Vivek K wrote:Ray sahab,
A tank with lower ground pressure will be more mobile, with better accuracy offer more chances of winning, and with better armour bring the fighting lads home. Rahul should perhaps re post the T90 blow up pictures from the Russiaa-Georgia skirmish.
So where is the problem? I would love to hear you explain it to all of us. To me it sounds like DRDO rubbed someone in the Army procurement the wrong way. The army keeps raking up the embarrasing AUCRT trials of 2008 where it sabotaged the Tank's "RENK" transmission (BTW from ships to tanks to reactors in chemical plants - RENK is a trusted name for transmissions) and complained of the Arjuns Torsion bar problems (the Arjun has no torsion bar).
Let’s leave the conspiracy theory out, even though it is fashionable to do so when it mystifies one as to what’s going on. Being nationalistic, patriotic and swadshi is one thing and being concerning about the lives of those who will defend us with the equipment given, is another! I assure you that the Indian Armed Forces are as patriotic as you in the BRF.
I have visited DRDO establishment in the line of duty and I have also visited commercial industries, not in the line of duty out of curiosity and inquisitive interest. There is a vast difference! One is bureaucratic and lazy and the other is out to make the finest product and be competitive.
A tank is designed on the three traditional factors determining a tank's effectiveness in battle and that is its fire-power, protection, and mobility.
Increasing protection by adding armour will result in an increase in weight and therefore decrease mobility; increasing firepower by installing a larger gun will force the designer to sacrifice speed or armour to compensate for the added weight and cost.
The mobility of a tank is described by its battlefield or tactical mobility, its operational mobility, and its strategic mobility. Tactical mobility can be broken down firstly into agility, describing the tank's acceleration, braking, speed and rate of turn on various terrains, and secondly obstacle clearance: the tank's ability to travel over vertical obstacles like low walls or trenches or through water. Operational mobility is a function of manoeuvre range; but also of size and weight, and the resulting limitations on options for manoeuvre.
Strategic mobility is the ability of the tanks of an armed force to arrive in a timely, cost effective, and synchronized fashion.
Tactical mobility is gauged by the tank agility based on the function of the weight of the tank due to its inertia while manoeuvring and its ground pressure, the power output of the installed power plant and the tank transmission and track design. In addition, rough terrain effectively limits the tank's speed through the stress it puts on the suspension and the crew.
Tanks are highly mobile and able to travel over most types of terrain due to their continuous tracks and advanced suspension. The tracks disperse the significant weight of the vehicle over a large area, resulting in a ground pressure comparable to that of a walking man. A tank can travel at approximately 40 kilometres per hour (25 mph) across flat terrain and up to 70 kilometres per hour (43 mph) on roads, but due to the mechanical strain this places on the vehicle and the logistical strain on fuel delivery and tank maintenance, these must be considered "burst" speeds that invite mechanical failure of engine and transmission systems. Consequently, wheeled tank transporters and rail infrastructure is used wherever possible for long-distance tank transport. The limitations of long-range tank mobility can be viewed in sharp contrast to that of wheeled armoured fighting vehicles.
So lower ground pressure has it own issues!
The Army sabotaged? Any links to prove so?
I am not aware of the skirmish between Russians and Georgians and so cannot comment.