Kargil Revisited

svinayak
BRF Oldie
Posts: 14223
Joined: 09 Feb 1999 12:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby svinayak » 28 May 2004 23:58

Below is an OpEd by J.N.Dixit in "Force Magazine" April 2004 issue. No URL.

Peace or an Interlude?

Till the K-question is resolved, future Kargils cannot be ruled out

By J.N. Dixit


Five years after the 1999 Kargil War, it is pertinent to recall the motivations of Pakistan and their relevance to the present tentative peace initiatives. Pakistan 's aggression in Kargil was a culmination of various options exercised by it to wrest Jammu and Kashmir from India . It was rooted in its failure to acquire Jammu and Kashmir , particularly during the period 1989 to 1999. The political elite in Pakistan felt that Kashmir's becoming part of Pakistan is the unfinished agenda of Partition; that the people of Jammu and Kashmir have the right to self-determination; that the government of India is violating human rights of Muslims in J&K and lastly, since 1998 when both countries became nuclear weapons power, Kashmir could be a flashpoint leading to nuclear holocaust.

Since these arguments did not bring Pakistan the necessary international support, the government decided to raise the threshold of violent subversion to a direct military intrusion. The rationale of this intrusion was based on Pakistan 's political assessments which have come to light since the end of the Kargil conflict.

The Pakistani assessment was that the credibility of chief minister Dr Farooq Abdullah in Jammu and Kashmir was very low. Pakistan believed that the Indian Army and security forces were involved in many disparate counter terrorist activities and hence would not be able to resist a coordinated large-scale military onslaught in an unexpected area by the Pakistani forces. The Vajpayee government had lost the No Confidence Motion in the Lok Sabha in March 1999. Apart from being a coalition government, it was also only a caretaker government which was expected to be busy conducting General Elections in the country. Pakistani assessment, therefore, was that the Vajpayee government would not have sufficient credibility to take firm decisions against military aggression.

Most importantly, Pakistan 's assessment was that the Indian Army would not be able to resist and push back Pakistani forces once they had entrenched themselves on the strategic heights in the Kargil sector. This assessment was based not only on Pakistani Intelligence reports but also repeated reports in the Indian media about our army being short of officers and equipment and its morale being low during the 1990s. Added to this was the confidence that Pakistan could resort to nuclear weapons if the Indian military resistance in Kargil become unmanageable. The then Director General of ISI, Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir gave the assessment that the Indian army was incapable of undertaking conventional operations at present. So how can one talk of enlarging the conventional conflict.

While these were the assessments which led to the Pakistani military intrusion, what was the geo-strategic background and what were the political motivations which led to the conflict? What was the military motivation? What was the extent of direct governmental participation in the aggression? What are the lessons that India should learn from the Kargil experience? Should Pakistan be trusted to return to the negotiating table? Should the dialogue be continued? Given the apparent intention of Pakistan to continue its proxy war against India , how should India deal with this threat? How should India assess the international reaction to the Kargil crisis? What are the lines on which India-Pakistan relations are likely to develop?

Before one proceeds to examine these points, it would be pertinent to describe the geo-strategic and demographic characteristics of Kargil and the factual and legal basis of the LoC that divides Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir from the state of J&K.

Kargil is a region of undoubted signification for the security of the Valley, Ladakh and our military positions on the Siachen Glacier. The area southwest of Kargil straddles the approaches towards Siachen, Ladakh and the Kashmir valley. The area lies within Indian territory east of the LoC and Siachen and Saltoro heights that are beyond the northernmost points up to which the Line of Control has been formally demarcated and delineated. If Pakistan could capture the Kargil area (stretching across 140 kilometres of mountain ranges) it could interdict the highway from the Valley to Ladakh and cut off India 's approach to both Leh and Siachen. The Kargil sector of the LoC (covering the Mushkoh valley, Drass, Kaksar, Chhain-kund, Shingo Batalik and Chorbat La) because of the terrain, was not manned in detail and around the year. There were gaps between brigades providing security to the Siachen region and brigades responsible for security of Kargil and Gurez. It was also felt that the composition of the Buddhist-Shia population of the area would be a natural prevention against any extensive Pakistani military intrusion.

Regular Pakistani forces came across the LoC all along the 140km stretch, penetrating into Indian territory to the depth of 10 to 12 kilometres between March and May 1999. When challenged by India , Pakistan argued that it had not crossed into Indian territory , that the LoC in this sector was not clearly demarcated or delineated. It would be sufficient to keep the following facts in mind.

• The LoC is rooted in the ceasefire lines drawn up after the 1948 and 1965 wars with Pakistan.

• The present LoC was drawn on the basis of the stipulations of the Simla Agreements of July 1972.

• The Line was drawn on the basis of mutual consent between the senior army commanders of India and Pakistan . The delineation of the Line has been shown on nine maps with detailed grid references in the appropriate scale. These have been countersigned by the military representatives of Pakistan . A matter of deliberate significance is that this Line was not a cease-fire line, but a LoC, not a Line of ‘Actual' Control which might have implied that it was a temporary arrangement. This was definitely not the intention. The agreement was on a permanent line.

The Line of control was respected by both sides for 27 years from 1972 to 1999. What then were Pakistani motivations in violating it? The macro-level political motivations were manifold: First, the restoration of an elected government in J&K and the gradual return of political stability and economic normality resulted in J&K fading away as an area of crisis for the international community. Compounding this situation was an incremental success achieved by Indian security forces in neutralising terrorist activities. The efforts of Pakistan in 1989 to destabilise and separate J&K from India came to a naught. Some efforts had to be made to refocus international attention on the Kashmir issues within the framework of Pakistan objectives.

Second, the strategic planners of Pakistan believed that the international community was becoming supportive of a settlement of the J&K issue on the basis of some kind of LoC agreement. So it was decided to change the delineation of the LoC to a more advantageous position in favour of Pakistan . Shifting the LoC eastwards would enable Pakistan to continue its efforts to capture J&K from a stronger position. Third, if the shift of the LoC could be consolidated on the Kargil sector, it would also have weakened India 's strategic capacity to safeguard Leh and the Valley. The expectation was that the Chinese would not have minded Pakistan acquiring a more advantageous geo-strategic position on the southern and south-eastern flanks of the Karakoram Highway . If the military conflict was taken to the threshold of a tangible nuclear confrontation, the international community would have intervened to pressurise India to compromise on Kashmir in a manner desired by Pakistan . To sum up, Pakistan 's overall plans and detailed military objectives were assessed as follows by the Government of India:

1. The plan was to have been kept top secret, which would involve the least number of people and avoid any activity opposite Kargil which might indicate Pakistani intentions.

2. Only an ‘in principle' concurrence without specifics was to be obtained from the Pakistani Prime Minister.

3. A cover plan must exist to obfuscate the aggression and defuse any escalation in early time-frame.

4. The operation should help in internationalising the Kashmir issue, on which global attention had been flagging for some time.

With these terms of reference in mind, the Pakistan Army evolved a plan which was kept confined to the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Chief of General Staff (CGS), Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), GOC 10 Corps and GOC Force Commander Northern Areas (FCNA) who was made overall in charge of operations in Kargil sector. Even the Corps Commanders were not kept in the picture. This has been completely substantiated by the taped telephone conversation between Pakistan COAS and CGS.

To cut a long story short, the Indian armed forces, though delayed in their response fought a determined battle against Pakistani forces located in position which were strategically advantageous to them, defeated and pushed them back. Nearly 500 officers and other ranks of the Indian Army were killed. More then a thousand armed forces personnel were wounded. The largest number of casualties was among officers of the Indian Army who led their men from the front. It is primarily India 's successful military response which caused the US and other world powers to put pressure on the then Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull back his troops beyond the Line of Control.

Two conclusions, which one can draw about Pakistani motivations, are: Acquisition of Jammu and Kashmir is an unalterable objective, but Pakistan can wait to achieve this objective. What is more important is to keep the Indian Army bleeding in Kashmir just as Afghan Mujahiddin supported by Pakistan kept the Soviet Army bleeding, and ultimately led to their withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Secondly, even if the Kashmir issue is resolved, there can be no normalisation between India and Pakistan because Pakistan 's own position in South Asia depends on preventing India from emerging as a major Asian power. The basic lessons derived from the Kargil conflict which are still relevant are as following:

a) Pakistan is not likely to agree to any practical solution of the J&K issue on the basis of ground realities and reasonableness in the foreseeable future. It will continue its political campaign and overt military and terrorist operations against India , particularly in Jammu and Kashmir.

b) Bilateral dialogue at the official and even at the highest political level with Pakistan should not be undertaken with any excessive expectation, nor should these be predicated on the sincerity of Pakistan . Pakistan participates in these dialogues only as a stratagem to keep the Kashmir issue alive, to indulge in diplomacy and publicity.

c) Pakistan 's unalterable objective is to capture Jammu and Kashmir . The substance of its policy is related to this objective.

d) Pakistan will continue to foment military tension on the LoC and will indulge in intrusion to capture territory in Jammu and Kashmir . Pakistan will also engineer violence and terrorism in other parts of India in support of its proxy war in Kashmir. India should remain politically sensitive to these prospects at the policy level and should maintain continuous military alertness vis-à-vis Pakistan along the Line of Control, as well as the international border. India will have to locate troops and security forces to the maximum extent possible on the LoC round the year.

e) India should undertake a thorough overhauling of its intelligence gathering and assessment, institutions and procedures both in functional and organisational terms. The interface between the intelligence Agencies, the National Security Council and its adjuncts and the Cabinet committee on Security Affairs has to be organised so that it does not face the surprise as well confusion in command control it faced during the initial period of the Kargil conflict.

f) Firmness in dealing with Pakistan at the operational level, combined with restraint gets India international support.

g) The support India got on the Kargil conflict from the international community was Kargil specific. There is no such support for India 's overall stand on the Kashmir issue. The international community is keen that India and Pakistan quickly resolve this issue which, in their judgment, has the seeds of a nuclear confrontation.

h) India must also acknowledge that a solution to the Kashmir dispute has the imperative requirement of being responsive to the desire of its citizens in Jammu and Kashmir .

i) International support for India 's general concerns about its territorial integrity, etc., will depend on our appearing to be responsible and talking to Pakistan on Jammu and Kashmir . A static stance by India will result in Pakistan regaining international support.

j) It is equally true that the international community does not support Pakistan 's total claim on Jammu and Kashmir .

k) Important powers are now inclined to a settlement of Kashmir dispute on some kind of LoC settlement plus a package deal for autonomy for the people of Jammu and Kashmir with the added proviso for normal and free interaction between people living in (India) J&K and people living in Pakistan-held territories. While India should be willing to resume dialogue with Pakistan , we must be clear in our mind that coming to a solution would be a gradual process spread over a decade or two. We must not let down our guard in any manner till then.

l) [color=red] A very important lesson to be kept in mind is the development of a US-China strategic consultation mechanism to deal with stability and security in a ‘nuclearly weaponised' South Asian region. President Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin were in more or less continuous contact during the Kargil War. The US and Chinese policy on Kargil were coordinated at the highest level. India should be alert about the strategic implications of this development. Two super powers having a converging approach on the security environment can impact India 's freedom of options.</font>

Rangudu
BRFite
Posts: 1751
Joined: 03 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Rangudu » 04 Jun 2004 08:09

According to Gen. Anthony Zinni's book, Musharraf was the one who forced Sharif to go to Washington and order troop withdrawal.

http://www.satribune.com/archives/jun6_12_04/P1_kargil.htm

Also see how much Zinni and Mush were hand in glove.

daulat
BRFite
Posts: 338
Joined: 09 Oct 2002 11:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby daulat » 04 Jun 2004 13:34

Originally posted by Rangudu:
Also see how much Zinni and Mush were hand in glove.
yes, sad to see - unkil always buys the sincere soldier bull from pakgeneral. however he does tell mushy unequivocably that the yindu banias will kick his tushy to jahannum, which is nice.

SaiK
BRF Oldie
Posts: 36299
Joined: 29 Oct 2003 12:31
Location: NowHere

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby SaiK » 06 Jun 2004 21:15

http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/holnus/002200406061575.htm "There have been lapses in national security. Nothing can be a more serious crime towards the citizens", Terming Kargil as an intellegence failure, should be taken against those responsible for it. "The government and Defence Ministry knew about it but still took no action", An in-house study of the Kargil war reportedly points to the shortcomings of the army during Operation Vijay in 1999 and holds political leadership responsible for failing to take decisive action in the war enabling Pakistan to wrest initial advantage.

Arun_S
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2800
Joined: 14 Jun 2000 11:31
Location: KhyberDurra

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Arun_S » 06 Jun 2004 21:36


Calvin
BRFite
Posts: 623
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Calvin » 06 Jun 2004 21:50

Dixit's article is an important one in multiple regards, not least of which is related to his position in the new government. Most interesting off all is the degree of convergence between Dixit's position and that of the NDA. There are some elements of discordance, but they may be more minor than they appear.

Point (b) regarding Dixit's understanding of what can be expected from the Pakistanis is interesting, and somewhat at variance from the Jan '04 ABV-Musharraf meeting. This may be related to the relationahip that ABV cultivated with Musharraf, to which Dixit (obviously) was not privy. In this case, Dixit's position is probably more valid, as it is not based on a dependence on a particular individual.

Firmness in dealing with Pakistan at the operational level, combined with restraint gets India international support.
This suggests no hot-pursuit, doesn't it?

Arun_S
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2800
Joined: 14 Jun 2000 11:31
Location: KhyberDurra

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Arun_S » 06 Jun 2004 22:48

[url=http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_808163,0008.htm]Cong to raise 'Kargil lapses' in Parliament, BJP says ready for debate
Press Trust of India

[/url]

Joeqp
BRFite
Posts: 111
Joined: 11 Nov 2000 12:31
Location: Earth

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Joeqp » 07 Jun 2004 03:17

I don't know how accurate the article linked above is, but the following sounds terrible:
<I>Voice communications were unreliable.

<B>Radio intercepts show the Pakistanis had knowledge of flight plans of our aircraft before missions were launched from Srinagar and Awantipur.</B>

Poor communications also led to our Mirage-2000 missions from Adampur and Ambala not being identified in time by our own Army formations in forward areas, as these aircraft were maintaining radio silence.

Communications from control and reporting centres to electronics warfare radars, from combined operations centres to air defence weapon nodes remained insecure.</I>

Instead of the current defence brass worrying about the color of the generals' insignia, there should be an all-hands approach to getting the basics fixed.

ehsmang
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 54
Joined: 12 Nov 1999 12:31
Location: ndelhi
Contact:

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ehsmang » 07 Jun 2004 08:09

Manvendra,

My take on the points highlighted by you

a) Voice communications were unreliable.

A cause of concern indeed. However, given the weather conditions and high altitude this was to be expected. Communications are not easy in those altitudes. However, there is scope for improvement.

b) Radio intercepts show the Pakistanis had knowledge of flight plans of our aircraft before missions were launched from Srinagar and Awantipur.

This is most debateable. Now all that was needed was a pair of 'Abduls' siting close to Srinagar, Awantipur airports with wireless sets and talking to their masters in Pakistan. 2 Mirage 2000's taking off. Now the only place these 2 M2K 's and all sorites were heading was the Kargil area. So if the pakis had prior knowledge of flight plans , it does not come as too much of a surprise. I think the word flight plan makes it sound as though they had photocopies of the document and has been used loosely IMHO!!!. What is meant probably is that they knew that 2 M2K's will show up in next 15-20 minutes in any of the sectors. How many such intercepts as a % of total sorties would be an interesting figure.

c) Poor communications also led to our Mirage-2000 missions from Adampur and Ambala not being identified in time by our own Army formations in forward areas, as these aircraft were maintaining radio silence.

I think this is a continuation of point (a).

d) Communications from control and reporting centres to electronics warfare radars, from combined operations centres to air defence weapon nodes remained insecure.

According to me if true this is the most critical and damning aspect of the report.

e) Instead of the current defence brass worrying about the color of the generals' insignia, there should be an all-hands approach to getting the basics fixed.

Fully agree.

daulat
BRFite
Posts: 338
Joined: 09 Oct 2002 11:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby daulat » 07 Jun 2004 13:50

the IAF letting IA know where it is sounds better fixed by datalink than by radio comms - the more talk, the more likely to be listened to

agreed on the 'flight plan' issue - most likely that spotters reported takeoffs from the airfields with no real knowledge of where they were headed. with the advent of air-air refueling, this problem can be aleviated since strike packages do not need to be forward deployed anymore.

i think there is scope for a LACM for the IA in the mountains where logistics and other support bases for the PA can be targetted beyond immediate artillery range - for reprisal strike purposes. a sort of mini-tomahawk

Surya
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5038
Joined: 05 Mar 2001 12:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Surya » 07 Jun 2004 16:51

Manavendra,

Actually pause and think how well the IAF boys did.

4 and 6 ship missions went in total radio silence. So even if all did not have encrypted comm, there are workarounds.

I spoke to a 22 yr old who flew in 4 missions. He was maha thrilled at them coordinating their strikes with total radio silence.

SaiK
BRF Oldie
Posts: 36299
Joined: 29 Oct 2003 12:31
Location: NowHere

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby SaiK » 07 Jun 2004 21:08

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/724898.cms

The crucial Point 5353 still in Pakistani occupation

SaiK
BRF Oldie
Posts: 36299
Joined: 29 Oct 2003 12:31
Location: NowHere

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby SaiK » 07 Jun 2004 21:10

Does the above mean, this war is unfinished, and the UPA govt wants to finish it off? Another war Kargil-II to start??

Q. Will this time, we would have a chance to get back PoK!!!???

Aditya G
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3391
Joined: 19 Feb 2002 12:31
Contact:

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Aditya G » 07 Jun 2004 21:27

Praveen Swami said in recent article that Pakis have been evicted from 5353.

Surya
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5038
Joined: 05 Mar 2001 12:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Surya » 07 Jun 2004 23:05

Look who is saying it!!!!

Skanhai
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 53
Joined: 28 Mar 1999 12:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Skanhai » 08 Jun 2004 00:45

It's really hard to say who's right and who's wrong.
I wish I could say it is not true, but that would be totally baseless, as when I say that it is true.
So lets hope he presents his proof, and it turns out to be false alarm.
Very disturbing piece I most say.

putnanja
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4421
Joined: 26 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: searching for the next al-qaida #3

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby putnanja » 08 Jun 2004 02:02

If I remember right, Praveen Swami did not say that the pt 5353 was recaptured. All he said was that even though 5353 offers views of Indian side of the highway, once IA used some smoke filled artillery to flush them out, and then just lobbed another artillery taking out around 17 rats. But he didn't say that the peak was recaptured. The article implied that though the peak is in paki hands, it couldn't do much with it and offered it no advantage.

Rangudu
BRFite
Posts: 1751
Joined: 03 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Rangudu » 08 Jun 2004 02:19

Whic Praveen Swami article are you guys talking about?

putnanja
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4421
Joined: 26 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: searching for the next al-qaida #3

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby putnanja » 08 Jun 2004 03:07

This one...

War and peace on Gurkha Post

Consider, for example, the case of Point 5353, named for its height in metres above sea level, from the summit of which the LoC takes a gentle turn in the southeastern direction. In the wake of the Kargil war, a series of local tactical errors on India's part allowed Pakistan to occupy the southern face of Point 5353, thus providing the enemy forces a clear view of Sando Top, an important post.

When Operation Parakram began a little over three years ago, both the Indian Army and the Pakistan Army began trading ferocious artillery fire up and down the LoC. In the high mountains, sudden winds and unpredictable atmospheric conditions ensure that shells rarely land where gunners intend them to. But, with a direct line of observation available to them, the Pakistani forces on Point 5353 should have been able to pass on corrections that would have enabled their artillery to obliterate Sando Top.

If, that is, the Pakistani troops on Point 5353 had been given the chance. Indian soldiers on three posts, namely Point 5165, Point 5240 and Point 5100, guided their superior 155-millimetre Bofors howitzers with devastating accuracy. Pakistani troops on Point 5353 were first hit with smoke-filled mortar shells, to flush them out of their bunkers, and then with air-burst artillery, which showered down shards of metal at great speed. Well over 40 Pakistanis are believed to have died on Point 5353. Pakistan could not reinforce the troops since the Indian soldiers on Point 5165 and Point 5240 were in a position to hit their supply lines.

This article does not mention that IA retook the peak.

Joeqp
BRFite
Posts: 111
Joined: 11 Nov 2000 12:31
Location: Earth

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Joeqp » 08 Jun 2004 03:42

<I>This article does not mention that IA retook the peak.</I>

This begs the question, why didn't IA retake the peak? If the Paki rats were gone, what prevented them?

The answer, to my feeble brain, is that there was no need to, since 5353 is already in Indian hands.

Anoop
BRFite
Posts: 326
Joined: 16 May 2002 11:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Anoop » 08 Jun 2004 03:58

Originally posted by Manavendra:

This begs the question, why didn't IA retake the peak? If the Paki rats were gone, what prevented them?
Could it be that the peak is exposed to Pakistani artillery, making it difficult to sustain logistics?

Joeqp
BRFite
Posts: 111
Joined: 11 Nov 2000 12:31
Location: Earth

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Joeqp » 08 Jun 2004 07:22

But isn't there a cease-fire on the LOC? I assume there are no daily arty barrages. Why not just walk up and seize the point, and build some solid bunkers?

Anoop
BRFite
Posts: 326
Joined: 16 May 2002 11:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Anoop » 08 Jun 2004 07:40

Manavendra, good point. I had forgotten about the ceasefire. I wonder if it will hold, though, if we attempt to get a foot-hold on a contested peak. I understand that 5353 is bang on the LoC. I wouldn't expect IA to hold their fire if Pakis tried to get atop a peak that is not well within their territory.

RayC
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4333
Joined: 16 Jan 2004 12:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby RayC » 08 Jun 2004 07:45

Manevendra,

These peaks are high and craggy with steepest of slopes. The surroundings of 5353 are with the Pakistans as they veer into POK.

Therefore, the route India can adopt will be real touch and difficult and what is more that they will be daylighted.

It is not that I am trying to say it cannot be taken, but it will be difficult and costly.

When the alternate route is through, these positions of Pakistanis will be just points on the map in so far as the trafffic safety is concerned.

Anoop
BRFite
Posts: 326
Joined: 16 May 2002 11:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Anoop » 08 Jun 2004 07:53

Originally posted by RayC:

When the alternate route is through, these positions of Pakistanis will be just points on the map in so far as the trafffic safety is concerned.
Ray sahab, could you expand on the alternate routes part? Is such a thing under construction?

ehsmang
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 54
Joined: 12 Nov 1999 12:31
Location: ndelhi
Contact:

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby ehsmang » 08 Jun 2004 11:00

the alternate route(s) could be the one through Manali - Rohtang Tunnel ( under construction , will it be a all year route??) and the one being created as a diversion on the Srinagar - Leh highway nearabout Kargil??

daulat
BRFite
Posts: 338
Joined: 09 Oct 2002 11:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby daulat » 08 Jun 2004 13:23

is pt. 5353 too high for air insertion? assuming there is any flat spot in the first place, even for hover and drop. and will PA fire upon any heli attempting to do so?

AmanC
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 91
Joined: 31 May 2002 11:31
Location: Chandigarh

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby AmanC » 08 Jun 2004 17:09

Manvendra,
Point 5353 is in Pakistani hands. The Army HQs has admitted this to me in a written statement.

AmanC
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 91
Joined: 31 May 2002 11:31
Location: Chandigarh

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby AmanC » 08 Jun 2004 17:12

HT Chandigarh, June 8
‘Point 5353 under Pak control’
Man Aman Singh Chhina
Chandigarh, June 7

FIVE YEARS after the conclusion of the Kargil war, the controversy over Point 5353 in Dras sector still rages on with Brigadier Surinder Singh, former Kargil brigade Commander, alleging that the feature is still under Pakistani occupation.

Brigadier Surinder Singh maintains that the orders for an attack to re-capture Point 5353 were explicitly given by him to the Commanding Officer (CO) of 16 Grenadiers and that the CO was put on adverse report by him after the attacking party failed to perform its job.

While the Army Headquarters have accepted the fact that Point 5353 is still under Pakistani control, it also states that the feature was never in Indian hands before or after the Kargil war and that no attack was launched to capture it.

However, Brig Surinder Singh vehemently maintains that the feature was occupied by the Pakistan Army during their intrusions in Dras sector in 1999 and that it is wrong on the part of the Army to claim that it has always been with Pakistan.

The Army HQs has also stated that the feature is on the LoC (see box) while Brig Surinder claims it is well inside the Indian territory overlooking the Sando post.

The Brigadier alleges that senior Army officers misled the nation by saying that all strategic heights were regained by the Indian Army during Operation Vijay.

The Army’s claim that no attack was ever launched is disputed by Brigadier Surinder Singh. He says that after he was moved out of Kargil and another Brigade (56 Mountain Brigade) moved into the area to beef up the home defences, its Commander, Brig A.N. Aul (now Maj Gen), put in an attack to re-capture the peak. This attack, too, reportedly failed. The Army stonewalled requests regarding this operation by saying that any attack plan for capture of Point 5353 cannot be answered being related to operational plans. Counters Brigadier Surinder Singh: “Only a detailed inquiry into the entire affair can bring out the facts of the case, as it is clear that there is more to it than meets the eye.” Another undisputed fact is that Point 5353 allows Pakistan Army to have an unfettered view over the National Highway-1A connecting Srinagar to Leh. In a more damaging revelation, Brig Surinder Singh also claims that the peak offers view to an alternate route developed by the Army, linking Dras to Kargil away from National Highway-1A.

Investigations by Hindustan Times have revealed that the officer asked to capture the peak by Col Pushpinder Oberoi, CO 16 Grenadiers, never accomplished the task and attributed the failure to the terrain. Meanwhile, most of the officers involved in Kargil operation have since been promoted. Maj Gen A.N. Aul is commanding an infantry division while his former boss Lt Gen Mohinder Puri is the Military Secretary at Army HQs. The Corps Commander, Lt Gen Krishan Pal has since retired as has the Army Commander, Lt Gen H.M. Khanna. Incidentally, both these officers received distinguished service awards for their meritorious role in the Kargil conflict.

Importance of 5353 over-emphasised: Army

IN RESPONSE to queries submitted by HT, the Army spokesperson stated that Point 5353 has always been under Pakistani occupation even prior to Operation Vijay. He adds that the feature is located on the Line of Control and accepts that it provides observation to a “small” portion of the national highway. “No attack was launched on Point 5353 by Indian troops at any stage,” he goes on to say. The reply ends with the comments that the “importance of Point 5353 has been overemphasized and the issue has been unnecessarily raised from time to time”.

Samir
Webmaster BR
Posts: 90
Joined: 08 Jul 2000 11:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Samir » 08 Jun 2004 17:33

AM Patney rebuts Army claims on Kargil:

http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/08spec1.htm

Pranay
BRFite
Posts: 1463
Joined: 06 Feb 2003 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Pranay » 08 Jun 2004 17:42

http://us.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/08spec1.htm?headline=Kargil:~Ex-air~marshal~returns~army~fire

Air Marshal Patney said had the air force been allowed to cross the LoC "it would have been a different story."

He revealed that during discussions on crossing the LoC, General Malik had opposed the idea.

"Had we crossed, we would have dealt with their artillery, their supply lines etc," Air Marshal Patney said.

He said the entire operation by the army lacked any tactical sense. "What they (the army) ought to have done was to hold on to the positions, take stock of the situation and ask air force to go out and hit their (Pakistani) artillery and supply lines, soften them out and then send the army on ground. That would have been correct militarily. But they wanted to charge, wanted quick results."
Candid remarks from an intelligent man... Shame on the Army for their poor planning.

Jagan
Webmaster BR
Posts: 3037
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Earth @ Google.com
Contact:

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Jagan » 08 Jun 2004 18:39

Air Marshal Patney said had the air force been allowed to cross the LoC "it would have been a different story."

He revealed that during discussions on crossing the LoC, General Malik had opposed the idea.

"Had we crossed, we would have dealt with their artillery, their supply lines etc," Air Marshal Patney said.
I think hes putting the blame of not crossing the LOC on the army's door while it was actually the government's decision.

Like it or lump it, not crossing the LOC turned out to be a wise decision - in terms of rallying international support on our side.

He said the entire operation by the army lacked any tactical sense. "What they (the army) ought to have done was to hold on to the positions, take stock of the situation and ask air force to go out and hit their (Pakistani) artillery and supply lines, soften them out and then send the army on ground. That would have been correct militarily. But they wanted to charge, wanted quick results."
Again blaming the army for wanting to achieve quick results is misguided . Political compulsions dictated that the matter be settled in months rather than drag for half an year or more.

Vanahan
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 20
Joined: 13 Dec 2001 12:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Vanahan » 08 Jun 2004 18:53

Originally posted by Jagan:


Like it or lump it, not crossing the LOC turned out to be a wise decision - in terms of rallying international support on our side.

International support which counted for naught. It was a disgrace for the Armed forces and a disgrace for the BJP-led government of the day to send 600 young men to their near-certain deaths.

daulat
BRFite
Posts: 338
Joined: 09 Oct 2002 11:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby daulat » 08 Jun 2004 19:13

patnay's rebuttal is also the first time i have seen anything on casualties due to pak interdiction of the highway... we were always told it was serious, but never knew how bad...

Umrao
BRFite
Posts: 547
Joined: 30 May 2001 11:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Umrao » 08 Jun 2004 20:02

Raising serious questions about the leadership of then army chief General Ved Prakash Malik during the conflict, Air Marshal Patney said: "It was such poor leadership by sending men to their deaths. The tactical options (exercised by him) were militarily E grade, that is fail and worse."
http://us.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/08spec1.htm

the above was stated by Spinster in 1999

Sribabu
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 31
Joined: 21 Dec 2000 12:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Sribabu » 08 Jun 2004 20:12

The rebuttal seems to imply that the army's recommendation was not to cross LOC, which the govt. accepted?????

putnanja
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4421
Joined: 26 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: searching for the next al-qaida #3

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby putnanja » 08 Jun 2004 21:16

He says that the request was made by Army for air force assistance on May 20th, and it was approved by May 25th.

Air Marshal Patney said the army officially did not place a request for air strikes until after May 20 or so. "The case for air operations was put up to the government after Malik returned from the foreign trip and toured Srinagar and other areas. Under those circumstances the government asked for more details and that took three or four days. That is not a great amount of delay. The air strikes were cleared on May 25. The government didn't dilly-dally. It was a clear intelligence failure," he said.

The report is out only in patches. I think the UPA leaked it to embrass NDA as NDA was raising issue of tainted ministers. It is unfortunate that a political color is being given to the whole saga. If the govt was serious, it should release the entire report so that people can judge for themselves. This public spat between army and air force does not augur well for the nation, even if the people caught up in the debate are ex-officers.

There is no data to show that the government prolonged the war for political gains, apart from not authorizing IAF strikes across the LoC. And not allowing IAF to cross LoC cannot be attributed a political motives according to me. Even Gen VP Malik is supposed to have opposed strikes across LoC as per Patney's article. So, it is important that we interpret the leaked report properly instead of giving it political colors or making it a IA Vs IAF issue.

Aditya G
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3391
Joined: 19 Feb 2002 12:31
Contact:

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby Aditya G » 08 Jun 2004 21:33

Some 80 percent of their casualties were due to Pakistani artillery firing, not frontal attacks. The road from Zojilla to Leh was full of military convoys and were easy targets. Since they (the Pakistanis) had taken up positions at heights they were able to direct artillery with accuracy," he added.

I think he has been mis-quoted by due to editorial bug. A few trucks were lost to shelling, and not all of them were military. He probably means that Vijay casualties were more due to arty/mortar fire rather than sirect small arms fire from the Pakistani posts. RayC?

RayC
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4333
Joined: 16 Jan 2004 12:31

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby RayC » 08 Jun 2004 23:19

If Aul attacked with a battalion and failed to capture, then there is some command flaw in Brig Surinder wanting 16 GRENADIERS (single battalion) to capure the same.

Arty did claim casualties but the figures quoted are a wee bit 'shooting the mouth'.

Patney is a showman. He is a glib talker and that is about all. He can make a mountain of a mole hill. I rather not comment on the Air Force. It is also interesting to note that everyone was an ass and he was the greatest! Good luck to him.

Ofcourse, after the event, he can appear to be the wise old owl, but can he tell us how many IAF PGMs hit Tiger Hill.

putnanja
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4421
Joined: 26 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: searching for the next al-qaida #3

Re: Kargil Revisited

Postby putnanja » 09 Jun 2004 00:31



Return to “The Kargil Archive”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 1 guest