That sir, is where I differ the most, and hence am less concerned than a lot of others on the T90-v/s-Arjun debate..In a Cold Start scenario, we will not face off 1st Armoured Div against the Paki 1st Armoured...We would attempt to have 3 tank regiments mobilised to strike for every regiment that the Pakis would be able to bring to bear in the given timeframe...And backed by equally dissimilar arty firepower...As also arguably better and more numerous C3I resources...And vastly dissimilar air support...Hence it will almost never be a tank regiment v/s tank regiment affair...In a localised, short operation, it will be mobilisation of vastly superior numbers (and comparatively superior quality in some respects) very quickly - that will be key
Sir, the above argument shows that you’ve not been keeping pace with developments in the Pakistan Army and their implications with respect to the Cold Start. I’ve already posted an overview of the same earlier. Allow me to reiterate the same in the context of present discussion.
The 2001-2002 mobilization and consequent amassing of three Indian Armored Divisions from Fazilka-Abohar to Jaisalmer (mid of 2002), exposed the soft underbelly of the Pakistan. IMO, as a response to that and also the looming Cold Start Doctrine, PA put in place resources to counter, or at least hold off any Indian Armored thrust in the area. The reason I make this statement is because certain publications had started mentioning these new formations prior to CSD being announced.
Again, in my opinion, one of the objectives of the CSD is to draw in the ARN/ARS of PA by achieving quick breakthroughs without the commitment of Indian Strike Corps. While no one, save the IA, know what form the IBG will take, my assumptions is that at the least, it will have a powerful Armored Brigade as its core. As you pointed out, the idea is to apply overwhelming firepower in double quick time to unhinge the PA defensive formations. Any such success will automatically involve the commitment of PA ARN/ARS. Another point, while India may have 3:1 superiority in armor during the initial stages of assault, actual assault will be conducted by only a single regiment. Unless, the PA armored regiment is holding too wide an area. The sheer impracticality of accommodating 3 armored regiments together will not allow this. But we digress.
Now coming to the developments in the PA in context of CSD. PA XXXI Corps (Bahawalpur – responsible for Southern Punjab and opposite to Indian X Corps) and V Corps (Karachi – responsible for Sindh and opposite Indian XII Corps) have both been reinforced with additional divisions (called Corps Reserves) – 26th and 25th Mechanized Divisions respectively. XXX Corps (Gujranwala - opposite the chicken neck area) reserves are pllaned but visibility not clear.
V Corps was supposed to have 3 independent armored brigades for quite some time, so the new mechanized division could very well be amalgamation of these. In case of XXXI Corps, it will be increase in assets (MBT) with induction of T-80UD and Al-Khalid which fecilitated the formation of this new division. These Mechanized Divisions are armored divisions in all but name. In absence of CSD and IBG (to come in future), these assets would have been used to counter/absorb/hold-off the Indian XXI and I/II Strike Corps offensive south of Fazilka-Abohar sector without having to commit the PA Reserves/Strike Corps. They would have given the PA freedom and flexibility to commit their ARS. Even with CSD, the IBG will not face off the old vanilla holding corps of PA – but those equipped with decent armor/mechanized infantry assets. So, the tank versus tank battle will sure be there and PA will not be defetead/put on back foot that easily. So while IBG is not on radar presently, the PA has assets to counter these.
This brings us to another interesting point - For India to achieve 3:1 Armor concentration in the general area, it will require that many more mechanized assets. I’ve already shown calculations in one of my previous posts which show that the current planned strength of MBT in IA (~3,500) is required to meet the present organization of Indian Army. In case IA goes for IBG in addition to present formations, the number of MBT+ other supporting assets required will go up substantially.
And the Army is not confident that the Arjun can either be inducted fast enough, or its infrastructure set up quickly enough for them to have confidence for an Arjun only solution
Unless the IA has planned to import the entire lot of T-90 from Russia, the same holds true for even the Tin-Can.