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Kargil Revisited

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Surya » 09 Jun 2004 01:07

Wonder what Patney has to say for persisting with the Mig attacks in the nitial days.

I woder whether he will claim credit for the M2K strikes

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby SaiK » 09 Jun 2004 02:05

Originally posted by Ravi:
Op Ed in Hindu: REVISITING KARGIL
Thirdly, it [IAF] did not — and does not — possess the kinds of slow-flying aircraft designed for the bunker-busting operations needed at Kargil.

Sadly, not one constructive word has been said on pushing intelligence reforms ahead.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Jagan » 09 Jun 2004 14:44

Kargil review report stokes Army-IAF rivalry : Army’s in-house report revives controversy on IAF entry timing
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=48544

‘‘It would not have made the slightest difference to the number of casualties even if the air strikes had been ordered earlier. The number of casualties were more because of tactical choices made by the Army.’’ AM Vinod Patney
Those involved in the Kargil operations are clear that while the Army wanted the Air Force to enter the battle zone even before the extent of intrusion was known, the latter made the government aware that the introduction of fighters into the theatre would bring the war into a different plane. Essentially, the Air Force was sounding the government about the possibility of an all-out war with Pakistan

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Joeqp » 09 Jun 2004 16:24

<A HREF="http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=227183">NDA Govt took 18 days to allow airstrikes</A>

It seems the IA asked on May 8; the signal was given on May 26th. But Pranab<I>da</I> says the following in his statement to the parliament:
<I>Regarding media allegations that a high casualty of 474 could have been avoided if air power had been used from the beginning, the Minister said "I wish there had been no casualties at all." However, he said between May 8 and May 25, 1999 the number of casualties had only been 35 as compared to 439 between May 26 and the end of the Kargil operation on July 26.

Mukherjee said it would thus be seen that the time taken for giving clearance to deploy air power was not the reason for higher casualties.
</I>

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ehsmang » 09 Jun 2004 16:30

a) will there be a Air Force report to counter the Army report?

b) In the 'spirit of jointness' would it not have been better if a joint IA-IAF team had published this report?

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Skanhai » 09 Jun 2004 18:17

b) In the 'spirit of jointness' would it not have been better if a joint IA-IAF team had published this report?
While both parties are putting the blame on each other? I don't think so.
Next question: After the whose fault was it question, will the GOI make sure that this doesn't happens again?

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby RayC » 09 Jun 2004 18:20

I sure would be interested to know the official report of the IAF regarding its contribution.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Surya » 09 Jun 2004 19:02

strange that this is not finding its way to Indian sites yet

http://in.news.yahoo.com/040609/139/2djr5.html

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby daulat » 09 Jun 2004 19:10

Originally posted by Surya:
strange that this is not finding its way to Indian sites yet

http://in.news.yahoo.com/040609/139/2djr5.html
kaka and dada doing deal on tehelka and bofors keeping quiet onlee. report leakage was done by others in party to discredit someone. bjp could have been preparing bofors mamla, kangress counter with kargil report leak, phone calls from Advaniji, kaka and soon it is all smile smile laugh laugh

either way, time to move on

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ramana » 09 Jun 2004 19:24

In the end only good will happen. Remember that one whole chapter was excised from the KRC report that commented on the events between May 8 to May 26. So there could have been delibrations and preparations being made in event of escalation. Also wouldnt pay mcuh attention to the Army report. In 1965 war they have blamed the IAF so much so that ACM PC Lal made special efforts to ensure there is better coordination and understanding. The big problem is the IA thinks the IAF is long range artillery.
Whatever it was Gen. Vij's job to make sure that the report is more balanced and give his underlings a dressing down for writing about matters beyond their ken. Looks like an arm chair major wrote the internal report. This internal report has undone years of good work in joint relations between the IA and IAF and in the end the country suffers due to the grumblings of a frustrated subaltern.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Katare » 09 Jun 2004 19:57

That report was prepared in early 2000 by army and army-chief (VP Malik?) turned it into a manual/book with hard cover and distributed to army officers to be used as manual/instructions/learning’s from Kargil war. He also gifted a signed copy to Kaka. Kaka was showing it to Journalists on TV (cover only) today. He said media added things in their coverage that were not in the report (after all it was prepared during his tenure, can’t have anything that implicates NDA) for political and other gains. Pranavda had no other option but to clear Kaka as it's not a secret document but only a classified/restricted document with a large number of people having access to it and hard copies are available with several others.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ramana » 10 Jun 2004 07:34

I take back my comments that Gen Vij should have ensured his underlings had not written about matters beyind their ken, It should be addressed to Gen Malik. Anyway by leaking the contents whoever it was has set back jointness in India by a decade. I think the first CDS has to be a Navy type as there is too much bad blood now.
Also the GOI first task it to find out how was a classified document leaked to the press in the first place.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby svinayak » 10 Jun 2004 09:07

There is a certain vested interest which wants to keep the CDS under controversy and may have found a way to bring the divide.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby putnanja » 10 Jun 2004 10:19

I still think the UPA govt leaked it to gain advantage over NDA as a counter to tainted ministers issue, but later had to backtrack realizing the seriousness of the issue.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby daulat » 10 Jun 2004 13:25

Originally posted by Ravi:
I still think the UPA govt leaked it to gain advantage over NDA as a counter to tainted ministers issue, but later had to backtrack realizing the seriousness of the issue.
bofors and tehelka my friends, nothing else.

RayC - jasjit singh's book on kargil has a lot of info/comment on IAF contribution

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby RayC » 10 Jun 2004 16:06

Originally posted by Daulat:
Originally posted by Ravi:
[qb]
RayC - jasjit singh's book on kargil has a lot of info/comment on IAF contribution
Thanks.

Whats the name of the book?

In so far as I am concerned, they were politely requested to practice their bombing elsewhere by Puri.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Calvin » 10 Jun 2004 16:08

Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ramana » 10 Jun 2004 18:08

For a read on the IAF role in Kargil please read the BRM article by a member. OPERATION SAFEDSAGAR: A NEW CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF MILITARY AVIATION

One could say it is the definitive essay on the IAF operations.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Surya » 10 Jun 2004 18:19

Hi RayC,

Is there an implied grouse against the IAF?

The IAF might not have been able to do everything Puri wanted but it certainly tried damn hard. I still remember my friend coming back from 18 hr days and still going because their suffering was in his words "nothing compared to the jawans".

Even in Parakaram, they described how miserable they felt when they had to deal with 40 C inside the buildings while the jawans dealt with 52 C in the desert.

Somewhere above the ranks of Wg CO and Lt Col there seems to be amajor disconnect here.
Surya

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby AmanC » 10 Jun 2004 18:48

I would give more weightage to Ray's comments anyday, anytime because he was one of the senior officers dealing with the conduct of operations in Kargil. Anything which he states, to the best of his knowledge and wisdom, has to be relied upon because there will be good reason to it.
However, I'm sure he is not the one to start a sort of verbal duel on the role of a sister service, especially five years after it happened. This thread gets immensely enriched because we have a member who as THERE performing a role in the higher conduct of battles. Squadron commander and battalion commanders' perspective cannot be compared with the wider perspective of senior commanders.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby RayC » 10 Jun 2004 19:31

I have immense regards for the IAF but that doesn't mean I should accept anything their brass say for the Gospel Truth, espcially when we were around the place.

I don't wish to join any controversy.

Let's put it across that this was the first time aircraft were used in combat in HAA and there were enough to to 'finetune' since the bombs were landing at palces that they should not have. I hope you can fathom what I mean.

Some of my own cadets who had become officers were flying these aircraft. I am proud of them and I would be the last person to let them down. They did the best they could, but someone as Tennyson wrote in the Charge of the Light Brigade 'had blundered'.

Also, remember the enemy and the ground troops would be the best judge of the efficiency since they were at the 'target end'.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Surya » 10 Jun 2004 20:40

RayC

I understand what you are saying -

This comes back to my view that as one climbs the senior ranks - they go nuts.

The IAF and IA top brass have basically made a mess.

Sober BR types will understand that the IAF was highly effective in keeping enemy air activity off, less efective (definitely in th eintial days) to clean up the vermin. We do not believe everything the top brass of the IAF or IA have to say.

There were also political compulsions whihc both the IA and IAF had to deal with it.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Aditya G » 10 Jun 2004 21:04

It is the army's report; there is nothing wrong with it even if it is biased. This is important because even there is fault in the IA's take on IAF's performance; it must be documented and researched for accuracy. It is very important for the IAF to understand why the army does not appreciat its work. The same must be done for the IAF's report (if any) and ultimately a joint history should be created.

IMHO in an infantry-centric war like Kargil there is only so much an air force can do, be it PAF, IAF or USAF. It appears to me that victory in Op Vijay was a lot about effective small unit tactics than some super planning at the top (IA/IAF).

BTW is this Six-Volume report the Kargil equivalent of Henderson Brooks report?

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby RayC » 10 Jun 2004 21:53

There is nothing wrong in the IAF conduct or intent at that time and not in hindsight of Patney. He is perpetually out to grab headlines. In fact, one would one day feel that he alone (not the Army nor the Air Force) won Kargil! :)

Maybe Surya was meaning him about the Brass going nuts.

Otherwise, most of the brass are just merely brass and don't change texture or tone or become nuts of any variety that may be savoured! Anyway Brass always sound when hit!

The travel profile of munitions in High Altitude is not the same as in lower altitudes. It requires thought and corrections. Further, the temperatures fluctuate rapidly and this too affects.

It was the same with Bofors in Siachen till the same was corrected.

In fact, there was a report on this forum that a Bofor hit Skardu!

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Ashutosh » 11 Jun 2004 01:01

Originally posted by RayC:
Let's put it across that this was the first time aircraft were used in combat in HAA and there were enough to to 'finetune' since the bombs were landing at palces that they should not have. I hope you can fathom what I mean.
So does this imply that armymen think the IAF is long range artillery?

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby RayC » 11 Jun 2004 07:38

Ashutosh,

Does it? Real incredible a thought I must say, given that this forum has so much of nuggets to educate even the uninitiated! :)

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby wyu » 11 Jun 2004 07:48

Gentlemen,

Welcome to my world. The primary job of an FOO is not to direct birds onto enemy targets but to direct their bombs away from us. Hitting the enemy is secondary.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby RayC » 11 Jun 2004 08:04

Some aspects that affect a projectile:
1. Angle of elevation, in radians
2. Velocity at release, in m/s
3. Mass of projectile, in kg
4. Coefficient of drag, pure number
5. Diameter of head of projectile, in m
6. Drag factor, in m^(-1)
7. Time increment, in s
8 Height at release, in m
9. Acceleration due to gravity, in m/s^2
10.Atmospheric pressure at various layers.
11.Temperature at various layers.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby abhejit » 11 Jun 2004 08:43

caught this editorial in the Indian Express

Good defence, Minister

It is therefore highly commendable on the part of Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee to quickly nip in the bud an incipient controversy over the NDA government’s early handling of the Kargil war of 1999. The charge — raised in an in-house study conducted by the army — was that the then political leadership unduly delayed the launching of air strikes against Pakistani intruders, which translated into higher casualties of Indian lives on the ground.

Mukherjee’s clarification in Parliament on Wednesday, endorsing the NDA government’s handling of that early phase of the Kargil war, has achieved two important purposes. One, it has helped throw more light on the events of that fateful May. His observation that the delay in deploying air power could not be perceived as the reason for higher casualties is borne out by the Express’s own reportage and reconstruction of the events of that period. As this newspaper has underlined, of the 474 casualties of the Kargil war, only 35 had occurred before the air strikes.

the unwarranted escalation of tension that the uncalibrated use of air power entails would clearly be a very real concern to any political dispensation — all the more so in a nuclearised region like the Indian subcontinent.

The second valuable fall-out of Mukherjee’s invention is the message it sends out that when it concerns the country’s core interests — which would, of course, include its conduct of war in the defence of its borders — there can be no scope for raucous partisanship or careless politicking.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Vivek_A » 14 Jun 2004 01:55

The authoritative source seems to be from the IAF. My guess is Patney.
High toll as Gen. Malik ignored our advice: IAF

New Delhi, June 13: Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s statement in the Lok Sabha on the Kargil conflict controversy last week has not cleared the air insofar as the Indian Air Force and the Army are concerned.

The clean chit or otherwise, as the statement was interpreted by former defence minister George Fernandes, has failed to convince the higher echelons of the Indian Air Force who were at the decision-making levels at the time, and are still of the view that the high number of casualties could have been avoided if their considered advice to allow a punitive strike across the Line of Control at the onset had been listened to.

The role of former Chief of Army Staff Gen V P Malik, who was out of the country when the Pakistani infiltration was first detected, has been under the scrutiny of his own colleagues ever since the Kargil conflict. The General had remained opposed to action across the Line of Control and had repeatedly expressed his reluctance to cross the border with Pakistan at high-level meetings. Authoritative sources said the political leadership was prepared to cross the border, but had made it clear that it would adhere to the advice of the military commanders. :confused:

Most of these initial patrols were killed by the Pakistani troops who had occupied the high points in the area. The number of casualties increased after full-scale military operations were launched. The Air Force at the time had suggested air action to cut off the supply lines on the other side of the border, with simultaneous frontal assault. This, it was pointed out, would minimise the Indian casualties, and also reinforce the military principle of responding to such enemy action with a “punitive attack.” The IAF was certain that Pakistan would not retaliate against a quick attack, and would instead look at the international community for intervention.

Gen Malik, who has never explained the abysmal military intelligence failure to detect the infiltration till date, emerged as the stumbling block and refused to go along with the Air Force suggestion to cross the border. The Army went his plea, was not ready for this, and he refused to move from this position despite the strong case made out by the Air Force which was keen to limit the casualties. According to official figures, 474 soldiers lost their lives.

The IAF, the sources insisted, was at the time in “excellent” condition, having completed a major exercise in April, just weeks before the Pakistani infiltration was detected. Senior officers went so far as to describe Gen Malik’s decision as “militarily inept”, saying that they could not understand why he had failed to take correct stock of the situation. The IAF claims an ability to attack targets within three hours, and to become fully operational within 24 hours.

The Indian Army and Air Force were sharply divided on this at the time, with the government having no choice but to go along with Gen Malik’s open unwillingness to “take the calculated risk,” as the sources put it. The Kargil infiltration was stumbled upon accidentally by shepherds and an initial patrol party. The 35 casualties in the initial days that were mentioned by the minister in his statement, the sources said, were not sustained in military action that began in right earnest after some delay. Instead, these were the casualty figures incurred by the initial patrol parties, “probes” that were sent out to ascertain the depth and extent of the Pakistani infiltration.

The sources still maintain that the casualties could have been avoided altogether had Gen Malik gone along with the plan to carry out quick strikes across the LoC at the time. The diplomatic intervention by the Americans, the sources said, “saved the situation.”

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Umrao » 14 Jun 2004 02:16

how close was Gen Malik to retirement when Kargil happened, this will answer some of his conduct.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Harry » 14 Jun 2004 03:08

Interesting old bit,

http://www.rediff.com/chat/jitchat.htm

stanisv (Fri Jun 25 1999 8:3 IST)
Commodore Singh! We should have our MiG25 fly past the LOC every other week taking pictures. Why haven't we been doing that?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (Fri Jun 25 1999 8:4 IST)
Stanisv: What makes you think we are not doing it?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Incidentally, the first successful medium altitude MiG-25 photo run over Kargil, took place only on 17 June. Only after this, did the IAF have a proper picture of what was going on.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Arun_S » 14 Jun 2004 04:51

I Transcribed the following from “HALL OF FAME” War Museum built by Army at Leh (Jammu & Kashmir)..

OPERATION SAFEDSAGAR
“The first ever air battle in the world fought over the mountainous terrain by the valiant pilot of the Indian Air Force”

It was the year of the lord 1999, the fifth month of the year, witnessed the most horrid surprise for the Indian Army to find themselves as guest at the withering heights along the LOC which they fondly vacated at the onset of the winters hoping to return at the dawn of spring to guard the frontier once again.

Pakistan army in the guise of mujahideens had occupied the vacated posts and had taken over the Kargil heights around Batalik sector with around 150 regulars in number. The sequence of events thereafter towards Op Safedsagar are enumerated in chronological sequence as under:

12 May 99 WAC put on alert. ORP(Operational Readiness Platform) mounted at Srinagar and Avantipur

13 May 99 LOROP (Long Range Oblique Photography) mission launched by Jaguar aircraft. MOPS (Mobile Observation Posts) deployed in WAC sector. Mini DC (Direction Center) activated at Leh. Communication between DC Leh and Kargil(Halipad) established on HF

14 May 99 Recee by MI-17 AC launched. Video film of the area obtained from Army Aviation helicopter. The request from Army to use Air Power was overbearing. The fear of using air-power and escalating the war was the over riding factor, albeit even if it was within own territory to evacuate the occupied own posts. J&K sector activated and mobilization of forces undertaken for an all out air war. Political clearance waited from government. IAF pilots go into extensive training for firing at high altitudes.

18 May 99 CCS meeting at AHQ to decide on the Indian course of action towards an aggression.

21 May 99 IAF Canberra shot up by Pak SAM near NQ 1392, 4 Km from LoC inside own territory, AC landed safely at Srinagar.Crew: Sqn Ldr Perumal(17150) F(P), Sqn Ldr V.K.Jha(20568) F(N)

25 May 99 Chief Of Air Staff makes an incognito visit to Srinagar and Avantipur for an on the spot assessment of the ground situation. Assures commander 15 Corps for an all out support towards conduct of operations both on ground and air

26 May 99 IAF goes into war against armed intruders with in own territory. Undertakes series of strikes to soften up targets. Tiger hill effectively engaged by IAF MI-17 helicopters

27 May 99 Flt Lt Nachiketa ejected from Mig-27 aircraft due to flameout while firing air to ground rockets in Batalik sector, taken POW. Sqn Ldr Ajay Ahuja (17864)F(P) shot down by gun fire while looking for wreckage of Flt Lt Nachiketa. He was on a BDA mission in MIG-21 aircraft. Pilot killed in captivity by enemy forces.

28 May 99 MI-17 aircraft shot down by enemy SAM in the Batalik sector.Crew: Sqn Ldr Pundhir(17143S) F(P) Flt lt Mohilam (22739) F(P) Sgt PVNR Prasad (695490) Flt-Gnr Sgt R.K.Sahu (72991) Flt- Engr IAF reviews aerial tactics and explores employing different weapons in different delivery modes such as toss, laser or cluster.

3 Jun 99 IAF pilots report presence of F-16 aircraft across LoC in area north of Kargil. IAF plans attacks on lines of supplies for interdiction.

4 June 99 HQ WAC prepares interdiction plans for admin bases and to regain Tiger Hill, Helmut and PT5140

24 June 99 Effective air action at Tharu, PT4927 and Kukartang.

2 Jul 99 Successful air attack at PT5280, PT5060 in Drass sector by fighter aircrafts

6 Jul 99 In Batalik sector one Puma helicopter seen with slung load and one Alouette. Three Igla missiles fired but no successful hit.

8 Jul 99 Air attack on Pakistani intruders ceased due to gains of the war in favour of India and rapid enemy withdrawal. Pakistani DGMO requested Indian counterpart to stop air attacks to facilitate withdrawal of retreating forces.

IAF carried out series of attacks during ensuing period on various targets as enumerated in the target list, both by day and night under moonlight conditions, having a telling effect on the moral of the enemy forces. This has been amply corroborated by the fact as recovered from the dairy of a killed Pakistani office. It read as under:“At 1100 Hr I got a call from Saddle that Badar has been bombed and destroyed by Indian aircraft. Major Jawad(5 NLI), Major Ali (CS), Major Zakriya (ISI) Capt Zulfiqar (CS) and Captain Izhar (5 NLI) embraced shahadat along with five other jawans.” (reported by Asian Age, dated 03 Aug 99).

The target was engaged by four Mirage-2000 with 250 Kg bombs and four Mig-23/27 with 500Kg bombs on 16 June 99 with excellent results (TSOT (Time Spent on Target) were from 0945 onwards) The M-2000 recce sorties on 25 June 99 was picked up visually and a s SA-16 missile fired on it that missed (Dairy extract 25 June same reference above).

The culmination of the Kargil war (Operation Vijay and Operation Safedsagar) ended in a very hearthy appreciation by the PM on behalf of the nation.

TARGETS ENGAGED IN AIR BATTLE OF SAFEDSAGAR
Batalik sector
Muntho Dhalo and PT 5096
Tharu
Padma Goh
Jubar
Drass-Mushkoh sector
PT4388
PT5140 and 5060 (Tololing area)
Tiger Hill & MU4260
Drass area (MU4462, PT4700,4965,5405
Mashkoh valley
PT4355, MU4162
MU3663, MU3762
Nissan hut camp
PT4875

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Skanhai » 16 Jun 2004 12:45

The Great Fightback

Nice shot of a Pinaka.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby daulat » 16 Jun 2004 14:10

the air lessons from kargil are mixed

1. IAF displayed air dominance, kept PAF out of the picture

2. conventional attack in mountains is a waste of time and expensive (3 a/c 5 men lost)

3. PGM's can succeed if... given many conditions... however are also very expensive - where's the value added targets?

4. designating pickets and sangars on razor sharp edges is probably technically too difficult for follow up attacks by air

5. High altitude munitions need to be rethought

6. tactical recon... not sure what the verdict was on this, but i would have thought that they did a good job once mobilised. maybe they should be doing more routine recon on teh LOC - or we need a high altitude UAV

7. Cross LOC attacks would have been really really useful but politics kept that off the agenda

All in all, I would back the study by the USN War College which urged more use of artillery in mountain warfare and change the role of air. More emphasis on recon and [shift this to teh cold start thread] use of air to hit very hard on the other side of teh LOC where it hurts more - for this night/PGM capabilities are essential

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby AmanC » 16 Jun 2004 16:34

HT Chd, June 16
Gen Malik admits dissent between Army, Air Force
Man Aman Singh Chhina
Chandigarh, June 15

FORMER CHIEF of Army Staff General V.P. Malik has admitted that there were differences in opinion between the Army and the IAF top brass on the use of air power during the Kargil conflict and that the then Air Chief had initially refused a request for air support.

In a statement released today to clarify the sequence of events leading to the delayed air support in the conflict following revelations in this regard by HT, Gen Malik said the then Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis, did not agree to a request by the Vice Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar, to use air assets on May 18, 1999. Gen Malik was away on a tour to Poland at that time and the vice chief had apprised him before making the request.

Gen Malik states that Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar sought IAF assistance in the Chief of Staffs Committee (COSC) and Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for further surveillance and detection of intrusions. “This request was not agreed to by Air Chief Marshal Tipnis on the ground that attack helicopters would not be able to fly at that altitude and that the use of air power would escalate and enlarge the conflict,” he says.

Accordingly, the CCS did not allow the use of air power, says Gen Malik. Further indication of dissension between the senior Army and Air Force commanders is revealed by the former army chief when he states that Air Chief Marshal Tipnis addressed a letter to him and the then Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sushil Kumar, on May 19 saying that there was considerable misconception on the use of air power and that the Chief of Staffs Committee ought to discuss it and adopt a standard operating procedure in this regard.

Gen Malik has revealed that on his return to India and his visit to the Command and Corps Headquarters in Udhampur and Srinagar, respectively, he was convinced that the IAF must use its air power. He states that he called a meeting of the Naval and Air chiefs on May 23 and stated in clear terms that the IAF should use its air power in the conflict. He adds that he said if any of his colleagues was against it, he shall oppose that view at the CCS meeting.

At this point, a unanimous decision was taken to recommend the use of air power to the CCS, says Gen Malik.

The former Army chief also states that till May 16 the then Vice Chief of Army Staff and the Director General of Military Operations told him that the Northern Command Headquarters and 15 Corps were confident of “getting militants intrusions vacated with their own resources” and that there was no need for him to cut short his official visit.

Without naming Air Marshal Vinod Patney, who was the AOC-in-C Western Air Command during the Kargil operations, but making a reference to the remarks of Patney against the Army, Gen Malik says

“It is unfair for any senior retired Air Force officer, who was neither a member of the COSC nor a participant in the CCS deliberations, to be so self-opinionated and pass unsavoury remarks about the Army and its senior hierarchy without knowing the facts”.

RayC
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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby RayC » 16 Jun 2004 19:18

Much that I would hate to agree, but Patney is really self opinionated.

jrjrao
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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby jrjrao » 17 Jun 2004 03:59

Somewhat related. KS in TOI on the role of NSC.

Artificial intelligence
The Big Idea | K. Subrahmanyam

http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_830886,00120001.htm

ramana
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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ramana » 17 Jun 2004 04:48

Lessons From KArgil - A soldier's view point- SIFY

Lessons from Kargil: A soldier's viewpoint
By Col R Hariharan, VSM (Retd)
Wednesday, 16 June , 2004, 13:57
Never learn to do anything: if you don’t learn, you will always find someone else to do it for you – Mark Twain

A new Lok Sabha was in session; but its old cacophony had not changed. Members shouted their slogans, showed their loyalties to their icons by jumping and thumping, collected their entitlements and that's it. Parliament's inaugural session has ended. Has it achieved anything? The American English word 'zilch' sums it up. But among the few foils that came in handy in the sad and sordid drama of Indian politics was Kargil and who goofed it up.

The newspapers say the Kargil issue was brought up as a counter to the Opposition's vociferous objection to a few criminals accused of mundane crimes like rape, kidnapping and plotting to murder and elected as MPs becoming ministers. It is sad to see a possible security lapse in Kargil being equated with the issue of some smart, but criminally inclined fellows getting elected and ending up as ministers with full police protection!

Everyone, including the cynical but docile public, knows from past experience how this charade will be gone through. There will be a lot of fingerpointing and talks of our jawans and Army being second to none; but nothing will come out of it. After all, it is five years since the K Subrahmanyam Committee on Kargil presented its reports. Now, we find that the Defence minister is keen to follow up and ensure its findings are implemented.

Five years is a long time for the troops serving in these troubled areas. They and their families would like to know how this issue did not figure all these years in the scheme of things of parties currently ruling the country (many of them were members of the outgoing Government also!)

Its five years since hundreds like young Lt Saurabh Kalia died in the Kargil War. Many more are still dying in these frontiers unsung, unheard, with only their families mourning them. |Discuss: Kargil heroes deserve a lot better than this! |

As an old soldier who fought the wars in 1965, 1971 and lastly in Sri Lanka as part of the IPKF, I wonder now whether the few thousands of my comrades who died for this country (and continue to do so, on and off) for notions of patriotism, loyalty and izzat had done so in vain. The sheer callousness of our people in power shocks me. Take for instance the case of 22 Border Security Force jawans and their families including women and children killed by militants in a mine blast in J and K. The State chief minister had no time to send even a condolence message. Was it because his party was busy probing 'human rights violations' in the fight against armed insurgents who are waging a war on a lawful Government? Every time a jawan salutes him, will the chief minister remember him for all the good he is going to do?

There is a tendency among bureaucrats, including those of the Armed Forces, to use the Official Secrets Act as a convenient cloak to cover all inefficiency, incompetence and deficiencies in the planning and handling of vital issues of national security and defence. I think the best memorial for those who died in Kargil would be not to allow another Kargil to happen. Even if it happens, the soldiers should go to war there confidently that they would not go like their predecessors did – taken by surprise, handled by ineptness, and lastly killed by sheer lack of timely decision making. It is time Parliament debated the issues of defence seriously on matters more urgent than the number of orderlies Army officers use.

On Page 2 Pakistan's terrorist-nuclear blackmail

Lessons from Kargil: A soldier's viewpoint
By Col R Hariharan, VSM (Retd)
Wednesday, 16 June , 2004, 13:57
A whole list of issues is there in K Subrahmanyam Committee’s Report that needs to be followed up (not to score political brownie points). These points need to be accounted for to the public at large as part of good governance.

Here are some (findings of the report are given in italics):

* Inadequate border surveillance: Has the surveillance been beefed up in J and K, as the committee found that the intruders avoided detection because our Winter Air Surveillance Operations (WASO) by helicopters was of negligible effect? Israel was supposed to supply special surveillance helicopters for use in this sector. As in the new dispensation, Israel appears to have become a bad word in South Block, has an alternate source been found? Or are still the files are being 'processed'? | Also Read: 312 civilians killed in J&K in 2004 |

* The report states that there was inadequate coordination at the ground level among Army intelligence and other agencies. Has it improved now? If so, how.

* Holding of special (glacial) clothing for extreme cold climates was inadequate. Can we now say this problem has been overcome?

* Though the new light rifle (5.56 mm Insa) has been inducted into service, most troops are yet to be equipped with light rifles. Adequate attention has not been paid to lightening the load on infantry soldiers deployed at high altitudes. In broader terms, increasing the firepower and combat efficiency of infantrymen has also suffered, as has the modernisation process as a whole. This needs to be speedily rectified. (This light rifle was introduced when I left the Army 13 years ago. It's a big joke that combat troops in high altitudes are still saddled with old rifles! I am not too optimistic things will change on this count). Can we hope for improvement? | Discuss: Is the Army technically advanced to face modern war-fare? |

* Nuclear weapons programme: For reasons of security, none of these prime ministers took anyone other than chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission (not all), and the Scientific Adviser to the Defence minister into confidence. The chiefs of Staff, senior Cabinet ministers and senior civil servants were kept out of the loop. The nuclear posture adopted by successive prime ministers thus put the Indian Army at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its Pakistani counterpart. While the former was in the dark about India's nuclear capability, the latter as the custodian of Pakistani nuclear weaponry was fully aware of its own capability. Three former Indian chiefs of Army Staff expressed unhappiness about this asymmetric situation. Are the Service chiefs still in the dark about their own nuclear capabilities? (I remember Johnson’s 'Ignorance is bliss when it is folly to be wise' in this context). Is this major issue going to be brushed aside as 'directly not pertaining to Kargil War'?

* Comprehensive manpower policy: Pakistan has ruthlessly employed terrorism in Punjab, J&K and the Northeast to involve the Indian Army in counter-insurgency operations and neutralise its conventional superiority. Having partially achieved this objective, it has also persuaded itself that nuclear blackmail against India has succeeded on three occasions. A coherent counterstrategy to deal with Pakistan's terrorist-nuclear blackmail and the conventional threat has to be thought through. The committee believes that a comprehensive manpower policy is required to deal with this problem. In the present international security environment, proxy war…. it is necessary to evolve a long-term strategy to reduce the involvement of the Army in counterinsurgency and devise more cost-effective means of dealing with the problem. Has any thought been given to sort out the role of Army and evolution of a long-tem strategy for counter-insurgency? Or is it going to be deferred to the next government?

I saw a report saying that each parliament member costs the exchequer Rs 22 lakh. If they deliver the goods I don't mind that expenditure at all. After all, India is shining, (though the shine has been successfully tarnished a bit now) and why shouldn't Parliament shine, too? But if the money is to become an investment, we would like them to be really people's representatives. We want them to sit, debate and improve the situation, lest the ghosts of those dead heroes of Kargil haunt us forever.

This is my learning from Kargil.

(Col R Hariharan retired from the Intelligence Corps in 1991 after 28 years of service in the Army. He had been a specialist in counter-insurgency intelligence; he had seen active staff and field service in counter-insurgency operations in Mizoram, Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, Tripura and lastly in Sri Lanka with the IPKF as Head of Intelligence. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
Courtesy: SAARC.ORG

Aditya G
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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Aditya G » 17 Jun 2004 07:33

Thanks for that info Arun_S! :wah:

Harry, any quotable source for that MiG-25 flight?


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