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Kargil Revisited - II

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Postby putnanja » 23 Aug 2004 10:35

Pak initially sent militants to capture Kargil peaks: report


NEW DELHI: Pakistan had ‘‘initially sent” militants to capture Indian bunkers in Kargil before the 1999 conflict began but later used them to assist the regular Army. ‘‘Al-Badr fighters were initially sent by the Pakistan Army to occupy Indian bunkers,” a report in the Asia Times said.

‘‘Later, another ISI connection, the recently arrested Khalil and his fighters battled side-by-side with Jamaat-I-Islami leader Bakhtar Zameen Khan and the Pakistan Army against the Indian forces”, it said.

Khalil is the chief of the militant outfit, Harkat-Ul Ansar. Harkat-Ul Ansar was ‘‘a signatory of a ruling issued by Osama bin Laden in 1998 in which he announced war against the US. —(PTI)




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Postby svinayak » 27 Aug 2004 05:09

THE HISTORY MAN: Bollywood’s Kargil —Ihsan Aslam
daily TImes - Pak


Javed Akhtar says, “You cannot ignore history”. But you can certainly make a film giving your version of the history. It is now over to Lollywood for ‘Kargil 2: The Return of the Jihadis’ or ‘October 12: The Return of the Generals’

‘Lakshya’, one of the most expensive Bollywood productions, seems to have been released to mark the fifth anniversary of the Kargil crisis, the Indo-Pak tussle over Kashmir during May-July, 1999. Although focussed on India’s successful Operation Vijay against ‘Pakistani-backed freedom fighters’ who had taken control of the strategic heights in Indian-occupied Kashmir, the film is supposedly ‘not a recruitment film for the Indian Army’ but about a confused lad discovering the aim (lakshya) of his life.

“It took him 24 years and 18000 feet to find himself,” says the poster for Lakshya, which was released on June 18 and shown over the weekend at Cambridge’s new multi-screen complex Cineworld (near the railway station, if you’re interested). Hrithik Roshan plays the clueless young brat who drifts about aimlessly in life. He is so ‘hrithick’ that he is puzzled about why he is the way he is. The song ‘Main aisa kyon hoon’ (why am I like this?), which sees the lanky Roshan doing some incredible free-flowing dance moves, is a brilliant example of modern Bollywood.

Roshan’s partner in the film is Priety Zinta and together they dance around Delhi singing ‘Agar main kahoon’, the other highlight of the film. Except for another romantic number about separation and pain, the rest of the tunes are a bit of a bore. ‘Kandhaun se milte hain kandhe’ is your ‘shoulder to shoulder we stand’ ultra-patriotic number about melting stones, shadowing mountains, and striking fear in the hearts of those damn Pakistanis across the border. Equally sickening nationalistic tunes inspire Pakistani jawans on the other side of the Wagah border.

Roshan shines in this film, and that’s without taking his shirt off and flashing those huge biceps of his. Our hero discovers the aim of his life is to join the army, and to retake a strategic position in Kashmir and to hoist the Indian flag there. All this is quite well done, without the usual excessive jingoism. There is, of course, a certain feel-good factor for the Indian viewers, but the Pakistanis don’t come out entirely bad.

Like Arnold Schwarzenegger’s catchphrase ‘I’ll be back’ in Terminator, it is said of Pakistani/Kashmiri fighters that ‘they always come back’. That is, they won’t give up on Kashmir. Which means that since the Indians won’t let go either, we will continue to see conflict in the region for the foreseeable future. While the politicians and the khakis play their games, the ordinary folk of Kashmir, India and Pakistan continue to suffer. This aspect — the suffering of the poor people of the area — is hardly covered in Lakshya.

Instead, Lakshya presents a view of the Kargil Crisis (even referred by some as the ‘Fourth Indo-Pak war’) from the perspective of the Indian soldier. It tries to depict soldiers as people. One of Jawad Ahmed’s videos does the same thing (about comradeship, courage, injury and death). These are Indian and Pakistani tributes to their soldiers. This is all very well, but the suffering masses need to be respected as well.

Lakshya is not a war documentary. It is not complete fiction, either. It is part fiction, part fact. It is set in 1999 and based closely on the Kargil Crisis. Actual footage of the then Indian and Pakistani prime ministers is shown. The latter part of the film has a very newsy feel because of Priety Zinta’s role as a TV war reporter. The war scenes (all shot in the dark) are realistic as is the depiction of death and injury. “Why war?” one wonders, but there is no answer other than the one about holding one’s national flag high on some blasted high-altitude ridge along the Line of Control.

While Bollywood films are famous for showing lovers chasing each other in picturesque mountain scenes in places such as Switzerland, Lakshya portrays the mountains as menacing, the mountains over which an undeclared war is being fought. It reminds one of Clint Eastwood’s ‘Eiger Sanction’ and Sylvester Stallone’s ‘Cliffhanger’. Actually shot high up in Ladakh, the cinematography is excellent.

“You cannot ignore history,” says Lakshya’s scriptwriter and Bollywood’s famous lyricist Javed Akhtar. And the Indians won’t forget Kargil too easily. Javed’s son Farhan Akhtar has already made history with his debut ‘Dil Chahta Hai (2001),’ the trendy blockbuster with an urban setting. Young Farhan Akhtar, who belongs to a new breed of Bollywood directors with a very fresh approach, is now back with his second offering, ‘Lakshya’.

As his father says, “You cannot ignore history”, but you can certainly make a film giving your version of the history. It is now over to Lollywood for ‘Kargil 2: The Return of the Jihadis’ or ‘October 12: The Return of the Generals’.
Last edited by svinayak on 30 Aug 2004 23:54, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby Mort Walker » 29 Aug 2004 08:35

"Lakshya" is now officially out on DVD as a two disc set. It sells for anywhere between $20-$25. The DVD is quite good. The video is very good and better than most all of current Bollywood DVDs. Very little digital artifacts, compression or combing is visible. Interestingly enough, the DVD, unlike other Bollywood DVDs, no edge enhancement or extensive ringing and noise are visible. There are no garish color tones of the film, which one would typically see in most Bollywood films, but rather a realistic color pallate. The night time fire fight scenes are delibrately grainy in the style of "Saving Private Ryan", yet they are detailed shots that give the feel of a film news reel. I watched the film on a DLP projector, which are generally unforgiving for bad input sources, and this DVD was very watchable and enjoyable.

Compared to the best DVDs available, including Hollywood films, I would rank "Lakshya" for video 8 out of 10 points.

The DVD is encoded for Dolby Digital 5.1 surround sound and the mix is also very good. The guitar rifts in cliff climbing scene are great and the first three songs are also very good. There is good spatial seperation and a lack of clicks and noise that one hears on many Bollywood DVDs. The film was originally encoded in Dolby Digital 5.1 and DTS, but again, the DVD is DD 5.1 only.

Compared to the best DVDs available, I would rank "Lakshya" for audio a 9 out of 10 points.

Bottom line - "Lakshya" the DVD is well worth purchasing.

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Postby JCage » 29 Aug 2004 09:53

The war scenes (all shot in the dark) are realistic as is the depiction of death and injury. “Why war?” one wonders, but there is no answer other than the one about holding one’s national flag high on some blasted high-altitude ridge along the Line of Control.


Such pizza eating, beer swilling DDM jacka$$es need to get out of their cozy, rich parent provided for existence and actually see what is being done to protect their sorry behinds.

What pathetic fools.

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Postby jrjrao » 30 Aug 2004 02:24

A **must** read, this. Amidst the amazing self-serving lies and garbage, there is pure entertainment. And some new snippets too. What is a "Kafir Pahar" in Kargil? Some mountain, apparently, 18 miles inside the LOC on our side, and which Nasir wanted to, and knew how to, hold on to at all costs... And that failure to employ Nasir to perform this task meant that Kargil was lost... (added later: as R said, this is too precious. Posting in full)..

Kargil – the bitter hard facts

By Lt Gen (Retd) Javed Nasir

http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/aug-2004/30/columns3.php
Statements by leaders and a large numbers of articles which have appeared about Kargil in the Pakistani newspapers during the last few months make it necessary to correct the resultant distorted version conveyed to the Pakistani nation.

Kargil was very much part of the Azad Kashmir and under the control of Pakistani troops upto 1972. Because of permafrost high altitude features mostly exceeding 17000 and some even 20,000 feet ASL, logistic dumping in the area used to be carried out for scouts from May — August who used to be moved in in May and withdrawn in December each year because the position was never threatened by the Indians. Because of the humiliating surrender in East Pakistan on 17 Dec 1971, the troops even on the western front and Kashmir were highly demoralised. The Indians have always been deceitful and cunning while dealing with Pakistan.

The Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was the grand victorious leader and knew that whatever she would dictate at Simla would have to be accepted by Bhutto, therefore she took the Indian Army Chief in confidence sharing with him that she would include the following term about Kashmir in the Simla agreement. That the areas captured across CFL (ceasefire line) in Kashmir would neither be vacated nor given back, instead the present line held will be termed as LoC but areas captured across the recognized international borders would be given back by both sides on the western front.

The Indian Army Chief therefore moved his troops to occupy the vacant snow line features in Kargil. Pakistan Army Chief Gen Tikka Khan did not even have a clue of what Bhutto was going to sign at Simla. He believed that once ceasefire was agreed between Indian and Pakistani Governments all the areas under adverse occupation across the CFL would be vacated and given back to each other as was done in l965.

Bhutto on the contrary wanted to put the army in such a humiliating and disgraceful position that no Chief in future would ever dare to remove the politically elected government. After the occupation of Kargil, the Indian army opened the road along Shyok river to the mouth of Siachen and Ladakh which previously was dominated and overlooked by the Kargil heights which always had been under occupation of Pakistani scouts.

Beyond this very area the CFL. toward Siachen had been left unmarked in 1973 because of inaccessibility. The Indians neither ever claimed Siachen nor challenged Pakistan’s control over it. All the positions in Siachen being permafrost areas. Pakistan army started holding the lower features very thinly from May to November after the loss of Kargil in 1972, pulling the troops back in early December each year. Having developed the road to the mouth of Siachen glacier and Ladakh, the Indians started experimenting with adventure thinking teams in early 80s and based on their recommendations occupied the Siachen heights in April ‘84 before the Pakistani troops were to move in.

Gen Aslam Beg who could have easily occupied the seat vacated by Gen Ziaul Haq’s accidental death, because of no resistance from any quarter, took the army’s depleted image to an unimaginable height by bringing in democracy. He was the first army Chief with outstanding dual qualities of professional supremacy and field dynamics and the only one who as a student leader was a devout worker for Pakistan Movement.

He was not only my most favourite Chief Instructor and colleague but also my friend. He prepared the plans to play back Siachen on the Indians in Kargil from where the Indians like the Pakistan scouts used to pull back by end November each year and re-occupy in mid-May next year. Gen Beg had the best team at GHQ Pakistan will ever have. Gen Shamim Alam was the CGS & Gen Jahangir Karamat was the DGMO, both of whom rose to four star ranks.

This excellent team had correctly appreciated that the occupation of vacant Kafir Pahar, Damgul, Tortuk Challunka in Kargil sector which completely overlooked and dominated the road running on the bank of Shyok river to Siachen would force the Indians to vacate Siachen failing which the Indian troops in the area with their logistics completely consumed and exhausted would be left with no option but to withdraw or surrender, unless they resorted to the most vulnerable heli-lifted supplies which too would have been limited.

The plan was presented to President Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Benazir in 1989. The response of the President was typically bureaucratic non-committal, but Benazir very curtly disapproved the plan. I met Gen S.R Kallue (R) the DGI, who was my best friend, who disclosed to me that during the pre–GHQ briefing he had advised Benazir that because of India’s undisputed nuclear, qualitative and quantitative overwhelming superiority and the freedom struggle by Kashmiris being in a very preliminary stage, the time was not ripe to go for such an operation for to retaliate it the Indian army will be forced to resort to major escalation, including war, which Pakistan, with its prevalent economic state and relative inferiority of strength, would not be able to endure.

I then met Gen. Beg to console him since he was highly disappointed and disheartened by Benazir’s curt rejection which according to him strongly reflected the sense of revenge about his father’s hanging by a military dictator, rather than an assessment of the prevalent situation whereby India had committed the blunder of getting three of its divisions committed in Sri Lanka and as such would not be in a position to go to war with Pakistan.

By December 1998 the power balance in the subcontinent had undergone a major change by the certification made by the pro-Indian western media that Pakistan’s three nuclear explosions in May 1998 had proved that its nuclear technology was far superior to the Indian technology. Mujahideen’s operations in Kashmir, particularly their too frequently successful and daringly bold suicidal missions and a too frequent turnover which was making all ranks serving in Kashmir due for the next tenure within 1½ year after the completion of the running tenure, had completely sunk Indian troops morale in Kashmir.

This had forced the Indian Chief to thin the fighting strength even from armoured regiments, air defence and artillery units of the defensive as well as strike formations from the main land, thus inducting major strategic and tactical imbalances rendering the formations inoperative for all type of operations on the main land should a war break out.
When Gen. Musharraf was appointed the Chief, his dynamically decision making personality was instantly reflected when within the first hour of his having taken over he issued orders for the postings of six Lieutenant Generals of his choice which included both the CGS and Chaklala Corps Commander. His choice CGS, as a brigadier, had served in FCNA as a Brigade Commander and Chief of Staff in the Chaklala Corps.

He proposed to the Chief a number of times to go ahead with the plan of occupation of Kargil. The Chief had himself while serving as DGMO minutely gone through the 1989 script of the plan which had not been approved by Benazir. From his excellent experience as instructor in the War Wing at the National Defence College he knew how to carry out the most critical analysis. He correctly evaluated that in the event of Pakistan Army occupying Kargil as a playback on Indians what they did to Pakistan in Siachen in 1984, the Indian Army would neither be in a position to undertake hot pursuit operations nor in a position to fight even a defensive battle should the conflict be enlarged and carried over to the international borders.

After a brilliant analysis, Gen Musharraf as the Chief perhaps gave the green signal. The responsibility beyond this point was that of his team comprising the CGS, Corps Commander, DGMO, Commander FCNA. Whether correct methodology was followed to get the government approval, and the operational instruction evolved, highlighted the most salient point that the occupation of the vacant Kargil feature would not involve even the firing of a single bullet but the measures to be taken for denial thereafter of the vital tactical features would be of utmost importance.

The question is whether these were identified alongwith the period for which the Indians were to be denied access to these features under all circumstances – which entailed strengthening through sufficient strength and defensive measures, logistical buildup and maximum possible fire power to beat back Indian attempts to capture the features to open the road to Siachen. This was to be done irrespective of the fact whether troops occupying Kargil positions were to be second line forces or even Mujahideen.
Pakistan Army instead as a cover plan gave the credit to Mujahideen for the occupation of these positions. Somehow it skipped the vital fact that Pakistan Army was to come in by all means to thwart Indian attempts to recapture these positions. Prior approval by the PM was a must for total support as this operation would instantly become an international issue and might lead to a war between India and Pakistan if India failed to take back Kargil.

I learnt about the occupation of Kargil by Pakistani troops for the first time at the end of March ‘99 in Karachi from a civilian whose brother was an officer in NLI. When I met PM Nawaz Sharif, in connection with Pakistan Sikh Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee as the Chairman ETPB, in the first week of April ‘99 when I asked him about Kargil, he had no idea. In May I met the Air Chief who told me that he and the Naval Chief learnt about the Kargil operation for the first time in April ‘99 when a presentation was made to the PM by Army Chief Gen Musharraf.

Caretaker PM Shujaat, who has been repeatedly quoted in the press as saying that Gen Musharraf had given five or six detailed briefings to Nawaz Sharif is absolutely correct, but in which month Kargil was occupied and when was the first briefing given by Gen Musharraf to Nawaz Sharif has perhaps been deliberately omitted. This is the most cardinal issue of Kargil which has not been cleared by anyone so far.

When the Kargil operation came in the open in May ‘99 I requested Nawaz Sharif to recommend to the Army Chief to make me the in charge of logistics build-up in the Kargil area for which he should place my services at the Army Chief’s disposal for one or two months. It is most unfortunate that Nawaz Sharif had some self-oriented advisors who were best in rendering most unprofessional advice. The PM did not convey this to Gen Musharraf and thereafter avoided me.

I therefore called on Gen Musharraf who was not only one of my instructors in the War Wing of NDC whom I had always rated as one of the best, but we also had the best of relations with each other and had been meeting off and on after he was made the Chief. I offered him my services for the logistics buildup in Kargil but he thanked me very much and gave full assurance that the logistics buildup though difficult was already going on very efficiently.

After The first two attacks on Kafir Pahar by the Indian troops who were beaten back with very heavy casualties on the Indian side, I met him again and informed him that I was going to include a statement from his side in my article to the effect that while addressing the Army troops in a formation, Gen Musharraf had stated that in case India committed the blunder of undertaking any hot pursuit operations in Kashmir, Pakistan would have the option to strike at the place of its choosing across the international border where Indians holding defensive and strike formations suffer from strategic and tactical imbalances and were not in a position to fight even a defensive battle. This would prevent the initiation of total war between the two sides, and as such his DG ISPR should not comment on it. I gave this in my article which appeared in the newspapers in first week of July `99.

After the NLI troops were pulled back from Kargil and the Indian Army reoccupied the positions, the Indian Government held a court of inquiry which was published in the Indian papers. Our press also reproduced the same whereupon I met Nawaz Sharif and suggested to him to immediately order an inquiry but his advisory group had repeatedly made him commit such major blunders which had spoiled his relations with Gen Musharraf to an irretrievable depth of the dungeon of misunderstandings.
Learning about these from the third parties, I tried my best to meet Nawaz Sharif to suggest to him to remove and clear those misunderstandings between him and Musharraf but he kept avoiding me. Much later he did call me thrice during Oct 1999 but I could not meet him because of my wife who was seriously ill and left this world for eternal heavens on 14 October 1999. By then it had become too late.

Gen Musharraf had given the green light to his team after a brilliant analysis carried out personally by him but his team faulted in the correct application of the methodology and thus in achieving the most vital core objective on the success of which the Indian reaction was to be based which was the opening of LoC to Siachen which was possible only if the Indians succeeded in recapturing Kafir Pahar features which completely dominated the road running along Shyok river.

Had Pakistan retained this feature till end July, the Indian troops in Siachen would have been starved because of the non-availability of any Kerosene oil, a must to melt the ice to make even drinking water. Denial of this position till and July would have forced the Indian troops in Siachen either to abandon or to surrender. Therefore questions arise. Was the significance of this fact highlighted in the operational instructions and was the Kafir Pahar position allocated sufficient troops and the logistics dumping to last till end August which was most difficult because it was approximately 18 kms from the LoC? Were sufficient guns and ammunition concentrated in range to beat back Indian attacks?
No features other than the ones overlooking the LoC to Siachen merited the same attention as the Kafir Pahar. Were any serving or retired officers from Infantry having served in the area and risen subsequently to the Gen’s rank like Maj. Gen. Bokhari -- who like the CGS had commanded a Brigade in FCNA, been COS of Chaklala Corps and DMO as well, and to beat all had been one of the top three Infantry Gens whom I would rate the best in the understanding and applications of operational strategy (the other two being Maj Gen Anwar and Lt Gen Usmani). The success or failure of the entire operation depended upon the retention of these vital features -- as such their advice would have been most invaluable. Likewise Gen Rahat Latif (FF) had served in the Kargil area as a Capt in scouts when it used to be part of the liberated Azad Kashmir.

His briefing on the significance of Kafir Pahar would have been also invaluable. Based on the findings of the inquiry reports the Indian Government has sacked apart from Brigs, Lt Cols and Majs, a Maj Gen (GOC 3 Inf Div facing FCNA who had been approved for the next rank) because of false reporting and certain command failures. On the contray, on the Pakistan side from the information and details available so far many major slips appear to have been made not by Gen Musharraf but by his team in the application of methodology and the evolution, implementation and execution of the operational instructions but, unlike the Indian side, instead of sacking, some have already been promoted.

What actually happened and who committed the blunder in his team? Gen Musharraf must constitute an inquiry commission comprising all retired officers to be headed by either Gen Aslam Beg or Gen Shamim Alam including Gen Bukhari (FF), Gen Anwar (AK), Gen Usmani (FF) and the author so that the entire nation comes to know the true facts and Pakistan does not miss a similar historical and golden opportunity in the manner we did at Kargil.
Last edited by jrjrao on 30 Aug 2004 02:36, edited 2 times in total.

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Postby vksac » 30 Aug 2004 04:01

jrjrao wrote:A **must** read, this. Amidst the amazing self-serving lies and garbage, there is pure entertainment. And some new snippets too. What is a "Kafir Pahar" in Kargil? Some mountain, apparently, 18 miles inside the LOC on our side, and which Nasir wanted to, and knew how to, hold on to at all costs... And that failure to employ Nasir to perform this task meant that Kargil was lost... (added later: as R said, this is too precious. Posting in full)..

Kargil – the bitter hard facts

By Lt Gen (Retd) Javed Nasir

http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/aug-2004/30/columns3.php
Statements by leaders and a large numbers of articles which have appeared about Kargil in the Pakistani newspapers during the last few months make it necessary to correct the resultant distorted version conveyed to the Pakistani nation.'''''' we did at Kargil.


This B*st**d does'nt seem to realize what an LGB can do to any fortification.
Breat indian backs....it seems..sala.

He needs to know what an LGB is or he needs to know what this baby does.

http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/ ... _Lite.html

He should even see the beautiful clip I saw on ndtv when tiger hill was blasted out by our mirages....only then he will realize what is talking about.
This whole ariticle is based on army's thinking and planning. There is no role of air-power which can single handedly finish any fortification.
Actually I think he is as ignorant in the world as....mexicans(oops). Pukis ask for F-16/gripens.....even the training instructors are going to start getting headaches teaching them how to fly planes. He talks of going to war colleges...I dont thinking he knows a single bit of how modern wars are fought where the role of air-power plays an important role. Just imagine how he will look when one of our brahmos/prithiv lands close to his backyard finishing off all of his much cherished nuclear technology that he thinks is superrior. This is precisely why I am lobbying hard for the Arrow -2.
I want these a*s-h**es to go through the same what they went through in 1971(He does'nt even know when the war was fought). All they can think is kashmir...they teach their children also to pick up assualt rifles like AKs-47s. They sell it in the streets for rs 5000 in city streets. God knows what quality it will be.

They deserve to be in this position all through out.

Inko Dunde ki bhasha samaj aaati hai nothing else.

I hate reading articles like these where people dont know what they are talking about and waste time of every-one. Go ask any tom,dick hary...

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Postby Yerna » 30 Aug 2004 07:22

Not directly related to kargil war.

Pak proxy war costs Rs 50 cr

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Postby Babui » 30 Aug 2004 21:22

I'm guessing "Kafir Pahar" is probably Tololing in the Drass sector.

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Postby Manne » 31 Aug 2004 08:35

I can rest easy now. Just count the number of times 'brilliant analysis' appears in that chindhi and you'll know what I mean. With haanjis like these, who needs an ego trip!

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Postby Vivek K » 31 Aug 2004 09:52

Babui wrote:I'm guessing "Kafir Pahar" is probably Tololing in the Drass sector.

Tololing or Tiger Hill?

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Postby Vivek_A » 04 Sep 2004 05:34

VIEW: Secrecy and uncertainty —Shaukat Qadir

There was the disturbing possibility of a sonic boom, caused by an Indian aircraft rather than our own. Was not there one a few years ago? On that occasion (in 1999?) we had learnt that the boom was deliberately caused by a reconnaissance Indian aircraft which we had failed to identify. Inevitably, it was followed by a scathing criticism of the PAF. So, would it suit the authorities to say this time that the sound was caused by a PAF aircraft even if it was indeed again caused by an Indian aircraft? This would explain the initial denial. It would be easier than the lengthier, though accurate, explanation that the Indian reconnaissance aircraft can fly so high that none of our aircraft can intercept them.

Irrespective of its truth in a particular instance, the lack of public faith in the official version is the result not only of the mysterious circumstances, but also a long history of lies and half-truths. Our troops, after all, never occupied the Kargil heights but received gallantry awards, including the Nishan-e-Haider, for courage beyond the call of duty! :D

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Postby jrjrao » 07 Sep 2004 02:12

F. Babar nails and screws and rivets Javed Nasir to the wall for his stupid rant linked and discussed above.

Kargil: some more hard facts
http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/sep-2004/7/columns3.php
FARHATULLAH BABAR
In writing about what he calls ‘the bitter hard facts’ about Kargil the former ISI chief Lt General (Retd) Javed Nasir has sought to absolve General Pervez Musharraf ‘my instructor in the War Wing of the National Defence College’ of the Kargil debacle and blames the executioners of the plan who ‘faulted in the correct application of the methodology’ of the plan. (“Kargil- the bitter Hard Facts”, The Nation, August 30) But history is a ruthless judge of men and matters. Its verdict is not influenced by evidence like ‘whom I had always rated as the best’ coming from a bystander of events who also had ‘the best of relations’ with General Musharraf. Objective history must depend more on the analysis of hard facts.

Javed Nasir was not an actor in the Kargil misadventure. He was a bystander who by his own account asked Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif “to make me in charge of logistics in the Kargil area”. With a fixation about the ability of his instructor “to carry out the most critical analysis” and himself wanting to take over the command of logistics of the operation, Lt General Javed Nasir sees the plan as brilliant but laments the way it was executed by dwarfs surrounding Musharraf.

Former ISI chief may like to believe that his becoming in charge of the logistics would have brought together the ‘brilliant analyst’ and master logistician on the same side at the same time and turned the tables on the Indians. As there is no ban on the flight of fanciful imagination the former general may be permitted to indulge in this fancy. The supposition that the Chief’s responsibility lay only in making “a brilliant analysis” and thereafter it was not his but his team’s (identified as Chief of General Staff, Corps Commander, Director General Military Operations and Commander FCNA) job to carry it out successfully, is both naive and dangerously faulty. What is ‘brilliant’ about a plan the implementation of which cannot be guaranteed? And where is the ability of carrying out “the most critical analysis” when such simple fact is lost sight of that neither India nor the international community would permit it?

It is unbelievable that a former Lt General should advance in such spurious logic. If all generals really think like him it is all the more reason why issues of war should not be left to them alone, being too serious.

Accordingly to the writer “General Musharraf correctly evaluated that in the event of Pakistan Army occupying Kargil, the Indian Army would neither be in a position to undertake hot pursuit operations nor in a position to fight even a defensive battle should the conflict be enlarged”. It is offensive even to the meanest intelligence to say that this evaluation was ‘correct’ and that after making this ‘brilliant’ evaluation the responsibility was no longer that of General Musharraf.

A case of a brilliant former general paying compliments to the brilliance of another general. Isn’t it?

Was it a correct evaluation? Certainly not. When Kargil was occupied the Indians launched a massive diplomatic, military and political offensive forcing Pakistan to withdraw its troops from Kargil. General Anthony Zinni in his book Battle Ready says about Kargil, “ I met with the Pakistani leaders in Islamabad on June 24 and 25 and put forth a simple rationale for withdrawing: If you do not pull back, you are going to bring war and nuclear annihilation down on your country. That’s going to be very bad news for every body”. He then goes on to add, “Nobody actually quarreled with this rationale”. It is strange that the brilliant visionary who did not quarrel with this rationale in June was unable to anticipate it early that year.

As a result of Kargil the bluff of nuclear deterrence was called. Nuclear Pakistan could not deter India from deploying its troops on the borders and adopting coercive diplomacy. Nuclear Pakistan had to back down from Kargil. As a result of Kargil also the genuine struggle of the Kashmiri people was reduced to cross border terrorism as no one talked of liberation movement but of jehadis sent into Kashmir by Islamabad. It did not internationalize the Kashmir issue. On the other hand it internationalized the issue of cross border terrorism so much that even China had to caution Pakistan against exporting jehadi zeal. As a result of Kargil, Pakistan was isolated as never before. It is therefore quite clear that the Kargil led to consequences, which the ‘brilliant analyst’ who had the ability to carry out the ‘most critical analysis’ failed to anticipate.

Nawaz Shairf claims that he was kept in the dark about the Kargil plan. Chaudhry Shujaat says that he is prepared to affirm on oath that Nawaz Shairf was briefed and knew about it. The central issue is when Kargil was occupied and when Nawaz Sharif was briefed about it. This can be ascertained only through an independent commission of inquiry and not on the testimony of a personal friend ‘not only my most favorite chief instructor but also my colleague’. Lt General Nasir has also taken a swipe at Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for allegedly agreeing to include in the Simla agreement the condition that ‘the areas captured across ceasefire line in Kashmir would neither be vacated nor given back’. He says Bhutto did this ‘to put the Army in such a humiliating and disgraceful position that no Chief in future would ever dare to remove the politically elected government”.
Simla agreement is not a secret document and is publicly available. One only has to read it to know the lie in the assertion that there is a clause in it about Kashmir, which requires that areas captured across the ceasefire line, would neither be vacated nor given back. The lie is also unwittingly exposed by General Nasir himself as he says in the same breath, “the Indian army chief therefore moved his troops to occupy the vacant snow line features in Kargil”.

The question is that if Kargil was already under Indian occupation why should the Indian army chief move his troops to the ‘vacant snow line features’ in Kargil. And if Kargil was not in Indian occupation then and Indian troops moved later to occupy it, who was to blame; Bhutto for ‘wanting to humiliate the Army’ or the military leadership whose responsibility it was to defend Pakistani territory?

If Bhutto wanted to heap humiliation on the Army he would have allowed Shaikh Mujib to proceed with the war crimes which have now come to public knowledge after the publication of Hamood Commission report. If he wanted to humiliate the Army he would not have striven to bring back the tens of thousands of soldiers back from humiliating captivity in India. In fact in the view of some he went too far in saving the Army from humiliation by not allowing the court martial of those responsible for war crimes. The writer also laments that a Kargil like plan was also submitted to Benazir Bhutto in 1989 but she ‘very curtly disapproved the plan’. History has proved that her curt disapproval saved Pakistan from humiliation, which was later to be heaped on it not by Bhuttos but by the Bonaparts.
[/quote]

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Postby putnanja » 08 Sep 2004 03:57

Pak owns up, remembers officer killed during Kargil

ISLAMABAD, SEPTEMBER 7: Pakistan Army paid homage to a captain who was killed during the Kargil conflict in 1999 at a ceremony in the North-West Frontier Province.

The Army held a special ceremony at the grave of Captain Karnail Sher Khan at his native town Karnail Sher Khan Kili in NWFP on Monday as part of commemorative ceremonies in connection with Defence Day observed all over Pakistan to remember the defence personnel killed since the 1965 Indo-Pak war, the official APP news agency reported.

‘‘Brigadier Iftikhar-Ul-Haq, commander, Artillery 7 Division placed a floral wreath and offered fateha (prayers), while a smartly turned out contingents of Northern Light Infantry (NLI) Regiment presented the salute to pay respects to their officer,’’ it said.




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Postby Vivek_A » 12 Sep 2004 09:37

Very interesting article...

[url=http://www.the-week.com/24sep12/currentevents_article10.htm]Siachen, a stronghold
K2 THE PEAK OF POTENTIAL DISPUTE[/url]

In early August, the two sides agreed to discuss modalities to disengage from Siachen, but sources in the Army are not very optimistic. "We hold the high ground on the Saltoro range," said an officer. "There is no need to come down unless Pakistan agrees that the Saltoro line is the actual ground position line. But why would they do it, when they say that the entire glacier region belongs to them and deny themselves any claim on those sources of water?"

The Army also believes that Pakistan could do a Kargil in Siachen if India vacates the Saltoro ridge. "What is the guarantee that they won’t come and occupy the posts the moment we vacate, just like they did in Kargil?" asks a senior officer.

According to the Army, the horror stories of fighting in Siachen are mostly of the 1980s vintage, when a brigade landed there without even snow-boots. "Yes, there are more weather ‘casualties’ than bullet casualties," says the officer. "But casualty doesn’t mean death. We immediately evacuate them and there are very modern medical facilities in the base camps. The death toll today is negligible. Kerosene is pumped up through pipelines; supply drops are no longer a problem. We have snow-mobiles and boots. We can stay there as long as we want. Siachen is today just another high altitude station."

When India protested, Pakistan began preparations for physically occupying the glacier region. Patrols were sent up immediately, which confirmed that the Pakistanis were preparing to move. The Indian Army then landed a brigade on the Saltoro ridge, and there they stay till date. The Pakistan army has since been trying to dislodge them, but in vain. One of the attacks on Bilafond La was mounted by Pervez Musharraf when he was commanding a brigade there.

Why waste Rs 5 crore a day for about 8,000 sq. km where nothing grows? "Don’t forget, it is the third biggest reservoir of fresh water after the two poles," says Col. Kumar. Besides, India’s control over Siachen would prevent China and Pakistan developing a combined offensive towards Ladakh.

Secondly, Siachen overlooks the Gilgit region, which is part of the Northern Areas. By sitting on Saltoro, India has a toehold on the Northern Areas and can bargain from a position of strength in any future talks on Kashmir and the Northern Areas. By extension, that includes the territories ceded by Pakistan to China and even K2.

In fact, as Lt.-Gen. V.R. Raghavan says, Pakistan did bring it up in one of the many rounds of talks on Siachen. There has been a clamour for a separate state of Balwaristan, comprising Baltistan and Gilgit (in today’s Northern Areas). "The compulsions of Paki-stan in strengthening its political control over Baltistan, and its need to possess the Siachen glacier, forced it to claim that the Nubra valley area is part of Baltistan," he says. But India countered that Nubra valley is in Ladakh.

Holding on to Siachen is important for both sides to make future claims—be it for water, sovereignty over the mountains or preventing the other from mounting offensives to capture other territo-ries. After all, ever since warfare began, high ground has been of advantage to the holder. As an officer puts it, "We can always come down. But don’t ask us to capture it again, after the Pakistanis come in."

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Postby Arun_S » 12 Sep 2004 11:01

Kargil ghost stirs: THE TELEGRAPH
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1040912/a ... st~stirs~+]~-->

OUR CORRESPONDENT
Chandigarh, Sept. 11: Memories of Kargil have been rekindled with armed militants continuing to tip-toe into Indian territory with alarming regularity from the Poonch-Rajouri sector of Jammu division.

“The continuous flow of militants... is indicative of yet another attempt to occupy strategic peaks in the region, within and outside the LoC. We are estimating that nearly 3,000 militants are waiting to occupy certain peaks in the Pir Panjal range. Force may have to be used to cleanse the infiltrated areas,” a northern command officer said from Udhampur.

The army has been receiving information about the militants’ plans to occupy peaks that are normally not manned by India owing to treacherous terrain.

Members of the Gujjar and Bakarwal nomadic tribes, who live in the upper reaches of the mountains and are sometimes forced by militants to ferry arms, ammunition and explosives to “safe havens”, are believed to be the informants.

“We are keeping a strict watch on all movements in the region. But even if all soldiers of the Pakistan and Indian armies posted in the area stand arm-in-arm, infiltration would continue unabated. We are, however, worried that even after Operation Sarp Vinash last year, Pakistan continues to push militants inside Indian territory. The firing during intrusions may have stopped but infiltration continues as before,” the officer added.

Operation Sarp Vinash had brought into light the existence of a fully functional transit camp with arms and ammunition, communication equipment and large stores of ration that could sustain 500 men for at least 15 days. While the exercise was hailed a success for preventing a Kargil-like situation, senior officers admitted it was an intelligence failure.

Five militants, arrested 2 km inside Indian territory from the Hiranagar sector of Jammu on August 22, told interrogators about a plan to occupy some of the mountain ranges. The arrest also laid bare gaping holes that have allowed militants to cross over even in areas where infiltration was claimed to be “impossible”.

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Postby Rishi » 15 Sep 2004 08:12

High Altitude Warfare: The Kargil Conflict and the Future

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/th ... osta03.pdf

Abstract:
Marcus P. Acosta, CPT, U.S. Army, June 2003

The unique combination of thin air, freezing temperatures, and mountainous terrain that forms the high altitude environment has resisted advances in military technology for centuries. The emergence of precision warfare has altered the nature of warfare on most of the world’s surface, yet has not significantly changed the conduct of ground combat at high altitude. The tactics that lead to victory on the high altitude battlefield have remained constant over time. This thesis examines the impact of the high altitude environment on soldiers, their weapons, and military operations, and identifies the lessons of the 1999 Kargil Conflict that are relevant to future high altitude combat. Combat at altitudes approaching 18,000 feet (5,485 m) above sea level between India and Pakistan at Kargil illustrates the timeless nature of high altitude warfare. U.S. combat experiences in the mountains of Afghanistan in 2002 parallel those of the combatants at Kargil despite the overwhelming technological advantage of U.S. forces. Trained and well-equipped light infantry is the only force capable of decisive maneuver in mountainous terrain. Heavy volumes of responsive firepower, in concert with bold maneuver, determine victory. Artillery, rather than air power, remains the preferred source of firepower to support ground maneuver.

Note: Is there any info available on Major N.S.Cheema's attack to capture Balal post (mentioned in the thesis)"

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Postby Yerna » 15 Sep 2004 10:52

Reference to BR in page 16
43 Chindu Sreedharan, “Flying in the Face of Danger,” Rediff (June 1999) at <http://www.bharatrakshak.
com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Articles/Article9.html> (August 2002).

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Postby Arun_S » 15 Sep 2004 11:22

rishi wrote:High Altitude Warfare: The Kargil Conflict and the Future

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/th ... osta03.pdf
[/b]


Thanks for a very interesting and complelling reading material.

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re: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/Acosta03.pdf

Postby rajpa » 15 Sep 2004 11:48

site seems down... anybody have a copy of it, could you pls email.?

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Re: re: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/Acosta03

Postby Rishi » 15 Sep 2004 15:13

rajpa wrote:site seems down... anybody have a copy of it, could you pls email.?


I have it. Pretty good read.

Mail to rishi at aero.iitb.ac.in

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Postby ramana » 15 Sep 2004 19:12

cross posted for completeness...
Rangudu
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http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4506

Quote:
The Day A Nuclear Conflict Was Averted

During the 1999 Kargil crisis, Clinton's forceful diplomacy pulled Pakistan back from the nuclear brink

Strobe Talbott
YaleGlobal, 13 September 2004

WASHINGTON: During the first week in June [1999], just as Milosevic was acceding to NATO’s demands over Kosovo, Clinton turned his own attention to India and Pakistan.


In letters to Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee, the president went beyond the studied neutrality that both prime ministers were expecting—in Pakistan’s case with hope, and in India’s with trepidation. Clinton made Pakistan’s withdrawal a precondition for a settlement and the price it must pay for the U.S. diplomatic involvement it had long sought. Clinton followed up with phone calls to the two leaders in mid-June emphasizing this point.


The United States condemned Pakistan’s “infiltration of armed intruders” and went public with information that most of the seven hundred men who had crossed the Line of Control were attached to the Pakistani Army’s 10th Corps.


In late June Clinton called Nawaz Sharif to stress that the United States saw Pakistan as the aggressor and to reject the fiction that the fighters were separatist guerrillas. The administration let it be known that if Sharif did not order a pullback, we would hold up a $100 million International Monetary Fund loan that Pakistan sorely needed. Sharif went to Beijing, hoping for comfort from Pakistan’s staunchest friend, but got none.


Pakistan was almost universally seen to have precipitated the crisis, ruining the promising peace process that had begun in Lahore and inviting an Indian counteroffensive.


On Friday, July 2, Sharif phoned Clinton and pleaded for his personal intervention in South Asia. Clinton replied that he would consider it only if it was understood up-front that Pakistani withdrawal would have to be immediate and unconditional.


The next day Sharif called Clinton to say that he was packing his bags and getting ready to fly immediately to Washington—never mind that he had not been invited. ..He warned Sharif not to come unless he was prepared to announce unconditional withdrawal; otherwise, his trip would make a bad situation worse. The Pakistani leader did not accept Clinton’s condition for the meeting—he just said he was on his way.


“This guy’s coming literally on a wing and a prayer,” said the president.” That’s right,” said Bruce Riedel [NSC aide], “and he’s praying that we don’t make him do the one thing he’s got to do to end this thing.”


It was not hard to anticipate what Sharif would ask for. His opening proposal would be a cease-fire to be followed by negotiations under American auspices. His fallback would make Pakistani withdrawal conditional on Indian agreement to direct negotiations sponsored and probably mediated by the United States. Either way, he would be able to claim that the incursion had forced India, under American pressure, to accept Pakistani terms.


After several long meetings in Sandy Berger’s office, we decided to recommend that Clinton confront Sharif with a stark choice that included neither of his preferred options. We would put before him two press statements and let Sharif decide which would be released at the end of the Blair House talks. The first would hail him as a peacemaker for retreating—or, as we would put it euphemistically, “restoring and respecting the sanctity of the Line of Control.” The second would blame him for starting the crisis and for the escalation sure to follow his failed mission to Washington.


On the eve of Sharif’s arrival, we learned that Pakistan might be preparing its nuclear forces for deployment. There was, among those of us preparing for the meeting, a sense of vast and nearly unprecedented peril. When Clinton assembled his advisers in the Oval Office for a last minute huddle, Sandy told him that overnight we had gotten more disturbing reports of steps Pakistan was taking with its nuclear arsenal. Clinton said he would like to use this information “to scare the hell out of Sharif.”

Sandy told the president that he was heading into what would probably be the single most important meeting with a foreign leader of his entire presidency. It would also be one of the most delicate. The overriding objective was to induce Pakistani withdrawal. But another, probably incompatible, goal was to increase the chances of Sharif’s political survival. “If he arrives as a prime minister but stays as an exile,” said Sandy, “he’s not going to be able to make stick whatever deal you get out of him.” We had to find a way to provide Sharif just enough cover to go home and give the necessary orders to Musharraf and the military.


The conversation had already convinced Clinton of what he feared: the world was closer even than during the Cuban missile crisis to a nuclear war. Unlike Kennedy and Khrushchev in 1962, Vajpayee and Sharif did not realize how close they were to the brink, so there was an even greater risk that they would blindly stumble across it.


Adding to the danger was evidence that Sharif neither knew everything his military high command was doing nor had complete control over it. When Clinton asked him if he understood how far along his military was in preparing nuclear-armed missiles for possible use in a war against India, Sharif acted as though he was genuinely surprised. He could believe that the Indians were taking such steps, he said, but he neither acknowledged nor seemed aware of anything like that on his own side.


Clinton decided to invoke the Cuban missile crisis, noting that it had been a formative experience for him (he was sixteen at the time). Now India and Pakistan were similarly on the edge of a precipice. If even one bomb were used…Sharif finished the sentence: “. . . it would be a catastrophe.”


[Clinton] returned to the offensive. He could see they were getting nowhere. Fearing that might be the result, he had a statement ready to release to the press in time for the evening news shows that would lay all the blame for the crisis on Pakistan.

Sharif went ashen.

Clinton bore down harder. Having listened to Sharif’s complaints against the United States, he had a list of his own, and it started with terrorism. Pakistan was the principal sponsor of the Taliban, which in turn allowed Osama bin Laden to run his worldwide network out of Afghanistan. Clinton had asked Sharif repeatedly to cooperate in bringing Osama to justice. Sharif had promised to do so but failed to deliver. The statement the United States would make to the press would mention Pakistan’s role in supporting terrorism in Afghanistan—and, through its backing of Kashmiri militants, in India as well. Was that what Sharif wanted?


Clinton had worked himself back into real anger—his face flushed, eyes narrowed, lips pursed, cheek muscles pulsing, fists clenched. He said it was crazy enough for Sharif to have let his military violate the Line of Control, start a border war with India, and now prepare nuclear forces for action. On top of that, he had put Clinton in the middle of the mess and set him up for a diplomatic failure.


Sharif seemed beaten, physically and emotionally. He denied he had given any orders with regard to nuclear weaponry and said he was worried for his life.


When the two leaders had been at it for an hour and a half, Clinton suggested a break so that both could consult with their teams. The president and Bruce briefed Sandy, Rick, and me on what had happened. Now that he had made maximum use of the “bad statement” we had prepared in advance, Clinton said, it was time to deploy the good one. ..Clinton took a cat nap on a sofa in a small study off the main entryway while Bruce, Sandy, Rick, and I cobbled together a new version of the “good statement,” incorporating some of the Pakistani language from the paper that Sharif had claimed was in play between him and Vajpayee. But the key sentence in the new document was ours, not his, and it would nail the one thing we had to get out of the talks: “The prime minister has agreed to take concrete and immediate steps for the restoration of the Line of Control.” The paper called for a cease-fire but only after the Pakistanis were back on their side of the line. It reaffirmed Clinton’s longstanding plan to visit South Asia.


The meeting came quickly to a happy and friendly end, at least on Clinton’s part.

Adapted from Strobe Talbott's "Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb" (Brookings Institution Press). Talbott, former Deputy Secretary of State is the President of the Brookings Institution. Copyright © 2004, The Brookings Institution


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ramana
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Quite a self serving account by Strobe Talbott if I may say so. Why doesnt he nominate Clinton for Peace Prize?

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Rangudu
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ramana wrote:
Quite a self serving account by Strobe Talbott if I may say so. Why doesnt he nominate Clinton for Peace Prize?


Exactly. I'll try to get a review of Talbott's book by M.D.Nalapat where he says the same thing. Very self-serving.

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ramana
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I said my piece about Strobe for it was Brajesh Mishra who told Sandy Berger before the Sharif mtg that they have 72 hrs before the XXI corps rolls in. So what is is all this sanctimonius BS about how the US which aided and abetted the acquisition of nukes by TSP via China and slapped feeble and minimum sanctions to comply with US laws?

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sunil s
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I am grateful to Strobe Talbott for having brought that peculiar drama to our attention. So if I understand correctly the negotiation positions were the following:

Nawaz: Questionable control over the military, requests US intervention to save his premiership in Pakistan. Does not want to be seen backing down on the Kargil thing because it will cost him his life and fortune.

Clinton: Desire to avoid looking like a complete idiot in foreign policy matters agrees to meet the guy but doesn't really care if he lives or dies. Wants Osama Bin Laden, makes Nawaz's survival rest on a promise to capture OBL. (Recall that the story about a US-SOF team that was rehearsing a capture of OBL in Pakistan before Nawaz was ousted in the coup.)

Pak. Military: Wants to use a military confrontation with India to leverage the US. Rather than negotiate with the US directly and risk ruining ties with them, the military puts up Nawaz in the middle. Realizing that Clinton doesn't particularly care for Nawaz, they decide to move around their ballistic missile groups, and indicate their will to escalate. This successfully puts Clinton on the back foot and his amateur theatrics aside, ultimately from that point on the US has essentially lost. Thanks to Clinton's skill he is able to save face at the cost of Nawaz's premiership.

The questions one should ask Strobe Talbot is

Why did Clinton even bother to meet Nawaz?

Everyone in Washington DC knew that Nawaz was not in any position to control the Pakistani Military and the nuclear posturing clearly showed it during the Blair house talks.

So why didn't Clinton talk to Musharraf directly? Was such an idea considered, and what were the reactions of the people in the NSC?

All of which leads to the corollary, did Clinton fail to understand the threat from Osama Bin Laden, and consequently fail to impress upon the Pakistani Army and Nawaz Sharif the need to capture Osama Bin Laden.

Come on Strobe, all it would have taken is a phone call to Gen. Jehangir Karamat who was due to join Brookings anyway. Why was this not done? Why was no attempt made to talk directly to the Pakistan Army at the Presidential level?

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Rangudu
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Posted: 14 Sep 2004 Post subject:

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ramana wrote:
I said my piece about Strobe for it was Brajesh Mishra who told Sandy Berger before the Sharif mtg that they have 72 hrs before the XXI corps rolls in. So what is is all this sanctimonius BS about how the US which aided and abetted the acquisition of nukes by TSP via China and slapped feeble and minimum sanctions to comply with US laws?


Ramana

What piece is this?

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sunil s
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Please note this statement

Quote:
Pak. Military: Seeks to use confrontation with India to leverage US.


stands the entire rationale stated in Strobe Talbot's article on its head. Strobe says the Pakistan Military was looking for a victory in Kargil with American help. He does not understand that the flip side also holds, that the Military was looking to use the confrontation in Kargil to stymie Indo-US ties and in the process leverage the US on things like its support for terrorism.

The entire language of South Asia studies is geared towards showing Pakistan as an inferior/peripheral player that is constantly seeking to improve its position by confrontation with India. There is absolutely no understanding of the possibility that Pakistan is using its confrontation with India to leverage the US on cooperation with the Islamists. This is a masterpiece in Pakistani Psyops.

Clinton is too shrewd a political customer to admit that he fuc*ed up the entire Kargil thing. From a stand point of US security, the desire to "save Nawaz" by making it contingent that he "capture Bin Laden" is a completely half a**ed approach to the Bin Laden problem. A more aggressive approach involving direct engagement of the Pakistan Army, i.e. by removing this proxy Nawaz could have resulted in a meaningful progress against Bin Laden.

Was such a progress not desired? did people not appreciate the meaning of the Embassy bombings? Was the Pakistani angle to Bin Laden's leaving Sudan never fully explored?

The sum total that appears from Strobe's writings is a very dreadful picture of Clinton's foreign policy drivers. A very poor standard for dicussion of options appears to have reinforced shoddy policy making and implementation.

How could anyone think that leaving Nawaz in place after cutting off his legs over Kargil would facilitate the capture of Osama Bin Laden?

Was Nawaz expected to believe that Clinton had saved Pakistan from a undergoing a nuclear holocaust?

What was the significance of Nawaz's statements in this regard? What did he mean when he said "I expect to see this kind of preparation on the Indian side but not on my side". Did it not indicate to the Clinton staff that Nawaz was prepared for a nuclear escalation - that he had a sense of escalation dominance?

Did it escape the staff's notice that Nawaz had flown to the US with his entire family? Does this seem like a man that would care about what happened to Pakistan after he left?

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ramana
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Just above- about the self serving account.

Sunil, time for an oped(one page) on the Blair house talks in light of the OBL actions post 9/11. Please hurry up. Need to nail the lies.

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Rangudu
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Any lsource for the Brajesh ultimatum to Talbott?

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pran
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1998 Pokhran tests exposed the Chinese nuclear proliferation to Pakistan.India did force the show of hand in the regional power balance, it is not yet known what was the Indian threshold for changing the equation when it knew for a long time about Chinese intent.My guess is India did have some Western input which it deemed to have crossed the threshold.Indirectly did someone elses bidding with their blessing.

During Kargil China did not permit Pakistan to lob a chinese-nuke at Delhi.That would have caused a nuclear showdown on the eastern side.

The Chinese were trying to minimize their exposure to the world as a nuclear -terrorist enabler at the same time talking with Clinton/Halfbright to be allowed the role of the asian pre-eminent super-power.

Strobe Talbott and Riedel both have not shed any light on the US-Chinese discourse on this crisis. Why this is important is because , if chinese had supported their stooge all the way,then the situation would have been different.So why did the Chinese back out? Is it in deference to Indian nuclear response or some other factor.Similarly China also forced a situation on the Western Powers via its proxy to show their hand in this game of Chicken.To me this whole episode revolves around making US the centerpiece of a convoluted strategy and get them tied down in controversy for time to come.

SunilS wrote: Why didn't US talk to Musharraf. My guess would be that he wasn't pulling the strings,he was doing someone elses bidding. So why not talk to the puppeteer directly instead of going through the minions. This hypothesis forms the basis for the Clinton/Halfbright daily telecon with Chinese leadership that was mention earlier in BR posts.

kgoan
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Posted: 14 Sep 2004 Post subject:

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Sunil, an op-ed piece should include these paragraphs. I'd suggest *not* re-writing these specific paragraphs but include them as is.

The first two are a superb condensation of the entire gamut of Pak-US relations - outside the S Asia "experts" community, and the last three turn much of the NP mullah writings on their head.

A few paragraphs like that, can at times, be worth entire "scholarly" monographs.

Quote:


. . .stands the entire rationale stated in Strobe Talbot's article on its head. Strobe says the Pakistan Military was looking for a victory in Kargil with American help. He does not understand that the flip side also holds, that the Military was looking to use the confrontation in Kargil to stymie Indo-US ties and in the process leverage the US on things like its support for terrorism.

The entire language of South Asia studies is geared towards showing Pakistan as an inferior/peripheral player that is constantly seeking to improve its position by confrontation with India. There is absolutely no understanding of the possibility that Pakistan is using its confrontation with India to leverage the US on cooperation with the Islamists. This is a masterpiece in Pakistani Psyops.

. . .How could anyone think that leaving Nawaz in place after cutting off his legs over Kargil would facilitate the capture of Osama Bin Laden?

Was Nawaz expected to believe that Clinton had saved Pakistan from a undergoing a nuclear holocaust?

What was the significance of Nawaz's statements in this regard? What did he mean when he said "I expect to see this kind of preparation on the Indian side but not on my side". Did it not indicate to the Clinton staff that Nawaz was prepared for a nuclear escalation - that he had a sense of escalation dominance?

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Kgoan,

Clinton era foreign policy appears to have revolved around high brow notions coupled with giant dollops of media coverage of Bill Clinton. Little it would appear was done to actually engage *real* players in the games of nations.

Whoever writes the oped should ask the following questions:

1) What was the Clinton Administration's view of Osama Bin Laden? After the embassy bombings was there a doubt about his capabilities? What did the Administration make of all those reports of Osama trying get his hands on WMD?

2) Post 9-11 an extensive cooperation regime on checking Islamist terrorism has been put in place with the Pakistan Army, why was this not pursued earlier? In Kargil time, if it was clear that there was a "nuclear flashpoint", then clearly Clinton should have talked directly to Musharraf, esp. after Nawaz made it clear he wasn't in the loop. Was this ever done? if not then why not? Did Clinton simply not know that this was also possible? or did he turn down a suggestion to do this? from whom?

3) How could anyone believe that Nawaz Sharif would be able to guarentee the capture of Osama Bin Laden after he was made to bear the public humiliation of having "restored the sanctity of the LoC"?

The only reason to get Nawaz to back down was to avoid a "nuclear flashpoint", and that would look good in the media for President Clinton (as Strobe quite nicely tells us). If even the slightest attention was paid to the details of the Nawaz's own statements in Blair House, the Americans could not have missed the fact that there was no escalatory potential in the situation. It was all harmless posturing.

Was the idea to use Nawaz's power base in Pakistani politics to undermine the Army? Did people simply not know that this isn't possible? That Nawaz's prime ministership was due to a deal between Abbaji, Rafiq Tarar and Lt. Gen. (r) Javed Nasir? Was the significance of these events missed? What on earth prompted Clinton to believe that Nawaz's feeble grip on power could be used to challenge the Islamists in such a substantial way?

***

One walks away with the impression that the Kargil war was a golden opportunity missed by the Clinton administration. If at that time direct communication had been opened with the Pakistan Army, perhaps something meaningful could have been achieved vis-a-vis Osama Bin Laden before the carnage of Sept 11. Instead time was wasted on Nawaz Sharif and making a non-existant "nuclear flashpoint" appear and disappear.

What precisely was gained by the US in all this?

Did the flashpoint disappear? nope it didn't things were much worse in 2002!

All that was different in 2002 was that the Americans were explicit that they would not support Pakistan's military unless it killed the Jihadis it had created. Why couldn't this deal have been struck in 1999 itself? Could Sept 11 have been avoided this way? - Not to mention the 10,000 or so Indian lives that have been lost since then?

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Posted: 14 Sep 2004 Post subject:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Quote:

Sunil S
Did the flashpoint disappear? nope it didn't things were much worse in 2002!

All that was different in 2002 was that the Americans were explicit that they would not support Pakistan's military unless it killed the Jihadis it had created. Why couldn't this deal have been struck in 1999 itself? Could Sept 11 have been avoided this way? - Not to mention the 10,000 or so Indian lives that have been lost since then?



The only explanation is that before 911 the US was coordinating with PA closely including when the meeting with Nawaz took place in 1999. The oped should include the analysis of Bruce Reidel papers since it says that a PA stooge( FM official) was inside the Nawaz entrouge when they came to Blair house.

The entire plan in 1999 kargil fell though when the GOI made moves which was not anticipated in the US war games scenarios. What was that move?
--------------------------

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Postby Rangudu » 16 Sep 2004 22:18

X-post

KK's next one.

Outside View: The Ghosts of Kargil


By Kaushik Kapisthalam
A UPI Outside View Commentary


Atlanta, GA, Sep. 16 (UPI) -- The ragged peaks near the town of Kargil in Indian Kashmir are silent today, but in 1999 they played host to a Pakistani incursion followed by a bloody and brutal battle that nearly led to a full-blown war between the newly nuclear-armed neighbors.

Five years on, there seems to be a renewed interest in what has come to be known as the Kargil mini-war. It would be worthwhile to look at Kargil today simply because Pakistan's behavior at that time followed a predictable pattern that is closely related to that nation's ties with America.

The conflict began in May 1999, when an Indian army patrol near Kargil was ambushed when it tried to assume the high-mountain posts that are normally left vacant during the brutal winters. In the first few days, before the magnitude of the incursion was realized, the Indian army suffered heavy losses as it thrust an ill-prepared force into frontal attacks on well-defended bunkers from below.

Meanwhile, Indian diplomacy got going, and the blame for the incursion was placed on Pakistan. Pakistan's official position was that the intruders were native "Kashmiri rebels" and it had nothing to do with this whole thing.

Once the Indian army got mobilized and inserted heavy artillery and air support, the Pakistani posts began to fall one by one. On July 4, 1999, Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made an emergency visit to Washington, where, after meeting with President Bill Clinton, he announced a pullback from Kargil while claiming that it was "mujahideen" and not Pakistani troops that did the occupying.

Who were the infiltrators? A 2002 book by BBC reporter Owen Bennett-Jones and articles by retired Pakistani Brigadier Shaukat Qadir have made it clear that troops from Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry and Special Services Group took part in the incursion, with the "mujahideen" playing the role of porters and scouts. Qadir added that in all, nearly 5,000 Pakistani troops were involved in the effort to man and support the more than 130 Indian posts that were covertly occupied starting as early as February 1999.

The world breathed a sigh of relief when Pakistan backed down, but the military establishment in Pakistan pinned the blame for the humiliation on Sharif. Their theory was that, but for the weak-kneed prime minister, Pakistani forces could have permanently occupied Kargil and given India a bloody nose -- a perfect revenge for India's capture of the Siachen Glacier in 1984.

Recent books by key players have shed new light on this issue. The first one by retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni, who was head of U.S Central Command in 1999, made it clear that it was the Pakistani army that asked for U.S intervention and not Nawaz Sharif. The current Pakistani president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, was then the army chief and is considered to be the architect of the Kargil plan.

Zinni wrote in his book that he met with Musharraf in late June 1999 and told him that Kargil could lead to Pakistan's "annihilation." After the meeting, Musharraf is on the record as saying that he "hoped" that Prime Minister Sharif would meet with President Clinton "soon," indicating that he was eager for the United States to arrange a face-saving end to the fighting.

Another theory of Musharraf's supporters is that the Kargil operation had wide approval from Sharif and the executive branch. A just-released book by retired Pakistani official Hassan Abbas casts doubt on that theory.

According to Abbas, Sharif was not briefed until after the operation was well underway, and that a "gang of four generals" had secretly planned this operation without anyone else knowing it. The clique was led by Musharraf and included Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmad, then commander of the X Corps, Lt. Gen. Mohammad Aziz Khan, Chief of the General Staff, and Maj. Gen. Javed Hassan, commander of the Pakistani troops in the Northern Areas, whose troops actually carried out the operation.

The Northern Areas basically represent the portion of Kashmir annexed by Pakistan, which has no clear legal status today. Their people do not have any voting rights or any real representation in Islamabad, which made them convenient cannon fodder for a risky incursion. A vast majority of the Pakistani army's enlisted men are from the dominant Punjab province, where such heavy casualties would have caused a political uproar and troop dissension.

After Sharif called on Musharraf to withdraw, most of the troops manning the posts were simply cut off and died of starvation and related reasons. There were reports that autopsies on some bodies revealed grass in their stomachs. Sharif later claimed that over 2,700 Pakistani troops were killed in the operation.

Another new book by Strobe Talbott, who was then deputy secretary of State and Washington's point man for South Asia, sheds light on the Sharif-Clinton meeting. Talbott claims that it was President Clinton who disclosed to Sharif that Pakistani forces were preparing to deploy nuclear weapons in anticipation of an Indian retaliation across the border away from Kashmir. Clinton essentially arm-twisted Sharif to agree to a withdrawal, per Talbott.

But Talbott's book creates more questions than answers. Why was Clinton speaking to Sharif if he believed that the Pakistan army was deploying nukes without Sharif's knowledge? Why not speak to Musharraf himself, if the United States knew he was the one holding the cards? Did the Americans work with the Pakistan army to make Sharif the fall guy in order to save the Pakistan army's face?

The answer to the last question is critical because if the United States tried to "solve" Kargil with the aim of protecting the Pakistan army, it would be yet another example that betrays the bottom-line in U.S.-Pakistani relations - namely, the Americans equate the Pakistan army's interests with Pakistan's interests and always strive to protect the "honor and dignity" of the Pakistan army when it comes to the crunch.

For instance, consider the events near the Afghan town of Kunduz in late 2001, after the Sept. 11 attacks on New York and Washington. As the Northern Alliance forces were ready to overrun a huge Taliban and al-Qaida encampment near Kunduz, the Americans called for a tactical halt. When the town fell later, there were hardly any fighters left. Some reports pointed to mysterious aircrafts landing and flying out of Kunduz.

Insider accounts by journalist Seymour Hersh and others revealed that most of the "Taliban" in Kunduz were actually senior Pakistan army and intelligence officers and troops. Hersh added that the United States had secretly allowed Pakistan to airlift its troops and officers to prevent them from being arrested and humiliated in a place where they were not supposed to be present.

Once again the United States stepped in to preserve the Pakistan army's "honor," but it was at a terrible cost. Hersh quoted U.S officials as saying that many al-Qaida figures, perhaps even top leaders, were able to flee to Pakistan along with the Pakistani troops. Perhaps this explains how so many al-Qaida figures were arrested in Pakistani cities and military cantonments.

Another understanding that can be gleaned from Kargil is how the Pakistani generals refuse to learn from history and how the United States doesn't disabuse them of their dangerous notions -- time and again. In 1965, then-Pakistani dictator Ayub Khan launched an incursion into Kashmir. Officially it was "mujahideen," as in Kargil, but in reality it was Pakistani troops. India retaliated with a frontal attack in the plains of Punjab, and Pakistan had to fight to save its heartland when a ceasefire was negotiated.

Ayub and his coterie had made the assumption that Pakistan's Cold War alliance with the United States would call upon American troops to protect Pakistan from an Indian retaliation. That combined with delusions of "Muslim martial superiority" over India's "cowardly Hindu soldiers" led Pakistan into a foolhardy adventure.

In the 1980s, the United States armed Pakistan ostensibly to help protect against a Soviet attack from Afghanistan. Pakistan instead used two-thirds of the equipment on the Indian side and used some of the American-funded weaponry to launch a covert war in Kashmir. That dirty war gave birth to the terrorist organizations midwifed by Pakistan's army and spooks, which form the backbone of al-Qaida today.

Today Pakistan is a newly minted "Major Non-NATO Ally" of the United States, with sanction-free military supplies in the pipeline. American taxpayers are also footing the $1.5 billion worth of military support to Pakistan over the next five years, ostensibly to assist in the war on terror. The purveyors of "engagement" in Washington argue today that the military aid would wean Pakistan away from nuclear brinkmanship by "balancing" Pakistan's military with rival India's.

The ranking Democrat in the Senate Foreign relations committee, Delaware Sen. Joe Biden asked recently: "Is there a plan to give Pakistan sufficient reassurance of its legitimate security needs that it doesn't have to embark on dangerous adventurism to the east and to the west?"

As one observer put it, this approach treats the Pakistani generals as "poor victims of their brain chemistry" who have to be weaned away from their dangerous habits with rewards instead of making it clear to them that any effort to provoke conflict with India in a nuclear age is simply unacceptable. But Washington seems to be set in its ways when it comes to Pakistan.

Many more books and insider accounts of Kargil are likely to come out in the coming years. One thing is certain, though. With the current U.S. rearming of the Pakistani military, another Kargil might not be too far off.

-0-


http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/2 ... -2449r.htm

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Postby ramana » 16 Sep 2004 22:53

R, Since you are quite familiar with the Kargil accounts please bear with me.
In all the US & TSP political accounts its the Pak Army that asks Sharif to go to DC and get the US to broker a ceasefire. Why did they feel the US would help facilitate the ceasefire? Such a ceasefire would leave the RATS in control of the territory that they occupied by stealth and is a definite win in their books. Now all the US accounts Reidel, Talbott, Zinni and maybe Clinton state that the US made Sharif withdraw. Such a withdrawl is a retreat in military parlance which happens after a defeat. So in the simplisitic mind of the RATS they got a definite victory turned into a defeat by the combination of Sharif (who got ousted) and the US. Now why did the US do such a thing as side with India. Note in the post 1965 war the SU and by proxy the US forced India to go back to the pre-exisitng conditions even in J&K. So what changed?
Also did the US decide that the Kargil debacle was the right moment to get on the good books of India and cut loose its relations with the terrorist loser nation? Because after Kargil there were glowing reports, satisifed and smug opinon eds in Indian press. Maybe the US decided to cut loose the baggage of the sanctions etc and turn a new leaf and that had to imply saying bye to its old minion. Note the Riaz Jafri rant in the paknews paper on 9/16 "Another chance to America or Pakistan ?" Very emotional.

And the minion turned on its master with 911. And that is the reason for the close embrace of the master and his minion post 911. The reports of the numerous hijackers visiting OBL are suspicious. How do we know they were not visiting the RATS facilities in the 'strategic depth' regions to facilitate their planning?

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Postby Rangudu » 16 Sep 2004 23:06

Ramana

My gut tells me that it was not India that benefited most from the Clinton mediated Sharif withdrawal declaration but the TSPA.

Some questions:

1. How did Clinton and co know that Sharif HAD the power to order a withdrawal when Sharif was even unsure of his family's safety?

2. Re-ask question 1 in the light of Sharif not knowing about the "nuke deployment"

3. What did Zinni and Musharraf talk about?

My view is that Mush felt that after IAF's successful destruction of the supply dumps and the clearing of the posts in the Dras sector, the rest of the posts would quickly fall without replenishment. If he tried to provide more support and CAS to resupply the other posts, India had the option of attacking elsewhere. Recall that in 1965, the ceasefire was announced when TSPA could not have held on for more than a week longer. So Mush and Zinni likely agreed to use Sharif as the fall guy to save TSPA's H&D.

How else could the US have known that Musharraf will obey Sharif's order to withdraw? They likely set Sharif up.

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Postby ramana » 16 Sep 2004 23:12

Bingo! And that is why the accession of Mushy after Karamat, superceding six generals (one of whom was son-in-law of Auyb Khan) is an important event. Sharif figured out he was set-up and dismiised Mushy at the first oppurtunity. He unfortunately did not have the backing in the Army - for america and army were together and allah was no where to be seen.

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Postby svinayak » 16 Sep 2004 23:32

Allah is always with the army

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Postby Guru » 17 Sep 2004 00:47

jrjrao wrote:
Kargil was very much part of the Azad Kashmir and under the control of Pakistani troops upto 1972.
[/quote]

Absolutely. They built the road to Leh from Zojila Pass, I presume.

Any more bedtime stories?

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Postby ramana » 17 Sep 2004 01:10

Guru,
Even though jr^2 posted it the original is by Javid Nasr of ISI fame. And your ire should be addresseed to him.

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Postby Rangudu » 17 Sep 2004 01:16

So the key here is the deal between Unkil and Mush. What did Zinni promise to Mush to get him to agree to a speedy retreat and What did Mush give up in return for the Nawaz trap and H&D saver?

Any deals on Osama? Nukes?

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Postby svinayak » 17 Sep 2004 01:39

Vivek_A wrote:Very interesting article...

[url=http://www.the-week.com/24sep12/currentevents_article10.htm]Siachen, a stronghold
K2 THE PEAK OF POTENTIAL DISPUTE[/url]



Very interesting article.


Suspicious of the American mission, Beijing hired a Belarussian remote-sensing company (China’s satellite remote-sensing capabilities are still poor) to track the Americans. When the photos came, there was more than what Beijing had bargained for. They showed that Pakistan was diverting the course of three glacial rivers, which were flowing into Chinese-held territory, to its territory. The work was learnt to have been undertaken by Kazakh engineers. Beijing protested, but Pakistan replied that it was entitled to a fair share of the waters. It was then that China asked Pakistan to "lay off" the peak which, it said, fell within the territory ceded in 1963.


This proves that TSP have given hope on controlling areas above the jhelum. The water issue with low availability in the sindh has made them to divert some glacier to their system.




Drawing its lessons from the Siachen experience, India ought to be concerned over the current Sino-Pak-US games being played out over K2.


The entire region will become a focus of geo-political moves with change of boundaries anticipated within the next 3 years.

The US China rivalry over the control of the glacier is interesting.

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Postby svinayak » 17 Sep 2004 02:05

Rangudu wrote:So the key here is the deal between Unkil and Mush. What did Zinni promise to Mush to get him to agree to a speedy retreat and What did Mush give up in return for the Nawaz trap and H&D saver?

Any deals on Osama? Nukes?


R, THe answers to your questions will be found when you figure out why Mush was selected as COAS.

In George Perkovich book - India's Nuclear Bomb there is a seperate chapter on 1999. Here ZInni is described as meeting Nawaz Sharief and his team to talk to them to withdraw. This should be read to complete the understanding of the episode.

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Postby Arun_S » 20 Sep 2004 18:19

UPA may make some Kargil report appendices public

Pioneer News Service/ New Delhi

The UPA Government is considering the issue of making public some appendices of the Kargil Review Committee report which examined the events leading to the Kargil conflict in 1999.

The main portion of the Kargil Committee Report headed by noted security expert K Subrahmanyam was tabled in Parliament but 18 appendices were not made public and national security advisor JN Dixit said here on Saturday the appendices which could be released should be made public. However, Mr Dixit did not give any timeframe for releasing these appendices.

"Whatever can be released to the public shall be released," Mr Dixit said at the launch of a book dedicated to Mr Subrahmanyam. In fact, his report saw the then NDA Government setting up a group of ministers(GOM) to examine all the issues relating to national security management.

This GOM headed by the then Home Minister LK Advani took stock of all the institutions including intelligence gathering, border management and defence. The GOM in its report to the Government then recommended several new, innovative and far reaching changes to meet security challenges in the future.

Some of the appendices of the Kargil Review Committee report, now under wraps reportedly reviewed several sensitive issues including the country"s nuclear programme.

The GOM report, which followed the Kargil Review Committee report took a holistic view coupled with focus on specific issues and brought security issues into national limelight and accorded it due importance.

Some of the suggestions included amalgamation and pooling in of resources and assets of various intelligence organisations to achieve optimum synergy. The same suggestion was also made for the defence forces and in fact the present government had recently reviewed the progress made on this front.

Mr Dixit said the National Security Council (NSC), set up for reviewing the security and strategic matters with the prime minister heading this crucial body, was meeting regularly for the last four months to take stock of India's security concerns. He also said the NSC had taken a deliberative role and was not limited only to being a briefing body anymore, he said.

Meanwhile, the defence forces were laying great stress on synergy between the three services and had already taken two major steps in this direction by setting up a tri-service Andaman and Nicobar command and merging the intelligence services of three services into the Defence Intelligence Agency.

Similarly, the Strategic Forces Command came into being two years back and entrusted with the onerous responsibility of managing the nuclear assets of all the three services and evolving relevant strategies and doctrines.

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Postby Vivek K » 20 Sep 2004 19:06

Rangudu wrote:So the key here is the deal between Unkil and Mush. What did Zinni promise to Mush to get him to agree to a speedy retreat and What did Mush give up in return for the Nawaz trap and H&D saver?

Any deals on Osama? Nukes?

OR was their a deal on Kashmir?

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Postby ramana » 20 Sep 2004 19:34

Vivek, Kashmir is nothing. It is much deeper. Think about it with open mind.

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Postby shiv » 24 Sep 2004 06:09

up

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Postby vipin » 27 Sep 2004 07:28


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Postby svinayak » 29 Sep 2004 02:59

X posted


The full text of the Hashmi letter, translated from Urdu:

Quote:
On behalf of the Pakistani armed forces, we want to assure the nation that this army belongs to you and to Pakistan. We expect every member of this Parliament, no matter which party or group he or she may belong to, to rise beyond party interests and work for upholding the sovereignty of the Parliament.

Pervez Musharraf and his clique have been imposed on this nation. They have committed a crime against the nation and are holding the nation hostage. This is a band of thieves and looters, which is robbing its own nation without any mercy. They also have supported American Jews and Christians in shedding the blood of our Afghan brothers.

This Pervez Musharraf has turned Pakistan, which was created as a fort for the Muslims, into a butchery where Muslims are being slaughtered.

If we did not have this Parliament, by now our troops would have been killing innocent Iraqis along with the U.S. troops and the nation would have been receiving daily the bodies of our soldiers slain in Iraq.

We, the officers of the Pakistan army, request the national leadership to bring the following matters before the parliament:

1. What was our objective in Kargil (in the disputed Kashmir region where India and Pakistan fought pitched battles in 1999) and why did we have to suffer (so much) loss? India ordered an inquiry after the battle of Kargil and on its recommendation sacked several generals and brigadiers. But in Pakistan, no such inquiry was ever held although we lost more (people) in Kargil than we did in the 1965 and 1971 wars.

Perhaps, the nation does not know that Maj. Gen. Javed-ul-Husnain commanded (the Pakistani troops) in Kargil. Before that he served in America for four years as Pakistan's military attaché under CIA's supervision. This was started on America's urging.

Officers and soldiers working under this man were so annoyed with his irresponsible leadership and faulty orders that they almost rebelled against him. Yet, instead of being sacked, he was promoted and made a lieutenant general.

2. What happened after Oct. 12, 2001, (when the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan began)? How many units were ordered to surround Islamabad (to avoid a mass protest)? Who was made commander of Rawalpindi's 111 brigade (which is responsible for Islamabad's security)? What has been happening in the GHQ (general headquarters)?

3. Before the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan began, every general and brigadier was allotted expensive commercial and residential lands in Lahore, although most of them had already received the lands they are entitled to receive from the government.

Upholding its sovereignty, the parliament should form a judicial commission, comprising those judges of the Supreme Court and high courts who were performing their duties before Oct. 12, 2001.

Patriotic officers of the Pakistani armed forces reveal national secrets before this commission as part of their national duty, so that those who have committed crimes (against the nation) can be punished according to the (Pakistani) constitution.

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Postby ramana » 01 Oct 2004 00:22

On India Musharraf pushes ahead
http://www.jang-group.com/thenews/sep20 ... ped/o1.htm

Nasim Zehra

The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst, is a fellow of the Harvard University Asia Center nasimzehra@hotmail.com

When Kargil, instead of being restricted to the Drass sector, snowballed into a multiple-sector military cross LoC operation, Pakistan’s COAS General Pervez Musharraf had hoped it may expedite the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. There was an expectation that Pakistan’s near control of the Drass-Kargil highway, India’s life-line to Leh and Siachin, would prompt India to come to the negotiating table and opt for a quick settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Or at least agree to return Siachin to Pakistan. Neither happened. "We need a fair and quick resolution of Kashmir so confrontation can end, cooperation is possible and above all Pakistan can progress," Musharraf had then argued.

A flawed Kargil operation, the October coup d’etat and the international environment prompted Pakistan’s COAS-President’s high gear diplomatic and political efforts to resolve Kashmir and normalise Pakistan-India relations. Ever since Musharraf has been in a hurry to justly resolve the Kashmir dispute. Post-Kargil Musharraf’s commitment to normalising Pakistan-India relations has matched that of the former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. His ‘peace’ offerings to India have been numerous; the unilateral decrease in troops, the May 2000 unilateral cease-fire, the 2001discussions at Agra, the January 12 2002 commitment that Pakistan will not allow its territory be used for terrorism against India, mid 2002 offer to India at Almaty that Pakistan would prevent LoC infiltration, the November 2003 cease-fire and the January 2004 statement reiterating Pakistan’s commitment on anti-terrorism. Musharraf has consistently argued that the Kashmir dispute is easily solvable, provided the Indian leadership demonstrates political commitment. His agreement, on former US President Clinton’s intervention, to establishing a back channel with Delhi, yielded the January 6 joint statement. Significantly, Clinton followed through his commitment of July 4 1999 to facilitate whenever possible, Pakistan-India dialogue on Kashmir.
He, himself, the man in uniform meanwhile wields enough power to declare flexibility on many fronts; a solution on Kashmir that all three parties find acceptable, a solution outside of what the UN resolutions prescribe, direct bilateral negotiations, all parties need to go beyond the blame game, construction by India of a two-tiered fence along the LoC tolerated, reducing criticism of India’s Kashmir policy at international forums and dropping his demand of a time-line for settlement. Interestingly, in his September meeting with the President of the Pakistan Muslim League Chaudary Shujaat Hussain, the Indian High Commissioner had indicated that increase cross-LoC infiltration and demand for a time-line to resolve Kashmir could derail the dialogue process. In November, the PML President will be visiting India on the Congress’ President Sonia Gandhi’s invitation.

Musharraf calls the final shots on Pakistan’s India policy. Since January, he has personally chaired almost a dozen inter-institutional policy meetings on India. In addition to the Foreign Office and the military’s input, Musharraf has kept the political channel open. His trusted aide Tariq Aziz has faithfully relayed to him the Indian political leadership’s thinking. Likewise J N Dixit has done the same for the Indian Prime Minister. Musharraf’s ‘read out’ on the Congress government’s approach on the Kashmir dispute is hopeful. More than that of the Foreign Office and the GHQ. Where they see no substantive change in Indian policy over Kashmir, even before his New York meeting, Pakistan’s President believed there is a 50-50 chance that India would engage substantively on the Kashmir issue. Clearly Musharraf does not subscribe to the thinking that a predominantly political protracted Kashmiri struggle supported by Pakistan will yield a solution favourable for the Kashmiris and for Pakistan. Instead, he appears committed to pushing an early and sustainable settlement.

In New York, Musharraf must have felt somewhat vindicated. He has pushed Kashmir to the centre-stage of Pakistan-India dialogue. However, now to the million dollar question of what solution?

The Indian advise that Pakistan not raise the Kashmir issue was heeded because there was a quid pro quo on offer. In a stark contrast to last year, when Musharraf’s and Vajpayee’s UNGA speeches were followed by the Pakistani and Indian Permanent Representatives, this year Musharraf urged Manmohan Singh to cease the opportunity to resolve Kashmir. The Indians did not accuse Pakistan of cross-LoC infiltration. The joint Manmohan-Musharraf statement was reminiscent of the Vajpayee-Nawaz Sharif’s1998 meeting in New York, which led to the Lahore summit. This holds more promise. The statement commits the two to "explore possible options for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the issue in a sincere spirit and purposeful manner."

While no mention by India of cross-LoC infiltration maybe read as Indian acknowledgement of a major decrease, it is unlikely that India would give up, one accusing Pakistan as at least a partial trouble-maker in IHK and two framing of the Kashmiri struggle within the terrorism framework, unless India and Pakistan have arrived at a broad common understanding on how to proceed on the Kashmir dispute. Clearly the most likely next step, even if behind the scenes, would be the examining of possible options. Musharraf has ruled out the LoC as a solution and any other solutions unacceptable to the Kashmiris. For Delhi, the ‘defensible frontiers’ solution has been the only acceptable one. It involves minor adjustments in the existing LoC, so as to end the interdiction capabilities the sides have against each other from different points of the LoC. It is still unclear if the Indian National Security Advisor’s assurance to the Pakistani Foreign Minister and Foreign Secretary that the Indians will now think "outside the box" while dealing with Pakistan would mean new thinking on Kashmir, too.

Between now and the December round of the composite dialogue, many roadblocks need to be cleared. If minds must meet on Kashmir, solutions to lesser disputes like Siachin, Sir Creek and Wullar should be in the offing. No less finding a way forward on the yet aborted talks on Srinagar -Muzzafarabad bus service.

Musharraf seems determined to push ahead with dialogue and dispute settlement. Among other confidence-building measures, he is also keen to follow through with the gas pipeline project initiated during Nawaz Sharif’s period. In Pakistan, political battling notwithstanding, there is a strategic consensus that normalising relations with India, on the basis of sovereign equality, international law and good neighbourly relations, is in Pakistan’s interest. Pakistanis will support Musharraf ‘s India policy as long as it moves within this consensus.

Meanwhile, as the bilateral dialogue appears to proceed rapidly, the Kashmiris must demand that India and Pakistan facilitate the holding of an intra-Kashmiri leadership dialogue at a neutral place. They must meet to agree on Minimum Common Demands regarding their political future. Pakistan remains convinced that without major Kashmiri support a sustainable solution to the Kashmir dispute would be unlikely. In fact, President Musharraf must encash the goodwill generated in New York, and personally intervene to organise the intra-Kashmiri dialogue. And ensure that that the Kashmiri voice is heard loud and clear in deciding their politics.

svinayak
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Postby svinayak » 01 Oct 2004 02:09

Or at least agree to return Siachin to Pakistan.



There is a fixation for Siachen. The current Paki leadership is the one which failed in Siachen and they are determined to get even.

Vivek_A
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Postby Vivek_A » 04 Oct 2004 01:55

http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/oct-2004/4/columns3.php

The Kargil fiasco

By Lt. Col. (Retd) Sikandar Khan Baloch

The Kargil heights were a part of Northern Areas till 1972. It had been an eye sore for the Indian army because these heights had strategic importance. These dominated the Kargil town and some very important roads and routes of the Indian army. In 1972, with the fall of East Pakistan, the Indians seized the opportunity and captured these. Since then it became an eye thorn for the Pakistan army. It assumed tremendous strategic importance after the Indian occupation of Siachin glacier.
This was and still is the only point from where Pakistan could exert pressure on the Indian troops at Siachin.

Let us look at the reasons which necessitated the Kargil. Commitment of troops at Siachin is very costly for Pakistan both in terms of expenditure and human lives. The issue has prolonged to an indefinite period. Despite best efforts by Pakistan, Indian’s stubborn and unreasonable attitude has proved the biggest impediment for reaching any peaceful solution.

er the most had to he discovered. The logical conclusion was to occupy Kargil, Dras and Batalik heights. The occupation of these heights presented unique advantages to Pakistan. We could simply cut off Indian road linking Srinagar with Zojila, Leh and Siachin. Dumping, of supplies for the troops at all these places could be stopped. It was masterful planning and, had it succeeded for which there was all possible chance, the history of the area would have changed.

He had seen and also personally experienced the miserable state of troops at Siachin. He had seen frost bitten, snow blinded, crippled and maimed soldiers and many dying in this vast snowy desert without even fighting the enemy. It was his professional and moral obligation to do something for this needless suffering of the soldiers. As luck would have it, Kargil action was the only alternative to get our neck relieved. He was a commando by training and had studied the plan in different capacities.

c. After the decision, the Northern command needed atleast 4 to 5 months to move the troops, dig up positions and dump the supplies, it was neither a small action nor a short period. How could General Musharraf or the Pakistan Army for that matter keep it a secret from the PM, the Ministry of Defence, the ISI and all other intelligence agencies? It was bound to come to light and in that case., the action might even have bounced back.
It is also not possible for the reason that the. PM has a vast intelligence network at his disposal which includes a number of civil intelligence agencies, the ISI and the military intelligence etc. The American satellites also covered the area who could spot the movement of’ a mouse even, what to speak of the army movement. A man moving In the wilderness of snow can he spotted from a great distance.

My own analysis is, and that can be proved from the GHQ visitors book also, that the action and plan were discussed sometime in Oct/Nov 1998 at GHQ but Nawaz Sharif, very rightly, remained worried about the resultant fallout. He, however, knew that he would become a hero if succeeded. This success would simply immortalize both Musharraf and Sharif. On top of all this it would avenge our humiliation of East Pakistan.

The temptation offered unique advantages. I personally feel ‘that Musharraf’s arguments for the action finally convinced him and the ambitious PM gave a silent nod. Both the parties seem to have agreed, in the larger national interest and better security reasons to act silently and maintain silence. They both avoided written procedure and open statements because of the possible implications. The occupation part of the plan, the most difficult one, was completed flawlessly but then the Indian diplomacy supported by Indian Armed Forces made us pay dearly. This exactly is the reason which stopped the PM from holding an inquiry or taking action against the general when he was in the office and was all powerful.


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