Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

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Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Roop » 09 Feb 2002 09:02

Continuing from the previous thread.

Old Thread

As an add-on to Shiv's work in plotting the ranges of various Agni-2 variants against potential Chinese targets, I have done something similar for the new Agni-1 (assumed max range 800km). The following figures are derived from the distance-measuring tool in Microsoft Encarta World Atlas.

I have assumed two hypothetical launch points, as follows:

Launch Point 1 (LP1): Uttar Pradesh (roughly in the centre of the triangle formed by Dehra Dun, Roorkee, Rishikesh).

Launch Point 2 (LP2): Rajasthan (roughly bisecting the line joining Ajmer and Udaipur).

These LPs were picked because they are as far deep in the heart of India as possible while still keeping most potential Paki targets in range. They are typical examples, I’m sure others can come up with lots more. So:

Ranges from LP1: </font>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Rahim Yar Khan: 785km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Peshawar: 750km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Gilgit: 730km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Dera Ghazi Khan: 715km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Multan: 645km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Bahawalpur: 625km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Skardu: 625km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Islamabad: 620km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Sargodha: 560km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Gujranwala: 440km </font></li>
<font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Ranges from LP2: </font>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Sargodha: 760km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Karachi: 725km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Gujranwala: 720km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Lahore: 660km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Jacobabad: 650km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Hyderabad: 590km</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Multan: 580km </font></li>
<font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Some other interesting numbers: </font>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">If you assume a Launch Point somewhere in the Dibrugarh-Jorhat area, all of the Eastern and part of the Central Tibetan plateau are within 800km range.</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">If you assume a Launch Point in the Gauhati-Tezpur area, all of the Western and part of the Central Tibetan plateau are within 800km range.</font></li>
  • <font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">Bhuj to Gwadar is 800km.
    </font></li>
<font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">As far as Agni-1 is concerned, I have not attached a whole lot of importance to Karachi and Gwadar, as these will most likely be targeted from the sea. I have concentrated on potential inland targets in Sindh, Punjab and POK.

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby shiv » 09 Feb 2002 09:34

Back to Sunil's question from the old thread.<p>Did the Agni test really aggravate Pakistan more than previous tests or Naval missile tests?<p>Perhaps some clues here - though there is no reference to the Agni test - and sorry for cross posting again - but it's an interesting theory (never mind if it is correct or not)
http://www.thefridaytimes.com/ejaz.htm<p>I have been arguing (at length, in the old thread) that the Agni test did not really aggravate Pakistan that much and that they are merely giving a knee jerk response to anything from India.<p>But am I right in concluding that (and essentially disagreeing with Sunil)? <p>Extrapolating from the Ejaz article above it would seem that the Agni test was probably a definite step in upsetting the (alleged) Pakistani calculus of chronic aggravation backed by a nuclear threat. Perhaps the Agni test signals a real ability to deliver nukes from a distance as a retaliatory strike while widening the scope for India to wage a non nuclear battle before Pakistan gets a chance to escalate.<p>But that still does not explain why Pakistan did not react to the naval missile tests. Is it possible that they do not see Indian naval missiles as no nuclear threat?<p>Sunil?

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby krsai » 09 Feb 2002 09:45

Arun said it does not matter if it is 1500kms or 800kms.. meaning he was answering to my question that a longer range missile could be used for a shorter range. Given that and hoping Agni-2 could also be used against pakistan, what makes Agni-1 SR more fearing than Agni-2!?!? for the pakis. There is something else if Arunji is not wrong.<p>One should not forget the fact that the limited amount of ghoris and gaznis they claim to have if tested at a time almost "any time war" is like wasting mongie missiles just for jings.<p>A couple of more Agni tests, even though it is A3, say it is paki specific and the range is only 800 [spin doctring thru our famous ddm] can scare the crap out of these guys. :D

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Peeyoosh » 09 Feb 2002 12:26

Shiv<p>The rhetoric apart - anuclear war on teh subcontinent stands at the use of between 4-10 wepaons with a loss of life BELOW 125,000 on either side from direct impact. The "billion dead holucast" si pure drivel.<p>In my opinion Pakistan would be willing to take this as the worst case option, and they see India as unwilling too. Its unlikely India could build the delivery capabilty needed to raise this threshhold of destruction as:<p>The Prithvi IMHO is not a nuke delivery paltform -and is far too maintainnace intensive to field in large numbers.<p>Agni (2.5 Km/3.5 km.) in very lagre numbers would get all kinds of 3rd parties involved. Not just the PRC, but NATO too.<p>The short ranged Agni ;let us completely alter the calculus - 100 (or 200) of tehse could raise the threshhold of destruction to around 2-5 million people for PAk. without aggravating otehr states. Suddenly a nuclear struke has dimensions of annhilation.<p>Now how can Pakistan respond:<p>Lie low?<p>Build up its own nuke force - but given the "fear factor" about nukes in Pakistan - not just by the west but the RAPE class - can they afford it? DO they have teh money - if there defence budget is frozen - will they have to let conventional parity vanish?<p>Moreover in the case of a nuke exchange against land forces - now can they afford to take it to tyhe next level if there is a assymetry in the force strength.<p>On the sub launched nukes from India - they are yet to happen - and I definitely do NOT see a large froce structure being built up.<p>In my mind the Pakis see the new Agni as a precursor to abandoning the "minimum credible detrrent" theme and moving towrads MAD - a move they may not be able to match. They need "world opinion" to handle this for them! Lack of adverse comment from teh world may eb teh source of the angst.<p>Cheers<p>PEeyoosh

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Prasenjit Medhi » 09 Feb 2002 17:10

Peeyoosh says:<p> <blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr> The rhetoric apart - anuclear war on teh subcontinent stands at the use of between 4-10 wepaons with a loss of life BELOW 125,000 on either side from direct impact. The "billion dead holucast" si pure drivel.
<hr></blockquote><p>I was reading Varsha Bhosle's article on rediff and I came across a reference to BR, so I decided to visit and guess what? I got sucked right back in :) Glad to be back .. for a bit :) I'll be around for a while, just waiting on a license from good ole GOI. <p>While 4-10(why not 5-10?) might be a reasonable estimate for the number of boosted fission uranium based devices mated to warheads, that are accessible to Pakistan(about the same for India, and double that in the form of free fall bomb kits), I think the figure of 125,000 is going a bit too far on the lower side of things. Pakistan makes use of nuclear weapons only as a deterrent and does not forsee any battlefield use for these devices. Unless you include a kamikazi hypothetical where Pakistan decides to wipe out an Indian strike corps on the gates(suburbs) of Lahore, Pindi(and Islamabad).<p>Anyway, Pakistan launches 5-10 nukes at us with their Hatf, No Dong missiles. A single strike on a metropolitan center(Delhi, Bombay, Ahmedabad, Pune) in airburst detonation will cause 50-100,000 casualties almost immediately, each, due to impact, and due to fires. Human casualties due to fallout in the Delhi area and fallout carried subsequently downriver incase of airburst detonation, I dont want to even think about ..<p>125,000 is on the lower side. A single fission device will cause that much damage within hours. And given the inefficiency of the Indian state(sorry - have to be honest) thousands more will die from fires, exposure to fallout, consuming contaminated livestock, produce, even milk and water. A huge city like Delhi only has 5 large hospitals to deal with such a civil emergency. <p>The Indian response will cause more damage to Pakistan, no doubt. A 200kt airburst over Karachi will cause unimaginable devastation. Similar strikes on other cities in Pakistan will cause smaller but significant(read massive) loss of life. The loss to Pakistan's GDP will be immense. Their agricultural sector, dependant on irrigation largely, will be devestated by the effect of fallout carried from upriver sources. India also stands to lose a substantial chunk of national assets as measured in terms of percentage of GDP. Though a lot less than Pakistan, on a percentage basis<p>In any case, assume for an instant that the figure is 125,000 immediate losses from a nuclear exchange, and say about the same long term, one is talking about 10 Gujarat earthquakes. Even this unrealistically low figure is too dreadful to contemplate. As it should be. A country that possesses nuclear weapons should seek to emphasise their deterrent value by talking up the potential of damage, not to contemplate their use after talking down their potential for damage! These are weapons of last resort. They have no real value in war fighting if the opponent has them. <p>As far as the Agni SRBM test goes, I think that this is an useful signal to Pakistan that we shall not take any nuclear blackmail from them, and that we are capable of responding in kind. And that they should not maintain any illusions about wiping out India's ability to respond to a first strike via either fighter bomber or via missile.<p>In any case, I think the GOI can conduct as many tests as they want, it wont make a big difference. The only thing that can work for India is to now join the Proxy war started by Pakistan. We need our own stooges. Baluchistan or Sindh anyone?

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Bharat » 09 Feb 2002 17:35

The AGNI SR test can be based on the following :
1.Prithvi is not a stable platform as the fuel must be on board just hrs prior to flight.
It is too close to the border for comfort and can be spied upon easily by Pak.
2.Logical conclusion of Agni is 3500+ km missile that is too hit China and that range is too large for Pakistan.
3.Probably the most important fact.
It frees the Prithvi to purely a tactical conventional weapon.
Now Prithvi in a tactical role can hit at artillery bases , air bases , railway platforms, bridges.
IT will replicate the role that the Tomahawk performs for US.
GOI can state that the Prithvi is no longer a nuclear platform.
This would lead to Pakistan not jumping on the button when a Prithvi is launched.
With the possibility of a conflict still there the AGNI SR would perform the nuclear role.
This is an excellent move and will lead to larger strategic strength in the diplomatic alleys.
It is stating that India is now preparing for a conventional conflict with Pakistan with missile strikes.
With the Prithvi in a conventional role Pak air strength will detoriate rapidly with air bases not in full usage..
IT will change a lot of air war plans.
also it gives the army an extra edge.
Also Pakistan does not have any ABM technology while India possesses the Russian SA-12(not sure if it 10 or 11) which claims to have some effect against Hatf 1,2.
AGNI SR should be treated by Pakistan has a larger warning to heed to our demands and that war would lead to rapid reduction in Pakistani military capabilites..<p>Some might argue that the strategic step would not be recognised by Pakistan which would claim that any missile moving towards Pakistan would be treated as nuclear payloaded..
After this we might see Pakistan proposing <B>""a no ballistic missile usage in conventional role treaty ""[/b]as a CBM ,especially if India possesses a workable ATBM capability.

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Prasenjit Medhi » 09 Feb 2002 18:14

>>Some might argue that the strategic step would not be recognised by Pakistan which would claim that any missile moving towards Pakistan would be treated as nuclear payloaded..<<<p>I dont think that India has to make any statement regarding which of its missiles are going to be used for what purpose during a conflict. In order to do so verifiably India will have allow a team of Pakistanis in to verify India's claim. Is this possible during war time? Besides, ambiguity enhances the value of the deterrent.<p>Let us also analyze Pakistan's unwillingness to adhere to no-first-use. Lets face it, Pakistans reluctance to adhere to a no-first-use policy is not based on a real and suicidal readiness to use nuclear weapons first but to enhance the value of their deterrent. In a real war they will use not launch on warning but launch on impact. It has to be so, since they lack the equipment and the time delay to distinguish between a anti-radiation or other cruise missile, a SRBM, or even a supersonic aircraft, and a nuclear device carried by BM/CM or aircraft. It is not like they have early warning stations which can pick up an ICBM launch and a telltale MIRV re-entry over a thirty minute flight time like the Americans had with the Soviets. Any early warning for them would give them a few minutes. They might as well wait for impact verification, then launch, from hardened silos or road mobile platforms. They will not resort to the ultimate form of military suicide over the launch of a BM or CM, who's payload type they can not verify.<p>AgniSR will not change Pakistan's _real_ unstated nuclear doctrine: which is launch on impact and verification. What it does is assure Pakistan that they can not in any way knock out India's ability to respons in a second strike not only with free fall bombs delivered by aircraft but also with nuclear tipped missiles.

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Peeyoosh » 09 Feb 2002 18:56

PM<p>I belive the TSP doctorine is to launch on <p>a) Impact OR<p>b) In case of severe conventional defeat.<p>Its the second that has to be overcome. Give our own DND, I do not see a being relevant.<p>PC

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Prasenjit Medhi » 09 Feb 2002 19:07

Peeyoosh, Pakistan has not even formulated a draft nuclear doctrine, apart from vague assurances that they have a proper command and control system in place.<p>They have categorily refused to adhere to no first use. No-first-use translates to launch on impact, more or less(well launch on warning also, since even if missiles are launched by one, upon verifiable launch of nukes by the adversary, the adverseries missiles will presumably land first). Not agreeing to no first use imples that Pakistan will not wait for launch on warning, forget launch on impact, instead, they have have held out the threat of a first strike. <p>Since India will clearly not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and I stake my bottom paisa on this, clearly Pakistan will not have to employ launch on impact or any such threshold of launching their own nukes. The only event in which nukes will be used in the subcontinent is if Pakistan uses them first. <p>The AgniSR test will make them less ready to do so and in some hard to quantify way will raise the nuclear threshold. <p>So we have established that there is a nuclear threshold. Where does it lie and are there areas where one can operate in, that is teh question. This may not fall under the purview of this thread. Ill start a new thread, heck I miss clicking on 'Start new topic.' :)

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Bharat » 09 Feb 2002 21:19

Medhi,
What I am saying is that Pakistan would not accept the fact that Prithvi is a conventional warhead...
Also I am talking of a war situation where 6-7 Prithivs are in air at the same time.
Also we can state that the AGNI SR has relieved the Prithvi of it's nuclear role and now it will be used purely in a conventional role.
I have seen and listened to arguments that the Prithvi cannot be used conventionally as it can be viewed as a nuclear attack and a mistake might occur especially when a no. of Prithvis are in air at the same time..<p>Also the Pakistanis might not officially recognise it but accept it in private.
This would also lead to Pakistan using it's SRBM's for conventional strikes.
I am not saying that absence of such a theory would stop either side from using BM's in conventional role but it forms a safety factor..<p>Also in relation to the timing of the Agni SR , it now must already be viewed in all defence circles as a nuclear capable missile that is purely Pakistan specific.This then leads to the reasoning that the Prithvi would not be a required deterrent .
Then what happens to the Prithvi, it is now easy to say that this is now a purely a conventional BM that will be used by the artillery units for field strikes.
Pakistan would have already deduced the above fact..
In the current situation usage of the Prithvi would be a multiplying factor for our Air Force.
I just see that the AGNI SR logical conclusion is a freeing up of the Prithvi for conventional role..

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby vinod_raman » 09 Feb 2002 22:39

Here is a question a bit off the track. How far is India from developing a true ICBM? Do folks see a dire necessity in India producing one ASAP?

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby krsai » 09 Feb 2002 23:33

I am not bought at the MAD approach. The destructions for either side is off high possibilites unless India has a sophisticated NMD in places already.. Till then pakis can and will threaten us with their evil missiles.<p>For argument, lets say we detect paki launch of 5 to 10 NDs[hatafs], and we respond with 2 to 5 Agni SRs/200kt s, in minutes. Even With NMD in place there is no guarentee that paki missiles can be intercepted in paki airspace itself [per what knowledge I have]. Experts can clarify.<p>In what way the threat is reduced. In what we need to be comfortable, going by the theory that moving to MAD will make us breath better.<p>IMHO, pakis missiles delivery can't match Agni-SRs in the sense there is some technical details that makes it easy to be detected and can be intercepted before launch itself. I guess, that is the only scenario that can make the pakis jitter. I am pretty positive that their missile technology [launch/delivery platform] is not sophisticated enough, time wise. While India can deliver in 3 to 10 minutes flat, pakis might take hours. {chapter close}

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Prasenjit Medhi » 10 Feb 2002 02:06

vinod_raman:<p>I dont think there is a need to develop an ICBM, atm. No need to invent more and immensely powerful enemies. And with a future sub based deterrent, distant potential foes can be brought under striking range, or more prosaicly, a sub nuke arm will potentially constitute a deterrent against distant adverseries without the need for ICBM's. Think about that.<p>K R Sai says:<p> <blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr> For argument, lets say we detect paki launch of 5 to 10 NDs[hatafs], and we respond with 2 to 5 Agni SRs/200kt s, in minutes. Even With NMD in place there is no guarentee that paki missiles can be intercepted in paki airspace itself [per what knowledge I have]. Experts can clarify.
<hr></blockquote><p>Guys, go do some more reading in your spare time :) Or ask Sunil all these questions :) <p>First off, nukes are not weapons of war. If Pakistan thinks it can blackmail India and push us around every which way by threatening their actual use, they are living in a fool's paradise. <p>I am secure enough with what Sunil calls MUD or Mutually Unacceptable Deterrence. As for NMD .. NMD of any sort, whether SA-12 based or some sort of mini star-wars, will never be perfect, it will merely tip the attrition ratio in the favor of the side deploying superior NMD, therefore making their paper deterrent more formidable. And of course it should be a good way of knocking down 2-3 Hatters.<p>The value of MAD, rather of MUD, comes in the form of its deterrent value. Its a game of chicken where the only safe route is for both sides to back down. Or it is a stable balance of power, if you like. In spite of any level of preparedness, one belligerent will not be able to take out its adversary without causing unnacceptable loss to itself. <p>This is what true security in the post Hiroshima world is about. Deterrence based upon MUD, forget MAD, is workable between two rational adversaries. But is Pakistan rational? Judging by their actions, sometimes not. But holding a big stick on our side should make them see reason. If they dont see reason well its time for them to explain to their maker why they couldnt kill more unbelievers successfully.<p>Nuclear blackmail can work both ways, and we have the bigger stick. An enraged India willing to risk a nuclear exchange and ready for war should strike the fear of god into these Pakistanis. Asa far as I am concerned .. it has. Nice to see Mushy and Sattar squirming and sad faced and sad eyed when it comes to India.<p>Bharat:<p>Yes, the AgniSR will free up the Prithvi for more conventional roles

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Rudra » 10 Feb 2002 05:01

Traditionally when you play in the big club,
unless you are very very sure of your sub fleets
numbers and survivality, its not considered a
safe platform to hang ones hat on. <p>we all can guess that all present nations with
SSNs can pose a great threat to any stray IN SSGN
if they so desire. Whos to know who fired a torpedo and even if one knows, then what to do ?<p>Russia in view of the sheer numbers of US SSNs and
ASW assets, has always laid stress on advanced
land based and air-launched cruise missile
delivery modes too. and this after they have
plenty assets to protect the Barents and White
seas...we have no such semi-enclosed shelters.<p>If the long term threat is seen as PRC , then I
think having 3-4 SSGNs is a huge waste of resources. Far better to just develop a road-rail
mobile missile capable to reaching upto Shenyang
and be done with it. The Russians seem to manage
just fine with maybe 2-3 SSBNs now (Delta-IVs)
and mostly relying on Topol-M regiments in siberia.<p>SSNs are a must ofcourse. perhaps our SSGN concept with brahmos is just shoehorning a bonus
N-package into the primary sea denial in S.China
sea role.<p>Just figuring out ways to be bigger pests...thats
what the game is.

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Amitabh » 10 Feb 2002 23:52

<blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr>I have been working on what different groups in Pakistan may be thinking in this regard.<hr></blockquote><p>Shiv, I have no quarrel at all with such an effort! I simply prefer "domestic political" explanations such as these to more diffuse "psychological" ones.

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby krsai » 11 Feb 2002 00:12

What would be an acceptable detterance? It would be a highly unacceptable post to say any reasonable answer to this question, and consequences are of course diabolic. If you're viewing thru the window only seeing pakis, then it is even more murkier. And, who knows what exactly is enemy capable of, thinking a worst case of a friend or neutral becoming a big enemy.
It also has time to it. tomorrow it would be definitely different. who knows. If that is the case, how are thinking in terms of cost effective solutions, long term or short term both falling under the same analysis going by the speed at which India defence matters goes.<p>Having road based detterance can be quite cheap and easier to maintain, but how it will survive or support a "MUD" or MAD is anybody's "guess", again depending on the subject of the argument: "survive". <p>IMOH, Agni-SR contribution is a special case of weapon delivery that may qualify for any type of deterrance, but does not support a comprehensive solution to any detterance theory. It could be a component, persay.

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Arun_S » 12 Feb 2002 09:33

This 1 ton Cryo engine test (with 1300 Kg fuel) in 1980's could be an indication of ICBM related activity ;) though I am not convinced of its military usefullness.<p>The cryogenic quest
<blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr>ISRO began work on the development of a cryogenic engine in the 1980s when it tested a single element injector generating 60 kg thrust. A one-tonne subscale engine was also realised and tested up to 600 seconds. With this, development of the cryogenic engine for use in the GSLV was initiated in 1994. <hr></blockquote>

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby reggie » 12 Feb 2002 09:44

[url=http://www.dailypioneer.com/secon3.asp?cat=\edit1&d=EDITS]http://www.dailypioneer.com/secon3.asp?cat=\edit1&d=EDITS[/url]<p>New Thrust for ISRO<p>The test, conducted at the ISRO's Liquid Propulsion Systems Centre at Mahendragiri Hills in Tamil Nadu, constitutes only the first step. A series of similar tests, for fine-tuning various parameters, is essential before the cryogenic engine can become operational. Scientists expect that these tests would be over in two years. The resultant engine could provide a thrust of 7.5 tonnes to carry the third Geo-Synchronous Launch Vehicle (GSLV) flight in 2003. The cryogenic engine is conceptually quite different from the conventional liquid propulsion-driven engine used in satellite launch vehicles. It uses a cocktail of seemingly contradictory fuel types-liquid hydrogen at -265° C as fuel and liquid oxygen at -240° C as the oxidiser-which, when burnt, produces temperatures up to several thousand degrees Celsius. The key is to keep the fuel stable at such exceedingly low temperatures even when excessive heat is being generated within the insulated metal chambers of the launch vehicle. This aspect of the technology is jealously protected by the five nations that have mastered it. India has been working on the project since the 1980s, when the ISRO first tested a single element injector generating a 60 kg thrust. Though subsequently, a one-tonne subscale engine was tested up to 600 seconds, progress was stymied by the rigid technology controls imposed by western nations. The Russians were very keen to part with the know-how in 1992, but were forced to back out a year later by the US which said such a sale would violate the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines. Although the Russians did sell 7 cryogenic states and a ground mock-up stage, instead of the stipulated 5 stages and technology, ISRO scientists were keen on going it alone. The successful test is an important step towards fulfilling that cryogenic dream.

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Peeyoosh » 12 Feb 2002 09:55

Cryo for an ICBM is hard to believe, agree that its not a military solution, but we have so manythings ranging from communications to sustainable water developement where high quality satellite infrastructure is invaluable.<p>Sai, PM<p>I agree - we tend to speak of Minimum Credible Detrrence (MCD) as a unified concept. I think MCD varies from opponent to opponent depending on the role India plays in their strategic calculus and the degree of antipathy/feas they have. Each opponnent requires a different degree of detrerrence and to that end we need to be ablt to define teh deterrence and the force structure needed to implement the degree of deterrence without aggravating stable positions reached with other opponents.<p>TO do that the only way we can arrange for a diffrential force structure is by playing around with the delivery mechnaisms.<p>This is a very different problem from what the US faced where anything that deterred their primary antagnonst did not affect the strategic posture of other players.<p>SO what I am saying is that to enforce MCD for the Pakis we need a very high destruction capability, and that should not UNITENTIONALLY raise the temperature elsewhere. Is the short ranged Agni a precursor to this or a tactical response to a delivery issue?<p>Peeyoosh

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby bala » 12 Feb 2002 10:33

All this talk about 700-800 Km Agni-1 and its implications for Nuclear deterence w.r.t TSP is a nice academic exercise. After reading the profiles of scientific leadership in India I am confident that they made the right decisions. The Agni-1 is tailor-made for TSP and perhaps incorporates the latest guidance technology from DRDO. With a 1 tonne thermo-nuclear warhead TSP is toast. No need for Agni-2 in this scenario. <p>I am awaiting Agni-3 which will be China specific.<p>Just an aside. I read the profiles of Prof Satish Dhawan, ex-chairman of ISRO. How uplifting. These folks knew their true calling and did a tremendous job, using limited resources, with panache and humility. Compare all the greats of Indian Space/Missile orgs with those in TSP. Actually, no comparisons. <p>Dr. Xerox Abdul Khan is discredited and shunned by TSP's Mushy. Xerox Khan is wanted by the Belgian authorities for nuclear theft. TSP Nuclear expert Bashir Mohammed was placed under house arrest for Al-Qaeda connections and interviewed by FBI. The missile program in TSP has no recognized author relevant in aerospace/rocket technology. They are all ex-nuclear experts scrounging around for other projects. Their only renowned expert Dr Abdus Salam, a nobel prize winning physicist, is shunned by TSP because he is an Ahmedi sect muslim.

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Arun_S » 15 Feb 2002 22:05

Some interesting information form this dated RAND report:
RAND: From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces<p> <blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr> Compared with India, China has formidable nuclear forces. China is believed to have deployed some 125 long-range (1700 km or greater) nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. [7] The missile warheads are thought to have yields of between 200 kT and 5 MT. In addition, China is believed to have some 150 bomber-deliverable nuclear weapons and 120 tactical nuclear weapons deliverable by short-range missiles or artillery. An attack using just a small part of this force could have a devastating effect on an Indian nuclear force. <hr></blockquote><p>The followign confirms many of my assertions:<p> <blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr> For these reasons, India might want to base its missile force to the west of Bangladesh. One of the closest viable sites to China would be near the city of Bhagalpur, which is some 3000 km from Beijing. To provide flexibility for basing or for operating a land-based mobile system, a missile range of 3500 km would be required. A missile with a range of 5000 km would be ideal because it could be based almost anywhere in India and still hit Beijing. However, no upgrade of the Agni-2 is likely to produce a missile with a 3500-5000 km range. Thus, India would have to produce a whole new missile. The Polar Space Launch Vehicle (PSLV) shows that India has the technology to produce the required missile, but the new missile cannot be directly derived from the PSLV because it is too big (it would be big even for an ICBM). The 3500-5000 km ballistic missile would have to be a new development, not derived from any existing Indian missile system, so it would be neither quick nor inexpensive. Ultimately, such a missile would probably weigh 25-30 metric tons and look something like the French S-3 or M-20 or the Soviet SS-20 ballistic missiles
<hr></blockquote><p> <blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr> Another alternative might be some form of mobile basing. A 30-metric-ton missile is light enough to be made road-mobile, but the poor state of India's roads makes this a dangerous proposition. Special roads could be built to transport the missile but would be expensive, and it is not clear that a road long enough to ensure the missile force's survival could be built. India's railroads are in fairly good shape, which makes a rail-mobile system a possibility. The identity of trains carrying nuclear weapons would need to be obscured, and the trains would have to move often enough so that China and Pakistan could not learn their locations. As with any mobile system, there are the problems of physical accidents, theft and physical security, and communication with civilian authorities. To minimize some of these problems, various garrisons could be connected by rail. The trains would normally be at one of the protected garrisons and only occasionally moved between them. This would be a compromise between a constantly mobile system and a fixed one. There would have to be enough garrison locations to ensure sufficient locational uncertainty so that some of the force would survive a first strike. This would increase costs. <p>Mobility on a submarine seems well beyond India's capability for at least ten, and probably 20, years. To build such a submarine, India would have to develop a light water reactor using enriched uranium, which would require India to obtain a source of enriched uranium. Foreign suppliers are not likely to be willing to help India, and in any case India may well not want to be dependent on foreign supplies, with the result that India would have to expand its centrifuge enrichment program to supply the needed material.
<hr></blockquote><p> <blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr> One possible option would be to have a mobile system kept safely guarded in garrison during "normal" peacetime. Only in a crisis or on receipt of strategic warning would the force be sent into mobile operation. This raises the issue of whether strategic warning can be the principal means to protect a nuclear force. Some have argued that Wohlstetter's "delicate balance" assumed a "bolt from the blue" attack and that such attacks are unlikely. [11] This argument, however, ignores the fact that some of the most serious instances of surprise attacks were not "bolts from the blue" but rather "bolts from the gray," and indeed sometimes the gray has been very dark indeed. [12] For example, the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred only ten days after a war warning had been sent to its commander from the Chief of Naval Operations. [13] The Israelis depend on strategic warning to mobilize their military forces, but failed to mobilize until just before the start of the 1973 Yom Kippur war despite a situation that could hardly be characterized as "blue skies." [14] The combat in Kashmir between Indian and Pakistani forces in the spring of 1999 once again illustrates that it is often hard to find "blue skies" in the relations between these two countries. <p> <hr></blockquote>
<blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr> India must also decide on a targeting and use doctrine. Open Indian sources (including the National Security Advisory Board's draft Nuclear Doctrine) call for a minimum or proportional deterrence doctrine. Such a doctrine would require only a small number of delivery vehicles and would target only the opponent's cities. This doctrine might be sufficient for deterring Pakistan, especially if India's main goal were to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used in any conflict. Against China this doctrine might not be enough. A first strike by China against India using approximately 20 nuclear weapons could devastate India's nuclear and air forces, yet China would still have over one hundred nuclear weapons to hit Indian cities should India strike Chinese cities in response. India must determine how it would respond to such an attack. Such a response would probably involve attacking Chinese military targets, which would require a larger and more discriminate nuclear force than would be required by a minimum deterrence doctrine. /QUOTE]<p>[QUOTE]Nor can India easily forgo the possession of thermonuclear weapons if it wants to maintain any sort of balance with China. Despite the common belief that one atomic weapon is enough to destroy a city, in actuality a 10-kT weapon will destroy about 9 sq km of an urban area. [22] While this yield would be quite enough for a medium-sized city like Hiroshima with a population of about one-quarter million and a built-up area of about 18 sq km, large modern cities typically have populations of 5 to 10 million and built-up areas of 500 to 1,000 sq km or more. A small Indian retaliatory force of, say, ten 10-kT weapons would barely be enough to disable even one large Chinese city (bearing in mind that not every square kilometer of a city must be destroyed before it stops functioning). However, a 1-MT weapon will destroy an area at least 20 times larger than that of a 10-kT one. Approximately 20 Chinese multimegaton weapons would be enough to disable every Indian city with a population of more than 1 million <hr></blockquote><p> <blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr>The second part of the question of further Indian nuclear weapons development concerns stockpile size and how it affects fissile nuclear material requirements. India currently has about 450 kg of separated weapons-grade plutonium, [24] which would allow the manufacture of about 90 simple fission weapons. [25] India is currently producing about 25 kg of weapons-grade plutonium per year, which could be increased to about 100 kg per year if India felt it to be necessary. This stockpile of plutonium and its current production rate are probably enough to supply India with an adequate supply of fission weapons. India's fissile material requirements for its thermonuclear weapons are less clear; there is no unclassified estimate of the amount of plutonium required per weapon. Furthermore, all of the five established nuclear-weapon states have produced both plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). The usual reason given is that thermonuclear weapons require highly enriched uranium. India has only a very small uranium enrichment capacity. It could currently produce at most only 10 kg of HEU per year. It also has produced kilogram quantities of U-233 by irradiating thorium in its power reactors. It is unclear whether it used some of its limited supplies of HEU or U-233 in its thermonuclear test or whether it has found a way to make thermonuclear weapons without HEU. Either way, India might have to increase its fissile material production if it wants to make tens of thermonuclear weapons. If it makes plutonium-only thermonuclear weapons, then these weapons might well use more plutonium than a standard fission weapon. If India uses HEU or U-233, then it will have to undertake a major expansion in its ability to produce these materials. <hr></blockquote>
<blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr> Pakistan has already made the decision to expand its stockpile of fissile material. From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s (when production stopped as a result of U.S. pressure) Pakistan produced some 200 kg of HEU at its enrichment plant at Kahuta. [28] Assuming 15 kg of HEU per weapon, this would have given Pakistan enough HEU for approximately 13 fission nuclear weapons. If Pakistan really did test six nuclear weapons in May 1998, afterwards it would have had only enough HEU for seven more weapons. Given this fact, it is not surprising that there are reports that Pakistan restarted production of HEU at Kahuta in the spring of 1998. [29] Although HEU may not have been produced at Kahuta during the 1991-1998 period, Kahuta was in operation during this time and the Pakistanis stockpiled medium enriched uranium product. Using this intermediate product to produce HEU would have given Pakistan some 200 kg of additional HEU by the end of 1998. [30] Pakistan would then have had enough total HEU to produce approximately 20 nuclear weapons. At this point, the intermediate product stockpile would be exhausted and Kahuta would have gone back to producing HEU from natural uranium. When Kahuta last operated, it produced some 25 kg of HEU per year (starting from natural uranium), which is enough for about 1.7 weapons per year. Pakistan may have already expanded the production rate at this facility or it may expand it in the future. <p>In addition, Pakistan is reported to have started the operation of its 50-MW heavy-water plutonium production reactor at Khushab. [31] Significantly, this reactor is reported to have started operation in April 1998, before the Indian tests. Where Pakistan obtained the heavy water needed to start this reactor has not been publicly stated. It probably took about a year for the reactor to reach full-power operation and the plutonium production in the fuel to achieve equilibrium. At this point, the reactor would start discharging about 11 kg of plutonium per year. Assuming 5 kg of plutonium per weapon, this will be enough for some 2.2 weapons per year. The number of plutonium weapons is additive with whatever HEU weapons are produced by Kahuta's
<hr></blockquote>
<blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr> Conclusions
Each of the five major nuclear powers has had to create deployed nuclear forces that meet the requirements for a deterrent force. It has been a long and expensive process. When the British, French, and Chinese first deployed their nuclear forces, they could not survive a Soviet first strike. These countries wanted (and needed) such forces anyway. As soon as they had the capability, both Britain and France deployed nuclear ballistic missile submarines. China has moved toward survivable forces somewhat more slowly, but even it has developed nuclear ballistic missile submarines and land-mobile missiles. <hr></blockquote>

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby SSridhar » 15 Feb 2002 22:51

<blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Arun_S:
This 1 ton Cryo engine test (with 1300 Kg fuel) in 1980's could be an indication of ICBM related activity ;) though I am not convinced of its military usefullness. <hr></blockquote>
I think that the cryogenic engine test at that time should be seen in historical perspective. IIRC, there was a group working on Russian SAM which used liquid-fuel and this group later graduated to doing experiments with cryo engines. At the same time, there was another group (under Gowarikar ?) working on solid fuel. Essentially, when ISRO received the Viking engine technology from the French for its contribution to its development, the liquid/cryo engine group stopped further development work.

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Guest » 16 Feb 2002 01:19

N-forces command: IAF picks Asthana
Vishal Thapar
(New Delhi, February 15)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has nominated its Deputy Chief, Air Marshal TM Asthana, to head India's nuclear forces command as its commander-in-chief.
Tentatively called the Strategic Nuclear Command, this will be part of the Integrated Defence Staff set up which is central to the biggest-ever revamp of higher defence management. <p>Though a Cabinet clearance for this command is awaited, the IAF sees itself as the central element in the conceptual framework. <p>The concept of an aerospace command as part of, or co-terminus with the Strategic Nuclear Command is also being discussed. If this materialises, this will give the IAF pre-eminence in the defence structure of the future. <p>"Space is a natural extension of anything that happens in the air. The concept of a futuristic aerospace command encompasses management of weapons launched from space and those passing through it, use of satellites for reconnaisance and other military use, and the employment of space for control of information," an IAF officer says. <p>The IAF is clear that the core of the nuclear forces command must be built around itself, as it sees strategic targetting primarily as its own responsibility. <p>"That Air Marshal Asthana is almost certain to get the job is apparent from the appointment of Air Marshal M Madon, an officer junior to him, to the post of Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C) Eastern Command. Asthana was cleared for the post of C-in-C before Madon. He is waiting for his job in the Strategic Nuclear Command," the IAF officer said.

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby jrjrao » 17 Feb 2002 22:35

Pak scientists pressing for permission to testfire Shaheen-II <p>http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/170202/dlfor39.asp

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Arun_S » 18 Feb 2002 02:25

Just confirm my hypothesis that Dhanush is based on the Second stage of Agni-2 (typo correction done). 300 nautical miles is equal to 555 Km ;) <p>
India to test more Danush missiles<p> <blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr>Top DRDO officials said Danush was configurated to hit targets at a range between 150 and 300 nautical miles. <hr></blockquote>

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Re: Agni-I/SR: Strategic Implications (Thread 3)

Postby Kumar » 18 Feb 2002 05:44

Arun,<p>I was also puzzled by the mention of "solid fuel".
<blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><hr>These warships have been modified to carry the Danush missiles and equipment supporting payloads like the solid fuel and warheads.<hr></blockquote><p>It does seem more like a single stage Agni.


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