two canals and one river running right on the border with Pakistan, I think these canals were deliberetely made by Indian strategists to stop Pakistani advance and to drain excessive water, now if Pakistan decided to hit Bhakra Dam, then Cantonment at Jalandhar is at risk, Bhatinda, Chandigarh, and Ambala will totally escape the flood.<P>Indian long term strategy judging from the army positions and terrain, it looks like is to be on defensive at Punjab. While the real offense is offcourse across the Rajasthan border beyond the point where all Punjabi rivers are merged into one big river called indus.<P>Sandeep Singh Bajwa<BR>

[Sukumar]

If Pakistan tries to flood the plains of Punjab it is itself going to get drowned.<P>For a looong time now, Pakistan has built an extensive network of canals in the Lahore (Punjab) area. The strategy is two fold. The canals form obstacles to an Indian armored strike towards Lahore (and they did in the 65 war, effectively slowing XXX corps' advance). The second is that if an armored pincer succeeds, they'll blow up some small dams and flood the area making it a big marsh and the killing ground you speak of - but for Indian tanks.<P>The idea is not to flood any cities or the troops themselves (the rivers flow into Pakistan), but to make a marsh out of the plains there.

[Johann]

Gobind, Attack hellicopters don't always have to operate on their own or in far forward offensive operations alone. <P> NATO role in case of a Warsaw Pact invasion would have been as a speedy defensive reserve, to be committed in case of a armoured breakthrough. Tens of thousands of sites were presurveyed for use as cover. helicopters, most armed with roof mounted sights would perform pop-up attacks from behind cover, and duck down again, and move to the next piece of cover. Such tactics decreased the aerial and SHORADS threat significantly. 12 Lynxes, each with 8 TOWS/Hellfires (and more reloads aboard) with say a 3k line of sight could stop a Soviet armoured regiment in it's tracks, or at very least gain time for airmobile troops to be ferried in to dig in and act as positional defence. Such a strategy would cause any Pakistani 'Riposte' some serious problems.<P> Even offensively, as a divisional asset attack helicopters could be used in the anti-armour role with tank thrusts ahead of the FEBA, but within artillery range. They can even be used (if have enough to spare) in the Battlefield Air Interdiction role in concert with fixed wing attack craft for a one-two punch. AH-64/AH-1S operated in concert with A-10s; the choppers tagetted air defence vehicles first.<P> Most of these tactics will work on all except the flattest of terrain.

[Johann]

Sukumar, it is expected that the AGS will be revived (at least United Defense thinks so). <P> I think you're underestimting the capabilities of well designed wheeled vehicles. I have seen some truly phenomenal mobility from Humvees and Land Rovers over the worst terrain. If your vehicle has a good power to weight ratio, a modern suspension with good weight distribution characteristics, and plenty of torque you can do well just about anywhere. Modern features such as hydro-pneumatic suspension and centrally adjustable tyre pressure make a huge difference when it comes to traversing soft or boggy ground.<P> Tanks aren't always tearing across at their highest speed, especially not over bad terrain. Most scout vehicles, for whom speed is an important feature are in fact wheeled. Both the Canadians and the USMC have had excellent results with their MOWAG Piranha based variants in various extreme climes and terrain. If FIBUA, cost,low maintenance and transportability are factors, then wheels become an important option. Even most AGS procurement plans involved a mix of wheeled fighting vehicles. <BR><p>[This message has been edited by Johann (edited 14-11-1999).]

[shashidhar]

Hi GUYS,I would like to know if we have southern armoured divisions?Do we have a defence if attacked from peninsular area?We have concentrated armour on western front.Is the arjun tank a better alternative for the south and can the roads handle 'em?I fully supprt the diesel light tanks as MBTs in the desert.

[Michael]

Johann is right - rugged all terrain vehicles like the US HUMVEE and British Landrover with mounted ATGM's are very cheap, mobile, and deadly little platforms. They are also very easy to camoflauge, they use little fuel, and require only a fraction of the maintenence of a tank or APC. I admit, I may be a bit biased because manning an anti-tank HUMVEE variant was my job in the US Army (and a hell of a lot of fun, too!) but I really do think that light combat vehicles are underrated. <P>

[Johann]

As a matter of fact, I do think you are biased Michael <P> ATGMs mounted on vehicles like Land Rovers and Humvees unless in an urban environment are basically good for one, maybe two shots at most and then they have to get the hell out of there before they get hammered by heavy forces. They're just not survivable enough, and the dependance on cammo and the element of surprise means that they work best in a defensive environment. They're questionable in an NBC environment, they can't carry more than three to four reloads at most, and they need just as much infantry support as far more capable platforms such as APCs, IFV's and tanks<P><BR>Shashidhar,<P> The only source of an armoured threat in the peninsula would be an amphibious landing, so your first line of defense isn't going to be mech. or armoured formation but the IN. <P> Secondly, no one in Asia has the kind of amphibious assets you'd need for an operation like that along with the attendant air support it would need- except of course for the Americans who don't maintain those kinds of forces in theatre. India would have plenty of warning beforehand (and consequentally time to mobilise and deploy) if a naval amphibious task group of that size were to be assembled or set sail. If such a thing did actually happen, a faint to the south might actually be an interesting diversionary measure to tie down Indian naval, air and amy assets. <BR><p>[This message has been edited by Johann (edited 16-11-1999).]