Kargil Revisited

A Sharma
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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby A Sharma » 25 Aug 2003 04:20


ramana
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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ramana » 29 Aug 2003 01:55

From the other Forum on Indo-Israel ties......

ramana
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Member # 356

posted 28 August 2003 02:04 PM

Wil send a chill down Mushy's spine!!!! So Hersh might be right afterall in his New Yorker article post 911.

Mossad behind Musharraf-Aziz Kargil tape
28 August 2003: Sensational transcripts of General Pervez Musharraf's conversations with
Lieutenant-General Mohammad Aziz during the May-July 1999 Kargil War released by Jaswant Singh to
the press were provided by the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad which was monitoring Pakistan army
headquarter activities intensively because it feared redeployment of nuclear missiles.

General Musharraf was visiting China when Aziz, then the chief of general staff, called him at his hotel on
two days, 26 and 29 May, to report the progress of the war, and the released tapes showed that the
Pakistan army was using terrorist infiltrators to cover its own attacks, and that Pakistan was making
false claims about Indian air and artillery strikes, and misinforming the world through BBC and other
news networks. { So there goes the BBC's reputation. They were also duped and were sincerely providing a
'fair and balanced' view!!}

Officials say that Mossad increased its surveillance of the Pakistani military brass soon after the war
commenced and became especially apprehensive of a top-level army meeting in which no political leader
from the Nawaz Sharief government was called, and Israeli intelligence reported back decisions to
redeploy nuclear missiles from known launch sites.

Since the war had escalated to Indian air strikes against infiltrators holed up in the Kargil heights, the
Israeli government assumed that Pakistan was preparing for a nuclear first strike, and this rang alarm
bells in Tel Aviv, New Delhi, and Washington, and when Musharraf flew to China, Mossad's listening
station in Hong Kong became active.

In that period, General Musharraf's conversations with Aziz were recorded by Mossad, and passed on to
India, which released it a day before the visit of Pakistan's foreign minister Sartaj Aziz, to his and
Pakistan government's great embarrassment.

Officials say that the transcript which blew the "mujahideen" cover off Pakistan army's Kargil War
and Mossad's intelligence about the Pakistan military's move for nuclear first-strike pushed the
Clinton administration to take a tough line against Pakistani aggression, leading the US to impress on
Pakistan to maintain the status quo on the Line of Control.

http://www.intelligenceonline.net/allintelligencefull.asp?id=138441100281392&recno=2254

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GGanesh
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posted 28 August 2003 02:23 PM

I heartily welcome Sharon's visit.

However, I shudder to think of the lives that are going to be lost due to the inevitable islamic terrorist
acts that will try and mar Sharon's visit.

Hope the GOI does all it can to ensure a safe trip. Going by recent trends, Mumbai may well bear the
brunt of this visit.

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Sarma
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posted 28 August 2003 02:23 PM

And, people like Praful Bidwai have only bad things to say about Israel. If true, what this proves is that
Israel has helped save the lives of Indian soldiers. Indians and GoI should be more welcoming of Israel
than we currently are.

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ramana
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posted 28 August 2003 02:28 PM

Sarma, Please read carefully the report.
What it means is the HK office of Mossad made the intercept!!!!
If alarm bells went off in Tel Aviv, Delhi(which cant do much except hand wringing), and DC then what did
DC do? Is this a double message to TSP and the dragon? Also is this in relation to Sharon visit? Some
body felt the need to highlight the Israeli help to assuage any resentment among anybody at the visit.

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muddur
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posted 28 August 2003 02:34 PM

Ramana you spoke my mind, I was about to mention the significance of the leak and its timing which is
just before the Sharon's visit to India.

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Sarma
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Member # 230

posted 28 August 2003 02:38 PM

Ramana:

I thought the redeployment -- I would characterize it as readying for possible use -- was well known
already. Clinton, in fact, mentioned this in a recent interview shown on PBS Frontline (I had posted the
transcripts here). In fact, what is also known is the Indian readying of Prithvis during this time.

What did Washington do? Its response was quite clear, wasn't it? I don't know, but things seemed
pretty clear to me. But, I also have to concede I am not a big thinker and not a very good
between-the-lines-reader.

Why should redeployment worry Israel?

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Ashutosh
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posted 28 August 2003 03:00 PM

Ramana, do you think the alleged Mossad tape-handing over was actually a pie in uncle's face?

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ramana
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Member # 356

posted 28 August 2003 03:17 PM

Sarma, It appears that uncle came to know from Israel. They might have gone and got further
corrobaration. From the begining uncle didnt know the escalation that was being planned. Indian info
was always disregarded. The Blair House summit was to provide H&D to TSP to 'withdraw' also called
retreat in normal circumustances.

The Israeli's handing over the tape and Indians releasing portions of it immediately means that the much
feared Yindoo-Yehudi axis has strong ties with or without Yankee blessing. This monitoring means that
Israel is very much keeping a watch on Pindi. whenever possible - note HK link. Redeployment is very
problematic for if you remember Israel spent much effort to convince the TSP that it had no plans to
attack the crown jewels in 1998 and yet TSP didnt believe them.

Uncle has been trying very much to bring the TSP and Israel together but its not working. With this
release of the source of tapes not much chance of Mushy recognizing Israel without another hit to H&D.
So who knows

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parsuram
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posted 28 August 2003 03:18 PM

A copy of the tape was at langley at that time, looking for a translator, afaik. Must have come directly to
them as well. Do not think US was out of the loop.

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ramana
Member
Member # 356

posted 28 August 2003 03:23 PM

parsuram, the jokers werent speaking in vernacular but in English. If what you say is correct than whole
Kargil ka kissa has to be reviewed. I didnt know that uncle already knew the tape but couldnt read it.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby JCage » 29 Aug 2003 02:53

Ummm....arent we taking Intellonline to be 100% credible here?Its past reports suggest otherwise.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Pennathur » 29 Aug 2003 04:04

Gen.Javed Nassir of the TSP orders his men to carry his thunderbox over the mountains - while our Col.Vishvanathan crawled a 100 meters without cover to retrieve the body of his fallen comrade. :( We Indians will never learn it seems. With enemies like the TSPA who needs friends?

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Rangudu » 29 Aug 2003 06:39

Okay, I finally got off my butt and scanned and OCRd the Herald Article on Kargil. Here's the text.

Life After Kargil

M.Ilyas Khan

Herald, July 2000

There are over 500 flags flying across the entire Northern Areas, home to the Pakistan Army's high-altitude warriors. The tombs are those of the heroes of Kargil who fought valiantly in a war that seems to have many losers but no winners. Behind each of these tombs lie tales of struggle and valour, of neglect and disavowal, and of betrayal and unfaithfulness. But a year down the line, these tales still remain untold.

The body of Kargil's first martyr arrived in the Rousnan village of Ghizer district in the Northern Areas (NA) as early as mid-October 1998. At the time, few people knew about the activity in the snowy peaks of the Kargil-Dras sector, overlooking the Srinagar-Leh highway in Indian-held Kashmir. Haider Khan, a sepoy of 5-Northern Light Infantry (NLI), fell in the Hamzagun sector on October 13, 1998, probably due to an accident because the war was still some seven months away. This, in fact, was the time when the Pakistan government says it had started to respond to the Indian build-up in the region. Haider Khan's body was brought home by four soldiers of the NLI. "They did not say if Haider was killed in action," recalls the martyr's cousin, Altaf Hussain. "They did not even tell us how he died." But when Islamabad decided in late June 1999 to acknowledge the Kargil martyrs as their own soldiers, Haider Khan was included in the list.

By February 1999, the area was rich with its own version of the events that were unfolding in Kargil. True to their tradition of glorifying soldiers, the people of the area were loathe to accept the government's claim that the militants had infiltrated deep into the Indian territory. For the residents of Ghizer, Hunza and Baltistan, the districts which supply the bulk of NLI's manpower, it was only the NLI soldiers who were involved in these heroic deeds. "Most of our relatives and friends are in the NLI and, when they came home on leave, they told us what was happening," says Zarawar Khan, a cousin of Havaldar Major Lalik Jan who earned the Nishan-e-Haider, the highest military award, for bravery in the Kargil war. "They were excited that they had advanced deep inside enemy territory without firing a shot, and would talk about it all the time." These were also tense times for the soldiers' families. "When my brother wrote to me in February that he was deep inside Indian territory in Shakma sector (Dras), we were worried," says Ghafoor Khan, a resident of village Hamardas. Ghafoor's brother, Sepoy Shakoor Jan of 12-NLI, was martyred three months later, on June 8, leaving behind a 20-year-old widow and three daughters. Around this time, the area was rife .with rumours that there may soon be serious skirmishes in the Dras-Kargil sector. But there was no information on what was actually happening in the frozen heights.

The uncertainty gave way to panic in early June last year when dead bodies of soldiers started arriving at the villages more frequently. Hamardas was to receive the first body in the Gopis subdivision of district Ghizer on June 5. It was that of Lance Naik Muzaffar Khan Zahid alias Muzaffaruddin Begana of 5-NLI, martyred in Hamzagun sector on May 29. "Begana's family had been informed about the body three days before, so the event was expected," recalls Sher Ali, a Hamardas resident. "But people were shocked five days later when they woke up to find that another body, that of Shakoor Jan, had also been delivered at night."

Over the next month, some 105 dead bodies passed along the jeep track that leads up to Yasin, Punial and Ghizer valleys in the central NA. Similar traffic appeared in the valleys of Hunza, Nagar, Gilgit and Baltistan. Residents of the area claim that the NLI soldiers who accompanied the bodies took care to move them at night in order to avoid publicity. As a rule, only one soldier accompanied a dead body. Shakoor Jan's body, for instance, was brought by two soldiers in a private jeep wnich also carried the body of Sepoy Ibrahim, Lalik Jan's cousin and colleague in 12-NLI. Both Ibrahim and Shakoor Jan were in track suits. One soldier delivered Shakoor Jan's body at his home at 4:00 a.m., while the other rushed off with Ibrahim's body, which was delivered at the martyr's native Hundur village before sunrise. In both cases, there were no military honours at the funeral, no hoisting of the national flag and no gun salutes. "The soldier who brought the body did not even offer a simple salute much less a gun salute. He was not in uniform," says Zarawar Khan of Hundur village.

The government's decision not to publicise their martyrs at that stage apparently created room for all kinds of politics in the area. "The authorities dumped our martyrs at our doors like logs of wood," says Dr Perveen Ashraf, a PPP leader and former member of the NA Council. "All the martyrs had beards, and they were mostly buried in the same civilian clothes in which they had left for the front line. They were not given any military protocol at the time of the funeral."

Residents of these areas claim that those injured in the Kargil conflict were given similar treatment. In the absence of medical facilities at the base camp in Skardu, those with severe injuries and frostbite were shifted to hospitals in Gilgit and Rawalpindi. Their relatives,however, were not informed. Iqbal, a 22-year-old NLI personnel, was admitted to the Gilgit hospital after having drunk poisoned water at the front line. He remained at the hospital for six days and died of kidney failure. Says Dr Perveen Ashraf, his aunt: "A dialysis in time could have saved him, but they did not do it. We could have looked after him better, but they never informed us."

The miseries of the locals were compounded by the stories of starvation and shortage of ammunition at the front line that emerged around this time. Gul Sambar Khan, father of Muzaffaruddin Begana, almost broke down while recounting his son's ordeal. "My child spent seven days up there without any food at all. One of his colleagues told me that they only had about five kilograms of sugar at the post. Muzaffar fought bravely and used up all his ammunition. Then he died, with only some sugar in his mouth. I saw it when I saw his face in the coffin."

According to circles close to the top military authorities in the NA, <u>[color=red]by mid-June 1999</font></u> almost the entire strength of 6-NLI on the Kargil front had been wiped out, while 12-NLI had also suffered heavy casualties. Though the Indians took more casualties than the NLI, they were able to clear the heights commanding the Srinagar-Leh highway by June 26, thereby taking the sting out of the Kargil operation.

"In early summer (just before the war), I received a couple of letters from our boys on the front line saying they had insufficient weapons and very little ammunition," says Major (retired) Hussain Shah, president of the Muttahida Qaumi Party (MQP) and a veteran of the 1965 and 1971 wars. "I used my contacts in the NLI to help improve the situation, but I was an outsider and could not influence security matters."

According to another veteran of the Kargil war, the NLI high command had made a specific promise of establishing supply lines to positions on the heights. But it was not fulfilled. "They also did not put their second-line forces in place, as we were given to understand. They virtually abandoned us. We later kicked up a row over this at a regiment darbar in Skardu. The major general who attended the darbar just lowered his head, not knowing what to say."

Many residents also allege inaction on part of the commanding authorities of the NLI, claiming that an SOS was sent to the GHQ for reinforcements only after the troops in the forward positions had suffered a fatal set-back. Even then, [color=red]the hurriedly called regiments from the Punjab could offer no help because they were not acclimatised. "I suspect the magnitude of the casualties took the planners of the operation themselves by surprise,"</font> says Hussain Shah. "Perhaps they had believed that by holding theheights, our troops would not suffer much damage. They did not realise :cool:

Others blame the militants for their role in the conflict. The government's decision to claim that the militants alone were involved in the conflict, according to the relatives of some of the martyrs, ended up demoralising the NLI personnel. Others accuse the Pakistani air force of failing to provide air cover to the NLI troops. "When I first heard on the Pakistani media that the Kargil war was being fought by the mujanideen, I was shocked," says Hussain Shah. "My children were being killed, but the laurels went to Qazi Hussain Ahmad."

On June 26, the anger of the people spilled onto the streets of Hunza where activists of the Karakoram National Movement (KNM) held a 'peace march' between Karimabad and Aliabad and openly raised slogans against the manner in which the Kargil operation was being handled. At least a dozen leaders of the march were later arrested on sedition charges and kept in Gilgit Jail for three months. They have now been released on bail and await court summons for trial. More trouble broke out in Skardu where militants of Al-Badar Mujahideen had started arriving in late May to act, according to the locals, as decoys for the operation. According to a senior police official in Gilgit, these militants forcefully occupied a house in July to establish their office, leading to an exchange of gunfire between them and the local people. An official meeting called to diffuse the situation turned ugly when a captain of the Inter-Services Intelligence hurled threats at SP Skardu, Momin Shah, for unduly favouring the Skardu residents. Shah, a native of Hunza, slapped the captain across his face. :eek: Though the khakis did not like it — and there are rumours that Momin Shah's "file may be reopened by the NA military authorities" — the militants had to be ordered out of Skardu to appease the infuriated population.

To prevent further public outbursts, the government moved to control the damage. Top state dignitaries started making whirlwind tours of the NA and extravagant rewards were bestowed on the martyrs and their families. The elevation of the paramilitary NLI to the status of a regular Pakistan Army regiment with all the attendant benefits and privileges, and the bestowal of over 40 medals of courage on NLI personnel (the largest number ever won by a single infantry regiment in Pakistan), appear to have partially appeased the injured pride and bolstered the sense of identity among the NA population.

Monetary rewards seem to have played a significant role in this regard. Each bereaved family received 500,000 rupees out of the prime minister's package, 60,000 rupees from the GHQ (through corps commander Pindi), and 30,000 rupees announced by Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf. In addition, each family has received anywhere between 200,000 to 400,000 rupees in pension commutations, insurance and other benefits admissible to the deceased. "The government has washed all my wounds," says Gulzari of village Damasu, the young widow of Sepoy Saboor Khan of 11-NLI. She has received 900,000 rupees, and may soon marry her brother-in-law. In such an event, she may continue to live in a comparatively peaceful home with her two children and parents-in-law.

But in the neighbouring Bejayot village, the widow of Sepoy Hazrat Qabool of 4-NLI has refused to remarry. She has already received 900,000 rupees in compensation andexpects to receive a further 300,000. She has two sons and two daughters, and says she will spend the rest of her life raising her children.

Not all widows are quite as lucky. In village Manich (Yasin subdivision), the widow of Sepoy Mohammad Isa (4-NLI), being issueless after three years of marriage, had to leave her husband's house in keeping with the local tradition. This nas given rise to disputes over the distribution of the compensation money between Isa's parents and herself.

A more instructive case is that of Havaldar Major Lalak Jan (12-NLI), the recepient of the Nishan-e-Haider. Having lost his first wife in child-birth, he remarried five months before his martyrdom. After his death, there were rumours that Lalak Jan's elder brother, Gul Sambar Khan, a Havaldar in 30-AK Regiment, had been given 9.6 million rupees as compensation by the government. The widow kicked up a fuss and, when told that it was not true, refused to believe her brother-in-law and went away to her parents' house. Subsequently, Gul Sambar Khan apparently prevented the authorities from issuing the prime minister's reward of 500,000 rupees in the name of the widow, as is generally done. He also prevented the settlement of Lalak Jan's pension in his widow's name. The dispute is still pending.

"These disputes have become the order of the day around here", says Zarawar Khan, Lalak Jan's cousin, who is also the general secretary of the Al-Madad Welfare Organisation, an NGO founded by Lalak Jan three years ago. "The widows are taking off to their parents' houses along with their children and the compensation money, abandoning the parents of the martyrs who in some cases are too poor and weak to fend for themselves. There are hundreds of such cases in the NA."

Contrary to the orthodox Muslim society in Pakistan, the local customs in the Northern Areas encourage an issueless widow to remarry at once, and do not prevent young widows with children from remarrying if they so desire. But the Kargil rewards have changed all that. "The war widows are not remarrying because they will have to forego the pension, and because
they will only get a widower as their match, something which they may not like with all the wealth that they possess now," says Zarawar Khan. "Even their parents would rather keep the rich daughter home than encourage her to remarry. This is corrupting our riwaj [custom]."

The corrupting influence of the rewards of martyrdom came to the fore ahead of the Haj season earlier this year when the war widows of Kargil were offered a free Haj package. While the policy required them to be accompanied by a mehram from the husband's family, widows attempted to fake the identification documents of their own brothers and fathers to get them on board. "We caught dozens of cases of fake identity in Ghizer alone, while many of them were helped by the conniving officials to slip by," says a senior district administration official in Gakuch, the district headquarters.

However, when the glitter of the new-found money rubs off over the next few years, another set of disappointments lies in store for these families. For one, the affectees of the Kargil war may not get the houses they were promised by former prime minister Nawaz Sharif. The present government has already revoked that promise, offering instead a plot and 200,000 rupees in cash. None of the families has yet received any of these benefits, and they are likely to wait a long time before enough plots can be spared for them.

Secondly, the affectees may end up chasing shadows in their bid to get the martyrs' children into proper schools. All such children were promised free education, boarding and food at NLI schools with the condition that they clear the primary classes at home. While more than a thousand children of the martyrs are yet to complete primary school, children past the primary stage are reported to have already been denied admission in some NLI schools in Gilgit and elsewhere.

"The martyrs have departed, but life goes on with all its simplicity, hardships, cunning and deception," says Nawaz Khan Naji, chairman of the nationalist Balawaristan National Front. "One only hopes that the lives of their children will not be treated as casually by the rulers as were those of the martyrs."

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Rishi » 15 Sep 2003 02:11

http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/RiedelPaper051302.htm

What did Nawaz do on 4th July, 1999?

American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House

BRUCE RIEDEL

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Jagan » 16 Sep 2003 16:22

First Nawaz Shareef - Now Benazir Bhutto :D

http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/aug/21bhutto.htm

BB interview to Indian Abroad

'Musharraf wanted to grab Srinagar'

Shyam Bhatia in London | August 21, 2003 13:10 IST
Last Updated: August 21, 2003 14:05 IST

General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's current military ruler, hatched plans to cross the Line of Control and conquer Srinagar long before the Kargil conflict.

In an exclusive interview published in this week's issue of India Abroad, the newspaper owned by rediff.com, former Pakistan prime minister Benazir Bhutto has described how during her last term in office (1993-1996) Musharraf startled her with plans for a new war against India. ........

"I think he personally doesn't like me because of that confrontation we had on the Kargil issue. But believe me I had to have that confrontation because if I did not have that confrontation, the blood of 3,000 soldiers would be on my hands. I did not allow it, but after I was overthrown they went ahead with their folly and<u> 3,000 of our young boys, the best in our army, died</u>, so many on the Indian side died, there was so much bitterness. The whole world had to intervene to stop it escalating into nuclear war."

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Raj Singh » 08 Oct 2003 21:06

Few weeks ago, a lot was said/talked about Siachen...not sure if the following excerpts belong here but some participants may find it of interest...

I was the brain behind Operation Meghdoot -- the plan that put the Indian army atop. The present impasse happened because the operation was never fully implemented. I want a probe into the botched Operation Meghdoot.

I blame the Indian government for having messed up Siachen. I hold former prime minister Narasimha Rao responsible for allowing Kashmir to slip out of India's hand. As PM he did not even visit Kashmir. In his August 15 address to the nation, he blamed Pakistan for the kidnapping of foreign tourists while his Pakistani counterpart Benazir Bhutto in her speech was talking of a visit to Siachen. The difficult conditions the Pakistani soldiers are living under and how she could even hear the echoes of the Holy Quran at such a high altitude.

How was Operation Meghdoot botched up?

My plan was to hold it thinly at the top. There are three approaches there. So Pakistan could have taken it there. If I beefed it up like it was done later, my logistics would go wonky. I said, let me have this force on the line of communication -- on the Srinagar-Leh Highway and if they take anything there (200 km away), I will hit them with this force, even in winter. I will just go and take Gilgit, Skardu and hit the Karakoram highway in Pakistan.

Now again there was a difference of perception: Sundarji came -- a brigade was raised, a division was raised. Instead of raising a corps and placing it in that area, he shoved it into Leh. With a result that a whole division, a brigade started looking after this area in Siachen. This was not required.

Siachen has to be held for some time. Till we consolidate. We concentrate our force and keep it ready for a riposte through an area at a time of our own convenience.

It was said by Lt Gen Hoon (retd)in one of the interviews. Here is the link to the interview..

http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/aug/05hoon.htm

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Luxtor » 15 Oct 2003 05:30

Originally posted by Rangudu:
Articles by former Pak Army officer Shaukat Qadir on Kargil.

An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999 - RUSI Journal - UK

Qadir wrote a four part series on Kargil in the Pak paper "Daily Times"

[b]Part 1 - Why did Kargil Happen?

The RAND Corporation, one of the most influential think tanks in Washington D.C., recently published a study on the Kargil war in 1999 titled, “Kargil: War under the Nuclear Umbrella”. From the Pakistani perspective, it is potentially the most damaging analysis of the events. It combines some realities with believable half-truths and some misperceptions, which appear very reasonable, to reach erroneous, but believable conclusions.

The very title is a misperception. It implies that Pakistan initiated the war under the misconception that India would be deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear capability and its response to hostilities would thus remain confined. But this, and many other misperceptions and erroneous conclusions stem from the basic question of why did Kargil occur at a time when the Lahore process had gone underway and the international community had pinned its hopes on it? This article will attempt to answer that.

Did the military merely have an inherent mistrust of the Indians and executed the plan despite the approaching peace initiative merely on that basis, or did it have a more sinister motive? Did the military plan to sabotage a possible political solution to outstanding issues with India, because it was not in its interest to make peace with India? Or was this intended as a precursor to the inevitable military coup in October 1999? Admittedly, these and many other conjectures and misperceptions are the direct outcome of the military’s reluctance to share information, in the interest of “national security”, though clearly silence is doing more damage because of giving rise to conjectures and misperceptions.

There is little doubt that the operation came at a particularly unpropitious moment, both for India and Pakistan. Vajpayee had just then lost a vote of confidence in the parliament, and was heading an interim government coming up for re-elections. That events at Kargil might have contributed to his victory is irrelevant. For Pakistan, the outcome was destined to be particularly embarrassing, since even China was critical of the operation. The embarrassment was further compounded since the army put out the story about the Mujahideen.

The strategic significance of the road link across Dras and Kargil to Siachin, which could be interdicted by the occupation of these heights, has often been highlighted, as also the fact that this plan had been made earlier as a possible response to the Indian interdiction of the Neelum valley, and had been shelved. But these considerations were a constant. Why the decision at that particular juncture?

The reality is that the Kashmir freedom movement was seen as “flagging”, and this operation was conceived as a way of giving it a “fillip”. It was intended to be a minor tactical operation, not of the magnitude it acquired. It was for this reason that initially the plans were confined to the COAS, Gen Musharraf, CGS, Lt Gen Aziz, Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mahmood, and Commander FCNA, Maj Gen Javed Hassan. Despite Nawaz Sharif’s denials, there is ample evidence that his permission was sought initially only in passing, and later, as the operation grew, he was briefed regularly. The first formal briefing took place on March 12, 1999.

The RAND assessment is partially correct that, at that point, Pakistan had little option but to continue supporting the low intensity conflict. But the report’s other conclusions are one-sided, since it did not take into account that at its conception the operation was supposed to be a tactical one — of a size the Indians would have grumbled about but ignored in the greater interest of avoiding conflict. However, in mountainous terrain, every next height appears more dominating than the one you are occupying. Consequently, without intending to do so at the outset, the Corps Commander kept sanctioning the enlarged occupation; the COAS was only told the troops had gone in a little deeper.

It was only when almost the entire region was occupied that the COAS became aware of the total magnitude. It was at this juncture that the sheer size of the ingress made it necessary to take the entire military into confidence, since the repercussions of a penetration of this size had not been earlier considered. Thus it was that the Military Operations Directorate was tasked to come up with a political and military aim for the operation, and an operational strategy to support it. It was their brilliant response to what was already a “given situation” which was presented to Nawaz Sharif and the other service chiefs on March 12.

Much has been made of the fact that the operation was conceived by and confined to the four individuals mentioned earlier. Some have credited this to the secrecy with which the operation was planned, others have discredited it for keeping the other services out of “the loop”, and ascribing more sinister motives to the secrecy, but if it is understood that the initial size of the operation was a tactical penetration, intended merely to provide a fillip to the freedom struggle in IHK, much of the significance of the secrecy will disappear.

Considerable criticism could be offered to Gen Musharraf for permitting the operation to grow beyond its intended size, but it must be understood that a corps commander is a very senior officer, who enjoys considerable liberty of action, which Mahmood exercised. Nor is it intended to make Mahmood the scapegoat, now that he is out of favour. In all likelihood, he was doing what he thought was in the interest of defending an area he was responsible for holding after it was occupied.

[/b]
This guy Shaukat Qadir is obviously a Paki and a Pak army person and his "analysis" is obviously very unrealistic and predictably self glorifying of Pak prowess. His article: An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999 - RUSI Journal(UK) makes it sound like Indians couldn't shoot straight and were bumbling idiots on the mountains of Kargil and only the American intervention saved the day for India. This is another example of how the Pakistanis notoriously live in their dreams and don't face reality. These kinda Paki analysis doesn't explain why Nawaz would run panick striken to China and then to Washington if the Paks were holding ground comfortably in Kargil and Indians were tripping over themselves. Later Nawaz has said that Paks have lost 4000 troops in Kargil. This certainly doesn't sound like the Paks were as potent warriers as their fantasies leads them the believe. Pakis never learn ...do they, no matter how many times we kick their asses. :rotfl:

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby member_4055 » 18 Oct 2003 17:16

Shirleen is back with kargil book...
review at
www.outlookindia.com

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Aditya G » 18 Oct 2003 18:09

:lol: :

A Kargil Fable

It is Pakistan's version of the Kargil war. A new book says they successfully countered India's 'adventurism'.

AMIR MIR

<img src="http://www.outlookindia.com/images/kargil_conflict_20031027.jpg" alt="" />

You think Pakistan occupied the Kargil hills in the summer of 1999. You believe it was an operation Pakistani generals planned on the sly and then prime minister Nawaz Sharif didn't know about it until the bullets started flying. You're absolutely sure about India emerging victorious and the Pakistani army deeply embarrassed.

Hold on, history can be rewritten. And to know how, read Dr Shireen Mazari's book, The Kargil Conflict 1999—Separating Fact from Fiction, which was launched in Islamabad recently. The slim, 162-page book claims, inter alia: Kargil was an operation planned to counter India's insidious designs; Sharif was aware of it; he failed to convert Pakistan's "tremendous military success" into a politico-diplomatic victory. The book concludes, "Had Nawaz Sharif not dashed to Washington to give in and had the Kargil tactical operation been allowed to sustain itself for a few more weeks (till the end of August 1999), it would have led to an Indo-Pak dialogue."

But just who's Dr Shireen Mazari? Answer: she's more influential than what her calling card—director general, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad—suggests. In the Pakistani establishment, they trust her more than anyone else. She confesses in the preface that the book would not have been possible "without the support and access given by President Musharraf to all manner of data and information".

No wonder, the book's being viewed in these circles as Pakistan's official version of Kargil. Her idea was to explode a few 'myths'. One of these pertained to media reports that there had been a long-standing 'Kargil Plan' but it was never executed because army chief Gen Jehangir Karamat (1996-1999) and then PM Benazir Bhutto had rejected it.

Fine, you accept there was no long-standing Kargil plan (leaving aside one awkward fact: Benazir claims otherwise). So then why did Pakistan decide to launch the 1999 operations? Mazari says there were suspicious movements in the Shaqma sector, north of the LoC at Kargil, in the late 1998-early 1999. The Pakistan high command asked the Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) to evolve a plan to counter possible Indian incursions. Even this defensive planning is dated March '99, and not during Vajpayee's visit earlier in the year, as India claims. "No movement across Burazil Pass was possible prior to mid-March. By keeping two well-equipped Indian brigades at Maskoh/Dras, India possessed the capacity to occupy positions in the Shaqma sector," writes Mazari.

The FCNA did plan a defensive action with its troops. Replenishment was provided only after Indian attacks on Pakistani posts. "This fact alone is sufficient to debunk the claim of a so-called strategic offensive operation planned by Pakistan at Kargil. Any major offensive would, obviously, have entailed some sort of additional troops and logistic build-up...."

Refuting the Indian assertions that Pakistan's operation was essentially planned across the LoC, she says, "If that had been the intent, the Pakistani troops would have attempted to recapture the Marpola and Bimbet posts that were established on the Pakistani side of the LoC by Indian troops in their many incursions across the LoC in 1988. How could Pakistan allow these Indian posts to remain intact even as Pakistani troops bypassed these positions, went across the LoC and occupied vast, inhospitable areas?"

What sparked the Kargil war then? India's adventurism, she says. "India, as per its plan, moved its troops to the watershed on their side of the LoC and initially came across those Mujahideen who were familiar with the terrain and had moved to occupy some of the heights across the LoC to interdict the Indian supply route along the Dras-Kargil road".In other words, the guerrillas had been deployed to nix India's plan.She says the FCNA took defensive measures by "positioning troops on the heights/features, overlooking Indian routes, which in fact had been mostly unoccupied previously. But as a result of the Indian counter-attacks, numerous new posts were established and fighting patrols were pushed ahead for early warning and depth and flank protection." Conclusion: Pakistan was successfully countering India's possible adventurism.

She arraigns Sharif's regime with this line of attack: it wasn't in the battlefield but in the diplomatic arena that Pakistan was worsted. "India managed to portray its lack of success in the military operations as restraint and adroitly played on Western fears of a nuclear war in South Asia. The central line being pushed was that it was Indian restraint that had prevented a nuclear conflict."

Simultaneously, India widened the military operations to Pakistan's disadvantage. She argues, "It got sucked incrementally into a larger military operation by India with the latter's induction of reinforcements, the Bofor guns and the use of the Indian Air Force. Pakistan had not anticipated this since its objective was simply to preempt suspected Indian military actions along the LoC. In any case, from the Pakistani perspective, no grand strategic plan was envisaged because it would have been difficult to employ large-scale forces in Kargil, in a sustainable manner."

The book refutes Sharif's claim that he wasn't briefed on Kargil. She says he was briefed repeatedly in '99, beginning with a session in Skardu on January 29. Mazari writes, "The isi gave him a briefing on March 12, 1999, while the Military Operations Directorate at the GHQ gave him briefings on May 17, 1999; June 2, 1999 and June 22, 1999. On July 2, 1999, at a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, the chiefs of the army, navy and air force gave a briefing on Kargil. A further meeting was scheduled for July 5, 1999." It wasn't held: Sharif suddenly left for Washington on July 4.

His trip to the US transformed the situation. For, Mazari claims, India was prepared to negotiate with Pakistan around mid-June 1999, courtesy backchannel diplomacy. "Apparently, it was reported on June 27 that an understanding had been reached on the final settlement of the Kargil conflict, which was to be signed in New Delhi by the prime ministers of the two countries. That is why at the time of Sharif's visit to China on June 27, 1999, the Indian side had suggested that Sharif make an 'impromptu' stop in New Delhi on his way back from Beijing. This is probably why Sharif cut short his visit to China.... But once he did this, the Indian offer was suddenly cancelled.... So somewhere between these developments, an external factor came into play which further impacted the Kargil dynamics."

That external factor was the Clinton administration. It interceded on India's behalf. She writes, "Many military commanders, in interviews, insisted that it was the US that prevented India from coming to the negotiating table with Pakistan at the time of the Sharif visit to China. The US administration was of the view that despite repeated warnings not to take any action along the LoC, Pakistan was playing a game of brinkmanship against the American wishes."

Mazari blames Sharif for mishandling the political and diplomatic dimensions of the conflict. He dashed to Washington without even informing his cabinet. Once there, he gave in to US pressure and committed himself to the army's immediate withdrawal. It turned "the whole Kargil episode into a political victory for India, while Pakistan saw a successful tactical operation—albeit one which was not accompanied by a coordinated politico-diplomatic plan—turn into a politico-diplomatic setback." In other words, the battle that had been won was thus lost.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Arun_S » 20 Oct 2003 09:38

I visited the "Hall Of Fame" at Leh that is the Kargil War Museum.

I got to see first hand the momentos of Kargil war; weapons and personal effects of the Puki NLI captured. Including paybook, personal letters and photos etc. Variety of Puki ordinance that the dead pukis had in hand. There was nothing that indicated mujahdeen / non-military presence. It was Puki army all the way: top to bottom.

I was so full of anger after seeing hard evidence of Puki duplicity.

Shameful Puki Army, did not not even acknowledge its dead and hounourable military burial for its soliders. They were just cannon fodder and dispensible.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Roop » 21 Oct 2003 06:35

Shameful Puki Army, did not not even acknowledge its dead and hounourable military burial for its soliders. They were just cannon fodder and dispensible.
Yes, and you can hear more about this betrayal straight from the horse's mouth, as it were (i.e. from on-camera interviews with Pakistani soldiers themselves), on BR's Kargil VCD.

Speaking of which, I highly recommend BR's VCDs to all members of the forum. I say this as a disinterested and independent observer, I am not affiliated with the distributors in any way.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby kgoan » 31 Oct 2003 00:01

In this weeks The Friday Times, Oct 31- Nov 6, 2003, Siddiqa the former Director of Pak Naval Research takes a pot-shot at Mazari's Kargil tripe and, very nicely, does so by situating it in a wider context.

Of course, Mazari being Mazari, her response when she strikes back should be quite interesting and; we get to watch the entertainment as the asylum inmates get stuck into each other. :)

Our socio-political culture
Dr Ayesha Siddiqa

There is a global consensus that the security environment since Sept 11, 2001 has changed and states need to reassess their national and military strategies to respond to the change. A reassessment is also necessary because despite differing perceptions of the threat and the responses to it, everyone has joined the war on terrorism. But the problem is that most countries have not managed, or seem reluctant, to take the crucial leap from the traditional to the alternative security paradigm. Clearly, it would be extremely exhausting if any state, in the absence of a clear assessment, tried to sail in both boats.

From the perspective of Pakistan's national security and strategy, I came across two interesting articles in the last issue (Oct 24-30) of The Friday Times. Ejaz Haider's basic argument ('Military needs to understand non-military options') that the military needs to think about non-military options and Moeed Yusuf's notion ('Exposing the mindset') that Pakistan must not get trapped by India's bid to drag Islamabad into an asymmetrical arms race shared a similar message - the need to rethink the traditional security paradigm. While I agree with their arguments, I am not sure if their advice would be heeded. The military might even disregard it as liberal blabber that cannot understand the logic of an eye-for-an-eye approach.

Indubitably, Islamabad needs to consider strategic alternatives within the traditional security paradigm as well as work new non-traditional approaches. The two aforementioned articles provide a perfect cue to initiate a discussion among the various schools of thought. Such discussion could in fact lead to the development of a consensus or an agreement on the future shape of national strategy.

But discussion requires the capacity for dialogue. And dialogue is not one of the strengths of Pakistan's socio-political culture. As a nation, we are generally averse to a debate. Quite often, a dissenting view or a different idea is taken as a total rejection and negation of one's own thesis and the other is immediately categorised as part of the much-abhorred opposition. This is why there is an acute dearth of inter-institutional or intra-institutional dialogue. This culture has never served our national interests. Unfortunately, the basis of this culture is in the notorious feudal-military-bureaucratic mindset that pervades all institutions and impacts all levels of society and the polity.

This mindset feeds on total allegiance to the centre and source of power. What comes from persons in authority is to be taken as gospel truth, never to be challenged. Anyone remotely seen to be challenging any idea of the source of power is deemed an enemy, to be immediately bracketed as the other. Another feature of this culture is the high element of secrecy: information is rarely shared with other stakeholders. The way decisions are made by the political and military leadership is a case in point.

A relevant example relates to the Kargil episode. Recently, Dr Shireen Mazari, who needs no introduction, has published a booklet on Kargil. The 82-page work uses selective information to a point where the study becomes noticeable more because of the absence of facts rather than its acclaimed objective of 'separating facts from fiction'. Thus the work hides more than it reveals (this could either be because the author was not given the correct information, or it could owe to her personal bias). For instance, she has limited her information-gathering exercise to some army officers at the risk of excluding the political leadership at the time of the crisis or officers from the air force and navy. It is now a matter of record (Owen Bennet Jones is one example) that the naval and air chiefs had seriously objected to the entire gameplan.

Perhaps, the reason for not including personnel from the other two services is owed to the author's appreciation of our peculiar socio-political culture where all alternative voices are considered inimical to certain interests. The only political leader interviewed by the author is Mushahid Hussain. What is intriguing is that the interview with Hussain was conducted after he morphed, following a long confinement that probably broke his will to state the facts of the crisis.

One is given the impression that the army played along with Nawaz Sharif's plan of visiting the US for fear of creating an impression that there was a civil-military divide on the issue. Dr Mazari tries to convince her readers that the responsibility of mishandling the information-battle during Kargil rested squarely with the political leadership. Such claims make one wonder if she had no information on the fact that the idea of seeking help from the US with the prime minister going to Washington was actually debated in the Defence Committee of the Cabinet; or even that she has no clue about the civil-military imbalance in the country that does not allow the political leadership to call the shots, especially when it comes to military matters. There are other serious distortions of facts as well that would only be revealed if a fair and unbiased analysis of Kargil was ever written in this country.

The idea is not to point to the deficiencies of the study but to highlight the fact that it is a fundamental representation of the culture that prevails in this country. Facts are hidden and a discussion never carried out to avoid the risk of endangering personal and organisational interests in the same manner as would happen in a feudal setting. Why is it not possible for concerned citizens to have better access to information and for stakeholders to have a debate that would then draw out the strengths and weaknesses of a policy? Why is that as a nation we have been unable to, at least, learn one lesson from our conflicts - the imperative of reviewing our strategic, operational and tactical shortcomings with the objective of learning from these? Finally, why is it that we shirk from an open debate at the risk of exposing the blaring gaps in reality and the facts that are presented later, making our facts appear more like fiction than anything else?

Sadly enough, the work mentioned above exposes more of our shortcomings by eschewing facts than if it had revealed them. For example, how does one explain the fact that the army continued to deny that it was involved in the operation or called the shots during the crisis? Reading the report one discovers that it was actually the Northern Light Infantry that was part of the plan. Similarly, Dr Mazari's basic argument is that the entire crisis was a reaction to some aggressive moves made by India. If so, why was the issue not taken up during discussions at Lahore? Why wasn't New Delhi told that Islamabad would only set up committees, agreed upon jointly by the two principals at Lahore to solve the various outstanding issues including Kashmir - esp., if India would stop intruding across the LoC? Assuming that there was a communication gap between the military and the political leadership, it would be interesting to know the military's appreciation of the political policy.

But one still needs to thank Dr Mazari for her initiative. One hopes her work would kick off a debate on how the crisis was played out at this end. The aim of such a debate is to ascertain the political objectives behind the Kargil operation. The fact is that even a tactical move is not permissible when it is not connected with an over-arching political goal. After all, it would be a remarkable national achievement if we could finally learn to discard our feudal-military-bureaucratic mindset that is averse to questioning and counter-arguments. Only after we have abandoned this trait that we could begin to re-think our grand national- and military-strategic options objectively and enable the nation to meet the challenges we face after 9/11.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Rangudu » 08 Nov 2003 02:02

Cross-posted.

Report on the letter circulated by Paki army dissenters

The letter, however, creates fresh doubts about the army's commitment to Musharraf and also reflects resentment, at least among those who sent the letter, against his decision to back the U.S.-led war against terrorism. The letter also raises questions about the decision to send Pakistani troops to Kargil, a region in Indian Kashmir, in 1999, which began a mini-war between the two rivals and caused the deaths of thousands of soldiers on both sides.

Opposition leaders in Pakistan said Musharraf, who was then commander in chief of the army, planned the operation to derail then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's efforts to mend relations with India.
The translated letter says:

"We, the officers of the Pakistan army, request the national leadership to bring the following matters before the parliament:

"1. What was our objective in Kargil (in the disputed Kashmir region where India and Pakistan fought pitched battles in 1999) and why did we have to suffer (so much) loss? India ordered an inquiry after the battle of Kargil and on its recommendation sacked several generals and brigadiers. But in Pakistan, no such inquiry was ever held <u>although we lost more (people) in Kargil than we did in the 1965 and 1971 wars.</u>

"Perhaps, the nation does not know that Maj. Gen. Javed-ul-Husnain commanded (the Pakistani troops) in Kargil. Before that he served in America for four years as Pakistan's military attaché under CIA's supervision. This was started on America's urging.

"Officers and soldiers working under this man were so annoyed with his irresponsible leadership and faulty orders that they almost rebelled against him. Yet, instead of being sacked, he was promoted and made a lieutenant general.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby grip » 12 Nov 2003 13:24

Excerpts from LOC:Kargil Story on Rediff.

"Yeh **** ko baahar nikal kar phenkna hai, [We must throw these **** out]," yells Dutt to his fellow soldiers. "Aagewalon ko peechewale sambhalenge, aur hum sab ko uparwala sambhalega. [The soldiers ahead can count on us for support. God is with us]."
"When we shot the film," said Manoj Bajpai, "only 60 per cent oxygen was available, as we were 14,000 feet above sea level. It was an extremely difficult condition [to shoot]. I told my co-stars we are perspiring only to shoot the film, while our jawans fought without caring for their lives.
More Here

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Guest » 22 Nov 2003 16:34

Looks like Shaukat Qadir is not speaking for the establishment. shrilleen is dis'ing him.
Noorani's review of Mazari's "Kargil Booklet" :D
Mazari blames the Centre for Contemporary Conflict's Kargil Project for misperceptions of Pakistan's policy. "Further misperceptions were created about Kargil when an unofficial, conjectural version of Pakistan's Kargil position was published by a retired Army official, who at the time had his own axe to grind with the military government in Pakistan." This is a reference to Brigadier Shakat Qadir's article "An Analysis of Kargil" in RUSI Journal (April 2002). He was a participant in the Monterey Conference.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Rangudu » 23 Nov 2003 05:41

Another review of Mazari's Kargil pamphlet by Ayesha Siddiqa Agha

REVIEW: The Kargil story

Reviewed by Dr Ayesha Siddiqa

The Pakistan Army's silence on Kargil was finally broken in the form of the recently published book by Dr Shireen Mazari. The publication presents mainly the official GHQ position, a reality borne by the fact that the study primarily contains a description of events rather than an analysis. Considering that India had produced quite a few studies on the subject and a lot of fingers were being pointed at Pakistan's silence, the task of presenting Islamabad's position was given to the best person available for the job: the director-general of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.

Ms Mazari's account of the conflict takes up only half the book (82 pages), the remainder contains a comprehensive chronology and some documents pertaining to Indian occupied Kashmir. The study comprises six chapters preceded by a prologue that is not just an introduction to the book but also to the Kargil conflict. The book tries to, as the subtitle suggests, separate facts from fiction. The basic concept is to respond to the stories spread by the Indian military, its government and media regarding the way the Kargil conflict was acted out.

In the prologue the author explains the entire Siachin glacier episode almost as the logic for the Pakistan Army's move in Kargil. The basic hypothesis is that India has always used a 'salami-slicing' approach to solve the Kashmir issue to its advantage. This is in spite of the Pakistan Army's success in thwarting such moves through its tactical brilliance.

The introductory chapter that follows speaks about the various myths that the author aims to dispel. Mazari, as stated in this chapter, does not subscribe to the fact that Kargil was an operation that had been planned in advance or had ever been mentioned in the past, as claimed by the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The author also refutes the American claim that Pakistan had readied its nuclear weapons during the conflict. Such claims were what inspired the author to seek the Army's help in making the GHQ's version public.

In the next chapter she describes certain Indian military manoeuvres that were provocative and required a response. This account has been described as the background to the conflict. The third chapter describes the geography of the area where the fighting took place, with the objective of explaining the hurdles that the terrain poses for any military operation.

The fourth chapter, which is the longest, presents the Kargil operation as a purely defensive move launched in March 1999 to counter Indian offensive measures. The chapter throws light on the military, political and diplomatic dimension of the operation and the events that followed it. The author is of the view that the Army had deployed the northern light infantry because it didn't want to launch an offensive operation. Moreover, the most controversial claim in this chapter is that the political leadership had full knowledge of the operations. It is also asserted that what led to the withdrawal and American involvement was Washington's own interest in pressurizing Pakistan. There is no detailed analysis to corroborate this claim.

The next three chapters briefly describe the disconnect between the political leadership and the military that led to the situation where the Pakistan Army could not benefit from its position of a safe control of the heights at Drass and Kargil. Mazari also tries to give a twist to American involvement in making Pakistan withdraw from Kargil by presenting it as an American conspiracy in which the Pakistani political leadership has been blamed equally.

The book is definitely an interesting read because it squarely presents the official position. However, it is also interesting for all the facts that the author has chosen to keep out of her narrative. Intriguingly, the study is limited to interviews of people from the Army, especially officers who were part of the operation. No efforts were made to measure their opinion against any other assertions by neutral observers.

The author also strategically left out the political leadership by making an excuse that since Nawaz Sharif was not in the country there was no one she could question. Oddly enough, she only chose to interview Mushahid Hussain who, in any case, had changed his political position by the time the book was being written. Contrary to the claim in the book that the prime minister and his political team was privy to all information regarding the operation, the one photograph in the book, which could have proved this point carries the date of June 1999 (see picture above) when the operation was out in the open and even the Indians had started to raise a hue and cry about it.

In fact, the study does not contain the views of soldiers who had fought in Kargil and related a different story to the Monterey group that she has mentioned in her study.

Of course, it is essential to read the book for the sake of knowing the GHQ's version of Kargil, but the study does leave a lot of questions unanswered. In fact, it raises more questions than it proposes to answer. There is a lot that remains hidden despite this seemingly academic effort to unearth the reality which is far more damaging to Pakistan's interests. Perhaps, someday the establishment in Pakistan would realize that some amount of openness serves national interests better than camouflaging facts.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Tim » 24 Nov 2003 19:28

I take responsibility for the misperceptions at the Kargil conference. Shireen was on a panel with me, and didn't agree with anything I said.

My bad.

:)

Tim

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Rangudu » 24 Nov 2003 19:39

After the Nazi Germany, has there been any other country that has been as bad as the Pakistanis in using lies and bland denials as a substitute for state policy?

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Aditya G » 24 Nov 2003 19:59

Originally posted by Rangudu:
After the Nazi Germany, has there been any other country that has been as bad as the Pakistanis in using lies and bland denials as a substitute for state policy?
I disagree with this phrase: using lies and bland denials as a substitute for state policy?

It ain't no subsitute - it is state policy.

Anyway, i will try...can think of two names viz-a-viz 3rd and 4th quaters of the 20th century:

1. West Pakistan
2. Pakistan

:D

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Vivek_A » 24 Nov 2003 20:07

Originally posted by Rangudu:
After the Nazi Germany, has there been any other country that has been as bad as the Pakistanis in using lies and bland denials as a substitute for state policy?
You mean using lies that fool only it's own people..

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Tim » 24 Nov 2003 20:35

Maybe I'm just an old Cold Warrior, but I seem to remember a country that is now called Russia...

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby SaiK » 30 Nov 2003 12:32

http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2024/stories/20031205000507300.htm

The truth about Kargil

This brings us to an essay on "American diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House" by Bruce Riedel, Clinton's Special Assistant for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the National Security Council. This shrill account of the Clinton-Sharif encounter has Riedel as an important participant but reveals him as one ignorant of South Asian realities.

He wrote of "disturbing evidence that the Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear arsenals for possible deployment" on July 3. The next day, "there was more disturbing information about Pakistan preparing its nuclear arsenal for possible use. I recommended that he (Clinton) use this only when Sharif was without his aides." Riedel would have us believe that Clinton asked Sharif whether he ordered "the Pakistani nuclear missile force to prepare for action."

If no such orders had been given, Riedel's account of the encounter would stand exposed as a figment of his imagination. Exposed as false it has been by an impeccable source, Gen. Malik. "The only canard debunked at the time of the Monterey Conference in May 2002, was the assertion central to Riedel's thesis. First, Mushahid Hussain, who had been Pakistan's Minister for Information at the time of Kargil, denied Pakistan ever having readied its nuclear-tipped missiles for action at the time of Kargil. This was followed by the statement of General V.P. Malik, who was the Chief of the Indian Army at the time of Kargil, that there was no truth in the Riedel assertion of Pakistan readying for a nuclear fight. As he declared, if there had been any such development, the U.S. would have informed India and that India's own intelligence would have also picked it up." Significantly, Riedel's essay was published when India-Pakistan tensions were at an all-time high.

........

Now the Army's role, long denied, emerges to the fore. "As the intelligence assessments about the suspicious movements of the Indian military in the late 1998-early 1999 period, started looking more credible, the high command of the Pakistan Army asked FCNA (Force Command Northern Areas) to evolve a plan to deny the Indians any adventurism/incursions along the LoC... Having been alerted to intensified Indian moves in the Shaqma Sector, HQ 10 Corps, on instructions from the Military Operations (MO) Directorate, directed FCNA to carry out a realistic assessment of the situation and to take defence measures in order to forestall Indian designs and avoid being caught off-guard. FCNA planned a defensive action with integral troops... . The operation was undertaken at the end of March 1999 after confirmation of Indian designs." Why did Sharif not complain to Vajpayee about Indian troop movements?

...............

There was no grand design, Mazari repeatedly asserts. "The use of Northern Light Infantry clearly showed that the Kargil operation was seen by the Pakistani military planners simply as a tactical operation to pre-empt further Indian adventurism in the Dras-Kargil sector. Hence the occupation by the NLI of the watershed along the LoC. However, given the nature of the terrain, the possibility of some of the NLI troops crossing the LoC, albeit at shallow depths (500-1000 metres) cannot be ruled out." The delicacy is stunning.

Pakistan evidently did not reckon with India's diplomatic and military responses as it ought to have, realistically. No Indian government could possibly have acquiesced in Pakistan's adventure. She claims that India's "raising of the military ante in Kargil created a major imbalance for India in terms of its overall position along the international border with Pakistan, which prevented India from opening an all-out war front. India also inducted air and aviation into the combat but could not get a decisive military result. At the same time, Pakistan's intent of keeping the Kargil operation limited was reflected in the fact that Pakistan did not respond to the use of the IAF by calling in the PAF... one of the problems that worked to Pakistan's disadvantage was that it got sucked incrementally into a larger military operation by India with the latter's induction of reinforcements, the Bofors guns and use of the IAF. Pakistan had not anticipated this since its objective was simply to pre-empt suspected Indian military actions along the LoC. In any case, from the Pakistani perspective, no grand strategic Kargil plan was envisaged... ."

..........

Her only consolation is that Kargil proved that "Pakistan could sustain a limited military encounter in conventional terms in the face of India raising the conventional ante, and still prevent India from opening an all-out war front along the international border". Were India to take steps to redress this, Pakistan would surely act to perpetuate its advantage. However, a suicidal arms race is on, any way.

..........

They squarely pose the question whether Pokhran II deterred Pakistan from the Kargil venture and answer it in the negative. If anything, "India found itself deterred in crossing the LoC to attack Pakistan's operational bases in Skardu."

.......

"Analysis of the logistics of the incursion has drawn western observers to the conclusion that planning and preliminary operations began during winter 1998/99, with movement of mujahideen from camps in Afghanistan for further training by the Northern Light Infantry around Skardu, and considerable movement by the NLI and other Pakistan Army troops in the areas of Astore, Skardu, the Deosai Plains, and forward to the Line of Control (LoC).

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ASPuar » 30 Nov 2003 18:00

I find myself in agreement with this statement at least for the situation in question:
They squarely pose the question whether Pokhran II deterred Pakistan from the Kargil venture and answer it in the negative. If anything, "India found itself deterred in crossing the LoC to attack Pakistan's operational bases in Skardu."
But I dont think that Pokhran II has conclusively placed us in a strategically worse position. PAkistan always had the nuclear weapons it detonated in balochistan. Simply the fact that we know about them doesnt change reality for us. In fact, thats 5 less paki nukes we need to worry about. The detonation of the same, however raised new foreign policy obstacles for us in the form of more hectic US lobbying at the start of anything ugly.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Rangudu » 30 Nov 2003 23:11

Originally posted by Tim:
Maybe I'm just an old Cold Warrior, but I seem to remember a country that is now called Russia...
Quite true. Thanks

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Aditya G » 30 Nov 2003 23:17

Book Review of Madame jalebi in Dung.

http://jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2003-weekly/nos-30-11-2003/dia.htm

The Pakistan side of Kargil

The world has seen the Kargil conflict through the Indian or western eyes. The first account by a Pakistani writer of what happened in 1999 also happens to be semi-official

By Arif Jamal

Pakistan has not officially revealed the background to the Kargil conflict even after the passage of more than four years. The world has seen the Kargil conflict through the Indian or western eyes. No official explanation or academic study from the Pakistani point of view is available. As opposed to this, a large number of good and bad books on the Kargil conflict have been written in India. India has also conducted an official investigation and made its findings public in the shape of 'The Kargil Review Committee Report'.

'The Kargil Conflict 1999 -- separating fact from fiction' by Shireen Mazari, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, is the first account by a Pakistani writer of what happened in 1999. This account happens to be semi-official. First, it is written by the head of Pakistan's premier defence think-tank: The Institute of Strategic Studies. Second, this account is based primarily on the interviews of ten Pakistani generals who played key roles in planning, starting and carrying out the Kargil war. <U>However, the author has not directly quoted any of the interviewees. This considerably reduces the academic value of the book. </U> :whine: Unless Pakistan also makes its version public, the world would keep accepting the Indian version as the truth.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby SSridhar » 30 Nov 2003 23:37

Originally posted by Rangudu:
After the Nazi Germany, has there been any other country that has been as bad as the Pakistanis in using lies and bland denials as a substitute for state policy?
It is just not the lies...there are many other similarities. Both of them believed in their racial superiority and eliminated the minorities in their respective countries. Both felt stifled by their geography and needed to expand space. It was 'lebensraum' in the case of Germany and J&K and 'strategic depth' in the case of Pakistan. Both relied on a massive propaganda of half-truths and naked lies to not only hoodwink their own people, but the rest of the world as well. Both created a mass hysteria among their peoples to achieve the goals of a scheming few. Both misused religion to achieve their narrow ends. Both were evil powers bent upon death and destruction. Both developed WMDs with the sole intent of using them, not for deterrence. Both gave international covenants and practices a go by and indulged in reckless actions. Both were appeased early on by world powers, by Neville Chamberlain of Britain in the case of the Third Reich and successive US regimes in the case of Pakistan, much against saner counsel from others.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Calvin » 30 Nov 2003 23:57

Well, the Chinese and Russians were pretty good at it too.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ASPuar » 01 Dec 2003 02:56

Book Review of Madame jalebi in Dung.
:rotfl: :rotfl:

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Rudra » 01 Dec 2003 07:43

has this paper by bruce reidel on Sharifs visit to DC during kargil been posted on BR ?

http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/RiedelPaper051302.htm

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Rangudu » 01 Dec 2003 07:45

Originally posted by Rudra Singha:
has this paper by bruce reidel on Sharifs visit to DC during kargil been posted on BR ?

http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/RiedelPaper051302.htm
Yes. many times.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Rangudu » 01 Dec 2003 21:15

Check this out. A student at US Naval Postgraduate School has based his thesis on Kargil and its comparison to US Op.Anaconda in Afghanistan.

Link

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Rudra » 01 Dec 2003 22:03

dont forget north korea. in addn the Great Leader has a fondness for nordic concubines hence embassies in that region have a staff of pimps to get people on short contracts.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Babui » 01 Dec 2003 22:31

Marcus Acosta has sure done his homework. Check out the bibliography of his thesis. BR is mentioned (Go LNS !).

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Roop » 02 Dec 2003 03:12

Way to go, Rangudu!

That thesis by Capt. Acosta is one of the most interesting and readable accounts of the Kargil War that I have yet seen. IMO every member of BRF should make the effort to read it.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby kgoan » 02 Dec 2003 03:58

Ditto.

But must say that I don't think Acosta made his case for artillery being the sole differentiator in *future* mountain wars.

From the Anaconda description, the real problem with PGM's seemed to be US response time from call to release and the CEP for the JDAMS.

If those were improved, and loiter times increased by adding UCAV's to the mix, tech heavy forces could make a difference with the Air Force alone. Artillery may still be needed, but perhaps not on the scale the IA used at Kargill.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby AkshayM » 05 Dec 2003 02:14

Please recommend top two books on Kargil if I have to buy from India. I may be there and would like to buy them. Thanks

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Rangudu » 05 Dec 2003 08:59

AkshayM,

One of the two top books on Kargil has to be Capt. Amarinder Singh's "A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights".

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Vivek_A » 05 Dec 2003 20:23

Originally posted by Mohan Raju:
That thesis by Capt. Acosta is one of the most interesting and readable accounts of the Kargil War that I have yet seen.
The main conclusion of the thesis seems to be that it was artillery that saved the day. When reading something about the Iraq war, i came across this interesting bit.

Army's civil war

The Crusader is the tip of the iceberg. Uniformed officers resented failure to use tube artillery in Afghanistan, with Shinseki publicly testifying that the Crusader could have saved American lives at the battle of Anaconda.
Shinseki was right on the money when he said artillery could have helped in operation Anaconda. This thesis seems to bear that out.


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