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Kargil Revisited

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby wyu » 18 Jun 2004 08:09

Originally posted by ehsmang:
Col Wyu,

What in your opinion were the IAF's OPOBJ ? and what were IA's OPOBJ ?
My apologies but I would have to decline your questions. That is a bit too much insight for the admins to allow, especially when I had acquire inside information.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby JCage » 18 Jun 2004 08:12

my thesis is that the ia would have known how useful IAF was, if the conflict had been longdrawn - when the logistics attacks would've had a trickle down effect. however these attacks wouldnt affect a stockpiled sangar/bunker hidden away, in the immediate term and which the ia had to take at the edge of a bayonet.
however, even so iaf attacks did attrit manpower on features taken by the ia and reduced casualties indirectly, they also played havoc with c&c on occasion. the tiger hill feature was one such incident per iaf and even ia confirmed the same- the link has details.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby wyu » 18 Jun 2004 08:13

Originally posted by nitin:
they recced constantly. no attempts made. they were running out of resources ..
this wasnt an AB with runways and dedicated engr teams..it was a huge depot in the middle of nowhere which the PA was using to push in men and materiel.
just remembered...ah amin who writes for orbat, a bit loony but rich in details PA type noted that the PA was forcing its combat troops into porter positions and they rebelled, also many vignettes of how logistics went belly up. kind of ties in with the everything went to bits kind of impression one gets of PA planning during the later part of the conflict.
Basically IAF went hunting throuout...constant recce, constant attacks. these apart from supporting IA for eg tiger hill.
Ntin,

This intel came out after the fact. Please put yourself in the Kragil CO position. Just what kind of intel are you actually receiveing?

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby JCage » 18 Jun 2004 08:18

i think we are talking at cross puproses. i dont dispute that the desired outcome by IA- get evryone smashed without bayonet coming out- was hard to achieve and probably impossible.
But from the IAF viewpoint- they did all they could and more so.
As far as the CO would be concerned- I think I covered it above? The IA view is that they just wanted each and every feature annihilated, they already had stuff stockpiled and the pol orders given to the commander were to get the job done asap before winter set in.
The IAF pov was to hit log nodes since hitting each and every sangar was impossible and too risky (blue on blue).
There is a fundamental dissonance here and only the IA's art upg plans will put paid to that.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby wyu » 18 Jun 2004 08:25

Originally posted by nitin:
i think we are talking at cross puproses. i dont dispute that the desired outcome by IA- get evryone smashed without bayonet coming out- was hard to achieve and probably impossible.
But from the IAF viewpoint- they did all they could and more so.
As far as the CO would be concerned- I think I covered it above? The IA view is that they just wanted each and every feature annihilated, they already had stuff stockpiled and the pol orders given to the commander were to get the job done asap before winter set in.
The IAF pov was to hit log nodes since hitting each and every sangar was impossible and too risky (blue on blue).
There is a fundamental dissonance here and only the IA's art upg plans will put paid to that.
I would agree to your post except two things. AT THE TIME,

1) The InAF believe that they could achieve more they could actually could.

2) They've relayed that belief to the InA.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby JCage » 18 Jun 2004 08:28

Its not as simple as that...what if Kargil escalated? In that case- the IAF would have to make sure that they could count ie not suffer needless attrition.
Pls note that initial IA wants were very risky and infeasible. They wanted only choppers!
When the IAF did so nonetheless- they lost one, malfunctioning flares, but a forced risk even then.
The brief was one thing- but the eventuality another. Even the IA knew that- hence they built up wwr's for even plains forces, such as tank ammo etc.
So the IAF did what it had to. This is a fact which imho- no disrespect intended to IA - is still not grasped by some of the brass involved which look upon the IAF constraints as "!@$$%^&" and hence the media makes merry and so on and so forth, provoking patney into thinking its a slur on his work and then his uncharitable words etc.
Why do I say attrition- well zooming down alleys in a manpad intensive enviro would have ensured that prob of delivery dropped and insane risks taken to keep the above high. Now the pilots were willing but the IAF brass had to keep the big picture in mind too.
What if even the PLAAF came in and the conflict blew up. The brief from upstairs leave a lot unsaid for post action CYA by the politicos.

What did the IAF accomplish-
It kept the PAF out
It attacked log nodes and C&C, latter proven to have effect
It attacked individual emplacements

IA grouse is that the last was not good enough . Fine. But the above 2 cant be ignored as well.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby JCage » 18 Jun 2004 08:30

Originally posted by wyu:
Originally posted by nitin:
[b]i think we are talking at cross puproses. i dont dispute that the desired outcome by IA- get evryone smashed without bayonet coming out- was hard to achieve and probably impossible.
But from the IAF viewpoint- they did all they could and more so.
As far as the CO would be concerned- I think I covered it above? The IA view is that they just wanted each and every feature annihilated, they already had stuff stockpiled and the pol orders given to the commander were to get the job done asap before winter set in.
The IAF pov was to hit log nodes since hitting each and every sangar was impossible and too risky (blue on blue).
There is a fundamental dissonance here and only the IA's art upg plans will put paid to that.
I would agree to your post except two things. AT THE TIME,

1) The InAF believe that they could achieve more they could actually could.

2) They've relayed that belief to the InA.[/b]
LCol,
Didnt even the IA think it was just a few beards and goats on top of the hill?
What then? Things changed and they brought in overwhelming force.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ehsmang » 18 Jun 2004 08:37

Col Wyu,

Did not understand you reply.

What is so secretive/ special about telling all of us IA & IAF OPOBJ?

more since you claim that IAF did not achieve its OPOBJ!! Let us all be educated.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby wyu » 18 Jun 2004 08:42

Ntin,

Crap happens (I personally know and you know enough of my stories to know that I've screwed up).

But that's not my point.

The measure of a good army is not when things go right but when things go wrong. And things couldn't have gone more wrong for the InA and they've lived up to that challenge no matter what anyone says.

Rushing minefields against machine gun fire?!?!?! That is some balls.

Measure against that, the InAF's performance is somewhat lacking.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby wyu » 18 Jun 2004 08:45

Originally posted by ehsmang:
Col Wyu,

Did not understand you reply.

What is so secretive/ special about telling all of us IA & IAF OPOBJ?

more since you claim that IAF did not achieve its OPOBJ!! Let us all be educated.
I'm afraid I am not the one you should be asking and the answer is already in this thread if you read through it.

Never-the-less, I am not the one you should be asking and I will have to decline your questions in deference to a superior officer and a gentleman.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby JCage » 18 Jun 2004 08:47

Problem is that IAF's POV has not been expressed. The Off acts and the fact that most of their work has gone off into the dont discuss- ie immediate relevance- ensures that their story wont draw as much attention. Their work has been as hair raising in quite a few instances, if not more. I can say with certainty they did all they could and took their fair share of insance risks- eg even SUrya mentions that they really went flat out for the troops. This certainly comes out esp from the pilots who undertook the missions.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby JCage » 18 Jun 2004 08:49

This is not to downplay the heroics of what you noted. Those stds displayed by the Army off and ranks have my eternal respect.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby wyu » 18 Jun 2004 08:55

Originally posted by nitin:
Its not as simple as that...what if Kargil escalated? In that case- the IAF would have to make sure that they could count ie not suffer needless attrition.
Pls note that initial IA wants were very risky and infeasible. They wanted only choppers!
When the IAF did so nonetheless- they lost one, malfunctioning flares, but a forced risk even then.
The brief was one thing- but the eventuality another. Even the IA knew that- hence they built up wwr's for even plains forces, such as tank ammo etc.
So the IAF did what it had to. This is a fact which imho- no disrespect intended to IA - is still not grasped by some of the brass involved which look upon the IAF constraints as "!@$$%^&" and hence the media makes merry and so on and so forth, provoking patney into thinking its a slur on his work and then his uncharitable words etc.
Why do I say attrition- well zooming down alleys in a manpad intensive enviro would have ensured that prob of delivery dropped and insane risks taken to keep the above high. Now the pilots were willing but the IAF brass had to keep the big picture in mind too.
What if even the PLAAF came in and the conflict blew up. The brief from upstairs leave a lot unsaid for post action CYA by the politicos.

What did the IAF accomplish-
It kept the PAF out
It attacked log nodes and C&C, latter proven to have effect
It attacked individual emplacements

IA grouse is that the last was not good enough . Fine. But the above 2 cant be ignored as well.
Ntin,

I'm sorry but it is as simple as that. You tell me you can reduce the enemy's relief and I count on that, what happens when you fail and all you can do is say "sorry?" You've just left me to deal with your failure.

In combat, I do not have the luxury of examining every detail. I rely on my people on to tell me what they can do and what they cannot do and that includes the birdbrains. I don't have time to go through your OPPLAN to see if it's feasible or not - that's your job and I am relying on your results.

At the Bde lvl, I have less than 15 hours to issue new orders before they're carried out. If your air strikes happen anytime during that 15 hours, I have two choices.

1) Cancel my plans
2) Carry it out regardless of the result

If #2, then if I cannot count on the success of the airstrike, then why should I include the results of that airstrike?

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby kgoan » 18 Jun 2004 10:22

>>My apologies but I would have to decline your questions. That is a bit too much insight for the admins to allow, especially when I had acquire inside information.

Come again?

An officer of a foreign force gets inside info on Indian ops which can't be discussed on *this* forum among Indians?

And the *admins* support this position?

WHAT THE FUK?

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby JCage » 18 Jun 2004 10:46

LCol ,I agree that the IAF may have overestimated - but they certainly didnt demur from trying. Harry posted the figures earlier- they are at the link I gave as well. The datewise links can be googled out too. They did as much as they could and more. Even when their eqpt didnt support them- note that bit about gps and stopwatches in MiG21's, basically manned rockets which the IAF used to bom in narrow valleys, yet maintain the avoid blue on blue hazard.
Their work may not strike out at first- I mean what can, compared to what the IA did, but pls dont tie in what they couldnt do to lack of effort on their part.
Also- the pic is not that one sided either. They flew round the clcok sorties and were only stopped when weather stopped them.
There are other things to consider- the IA is a million man army. The IAF has a 600 strong fighter pool and a pool of trained pilots- the brass have to husband them and cant afford to fritter them. Now which AF- PLAAF, IAF,PAF,USAF etc have fought at such altitudes with dumb bombs? The USAF found out what it couldnt do at Anaconda- with much superior tech and resources- how many can afford to send a million buck munition to blow up honest abdul's dollar one mud hut anyway? So the IAF struggled- but it sure did respond, more often than not to what it was asked.
So these have to be factored in. You may (legitamately) fault the IAF for not delivering miracles esp , but what they delivered was as good as the best could have done. The anecdotal stories ..speak for themselves. In essence, I dont think that the IAF called off on its obligations, it may not have been able to do all that it wanted to, but it did acquit itself well.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby JCage » 18 Jun 2004 10:53

KG,
As the joke goes, the french know more about maharajpur than we'all do.
the info wyu is referring to has already been laid out in this thread and is no great shucks (imho) we have all been yacking over at it for the past three pages or so..
Basically, IAF didnt blast each and every critter outta his foxhole which was their promise , so on and so forth etc.
I think he just doesnt want to say it out loud because of deference to admins sensitivity and imho he was a gent to say it out loud. (since only open source on BR etc)
So pls dont take it askance(hope that didnt come off the wrong way).
Man i aint made out to be the ipkf..

Anyway this thread has been a gem so far.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby SSridhar » 18 Jun 2004 12:20


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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ehsmang » 18 Jun 2004 12:20

Nitin,

IF the info has been all laid out in the threads , why cant respected Col wyu summarise it for lay persons on the forum. And indeed if it so goddammed secret why is it being discussed in the open forum. What is all this BS he is spewing!!!! about inside info yada yada.....

I find some of Col Wyu's questions quite funny

What did IAF do to prevent PAk Army engineers from rebuilding the destroyed camp???!!!!

The fact that IAF destroyed that dump/camp so effectively was reason enough which prevented PAk Army engineers from rebuilding it.

I was feeling scared that the next question from Col Wyu will be ' What did IAF do to prevent Paki intrusion in the first place?'

I am no expert but my 2 cents is that

"IAF tried to do a job for which it never trained or imagined. Coupled with the fact that IAF does not possess the best of a/c's & infinite amounts of PGM's etc.. and it has to carefully husband its resources. How well it did its job can never be objectively measured since there are no yardsticks against which it can be measured. opinions can range from Col Wyu that IAF did not achieve its OPOBJ ( which he does not want to explain how!!) to probably that Of ACM Tipnis that IAF achieved all its OPOBJ and much more.

IA initially made a hash of operations for which it was trained and equipped unlike the IAF. After initial hiccups IA got its act right and the 'bellycrawlers' ( to use Wyus' lingo) finally saved the day. '

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby RayC » 18 Jun 2004 12:23

To put things in some perspective (not that I claim any superior knowledge).

The IA and possibly the govt did not want the situation to escalate into a full fledged war. There are many reasons apart from political.

Therefore, it was essential to keep the war localised. Air effort into the enemy area would escalate the war to confrontation along all fronts. We would have nevertheless won, but the ramifications can be well understood.

That is the reason (or so I think) for which India did not take the war into POK. That is the reason why even the air effort was confined to the areas occupied by the Pak Army.

If I may take the allegory of Natwar Singh on taking over as FM. He made the usual noise about Pak and soon he had to eat crow. Therefore, in today's comtext as it said, the spirit is willing, but flesh is weak.

One may have liked to do many things and it would have been possible, but the whole show was contrained by the parametres of the geoploitical scenario that was prevalent.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby RayC » 18 Jun 2004 12:38

Originally posted by ehsmang:


IA initially made a hash of operations for which it was trained and equipped unlike the IAF. After initial hiccups IA got its act right and the 'bellycrawlers' ( to use Wyus' lingo) finally saved the day. '
Thank you.

Do be kind enough to amplify as to how the 'bellycrawlers' made a hash?

Have you been on those heights? Have you walked there without even the snow? I am not talking about a stroll on NH 1A i.e. the Kargil Highway.

Friend, if you sit on a mountain top, you can't see whats on the other side of the next mountain ridge just next to you. To see whats there, you have to walk to that place i.e. go down to the valley floor and then climb again. It is easier said on the forum than done. Just look out of your window and tell me what you can see beyond the building next to you.

Lets talk about WASO (Area surveillance with helicopters in winters). If I am the enemy and I hear a helicopter (and the area is so silent that you can hear a pin drop) which you can hear miles away, obviously you hide. From the air, what can you see? Footprints? Yes, but there are a lot of footprints all around. Go chasing each (Remember what I said about looking around on these heights).

The extent of area is vast. There was just a Brigade. There is Division there now and yet they can't be 100% dead sure that as a CO in Kargil long back said when I was commanding a battalion there myself said 'So long as my battalion is there, not a balde of grass will move'. That was bullshit, but then maybe he was right. After all grass does not grow except alfa alfa in some areas which is very tough and hardly sways!

In the valley areas like Muntho Dalo, the IAF did good work. However, the success rate of bombs be it the artillery (except direct fire which the Bofors did)or the IAF will always remain chancy because of the 'overs' and 'unders' and the rapidly changing met. Low level attacks would be OK but then there are AD weapons bristling. Few bunkers for one aircraft. Not cost effective, but great for bravado!

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ehsmang » 18 Jun 2004 13:05

Another of Wyus gems

Q) How much actual stock did the InAF destroy when they hit the Pak supply base?

How can anyone on the forum ever answer this question , unless he was an occupant of the camp!! and lives till today to tell the tale!!!. I am sure even the guy receiving the inventory in the camp cant be sure about the stock position, what to talk about folks on the forum.

And what is this 'actual stock'. I mean would there be tons of teak wood furniture on the camp in addition to ammunition, petrol. or would destruction of eatables, medicines etc .. not considered actual stock?? I would imagine anything carted upto the camp for Paki war effort would qualify as 'actual stock'.

RayC Saheb,

I said the 'bellycrawlers' saved the day and not
made a hash ( if you read my post carefully!!!)

I said that the 'initial Army reaction' was not exactly awe inspiring by all accounts when troops were sent up without adequate preparation/support. And that too from a Army which claims to be best in HA operations.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby RayC » 18 Jun 2004 13:18

The verity lies in looking through your window and telling me what you see beyond the house next to you. Read my earlier post.

Easier said than done.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ehsmang » 18 Jun 2004 13:51

RayC Saheb,

I dont want to enter into a debate with you about the rugged terrain, what you can see and not see etc... You have had the oppurtunity to be there as part of your job and I respect that.

But are you telling us that people who have not been at a post at 20,000 feet are not supposed to discuss matters?

Is there any dispute or difference of opinion on the fact that initially troops were launched without adequate support/ preparation?

Now we all can argue that it was the fog of war, faulty intelligence etc etc... but the basic assertion remains. This has been faily well documented and is in public domain and not something cooked up by me. and this is precisely what I have written in my mail which has got you excercised.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby daulat » 18 Jun 2004 14:45

ehsmang - RayC is pointing out a fact that most of us who have never been in the deep mountains do not appreciate. the terrain is very very difficult and plays a massive part in everything, absolutely everything, even to the extent of challenging the maintainance of your sanity. As i said previously on the siachen thread, my brief exposure to big mountains left me in serious awe of geography, i for one would not like to be fighting on them. hats off to those who did and do.

wyu is asking questions to provoke thought not to obtain inventory counts. his point is valid. if the PA wanted to rebuild muntho dhalo and resume ops, what would IAF have done? reattack, perhaps this time into more prepared air defences? leave behind delayed fuse bomblets? zap the whole area with fuel-air munitions? IA at the time would not have known the impact of removing muntho dhalo from the equation. the benefits were felt later. in the meantime the NLI positions on the ridges would still have enough ammo to keep fighting without resupply for another 48-72 hrs?) thats a lot more dead jawans. if i was at the bottom of the ridge with an INSAS and a bayonet, and the lives of ten men on my shoulders i'd be crapping my pants. the only thing that would make me feel better is if i saw a big puff of smoke and flying body parts above me. who cares what happened in the next valley - it could be on mars for all i care!

i would say though that the IAF tried their best under very difficult circumstances. operating at such altitudes in a tight airspace box (this side of LOC in high valleys), with limited manoeuverability (due to poorer high altitude aerodynamcis and engine performance), going for miniscule targets that are next to impossible to spot, and face a barrage of manpads... brave enough in my book

the strategic impact of keeping PAF out is also important, would have made them think seriously about avoiding escalation. they would have been very aware of what it would mean if IAF strike packages were able to operate unchallenged in POK vis a vis a larger mobilisation

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Raj Malhotra » 18 Jun 2004 16:31

Originally posted by Harry:
I guess you did'nt see the pictures of damage circa 1999, in POKistan, claimed by TSP to be the result of IAF a/c attacks, which crossed the LoC.
Harry, more details please.

One cannot forget the famous taped conversation when Mushy was told by Aziz that a few bombs have been dropped on the Pok, but did we do something more?

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Aditya G » 18 Jun 2004 19:49

The Paki transcript is available on the net; 2-3 bombs were quoted to fall "on our side;very far from the others - as if to send a message".

It is only the Paki general's opinion - we cannot say that it was intentional.

Another page on Op Safesagar:
http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/kargil-summary1.html

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ramana » 18 Jun 2004 20:03

I hate to intervene but the next finger pointing poster will be banned. No more bs about IA this and IAF that. Its the Pakis who did it. Kapisch? ramana

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Harry » 18 Jun 2004 20:24

Originally posted by Raj Malhotra:
Originally posted by Harry:
I guess you did'nt see the pictures of damage circa 1999, in POKistan, claimed by TSP to be the result of IAF a/c attacks, which crossed the LoC.
Harry, more details please.

One cannot forget the famous taped conversation when Mushy was told by Aziz that a few bombs have been dropped on the Pok, but did we do something more?
There was'nt much. Just some sheds and structures in rubble state in some populated areas of POKistan. These pics were in the media and claimed to be the results of airstrikes.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Vivek K » 18 Jun 2004 20:34

Originally posted by SSridhar:
The soldier who became a legend - Lt. Vikram Batra
You read about such heroes and you are moved to tears. And then you see 'Main Hoon Na' and it makes you mad.
I saw Capt. Batra on TV during the war. I heard him say 'Yeh Dil Maange More'. I've read several stories about him - 24 yrs old yet so brave! It makes me proud to know that we train men like him! It makes me proud of the Indian Army and of India!!

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ramana » 18 Jun 2004 23:27


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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ramana » 22 Jun 2004 03:38

From The Telegraph,6/22/2004....
Revealed: Clinton’s Kargil crisis secret

Revealed: Clinton’s Kargil crisis secret
- Autobiography says US intervention was not voluntary, prompted by Sharif
K.P. NAYAR

Clinton to Sharif: Better have a good reason to come on July 4
Washington, June 21: Contrary to common belief, President Bill Clinton did not intervene on his own in the Kargil dispute in 1999 to bring about a withdrawal of Pakistani forces and avert a war between India and Pakistan.

The former President says in his autobiography that “Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan called and asked if he could come to Washington on July 4 to discuss the dangerous standoff with India that had begun several weeks earlier when Pakistani forces under the command of General Pervez Musharraf crossed the Line of Control (LoC)”.

The autobiography, My Life, is to be published on Tuesday, but an advance copy of the book, which promises to be America’s publishing sensation of the year, was obtained by The Telegraph on Sunday night.

Clinton’s first person account of US diplomacy and his summit meeting with Sharif in Washington at the height of the Kargil conflict throws authoritative light on America’s approach to India-Pakistan issues and is certain to be a factor with the new policymakers in New Delhi as they weigh their positions on the vexing trilateral issues involving India, Pakistan and the US.

Clinton writes in his memoirs that following the now-exiled Pakistani Prime Minister’s plea to be allowed to visit the White House: “I told Sharif that he was always welcome in Washington, even on July 4, but if he wanted me to spend America’s independence day with him, he had to come to the US knowing two things: first he had to agree to withdraw his troops back across the LoC; and second, I would not agree to intervene in the Kashmir dispute, especially under circumstances that appeared to reward Pakistan’s wrongful incursion.”

According to the former President: “Sharif said he wanted to come anyway. On July 4, we met at Blair House”, the residence for state guests adjacent to the White House.

“Sharif was concerned that the situation Pakistan had created was getting out of control… Once more, Sharif urged me to intervene in Kashmir, and again I explained that without India’s consent it would be counterproductive, but that I would urge (Prime Minister Atal Bihari) Vajpayee to resume the bilateral dialogue if the Pakistani troops withdrew. He agreed and we released a joint statement saying that steps would be taken to restore the LoC and that I would support and encourage the resumption… of bilateral talks once the violence had stopped.”

The rest is history. The broad premise of what Clinton writes about his Kargil diplomacy was revealed two years ago by Bruce Riedel, Clinton’s special assistant for South Asia on the National Security Council, in a policy paper for the University of Pennsylvania, but Clinton’s first person account is significant for its confirmation that the US was not doing India any good turn by securing a Pakistani withdrawal of forces from territory it occupied.

In recent years, the Kargil experience with the US has been repeatedly used by those who favour an Indo-US alliance to argue that New Delhi could be a strategic beneficiary of any such alliance.

Clinton’s book reveals that the US was unwilling — at least at that stage — to do anything beyond what it had already done to help India and that it was Sharif’s desperation for a settlement that forced Washington into the picture. Indeed, Sharif had to force himself on Clinton to make peace with India.


Those who favour an Indo-US alliance also cite the Bush administration’s subsequent pressure on Pervez Musharraf to end cross-border terrorism to argue for such an alliance, though their claims have lately been pricked by Washington’s decision to grant Pakistan the status of a major non-Nato ally.

Clinton reveals in his memoirs that his major consideration in dealings with Sharif was that “I needed his cooperation in the fight against terrorism”, the very same rationale of the Bush administration in support of Musharraf, the author of Kargil.

“Before our July 4 meeting”, writes Clinton, “I had asked Sharif on three occasions for help in apprehending Osama bin Laden… We had intelligence reports that al Qaida was planning attacks on US officials and facilities… perhaps in the US as well. We had been successful in breaking up cells and arresting a number of al Qaida members, but unless bin Laden and his top lieutenants were apprehended or killed, the threat would remain.”

Ashutosh
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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Ashutosh » 22 Jun 2004 03:49

Typical leftist commie conclusion ...

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby kgoan » 22 Jun 2004 04:01

Ashutosh, I don't think Kuldip of wagah fame is the same as K P above?

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Ashutosh » 22 Jun 2004 04:06

No I think the one writing for the Telegraph isn't the candelwallah ... however what can one expect from the commie Telegraph to but grumble about and accuse the US wanting to stay out of Kargil - had they gotten involved, Telegraph would've found the other excuse ...

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby svinayak » 22 Jun 2004 04:33

Originally posted by ramana:

Clinton reveals in his memoirs that his major consideration in dealings with Sharif was that “[b]I needed his cooperation in the fight against terrorism”, the very same rationale of the Bush administration in support of Musharraf, the author of Kargil.


“Before our July 4 meeting”, writes Clinton, “I had asked Sharif on three occasions for help in apprehending Osama bin Laden… We had intelligence reports that al Qaida was planning attacks on US officials and facilities… perhaps in the US as well. We had been successful in breaking up cells and arresting a number of al Qaida members, but unless bin Laden and his top lieutenants were apprehended or killed, the threat would remain.”[/b]
As if US did not have enough leverage to force Mian to cooperate or have some leverage with the PA to get some SpOps support inside Afghanistan.

It looks more like an act to show that there was a compulsion to deal with the shariefs.

But Mush revealed recently that He was the one who forced Sharief to ask for the help of Clinton.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Khalsa » 22 Jun 2004 06:43

Originally posted by Vivek.:
Originally posted by SSridhar:
[b]The soldier who became a legend - Lt. Vikram Batra
You read about such heroes and you are moved to tears. And then you see 'Main Hoon Na' and it makes you mad.
I saw Capt. Batra on TV during the war. I heard him say 'Yeh Dil Maange More'. I've read several stories about him - 24 yrs old yet so brave! It makes me proud to know that we train men like him! It makes me proud of the Indian Army and of India!![/b]
what is that movie about... Vikram Batra ?!?!

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby RayC » 22 Jun 2004 09:33

KP Nayar Is not Kuldip Nayar. He is a Washington based chap, who is not as old as that 'human rights with dark glasses on' warrior.

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ramana » 22 Jun 2004 19:29

Ray saab is right. KP Nayar is the Washington correspondent for The Telegraph from Kolkota. Before that he was the Ind Express correpondent in New Delhi. He is quite right of center when it comes to Indian interests.
Besides dont shoot the messenger but look at his message. Even at his mtg with Sharief to defuse the Kargil gamble, Clinton is pressing for OBL's head. The relentless quest for OBL before, during and after Kargil that is a constant. So could this quest have led to 911 retaliation by OBL?

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Picklu » 22 Jun 2004 22:29

Ramana,

A request: it is Kolkata, not Kolkotta.

Rgds,
Picklu

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Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby svinayak » 22 Jun 2004 23:44

Originally posted by ramana:
Besides dont shoot the messenger but look at his message. Even at his mtg with Sharief to defuse the Kargil gamble, Clinton is pressing for OBL's head. The relentless quest for OBL before, during and after Kargil that is a constant. So could this quest have led to 911 retaliation by OBL?
It may lead to the possibility that Mush was trying for some concessions with the bargaining for OBL.


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