Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

anjan
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby anjan » 24 Apr 2010 03:40

Viv S wrote:Yes, technically speaking the evaluations are confidential, but its not unheard off to have officers speaking off-the-record to journalists. The level of enforced confidentiality is not akin to that of .. say India's missile program.

Weapons evaluations very much are classified. What we hear are very sanitized reports.

Absolutely. And the men who'll actually be sent to war in it, i.e. the ORs, JCOs and officers of the Arjun regiments are very pleased and satisfied with the tank(and this includes veterans).

If they truly are then I'm pretty sure their accounts are in consideration with the Army. Seriously, what are the options? a. Corruption(which I addressed earlier) b.The Army is being pig-headed about a weapon that is in their interests but somehow only we're smart enough to see it. c. There are things we simply don't know about deciding outcomes.

While we keep talking about accountability to the public in a democracy the fact is there is also a need for secrecy. We resolve this by putting in checks and balances within the system. I haven't heard anything that makes me believe this system has failed. Nor do I hear reports from within this system at all. All I hear from is DRDO. This being so, I'd still go with "Let the user(who must risk his life on it) decide".

Rahul M wrote:@ anjan, why are then ex -IA officers like Gen RoyC supporting the arjun project ? by your post it would seem as if he is eager to put the lives of soldiers on the line unnecessarily ? may be the real reason is because the t-series itself is a threat to soldier's lives ?

Two things. One, the army has always been for the Arjun project. They recognized that we needed Indigenization and supported the tank. This had to be balanced against their primary job of winning wars with the least casualties. So the army was resigned to buying a limited number of them *always*(at least as far back as '94').

Second, the good General is entitled to his views. I'm more interested though in why serving chiefs haven't been pushing for it if it is all it's made out to be. You'd think serving chiefs and officers would have a far better awareness and say in the induction of the tank?

P.S. My apologies for the late reply. I didn't realize there would be 3 new pages in 2 days! :shock:

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Karan M » 24 Apr 2010 04:06

Sure there is systematic corruption and no one neither the GOI nor the opposition or the people has done anything about it .


If GOI took action based on CAG report then most of the politician would have ended in jail by now , CAG report AFAIK is non binding on the GOI.


Tell me what are you going to do about it ?

Will you file a PIL based on CAG or AS report and bring the guilty to justice ?


Why dont you - since you were going on and on about how the Army is not responsible and only the evil GOI is. Go on, walk the talk and file a PIL.

No if the Army was responsible along with MOD or Politician then they should be brought to justice with what ever means possible.


What are all these means possible? Care to elaborate or even try them out? When was the last time, all "these means possible" were tried out and worked?

No body is denying it , every one knows and its a open secret that every defence procurement has kickbacks involved , but no one has ever done any thing to fix it.


No, you missed the point entirely. Somehow your argument hinges on the belief that the Army cannot make mistakes in procurement and is perfect in what it does. Which then leads to the flawed conclusion, that any incorrect procurement is due to corruption, even when it is not. Cases like the Arjun are not as much due to corruption, as organizational inertia and ego clashes (case in point being the DGMFs behaviour) and then the usual tendency amongst everyone to keep with the flawed decision and avoid taking contrary stances.

I am not repeating these statements nor is that a fallacy , go figure out how does defence procurement works and how it is impossible for any single institution to manipulate it and get its way.


Unfortunately for you, I know enough about defence procurement as it stands to recognize the kind of flawed arguments you are making.

Defence procurement is a multi stage process and the decision to procure it or cancel it rest with GOI ( CCSA ) the final decision making body of GOI.


Fluff. In the case of the T-90, the procurement was driven by the Army citing operational needs and pushed through as well. The CCS signs off the deal getting all the so called stakeholders on board, in reality however, the deal is cooked before it reaches the CCS and everyone knows what the result will be.

T-90 has gone through similar multi stage process and GOI ( CCSA ) has approved these defence deals , much like Gorshkov or Scorpene or any other big ticket defence deal.


Actually, in both those deals as well, the respective services had a lot of stake in making the rest of the stakeholders sign on the dotted line, citing national security.

Infact the orders in different stages were approved by GOI of BJP and Congress

Please point to me what is wrong in what i said ?


What you said was clearly wrong, in that you were attempting to deflect blame for the Army's flawed choice for the T-90, onto the remaining stakeholders who went along with the Army's decision believing the latter's choice was accurate. It is the Army which made the choice of tank, cited operational needs and continued to impress upon decision makers that it needed more tanks even when the current ones were underperforming and the Russians did not do their bit. In what shows the level of hilarity, the entire T-90 deal is worth, the Army first evaluated the T-72S, and found them to be used tanks patched up and supplied to them, and then cited it as a reason to go for the T-90, stating that "at least" these tanks would be new. :rolleyes:

I have a disagreement on what they have said , so I just agree to disagree with them


Quite interesting you choose to disagree with whatever evidence shows your claims to be wrong. So far, we have had tons of evidence from multiple people showing pretty much each and every statement you made to be inaccurate.


So every one is fudging here , Army , MOD , GOI .... so we are not in a good state of affairs then isnt it ? :lol:


So you admit that there was fudging on the T-90 procurement? Great.

True it seems the GOI disagrees with the Standing Committee on Defence and did not opted for superior Arjun


The GOI acted on the recommendations of the Army which opted for the T-90. Insofar as the Std Committee on Defence's statements are concerned, they testify to how flawed the entire T-90 procurement is wherein an inferior, flawed, obsolete design was chosen on dubious grounds and the decision was not even rescinded but continues to be supported.


I never said that the GOI decision was correct or wrong , I just said that in every stage of T-90 deal GOI was involved and that they are the final decision making authority , not the IA , not the DRDO , nor the MOD.


Which is somewhat irrelevant, as they tend to go along with what the IA asks, and the MOD actively works with the IA to ensure that cited requirements for clearances are met. In certain cases, as in the case of the T-90, the MOD even tweaks the deal to ensure the IA got what it wanted, eg by dropping APS, going for extra imports even when the tank does not work.

As of date, the subpar T-90s dont have a functioning thermal imager, dont come with adequate TOT, have issues with derated engines which overheat, the ballistic computer does not accept Indian rounds, the tank cannot accomodate extra electronics..the list of defects is huge. But yet, procurement continues.



The GOI is within its right to disagree with Army , MOD or DRDO suggestion and make a decision , it the prerogative of GOI , it may agree to suggestion of Army , DRDO and MOD as well


See prior reply.



True , we do not know the circumstances under which succession Government has allowed such a go ahead to procure the T-90 in big numbers.


Govt procurement is all about continuity, bar allegations of corruption. The Army made the case, successive Govts have pushed for it.

So now that the comparative trials are done and few blogs claim that Arjun was superior , will GOI order thousand more Arjun ?


The GOI will not order a single Arjun more, unless the Army agrees to it. And there lies the problem. The Army ordering a thousand more Arjuns also raises the question that the Army was wrong about the T-90, and it is not to the advantage of the ex DGMF and the institution that such questions be raised.


The Army will accept what ever GOI provides them with , it may not always be possible to procure top of the line stuff for various reason , but it is not the business of the Army to tell the GOI what decision they should take , the decision making authority is solely the prerogative of GOI .


In an utopian world perhaps. In Indian procurement, the GOI has long stopped forcing equipment on the Army unless they meet basic Army criteria. The problem is that these criteria, as the CAG justifiably points out, are often whimsical, inaccurate and flawed and end up causing inferior equipment to be chosen.

Any decision by the GOI/MOD to play favorites, invites allegations of corruption and wrongdoing. No current RM worth his political acumen will wade in such sticky waters. As things stand, the Army can come up with a dime a dozen claims and counterclaims to rubbish any piece of equipment. They have done so repeatedly with the Arjun.


The IA ( like IN/IAF ) does the field test and provides the result to MOD and thats where it end its role , The Army like other defence service has to abide by the decision of GOI , if any clarification is required the GOI asks the MOD or Defence Service to provide the same.


Wrong again. The services submit a fairly authoritative and comprehensive set of reports to the MOD to indicate their preferred choice(s).

In the case of the T-90, it was a single vendor situation, and it did not even have a competitor. The deal is then referred to the CCS of which the MOF is a member, and once it is cleared the procurement goes through. The actual work begins much before the deal reaches the CCS itself in several cases, citing urgency, and the MOF even indicates to the MOD whether they will oppose or agree to a certain deal.

All in all, your claims that the GOI is somehow responsible for the T-90 mess, while the Army is to be absolved are not accurate. And so is the belief that the GOI alone can run roughshod over Army desires. Things dont work that way.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Viv S » 24 Apr 2010 04:16

anjan wrote:Weapons evaluations very much are classified. What we hear are very sanitized reports.


Army personnel aren't authorized to speak to media regardless of whether the information is sanitized or not. And since Arjun's trials were not akin to say... the IN's ATV program, so credible information does leak out prematurely. Col. Shukla has based his recent articles on the Arjun on his interactions with Army officers involved in the comparative tests as has Shiv Aroor, and its very evident that the Arjun did come out tops.

If they truly are then I'm pretty sure their accounts are in consideration with the Army. Seriously, what are the options? a. Corruption(which I addressed earlier) b.The Army is being pig-headed about a weapon that is in their interests but somehow only we're smart enough to see it. c. There are things we simply don't know about deciding outcomes.


Corruption is a very unlikely possibility. And no b) and c) are not the only other possibilities. IMO organisational inertia within the Army is responsible. Fact is the Arjun had major problems in 2005, the IA decided to cut its losses and transfer its eggs to the T-90 basket. Had they known(and this the crux of the debate) that the Arjun would stage a turnaround within two years they probably would perhaps have limited the T-90 acquisition. They got it wrong and one can forgive them for that as long as they make the Mk1 the basis for the Army's future armor plans.

While we keep talking about accountability to the public in a democracy the fact is there is also a need for secrecy. We resolve this by putting in checks and balances within the system. I haven't heard anything that makes me believe this system has failed. Nor do I hear reports from within this system at all. All I hear from is DRDO. This being so, I'd still go with "Let the user(who must risk his life on it) decide".


On issues of strategic significance(nuclear program, missile program, SSNs, etc) the need for secrecy is paramount. Transparency in other programs, on the other hand has served us ,along with most western countries, very well.

Anyway, that's not the issue here. The T-90 is imported but has an estimated 1600 orders placed so far and is the logistically easier option. The Arjun on the other hand is indigenously developed, domestically manufactured and outperforms the Arjun on most technical parameters. The choice is obvious and the Army will eventually reach that conclusion(especially with the MoD's nudging), but it will take its own sweet time about it(inertia at play) and that's what really rankles most of us on the forum.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Karan M » 24 Apr 2010 04:27

anjan wrote:Weapons evaluations very much are classified. What we hear are very sanitized reports.


Sanitized yes, but with enough meat in them to determine what is what. Funnily enough, there has been a blanket ban on talking about the T-90's glaring flaws, whereas every attempt was made to play up even the Arjuns strengths as its weaknesses.

If they truly are then I'm pretty sure their accounts are in consideration with the Army. Seriously, what are the options? a. Corruption(which I addressed earlier) b.The Army is being pig-headed about a weapon that is in their interests but somehow only we're smart enough to see it. c. There are things we simply don't know about deciding outcomes.


This sort of argument is an exercise in futility as you have raised a flawed premise to begin with "somehow only we're smart enough to see it". The reality is that enough people have seen it, complained about it, and as the case of the 43AR shows, even been pressurized to not go against a decision already made. There were further incident as well. In short, there are many who disagree with the Army establishments decision but cannot speak up, thanks to the manner in which the Army cracks down on those who counter the stated view, and also because it would be seen as betrayal.

While we keep talking about accountability to the public in a democracy the fact is there is also a need for secrecy. We resolve this by putting in checks and balances within the system. I haven't heard anything that makes me believe this system has failed. Nor do I hear reports from within this system at all. All I hear from is DRDO. This being so, I'd still go with "Let the user(who must risk his life on it) decide".


If you havent heard anything that the system has failed, then clearly, you need to look into this aspect more. Its been a decade since the T-72 Upgrade was first proposed, whats happened to it? The DRDO developed items are all on the tanks, however the items which were to be selected by the Army after trials, are yet to be finalized. The Artillery procurement is yet another saga, where the Army's hankering for the utopian best led it to saddle soldiers with obsolete equipment wherein none from the Army had the sagacity or the will to push through the development of a local system, which even if it was 80% of what a Bofors was, would still be substantially ahead of the obsolete 130mm guns. Simply put, the Army has long treated local research and development as something that is best avoided, since the Govt of the day (anywhich one) would import them whatever they wanted.

Two things. One, the army has always been for the Arjun project. They recognized that we needed Indigenization and supported the tank. This had to be balanced against their primary job of winning wars with the least casualties. So the army was resigned to buying a limited number of them *always*(at least as far back as '94').


I really wonder at the statement you have made here. The Army has "always been for the Arjun project"? Really? It would be more accurate to say that some officers and soldiers in the Army have been for the Arjun, whereas others simply didnt care, and others, for a variety of reasons, did their utmost to scuttle the program. As far as the claim "winning wars with the least casualties" is concerned, I would disagree here as well. Like it or not, there is a disturbing attrition centric "come what may" mindset amongst several sections of the establishment, who have rubbished acquisition of sophisticated technology in the past.
The fact that you say the "Army was resigned to buying a limited number of them" - actually shows up the reality. Why would the Army, if it truly supported the Arjun be "resigned" to its purchase (as compared to enthusiastic) and that too a limited number (as opposed to making it the standard MBT)

Second, the good General is entitled to his views. I'm more interested though in why serving chiefs haven't been pushing for it if it is all it's made out to be. You'd think serving chiefs and officers would have a far better awareness and say in the induction of the tank?


Serving chiefs have been unable to meet even a fraction of the Army's requirements in terms of modernization and procurement.

Almost no introspection has been done, unfortunately, on how successive chiefs did not even contemplate, let alone manage to create or even float a proposal for a dedicated Army weapons development organization which would even lead a comprehensive program to indigenize its systems.

Instead programs are led from the respective DG's and it is their call on what gets selected and why, and the AHQ does not do much beyond a point.

It has become instead, de riguer amongst the Army (and its support community) to blame the lack of indigenization on a) MOD incompetence b) lack of funds c) DRDO d) OFB e) the useless DPSUs

What really stifles things further is the acrimonious civil-military relationship, wherein the Army distrusts the aforesaid GOI units and secondly, the intense solidarity in the services which has the flip side that any serving/rtd officer will not criticize his organization for fear of being accused of disloyalty and in most cases, will not even contemplate such issues publically. Ajai Shukla, if he continues, marks the rare exception to the case.

The end result is that almost all the so called corrective actions proposed so far about the Indian Mil-Ind complex, focus only on the civilian side of things, and avoid raking up the glaring weaknesses in service procurement and actions.

This sort of attitude has been responsible for, and will continue to be responsible for many more procurement problems in the future. As things stand, there has been constant improvement both in the DPSU and R&D end to meet their obligations and improve upon their performance.

However, on the Army side, as recent as 2007, something as critical as GSQRs continue to be severely flawed. If you examine recent RFIs as well - you would be disappointed. There is very little introspection, and in fact a new belief has emerged, that a) India is now rich enough to get whatever it wants and b) The private sector will ride to the rescue in the form of JVs.

But the basic problem of what equipment is required and how accurate the determination of needs is, continues to be haphazard, and the organization continues to lack the institutional structure to support local development of weapons systems.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Karan M » 24 Apr 2010 04:51

Viv S wrote:Fact is the Arjun had major problems in 2005, the IA decided to cut its losses and transfer its eggs to the T-90 basket. Had they known(and this the crux of the debate) that the Arjun would stage a turnaround within two years they probably would perhaps have limited the T-90 acquisition. They got it wrong and one can forgive them for that as long as they make the Mk1 the basis for the Army's future armor plans.


This is again a flawed perception, and more of a "after the fact" assertion from Ajai Shukla to justify his turnaround, when he became more aware of the tanks capabilities. The fact is however, that the Arjun program turned around by 2000-02, its occasional failures thereafter in trials and otherwise were statistically insignificant as compared to the initial problems, and actually showed significant improvement in trending. However, the mere fact that these occurred were played up to the hilt vis a vis the absolute carte blanche given to the T-90 as a case in contrast. The Arjuns only improvements were that individual systems needed to be ruggedized further, but the basic design of the tank itself was sound allowing these improvements to be made.

In the case of the T-90, and in what testifies to the lack of Army engineering and R&D capabilities, little thought went into the fact that the T-90's, space constrained and rigid design parameters would make any subsystem re-engineering a huge problem! The fact that the Army realised after acquisition, that it could not fire Indian tank rounds from the BC shows up how slipshod their procedures can be, thanks to the lack of inhouse development and dedicated procurement capability. Furthermore, T-90 engines continue to overheat (as recently as 2009), never mind these derate to begin with. Strategic considerations also played little role in the Army's thought process, ergo, the Russian Arm twisting came not only as a surprise, but was in fact rewarded with a further 347 tank orders.

Of the three services, the Army and AF are often the most dismissive of local development and manufacturing capabilities, primarily because they often have the least stake in such decisions, and there are no organizational units (comparable to what the Navy has) which confer a sense of ownership and pride, and also, a sense of realism to their demands of what equipment should be, and what it should actually deliver. With the lack of such in-house capability, procurement mistakes are all too common and recourse to imports becomes normal and in fact, the accepted method. Procurement from local means, involving any gestation time is regarded as a problem and contrary to service requirements. The AF situation is reportedly improving, but the Army's, needs substantial overhaul yet.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Viv S » 24 Apr 2010 05:49

Mrinal wrote:This is again a flawed perception, and more of a "after the fact" assertion from Ajai Shukla to justify his turnaround, when he became more aware of the tanks capabilities. The fact is however, that the Arjun program turned around by 2000-02, its occasional failures thereafter in trials and otherwise were statistically insignificant as compared to the initial problems, and actually showed significant improvement in trending.


Ofcourse he's reversed his opinion on the basic design being flawed but unless he's misreported facts, the Arjun did have major problems with electronics cooking in the 2005 trials, that left the army brass rather miffed to say the least.

However, the mere fact that these occurred were played up to the hilt vis a vis the absolute carte blanche given to the T-90 as a case in contrast. The Arjuns only improvements were that individual systems needed to be ruggedized further, but the basic design of the tank itself was sound allowing these improvements to be made.


Yes I agree its been rather hypocritical in its approach to the T-90, especially in its presentation of the acquisition cost.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Karan M » 24 Apr 2010 06:42

Viv S wrote:Ofcourse he's reversed his opinion on the basic design being flawed but unless he's misreported facts, the Arjun did have major problems with electronics cooking in the 2005 trials, that left the army brass rather miffed to say the least.


Look, you are mistaken and miss the point, allow me to elaborate since a) the Arjuns electronics issues were minor vis a vis the T-90s and second, the point was that the basic design of the tank allowed better solutions to be employed.

The first issue was of the Gunners main sight systems, such as LRF overheating once in a while - to the Arjuns bad luck, this happened during trials in front of bigwigs. Before that in equally harsh conditions, they worked well. They did, and hence the tank was taken for trials, where the equipment finally gave way. Compare and contrast to 80-90 TI's out of 310 odd T-90s having issues. Again, this was resolved by ruggedization and re-engineering. This testifies to the soundness of the basic Arjun design which has ample space in the tank to reconfigure systems, and vent heat, plus design data in Indian hands so that Indian designers can work with the French suppliers quickly. In the volume constrained T-90 tank - this approach is simply not possible, the heat has to go somewhere, but where! And the TI cannot just be squeezed anywhich where. The end result is now they are looking for a ECS (as Rohitvats said, a downgraded Aircon) which will in turn require an APU to power it, since the engine already derates and conks out when stresssed. The Arjun by the way, has an APU already.

Second issue was of the stabilization failing. This proved to be because of improper calibration from the German supplier. And the electronics, in this case did not need tweaking.

What Shukla did not understand, is that there is a difference between a basic design which is flawed (in some respect, as every design has its compromises) as versus a sound design which is being matured. The Arjun is the latter, its basic design was sound, its systems were from a mix of suppliers including those who supply worldwide, and the tanks systems needed to be trialled extensively and tweaked which was done.

The problem with the T-90 is that its basic design itself holds to a "Russian" way of doing things which many were ga ga over but which comes with significant disadvantages. E.g. the Russian tanks having systems that "fit like this" (pinches fingers) with "no space wasted or required", what happens then when you need to add newer systems? This was the case with the Thermal Imager on the T-90S. It had to be added separately from the day sight, and literally "squeezed in" to the tank. And it is facing heat problems. Similar is probably the case why the T-72 trials have seen no definitive gun sight and imager selected yet. The end result is that one then needs to add more equipment to make up for this deficit. Similarly, to include crew protection measures, the Russians are now talking about extending the turret and adding separate ammunition from the crew, as somebody reported. Till date, it was all about compact, cost effectiveness, and suddenly the tides have changed.

That is the problem. The basic design of the tank itself is flawed, and for "improvement", it requires significant re-engineering, after which also, there is no guarantee that things are much better. Hence, it is now 2010, and still Thermal Imagers have issues, there is no ECS, Indian ammo does not fire from the T-90, the engines still conk out from time to time....

Problem is some people have this mindset, that anything European or Russian is automatically correct, whereas Indians and whatever they say needs to be taken dismissively.

Hence this belief that basically the T-90 is ok, and the Arjun is being pushed because it is Indian. That is the difference in perception, which seems to color a lot of claims and counter claims about the T-90 versus the Arjun, including some pages back on this very thread.

The Army clearly did not do its due diligence when purchasing this tank. It made some sense as a panic purchase, but follow on tanks were taken "as is" without even fixing the basic issues!

Now, to fix these issues, the Russians will charge us a pretty penny.

Let us look at this so called Arjun MK2, from the information available so far, it will include a GMS with more features, more electronics (BMS) and defensive suite. And some others which I am not aware of (Rohitvats or Rahulm may have more on this). Each of these "items" if required for the T-90, will translate to a huge contract for "integration" and not just the item itself, for our Russian friends. They will of course give a complete package deal, but when things dont quite work out, after the Army commits itself, what happens then? That is what is now happening for the T-90.

You have Russian firms running ads about offering India Air conditioning and APUs! Why would we even require these if the TI had worked? The so called acquisition costs, become recurring and translate to a new cash flow by themselves, coming out of the Armys budget and the taxpayers money.

Furthermore, just look at the specifications here:
http://frontierindia.net/dissimilar-com ... -90s-specs

See the number of parameters where the Arjun MK1 beats the T-90 hands down. The ones where the T-90 is ahead, dont even translate to significant operational utility. Yet we are having this debate and the Army is now saying "MK2", while the flawed T-90 has a 1647 tank bonanza. Instead, folks have been in denial and say such data should not be accepted because it is from a "blog" - give me a break, because the numbers are correct, and I know them to be so. After understanding the debate and doing some due context digging, this part is very true:

"Firing performance of Arjun MBT is superior to T-90S in terms of accuracy (both static and dynamic situations) due to gun ammunition combination and high order of weapon stabilization coupled with auto collimated MRS. Auto collimated MRS compensates for the barrel bend. Firing performance of rjun MBT and T-90S is same in terms of defeat capability and rate of firing. "


We should just cancel the T-90 tank run at around 1000 tanks - even 800, I would say, and spend the rest of the capital expenditure and effort in indigenizing the aggregates and spares. And the rest of the 647-847 units should be Arjuns plus more to replace the older T-72s.
Last edited by Karan M on 24 Apr 2010 07:10, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Viv S » 24 Apr 2010 07:06

Mrinal wrote:
Look, you are mistaken and miss the point, allow me to elaborate since a) the Arjuns electronics issues were minor vis a vis the T-90s and second, the point was that the basic design of the tank allowed better solutions to be employed.


Well the basic differences in design are obviously very evident. The T-90 carries over the same deficiencies as the T-72, from ammo not being compartmentalized to miserable ergonomics. And IA has also had a narrow-minded 'T-72 was fine, the T-90 will be just fine too' approach.

But, in this context I was referring to defects identified during trials(that needed to be ironed out). Not as important as the basic design in the larger scheme of things, but they did manage to delay induction.

The first issue was of the Gunners main sight systems, such as LRF overheating once in a while - to the Arjuns bad luck, this happened during trials in front of bigwigs. Before that in equally harsh conditions, they worked well. They did, and hence the tank was taken for trials, where the equipment finally gave way.


But, I believe there were five tanks on trial so I don't think we can call it an one-off incident.

That said, I agree that the problems were a part of the development and not indicative of the quality of the tank's design and the IA should have recognized that fact. Instead HVF Avadi is today manufacturing Arjuns and T-90s simultaneously.

We should just cancel the T-90 tank run at around 1000 tanks, and spend the rest of the capital expenditure and effort in indigenizing the aggregates and spares. And the rest of the 647 units should be Arjuns plus more to replace the older T-72s.


Again... typical inertia in decision making will ensure by the time a decision is taken, the T-90 would have completed most of its production run. I don't believe anymore than 178 further Arjuns should be ordered. Not if the MkII will be ready by 2013 like I hear.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Karan M » 24 Apr 2010 07:20

Viv S wrote:But, in this context I was referring to defects identified during trials(that needed to be ironed out). Not as important as the basic design in the larger scheme of things, but they did manage to delay induction.


Delayed induction, because the Army held the Arjun to different standards then that of the T-90. In the larger scheme of things, these problems were minor vis a vis those on the T-90, which should have been recognised as major from day 1. The funny part is, that the Army simply did not get this, and I fear it still does not, understand how flawed the T-90 still is.

But, I believe there were five tanks on trial so I don't think we can call it an one-off incident.


It was a one off because the same problems did not exist in more gruelling trials prior to this incident. The 43 AR, in much more definitive trials had certified the gun sights and stabilization. That the problems were minor were shown up by how quickly they were resolved.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Karan M » 24 Apr 2010 07:25

Viv S wrote:Again... typical inertia in decision making will ensure by the time a decision is taken, the T-90 would have completed most of its production run. I don't believe anymore than 178 further Arjuns should be ordered. Not if the MkII will be ready by 2013 like I hear.


How so? You think that by the time a decision is taken, Avadhi would have delivered its 347 additional T-90's, plus completed a production run of 1000 more tanks? IA in its most optimistic moments does not think this will happen before 2020! Thats ten years away. Scrap the 1000 tank run at the very least!

Why should the MK1 be scrapped at 178 tanks when the Arjun MK1 is already superior to the T-90? In fact, there is little on the MK2 that cannot be retrofitted to the MK1 as well.

The Arjun production should be fixed now, not kept in abeyance waiting for a MK2 by 2013, by which time the next DGMF will ask for flying hovercraft tanks and we will be told how the Russians have offered to include a dosa maker for the thambis who operate the tank in a particular operational area, and a roti maker for another unit! In the meanwhile, this will translate to the T-90 being a super high technology tank!

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Viv S » 24 Apr 2010 08:11

Mrinal wrote:Delayed induction, because the Army held the Arjun to different standards then that of the T-90. In the larger scheme of things, these problems were minor vis a vis those on the T-90, which should have been recognised as major from day 1. The funny part is, that the Army simply did not get this, and I fear it still does not, understand how flawed the T-90 still is.


I agree the T-90's evaluation from far from fair.

It was a one off because the same problems did not exist in more gruelling trials prior to this incident. The 43 AR, in much more definitive trials had certified the gun sights and stabilization. That the problems were minor were shown up by how quickly they were resolved.


Well if it was one of the five or even two of the five tanks that were problematic one could still call it a one-off incident but the according to Col. Shukla the problems weren't restricted to one or two and the entire trial had to be called off.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Viv S » 24 Apr 2010 08:22

Mrinal wrote:How so? You think that by the time a decision is taken, Avadhi would have delivered its 347 additional T-90's, plus completed a production run of 1000 more tanks? IA in its most optimistic moments does not think this will happen before 2020! Thats ten years away. Scrap the 1000 tank run at the very least!


Well I confess I'm not very enthusiastic about the capacity of the IA to expedite the cancellation of the tank which is currently the mainstay of its armor modernization plans.

Why should the MK1 be scrapped at 178 tanks when the Arjun MK1 is already superior to the T-90? In fact, there is little on the MK2 that cannot be retrofitted to the MK1 as well.


Well as long as the production lines aren't pushing out MkIs after the MkII becomes available... :|

The Arjun production should be fixed now, not kept in abeyance waiting for a MK2 by 2013, by which time the next DGMF will ask for flying hovercraft tanks and we will be told how the Russians have offered to include a dosa maker for the thambis who operate the tank in a particular operational area, and a roti maker for another unit! In the meanwhile, this will translate to the T-90 being a super high technology tank! x


I think the Army would be more likely to sign off on an 'interim' order while the CVRDE gets the MkII ready. Considering all the demands for a futuristic tank, that should be an easier sell for the DRDO.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby a_kumar » 24 Apr 2010 09:54

Sanku wrote:a_kumar I must say that IT IS possible to have a discussion when a civil post like the one you made below is made, thanks.

Thanks and vice versa.. I have to admit, you made it difficult initially!! :)

Sanku wrote:
a_kumar wrote:..................
IN went through the 90 day option painstakingly in the past decades (building its MIL_IND complex), while IA is demanding a 10 days option (that MIL_IND complex should be there).


IA has been constantly engaged in the Arjun process, made GSQR, taught CVRDE that a tank did not mean the one in local temple (I am talking 30 years back), devoted a regiment for it. Carried out trials sent up reports invested energy and effort.



While above is true, here is something to note.

I cannot put a date to it, but as you are aware, the famous Gen. Shankar Rou Choudary said
“It is for these reasons that I have consistently argued for supporting the Indian Arjun tank,” says General Shankar Roy Chowdhury, former army chief and himself a tankman. “Another country can hold India hostage in many ways. We need to place an order for several hundred Arjun tanks so that economies of scale can kick in and we can bring down the price even further.”


You mentioned several examples of IA's support for Arjun, but all that was in 90's when its institutional organization was just as different from IN as it is now. So, what gives?

IA's support to Arjun in 90's is in some sense a reflection of vision of those like Gen. Shankar Roy Choudary. If you can point 10 issues with Arjun now, there were probably 100 issues with Arjun in 1990's. It still had IA's support.

In 2000's, it fell on others shoulders, who unfortunately didn't have the same vision as he did. I wonder how would Gen. SRC react if he had been the chief for another decade!!!!!

For IA, its an opportunity lost. In 1990's, IA did its part even when Arjun was tottering. All credit to IA, because I can imagine how difficult it can be to deal with arrogant scientists. However, under recent chiefs, IA hugged the T-90 and made it a zero-sum game, even when Arjun was peaking.

I understand you blame Arjun's delays for current state. I for one feel that, it is the IA's mindset that changed with subsequent chiefs.
If there was change in Arjun, it was that it as getting better and better. As Arjun was stabilizing in 2004-2005, vision of 90's would have done wonders.

Sanku wrote:What do you want IA to do differently? Specific examples please in specific time lines.

If I may turn this around, can you specifically point out why MIL_IND complexes needed for IN and IA are where they are?

Specifically, what makes IN so special that they now have domestic shipyards churning out cutting-edge vessels for them regularly? And what is it that stops IA from replicating it?

I understand their organizations are different, but they are different because somebody made it so, isn't it!

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby ArmenT » 24 Apr 2010 10:59

Peru suspends order of MBT-2000 tanks from China. (Yes, that's the same tank that the Pakis call the "Al-khalid" :)).
Original article is in Espanol but you can translate to English with babelfish

Interesting thing is that per the article, the deal price was set at $750 million for 120 tanks. That's $6.25 mil per tank! And some people complain about the high prices of Arjun tanks. :eek:

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby rohitvats » 24 Apr 2010 11:54

Viv S wrote:...<SNIP>Well if it was one of the five or even two of the five tanks that were problematic one could still call it a one-off incident but the according to Col. Shukla the problems weren't restricted to one or two and the entire trial had to be called off.


Viv, as per the 11th Parliamentary Standing Committe on Defense Report - 14 Lok Sabha - 2006-07, the problem was as follows:

The Ministry in their subsequent note on latest position of the Arjun Tank further stated as under:

“Five production tanks (Nos 001 to 005) were subjected to comparative trials during June 2005 wherein some defects were reported by the User with regard to (a) fire control system and (b) gun control system. In view of these defects the tanks were withdrawn by DRDO to carry out extensive re-examinations, system defect analysis, carry out rectification work and re offer at a later date as and when these tanks are fully prepared for its readiness by conducting in – House (DRDO) revalidation trials to fully satisfy the user requirements. Accordingly, a plan of action was charted out to resolve all issues.

Broadly, the problems are comprising to OEM supplies only, viz. (a) OIP Sagem Belgium – France (for GMS/LRF), and (b) Rexrath, Germany (for Gun control system). Rest are all minor issues pertaining to quality and workmanship/assembly
integration which has already been resolved.

As regards current factual status of Arjun Tank the Ministry in their written note further stated as under:

“All tanks 001 to 005 at MFFR (IMO, this stands for Mahajan Field Firing Range) are updated with complete improvements duly in house validated in respect of (a) GCS (b)Automotive systems (c) FCS systems (except for the LRF meeting 60 C temp spec). Tank No. 002 to 005 are expected to be fitted with LRF meeting 60 temp Spec by 25th May, soon thereafter Army’s evaluation will start off.”


You see the beauty of indeginious product: The problem with GCS and FCS were rectified in-house and tank turned around for further trials and validations. These problems would have been taken care of when the rest of the tanks were handed over to the Army. So, none of the 124 Arjuns planned as of now and any future orders will have this temprature setting proble. Compare this to the situation with Catherine TI heating and FCS not firing Indian ammunition problem of T-90? Where are we 8 years after induction of T-90? Issuing RFI "Environment Control System" for T-90....

The exact nature of the problem with GCS and LRF is further explained in the 14th Parliamentary Standing Committe on Defense Report - 14 Lok Sabha - 2006-07:

During oral evidence, on the production of MBT Arjun, the representative of the Ministry informed the Committee :—

<SNIP> (this section of reply has been ommitted by me)

Regarding the snag, he further stated :—

“Sir, we have driven them and for over 60,000 kms and fired more than 8,000 rounds. There was no problem. What happens is that in the gun control system, there are power amplifiers which are used in the fire control system. Some temperature settings were not properly done by the parent company. These were tucked inside. As you know, now-a-days, the deck is packaged so densely even to get access to that you have to take out the whole module. So, when this type of settings get disturbed, the rule says that one has to go through the whole qualification process again. There is no change in the design. It is a temperature re-setting which was got done. That has been rectified. Now the tanks would be there by the middle of January”.

During oral evidence, on the problems faced by MBT Arjun during trials, the representative of the Ministry apprised the
Committee :-

“In the Arjun, we got into a little bit of a problem because certain temperature-setting switches were not tuned properly. They had to be returned. Yes, this was a problem of the Defence Research Scientists who have not seen that 60 degree setting was not kept at 60, but at 55 which is a normal standard of that company which supplied those parts follow. But we had in the prototype modified that for the 60. so, this had to be done. Once this got done, now we are ready. So some of these productions hiccup if they do take place in the initial phase, they should not dispirit us because whenever we do new products like that, we may face these kinds of problems”.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Singha » 24 Apr 2010 11:57

@6.75 mil they could probably get brand new M1 or Leo2 tanks or whatever tank in the world they want.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Philip » 24 Apr 2010 14:05

IDR in its March 2010 issue had a report on the IA's "blind tanks",with an acknowledgement from the COAS that about 70-80% of the enemy's tanks (Pak and China) had "nightfighting capabilities",whereas "80%" of India's tanks were almost totally blind.Barring the T-90s,all other tanks were "blind".Arjun was not mentioned at all though in the report.The report further added that the IA was obtaining /obtained 300 + another 1000 sets TISS of night fighting devices from Israel for upgrading the large fleet of T-72s,which are being substantially upgraded.

*Indian general highlights 'night-blind' plight of army armour fleet
Indian Army chief General Deepak Kapoor has admitted that around 80 per cent of his force's main battle tanks (MBTs) are "night blind", reiterating the...
09-Feb-2010


Some pithy comments about the IA's lack of "vision" and the fact that its much vaunted "Cold Start" doctrine against Pak stops at darkness when its tanks (except for the T-90s) cannot fight! From overheating to night-blindness,it appears that the IA has allowed serious lapses to occur in the fundamental capabilities of the armoured corps.As at Longewala,some of the most important battles involving armour in history were fought at night.The mental divide between the manufacturers (DRDO/PSU) and the users (IA) was also mentioned.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby manjgu » 24 Apr 2010 15:29

Phillip,,

I am not so sure if Longewala was fought during the night.. the real destruction took place in the morning hours. only the pakis moved during the night across the desert.

which other tank battles are you referring to ?? during Desert storm??

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Manish_Sharma » 25 Apr 2010 03:50

Rohitvats wrote:
You see the beauty of indeginious product: The problem with GCS and FCS were rectified in-house and tank turned around for further trials and validations. These problems would have been taken care of when the rest of the tanks were handed over to the Army. So, none of the 124 Arjuns planned as of now and any future orders will have this temprature setting proble. Compare this to the situation with Catherine TI heating and FCS not firing Indian ammunition problem of T-90? Where are we 8 years after induction of T-90? Issuing RFI "Environment Control System" for T-90....

Sad so sad! It can't be more clear than this. :(

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Sanjay » 25 Apr 2010 04:15

I don't know if anyone can provide an answer to this:

What is the FCS fitted to Indian T-55s and Vijayantas ? I know there was supposed to be a BEL system based on a laser rangefinder but I don't know if it was actually done.

Also, does anyone have any photos to share of the T-55, Vijayanta, the Centurion and the Sherman in Indian service ?

Even a website as excellent as BR has few pics of any of these types which are a vital part of India's armour history.

Any assistance would be appreciated.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby chackojoseph » 25 Apr 2010 10:58

Viv S wrote:
anjan wrote:Fact is the Arjun had major problems in 2005, the IA decided to cut its losses and transfer its eggs to the T-90 basket.


My mind numbs when I read such things. Every one has this HTML comments on Arjun Tank. Everyone forgets that after 1996 demos, there were no serious reported cases with Arjun. The ones were calibration issues from CVRDE. At the same time, T-90's were lying on roadside (please forgive my usage), as Russians wouldn't fix its issues.

So, if Arjun has a punctured Tyre (i know it hasn't one), it goes back to the R&D organization for major design fixes. Where as the T-90's lying on roadside needs to be taken to a mechanic.

so, Army says that oh, there is a big design problem with Arjun and small problems with T-90 like sights not working etc, lets fill our baskets with T-90's.

I fail to understand the logic.

It has become like a typical story opening "once upon a time there lived....." "Since Arjun had major design problems....."

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Viv S » 25 Apr 2010 11:25

chackojoseph wrote:
My mind numbs when I read such things. Every one has this HTML comments on Arjun Tank. Everyone forgets that after 1996 demos, there were no serious reported cases with Arjun. The ones were calibration issues from CVRDE.


Calibration issues? Well okay if you say so. :|

So, if Arjun has a punctured Tyre (i know it hasn't one), it goes back to the R&D organization for major design fixes. Where as the T-90's lying on roadside needs to be taken to a mechanic.At the same time, T-90's were lying on roadside (please forgive my usage), as Russians wouldn't fix its issues.

so, Army says that oh, there is a big design problem with Arjun and small problems with T-90 like sights not working etc, lets fill our baskets with T-90's.


At no point have I advocated buying more T-90s.

I fail to understand the logic.


It has become like a typical story opening "once upon a time there lived....." "Since Arjun had major design problems....."


Again... I haven't mentioned design problems anywhere.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby chackojoseph » 25 Apr 2010 12:49

Since you have denied everything, there is nothing to argue about. :D

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Sanku » 25 Apr 2010 18:13

amit wrote:
Sanku wrote:
Where Arjun has suffered the most is lack of owner. It has no owner. It gets bounced about between a whole bunch of folks -- that in my view is the problem.


Aha Sanku, finally the start of comprehension of what folks here are trying to say. And who do you suppose was supposed to be the "owner" of a tank being built to strict specifications? The IA, na?


Actually thats the problem if you jump in right some where in between discussion without any back ground.

What I said in the above is something I have been saying for lets for many years now, including about 10 times in this very thread.

:lol:

And No IA can not be the owner. Not short of completely changing the MoD structure.

This has be explained way too many times already, look up R&D and PSU thread.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Sanku » 25 Apr 2010 18:29

a_kumar wrote:
Sanku wrote:a_kumar I must say that IT IS possible to have a discussion when a civil post like the one you made below is made, thanks.

Thanks and vice versa.. I have to admit, you made it difficult initially!! :)


Yes, It gets tiring that there are some people who flog the same dead horse when they have been told many times.

In 2000's, it fell on others shoulders, who unfortunately didn't have the same vision as he did. I wonder how would Gen. SRC react if he had been the chief for another decade!!!!!


I dont see how anything has changed in 2000s frankly. IA is still doing what it has always been doing.

The T 90 is killing the Arjun is not a true debate. The fact is Arjun is coming on its own speed. T 90s have nothing to do with it.

Frankly beating T 90s is a open fly torn shirt type of argument resorted to those who are not willing to accept that India takes so much time to make tanks.


If there was change in Arjun, it was that it as getting better and better. As Arjun was stabilizing in 2004-2005, vision of 90's would have done wonders.


I have not see a single suggestion by anyone what IA should have done at what time. Exact specific suggestions. Only general rona dhona.

Sanku wrote:Specifically, what makes IN so special that they now have domestic shipyards churning out cutting-edge vessels for them regularly? And what is it that stops IA from replicating it?


It has been mentioned many times. look up the PSU thread for my answers there. I also posted couple of Parliamentary committee reports and other reports which deal with INs evolution etc.

In short only MoD can make those changes, in fact probably only the cabinet can. The recommendations are all to the cabinet and MoD.

I understand their organizations are different, but they are different because somebody made it so, isn't it!


Yes GoI -- but as I have posted many a times that is not what I want IA to be like. Personally my solution is different.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby asprinzl » 25 Apr 2010 22:33

As a special infantryman who fought in combat while operating beside tanks armed with ERA, I will say that I would prefer to operate beside tanks that can offer protection without the need to utilize ERA. ERA is not a magic word. It can be dangerous to troops operating beside the tank. High calible machinegun fires can set off the ERA. An exploding ERA may protect the crew inside the tank but it could kill or maim the troops outside.
Avram

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Viv S » 25 Apr 2010 22:58

asprinzl wrote:As a special infantryman who fought in combat while operating beside tanks armed with ERA, I will say that I would prefer to operate beside tanks that can offer protection without the need to utilize ERA. ERA is not a magic word. It can be dangerous to troops operating beside the tank. High calible machinegun fires can set off the ERA. An exploding ERA may protect the crew inside the tank but it could kill or maim the troops outside.
Avram


Special infantryman? Where'd you see combat?

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Rahul M » 25 Apr 2010 23:03

avram, modern ERA's are not supposed to have those problems. when was this ? which version of the tank if you can share ?

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Karan M » 26 Apr 2010 01:45

VivS:
Well if it was one of the five or even two of the five tanks that were problematic one could still call it a one-off incident but the according to Col. Shukla the problems weren't restricted to one or two and the entire trial had to be called off.


Rohitvats has kindly provided the details. That apart, some more things to be aware of. These were tanks from the production batch where improperly calibrated equipment was provided. However, this was after production was cleared on the basis of rigorous trials where the FCS & stabilization system showed excellent results. Results which started appearing around 2001-02, according to data at hand, and which clearly showed that the system only needed to be matured but did not have any design defects. OTOH, as I was pointing out, the T-90 has severe design flaws which restrict the solutions that can be applied. As informed to me, the tank design is all about "compact, no space, no weight", the end result is that the tank has severe limitations in accepting any third party equipment which does not strictly conform to predefined Form Fit Factor.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Karan M » 26 Apr 2010 02:00

Philip wrote:IDR in its March 2010 issue had a report on the IA's "blind tanks",with an acknowledgement from the COAS that about 70-80% of the enemy's tanks (Pak and China) had "nightfighting capabilities",whereas "80%" of India's tanks were almost totally blind.Barring the T-90s,all other tanks were "blind".Arjun was not mentioned at all though in the report.The report further added that the IA was obtaining /obtained 300 + another 1000 sets TISS of night fighting devices from Israel for upgrading the large fleet of T-72s,which are being substantially upgraded.


Could you mention more about the 1000 sets of TISS? Is the order confirmed?

Also, what is IDR? Are you referring to Indian Defence Review (Lancers) or International Defence Review (Janes)

Some pithy comments about the IA's lack of "vision" and the fact that its much vaunted "Cold Start" doctrine against Pak stops at darkness when its tanks (except for the T-90s) cannot fight! From overheating to night-blindness,it appears that the IA has allowed serious lapses to occur in the fundamental capabilities of the armoured corps.As at Longewala,some of the most important battles involving armour in history were fought at night.The mental divide between the manufacturers (DRDO/PSU) and the users (IA) was also mentioned.


The worrisome part is that the Army considers the Armoured procurement to be relatively successful given the state of its other projects, namely gun artillery.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Viv S » 26 Apr 2010 02:10

Mrinal wrote:Rohitvats has kindly provided the details. That apart, some more things to be aware of. These were tanks from the production batch where improperly calibrated equipment was provided. However, this was after production was cleared on the basis of rigorous trials where the FCS & stabilization system showed excellent results. Results which started appearing around 2001-02, according to data at hand, and which clearly showed that the system only needed to be matured but did not have any design defects.


So, the electronics were not in fact 'hardened' to operate in very hot conditions after the trial?

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby chackojoseph » 26 Apr 2010 08:14

I will generally speak about the "calibration problems."

Due to sanctions and other reasons, equipment had to be changed from one vendor to another. They came with specific calibration requirements. Some procedures changed. We saw that in the trials at Thar. The five of the production tanks which were returned had similar issues. It takes 3 months to re calibrate systems. The incident is on internet if you search.


It was not "design issue" or "major design problem" as some people claim.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Rahul M » 26 Apr 2010 08:25

Viv S wrote:So, the electronics were not in fact 'hardened' to operate in very hot conditions after the trial?

AFAIK hardening electronics is not a trivial matter that can be done at a few weeks notice, it has to be designed from ground up.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Viv S » 26 Apr 2010 08:59

chackojoseph wrote:I will generally speak about the "calibration problems."

Due to sanctions and other reasons, equipment had to be changed from one vendor to another. They came with specific calibration requirements. Some procedures changed. We saw that in the trials at Thar. The five of the production tanks which were returned had similar issues. It takes 3 months to re calibrate systems. The incident is on internet if you search.


Well maybe I've got my definitions wrong. I'm quoting Ajai Shukla here:-

When the first shots rang out as the tanks started zeroing, the crews came out and told the trial team that the LRFs were giving wonky ranges. Totally wonky. Like indicating 600 metres instead of 2400 metres. Switches were also tripping, for no accountable reason.


Well that doesn't sound like a calibration error to me(though I admit I could be wrong).

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby chackojoseph » 26 Apr 2010 09:13

Viv S wrote:Well maybe I've got my definitions wrong. I'm quoting Ajai Shukla here:-

When the first shots rang out as the tanks started zeroing, the crews came out and told the trial team that the LRFs were giving wonky ranges. Totally wonky. Like indicating 600 metres instead of 2400 metres. Switches were also tripping, for no accountable reason.


Well that doesn't sound like a calibration error to me(though I admit I could be wrong).


You are actually quoting a calibration problem.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Austin » 26 Apr 2010 09:15

Rahul M wrote:
Viv S wrote:So, the electronics were not in fact 'hardened' to operate in very hot conditions after the trial?

AFAIK hardening electronics is not a trivial matter that can be done at a few weeks notice, it has to be designed from ground up.


The question to ask is if its "sufficiently" hardened to work in the extreme heat , the tanks would definitely have hardened electronics but may need more hardening for Indian specific extreme climate or to meet GSQR requirement.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Sanku » 26 Apr 2010 09:27

Ok for Arjun, AFAIK, its not the electronics that themselves are hardened, but it is the tank design itself which ensures sufficient cooling (airflow, large spaces, special cooling?) for the electronics.

Basically a simple analogy would be, if you put a high end graphics processor in a lap top it will die, however in a large roomy desktop with a fan etc, it works well.

This was what JCage said if I am not wrong. Any opinions?

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Austin » 26 Apr 2010 09:34

Any specific reason why 120 mm Rifled gun was chosen say compared to widely available 125 mm smooth bore gun seen on T-72/90's tank ? The 120 mm gun would itself mean specially designed ammo for Arjun than have common ammo for both tanks ?

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Anujan » 26 Apr 2010 10:25

Austin wrote:Any specific reason why 120 mm Rifled gun was chosen say compared to widely available 125 mm smooth bore gun seen on T-72/90's tank ?

GSQR called for ability to fire HESH projectiles.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby aditp » 26 Apr 2010 10:37

Austin wrote:Any specific reason why 120 mm Rifled gun was chosen say compared to widely available 125 mm smooth bore gun seen on T-72/90's tank ? The 120 mm gun would itself mean specially designed ammo for Arjun than have common ammo for both tanks ?


Just followed the Brit approach towards Chally 2. The ability to fire HESH rounds, which can receive spin from rifling. Smoothbores do not provide such a spin. Moreover, the soviet 125mm design is incapable of firing long rod penetrators due to autoloader constraints. The Russkies try to compensate with higher dia penetrators to achieve same / similar muzzle momentum but the energy is bled by increased air drag and results in inferior penetration.

Hence the GSQR requirement of NATO style 120mm gun.


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