Ideally, one may like to have separate forces for every type of warfare.
But can one afford to have them is the question.
When the CI is no longer there, what will happen to the large force made to fight CI? Can they be left unemployed? Should the govt exchequer be burdened thereafter with unproductive manpower? One must understand it is not only pay involved, it is pension, housing and administration.
Therefore, the Army has to do both the task ie defend the country externally and internally. That is the task anyway and the same task is applicable for armies worldwide.
In so far as stocking is concerned, it is a routine thing done every year during the summer. The ammunition etc can last out the number of battles envisaged. I think that is about all that I will write in an open forum.
As far as the rush orders, it is to shore up for a bigger action that could have happened. As far as small arms ammunition (amn), we produce the same. Bofors amn because certain categories were required to shore up the overall stocks for a larger conflict. In so far as coffins, it was not the practice to send the dead to their homes before. It was a practice introduced during Kargil. Obviously, there would be no coffins and so it had to be bought.
Kargil War Thread - V
JC,
I'll have to take up a more detailed response later. But I would say that there is a good reason for a COIN force like the Assam Rifles to be drawn from local resources and not used anywhere else in India - that is part of the political settlement considerations of COIN.
The other option is of building CRPF forces to be deployed everywhere, but given the initial responses of the CRPF and BSF in Kashmir, they did not inspire much confidence. The experience of the Punjab Police indicate that a State Police force needs total political backing in combating terrorism and you will recall that the State administration in Kashmir had been completely subverted, so that option was out.
The last point relates to the easiest route any government would take. Their attitude is - the Army is in the barracks, not fighting a war. Here we have a "war" going on, so rather than raise a new force, use existing resources and we'll deal with the consequences later. Sub-optimal, but take a look at every long insurgency around the world and how it was tackled.
I would say that India is probably the only country in the world which has specialized COIN forces like the AR, RR etc, no matter where they are drawn from.
I'll have to take up a more detailed response later. But I would say that there is a good reason for a COIN force like the Assam Rifles to be drawn from local resources and not used anywhere else in India - that is part of the political settlement considerations of COIN.
The other option is of building CRPF forces to be deployed everywhere, but given the initial responses of the CRPF and BSF in Kashmir, they did not inspire much confidence. The experience of the Punjab Police indicate that a State Police force needs total political backing in combating terrorism and you will recall that the State administration in Kashmir had been completely subverted, so that option was out.
The last point relates to the easiest route any government would take. Their attitude is - the Army is in the barracks, not fighting a war. Here we have a "war" going on, so rather than raise a new force, use existing resources and we'll deal with the consequences later. Sub-optimal, but take a look at every long insurgency around the world and how it was tackled.
I would say that India is probably the only country in the world which has specialized COIN forces like the AR, RR etc, no matter where they are drawn from.
If I understand correctly what RayC and others are saying:
1. Kargil was like a suicide terrorist mission planned in a grand scale by PA.
2. IA, though wargamed many times against valid military strategies, did not wargame against such possible suicide missions by PA. So when Kargil happened, it was a strategic surprise for us. And IA paid the price in blood.
Now AFAIK,
A. IA has effective tactics to employ against suicide mission by individuals or group of terrorists, as part of its COIN doctrin. (Here 'effective' does not mean 100% success but to reduce the damage to a great extent).
B. IA also knows the terrorist jihadi mindset of PA.
My Q is, after knowing the jihadi mindset, why IA did not wargame against such jihadi suicide missions? Was it group think?
I know I am saying this today with 20/20 hindset and whatever we do will not return those dead men ... but my argument is more to direct the people in the helm to find out the ommissions in the scenarios that are planned and wargamed.
1. Kargil was like a suicide terrorist mission planned in a grand scale by PA.
2. IA, though wargamed many times against valid military strategies, did not wargame against such possible suicide missions by PA. So when Kargil happened, it was a strategic surprise for us. And IA paid the price in blood.
Now AFAIK,
A. IA has effective tactics to employ against suicide mission by individuals or group of terrorists, as part of its COIN doctrin. (Here 'effective' does not mean 100% success but to reduce the damage to a great extent).
B. IA also knows the terrorist jihadi mindset of PA.
My Q is, after knowing the jihadi mindset, why IA did not wargame against such jihadi suicide missions? Was it group think?
I know I am saying this today with 20/20 hindset and whatever we do will not return those dead men ... but my argument is more to direct the people in the helm to find out the ommissions in the scenarios that are planned and wargamed.
Maybe IA banked more on the time-tested and perfected self-preservation practices of PA. They had not reckoned for the 'cannon fodder' practice of using Gilgit boys to become shaheed, while the true Pukijabis officers and Mushy's rats were far behind.
If you look into how IA now maintains some force in Kargil through the winter and their position on Siachen demilitarisation. Never trust the Puki Army
If you look into how IA now maintains some force in Kargil through the winter and their position on Siachen demilitarisation. Never trust the Puki Army
Anoop,
The practice of raising forces of as much of a a local character as possible to deal with local problems goes back to colonial times.
A number of countries have Interior Ministry type forces to deal with a range of internal threats. In Europe the Spanish, French and Italians relied on these kinds of hybrid police-military formations to deal with Basques, Corsicans, the Mafia, Red Brigades, etc as well as major civil disturbances.
Russian MVD for example is heavily involved in the Caucasus, having taken over many duties from MoD and the Ground Forces.
Arab countries, Iran, Pakistan etc, prefer to use paramilitary and anti-coup forces as far as possible for internal problems. PA helicopters are hitting the Baluchis, but much of the fighting on the ground is carried out by the Frontier Constabulary.
The PRC's People's Armed Police now handle much of the batons and bayonets aspect of internal security. The PLA backs them up while looking outwards.
Most countries would rather not have to spend to maintain such an array of forces.
The practice of raising forces of as much of a a local character as possible to deal with local problems goes back to colonial times.
A number of countries have Interior Ministry type forces to deal with a range of internal threats. In Europe the Spanish, French and Italians relied on these kinds of hybrid police-military formations to deal with Basques, Corsicans, the Mafia, Red Brigades, etc as well as major civil disturbances.
Russian MVD for example is heavily involved in the Caucasus, having taken over many duties from MoD and the Ground Forces.
Arab countries, Iran, Pakistan etc, prefer to use paramilitary and anti-coup forces as far as possible for internal problems. PA helicopters are hitting the Baluchis, but much of the fighting on the ground is carried out by the Frontier Constabulary.
The PRC's People's Armed Police now handle much of the batons and bayonets aspect of internal security. The PLA backs them up while looking outwards.
Most countries would rather not have to spend to maintain such an array of forces.
Johann,
Isn't it fair to say that with the exception of Chechnya, none of the other insurgencies you mentioned even closely approach the level of military sophistication and endurance that India faces? Not to mention the sheer ethnic and linguistic diversity that India has to handle.
In that light, what would your recommendations be for raising internal security forces? For example, how well would police forces fare in search and cordon, ambush, road clearing, detonating IEDs and show of force marches for over 10 years? One of the pros and the cons of using the military is the ability to rotate them in and out of the area that prevents their subversion as an organization. To mimic the ability of the military in handling such threats is to create another military, no?
I am not for continued deployment of the Indian Army in Internal Security duties, but I don't see very good alternatives either.
Isn't it fair to say that with the exception of Chechnya, none of the other insurgencies you mentioned even closely approach the level of military sophistication and endurance that India faces? Not to mention the sheer ethnic and linguistic diversity that India has to handle.
In that light, what would your recommendations be for raising internal security forces? For example, how well would police forces fare in search and cordon, ambush, road clearing, detonating IEDs and show of force marches for over 10 years? One of the pros and the cons of using the military is the ability to rotate them in and out of the area that prevents their subversion as an organization. To mimic the ability of the military in handling such threats is to create another military, no?
I am not for continued deployment of the Indian Army in Internal Security duties, but I don't see very good alternatives either.
I didnt make my point clearly enough. Take a look at India's paramils- each of which has grown beyond its original mandate and is juggling with several tasks, YET, there is little coordination at the central level beyond a point. We have had no issues splurging on raising paramil after paramil, but come insurgency and then a) send in paramil- which was despite FIVE DECADES of insurgency, yet unprepared to deal with a full blown COIN perspective b)When it fails, Send in the Army. The end result is that since there was no long term planning of what to expect, we keep flitting from one fire to the next, and anyways Urban India cares TWO HOOTS about what is going on in North east or Kashmir. The usage of the armed forces as a fire fighting force, has also led to an attitude where-
- Disaster management has been relegated to them
- They replace civil authority because civil authority is corrupt and hand in glove with the problem or because civil authority is incompetent
- Lack of appreciation of security issues in general, wait till an insurgency becomes full blown....and....send in the Army
- Ad hoc attitude towards essential preparation of a Nuke response force (begun fairly recently)
The entire establishment acts on an adhoc basis. One of the existing paramils could have been revamped to serve the role earlier if costs were an issue. The IA could have retrained, them, officered them, sort of an enhanced Assam Rifles as it were or an RR much earlier.
But the presence of the IA basically is a paper pushers dream. The admin messes up, or an insurgency arises thanks to our neighbours...and send in the IA...
My point is, COIN & Anti terror ops should be treated with the seriousness they deserve, troops should be trained to the utmost and equipped to blazes to deal with it (sure the Army does it), but its still now when it should have been done ages back. Instead we just keep shuttling alphabet soups around, till the IA has to be called in.
Look at the NSG. Luckily the army component is ok, but what was the need for the paramil component to become an overblown protect the VIPs unit?
The first thing to do is remove the IPS from political pressure and to examine how and where the locals can do firefighting consistently. The moment a threat emerges or is deemed seditious, the state should not be allowed to mess up the anti insurgency beyond a point- eg the Congress vs Maoists in AP. The Centre has to take up and draw a coordinated plan to deal with ALL insurgencies and wargame it or plan it out and proceed.
Lets not just "Send in the Army" after sleeping on the job for a decade.
And lets give some seriousness to the entire issue, ie dedicated COIN R&D units, training facilities only for COIN at a much larger scale than Wairengte, etc. Cross training paramils, army, state detachments at these institutes, have them develop some sort of institutionalized approach. Share resources, ELINT - make it consistent.
My point is that just throwing manpower (paramils) followed by Send in the Army, is a vastly inefficient and callous approach and in no way addresses either the causes of insurgency (we never seem to learn) or leaving even the NBJPrie stuff apart, it is also a very inefficient method to deal with the issue from the defeating insurgency perspective. All that has done is bloat up the number of people in the paramils YET not give us the kind of solutions we desire. The entire budget keeps going towards their pay/pensions/ not even modern equipment for the rank and file in the paramils beyond INSAS and some stuff.
- Disaster management has been relegated to them
- They replace civil authority because civil authority is corrupt and hand in glove with the problem or because civil authority is incompetent
- Lack of appreciation of security issues in general, wait till an insurgency becomes full blown....and....send in the Army
- Ad hoc attitude towards essential preparation of a Nuke response force (begun fairly recently)
The entire establishment acts on an adhoc basis. One of the existing paramils could have been revamped to serve the role earlier if costs were an issue. The IA could have retrained, them, officered them, sort of an enhanced Assam Rifles as it were or an RR much earlier.
But the presence of the IA basically is a paper pushers dream. The admin messes up, or an insurgency arises thanks to our neighbours...and send in the IA...
My point is, COIN & Anti terror ops should be treated with the seriousness they deserve, troops should be trained to the utmost and equipped to blazes to deal with it (sure the Army does it), but its still now when it should have been done ages back. Instead we just keep shuttling alphabet soups around, till the IA has to be called in.
Look at the NSG. Luckily the army component is ok, but what was the need for the paramil component to become an overblown protect the VIPs unit?
The first thing to do is remove the IPS from political pressure and to examine how and where the locals can do firefighting consistently. The moment a threat emerges or is deemed seditious, the state should not be allowed to mess up the anti insurgency beyond a point- eg the Congress vs Maoists in AP. The Centre has to take up and draw a coordinated plan to deal with ALL insurgencies and wargame it or plan it out and proceed.
Lets not just "Send in the Army" after sleeping on the job for a decade.
And lets give some seriousness to the entire issue, ie dedicated COIN R&D units, training facilities only for COIN at a much larger scale than Wairengte, etc. Cross training paramils, army, state detachments at these institutes, have them develop some sort of institutionalized approach. Share resources, ELINT - make it consistent.
My point is that just throwing manpower (paramils) followed by Send in the Army, is a vastly inefficient and callous approach and in no way addresses either the causes of insurgency (we never seem to learn) or leaving even the NBJPrie stuff apart, it is also a very inefficient method to deal with the issue from the defeating insurgency perspective. All that has done is bloat up the number of people in the paramils YET not give us the kind of solutions we desire. The entire budget keeps going towards their pay/pensions/ not even modern equipment for the rank and file in the paramils beyond INSAS and some stuff.
Anoop,
I am not agaisnt hybrid police-military formations; in fact I do think they are more often than not the right way to go when faced with an internal armed movement. I have only said that the use of such formations is far from unique.
JC,
Absolutely the GoI better prepare itself. It is clear that the Maoists are escalating conflict to an entirely new level, and their efforts have far from peaked. If the GoI has to call in the IA to contain the Maoists, the Pakistanis will almost *certainly* get ideas again. After all tying down the IA was one of the Pakistani's chief goals in Kashmir throughout the 1990s. The IA has to avoid getting bogged down if it is to remain a deterrent force to the Pakistanis.
I am not agaisnt hybrid police-military formations; in fact I do think they are more often than not the right way to go when faced with an internal armed movement. I have only said that the use of such formations is far from unique.
JC,
Absolutely the GoI better prepare itself. It is clear that the Maoists are escalating conflict to an entirely new level, and their efforts have far from peaked. If the GoI has to call in the IA to contain the Maoists, the Pakistanis will almost *certainly* get ideas again. After all tying down the IA was one of the Pakistani's chief goals in Kashmir throughout the 1990s. The IA has to avoid getting bogged down if it is to remain a deterrent force to the Pakistanis.
i wuz in kargil and drass day coupla days back... awesome place..
took pictures of tiger hill, tololing.. met the local ladakh scouts co... his junior was reading a book named "heroes of kargil"
people there believe that india paid a heavy price... thousands of soldiers killed and unreported.. they also believe/claim that pakis still have a lot of peaks/tops which look into indian territory... there are a few places where the signboard says "under range of enemy artillery fire/observation" etc.. while still seemingly far from loc...
the porters there,the local ladakhis/muslims are not pro-pakistani... they recall batra, thapar et al very fondly... however they are sad that the indian army has forgotten them after the incident...
the people are extremely friendly.. i have put up a blog which i will reveal to you on request...
took pictures of tiger hill, tololing.. met the local ladakh scouts co... his junior was reading a book named "heroes of kargil"
people there believe that india paid a heavy price... thousands of soldiers killed and unreported.. they also believe/claim that pakis still have a lot of peaks/tops which look into indian territory... there are a few places where the signboard says "under range of enemy artillery fire/observation" etc.. while still seemingly far from loc...
the porters there,the local ladakhis/muslims are not pro-pakistani... they recall batra, thapar et al very fondly... however they are sad that the indian army has forgotten them after the incident...
the people are extremely friendly.. i have put up a blog which i will reveal to you on request...
Well, I think instead of comitting Army in COIN and rasing a new COIN force ( again Peter-Paul case) our top brass should have put more confidence in para military forces. They should have given better traing and equipments.
Army is willing or not willing is not the question. I seriusly belive that very prolonged use of Army in COIN will have adverse effects on it. I may try to elaborate this after Gandhi Ji's B'Day.
Army is willing or not willing is not the question. I seriusly belive that very prolonged use of Army in COIN will have adverse effects on it. I may try to elaborate this after Gandhi Ji's B'Day.
rajpa wrote:i wuz in kargil and drass day coupla days back... awesome place..
took pictures of tiger hill, tololing.. met the local ladakh scouts co... his junior was reading a book named "heroes of kargil"
people there believe that india paid a heavy price... thousands of soldiers killed and unreported.. they also believe/claim that pakis still have a lot of peaks/tops which look into indian territory... there are a few places where the signboard says "under range of enemy artillery fire/observation" etc.. while still seemingly far from loc...
the porters there,the local ladakhis/muslims are not pro-pakistani... they recall batra, thapar et al very fondly... however they are sad that the indian army has forgotten them after the incident...
the people are extremely friendly.. i have put up a blog which i will reveal to you on request...
India (luckily) is not Pakistan where casualties can be whispered away.
http://www.indianarmy.nic.in/martyrs/home.jsp
Casualties (fatalities) by operation.
Operation Vijay (Kargil)
533 Records Found
t
http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/insights/i ... 0101a.html
Therefore, the Shias this side could not be too enamoured with Pakistan. East of Zoji La is the Shia belt.
Could it be that they are Shias?he porters there,the local ladakhis/muslims are not pro-pakistani..
http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/insights/i ... 0101a.html
Therefore, the Shias this side could not be too enamoured with Pakistan. East of Zoji La is the Shia belt.
Satya, your source for this speculation are the ladakhi villagers, most of whom I am sure do not have access to information. I cant really blame them as even an urbanite from any major city also doesnt have any clue on IndoPak war casualities. But I can say one thing.satya wrote:The debate is not on the number of casualties during Operation Vijay , its about the number of Missing In Action [MIAs] soldiers , is it possible to find the actual number of MIAs during Operation Vijay ?
I am 100% sure that assuming 100s of MIAs is nothign but baseless speculation on behalf of the source that you have consulted. There are sufficient official statements that addressed the MIA issues as well. The GOI typically classifies all MIAs as KIA within an year of them going missing (and provided they are not in any POW lists).
Actually no - I think the variation was because the govt would not have been able to decide on cutoff dates for the fighting. So they probabaly moved the dates here and there to be all inclusive.JCage wrote:Jagan said:
>The GOI typically classifies all MIAs as KIA within an year of them going >missing (and provided they are not in any POW lists).
Is this probably why the Kargil fatalities list which was at ~ 472 iirc now stands at 533?
I remember the 470 approx figure from earlier.
from what i know the MIA in kargil should have been in single digits.
While i dont have the actual gen, a good indicator of the dates should be the qualifying dates for the Op Vijay Star - which the govt has set as 01 May 99 to 31 Oct 99.
Gen. V.P. Malik's interview in the Indian Express today. I am posting the Kargil-related excerpts:
‘Army’s Kargil gains got neutralised because we went into poll mode. NDA used it, Opp played it down’
‘Army’s Kargil gains got neutralised because we went into poll mode. NDA used it, Opp played it down’
SHIV AROOR: What do you think of Musharraf's account of Kargil?
Musharraf in his chapter on the Kargil war has completely turned the war on its head. He says he approved the plan in mid-January 1999. He mentions 800 sq km of our territory being under the Pakistan Army's control, he mentions mujahideen. Let me tell you there were no mujahideen in that area. Till date we haven't received any evidence of their presence. There was an American party, including some of their officers. They were briefed by the FCNA (Force Command Northern Area) in Pakistan in January 2003 by a general who is now a lieutenant general, Nadeem Ahmad. Nadeem categorically answered the question saying there were no mujahideen on either side of the LoC. Musharraf in his book is portraying it is a victory for the Pakistani Army, that he was forced by his prime minister to accept the ceasefire and withdraw. He's very conveniently silent on anything inconvenient to him. He doesn't talk about the telephone conversations between our DGMOs, that we have tapes of with us. During the war we were speaking to each other two-three times in a week. Nor about the meeting between the DGMOs that took place at Wagah. The way he describes his conversations with Nawaz Sharif is amazing --- a man who could stage a coup saying 'What can I do?'. I would describe his interaction with his political bosses as timid.
PRANAB DHAL SAMANTA: Could an Indian army chief have put his foot down if the prime minister was acting timid or under pressure?
In India the interaction between the military and the executive is institutional. The prime minister simply represents the Cabinet. For example, during the Kargil War, they said don't cross the LoC. Initially we didn't say anything. Twice the prime minister made a public statement that we are not going to cross the border. So I had to tell him 'Sir, you don't make any public announcement. We are not going to cross the border, we are following orders. But if we are left with no alternative we'll cross the LoC and come back to you'. That night Brajesh Mishra said on a TV interview that not crossing the order holds good for today but we don't know about tomorrow.
JAYANTH JACOB: Were you surprised by Musharraf staging the coup? When did you find out?
When the coup broke out Brajesh Mishra rang me up to tell the news. He asked me, 'Aren't you surprised?'. I said I was surprised it took so long. Because we knew since some time they (Musharraf and Sharif) weren't getting along. They were involved in Kargil together and later you could see there was a lack of communication between them. A lot of questions were being asked of Musharraf within the army, of what he had gotten the army into. Families of the dead soldiers were being bribed not to say anything. We buried more than 250 bodies in our territory which remain buried there. And he hasn't said a word about that.
C RAJA MOHAN: What do you think prompted Musharraf to carry out the Kargil misadventure?
I feel the failed Siachen operations hurt Musharraf more than they did anyone else, as well as other actions involving him that failed. Second is his mindset. If you go through the thesis he wrote at RCDS (Royal College of Defence Studies) you can see he's always been a hardliner. Maybe because Nawaz Sharif had chosen him superseding two seniors, he wanted to prove his worth. In one of his earliest interviews he said he wanted to sort out the Kashmir problem once and for all. So my feeling is by December he was into this infiltration plan and in January he approved it.
C RAJA MOHAN: When did you realise Kargil was a full-fledged military operation?
I went to Srinagar on May 22. All along I had been hearing that there were mujahideen involved. That 15 Corps will sort it out themselves, the Army Headquarters doesn't need to get involved. But when I reached there I saw that the way they were conducting their activities it couldn't be the mujahideen. They fight a war differently from regular forces. A militant, a guerrilla, doesn't hold ground... And the kind of artillery support they were getting. Then more evidence started coming out, the uniforms, the maps....
SHIV AROOR: What do you think of the Kargil Review Committee report? Have we learnt from the mistakes made then? The intelligence failures at the time?
The Committee has written a lot, some of which hasn't been released. Unfortunately there was no debate in Parliament. Four task forces were set up on the recommendations of the committee and one of them was exclusively for intelligence. The report states the number of troops involved were between 15,000 to 30,000. My estimate of the actual number of those who had infiltrated our territory is 3,000-4,000. The 100 posts of ours that were captured were all captured by captains and lieutenants and JCOs. None of their commanding officers came to our side. Subsequently we captured eight of these boys. They had no food, they were drinking water by melting snow. They were destitute. But I admit their soldiers --- the boys, not the commanding officers --- fought well. The officers, on their part, showed no strategic sense, their logistic planning was very poor. On our side, I remember all the three chiefs of staff met and asked for the Air Force to be allowed to enter about 2 km into their area to help the planes complete their turning circle. But the Cabinet was emphatic that it could not be allowed.
C RAJA MOHAN: Did Kargil succeed in internationalising Kashmir?
Yes it did. What internationalised it even more was the nuclear hype around the conflict. The hype was more on their side. We never made any statements on using nuclear weapons. But on the other hand it also helped reinforce the LoC. LoC is now becoming sanctimonious, a permanent border.
JAYANTH JACOB: Was artillery pulled out from southern borders to be deployed in Kargil? Did it create an imbalance?
No, not at all. Our strategy was we didn't want them to reinforce in the area. We had to threaten them against doing so. That's why we shifted the Eastern Naval fleet to the Arabian Sea. We had all our Air Force bases ready. All strike formations were on six-day notice, that is on the sixth day I would expect them to cross the border. I have used the term 'strategic asymmetry' for it. I wanted them to realise our huge conventional superiority.
ABHAY MISHRA: Were there times during the war that you lost sleep?
At Tololing, which was the first feature overlooking the National Highway, the fighting went on for six days. Only on the seventh day I was told that we had captured the peak. Those seven days I couldn't sleep at all. We all had with us a plan to cross the border, but the rainy season isn't the best time to take initiative. The Air Force, Navy, even the armoured units are less effective because of the weather. September would have been a better time, but that period was not what we would have liked for crossing the border if we needed to.
MANINI CHATTERJEE: What were your meetings with the NDA like when the matter of enforcing a ceasefire came up?
There were only three of us, the prime minister, Brajesh Mishra and I. The prime minister asked me how much time do I need. I said two weeks, and another week to clear the LoC completely. He asked if we'll suffer casualties. I told him certainly we will. He said we have to go to elections, and I said whatever, but war is war. Then he said the Pakistanis want to withdraw. He didn't tell me anything about US pressure or the Track Two diplomacy that was going on. My first reaction was no, my men will not accept it. We have suffered so many casualties, why should we let the Pakistanis go? So we kept chatting for 15 minutes and I said let me consult my people, the decision is not mine alone. I consulted the two chiefs of staff and we agreed on a sector-wise withdrawal with the condition that if there's any firing we'll retaliate. This is what General Vij took to their (Pakistani) DGMO the next day when he met him at the Wagah border. And when Vij showed him the maps that the Pakistani troops had left behind, he said 'Ye kaun ahmak log hain jo ye sab cheezein chhod ke aa gaye (What dimwits have left behind these things)!'. By the way, Musharraf doesn't talk about all that in his book.
GAUTAM CHIKERMANE: What do you think about the criticism of the Army over Kargil?
Unfortunately, the historic achievement of the Army in the Kargil War got neutralised because we got into election mode even before the war was over. The NDA government wanted to use it to get re-elected, and it did, while the others (opposition) played it down for political reasons. When the fact that I had briefed the NDA on the war came up and became controversial, I went and told Mr Vajpayee 'You fight your elections, why are you getting us involved?. I met Manmohan Singh at his home (dressed in civilian clothes) --- he was the leader of the opposition in Rajya Sabha at the time --- and asked him the same question. He said 'Yes, I sympathise with you, but it is for the prime minister to call an all-party meeting and explain the situation'. So I went back to Mr Vajpayee and asked him why he doesn't call an all-party meeting. He said 'Ye sab to hota hi rahta hai, humne bhi to kiya tha 1962 mein ('This is routine politics, we did the same in 1962'). He told me 'Hum aapki baat dekhenge'. Aur wo dekhte hi rah gaye (He said 'We'll look at your viewpoint', and he's been looking ever since). This hurt me. If the president of Pakistan writes something fictitious about as important a thing as the Kargil War, shouldn't it be officially denied here?
yup. it is a shia belt... not so pro-tsp...RayC wrote:tCould it be that they are Shias?he porters there,the local ladakhis/muslims are not pro-pakistani..
http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/insights/i ... 0101a.html
Therefore, the Shias this side could not be too enamoured with Pakistan. East of Zoji La is the Shia belt.
yes, the locis believe tht there is some misinformation on kia/mia... they do believe tht thousnds of lives were lost... and msgs sent to the families of the dead tht they were mia...
they also know about the nli thingie.. they know tht nli were told to get into "jung" to liberate the shia areas.. nli being exact similr to the ladakh scouts on our side... however as it turned out for them... it was just infiltration and they didnt receive support from the regulr tsp army... so they were really pissed... tht is the version i received from the locis...
they also know tht there is a lot of development on our side... so they are somewhat happy. they want the srinagar road open throughout the year.. tht seems to be the foremost thing tht they want. it will bring more money to the region...
also the road to skardu and gilgit... becuz those ppl are practically the same as the ones on this side...
also after op sadbavana.. the locis were won over by ia... but op sdbvna is now practically extinct... and development is what they really want.
it seems tht the tsp pr machine is working overtime in these places.. they actuly believe tht the ia was the one that didnt accept the war dead in many cases.. they cite some cases where some bodies floating down the river were sent back to india across the border by some satark tsp while indian army folks went in monkey caps and disguised themselves to avoid being detected by the media... they even received gifts from the tsp....
i told them bt the nic website... chllenged them to find one kia not listed there.. tht is when they mentioned bout the mia workaround apparently used by the ia... which they say they know runs into thousands...
they know bofors drove the tsp away..
some ppl believe tht it will be their "badkismet" to be part of tsp... but lot seem to be in fvr of indep kshmr dealing with both tsp and india..
they also know tht there is a lot of development on our side... so they are somewhat happy. they want the srinagar road open throughout the year.. tht seems to be the foremost thing tht they want. it will bring more money to the region...
also the road to skardu and gilgit... becuz those ppl are practically the same as the ones on this side...
also after op sadbavana.. the locis were won over by ia... but op sdbvna is now practically extinct... and development is what they really want.
it seems tht the tsp pr machine is working overtime in these places.. they actuly believe tht the ia was the one that didnt accept the war dead in many cases.. they cite some cases where some bodies floating down the river were sent back to india across the border by some satark tsp while indian army folks went in monkey caps and disguised themselves to avoid being detected by the media... they even received gifts from the tsp....
i told them bt the nic website... chllenged them to find one kia not listed there.. tht is when they mentioned bout the mia workaround apparently used by the ia... which they say they know runs into thousands...
they know bofors drove the tsp away..
some ppl believe tht it will be their "badkismet" to be part of tsp... but lot seem to be in fvr of indep kshmr dealing with both tsp and india..
Last edited by rajpa on 01 Oct 2006 12:10, edited 1 time in total.
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Raj Malhotra
- BRFite
- Posts: 997
- Joined: 26 Jun 2000 11:31
Actually the Indian losses in Kargill may even be less as IA may have put some casualities in Kargil action to get their family more benefits. On the other hand some losses may not be included if they took place in subsequent action which may have continued for many months-years till ceasefire on LoC.
But I think that the approx figure should be correct. But I have lot of doubt on Pak figures, me thinks it is around ~3000
But I think that the approx figure should be correct. But I have lot of doubt on Pak figures, me thinks it is around ~3000
what is amazing is that tololing is so close to the drass village.. the locis told me "yeah, the tsp came running down these slopes..." and it is like one km from the main street... i can only imagine how the fighting must have been...
and hey couple army officers i spoke to knew bout brf.. the ldkh scouts co and nthr officer from 13 Grndr...
nthr thred, but gotta discuss how we can interfce with the army folk...
and hey couple army officers i spoke to knew bout brf..
the ldkh scouts co and nthr officer from 13 Grndr... nthr thred, but gotta discuss how we can interfce with the army folk...
Really!the locis told me "yeah, the tsp came running down these slopes...
That's news to me.
Further, I don't know who you spoke to and therefore it is interesting to note that the Shias are keen to have an independent Kashmir. If independent. they are aware that they will receive the same treatment as the Shias in Northern Areas. So, that observation of yours is also interesting,
some ppl i spoke to in a chai shop, just a local dude.. expressed the stuff about indep kashmir... ie prefer indep kshmir to being with tsp..RayC wrote:Really!the locis told me "yeah, the tsp came running down these slopes...
That's news to me.
Further, I don't know who you spoke to and therefore it is interesting to note that the Shias are keen to have an independent Kashmir. If independent. they are aware that they will receive the same treatment as the Shias in Northern Areas. So, that observation of yours is also interesting,
the stuff bout tsp crawling down the slopes was from somebody who had worked as a porter... lugging the stuff up the slopes with the ia..
also they know tht shias are not being treated properly on the other side.. that is the observtion about development on this side..
mostly i think ppl're interested in dev and islamic arguments are prolly not much in vogue now...
ppl who used to sell black tickets in some local theatre in sringr are rich jihadis now... so ppl are aware of exploitations on all sides...
Ray C
Instead of giving bits of info on "need to know" basis,why not to write comprehensive mini series of essays on Kargil.......for the benefit of all BRites. Altough at times I wonder,if you need some kind of authorization for the stuff you reveal...............just my suspecting mind.No offence.
Instead of giving bits of info on "need to know" basis,why not to write comprehensive mini series of essays on Kargil.......for the benefit of all BRites. Altough at times I wonder,if you need some kind of authorization for the stuff you reveal...............just my suspecting mind.No offence.
There so much that has been written in books that mini series on Kargil will not help.
The only thing that is left to be done is to explain the nitty gritties, but then how is one to know what someone does not know and what one wants to know.
Therefore, when such a situation does arise in this forum or elsewhere, I chip in so that it helps if indeed it does.
I am rather keen right now to lay my hands on Musharraf's books and see what a story teller he is. I believe the book is as good as Grimms Fairy Tales.
The only thing that is left to be done is to explain the nitty gritties, but then how is one to know what someone does not know and what one wants to know.
Therefore, when such a situation does arise in this forum or elsewhere, I chip in so that it helps if indeed it does.
I am rather keen right now to lay my hands on Musharraf's books and see what a story teller he is. I believe the book is as good as Grimms Fairy Tales.
Rajpa,rajpa wrote:i wuz in kargil and drass day coupla days back... awesome place..
the people are extremely friendly.. i have put up a blog which i will reveal to you on request...
Why the secrecy?
Is the blog password-protected?
If not, why don't you just link it in your profile like I have. It will be displayed beneath every post of yours.
From the interview of Gen. Malik above, posted by Rajiv.
I want to ask the BRF members, especially those familiar with details, like RayC Sahib:
Thanks.
surinder
I want to ask the BRF members, especially those familiar with details, like RayC Sahib:
Most Indians get their blood boiling when we hear that the enemy was allowed to escape, when we could have shot them. Some of them even laid out mines while withdrawing, I remember reading. What is your comment on this? Did we really have to do this? Is this the same old Indian, or Hindu, magnanimity. Most of us people on street feel it is the same old foolishness. Comments? Insight?My first reaction was no, my men will not accept it. We have suffered so many casualties, why should we let the Pakistanis go? So we kept chatting for 15 minutes and I said let me consult my people, the decision is not mine alone. I consulted the two chiefs of staff and we agreed on a sector-wise withdrawal with the condition that if there's any firing we'll retaliate.
Why does this occur routinely that after every war, we congragulate the Pakistanis on fighting well? Should we not be working to demoralize the Pakis? is not Compliment = encouragement to the pakis? I mean, I do not hear us comlimenting the Chinese in 1962 for fighting well. Nor do we hear from the British complimenting the Argentines, or the Americans congragulate the Panamans, or Iraqis, or the Taliban. Why do we do it? Shouldn't the enemy be psychologically crippled also?Subsequently we captured eight of these boys. They had no food, they were drinking water by melting snow. They were destitute. But I admit their soldiers --- the boys, not the commanding officers --- fought well.
Thanks.
surinder
ok... here it is... please comment there... not here..Airavat wrote:Rajpa,rajpa wrote:i wuz in kargil and drass day coupla days back... awesome place..
the people are extremely friendly.. i have put up a blog which i will reveal to you on request...
Why the secrecy?
Is the blog password-protected?
If not, why don't you just link it in your profile like I have. It will be displayed beneath every post of yours.
http://quickievacation.blogspot.com
aaaaarrrgh...
This is not surprising. It is the standard procedure of the PA. That is why one of the cardinal principle is that one never uses the same defences that the enemy uses. The defences are bobby trapped and they would also know the layout of the defences and so when they did a counter attack, it would be all the more easier for them. Their artillery would know the exact Grid reference and exact spread of the defences too. If one is forced to use their defences because of various reasons, then the bunkers would be searched for booby traps and then occupied. However, there is every possibility in the heat of the battle and the fog of war, these small drills can get forgotten resulting in casualties.surinder wrote:From the interview of Gen. Malik above, posted by Rajiv.
Some of them even laid out mines while withdrawing, I remember reading. What is your comment on this? Did we really have to do this?
At the first opportunity the layout of the defences occupied should be re-engineered.
Thanks.Why does this occur routinely that after every war, we congragulate the Pakistanis on fighting well? Should we not be working to demoralize the Pakis? is not Compliment = encouragement to the pakis? I mean, I do not hear us comlimenting the Chinese in 1962 for fighting well. Nor do we hear from the British complimenting the Argentines, or the Americans congragulate the Panamans, or Iraqis, or the Taliban. Why do we do it? Shouldn't the enemy be psychologically crippled also?Subsequently we captured eight of these boys. They had no food, they were drinking water by melting snow. They were destitute. But I admit their soldiers --- the boys, not the commanding officers --- fought well.
surinder[/quote]
It has nothing to do with the Hindu, Christian or any philosophy for complimenting valour. The IA Army recognises valour and compliments it, even if it is that of the enemy. This is not the first time it has been done. The enemy CO in the Battle of Basantar got a high Pakistan gallantry award based on a letter of Lt Col (later Lt Gen) VP Airy, CO 3 GRENADIERS, complimenting the Pak CO's valour.
One must be chivalrous and magnanimous in victory, more so, because the IA is not composed of barbarians. We take pride to be Gentlemen first and Officers later!
Last edited by RayC on 02 Oct 2006 07:49, edited 1 time in total.
Of course such incident rankle.John Snow wrote:It is great to hear that IA is gentlemen first.... officer next...
But what of Shaurab Kalia, and SqLdr Ahuja... who suffered so much in their hands?
Dont tell me they were done in by Mujha piglets, everybody there involved were Paki regulars.....
What is your suggestion that should have been done to the Pakistani Prisoners of War?
I dont know about Kalia, but it appears that Ahuja was killed in a regular shootout - no use blaming the packees on that.John Snow wrote:It is great to hear that IA is gentlemen first.... officer next...
But what of Shaurab Kalia, and SqLdr Ahuja... who suffered so much in their hands?
Dont tell me they were done in by Mujha piglets, everybody there involved were Paki regulars.....
It just amazes me that people on a forum that is dedicated to keep the spirit of the Indian armed forces alive, can actually carp about one of the finest, distinguishing features of our armed forces, namely the ability to remain human through inhuman times. The ability to recognize valor is intimately tied to the ability to display valor. Without it, one is just a mindless killer in an uniform, not an honorable soldier who does his duty.
The hallmark of fine sense is the adherence to one's own values. Do we need to match the bad examples, or wouldnt we rather set a few good ones of our own? This is not 'armchair general' talk, but feelings from the front line.John Snow wrote:It is great to hear that IA is gentlemen first.... officer next...
But what of Shaurab Kalia, and SqLdr Ahuja... who suffered so much in their hands?
Not true he was badly injured and was alive when he was tortured and finally killed.CPrakash wrote:I dont know about Kalia, but it appears that Ahuja was killed in a regular shootout - no use blaming the packees on that.John Snow wrote:It is great to hear that IA is gentlemen first.... officer next...
But what of Shaurab Kalia, and SqLdr Ahuja... who suffered so much in their hands?
Dont tell me they were done in by Mujha piglets, everybody there involved were Paki regulars.....
If you dont know about Surab Kalia , its not your fault the Indian janata is like that onlee. Just a little info, his eyes were gouched out after capturing him alive...
and for the ones who think valor in the age of smart bombs, cluster bombs, Fuel air explosives is a little anachronism...
Valor to the people who understand valor, not to people who dont understand valor...
The pakistani army of 1990 is not that of 1945 or 1965 or for that matter even 1971.
Remember the very same army butchered , raped killed in Bangaldesh hundreds of their own country men, talk of valor to them....is throwing pearls to swine...
Its always better to keep in mind that
"War doesnt determine who is right, but only who is left"
He had two bullet wounds - one to the chest, the other that went thru the bottom of his chin - both resemble hits fired from some distance away - I suppose you have the postmortem report with you to prove otherwise?John Snow wrote:
Not true he was badly injured and was alive when he was tortured and finally killed.
added later: one bullet went thru his ear.
IAF spokesman Air Vice Marshal S K Malik stated that the post-mortem report revealed that Ahuja was shot twice, once through the ear and once through the chest, after he had parachuted into Pakistani territory. He also suffered a fracture on his left knee.