Kargil War Thread - IV

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Kargil War Thread - IV

Postby Aditya G » 30 Apr 2006 13:15

For discussion and info on the 'Kargil War'.

The Kargil Archive @ BRF:
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewforum.php?f=11

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Postby Aditya G » 30 Apr 2006 13:22

New insights have been provided in the new book authored by Gen. VP Malik.

http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/30/stories ... 411000.htm

Indian spies, soldiers cross swords on Kargil

Praveen Swami

V.P Malik's book provokes renewed debate on pre-war intelligence

Unusual decision by the Intelligence Bureau chief to bypass RAW
Pakistani activity misunderstood to represent preparations for local peak-seizing operations


NEW DELHI: India's covert services and its former Chief of Army staff, Gen. Ved Prakash Malik, have crossed swords over the root causes of Pakistan's successful offensive in Kargil in the summer of 1999.

In his newly-released memoirs on the conflict, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory, Gen. Malik has asserted that Pakistan's successful intrusions "reflected a major deficiency in our system of collecting, reporting, collating and assessing intelligence." However, India's covert services have hit back, saying they had provided detailed information on Pakistan's offensive plans 12 months before fighting broke out in Kargil.

Controversy over note

Much of the controversy revolves around a secret June 2, 1998 note, personally signed by the then-Intelligence Bureau Director, Shyamal Datta. Based on intelligence provided by the Intelligence Bureau's Leh station, Mr. Datta's note warned of the training of large numbers of Pakistani irregulars in the Kargil sector, who it said were being prepared for a renewed wave of infiltration after the May 1998 nuclear tests at Pokhran.

While such infiltration was unusual, the second part of Mr. Datta's warning was not. Increased Pakistani military activity, it recorded, had been noticed along the Line of Control in the Kargil sector, notably along posts code-named Chor, Hadi, Saddle, Reshma, Masjid, Dhalan and Langar. All these posts, it is now known, functioned as base camps to feed the intrusion which India was to detect only a year later.

Mr. Datta's unusual decision to personally sign the note indicated the seriousness with which he took this information. To put pressure for rapid action, the Intelligence Bureau bypassed the Research and Analysis Wing and Joint Intelligence Committee. Instead, Mr. Datta directly marked copies to the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Cabinet Secretary, Defence Secretary, and the Director-General of Military Intelligence.

Several warnings

Over the next several months, several other warnings were also issued. In July, Intelligence Bureau informants reported the deployment of M-11 missiles on the Deosai Plains and new mine-laying activities. RAW, for its part, reported that new Pakistani troops — the 164 Mortar Regiment, the 8 Northern Light Infantry and 69 Baloch Regiment — had been pumped into the area, and that numbers of troops were being given special training.

Even the military's own covert services made similar determinations. In June 1998, the Kargil Brigade Intelligence Team reported that supplies of ammunition were being dumped, and that terrorists had been seen in Skardu, Warcha and Marol, awaiting infiltration through the Kargil sector. Again, in August, the BIT and the Intelligence and Field Security Unit reported the presence of terrorists preparing to cross the LoC.

As late as November 1999, the Intelligence Bureau's Leh station issued warnings that Pakistan was "training Taliban who were undergoing military training as well as learning the Balti and Ladakhi language." These irregulars, the warning stated, were likely to be inducted into the Kargil sector during April 1999. While the Intelligence Bureau did not realise these `Taliban' were in fact Pakistani troops, its assessment was in general correct.

Far from preparing to meet the onslaught, the Srinagar-based 15 Corps is known to have actually withdrawn numbers of troops from the Kargil sector, ignoring warnings generated by commanders in Kargil that there were serious deficiencies in Indian defences. Military strategists misunderstood Pakistani activity to represent preparations for local peak-seizing operations which used to break out along the LoC every summer.

Sources told The Hindu that India's acquisition of bunker-busting missiles had led Pakistan's Force-Commander for the Northern Areas, Lt.Gen. Javed Hasan, to anticipate an attack on positions from where his forces could interdict traffic on the Srinagar-Kargil road. Gen. Hasan was thought to be readying to seize undefended heights on the Indian side of the LoC to in the event of a local Indian offensive.


http://www.newkerala.com/news2.php?acti ... s&id=49995

If we had a CDS, Kargil war could have been less damaging: Rasgotra

New Delhi, April 27: If India had a Chief of Defence Staffs, the Kargil war could have been "shorter" and "less damaging", said former Foreign Secretary M K Rasgotra here today.

"If we had a CDS, even if one of the chiefs was out the war, the war would have had direction from the word go and the time that was taken in individual consultation, persuading the chiefs of staffs committee, persuading the individual chiefs, and what their role should be, that kind of delay would have been avoided. Probably, the war would have been shorter and less damaging than it actually was," said Rasgotra at the launch of the book "Kargil: From Surprise to Victory" by former Chief of Army Staff V P Malik.

"In a very short paragraph or two, Gen Malik makes a very succinct and a very powerful case for the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff", he said.

Rasgotra said he was referring to a paragraph in the book which reads: "The first thing I (General V P Malik) had to do was to explain the operational situation and its serious political and military implications to my colleagues in the COSC and get them on board to fight the war jointly. I was convinced that the Air Force must make its presence felt by using its power in Kargil." The next paragraph reads: "Admittedly the Army, Navy and Air Force were faced with their respective problems when it came to timely mobilization for war. But these problems could be overcome, if all three services planned, coordinated and implemented a joint military strategy and, more importantly, put across our points of view to the CCS in unison."


http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/arti ... 508724.cms

'Kargil changed the way Army thinks'
[ Friday, April 28, 2006 12:04:02 pmIANS ]

NEW DELHI: The 1999 Kargil war in Jammu and Kashmir, in which Pakistani intruders occupying the heights were evicted after a bitter battle, changed the way the Indian Army thinks, says the man who commanded the force at the time.

"The Kargil war and events thereafter have highlighted some new trends which have had a marked influence on the conduct of warfare and the structure of the armed forces," Gen. (retd) V.P. Malik writes in his just-released book "Kargil: From Surprise To Victory".

Some of these trends are being driven by technology, others by strategic considerations and concepts.

"The objectives are varied: to avoid escalation of violence, to minimise collateral damage, and to achieve success with minimum losses," Malik says.

This has had a threefold impact on strategies and tactics, the first of which is that the separation among the tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare is getting blurred.

"While there was always some degree of overlap among these levels, due to the increasingly pervasive influence of IT on warfare, this overlap is increasing," Malik writes.

"Even a small military action along the LoC (Line of Control that divides Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan), or a terrorist act in the hinterland, tends to become issues for consideration and decision making at the strategic level.

"It is a situation wherein a junior military officer is expected to understand political considerations and a political leader is expected to know the tactical and operational factors," Malik maintains.

Thus, fast flow of information, quick assessments and transparency at the three levels is essential as communication gaps can be fatal.

"To a considerable extent, all these aspects became evident during the Kargil war," Malik states.

Second, "there is need for more effective integrated command, control, communications and intelligence systems, apart from faster decision making at tactical, operational and strategic levels of command," he maintains.

Third, there is greater need for politico-military synergy.

"At the military level, the actual fighting during a war has to be conducted in a more integrated manner; hence the need for more integrated capabilities and 'jointness' to obtain optimum results," Malik states.

However, with nuclear weapons here to stay, the author feels, the possibility of an all-out high-intensity regular war will remain low.

"Even if a conventional war does break out, it is likely to be limited in time, scope and space. Such a war would have to be conducted within the framework of carefully calibrated political goals and military moves that permit adequate control over escalation and disengagement," Malik writes.

He says, "I am not one of those who believes that war makes the state and states exist only to make wars. No one in his or her right senses wants a war on their hands, least of all democracies like India and people like me who have studied, participated in and conducted wars.

"But the armed forces have to be prepared for all possible conflict contingencies so long as wars remain an instrument of state policy."

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Postby ramana » 30 Apr 2006 22:11

From Hindutan Times qutoing PTI.

'Vajpayee ignored my warning on Kargil'

Press Trust of India

New Delhi, April 30, 2006


In remarks that are likely to reopen the debate on intelligence vis-a-vis the Kargil crisis, the then Army Chief says the possibility of a conventional conflict with regular Pakistani forces was consistently negated and that Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee also ignored his statement on the subject.



General VP Malik, who headed the force during the 1999 Kargil crisis, also brought in a new angle in his just-published book Kargil - from surprise to victory that China made a "demonstrative support" to Pakistan at the height of the conflict and that its forces almost sparked off a stand-off on the Sino-Indian border in Arunachal Pradesh.



He asserts that there were no intelligence reports to warn of the surprise Pakistani moves to infiltrate troops through wide gaps in defence.



"RAW (external intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing) which was responsible for keeping track of the movement of Pakistani military units and for the order of battle of the Pakistani army formations, showed no accretion in the force level of the Force Commander Northern Areas (FCNA) in the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir during a period preceding the intrusion," Malik says in the book.



Intelligence Bureau had remained focused on jihadi activities and its report had only implied that jihadi infiltration could take place in the Kashmir valley or Dras-Kargil sector, he says.



"Prior to the intrusion the FCNA had realigned the areas of responsibility of its brigades and moved the reserve battalion, usually based in Gilgit, to the LOC. RAW and military intelligence units in 3 infantry division did not notice these developments."



The intelligence reports may have indicated an enhanced level of artillery fire exchange in Kargil during the forthcoming summer, but the possibility of a conventional conflict with regular Pakistani forces was consistently "negated".



Malik says even after the intrusion had been detected, the Brigade commander did not realise the seriousness of the situation dismissing the intruders as handful of militants and tasked the units accordingly.



Even visual aerial surveillance and aerial reconnaissance had failed to pick up some telltale signs of the massive intrusion.



The book says even after the intrusion had come to light, it was sought to be painted as infiltration and occupation of heights by jihadi elements.



It was only after the Aviation Research Wing managing to photograph a Pakistani military helicopter flying over Indian territory in Kargil areas and interception of telephonic conversation between then Pakistani Army Chief Pervez Musharraf, at that time on a visit to Beijing, and his Chief of General Staff Mohd Aziz Khan had the contours of regular Pakistani troops involvement been brought home to Indian policy makers, it says.



"I questioned this assessment and pointed out that all the evidence available with the army indicated that the intrusion was by the Pakistani army.



"The Prime Minister did not pay much attention to my statement and only the Secretary of the National Security Council Satish Chandra pointing to RAW and IB chief whispered to me General Malik inki bhi to laaj rakhni hai (we have to save their honour too).



"I consider this remark unforgettable," Malik writes.



In future there could be other Kargils in the making, he says. The Pakistan army's nexus with radical Islamist and the Jammu and Kashmir militants has the potential to bring India and Pakistan to the brink of war again.



"Chinese had inducted one company in the area opposite Chantze, with the rest of the battalion waiting in the wings," Malik discloses in the book.



He says it was not only at Kameng, but the Chinese army enhanced its level of activity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh as well from where some of the forces had been thinned down to be redeployed in Kargil.



"This enhancement in PLA activities along the LAC coincided with the start of the conflict in Kargil" Malik says which at military level, indicated a demonstrative support to Pakistan.



Malik says this ran contrary to Beijing's assertions in recent years that it was pursuing an independent foreign policy and that its relations with Pakistan would not be at the cost of India.



The Chinese forces also made a show of force in Demchok, in eastern Ladakh, constructed a track from Spanggur to south end of Pangong lake and a track in Trigg heights.



He says India also received intelligence reports that PLA's Director in the Department of Armament had visited Islamabad during the conflict to help Pakistan army overcome its critical deficiencies in conventional armament, ammunition and equipment.



"Lack of road communication and vulnerability at Trigg heights did not give us a particularly comfortable military posture," Malik says adding, Indian forces had increased vigilance to match the PLA patrolling to make sure that operational situation on the Sino-Indian border was not permitted to escalate.


Now we know why India had modified the draft Nuclear Doctrine. From Malik's account the Kargil intrusion was a strategic surprise. I had analsysed the press reports and the KRC report for BRM and came tothe conclusion that unless there is major reform and breakdown of hierarcial structures a repeat of strategic surprise is inevitable.

Gen Malik is also culpable for he was on visit to Poland at that time and continued with the visit. It was Lt Gen. Krishna Pal's deplyment and ABV's decison to clear the intrusion with out crossing the LOC that helped India mainitnat the upper hand. The intruders built up structures over a long period of time. Read Shiv's article in BRM.

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Postby karan » 01 May 2006 00:14

Ramanna Boss
I just want to add some more. Gen Malik now get to write a book, make some money and no where does he takes the blame. I am still clueless why Maulana Yadav made him COAS, was it at the behest of Mahendra Singh Tikait. If anyone is squarely responsible for kargil fiasco it is the COAS. Being a General it was his responsibility to be pro active. Daily operations within our borders does not fall under the purview of political leadership, they are sole responsibility of General and his field commanders, again, He was too busy enjoying Vodka in Poland. As far as LTG Kishan Pal Singh Yadav is concerned, he is a brilliant tactician who commanded utmost respect from his men. A very humble man with a vision of falcon. LTG Kishan Pal was against sending so many troops to their death. His plan was to wait for few months when weather worsened unleash the Air Power, it would have given enough time to prepare troops for extreme cold weather fighting, with enough war reserves, extreme weather gear. IA has never openly acknowledged the fact, how many troops actually froze to death in initial assault.
However, due to the rehtoric build by DDM, these Dhotiwala politicians, a PM who never gave up his lust for Evening Scotch, fell asleep during war time, as a result alot of troops died, lost limbs for the glory. Intelligence and IA was made scapegoat for the mistakes of these politicians. Musharraf didn't meet Vajpayee in Lahore, he was busy giving final touch to the assault. All the while Vajpayee was savoring on Paki Mangoes. Then he had the audacity to chide IAF chief for not saluting the architect of kargil.

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Postby ramana » 02 May 2006 09:07

Karan there might be psyops at work. I wonder what purpose is served by Malik's work? Parkalaam(wait in Tamil).

A whole slew of questions need to be answered:

I would like to know of the Kargil review team at Monterey Institute if any discussion came up about Chinese moves?
Also what troops were disengaged from Chinese front?
There were reports that four Prithvis and one Agni were activated. Why was the Agni activated? And what did that mean?

In the timeline the Chinese Embassy got bombed in Belgrade around May 6th. Was there a connection?

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Postby Jagan » 02 May 2006 09:16

I should add that its not the Chief of Army sTaff's business to monitor what patrols are doing - at the most it is the local commanders business and all matters should be handled by the GOC-in-Cs. the COAS and his team handle policy and objectives, not worry about patrol and post deployments. It is for local formations to implement those objectives.

What is being suggested is exactly the kind of interference that led Lt Gen Kaul of the 62 war fame to try and fight the company actions at thagla in 62 and rest is history.

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Postby svinayak » 02 May 2006 09:36

ramana wrote:
In the timeline the Chinese Embassy got bombed in Belgrade around May 6th. Was there a connection?


Chinese bombing on May 7, 1999 by NATO was diversenary tactic by Uncle so that the Kargil conflict does not escalate to continental theater. It was bombing by NATO since it gave the sense of a multinational force which has the international backing against China-Pakistan axis.


NATO Bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Bombi ... n_Belgrade

On May 7 1999 in Operation Allied Force, NATO bombs hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, killing three Chinese journalists and outraging Chinese public opinion. The United States and NATO later apologized for the bombing, saying that it occurred because of an outdated map provided by the CIA. This was challenged by a joint report from The Observer (UK) and Politiken (Denmark) newspapers [1], which claimed that NATO intentionally bombed the embassy because it was being used as a relay station for Yugoslav army radio signals. The bombing strained relations between China and NATO countries and provoked angry demonstrations outside Western embassies in Beijing.
Last edited by svinayak on 02 May 2006 21:50, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby svinayak » 02 May 2006 10:01

ramana wrote:
I would like to know of the Kargil review team at Monterey Institute if any discussion came up about Chinese moves?
Also what troops were disengaged from Chinese front?


All Chinese movement in kARGIL have been omitted in reviews. Reports of PLA movement near NUbra Valley during Kargil and PLA advisors for PA on the POK have been omitted.

The deployment of Agni by India made PLA to rollback and let IA to disperse the intruders across LOC>
http://news.indiamart.com/news-analysis ... -6721.html
2000 news report

The visit of Jaswant to China started the border talks between India and China. This follows the deployment of Agni.

http://www.indianembassy.org/inews/June ... reign.html


External Affairs Minister visits China

June 16, 1999

The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh has said his visit to Beijing has led to better understanding between India and China on regional and global issues, including the security perceptions of the two countries. Speaking to newspersons in Beijing at the end of his two day visit, he said new initiatives are already on the anvil.

Mr. Singh, who met Chinese Premier, Mr. Zhu Rongji on the last day of his visit, emphasised enhancing trade and economic relations between the two countries saying that these have not been sufficiently tapped. Mr. Jaswant Singh, the first External Affairs Minister to visit China in eight years, described his visit as 'rewarding'. The talks were fruitful and a consensus has been reached on a number of matters concerning bilateral ties, he said.




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kargil_War

The other G8 nations, too, supported India and condemned the Pakistani violation of the LoC at the Cologne summit. The European Union was also opposed to the violation of LOC.[17] China, a long-time ally of Pakistan, did not intervene in Pakistan's favour, insisting on a pullout of forces from the LOC and settling border issues peacefully.



The Clinton administration goal was to make sure that Stock Market in 1999 does not crash with an escalating war spiralling out of control.
Last edited by svinayak on 02 May 2006 21:48, edited 3 times in total.

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Postby surinder » 02 May 2006 10:49

karan wrote:As far as LTG Kishan Pal Singh Yadav is concerned, he is a brilliant tactician who commanded utmost respect from his men. A very humble man with a vision of falcon. LTG Kishan Pal was against sending so many troops to their death. His plan was to wait for few months when weather worsened unleash the Air Power, it would have given enough time to prepare troops for extreme cold weather fighting, with enough war reserves, extreme weather gear.


I have always wondered about why during Kargil we needed to send men straight up the steep hills to fight. We could have just waited for the snow to fall and bomb the base camps of the Paki intruders and hurt their supply lines. I am not knowledgable about such issues, though. Could you throw some more light (or point to some link) to the alternatives to our plan in Kargil? More info on LTG Kishan Pal Singh's plans?

Thanks.

s

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Postby svinayak » 02 May 2006 11:09

http://news.indiamart.com/news-analysis ... -2716.html




Once India-China relations deteriorated after the 1998 nuclear tests, the PLA adopted an offensive posture on the LAC. The PLA constructed a road approximately five km inside Indian territory in the Trig heights area. The Army reported about 120 incidents of PLA violation of the Trig heights area in 1999, 99 in 2000 and 98 in 2001. China also started claiming new pockets of dispute consequent to aggressive patrolling inside Indian territory, especially in the Western and Eastern sectors. For example, the PLA started patrolling on Pangong Tso Lake surface in the Western sector in 1998 and the next year it constructed a motorable gravel track from their post in Spanggur up to the southern bank of the lake and increased their activities in Rechin La and Siri Jap in the Western sector, none of which were recorded as disputed areas in 1995. The PLA at many places has moved up to its 1960 claim line in the Western sector. In the Eastern sector where Indian presence is strong, the PLA has repeatedly attempted to push its grazers mingled with soldiers into Indian territory. In a desperate attempt to seek better relations with China, New Delhi had sought to silence Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Mukut Mithi in October 2000 when he reported multiple intrusions in his State’s territory by the PLA. The 554 km-long Middle sector is the smallest of the three sectors and least contentious. Under the 1954 agreement on trade and intercourse both sides had agreed to six border passes in this sector which implicitly indicated an agreed border here. However, when talks for the Middle sector began in 1998 China made claims in four areas of Lapthal, Sangcha, Pulam Sumda and Kavriki in addition to the 1995 recorded areas of dispute in Barahoti.

China, in essence, has been trying to assert its claims and seek fresh bargains on the basis of de facto possession of pockets that are being grabbed through intrusions and aggressive patrolling, says Praveen Sawhney. This would ensure that the LAC is not delineated in its entirety in any hurry as that would result in stability on the LAC.


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Postby John Snow » 02 May 2006 20:43

Gen was playing Golf while Kargil was happening.
Trying to say PRC moved its troops is silly pincer movement, we should have anticipated that and Gen would have done yoeman service if did his Job instead of writing books now....
India is blessed with young folk who were ready to do their job inspite of the inept leadership we thrust on ourselves even today..

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Postby NRao » 02 May 2006 21:44

Keep Siachen, I would say.

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Postby Jager » 02 May 2006 22:29

Jagan wrote:I should add that its not the Chief of Army sTaff's business to monitor what patrols are doing - .


But jagan when so many of these patrols went missing and almost every clue pointed towards hundreds of armed intruders invading indian territory it was about bloody time General Malik took notice ,yes ? not to mention the total lack of artillery and air power in the beginning of the campaign , which again came under the general's purview .

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Postby Jagan » 03 May 2006 00:37

Jager wrote:
Jagan wrote:I should add that its not the Chief of Army sTaff's business to monitor what patrols are doing - .


But jagan when so many of these patrols went missing and almost every clue pointed towards hundreds of armed intruders invading indian territory it was about bloody time General Malik took notice ,yes ? not to mention the total lack of artillery and air power in the beginning of the campaign , which again came under the general's purview .


1. How many patrols went missing? Were the numbers high enough to be cause for concern? Were there cases of patrols missing before ? (that came back)? Do we have all the answers to these Qs?
2. It was the job of the Brigade / Div / Corps / Command HQ to deal with it before the COAS has to put his foot down.. what were the commanders at the first four levels doing? Why is the need to go directly up and behead the COAS? Maybe we should ask the current CNS to resign because INS Prahaar Sank? Or maybe we should ask Tipnis to resign because one of the fighters and choppers were shot down?

We have to understand that the Generals at Delhi can not plan the war at the front line. It is the responsibility of the commanders at every level from brigade to the Army command to plan these battles and communicate it to the army hq on the resources they need. If the ArmyHQ in delhi refuses resources, it is the CinCs job to put his foot down, or the corps commander etc down the ladder.

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Postby Jagan » 03 May 2006 00:41

Much is also being made that he ws in Poland. So what? Visits and trips are planned months in advance - and there are always the senior staff at HQ right from the VCOAS to the DGMO who can and who should deal with situations. Just because he was in Poland does not mean he was incommunicado or anything.. there are things like phones and secured lines of communication .

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Postby Surya » 03 May 2006 01:14

While I have my list of issues with Malik, these are not his fault. WHat if he had a stroke in Poland? Army cannot function??

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Postby Kakkaji » 03 May 2006 01:25

surinder wrote:I have always wondered about why during Kargil we needed to send men straight up the steep hills to fight. We could have just waited for the snow to fall and bomb the base camps of the Paki intruders and hurt their supply lines. I am not knowledgable about such issues, though. Could you throw some more light (or point to some link) to the alternatives to our plan in Kargil? More info on LTG Kishan Pal Singh's plans?

Thanks.

s


Surinder:

Once the intrusions were discovered, it became a media circus. The Govt. had to do something. Waiting for a few months to prepare for action becomes difficult with the public demanding action every day. Also, the parliamentary elections were coming up. It would have been political suicide for the GOI if the intruders were allowed to remain on the heights for months. It is the same thing under hostage situations nowadays. Quiet preparations and behind-the-scene actions are hard to undertake under intensive media gaze.

Perhaps a stable Govt. with a comfortable majority in Parliament, and with a strong leader, like we had in 1971, would have been able to respond to intrusions at a more measured pace.

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Postby Vivek K » 03 May 2006 01:48

It is not that our leaders haven ot been strong in the past. PVN, ABV and MMS are all strong, capable men. But look at the awful mandate WE THE PEOPLE have given to these leaders. It is this weak mandate that makes a leader in a democratic setup weak.

However, Kargil was not in preparation for the parliamentary elections, though. Do you remember the anger among the masses at the time? Kargil was a military response to an aggressor.

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Postby Babui » 03 May 2006 01:48

Jagan - there was a period of 3 wks between missing patrols, reports of intruders by different sources and initial firefights between the Pakis and men of the Punjab regmt (forget which batt). There was more than enough information coming in to suggest that large areas of Indian territory had been ingressed. The fact that intrusions took place at the height and weather conditions of Kargil should have been more than enough to clue in a veteran general that this is more serious than the usual. It WAS Gen Malik's job to bring to the notice of the politicians that territorial integrity had been lost and serious action was needed. In that regard, he totally failed. Too much time passed before action was implemented. The buck stops with him!

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Postby NRao » 03 May 2006 01:57

IIRC, initially (even GF the then DM) everyone felt they could finish the job in a jiffy. It went from some days to weeks, etc. I would think IF Malik while in Poland would have known the true gravity of teh situation he would have come back pronto. Everyone underestimated the situation rather badly at the start.

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Postby ramana » 03 May 2006 02:15

Folks I dont want Monday morning quarterbacking and criticism of those in charge. I want the issue of Chinese troop movements understood in larger context. I went over the KRC report, and had another member go over a couple of Kargil books, and none of them have any refs to China. The US based Kargil website is also blank on this.
link: Conference Report

Maybe the censored version of KRC might have it.

I also want discussed what prompted Gen Malik to reveal these now? Must be something important going on and he wants to warn about the nexus between TSP and China.

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Postby putnanja » 03 May 2006 02:17

What would the international pressure have been on us if we had not done anything immediately? Like ABV mentioned somewhere where he regretted not hitting TSP soon after parliament attack, it would have been a bit difficult, if not impossible to wait and attack later. IIRC, even Clinton tried to mediate, and ABV brushed him off saying he won't talk till the intruders are cleared off.

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Postby Jagan » 03 May 2006 02:29

Babui wrote:Jagan - there was a period of 3 wks between missing patrols, reports of intruders by different sources and initial firefights between the Pakis and men of the Punjab regmt (forget which batt). There was more than enough information coming in to suggest that large areas of Indian territory had been ingressed. The fact that intrusions took place at the height and weather conditions of Kargil should have been more than enough to clue in a veteran general that this is more serious than the usual. It WAS Gen Malik's job to bring to the notice of the politicians that territorial integrity had been lost and serious action was needed. In that regard, he totally failed. Too much time passed before action was implemented. The buck stops with him!


Babui,

I doubt there were three weeks. The first patrol went missing on May 15th. The initial encounters were just observations of infilitrators then thought to be militants - it is highly likely that the local commanders would have told higher HQs that they would deal with the lot. Things got serious after May 14/15, Malik was in Poland. Now the issue here is cant the army fight a war without its COAS?

The COAS does not order a Command or a Corps or a Div to send extra patrols, it is the respective command's responsiblity. From the COAS to the Brigade Commander - we have Three Lt Gens (CinC, CoS, Corps Commander), and Two Maj Gens (Div Commander, CoS of Corps) and a Brigadier (2inC of a Div) in between. Were they all useless that we need the COAS to sit up and take notice of skirmishes of which no one was sure about? Remember the COAS also has to deal with Five other CinCs during the same period.

Let me quote an air chief here

when a war gets started, the CAS does not fight it. The C-in-Cs in the Op Commands are the people really responsible and should not need to have their hands held for reassurance but have their hands left fully free. The Chief should be doing only two things in war :-

(a) Chewing his fingernails through worry over whether or not his C-in-C underlings are on the ball, one step ahead of their opponents and working with a well-oiled basis of trust and confidence with their other-service colleagues in the theatre.
(b) Rattling about from place to place to stiffen the resolve and morale of the boys and girls in blue, particularly in those places where they took a beating.


The same applies to the Army. The last thing a CinC wants is a Chief of Army Staff peering over his shoulder and trying to play Major General or Brigadier on the frontline.

In every war, it is the Staff that does the planning and fights the battles. Just the way we credit Aurora as the Liberator of Bangladesh, and Jacob with planning and fighting the war, I say it is completely wrong to blame the COAS where you had so many other commanders in between.

The COAS can be held blameworthy, but only in a case where there is clearcut evidence available that he disregarded and countermanded advice from all his local commanders - can anyone present that?

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Postby Bishwa » 03 May 2006 03:03

Am posting after a very long time.

I kindoff agree with jagan. To expect the CAS to monitor each and every thing in every corner of the country would be expecting too much.

A good leader delegates work to efficient people and gives then leeway to implement it. One can fault him/her for a bad choice of people whom he delegated but beyond that it is difficult to pin it on him/her.

If after the problem surfaced he/she did not take any action, then yes, he/she can be held responsible.

An army of a million people can certainly be expected to work efficiently if the CAS goes out of town.

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Postby ramana » 03 May 2006 03:22

I think the thread is being distracted. The prinicpal reason for it is the revelation of the Chinese role. No one is expecting Malik to lead from the front. Can we get back to topic?
Jagan please.

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Postby JCage » 03 May 2006 03:41

surinder wrote:
karan wrote:As far as LTG Kishan Pal Singh Yadav is concerned, he is a brilliant tactician who commanded utmost respect from his men. A very humble man with a vision of falcon. LTG Kishan Pal was against sending so many troops to their death. His plan was to wait for few months when weather worsened unleash the Air Power, it would have given enough time to prepare troops for extreme cold weather fighting, with enough war reserves, extreme weather gear.


I have always wondered about why during Kargil we needed to send men straight up the steep hills to fight. We could have just waited for the snow to fall and bomb the base camps of the Paki intruders and hurt their supply lines. I am not knowledgable about such issues, though. Could you throw some more light (or point to some link) to the alternatives to our plan in Kargil? More info on LTG Kishan Pal Singh's plans?

Thanks.

s


The popular perception was to get the intruders out before winter. Time was also of the essence because of the political angle and because India didnt want the Pakis to formalize their occupation.
Lastly, we lacked adequate Surveillance and precision strike ability to conduct a painless campaign. 472 soldiers died and over a 1000 maimed before the Min Fin and Min Def's pursestrings opened up, post Kargil.

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Postby karan » 03 May 2006 05:31

Surinder
It was during the leadership of LTG Kishan Pal Singh that Indian Forces went on Offensive like never before against Imbecile pukes. His objective was so clear, and clean cut, these Dhotiwalas were little afraid of him. Under his command, his field commanders had clear orders; If they carried weapon shoot them, don't take any prisoners it costs more to keep them in jail and process them through notorious Indian Judicial System. His field commanders did not disappoint him at all. The other problem was Vultures got too fat. He brought some peace to valley where tourists started coming to valley again. However, Brig Surinder Singh who always demanded the impossible before starting the offensive, but the cake goes to Maj Sharma who preteneded to break his leg in bathroom so he doesn't have to lead his men to war, that job was later given to Maj. Acharya. Maj Sharma was later Court Martialed and so was Brig Surinder Singh.
Still IA had few officers at senior level who really believed in their motherland. One of them who stands out beside LTG KPS is Maj. Gen Lukhwinder Singh. It was his ingenuity in using Bofors to such devastating effect that even Bofor Engineers didn't know their guns could be used in that way. We all know the stories of Junior Officers who actually bore the brunt of the whole war.

Jagan Boss
If Malik was honorable why did he approached Mahendra Singh Tikait who was in cahouts with Maulana Yadav, then Defence Minister to become COAS, that after the fact, Army Board did not find him worthy of becoming COAS. Secondly, Why was LTG Kishan Pal Singh retired so quickly after Kargil. He was the commander who tooke over and won the war for India. His exit was very unceremonial. LTG KPS has deep disdain for these Dhotiwala, even though he will never say it out loud because he is Man Of Honor who still believes in the supermacy civilian authority. Another point, why did Bewda Vajpayee so quickly offered ceasefire to enemy against the advise of his Field Commander who explicitly told these Moron Politicians, that this is the time to destroy Paki H&D once for all. Nation was ready, we had the momentum in every possible way. :evil:

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Postby Jagan » 03 May 2006 06:16

ramana wrote:I think the thread is being distracted. The prinicpal reason for it is the revelation of the Chinese role. No one is expecting Malik to lead from the front. Can we get back to topic?
Jagan please.


Ramana garu,

I am sorry I disagree. This is the military forum, and I think it is a legit aside to discuss under a generic thread titled Kargil Conflict. unless we change it to something more specific related to chinese role. maybe a new thread might be started in the strat forum to discuss that aspect of "Chinese role during Kargil Conflict".


Jagan Boss
If Malik was honorable why did he approached Mahendra Singh Tikait who was in cahouts with Maulana Yadav, then Defence Minister to become COAS, that after the fact, Army Board did not find him worthy of becoming COAS. Secondly, Why was LTG Kishan Pal Singh retired so quickly after Kargil. He was the commander who tooke over and won the war for India. His exit was very unceremonial. LTG KPS has deep disdain for these Dhotiwala, even though he will never say it out loud because he is Man Of Honor who still believes in the supermacy civilian authority. Another point, why did Bewda Vajpayee so quickly offered ceasefire to enemy against the advise of his Field Commander who explicitly told these Moron Politicians, that this is the time to destroy Paki H&D once for all. Nation was ready, we had the momentum in every possible way.


Karan,

lets dispense with the yankee terms LTG, LTC etc are confusing - they are never used in our Army. It might seem cool to some, but for me it looks like we are trying to imitate the yanks. Lt Gen / Lt Col works fine with me any day.

It really does not matter what kind of a person Gen Malik was. 1. Whether he was a great general or a psychophant is not my concern. I dont know the facts and I wont make judgement based on somebodys word posted on the forum. If you have insider information then I suggest you write in detail about your sources, quote them here or back your assertions so that we might re-educate ourselves.

What DOES matter to me is that whether we have a manekshaw in command or a thapar, when the situation comes that the COAS has to be sacked for a reverse, I am sure the CinCs below him will be the first to go. Its their job. that includes all the "LTGs", "MGs", "BGs", "LTCs" etc whose job is to plan and fight the war, not the COAS.

As regards Kishan Pal Singh, I dont know how you can qualify him "he won the war for India". You have to give credit to his div commanders, and bde commanders too. Besides, the situation worsened under his watch. Why do you think he is totally 'blameless' - do enlighten us. Please do write in detail why you think a particular person is to be praised and the other has to be pilliored, I am willing to read and learn. But passing one off judgements "morons" "dhotiwalas" and comments doesnt really further this discussion.

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Postby karan » 03 May 2006 06:28

Jagan Boss
I did give credit to his Birgade Commanders. How do I know so much, I met the Good General at a wedding back in Oct 1999. If you will email me at huntinghawk767 yahoo dot com, I will be more than glad to send you some information
As far as situation worsening under his command, remeber that was the time of Pao Jhapphi tey khao Aam(Pakistani Mangoes for good PM with Hugs).

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Postby Jagan » 03 May 2006 06:47

karan,

He made Lt Gen, he got a UYSM, an according to KRC he never got any blame -I think he actually had it good. Didnt he retire normally? what exactly was 'uncermonial' about his exit'? Okay he didnt make GOC-inC, but its pretty tough competion to become one and it is nothing new that commanders with war experience sometimes get passed over.

Lot of good commanders fall by the way side because the pyramid is too narrow at the top. I am skeptical if there was any agenda in his case.

Jagan

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Postby ramana » 03 May 2006 07:05

While we are bashing India and Indian performance can we also think about the impact of kargil on TSP?

Karan there is a saying"Apprearances are of deceptive" Shakespeare in Hamlet.

Fair enough Jagan. But can my issue be also addressed here?

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Postby svinayak » 03 May 2006 08:32

We can blame the intelligence dept or the Army top brass for all the mistakes in Kargil but there are fundamental changes which have occured due to Kargil and India has made it happen.


Due to Kargil war the Pakistan military and Pakistan political parties have been divided. This is a fundamental change in Pakistan not seen since ZAB and Zia times. It has created its own momentum.


Due to Kargil War there is a divide between PA and US govt which was not there before. This may have been intentional or unintentional due to Kargil war. But the result has been 911 and other developments.
Last edited by svinayak on 03 May 2006 08:59, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby rocky » 03 May 2006 08:46

surinder wrote:I have always wondered about why during Kargil we needed to send men straight up the steep hills to fight. We could have just waited for the snow to fall and bomb the base camps of the Paki intruders and hurt their supply lines.
Well, the snow and winter doesn't respect the LoC either, so if the weather is harsh for the terrorists, it will be for us too. So waiting for the winter would've given them more hardship, but would've caused us hardship too.

Secondly, the terrorists by some account had moved into those sectors over the winter itself, so they had already acclimatized themselves whereas the Indian troops were moved from several theatres away. So the terrorists certainly had advantage when it came to winter conditions. According to some accounts they were even better prepared for the harsh conditions than the Indian army - logistics wise.

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Postby rocky » 03 May 2006 08:51

Ramana, I do not think there is anything to be read in the timing of the release of Gen. Malik's book. It could very well be that all the work was done, and the publication was given the go ahead.

However, my question - is why did Gen Malik. write the book in the first place! Does he have scores to settle? Was he implicated in the Subramanyam comittee report? Or he is just writing the book like almost all generals do? Did he get clearance from the top for writing the book?

Note that it is not just an autobiography, but a book dedicated to a very specific topic. Gen. Padmanabham also came out with a very focussed book almost immediately after his retirement.

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Postby ramana » 03 May 2006 09:44

Also the US came out supporting India against TSP and that too one year after imposting sanctions due to the POKII tests.

Rocky, Dont know. There is hardly any squawks in Indian press. Havent seen reviews or excerpts. Satish Chandra was on the KRC panel along with KS, BG Verghese and Lt. gen. KK Hazari.

The Rasgotra statement about CDS is interesting. It might be that Gen Malik wanted to force the appointment?

Kargil is now a study subject at US utys. Eg.
link: http://www.stanford.edu/class/history5n/

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Postby Aditya G » 03 May 2006 13:33

> Why not wait for the winter before attacking.

In the kind of terrain where the invasion occurred, it is basically considered nigh impossible to dislodge the force occupying higher ground. Snow would have made any movement required for reaching the height by foot IMPOSSIBLE. While the Pakistanis sitting on the top did not need to move at all. They were already well stocked for the winter and could manage rotation of troops as well. So infact the onset of winter was the deadline for the cleanup.

Secondly, the invasion was still progressing when the Army discovered it. Had we waited, the enemy would have occupied more areas.

> why agni was activated

AFAIK Jaswant Singh said that Agni was needed due to inadequecy of range of the Prithvi system. The missile would have performed a dog-leg maneovre inorder to target Pakistani from the Arabian sea.

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Postby Lalmohan » 03 May 2006 17:58

aditya - don't mean to doubt you, but how does an IRBM perform a dog-leg manouevre?

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Postby Vivek K » 03 May 2006 19:36

Was it a dog-leg manouevre or a foxy warning to China?

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Postby svinayak » 03 May 2006 20:01

ramana wrote:

Kargil is now a study subject at US utys. Eg.
link: http://www.stanford.edu/class/history5n/




May 19: What has the impact of nuclear weapons been on relations between India and Pakistan?

- From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (Sage Publications, 2000) pp. 183-213.

- Gregory S. Jones, From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing India and Pakistan (Rand Corporation, 2000)
Admin Note: Font formatting removed.

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Postby Aditya G » 03 May 2006 21:22

Lalmohan wrote:aditya - don't mean to doubt you, but how does an IRBM perform a dog-leg manouevre?


Well thats what I recall Jaswant Singh reading, let me see if I can dig it up.


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