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Kargil War Thread - V

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Kargil War Thread - V

Postby Rakesh » 11 Aug 2006 04:48

Previous Thread in The Kargil Archive.

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Postby Vivek_A » 12 Aug 2006 05:25

continuing the discussion on the paki nuclear bluffs and India's idiotic policy of NFU, this is an interesting article from dupatta..he says the pakis threatened India with a nuclear weapon in 89 and India, at that time, didn't have a bomb.


Indian Express

Shekhar Gupta

Posted online: Saturday, August 12, 2006 at 0000 hrs IST


One of the great mysteries of our contemporary history is, just what happened between India and Pakistan in the summer of 1990? Did India and Pakistan come close to a war without any immediate provocation? Or, more precisely, did Pakistan deliberately increase tension levels and then threaten India with a pre-emptive nuclear strike? This is when the then prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, now a peacenik-come-lately, was shouting her slogans of azaadi, and exhorting the people of Kashmir to cut Jagmohan, then governor of the state, into pieces, as in “jag-jag, mo-mo, han-hanâ€

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Postby svinayak » 12 Aug 2006 05:47

Unrelated post to thread - edited by admin

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Postby Jagan » 14 Aug 2006 08:54

http://in.news.yahoo.com/060808/139/66iip.html

Sharif's Kargil White Paper more propaganda, less substance

By ANI
Tuesday August 8, 05:01 PM

By Sudhakar Jagdish/Suman Sharma

New Delhi, Aug.8 (ANI):Indian war veterans who were involved in Operation Vijay to flush out Pakistani Army units in Kargil in 1999 have rubbished the Pakistani Muslim League Nawaz's White Paper claim that New Delhi was aware of Pakistan Army's Kargil attack plan eleven months in advance.

They termed the assumption as "completely baseless" and "without foundation".

Speaking to ANI over phone, Lieutenant General S. Chandrashekar, who was the Vice-Chief of Army Staff at the height of the April-July 1999 Kargil war, said: " If India was aware of the Pakistan Army's plan, then they would not have allowed the Pakistan Army units to come inside Indian territory. Who would have allowed so many casualties (over 450 killed) to take place in the effort to throw them out?"

The 100-page White Paper quotes June 22, l998 as the day when the Indian Government came to know about Pakistan Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf's plan to launch an offensive in Kargil area of Jammu and Kashmir. This suggests that former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was aware of Pakistan Army's plan when he signed the Labore Declaration in February 1999 -- a plan which Nawaz Sharief claims he was not aware of.

According to the Kargil Committee report submitted by strategic expert, Mr. K. Subramanyam, the armed intrusion by Pakistan took India by surprise.

The report, which was tabled in Parliament on February 23, 2000 states: "The Review Committee had before it overwhelming evidence that the Pakistani armed intrusion in the Kargil sector came as a complete and total surprise to the Indian Government, Army and intelligence agencies as well as to the Jammu and Kashmir State Government and its agencies.

The six-member committee further went on to say that the Indian side detected Pakistani intrusion for the first time on May 3, 1999, through the help of "shepherds". This development was confirmed four days later by an army patrol group.

It also said that the Indian Army was unaware of the magnitude of the Pakistani intrusion and the profile of the intruders till the middle of May 1999. This was made "evident from the statement of the Corps Commander on May 10".

According to former Defence Minister George Fernandes, India was completely in dark about Pakistan's motive, but said then that enemy troops would be evicted in "48 hours".

Apparently the PML-Ns white paper bases its contention on an Intelligence Bureau(IB) Communication which pointed out that some unusual activities were taking place in the Kargil Sector. The Kargil Report states that the IB acquired certain inputs on activities in the FCNA (Frontier Corps Northern Areas) region, which were considered important enough by the then Director IB and was immediately communicated to the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the Cabinet Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Director-General Military Operations.

However, the date of the IB communication in the report has been given as June 2, 1998, rather than June 22, 1998 as cited by the PML-N's White Paper.

The then Chief of Army Staff, General V.P.Malik, was away on the formal visit to Poland when the Indian Army became aware of the Pakistan Army's intrusion in Kargil and the seriousness of the situation.

The Kargil report emphatically states that the inputs were unverified by other Intelligence agencies, including the Research and Analysis Wing, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Director-General Military Intelligence.

The Kargil report has already nullified Sharif's claim that he was not aware about his army intruding into Indian territory and that it was completely General Musharraf's brainchild.

It is quite plausible that General Musharraf had not taken Sharif fully into confidence about the Kargil invasion plans. The transcript of the telephone conversation between General Musharraf, who was in China, and his Chief of Staff on the eve of Kargil invasion gives an indication of the extent of power that the Pakistan Army enjoyed during the period.

The White Paper appears to be an attempt to rekindle Sharif's political career, especially with a view to next year's general elections in Pakistan. (ANI)

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Questions galore

Postby Nayak » 14 Aug 2006 23:39

Questions galore

[quote]Questions galore

In India there have been quite a few books in recent times dealing with the Kargil controversy. In the absence of any such effort in Pakistan, it is the Indian viewpoint on the issue that is gaining currency across the world

SEVEN years down the line, the Kargil controversy fails to die down. It resurfaced recently with the publication of excerpts from a book that were carried by the vernacular press, quoting former prime minister Nawaz Sharif as having reiterated his stance that he was not taken into confidence by the military. Soon after, President General Pervez Musharraf in an interview to a local channel refuted the claims and produced pictorial evidence to the contrary. It is extremely unfortunate that events of historical significance in our country are always shrouded in mystery. In the absence of any academic, intellectual and meaningful debate, conspiracy theories thrive, leaving the hapless silent majority bewildered. As the country gears up to enter the 60th year of its existence as an independent entity, it is time to do a bit of introspection.

It is ironic that we as a nation are averse to chronicle the important events not even for posterity and merely believe in rhetoric and polemics. While there is a total lack of debate and analysis on the impact of Kargil conflict in Pakistan, the situation is much different in India where it is a topic of continuous and meaningful debate. A case in point is that of Kargil – From Surprise To Victory (Harper Collins, India; March 2006) by General V.P Malik, who happens to be a former army chief in India (October 1, 1997 –September 30, 2000).

Brigadier Gordon Corrigon, a noted military historian, in his recent book Blood, Sweat and Arrogance and the Myths of Churchill’s War (2006) notes, “History is written by the victors. After the first war Stanley Baldwin is reputed to have said, ‘Winston has written a big book (in fact six big books: The World Crisis 1911–18, six volumes). Similarly, Churchill’s History of the Second World War, published in six volumes between 1948 and 1951, was the first major serious history of the war, and was Churchill’s perception of it. By getting up first he ensured that his interpretation of what happened and how it happened became the accepted version.â€

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Postby shyamd » 01 Sep 2006 21:02

We were deceived in Kargil: Indian Army

KARGIL, J&K, SEPTEMBER 1: The Army was prepared to thwart any repeat of the Kargil intrusions of 1999, which were the result of ‘trusting the adversary’, a senior military officer said in Kargil on Friday.

"The Army was deceived by the adversary as we believed that they would abide by the Shimla agreement. We were at fault in 1999 in trusting our adversary," General Officer Commanding, 14 Corps, Lt Gen J K Mohanty told visiting media men on the occasion of golden jubilee of Kargil Brigade.

Mohanty said the Army had taken several steps to prevent a repetition of 1999 when India lost over 500 soldiers while evicting Pakistan-backed intruders from strategic heights in the Kargil region.

"The entire border has been sealed and the patrolling has been intensified. With the cooperation of the people, the Army has succeeded in achieving its goals," the officer said.

In response to a question, he said there was no recorded bid of infiltration by militants from across the border in the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir controlled by 14 Corps.

Mohanty said the Army had no problems with the reopening of Kargil-Skardu route across the Line of Control. "In fact, Army wants it to be open as we want people of both sides to meet each other," he said adding, Pakistan was not agreeing to the idea of reopening of the road.

Earlier, addressing a ‘Sainik Sammilan’, Mohanty said Kargil Brigade has a long and glorious past and its personnel had won a number of gallantry awards.

Mohanty also lauded the people of Kargil for their support to the troops.

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Postby JCage » 01 Sep 2006 22:04

Book Reviews

Kargil: The Impregnable Conquered

By Lt Gen Y M Bammi examines attempts by Pakistan to unsettle India, and how India removed Pakistani intruders from Kargil. The book indicates in-depth research by the author, for it has information on Operation Vijay that has never been revealed earlier. Like the Artillery fired 293600 shells to dislodge the Pakistanis from their entrenched positions.
The Indian Artillery fired an assortment of 2,93,600 shells during the 1999 Kargil War to destroy the Pakistani positions in the intruded areas as well as to hit back at the Pakistani deployments across the border.
:eek: :twisted:

According to the recently-released book, Kargil: The Impregnable Conquered by Lt Gen (Retd) Y M Bammi, the Pakistani army had deployed its artillery ?in troops, in pairs and even singly? for wider coverage, and particularly to break the Indian infantry attacks on its well-entrenched positions, with its artillery being responsible for 83 per cent of the Indian casualties. Pakistan had the advantage of commanding heights, UAV surveillance and the US-supplied Gun Locating Radars to gather information on Indian deployments and artillery positions.
The Indian Army had several disadvantages in not having similar means, shortage of proper ammunition, and the requirement to hurriedly assemble a suitable force to evict the enemy. Despite this however, ?innovative? techniques were used to bombard the enemy on both sides of hill slopes, apparently to deny him the chance to take cover and massive artillery and air power was used to back the Indian Infantry attacks.
The 155mm Bofors Guns ?proved most effective, as besides firing in high angle and having a variety of charges, their long range of 30 km, enhanced by 10 per cent due to rarefied atmosphere, was able to cover all targets without redeployment?.

69,800 Bofors (155 mm) shells, 1,90,000 Field Gun (105 mm) shells, 16,100 Mortar (120 mm) shells, 3,400 Medium Gun (130 mm) shells, 9000 heavy Mortar (160 mm) shells and 5,300 Pinaka Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) shells were fired.Lt Gen Bammi, a graduate of the Defence Services Staff College, was commissioned into the Gorkha Rifles in 1958. During his 37 years of service with the Indian Army, he fought in the 1962 and 1971 Wars, and later, commanded a Mountain Division and a Strike Corps.

According to the book, the first Pakistani Prisoner of War (POW) in the Operation Vijay, which also established the presence of regular Pakistani troops on the Indian side, was in this ?very difficult? sector where the 70 Infantry Brigade was able to take back the entire occupied area, evicting 800 Pakistani troops.

Pakistan occupied ?all the dominating features? and neither could the helicopters fly nor the operations could be controlled from any single point. The Brigade Commander, Brig Devinder Singh, and his units, were not familiar with the region, but he set up different flanks and moved from one place to another to conduct and control operations against the enemy.

Lt Gen Bammi describes the effort here as the ?most successful operation," pointing out however that despite the great constraints, many units, officers and men have not been suitably awarded.
Instances cited in this regard are those of Commanding Officer 2 Rajputana Rifles, ?who had personally led the attack and gave the country the first victory of the Kargil conflict that saw the Tricolour flying majestically on Tololing?, that of Commanding Officer and Maj Dutt of 12 Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry, Lt Aditya of 5 Para for the attack on Conical, Major Ajit of 22 Grenadiers, Lt Col Amul Asthana of 1/11 Gorkha Rifles, Maj Ranade of 10 Para Commando, Col A Bhatia of 11 Rajputana Rifles, Capt S Sinha and Havildar Joginder Singh of High Altitude and Winter Warfare School, and the Missile Teams of 5 and 19 Guards.

Suggesting reconsideration, Lt Gen Bammi says: ?Commander 70 Brigade (Brig Devinder Singh) with eight units under command, had captured maximum territory, evicted the enemy first from 35 km frontage and accounted for the first ?and six out of eight?Prisoners of War. He was the only Brigade Commander who fought well ahead of along with his troops, and had often come under enemy?s machine gun and artillery fire. Yet, he was awarded (only) a Vishisht Seva Medal, which is normally awarded for ?Devotion to Duty during peace time.? Similarly, the efforts of Major Balan, his Brigade Major who continuously manned the operations room without relief for over two months and coordinated operations on four divergent routes, deserved to have been recongnised.?
The book also says that 17 Garhwal Rifles did as well as some other units getting the Unit Citation, but it was left out ?probably because the Commanding Officer had conveyed his different perceptions to the Divisional Commander, in writing.?
The Indian Army had been surprised by the intrusion, but Pakistan was also amazed at the grit, determination and tactical audacity of the Indian soldiers, who adopted very difficult approaches for attacking the formidable features and throw out the occupying Pakistanis.


The book is an exhaustive account of the Kargil War, having 80 maps and 40 pictures, and information useful to historians and those interested in military affairs. How the Indians made effective use of grit and willpower, artillery and air force, is vividly described by the Lt General.
* * *

www.defendersindia.com

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Postby Picklu » 01 Sep 2006 22:50

JCage wrote:Book Reviews

Kargil: The Impregnable Conquered
.............
69,800 Bofors (155 mm) shells, 1,90,000 Field Gun (105 mm) shells, 16,100 Mortar (120 mm) shells, 3,400 Medium Gun (130 mm) shells, 9000 heavy Mortar (160 mm) shells and 5,300 Pinaka Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) shells were fired.
* * *
..............
www.defendersindia.com

5,300 Pinaka Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) shells :eek: -- holy crap -- IA DID test Pinaka all right!!! :twisted:

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Postby Jagan » 01 Sep 2006 22:53

But note that it does not mention any Katyusha MBRLs being fired. Perhaps the author got confused and put Pinaka instead of Katyusha?

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Postby Picklu » 01 Sep 2006 23:23

Jagan wrote:But note that it does not mention any Katyusha MBRLs being fired. Perhaps the author got confused and put Pinaka instead of Katyusha?


Much more likely since for Pinaka it means around 450 loadout. But a lt. gen making such mistake? :roll:

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Postby Jagan » 02 Sep 2006 00:01

Picklu wrote:
Jagan wrote:But note that it does not mention any Katyusha MBRLs being fired. Perhaps the author got confused and put Pinaka instead of Katyusha?


Much more likely since for Pinaka it means around 450 loadout. But a lt. gen making such mistake? :roll:


i was suggesting that the reviewer made the mistake - not the actual book.

If this reflect pinaka, then two more issues come bout - 1. the figures are not complete because the katyusha numbers are missing 2. time to dig back old photos and see if any photographic records exist of its usage.

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Postby Sharma » 19 Sep 2006 18:29

Book :
Title : KARGIL
Authour : Gen V P Malik
Publisher : HarperCollins Publishers India
Price : Rs 595/-

And before writting about the book just want to tell all of you that today Gen Malik came to our office and I got my copy signed by him.

Though nothing new in that book but it have very good account of force buildup and mobilization of Indian forces during the crisis. According to him all strike and holding formations were either moved or made ready for move. Moving out our only ambhibious Inf Div at Andaman i.e. 108 inf div to west cost signaled that India was ready to escalate the war. In total 466 trains were used for the mobilization. He also mentioned that it was very difficult to move the formations as Indian Govt did not declared "WAR" and hence no organization like railways, P&T, Petroleum etc could provide full support for mobilization. Even though he praises support our Babus in these org to help Army during that time.

As earlier books on Kargil he also bashed up intelligence agencies for the failure including his own Brigade Intelligence Units, Div Intelligence Units and DMI. In Ch 5, Page no 111 he wrote a instance of a NSC ( National Security Concil) meeting chaired by Prime Minister during Kargil ops.There he insisted that intruders are not irregulars but Regular Pakistani soldiers supported by PA against the calim of RAW. His reports were based on actual contacts between intruders and IA patrols. When Gen Malik questioned that claim in a raised voice our Dear Prime Minister kept quite and Gen was pleaded by Secretary, NSC by saying " inki bhi to laaj rakhni hai" ( we have to save their honour too). He was pointing to Mr. Arvind Dave, Secretary, RAW.

He openly remarked about that poor Brigadier Surinder Singh for his incompetence and irresponsility. According to him Brig continued to give "No-Intrusion" certificate to his Div and Corps even up to late May, 1999. He also metioned 2-IC of 1/11 Lt Col Amul Asthana. This fellow wrote a direct letter to COAS about the deficiencies in the weapons provided to his Unit. New weaponry was airlifted to them immediately from reserves and COAS ensured that this Lt Col did not get mauled up by others for breaking the chain of command. He mentioned his then ADC Major Sudhir Kumar of 9 Para who joined Kargil battle after his special permission and won Vir Chakra in that. This fellow later died in CI OPS. He specialy mention all PVC winners in box.

He was little critcal about then Air Chief Mr. Tipnis about his intial reluctance to provide support to Army. He praised Navy Chief for his agression and support.

This book also reveals that special HAWS and Group Vikas teams involvment in war. These troops were attached to regular battlions for expertise.

As anyother military man he is also crtical to the fact that Indian Politcal leaders are not aware of military matters and how military works. But he was surprised when Jaswant Singh stood in front of his almost granted request of crossing the LoC. It is to noted that Mr. Jaswant Singh is an ex-army. He stated that Vajpayee govt overlooked his intial reports about composition of intruders and wanted only army to clear all that without escalating it to even artlerry support let alone the airforce.

A good book to read to get commanders prospective about te war fought under him.

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Postby Jagan » 19 Sep 2006 20:40

What exactly was the grouse against the AF chief?

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Postby Mihir » 20 Sep 2006 04:46

Gen. Malik states that ACM Tipnis refused to provide air support to the IA because of the danger of escalation. However, later in the book, he describes how all three service chiefs were in agreement for a proposal the IAF to cross the LoC to carry out a particular attack, only to have it shot down by the PM.

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Postby JCage » 20 Sep 2006 05:04

Sorry to say this, but typical of how the IA sees the IAF as flying arty and the IAF doesnt want it..

IA asked the IAF to begin strafing attacks with choppers
IAF said no, we need fast jets too, choppers cant operate for all those attacks in different conditions (height, speed) making them vulnerable
IA says whatever, start off.
IAF says no, we need fast jets and that requires a sign from the PM whatever

And thats the crux of the "slight".

Unfortunately, if we see the comments by even respected commentators like Gen Mehta, the attitude is often one of lets snap our fingers, and the Af better get to it.
The IA was knee deep in war, with it soldiers fighting, so it cant be blamed for urgency, but there is a lot that can be said for understanding the compulsion of the other services..

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Postby karan » 20 Sep 2006 05:16

Jagan wrote:What exactly was the grouse against the AF chief?


Boss
Lets wait till ACM Tipnis writes his version of events. Let the slug fest begin. Gen Malik got his Lakh Rupiya for writing his memoirs. There isn't a mention of his poor leadership, his lack of conviction. Has he ever accepted an iota of blame for kargil mishap. Attitude reflects leadership. His and the political masters lackadaisical leadership led to the deaths of so many.

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Postby ramana » 20 Sep 2006 09:48

There was an agreement post 1965 signed by Swaran Singh about not fly if combat jets within 150 km. So ACM Tipnis was correct that it would be escalatory and made sure that he had the assets in place in such a case.

I dont think ACM will indulge in any slug fest. The PM shot it down as he wanted the territory recovered and not lost post ceasefire. This was made clear many times.

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Postby Sharma » 20 Sep 2006 09:54

karan wrote:
Jagan wrote:What exactly was the grouse against the AF chief?


Boss
Lets wait till ACM Tipnis writes his version of events. Let the slug fest begin. Gen Malik got his Lakh Rupiya for writing his memoirs. There isn't a mention of his poor leadership, his lack of conviction. Has he ever accepted an iota of blame for kargil mishap. Attitude reflects leadership. His and the political masters lackadaisical leadership led to the deaths of so many.


In the chapater where Gen Malik mentioned support of other services he explained that it was not Tipnis who was at fault but it was Air Chief ( Man Under rules). Actualy IA wanted IAF to use her atatck helicopters immediately. As mentioned in the book Govt did not declared "WAR" and that was equated as a CI-ops at that time. In such scenario Ait power can only be used after ploitical clearnce. Gen Malik wrote against that "Political Clearnce" rule which he wants to be amended in wake of larger possibility of theatre level conflicts instead of full scale conventional wars. Also when Army asked for the help IAF was already under prepaerations with her attack helicopters practising at Tosha ranges in Pir Panjal. So Tipnis was doing his best to support IA but he needed that political clearnce.

I request you not to make it Gen Malik vs Tipnis as it is clearly not the case.

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Postby negi » 20 Sep 2006 09:57

Ok Ok.............guys I got it yet again it is our GOI and the decision makers at the helm of the things that did not give a green signal to Armed Forces.Between I never knew that one requires Pm's or GOI approval for calling Fighter Bombers,IOW what differences does it make to those netas whether IAF uses Choppers or Fighter Jets(I doubt whether these Netas even now the diff between a Chopper and a Jet :twisted: ).Anyways guys dont you think Armed forces be given the full authority and autonomy in terms of making tactical decisions after the President has declared a War(I mean like all three services chalking out their plans without BABU intervention).In case of Kargil GOI did not declare it as a war(perhaps a blunder on it's part).

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Postby Sharma » 20 Sep 2006 11:07

psnegi wrote:Ok Ok.............guys I got it yet again it is our GOI and the decision makers at the helm of the things that did not give a green signal to Armed Forces.Between I never knew that one requires Pm's or GOI approval for calling Fighter Bombers,IOW what differences does it make to those netas whether IAF uses Choppers or Fighter Jets(I doubt whether these Netas even now the diff between a Chopper and a Jet :twisted: ).Anyways guys dont you think Armed forces be given the full authority and autonomy in terms of making tactical decisions after the President has declared a War(I mean like all three services chalking out their plans without BABU intervention).In case of Kargil GOI did not declare it as a war(perhaps a blunder on it's part).


May be Netas do not know the differnce between a Chopper and fighter jet and there is no need for them to do that. They must know the difference between the implication of usage of two and I think they knew it very well.

Defence forces are always given authority for tactical decisions in case of war. Whether to use Air Force or not was a Startegic decision and linked to Politics? Also how to use air force is also a Strategic decision. I mean to cross LoC or not? So Netas had their say in that. But I do not think they directed IAF to use Mirage-2000 instead of Mig or laser guided bombs instead of dumb ones.

So there is a difference b/w strategic and tactical decisions to understand. Why blame Netas and Babus for every thing?

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Postby negi » 20 Sep 2006 11:42

Sharma wrote:May be Netas do not know the differnce between a Chopper and fighter jet and there is no need for them to do that. They must know the difference between the implication of usage of two and I think they knew it very well.
Well so you are justifying their delay in granting permission to the IAF regarding use of Jets.Moreoever I think the Army and AF chief would be anytime in a better position than those Gawanrs in GOI to make those decisions.

Defence forces are always given authority for tactical decisions in case of war. Whether to use Air Force or not was a Startegic decision and linked to Politics? Also how to use air force is also a Strategic decision. I mean to cross LoC or not? So Netas had their say in that. But I do not think they directed IAF to use Mirage-2000 instead of Mig or laser guided bombs instead of dumb ones.

So there is a difference b/w strategic and tactical decisions to understand. Why blame Netas and Babus for every thing?
Cross the LOC ,what on earth would make IAF do that for the enemy was within the Border.I think IAF never crossed it even when M2k's were pressed into action.Between Netas did not say anything about which A/C to choose, for there they did not have any chance of drawing a political mileage(or they eventually did who knows :twisted: ).Man having delayed the IAF Netas deprived the IA of Air support and to me are responsible for large number of casualties on our side(infact they have always poked their reeking nose into decision making of Armed Forces).

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Postby Sharma » 20 Sep 2006 13:10

Thats a very big misconception about Netas majority of people has developed after seeing bollywood flicks. All Netas are not like you think and they are not always Gawanr.

In kargil first it was our intelligence agencies and than army who was caught off guard not these Netas. I know that our political leadership is not best in world but they are better than our neighbours and it is enough as of now. Netas will also improve along with you, me and India.

As for the delay in approval of use of IAF in Kargil. It was again our dear RAW and Army. Upto late May,99 there were different informations with both of them about composition of intruders. According to RAW it was 70% muzhadins and 30% regulars and Army had opposite figures. Ears of GOI were at fault and hence delay in reaction.

You should read about Op Safed Sagar before commenting on need for IAF to cross LoC or Not.

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Postby negi » 20 Sep 2006 13:39

Sharma wrote:Thats a very big misconception about Netas majority of people has developed after seeing bollywood flicks. All Netas are not like you think and they are not always Gawanr..
Sir to me Gawanr is a person who irrespective of his education fails/hesitates to take a decision that is detrimental in terms of nations security,in this context their failure,aloofness or intentional delay in giving the IAF free hand cost us dearly.As for Bollywood flicks well what they show is just the tip of the iceberg.Having said that I concede that all Netas are not like that ,but again those are exceptions and exceptions are never an example.

In kargil first it was our intelligence agencies and than army who was caught off guard not these Netas. I know that our political leadership is not best in world but they are better than our neighbours and it is enough as of now. Netas will also improve along with you, me and India.

As for the delay in approval of use of IAF in Kargil. It was again our dear RAW and Army. Upto late May,99 there were different informations with both of them about composition of intruders. According to RAW it was 70% muzhadins and 30% regulars and Army had opposite figures. Ears of GOI were at fault and hence delay in reaction.

You should read about Op Safed Sagar before commenting on need for IAF to cross LoC or Not.
Intelligence failure or callousness whatever you may call it ,it was kinda not under direct control of GOI (for it can be caused by even a single person's blunder courtsey our Chalta hai attitude).But when Kargil was recognised as a case of Terrorist/Military(do the terms matter) intrusion,I think from there on every decision should have been left to the armed forces.Between does the issue that whether Chopper or Jets be used depend on the composition of the Intruders ,moreoever I wonder whether GOI reaction would have been any more faster in case both Army and RAW would have submitted similar findings?.LOC cross karne ki baat to chod dijiye sir even if we will be under full scale invasion GOI would still be wondering whther to declare it as a full scale war,a skirmish or a daily terrorist intrusion.

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Postby Sharma » 20 Sep 2006 14:10

India moved her 108 Inf Div from Andaman to West coast in late May,99. Indian Navy called some of her eastern fleet ships to western. All Strike formations were moved to their launch pads. 39 Armd Div (Palampur) and 28 Inf Div ( Kargil) were moved back to their desigmated areas of action. 39 was at Rajouri and 28 was at Kupwara for CI ops. India moved her strategic missile assest when they came to know that PA is preparing and clearing her missile launch sites ( 3rd july, 99. One day before Nawaj met Clinton).

Now all these decisions can not be taken by defnce forces alone. This means Indian leadership was ready to escalate the war to any extent if situation demanded so.

I am sure if GOI had full and authetic information about PA's intrusion the response could have been different. Fog of contradictory informations during the war always hinders decision taking capability of top brass.

In totality Kargil was a national disastor where every body right from COs of every regt in Kargil to PM of India was responsible.

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Postby negi » 20 Sep 2006 14:35

Sharma wrote:India moved her 108 Inf Div from Andaman to West coast in late May,99. Indian Navy called some of her eastern fleet ships to western. All Strike formations were moved to their launch pads. 39 Armd Div (Palampur) and 28 Inf Div ( Kargil) were moved back to their desigmated areas of action. 39 was at Rajouri and 28 was at Kupwara for CI ops. India moved her strategic missile assest when they came to know that PA is preparing and clearing her missile launch sites ( 3rd july, 99. One day before Nawaj met Clinton).

Now all these decisions can not be taken by defnce forces alone. This means Indian leadership was ready to escalate the war to any extent if situation demanded so..
Wait a minute Armed forces take the decisions they only were awaiting orders from the GOI who inturn caused the delay.Meanwhile those formation changes were made keeping in mind the fact that TSP might declare an open war.Meanwhile what do ya mean by India moved her strategic missile assets (our missiles can hit any corner of TSP from anywhere in India) .

I am sure if GOI had full and authetic information about PA's intrusion the response could have been different. Fog of contradictory informations during the war always hinders decision taking capability of top brass.


Yeah like Nehru had about the Lizard.Information about the enemy would not be always available readily in war time ,infact people in charge are supposed to prepare for the worst without wasting time even if they sometimes might have to back their instincts.The biggest excuse that one can give for failure is lack of Information and I am afraid no one buys it.

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Postby John Snow » 20 Sep 2006 22:00

Guys be careful, rayc and his supporters were ready to punch day ligts out when I questioned in the same vein about Malik and his golf skills :)

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Postby Kakkaji » 20 Sep 2006 23:40

JCage wrote:Sorry to say this, but typical of how the IA sees the IAF as flying arty and the IAF doesnt want it..

Unfortunately, if we see the comments by even respected commentators like Gen Mehta, the attitude is often one of lets snap our fingers, and the Af better get to it.
The IA was knee deep in war, with it soldiers fighting, so it cant be blamed for urgency, but there is a lot that can be said for understanding the compulsion of the other services..


Maybe there is a case there for letting the Army control the "Flying Artillery" assets that are currently owned by the Air Force?

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Postby JCage » 21 Sep 2006 00:11

With multirole aircraft & PGMs the role of flying arty is on the way out...you need to do BVR one moment, launch PGMs the next, rocket a tank later..

No way can the Army manage that, its not their dept, why should they?

Instead, ramp up the IAs own Arty assets, and give them proper sensors and networking ability..thats a much better boost!

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Postby Kakkaji » 21 Sep 2006 00:39

JCage wrote:With multirole aircraft & PGMs the role of flying arty is on the way out...you need to do BVR one moment, launch PGMs the next, rocket a tank later..

No way can the Army manage that, its not their dept, why should they?

Instead, ramp up the IAs own Arty assets, and give them proper sensors and networking ability..thats a much better boost!


How about the attack helos? Shouldn't they belong to the Army?

Personally I think the bulk of rotary wing assets should be operated by the Army instead of the Air Force.

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Postby JCage » 21 Sep 2006 00:47

Oh sure! But right now, they are under the operational control of the Army already so dont see much of a difference there, Army probably likes it that way cause it saves on their expenditure! :lol:

Meanwhile both the IA and IAF are funding the LCH, going to acquire it. The IAF was interested in it for SEAD work, the IA for their usual tank busting, other ground warfare thingies. IIRC the Army was cut up that the IAF was piggybacking on their financing for the LCH and saving its money, what goes around comes around, I guess! :lol:

Bulk of rotary assets by IA, well..not really, because IAF rotary wing does a lot more than just support army, from disaster relief to all sorts of essential ops necessary for supporting the IAF itself.

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Postby RayC » 21 Sep 2006 03:19

What's this about IAF being IA's flying arty?

IA has a role and one of that is for close support of the ground forces.

In Kargil, there was no question of movement across the LC. Therefore, what is the role envsioned by you all for the IAF?

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Postby RayC » 21 Sep 2006 03:36

Sharma wrote:India moved her 108 Inf Div from Andaman to West coast in late May,99. Indian Navy called some of her eastern fleet ships to western. All Strike formations were moved to their launch pads. 39 Armd Div (Palampur) and 28 Inf Div ( Kargil) were moved back to their desigmated areas of action. 39 was at Rajouri and 28 was at Kupwara for CI ops. India moved her strategic missile assest when they came to know that PA is preparing and clearing her missile launch sites ( 3rd july, 99. One day before Nawaj met Clinton).

Now all these decisions can not be taken by defnce forces alone. This means Indian leadership was ready to escalate the war to any extent if situation demanded so.

I am sure if GOI had full and authetic information about PA's intrusion the response could have been different. Fog of contradictory informations during the war always hinders decision taking capability of top brass.

In totality Kargil was a national disastor where every body right from COs of every regt in Kargil to PM of India was responsible.


When a war is engaged in, the operational plans are put into gear and all formations become combat ready as envisioned and located as per plans which have been war-gamed and the strategy is known to the govt in peacetime.

One does not escalate a war. One caters for all contingencies. Escalating has a connotation of mindless engagement and conflagration. War and combat is a deliberate affair and not a knee jerk ecstasy.

National disaster? In what way please?; unless, of course, you are implying all wars are national disasters.

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Postby JCage » 21 Sep 2006 09:09

RayC wrote:What's this about IAF being IA's flying arty?


Nothing much sir, just the odd bit of sniping that goes on between bigwigs on both sides about CAS vs interdicting logistics etc..

In Kargil, there was no question of movement across the LC. Therefore, what is the role envsioned by you all for the IAF?


I think their platform and munition limitations prevented them from being engaged in pure CAS to some extent (bombs can miss and hit own troops)..its changed to quite some extent now, but I'd think that the best thing for the IA to do is boost up its own artillery.

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Postby Sharma » 21 Sep 2006 11:30

RayC wrote:
National disaster? In what way please?; unless, of course, you are implying all wars are national disasters.


Thats my personal opinion and I say so becasue every institutions involded with National security failed to prevent it. Kargil could have been avoided easily.

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Postby negi » 21 Sep 2006 11:39

Sharma wrote:Thats my personal opinion and I say so becasue every institutions involded with National security failed to prevent it. Kargil could have been avoided easily.


Sharmaji did ya visit the thread on 27th-28th July (I joined BR ) and was flogged by every one for saying things on similar lines,rest as they say is History. :oops: .

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Postby Anoop » 22 Sep 2006 04:54

Sharma wrote: Kargil could have been avoided easily.


How?

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Postby Sharma » 22 Sep 2006 11:19

Anoop wrote:
Sharma wrote: Kargil could have been avoided easily.


How?


If all the routine patrols sent my 121 Bde's regts would have gone on ridges and height instead of taking easier routes i.e. river bed or nallah or valleys.

If they were allowed to go upto LoC for patrolling and just not a walk upto the suitable terrain.

If WASO patrols were taken seriously and not as formality to complete flying hours.

If Bde Surinder Singh had thought twice before issuing "No-Intrusion" certificates to his higher formations.

If RAW could have noticed movement of all reserve and additional battlions to forward area of FCNA.


there are many IFs which alone could have avoided the Kargil. Atleast the way intrusion came to light and hasty reaction. Kargil was a complete failure at strategic level. And indian defnce forces were again caught offguard and ill prepared ( due to themselves, Babu's , Neta's or erstwhile Track-2 diplomacy).

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Postby viktor » 22 Sep 2006 11:32

There are lots of IFs & BUTs in the history. If we had crossed the seas and conquered Europe. But that doesnt make sense as its history. What we need to do is learn from our mistakes and ensure that it doesnt get repeated. Eg Brigadier Surinder Singh was lax then how come his immediate superior Maj. Gen. Budhawar didnt check on him ? Many questions remain unanswered.

- This is what we should do to avoid similar debacle:

- Strengthen inter-agency intel sharing.

- Build up logistics chain strong enough to take any damage.

- Use technology to the max, but dont entirely rely on it. Remember the best surveillance gear still is Eyeball Mk.1.

- Try to take pre-emptive steps even if means losing few lives because ultimately it'll save many more lives.

I am no military analyst, but this is what my civilian brain came up with. Apologies if I am not entirely correct.

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Postby Anoop » 22 Sep 2006 17:01

Sharma wrote: If all the routine patrols sent my 121 Bde's regts would have gone on ridges and height instead of taking easier routes i.e. river bed or nallah or valleys.


In the Kargil sector, the gaps between battalion area of responsibilities ranged from 10 to 40 km and the available personnel strength dictated that only approaches could be manned/monitored. The degree of patrolling is governed by (a) threat perception (b) physical accessibility (c) ability to spare personnel from other tasks.

If they were allowed to go upto LoC for patrolling and just not a walk upto the suitable terrain.


And how would they physically get up to the LoC when snow had fallen to over 3 feet? What would the reaction of AHQ been if soldiers were lost in avalanches?

If WASO patrols were taken seriously and not as formality to complete flying hours.


I have heard from officers posted there that WASO has serious limitations in identifying infiltration routes because of the ridgelines - the terrain is too cut up to allow a good field of view and there is plenty of cover unless one is flying close to the ground - which, under high snowfall, low visibility and gusting wind conditions, is easier said than done. Besides, WASO occurs infrequently (once in three weeks as a Priority Four sector!) and is not stealthy, giving the Pakistanis time to take cover. However, I've read that the few WASO flights that were conducted were in mid-day making them ineffective due to blindness from the sun reflecting off the snow.

If Bde Surinder Singh had thought twice before issuing "No-Intrusion" certificates to his higher formations.


Brig. Surinder Singh couldn't have thought twice because indications from his battalion commanders would have been based on the limitations outlined above, hence provoking little alarm.

One may ask - if the conditions were so inhospitable, how did the Pakistanis intrude and set up positions?

The counter question to that is - how effective were those intrusions? Could they have been sustained? As we found out, the answer is no. So all the Pakistanis succeeded in doing was highlight the inadequacies of the Indian deployment there prior to 1999, a deficiency that has been addressed now. Much more area coverage is provided now, the logistical tail to sustain those deployments is much longer and the expenditure incurred by the deployment is much higher now - all of which can be justified post-Kargil.

But that must still come at a cost of reduced deployment somewhere else...

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Postby kgoan » 22 Sep 2006 18:36

On various internet fora and in real life, whenever we come across a Pakee and Kargil comes up, the Pakees are usually hysterically insistent on their "victory".

Shafqat Mahmood has a nice take on this in todays jang.

It happened seven years ago but the wound is still raw. Hundreds of our young people lost their lives and many more suffered dreadful injuries. Our image took a terrible battering with the world condemning us as aggressors. And South Asia came close to a nuclear holocaust. Yet, we pretend as if nothing happened. We have consigned the entire episode to oblivion.

No paper takes out supplements commemorating the event. No heroic stories of war or victory are penned down. No military or civilian dignitaries visit the graves of the shaheeds. No special flag-hoisting takes place to stoke the embers of patriotic feelings. It was the fourth real war between India and Pakistan. Yet for us, it has become a black hole of forgetfulness.

I am told that no postmortem of the event is conducted in our defence institutions. No wargaming is done to determine what went right or wrong or to asses strategic gains and losses. It is as if we don't want to remember, don't want to go down this particular memory lane. Kargil is like an embarrassing family secret that we want to hide from prying eyes.


Given the braggart nature of the average Pakee, one wonders why they want to hide and not commemorate "their" victory in standard Pakee style, by shouting it out from the roof-tops.


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