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Defence Week from Washington DC, has a report in their July 31, 2000 issue from New Delhi by Mohammed Ahmedullah confirming this news. He interviewd our Sanjay Badri Maharaj who reveals this info in his new book "Armageddon Factor". SBM wrote that he deduced this info from his interviews with IA artillery officers that four Prithvi and 1 Agni were readied during the crises.<BR>Ahmedullah confirmed this with his sources in the IA who said that India had to respond to Pakistan's moves. Probing further he was informed that AQ Khan had in mid-June '99 said that thier forces were on alert. A Pak journalist Najam Musthaq(Has any one seen stuff by this person in Dawn or Jung?) from Islamabad confirmed that six Hatf-II were readied by TSP.<BR>Other Indian analysts saidthat it was a precautionary move and in conformance with the no first use pledge. Another said the Agni-ii test was operational test and the crisis showed it was deployed. After the crisis both sides went back to peace time posture.<BR>--------<BR>Looks like Indian posture was altered after TSp made its position known in mid-June.<BR>I say this because ACM Tipnis stated that all arrangements were made prior to air operations in Kargil to handle escalation. It probably ment air component was readied, but on hearing the news from AQK other assets were also readied.<BR>It also shows that other than the IAF other services would be part of the deterrent posture. So there are more than one strings in the bow. Redundancy factor.<BR>TSP started the operation in late Jan / early Feb and completed by mid April per KRC report (I think it was before that but let it rest at that. They got their nuke forces ready around mid-June per AQK. Around that period IA ops in Kargil intensified. Looks like they were afraid that it would spill over. <BR>These chaps were getting their nukes ready over some craggy heights which they forcibly and surreptitously occupied. This shows how desparate and irresponsible they were. Hence the post Kargil emphasis on isolating these thugs.<BR>They did this with nominal civilian control. Who knows their disposition under the present RATs being in charge?<BR>Also shows that GOI decison not to cross the LOC was the right thing like Kennedy not invading Cuba during the missile crisis.<BR>The Musthaq info about six could be a bit of braggado - one more than India. It could also mean their max inventory minus six for missile delivery. For relaod as a crisis like this they could get all their assets ready and that is all the missiles they got ready. Notice no Gauris(No dongs or dings) may be made up the short fall now. <BR>Aircraft delivery would be additional may be confined to strike against the IA forces.<BR>No flames please.<P><p>[This message has been edited by ramana (edited 05-08-2000).]
Cryptic ramana !<P>Didnt Sanjay talk about deployment of Prithvi/Agni during Kargil in his long post not too long ago.<P>What's the range of the HATf II (arent they the chinese M 9( (?)<P><B>It also shows that other than the IAF other services would be part of the deterrent posture. So there are more than one strings in the bow</B><P>Who has operational control of the Pr/Agni's.<P>I mean does it flow from the PM to COAS and then to an Artillery/Missile commander. i believe this was discussed , but my memory is failing ...<P>K<P>
Time and again India has restrained itself and no credit could ever be given to the rats as for restraint goes.Crisis after crisis has been engineered by the scum.Why should India under those circumstances should have a neasyred and controlled response?Will it not be beneficial for the whole of humanity if we raise the cost of such stupidity by the rats to unaccepatable levels to them?IOW I dia mus make a case for maximum deterrence and full operationalisation of all available assets.I think more nuke tests to build pressure on the rats is way overdue now.Let them respond and counter response.The TSP economy will increasingly crumble under the weight of this.We must keep up the pressure not letting that down.There will be more kargils if TSP becomes economically and politically stable.This is not something that is to be taken lightly.I think the above has been discussed many times and I won't go into that.
There has been time and again on the BRF that India should have proportionate response for everything.The time is past.The TSP establishment has time and again demonstrated that it has a penchant for trouble.Trouble that is costing us money,material and not to mention the valuable life of our citizens and soldiers.Why the restraint then?Why then we don't escalate at a pace that we can sustain?Why then should we not accelearate ourselves from a currently woefully inadequate readiness to real and demonstrable superiority to keep the scum offbalance?Why should we then not deal with the scum in a deliberate calculated manner aimed at eliminating the threat once and for all?Why the half measures?Why not deterrence in the true sense?What is this child's play?This is serious business.The business of our survival as a nation.<BR>Why do we anticipate more kargils?Why should we?The ultimate solution is the elimination of the scum,utterly destroy them so that they will consigned to the annals of history.We cannot and must not let them to comeback and haunt us at our weakest time.Believe me they will haunt if we let them.<BR>Hence my argument that we proceed ten steps ahead rather than stay one step behind or maybe ahead.We need high yield,high efficiency weapons and delivery.We also need technology to develop new and highly lethal weapons.We also need weapons that will render their detente useless.It is a dog eats dog world.Nobody cares if we die or live least of all the scums.Why should we care at all?
That would be foolish at present.The question is not of abdullah's survival but one of nations survival.If he wants that he must agree for complete integration of the state with union of India that means no autonomy at anywhere more than what other states enjoy,J&K should become just like another state of the Union and Indians must do as they please in Kashmir.That would probably be the first step.The man is loosing credibility among his people and may be resorting to gimmicks.We must watch the guy.<BR>In the meanwhile I believe attaining nuclear superiority -overwhelming vis-a vis TSP and technological rather than numerical superiority vis-a vis chinese chincoms is the right step for settling the dispute.If nuclear tensions were indeed raised the intentions of TSP is clear.We must accept ground realities and formulate strategy based on that.Curtailing TSP economy and undermining it's unity will be other measures.Mushy is trying to buy time to buildup.We must cut him off.<BR>Vajpayeeji's recent remarks that TSP will never ever want peace with India at least reflect the correct understanding of a seasoned man as to ground realities.<p>[This message has been edited by shashidhar (edited 05-08-2000).]
Just know that I never spoke to anyone.<BR>Furthermore, I never confirmed the Kargil stuff with the artillery officer. That was done elsewhere.<BR>The arty. officer was lucid regarding the development of warheads for Prithvi and Agni.<P>If you can, post the whole article.<P>Thanks<BR>Sanjay<p>[This message has been edited by Sanjay (edited 07-08-2000).]
IMHO it is virtually certain that the much publicised "4 Prithvis and 1 Agni" news is more for public consumption and morale reasons that an actual revelation of the exact plans. Nobody is going to give away exact preparations for a crisis such as this, and even details of Pakistani preparedness may not be revealed for fear of revealing the extent of information available.<P>However this is the first instance of info I have seen about Pakistan preparing to launch nukes - and it has come not a moment too soon. Pakistan was surely going to exploit the "4P+1A" story to say that India was preparing to launch nukes against Pakistan to divert attention from an internal civil war in Kargil. It needs to be shown that there was a controlled Indian response to a Pakistani nuclear threat.
"Can you please specify what you mean by controlled ? Controlled as in "not panicky" ?"<P>Yes controlled as in not panicky - and, more importantly, that there actually WAS a response from India, as opposed to no reaction, knowledge or suspicion at all. We will never know who panicked and who didn't - but what is said outside is more important in these post-mortems.
Anyone who thinks that merely 4 Prithvis and 1 Agni were operational during Kargil is naive.These numbers are too small to have been of any significance.They may merely pertain to those probably with N-warheads.In addition,the N-weapons to be delivered by air,which seems to have been the first delivery system perfected,have not been mentioned.It would be safe to assume that at least a dozen N-weapons were ready to strike pak,had that entity struck first.
Sanjay, the guy quotes you. I wonder if it was the report in Indian Express that he saw and went for confirmation. Did you talk to any one or group of people in India or Delhi in particular, as part of your book release?<BR>Its a one and half page news report and has copy right pasted all over it. I have posted the gist of it. the issue is DW, Vol 21, Number 31. Am sure Tim will be able to confirm this.<BR>He says he indirectly confirmed the 4+1 story with an IA officer. He also talked to Mushtaq guy from Islamabad and was told about the 6 Hatf-II story. I think the purpose of the story is he is trying to point to the nuke angle. BTW, he writes for Mil Tech, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and Defense Week.<BR>Shiv, he is trying to say that Indian deployment was in response to Pak rantings of AQK and it was confirmed by him that TSP did deploy something.<BR>-----------<BR>I think, the need is to calmly examine the facts in light of the info and try to see what can be deduced from it.<BR>Note that instead of the usual experts from West its South Asian experts who are bringing up this matter as opposed to the 1990 story. That must count for something.<BR>Can any one dig up articles by Mushtaq? Also dont bring in Abdullah and his problems. He is very dramatic- read Chitra Subramanyam's articles in ReDiff on how he saved Kashmir. The reality was he brought the mess by fixing the election which he would have won any way. His goose was cooked when Hurriyat decided to talk and brought the autonomy farce with his rump Assembly.<BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by ramana:<BR><B>Sanjay, the guy quotes you. I wonder if it was the report in Indian Express that he saw and went for confirmation. Did you talk to any one or group of people in India or Delhi in particular, as part of your book release?<BR>Its a one and half page news report and has copy right pasted all over it. I have posted the gist of it. the issue is DW, Vol 21, Number 31. Am sure Tim will be able to confirm this.<BR>He says he indirectly confirmed the 4+1 story with an IA officer. He also talked to Mushtaq guy from Islamabad and was told about the 6 Hatf-II story. I think the purpose of the story is he is trying to point to the nuke angle. BTW, he writes for Mil Tech, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and Defense Week.<BR>Shiv, he is trying to say that Indian deployment was in response to Pak rantings of AQK and it was confirmed by him that TSP did deploy something.<BR>-----------<BR>I think, the need is to calmly examine the facts in light of the info and try to see what can be deduced from it.<BR>Note that instead of the usual experts from West its South Asian experts who are bringing up this matter as opposed to the 1990 story. That must count for something.<BR>Can any one dig up articles by Mushtaq? Also dont bring in Abdullah and his problems. He is very dramatic- read Chitra Subramanyam's articles in ReDiff on how he saved Kashmir. The reality was he brought the mess by fixing the election which he would have won any way. His goose was cooked when Hurriyat decided to talk and brought the autonomy farce with his rump Assembly.</B><HR></BLOCKQUOTE><P>It could be that the piece was rewritten by the editors that his citing of the PTI report got changed.<BR>Anyway, the 6 M-11s are interesting - note no Ghauris mentioned. Also it confirms to me the real likelihood that Pakistan's missiles carry Chinese warheads - not just Chinese designs - but fully fabricated in China.<BR>This is what Indian intel. is saying.<BR>Ghauri has been fitted with a Chinese warhead and a Chinese guidance package.<BR>Pakistan's own capabilities are still at the gravity bomb stage.<BR>Only Lancer has rights to the book - Sage saw a copy though - and Pravin Sawhney has a very early and rough draft ( and frankly none of the Kargil nuclear stuff is in the book ). Release date, for anyone interested is in September/October.
Gentlemen,<BR>Do not underestimate how serious Kargil was.<P>Few will know how close India came to crossing the LoC. The nukes were for insurance.<P>I think many Indian officers were actually surprised as to how well the men did in the high altitude conditions and rugged terrain. The physical skill and tactical innovations that enabled the units to take enemy positions were quite a shock.
<B>Few will know how close India came to crossing the LoC</B><P>Am I logical in assuming that the Chinese warned Nawaz that India had readied the nukes just in case (i guess the question is did they know and how did they know ?), which in turn led Nawaz to believe that India would cross the LOC. Which is why his face looked ashen on return from his considerably shortened trip to the forbidden city. The visit to Washington was a fig leaf to say that the US had put pressure on <B>both </B> countries. So those who would carp on India's subservience to the US in these decisions would do well to ponder the turn of events as they actually turned out vs. the path that events may have taken.<P>K
Finally the thread is coming back to the topic I was hoping for. My intention was to discuss rationally the implications of this move and its impact o future relations. I believe that it has impact on current situation. Weaning away the Hizbullah from the TSP is a consequence of the war by other means. All these threads are connected- Daulat at RAW, Hizb ceasefire, Hurriyat talks and NC autonomy farce.<BR>Spinster I understand your angiush. The point is India has to be very careful as it walks the minefield. The leaders are not as incompetent as the press makes it out. I said many times the press in India still has blinkers and doesnt separate national interests from partisan politics.<BR>As Sanjay says it was a close one. KS also said the same thing around April '00 in and editorial in TOI.<BR>Again does any one have reports by Mushtaq? Need to establish his credentials. Or else it could be a India + one type of report.<BR>--------------<BR>A search on Lycos shows there is a Najum Mushtaq who writes in Pak papers. His style from one sample is that of Ayaz Amir and Mansur Eyaz. Need to look more.<BR><p>[This message has been edited by ramana (edited 06-08-2000).]
A question here.. sorry if it sounds naive. <P>India's crossing of the LoC is often projected as being a prelude to a nuclear confrontation. <P>How well is this statement borne out by facts, i.e at what point in time and space can it be reasonably expected that Pakistan will use nuclear weapons against <P>1) an invading indian force.<P>2) the indian mainland? <P>ramana please let me know if you mind this discussion as it does in some sense divert from the topic. <BR>if so i'll repost on another thread. <P>
If it is okay with RAmanaji would it be appropriate also to discus the possible posturing of Indian and TSP nuclear forces in future Kargils?Assuming that nobody believes naively that there will be no further Kargils!!<BR>Would this entail the TSP doctrine If yes what is the salient feature of their doctrine?What will be their projected doctrine assuming that they would change based on future capabilities?<BR>With this I feel India will be able to take measures to safeguard itself.<BR>I think although truth in it's entirety will not be known.It will take years for partial truths to come out.Whether India had six/five and TSP five or six is amere speculaton as nobody will want to say the right thing.What however obvious is that there is assertion that Agni-2 is active and deployed.<BR>Also,with the demonstration of restraint,India has made it much easier for itself to cross LOC next time.However TSP will be under increased pressure not to strike immediately due to previous kargil experience and the Indian response of restraint.This is possible but not necessary.Again it boils down to TSP doctrine.<BR><p>[This message has been edited by shashidhar (edited 06-08-2000).]
<BLOCKQUOTE><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by ramana:<BR><B>Finally the thread is coming back to the topic I was hoping for. My intention was to discuss rationally the implications of this move and its impact o future relations. I believe that it has impact on current situation. Weaning away the Hizbullah from the TSP is a consequence of the war by other means. All these threads are connected- Daulat at RAW, Hizb ceasefire, Hurriyat talks and NC autonomy farce.<BR>Spinster I understand your angiush. The point is India has to be very careful as it walks the minefield. The leaders are not as incompetent as the press makes it out. I said many times the press in India still has blinkers and doesnt separate national interests from partisan politics.<BR>As Sanjay says it was a close one. KS also said the same thing around April '00 in and editorial in TOI.<BR>Again does any one have reports by Mushtaq? Need to establish his credentials. Or else it could be a India + one type of report.<BR>--------------<BR>A search on Lycos shows there is a Najum Mushtaq who writes in Pak papers. His style from one sample is that of Ayaz Amir and Mansur Eyaz. Need to look more.<P><BR>[This message has been edited by ramana (edited 06-08-2000).]</B><HR></BLOCKQUOTE><P>In mid-June 1999, I spoke to one of my sources and he firmly believed that India was preparing for an LoC crossing as a last resort. A week later, in a slightly dazed voice, he spoke in awe of the tactical skill shown by the units in Kargil. This man is a retired artillery officer and knows the army very well - and even he was stunned.<P>Units were on alert to cross the LoC and ammunition and spares stocks were hurriedly replenished. Ordnance factory production surged 400%. A lot of shortages were eliminated during this time.<P>Air Defences were on alert nation wide and upgrade plans for the SAM units brought forward.<P>What is of great interest in that all Civil Defence cells were reactivated and plans drawn up to activate the auxiliary Civil Defence units.<P>I believe that NBC gear was also issued. Now on what scale I don't know. Ramana, can you and LNS let me know everything you know regarding the issuing of NBC gear in the Indian forces - I know that you guys have good sources in the army ? I might be able to add a bit to your knowledge.<P>India could have run the invaders out of Kargil. However, more of our soldiers would have died and frankly ammunition stocks were needed in the event of escalation.<P>India believed that Pakistan would try again and this time, India's response would not be so restrained.<BR>
Sanjay, I have no sources in any place. Only wide reading and thinking about the facts. My info about the NBC gear is from Deccan Herald news articles and the DRDO Tech Focus pages.<P>The decision not to cross Loc appears based on not escalating the conflict in order to prevent international intervention which definitely was a TSP war aim. However as the days went by India appeared ready to escalate if the intrusions were not cleared in short time or at greater cost. The deterrent posture was readied in accordance with response to TSP moves.<BR>This TSP moves shows that they are not clear about the deterrent. They think they are another weapon only more massive in destruction. The fact that they readied it so late in the game shows that they never expected the conflict to prolong and possibly escalate. Another example of not thinking through or reading India wrong.<BR>A fallout of this was the doctrine annuniciated by the three authors in Dawn(?) one of whom was Sattar the present Foreign Minister of TSP. The core of it is they will respond if certain redlines are crossed. One can dig up the old article but it did make an impression on KS for he wrote a couple of articles. Again the principal factor was IA crosses the IB and LOC and is marching up to Islamabad, then they would not hesitate to use against the approaching forces. So their vaunted first strike postue is only if India crosses the IB and is defeating the RATs. As can be seen India has no such plans- it wants the RATs to defeat themselves and they are doing fine.<BR>What we see is the insurgency is being tackled on many fronts in Kashmir in such a manner that TSP is irrelevant to the fight. The distinction between foreign and natives is being brought out. Now all local roots militants want to be in the deal and they should be. And there are good chances that some kind of deal aimicable to all will be worked out. <P>The danger is the heathen will rage and do their best to upset the apple cart. The poor teeming massess in TSP have been brought up on a diet of how they are suporting the cause in Kashmir and thus their deprivation is palatable. Now they find that the 'brethern' want a separate peace and will start asking questions of RATs. The RATs will definitely try to find scapegoats. Hence the need for caution.<P>The line should be that this is a defeat of first magnitude to the RATs comparable to the loss of East Pakistan, and the retreat at Kargil. Raman says dont gloat at the Hizb type of militants. I suggest that this should be thought of as a defeator end of the thousand year war! <BR>Yes go ahead and discuss all aspects of the situation. Its a free forum. Years later there will be experts discussing how it was another Cuban crises averted.<BR>Those with Chengappa's WOP- could you briefly write the context in which he brings out these facts? May be there is a background and not bare facts.
I just dont buy the argument that the 'divide and talk ' tactic of India does not have the tacit blessing of the TSP. These Hizb guys cannot clear their throat without TSP blessing and we are led to believe that there is a rift between the two. We have seen no evidence of this. Just a lot of supposition.<P>K
Johann's comments by e-mail.<BR>----------<BR>Najum Mushtaq is an assistant editor for 'The News'. He was a BAS visitng<BR>fellow in 1999, and wrote an article for them on the Madrassas and the<BR>spillover effect from the Afghan war. He is basically a liberal, and<BR>extremely critical of an establishment which he views as corrupt,<BR>anti-democratic and ultimately dangerous to Pakistan. Was not in favour of<BR>Pakistans nuclear tests of '98, and was taken aback by the vehemence and<BR>violence that anti nuclear liberals in Pakistan faced when they made their<BR>views public. He has actually said in his column that Pakistan's official<BR>history as publicly popogated and taught in schools is based on 'self<BR>deluding lies', and went even further to say that Pakistani policy is<BR>driven by an irrational hatred of India which needs to be reexamined. He<BR>does not seem to support the proxy war in India. While bitterly opposed to<BR>the JI and other representatives of 'political Islam' he is far from<BR>irreligious. In fact he beleives that genuine, non-sectarian Islam is the<BR>only ideology powerful enough to motivate the masses and reshape the<BR>establishment. While he does work out of Rawalpindi (PA GCHQ) and would have<BR>access to a great deal of the scuttlebut, it is unlikely that such an<BR>individual has any accurate first or second hand information on Pakistan's<BR>nuclear state. He has been an outsider by virtue of his views and the<BR>company he keeps and the things he's said. If I were you, I would ask Tim<BR>whether the think tank and/or non-proliferation circuit (with which Mushtaq<BR>interacts) was passing aound the figure of '6 Hatf-IIs' at some point.<P> Regarding Pakistani misreading of India & alerting of their own<BR>deterrent. All sources show that the Indian decision to use airpower, and<BR>genuine willingness to escalate came as a real shock to the Pakistani<BR>military. You believe, with reason, that the cumulative incursion preceded<BR>the dates provided in the sanitised KRC report. If this were true, wouldn't<BR>the Pakistani military establishment been lulled into a false sense of<BR>complacency? They would have assumed after a certain period that India with<BR>all its human, photographic and electronic intelligence assets must have<BR>already been aware of the incursion, and chosen to (a) not do anything about<BR>it or (b) respond in a limited fashion because of the succesful Pakistani<BR>deterrent. While most Pakistani military writers have put all kinds of spin<BR>on Kargil, it's interesting that many of them described the Indian decision<BR>to use airpower as 'irresponsible'. Indian behaviour up to that point had<BR>fit their model. The Pakistanis believed that their previous nuclear<BR>threats, esp. during Brass Tacks and in 1990 had succeeded. Why would things<BR>change now? The Indian resolve surrounding Kargil would have come as a<BR>complete surprise, an anomaly of the first order. One can speculate what<BR>beliefs were reinforced by the Kandahar hijacking. (1) Fighting a proxy war<BR>is now safer than ever because we know New Delhi does not perceive terrorism<BR>in the same way as actual territorial loss & direct confrontation.<BR>(2)Deterrence works because they are unwilling to fight a conventional war<BR>over this issue. I know the two contradict, but this is what a retired<BR>Pakistani one star officer tried to argue in my presence.<P>I would also suggest that the Pakistani military establishment failed to<BR>understand the depth of Indian decisionmakers outrage re. the broaching of<BR>the spirit & letter of Lahore the Track II process because they did not<BR>actually participate in it. A lot of Indo-pak 'dialogues' are cynical<BR>affairs meant for posturing and playing blame games, but Vajpayee's<BR>commitment in this case at least was genuine. The military would not<BR>necessarily have known this.<P> The relatively late alerting of their deterrent does not necessarily<BR>mean they fail to understand it's use. SBM has said that a nuclear strike on<BR>Indian armoured forces in an Indo-Pak confrontation would result in<BR>disproportionate nuclear retaliation on Pakistan. However, the actual<BR>decision to use nuclear weapons in India's case seems closer to McNamaras<BR>'flexible response' than the Pakistani 'tripwire'. Given the constraints of<BR>the NFU clause India has to be prepared earlier than Pakistan for nuclear<BR>confrontation. With the density of subcontinental armed forces, terrain<BR>constraints, and the historic pace of gerneral mobilisation and actual war<BR>on the Indo Pak border the Pakistanis could afford to wait somewhat longer.
Ramana, I suggest reading a piece I once did for IDR regarding the nuclear battlefield in South Asia where it was quite clear that nuclear weapons were of very dubious utility in the battlefield role.<P>I didn't make the comment regarding disproportionate retaliation lightly. India wants a flexible response vs. China, but not with Pakistan. <P>Your point regarding that Pakistan did not expect India's use of airpower in Kargil is an excellent one. It reflects a serious flaw in Pakistani tactical thinking and an even more serious flaw in their strategic thinking.<P>It raises serious questions regarding the use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan. The Kargil invasion was not a rational move - the failure to anticipate the Indian response was even more irrational. So does this mean that the Pakistani leadership is fundamentally irrational in military matters? It is a point worth pondering.<p>[This message has been edited by Sanjay (edited 07-08-2000).]
Lots to look at, and so little time (sorry - I've got grades due).<P>The DC think-tank/nonproliferation community has said very little about missile mobilization in the Kargil crisis. I suspect that a lot of the info might be classified, and no one has a good reason to leak it yet - if indeed any such info exists. I'm not too surprised by Prithvi reports, but personally am still a bit uncertain about the Agni. My gut feeling is that if it had gotten out somewhere in deployed status, it would have leaked. It would be hard to miss an Agni-1, and I'm reasonably sure that US (and other) intelligence agencies were keeping a fairly close eye out on nuclear mobilization during the crisis.<P>That said, I have no interviews that would directly gainsay anything Sanjay has written - I simply have no corroborating evidence, and don't know what to make of it. As I said, it's a gut feeling, rather than a doubt based on solid information.<P>IIRC, isn't the Hatf II a tactical SRBM, based on evolution from the Hatf-I, in turn derived from a French sounding rocket. I didn't think it was an M-11, but the Pakistani's intermingle so much terminology in their missile program that I have trouble keeping it all straight.<P>Haven't found the Defense News copy yet, but I'll try to get it tomorrow. Life's a little hectic right now.<P>All the best, <BR>Tim<BR>
Sanjay, <P>This will attract lots of flames, so I'll just post it and run off to class.<P>Pakistan's efforts at Kargil were not so much irrational as "scripting" - they assumed India would do what they wanted India to do.<P>That's very different from irrational, at least in a strategic sense. The Pakistanis had a vision of how the Kargil campaign could serve their longer-term interests, and that vision was premised around a series of assumptions about India's unwillingness to respond quickly or aggressively and the likelihood of international intervention.<P>To analyze potential future actions by Pakistan, you probably have to "get inside their heads" and begin to understand their conceptions and misconceptions, rather than assume that they are irrational and therefore unpredictable.<P>That may be splitting hairs, but from a strategic perspective it's an important distinction.<P>We can talk about this more tomorrow.<P>BTW, I'd love to read your book, whenever it comes out. If you need an American reviewer, drop me an e-mail at <P>email@example.com<P>All the best, <BR>Tim Hoyt
Sanjay, Thanks for the prompt response. The comments are by Johann and it is his insight which I posted for sake of completeness.<P>I think that TSP acted as they did after not seeing any response from the GOI to previous incursions. They thought the crisis would end somewhere in August with them holding the heights and some kind of talks. What they did not understand was the response to territorial loss by a nationalist govt. The Lahore initiative was misread as the ususal wishy washy response by a former Lahore wallah and in line with the previous UF govt which was led by a Wagh border candle wallah. <BR>I had previously said but not examined in depth the idea that the vote in 1996 where the Congress got decimated was a turn to the right and not the fractured verdict as it was trumpeted by our chatterati.<BR>A request could you go back and delete the full quotes that you do in your posts to reduce badwidth? This is for the people outside India who might be linked using narrow bandwidth connection.<BR>----------------<BR>Tim it is Defense Week not News! Totally two different periodicals.<BR>The deployment was Agni-II not the old hybrid -I. Its teh rail mobile version they are talking about. What do you know about this Najum Mushtaq guy? What does the former Chief say? SO summer school is getting over!<p>[This message has been edited by ramana (edited 07-08-2000).]
Chaithanya,<BR>To answer your questions briefly:<P>1) Yes.<BR>2) Physical proof. You don't make charges like this officially without real proof. Unless India were to steal a warhead and put it on display, India is in a delicate position. No faith in CIA, but China should in theory face serious sanctions.<BR>3) No to both.<P>4) Sorry to put it this way, but how would anyone outside the inner circles of the Indian security apparatus know the targets of nuclear weapons ? I mean we can guess, but we don't know. I should also add that even if I knew, I would never disclose something like that.<P>As to the delivery, I do not believe that India's first nuclear strike against Pakistan - in response to a Pak. first use of nuclear weapons of course - would be with missiles. I firmly believe it would be an air strike supported by nuclear armed Prithvis. Against China, it depends if a tactical, sub-strategic or strategic strike is required.<P>5) I believe that the threat of massive retaliation is the sole deterrent against Pakistan launching a nuclear strike.<P>6) I don't know. It depends on whether Pakistan's leadership is rational or not.<BR>Furthermore, it depends on India's military objectives. If India attempts to bisect Pakistan, then any leadership could feel compelled to use nuclear weapons to prevent the disintegration of the country.<BR>If, however, India's objective is massive attrition against the Pakistani armed forces, then things are different.<P>Suggest reading a piece of mine entitled The Nuclear Battlefield in South Asia - Indian Defence Review April-June 1999.<p>[This message has been edited by Sanjay (edited 07-08-2000).]
Tim:<P>Well, scripting is always irrational.<P>Learnt that the hard way after 16 frustrating years in opposition politics down here. The problem with theoretical strategy is that it may or may not have anything to do with reality. At King's we had that stressed several times. <P>Your point is taken though. I believe, however, it is better that India assume a certain degree of irrationality in Pakistan's moves - it will ensure a degree of caution in India's reactions.<P>Furthermore, purely from a common-sense ( rather than an academic ) point of view, Kargil defies descriptions of 'scripting' or 'misjudgement'. Nobody could have believed that India's response would be anything less than devastatingly vigorous.<P>Assuming that your opponent will always do what you want is irrational - maybe stupid is a better word. <P>Your comments on Hatf-2 are wrong. They are nothing more than M-11s. The Hatf-2 never entered service or were ever tested more than once. <P>Also, I would be careful about any comments regarding difficulties with the liquid fuel systems on Agni-1 and Prithvi. For several years, I had the luck to be quite close to someone with very strong links to 333 Missile Group ( former 60 Heavy Artillery Regiment ) and much was explained. 333 Missile Group was quite comfortable with the system and they said the inherent dangers in liquid fuelled systems were limited by intense training. A special simulator was produced in 1995.<P>Initially, liquid fuel was adopted to ensure that accuracy was maximised. Two tests of the Prithvi in 1995 had a CEP of 10m at a range of 67km against Wheeler Island. However, these were fired from a pre-surveyed launch site. From an unsurveyed launch site, accuracy can deteriorate quite substantially.<P>A small number of Agni-1s were produced - as test models - and these were used to develop the mobile lauchers of the Agni-2. It's quite easy to conceal things from satellites if you know their orbits and for a country with good satellite tracking facilities, this is not impossible.<p>[This message has been edited by Sanjay (edited 07-08-2000).]
Ramana,<P>I noticed something - we're forgetting Mr. Chengappa too much.<P>Raj Chengappa had unprecedented access during the Kargil conflict to all aspects - including the nuclear one. Let's take his views very, very seriously. He's the one who broke much of the story regarding the warhead developments and missile deployment.<P>Yours truly was told - in a MacDonald's near RUSI - about the development of the Agni nuclear warhead in 1996. However, it was Raj Chengappa who confirmed it had been successfully tested.<P>Mr. Chengappa is very reluctant to comment on anything nuclear at present, but right now, he is the only fully functioning defence journalist in India with a non-specialist magazine.<P>Have little faith in the Think Tanks - especially those in the 'States. While composed of very intelligent people, too many things slip past. There are only a few dedicated Indian military journalists and I don't think any are on the Think Tank circuit full time.<P>Here's where journalists have a huge edge over academics. ( I'm lucky in that Air Forces Monthly provides journalistic cover while I am one of the few India specialists from the Department of War Studies ).<P>Remember this - India's troop movements along the IB and the LoC was done in a very deliberate manner, in full view of US assets.<BR>The missiles would have been very carefully concealed. This is not difficult.<P>As a point of interest, it takes 72 hours - at present - to bring the entire Indian military Strike Corps on line against Pakistan. The Holding/ Pivot Corps can be on line in 12-24hrs. Troops for local defense are already in place. You may have to wait for your free copy of my book to get the details though ! <BR>
K Subrahmanyam has given a series of interviews in Rediff about the Kargil episode and the attitudes in India (among the ruling classes and the media as he puts it.). He does seem to believe that the Pakistani adventure in Kargil was based on the (irrational) assumption that there will be little indian retaliation. the links are:<BR> <A HREF="http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/07inter.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/07inter.html</A> <BR>.<BR>
<BR>"Scripting" done by TSPA comes in when they are highly confident or over confident. They have assumed they they can read the Indian decision makers or the Indian psyche which is more possible.<BR>With small changes their entire script will be made irrelevant. It is very dangerous for a nuclear power ever to rely on scripting according to me.<P><BR>
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