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Kargil War Thread - IV

CPrakash
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Postby CPrakash » 18 Jun 2006 07:59

http://164.100.24.208/debate14/debtext. ... 71&ser=air^force&smode=t

STATEMENT BY MINISTER

NEWS ITEM, ‘AIR-STRIKE

DELAY COST LIVES : KARGIL REPORT’

Title: Statement regarding news item "Air-strike delay cost lives: Kargil Report"- Laid.

MR. SPEAKER: Now, the House will take up statement to be made by Shri Pranab Mukherjee.

… (Interruptions)

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THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE (SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE): Mr. Speaker, Sir, my attention has been drawn to the article published in the Hindustan Times … (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Mr. Minister, you can lay the statement. The statement will be treated as laid.

… (Interruptions)

SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE: Sir, my attention has been drawn to the article published in the Hindustan Times which suggests that for lack of decisive action by the then political leadership there was a loss of 474 men to the Indian Army and this also allowed Pakistan to wrest the initial advantage. The facts of the case are detailed below.

On 3rd May, 1999 the first information about an intrusion having taken place in Kargil came to the knowledge of the army Authorities. Between 25th May, 1999 and 26th July, 1999 the CCS was briefed on the various developments that were taking place. On the 26th of July, 1999 the Kargil operations were formally declared as over.

As with every war, so too with Kargil, the Indian Army in September, 2000 prepared a 6 volume classified, report to record the events and analyse the success and failures, shortcomings and strengths of the warlike situation in Kargil. The preparation of an abridged version of this report was taken up in July, 2003 and completed in January, 2004. This report is prepared for the purposes of campaign study in promotion examinations. As these are documents prepared for internal use for training purposes the Ministry of Defence has not been involved in any way with the preparation of these reports.

This ‘in-house’ report mentions the fact that despite Army asking for the employment of air power from 8th May, 1999 the CCS gave approval for the same on the 25th May, 1999. During this period the Chief of Air Staff was taking the view that air power at those heights could not be properly utilised as helicopters would be extremely vulnerable & there would be danger of escalation of the conflict. His view was that before committing air power political clearance should be obtained which was finally done on 25th May, 1999.

Hon. Members are aware of the circumstances in which the Kargil Review Committee, also popularly known as the Subramaniam Committee, was constituted by the then Government on 29th July 1999. A copy of the Kargil Report is already available with the hon. Members. The then Government had constituted a Group of Ministers to examine the recommendations of the Committee as well as four other task forces that were set up to examine in-depth the recommendations of the Subramaniam Committee. The recommendations of the Group of Ministers were approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security in May 2001 and most of the measures have already been implemented by the previous Government.

One of the questions raised in the Hindustan Times article is that the casualties of 474 could have been avoided if air power had been used from the beginning. I wish there had been no casualties at all. However, I have been told that between 8th May, 1999 and 25th May, 1999 the number of casualties were 35. From 26th May, 1999 to the end of the Kargil operation on 26th July, 1999 the number of casualties was 439 (including six Air Force officers). The total casualties are thus 474. It would be seen that the time taken for giving clearance to deploy air power was not the reason for higher casualties. After all, it was a difficult war fought from a position of disadvantage. The members of our Armed Forces demonstrated indomitable courage, fighting abilities, evicted the enemy and won the war.

Regarding the use of air power the Army had on 8th May, 1999 projected the requirement of attack helicopters for use against the enemy and also helicopters for transport of troops. This was considered between 12th May, 1999 and 17th May, 1999 and it was decided not to use this option as it may lead to escalation.

On 25th May, 1999 after a fuller and in-depth appreciation of the emerging situation the CCS took the decision to deploy the Indian Air Force. Finally on 25th May, 1999 the CCS gave the go ahead for use of air power.


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Postby Sai.U » 13 Jul 2006 05:22

Image

Gola offers photographic proof that Nawaz Sharif was briefed and he even visited the Kargil sector BEFORE Lahore meeting.
[quote]
In his interview, General Musharraf held out four photographs showing Mr Sharif’s visit to Kel frontlines which took place on February 5, 1999, many days before the Indian prime minister’s visit to Pakistan on Feb 19 1999.

“Look at these pictures,â€

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Postby Harry » 13 Jul 2006 06:50

Notice how the guys behind Sharieff and Musharaff are both covering their noses. :lol:

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Postby Ujjal » 13 Jul 2006 06:51

:rotfl:

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Postby Harry » 13 Jul 2006 06:58

Aditya G wrote:
Btw wasnt Nachiketa commanding a SAM unit sometime back? IIRC he had suffered from injuries to his back.


Nachiketa is now flying An-32s.

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Postby symontk » 14 Jul 2006 13:30

Harry wrote:Notice how the guys behind Sharieff and Musharaff are both covering their noses. :lol:


They can be looking at the dead bodies too

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Postby abhischekcc » 14 Jul 2006 15:21

Harry wrote:Notice how the guys behind Sharieff and Musharaff are both covering their noses. :lol:

:D

That's what you get for standing behind windbags.

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Postby John Snow » 18 Jul 2006 19:42

OPED



Surprised at Kargil
There was a command failure as well
by Lt Gen (retd) Harwant Singh

F C. Fuller, a well known military historian, records, “he, if he wishes to understand war, must examine the nature of surprise in its thousand and one forms as it pursued its relentless course throughout history.â€

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Postby CPrakash » 19 Jul 2006 19:01

inally, success at Kargil can be attributed to three factors. One, that the political leadership in Pakistan developed cold feet and denied its troops the essential support, two, strong American intervention, and three, the courage and bravery of our troops and junior leaders.


So now we have to give credit to the Pakis and Unkil first for our Kargil victory? This is like toe-ing the paki line...

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Postby John Snow » 19 Jul 2006 19:29

I had a many a time said during Kargil the day was save d by Jawans/JCOS and COs upto the rank of Lt Cols and Cols, beyond that there was complete abdication of leadership.

We owe it to the lesser known heros not Golf playing, rotunda pot bellied generals flashing color tabs.

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Postby CPrakash » 19 Jul 2006 19:46

John Snow wrote:I had a many a time said during Kargil the day was save d by Jawans/JCOS and COs upto the rank of Lt Cols and Cols, beyond that there was complete abdication of leadership.

We owe it to the lesser known heros not Golf playing, rotunda pot bellied generals flashing color tabs.


I guess it was someone like you who went upto col anil kaul vrc and told him he was too fat (read the review on the army site). and fyi, all generals play golf and just because theya re fat does not mean they are not good.

Oh yeah Sheonan Singh VrC is also 'fat' - going by your standards.

besides you should actually tell someone like RayC on our forum that you think there was an abdication of leadership beyond the rank of Lt Col and Col... I am sure you will get a punch in the face..:P

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Postby John Snow » 19 Jul 2006 19:50

CPrakash wrote:
John Snow wrote:I had a many a time said during Kargil the day was save d by Jawans/JCOS and COs upto the rank of Lt Cols and Cols, beyond that there was complete abdication of leadership.

We owe it to the lesser known heros not Golf playing, rotunda pot bellied generals flashing color tabs.


I guess it was someone like you who went upto col anil kaul vrc and told him he was too fat (read the review on the army site). and fyi, all generals play golf and just because theya re fat does not mean they are not good.

Oh yeah Sheonan Singh VrC is also 'fat' - going by your standards.

besides you should actually tell someone like RayC on our forum that you think there was an abdication of leadership beyond the rank of Lt Col and Col... I am sure you will get a punch in the face..:P


Good if he can do that, but better if he can land his punch on the enemy, for which he is paid :D

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Postby CPrakash » 19 Jul 2006 20:01

John Snow wrote:
CPrakash wrote:[
besides you should actually tell someone like RayC on our forum that you think there was an abdication of leadership beyond the rank of Lt Col and Col... I am sure you will get a punch in the face..:P


Good if he can do that, but better if he can land his punch on the enemy, for which he is paid :D


He did, and at Kargil, and in the rank of Brigadier no less - your statement tarring all generals with the same brush is a disservice. If you have specific generals or officers you want to name, then do so, but clubbing them altogether in one shot shows a lack of knowledge - or worse an abdication of resposnbility on your part.

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Postby John Snow » 19 Jul 2006 20:09

Ok fair enough.

Read the COAS claim. ( he doesnt seem to understand the Buck stops here when)
"He (Ved Prakash Malik) blames the field commanders for their failure to obtain and report the developments across the LOC, and surveillance and patrolling of the gaps between the posts. Their assessment of the threat limited itself to infiltration. ..


also

Those in far away army HQ completely failed to assess and evaluate these developments and instead busied themselves with working out foreign tour programmes.


The author himself is a Lt. Gen ( from the previous posts)

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Postby CPrakash » 19 Jul 2006 20:12

The Author also claims we should give the pakis and unkil credit (read my original post above) - My question is why should we?

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Postby John Snow » 19 Jul 2006 20:53

CPrakash wrote:The Author also claims we should give the pakis and unkil credit (read my original post above) - My question is why should we?


couch in as many as words, till IAF stepped in our army brass was clueless as to how to get the peaks back while young officers were being sent like lambs to slaughter.

Even today I dont think the army is nimble enough in startegy or tactics to handle a rapidly evolving situation.

Its better to have a complete and honest apprisal than following the maxim

"of all the hunting expeditions, the easiest is to find a scape goat'


The very fact that if IAF was asked to step in was construded by Army brass hat they had goofed up while playing golf in swiss alps. Yes alll in all we were in a hole....
Last edited by John Snow on 19 Jul 2006 21:45, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby satya » 19 Jul 2006 21:11

Even today I dont think the army is nimble enough in startegy or tactics to handle a rapidly evolving situation


IA is capable to draw up a strategy and execute it well enough , problem during tht time was the Vajpayee-Sharif Lahore Summitt and lowering of terror related acitivities in the Valley [ remember b4 kargil it was one of the best tourist season in Valley and RR was having a complete upper hand over terrorists so much tht signs stating u r entering '' no terroris areas' were posted in Srinagar ].

Another factor is IA's top brass during pre Kargil time were busy honing up concept of RR as a dedicated CI cum Urban Warfare force .

More than young officers , i would say it was the experienced hand of JCOs tht saved the day for India , i remember once incident where a young Lt. just passed out from IMA was sent as an Arty. Observer across LoC and it was his JCO tht saved him and helping him rather than vice versa not cuz he was short on courage but cuz JCO was an old hand in LoC area and knew the terrain well enough.

Another factor tht most people here are missing is tht PA's Arty was in action much more strongly with well developed defensive positions and they were going as per their plans, for their arty. fortification was to attack any IA's venture across LoC , it was never intended to directly support the forces occupying Indian positions.

In a way , IA was doing rite , it never receieved any speicfic info. on tht and secondly it was the mindset of top brass '' PA will attack only to capture not to internationalise the J&K issue'' , tht was the presumption on which whole of IA's strategy b4 Kargil was based on .

We all can argue for level of intel. provided out by our intel agencies but if u give a glace to statements made by Intel Officers they always have said even for B'bay blas , yes we had a ''general intel'' , same was the thing for Kargil except for tht specific movement of 5-7 NLI Batallions .
So how much is this sort of general intel. worth taking an action?

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Vijay Diwas

Postby kax » 26 Jul 2006 11:16

Today July 26 is Vijay Diwas, the seventh anniversary of the Kargil war

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Postby JCage » 26 Jul 2006 12:40

John Snow wrote:couch in as many as words, till IAF stepped in our army brass was clueless as to how to get the peaks back while young officers were being sent like lambs to slaughter.

Even today I dont think the army is nimble enough in startegy or tactics to handle a rapidly evolving situation.

Its better to have a complete and honest apprisal than following the maxim

"of all the hunting expeditions, the easiest is to find a scape goat'


The very fact that if IAF was asked to step in was construded by Army brass hat they had goofed up while playing golf in swiss alps. Yes alll in all we were in a hole....


This line of arguementation is not logical

So if the IA asks IAF to soften up enemy positions, its because they are not competent?

The reverse should be true- ie joint ops demand that you use maximum force as and when available and save lives!

And evocative imagery of YO's charging up peaks apart, 83% of casualties at Kargil were caused by enemy arty. So yes, initial ops were haphazard- but it was not true throughout.

And IAF's excellent role vs logistical nodes apart, many positions fell to IA arty, so its not that the IAF alone swung the tide for a confused IA.

So the line of arguementation you are going for is not quite logical (unless I misunderstood).

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Postby uddu » 26 Jul 2006 13:24

7th Kargil Anniversary
Remember Kargil?
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/arti ... 808547.cms

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Postby Jager » 26 Jul 2006 16:23

John Snow wrote:couch in as many as words, till IAF stepped in our army brass was clueless as to how to get the peaks back while young officers were being sent like lambs to slaughter.


Snow ,
you must be off your damn rocker to actually write ridiculous stuff like this .
While the army may have been late to realise that the peaks were occupied , the op vijay was carried out brilliantly . In mountain warfare ,the side that attacks from the lower altitudes usually requires a 5 : 1 ,numerical superiority and suffer casualties on a 3 : 1 ratio .
Given the conditions and the resources at their disposal our army commanders performed amazingly to wrest the entire territory back .

The part played by the airforce could at best be described as a support function as their only real success was the supply bases / depots ;
impossible for them to hit those bunkers and tents in which the pakis were.

They were cleared out with a good old fashioned infantry boot to their hind parts . So do not make ridiculous claims like " army was cluless and IAF won the war " .

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Postby Ved » 28 Jul 2006 08:13

Jager wrote:
John Snow wrote:couch in as many as words, till IAF stepped in our army brass was clueless as to how to get the peaks back while young officers were being sent like lambs to slaughter.


......While the army may have been late to realise that the peaks were occupied , the op vijay was carried out brilliantly . ....


I agree.

The part played by the airforce could at best be described as a support function as their only real success was the supply bases / depots ;
impossible for them to hit those bunkers and tents in which the pakis were....


Wrong there. I quote myself from the archives,...

As a result of the air attacks, severe damage to enemy personnel and equipment became apparent in various areas. It is surmised that airstrikes contributed to a significant portion of the enemy's casualty list, as apparent in the numbers. However, the most telling effects on the ground were from intercepts of enemy radio revealing severe shortage of rations, water, medicines and ammunition. Losses due to airstrikes and inability to evacuate their casualties were also mentioned in the intercepts. This was the actual manifestation on the ground of the result of effective airstrikes by the IAF.

The effect of accurate attacks is best summed up by a message received from one of the HQ of the Army.......<P> "You guys have done a wonderful job. Your Mirage boys with their precision laser guided bombs targeted an enemy Battalion HQ in Tiger Hill area with tremendous success. Five Pakistani officers reported killed in that attack and their Command and Control broke down - as a result of which our troops have literally walked over the entire Tiger Hills area. The enemy is on the run. They are on the run in other sectors also. At this rate the end of the conflict may come soon."
IAF air strikes against enemy supply camps and other targets yielded rich dividends. A noteworthy fact is that there was not a single operation on ground that was not preceded by airstrikes. Inevitably, some Army personnel at some locations who did not actually see these missions harbored, understandably, the feeling that the IAF was not as effective as they had hoped. While that would happen in any operation, it is a fact that each and every airstrike was the result of coordinated planning between 15 Corps and the AOC, J&K. <P>9. Firstly, in the area of interdiction of enemy supplies, the successful and incessant attacks on the enemy's logistic machine had, over the last few weeks, culminated in a serious degradation of the enemy's ability to sustain himself in an increasing number of areas. The series of attacks against Pt 4388 in the Dras sector was an excellent example of how lethal airstrikes combined with timely reconnaissance detected the enemy plans to shift to alternate supply routes which were once again effectively attacked. In this the IAF succeeded in strangling the enemy supply arteries, amply testified to by enemy radio intercepts. The primacy of interdiction targets as opposed to Battlefield Air Strikes (BAS) targets was clearly brought out, as also the fact that air power is not to be frittered away on insignificant targets like machine gun posts and trenches, but on large targets of consequence (like the supply camp at Muntho Dhalo, enemy Battalion HQ on top of Tiger Hill, etc). Gone are the days of fighters screaming in at deck level, acting as a piece of extended artillery. The air defence environment of today's battlefield just does not permit such employment of airpower anymore, a significant fact that needs to be understood by soldier and civilian alike.

The second major impact of air power in this operation was in the area of casualties. Normally, an enemy defending a well fortified position (in this case, Pakistan) suffers between 3-6 times less casualties than does the force on the offensive. However, this operation has seen the reverse, with the enemy casualties far in excess of those suffered by us. One significant fact must not be lost sight of; of the two warring sides, it is the Pakistani Army that suffered air strikes, which, obviously, contributed significantly to its casualties. It is felt that without the use of air power, our own casualties could have approached if not exceeded four figures.

A major impact of air power is in the enormous difference it made to the ground operations, no better example of which exists than the message from the HQ of a field Army unit, stating that " as a result of the precision airstrikes on Tiger Hills our troops have literally walked over the entire Tiger Hills area. The enemy is on the run.."

The effort put into air defence escorts and area Combat Air Patrolling by day as well as night proved an effective deterrent which ensured total air superiority. At times, PAF F-16s orbited a scant 15 kms (on their own side of the LOC) from our strike formations attacking Pakistani targets, kept at bay by our own air defence fighters flying a protective pattern above the strike.

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Postby Harry » 28 Jul 2006 08:22

According to VP Malik, Kargil style attacks would require a 10:1 attacker:defender ratio and sometimes even this would'nt be enough. What the IA did was quite superhuman.

However, the IAF must receive a lot of credit for the eventual ~9:1 kill ratio in India's favour. Airpower is the only way to avoid heavy casualties. The IAF deserves the biggest role in future wars.

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Postby Jager » 28 Jul 2006 10:05

Ved wrote:However, the most telling effects on the ground were from intercepts of enemy radio revealing severe shortage of rations, water, medicines and ammunition. Losses due to airstrikes and inability to evacuate their casualties were also mentioned in the intercepts. This was the actual manifestation on the ground of the result of effective airstrikes by the IAF.


No one disputes this . The IAF did a magnificent job on this front !

ved wrote: The effect of accurate attacks is best summed up by a message received from one of the HQ of the Army.......<P> "You guys have done a wonderful job. Your Mirage boys with their precision laser guided bombs targeted an enemy Battalion HQ in Tiger Hill area with tremendous success. Five Pakistani officers reported killed in that attack and their Command and Control broke down - as a result of which our troops have literally walked over the entire Tiger Hills area. The enemy is on the run. They are on the run in other sectors also. At this rate the end of the conflict may come soon."


Walked over tiger hill ??? With all due respect tiger hill was one of Kargil's costliest assaults . I am one hundred percent sure that the Sikhs and grenadiers did not just walk over tiger hills .This message from army HQ needs to be verified .

Plus i don't think anyone can be certain how effective the airstrikes were as the assault on tiger hill was preceded by an intense artillery barrage .

P.S Read this washington post article some time back that the IAF had used chemical weapons in Kargil ? Any fire on that smoke .Or even Naplam ?

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Postby RayC » 28 Jul 2006 23:04

Mr Snow,

I have no desire to punch you in your face no matter how great the provocation is, for two reasons:

1. A man is about as big as the things that make him angry, and
2. For every minute you are angry you lose sixty seconds of happiness.

First of all, if the air force was used in Kargil in the way it is being inferred other than what was done, would the casualties really be less? One aspect that all must realise that there is hardly any cover in the High Altitude area (HAA) nor can it be discounted that PAF would then get active and bomb our troops.

Would the use of air force in close support be of use? Yes and no. I have earlier explained the effect of rarified atmosphere on ballistics. If one remembers the results of the Krasnapol trials in the HAA, it would prove some of the points. However, what would have landed on the enemy could have some morale as also tactical effect.

In so far as Intelligence goes, the reports are never precise. It is mostly worded in woolly terms. There is no doubt that increased artillery and dumping requires attention. However, given the pattern where Pakistanis apparently take glee in “pooping offâ€
Last edited by RayC on 28 Jul 2006 23:21, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby RayC » 28 Jul 2006 23:16

Harry wrote:According to VP Malik, Kargil style attacks would require a 10:1 attacker:defender ratio and sometimes even this would'nt be enough. What the IA did was quite superhuman.



10:1 is the standard ratio required in HAA
3:1 is for the plains.

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Postby Jager » 28 Jul 2006 23:16

Touche` ! Ray sir , Very well put . Loved your retort , specially the last para .

One more point to ponder for all of you guys who scream that "IAF won kargil " .
Take a look at how many militants were killed by aerial bombardment and compare it to the number killed by infantry assaults .
While my expertise may not match up to some gentlemen in this forum , i'm willing to wager that more than 85 % of all enemy casualties was from the infantry .
While blowing up supply bases is very useful , it still remains a support function .

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Postby ASPuar » 28 Jul 2006 23:46

Jager wrote:Take a look at how many militants were killed by aerial bombardment and compare it to the number killed by infantry assaults .
While my expertise may not match up to some gentlemen in this forum , .


If I may be allowed a nitpick, they were PAKISTANI ARMY REGULARS, not militants.

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Postby Jager » 29 Jul 2006 00:02

ASPuar wrote:
If I may be allowed a nitpick, they were PAKISTANI ARMY REGULARS, not militants.


:oops:
My Bad . I will now go and write "they were paki army regulars " a hundred times . :D

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Postby AmanC » 29 Jul 2006 12:24

Ray,
You friend Amar Aul is coming here as Chief of Staff Western Command.

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Postby Jagan » 29 Jul 2006 18:33

PS Negi, you got your own thread on Kargil now - Leave this thread alone.

-Jagan

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Postby Gerard » 29 Jul 2006 18:50

From Our religion says to fight for jihad -Interview with General Muhammad Nasir Akhtar
Why did you attack Kargil in 1999?

Our idea was to merely cut off the supply line from Srinagar. Kargil was done to pressure India to resolve the Kashmir issue. We wanted to start a process of dialogue. Kargil was attacked to put pressure on India on the Siachen glacier issue. Kargil was attacked by the mujahideen.

Why was the Kargil attack not successful for Pakistan?

Kargil was successful because India started talking on Kashmir!

At that time the world intervened between us. They feared we might use nuclear power. Eleven times the nuclear threat came up from both sides during the Kargil war. Both sides officially exchanged nuclear threats.

We have to behave responsibly when the nuclear threat comes up. We agreed to a ceasefire because of nuclear threats.


Poor fellow is so confused ... doesn't know which lies to parrot

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Postby Lalmohan » 29 Jul 2006 19:05

RayC's post once again emphasizes the need for DRDO/HAL to develop High Altitude Recon UAV's and for the army to evolve more technologically advanced and integrated patroling approaches - no one else may be doing this, but we might just have to be the ones to innovate on this front

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Postby Jager » 29 Jul 2006 20:16

Excerpt from Gerard's link :

As an army officer how do you react to the presence of American soldiers in Pakistan?

We have no American soldiers on our land. Our army is carrying out operations against militants. US soldiers are not in Pakistan but are present on the Afghan side.

But you did give the Americans a base.

Yes, we gave them a base and gave them facilities. But they are vacating it as the Afghanistan situation is stabilising


I think the general's living in a cuckoo clock !

Ved
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Postby Ved » 30 Jul 2006 09:29

Jager wrote: Walked over tiger hill ??? With all due respect tiger hill was one of Kargil's costliest assaults . I am one hundred percent sure that the Sikhs and grenadiers did not just walk over tiger hills .This message from army HQ needs to be verified .


I'm only repeating what was said - BGS 15 Corps, I think.

Plus i don't think anyone can be certain how effective the airstrikes were as the assault on tiger hill was preceded by an intense artillery barrage .


I've got a movie of the two bombs impacting on the tents, apparently the Bn HQ on Tiger Hill, I think. One can even see a Puki looking up and running (pic taken when he was only seconds from exalted matyrdom!). When I find the CD, I'll scream for help from the Admins to put it up.

P.S Read this washington post article some time back that the IAF had used chemical weapons in Kargil ? Any fire on that smoke .Or even Naplam ?


Definitely not - I guess it would have been logical for the IAF to think of it (napalm only) , but the Govt kept them on a leash.

gauravs
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Postby gauravs » 30 Jul 2006 09:49

Given all this talk of effects of air density on bomb trajectories, I wonder why did the IAf never try to find out what the effects are?

I can't believe that the IAF did not have plans to fight at top of the world!!! Simply can't believe it, specially after the Siachen operations.

Another question, does the IAF or the services have dedicated teams that actually try out the ordinance in varying flight and air conditions?? If there is a unit that does that, they deserve a roundhouse kick in the Ba115.

On a similar note, it can't be that difficult to simulate the trajectory of ordinance, given the fact that ISRO routinely performs these for ite space crafts.

Ved
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Postby Ved » 30 Jul 2006 10:12

gauravs wrote:On a similar note, it can't be that difficult to simulate the trajectory of ordinance, given the fact that ISRO routinely performs these for ite space crafts.


It is comparatively easier to calculate the trajectory of something that is moving directly 180 Deg to gravity, than at near horizontal to it, well within the atmosphere.

JCage
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Postby JCage » 30 Jul 2006 10:21

Ved so India didnt use napalm at Kargil thanks to GOI insistence?

Bloody shameful.

saumitra_j
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Postby saumitra_j » 30 Jul 2006 11:30

Definitely not - I guess it would have been logical for the IAF to think of it (napalm only) , but the Govt kept them on a leash.


Its really sad - why Napalm, why didn't the GOI think about gassing the scums out of their holes - if they were not a regular Army as claimed by the Pukes, then the Geneva convention certainly did not apply.

Its bloody shameful that we as a nation end up having leaders who wouldn't think even once in sacrificing others for self glory :(

RayC
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Postby RayC » 30 Jul 2006 16:57

Napalm bombs when dropped along low level attack profile, slide along the ground and incinerate the area as it slides along and also spreads. (I have not seen a napalm strike to be honest, but I have seen such attacks in training films).

One wonders how effective it would be on mountain tops and along spines if it has to slide and incinerate.

High level drops would have no guarantee of hits.

Maybe an airforce chap can tell us.


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