Kargil Revisited - III

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Postby IssacB » 26 Jan 2005 03:39

Good luck with the project. It is a great idea. The world really needs to know TSP' game. I will be waiting anxiously to see the site and learn more.

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Postby ramana » 28 Jan 2005 22:09

I am renaming this thread to preserve continuity.

SAAg has an article : PAKISTAN’S LESSONS FROM ITS KARGIL WAR (1999)


The Kargil War (1999) against India was a military misadventure of the Pakistan Army maser-minded and executed by Pakistan Army’s Chief of Staff, General Pervez Musharraf and now the self-anointed President of Pakistan.

The Pakistan Army under General Musharraf, despite some initial gains, ultimately suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Indian Army. With the possibility of India escalating the war from a “limited war” in Kargil and extending it to Pakistan proper, General Musharraf seemingly goaded the hapless Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to rush to Washington and enlist United States aid to pressurize India for a three-day ceasefire to enable Pakistani troops to withdraw to their side of the LOC.

The Pakistani Army under General Musharraf had kept the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in the dark about the Kargil military misadventure. Later, the Pakistan Army and General Musharraf, after the Kargil defeat, kept secret this fact from the Pakistani nation. To deflect domestic and international attention from his own personal culpability in this misadventure, General Musharraf, unscrupulous as his wont, blamed PM Nawaz Sharif for Pakistan’s military humiliation and used this as a pretext for launching his military coup against a democratically elected Government Incidentally PM Nawaz Sharif was elected by an overwhelming majority and that too on an election plank of peace with India.

Its only five years later after the Kargil war that analyses have now started appearing analyzing this war from the Pakistani perspective and drawing lessons from it. One such work that is now available on the Kargil War is by Shireen Mazari a Pakistani strategic analyst, with hawkish anti-Indian stances. Shireen Mazari’s research stands published by the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan.
.......


There is a lot of info here which can be subjected to analysis. Shirleen has revealed some of the inner workings of the TSP politico-military elite. Will read and give my take on the paras highlighted by SAAG author.

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Postby klemen » 19 Feb 2005 05:40

On another interesting note, I've submitted a proposal to the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research to record the experiences of all war veterans - WW 2,J&K 1947-48,1962, 1965, 1971, Sri Lanka, Kargil and all the insurgencies/IS ops. This would be both audio and video.


I agree with others, Mandeep! A very good suggestion! :lol: Do you know whether the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research plans to publish their accounts in a memorial book or something like that? I would be definately very interested to hear Indian WW2 accounts, especially those ones who were in malaya 1941-42, British North Borneo 1941-42 and Dutch East Indies 1945. I know a couple of people who said to me they owe their lifes thanks to Indian soldiers. Keep us updated with this, please.

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Postby Rajput » 19 Feb 2005 18:07

Outlook cover story: War on Error about the Kargil report. Makes for interesting reading.

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Postby Daddu » 20 Feb 2005 03:11

Most shcoking was....

**********Misuse Of Special Forces*******
An operation launched by a Special Forces team under the 8 Mountain Division ground to a halt on a mountain feature called Sando Top when they were engaged by Pakistan's Special Services Group. The Indian troops were found to be lacking in key equipment and the tasking was also questionable. Other SF units which were deployed were used as regular infantry battalions to capture features, a role they are neither equipped nor tasked for. This led to higher casualties and misuse of a strategic force.

Lessons: None. The army continues to misuse the Special Forces.

:(

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Postby Mandeep » 20 Feb 2005 19:48

klemen wrote:
On another interesting note, I've submitted a proposal to the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research to record the experiences of all war veterans - WW 2,J&K 1947-48,1962, 1965, 1971, Sri Lanka, Kargil and all the insurgencies/IS ops. This would be both audio and video.


I agree with others, Mandeep! A very good suggestion! :lol: Do you know whether the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research plans to publish their accounts in a memorial book or something like that? I would be definately very interested to hear Indian WW2 accounts, especially those ones who were in malaya 1941-42, British North Borneo 1941-42 and Dutch East Indies 1945. I know a couple of people who said to me they owe their lifes thanks to Indian soldiers. Keep us updated with this, please.


Well the interview are to be archived for just such a purpose.About the people who owed their lives to Indian soldiers, can we have more information ? Their experiences might just be something nice to include in Mark Tully's programme on India's contribution to WW 2.

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Postby Kakkaji » 21 Feb 2005 07:57

Cross posted from the other thread:

Letter of support wins friend for life
- Clinton repays Sharif gesture in Lewinsky crisis with Saudi sanctuary deal

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1050220/a ... 402120.asp

Lot of nuggets about Kargil and the US-Pak relations in this story.

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Postby Laks » 22 Feb 2005 19:18

[url=http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_22-2-2005_pg4_24]Kargil war — Indian Army admits making blunders
[/url]

Got this from Daily Times by I. Gilani, he claims it is a scoop from the latest Outlook magazine. Can the BR-experts throw some lights on this?

Update: Here is the actual Outlook article. Gives a pretty damning report.

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Postby karan » 22 Feb 2005 20:56

Laks wrote:[url=http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_22-2-2005_pg4_24]Kargil war — Indian Army admits making blunders
[/url]

Got this from Daily Times by I. Gilani, he claims it is a scoop from the latest Outlook magazine. Can the BR-experts throw some lights on this?

Update: Here is the actual Outlook article. Gives a pretty damning report.


There is nothing damning about it. Professionals learn from their mistakes and move on. Lessons learned is an evolving process that helps with development of new tactics, techniques, and plugging holes. There isn't a war that does not have its own pitfalls. Only thing damning about this is blame must be apportioned to these goddamn Netas and Babus who have no understanding of military operations and requirement, they make the decisions based on DDM or some other stupid analysis.

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Postby SaiK » 22 Feb 2005 21:13

http://us.rediff.com/news/2005/feb/22loc.htm Army battles 70 feet of snow at LoC...

wonder how many more feet to happen? .. and the floods after they melt in spring/summer.

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Postby Babui » 22 Feb 2005 22:12

There is nothing in this report that has not been made public earlier. Perhaps the only heartening item is that this report was chaired at the highest level (Gen. Vij) and has been widely disseminated among the higher-ups. I would not state that SF are being misused. They are better equipped now to undertake roles that they would not have been able to do earlier with lesser equipment. Also, there were reports (always denied) during and after the war of SF going behind enemy lines to pinpoint enemy gun positions for our artillery. These ops are obviously not publicized but appear to have been more in line with traditional SF work.

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Postby ramana » 22 Feb 2005 22:23

Babui, Also remember the Skardu TSP helicopter crash that took out the TSP Brig.Syal (sp?) Who knows what happened there?

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Postby Rangudu » 22 Feb 2005 22:36

Brig. Nusrat Sial?

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Postby Mekala » 25 Feb 2005 23:39

Jagan wrote:Regarding Maps. Sometime back I was working on a cropped image taken from the US Army map archive.
XXXXXXXXXX.................
The original map was slightly larger, I can email it if anyone wants it.
Jagan


Hi Jagan

I have collected some map resources and satellite pictures of Drass-Kargil-Soltoro-Siachen. I wish to co-relate the same on topo maps and the recorded history of Kargil-Siachen. Unfortunately I could not lay my hands on topo maps. If you could email the map you mentioned, I hope to work out the places that saw action, including the disputed point 5353.
My email srinivasulumekala_at_yah00_com.

Regards,
Srini-M

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Postby SaiK » 25 Feb 2005 23:49

http://us.rediff.com/news/2005/feb/25pak.htm Kargil was a lesson to Indians: Musharraf...Then came the Kargil Operation with all its reality and distortions. It proved a lesson to the Indians and a rude awakening to the world of the reality of Kashmir....but ended up in a disappointing failure under the negative influence of some radical Indian Government functionaries in particular Mr. Advani.... We moved forward our forces also and stood our ground firmly. ....It became a trial of who blinked first. India blinked. We decided to move our forces back....

....In the process I have successfully managed to bring Pakistan on the radar screens of the world and am continuously trying to improve its image. I have a vision for Pakistan.....

http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/F ... sDesk.aspx

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Postby Jagan » 26 Feb 2005 00:01

Mekala wrote:
I have collected some map resources and satellite pictures of Drass-Kargil-Soltoro-Siachen. I wish to co-relate the same on topo maps and the recorded history of Kargil-Siachen. Unfortunately I could not lay my hands on topo maps. If you could email the map you mentioned, I hope to work out the places that saw action, including the disputed point 5353.
My email srinivasulumekala_at_yah00_com.

Regards,
Srini-M


Srini,

The topo maps are the ones I downloaded from a US Site. They were US Army maps of the area - will send either the files or at the very least some links in a day or two.

Jagan

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Postby RayC » 26 Feb 2005 01:27

Jagan,

Which is this US site?

Do give the links.

Thanks.

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Postby Anoop » 26 Feb 2005 02:09

For maps on Kashmir, please go to:

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/kashmir.html

Look under 'Detailed Map' section by scrolling down.

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Postby Vivek_A » 26 Feb 2005 02:27

With all due respect, Patney makes an ass of himself, again....

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/arti ... 032745.cms

Ex-army chief's role in Kargil war under cloud

NEW DELHI: Disagreeing that possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan delayed India's response to the Kargil aggression, a top-ranking former Air Force officer has alleged there was indecision on the part of the government.

He also said that there was hesitation to recognise the seriousness of the problem and sought to question the attitude of the then army chief.

Air Marshal Vinod Patney, former who participated in the 1999 conflict, also raised questions over the attitude of top army officials, including the then army Chief Gen VP Malik, towards the Pakistani action.

"To my mind the threat of a nuclear war was a bogey. The value of a deterrent is lost when you shout from the rooftops that you will use nuclear weapons," he said.


"The fact is there was a degree of hesitancy within the system. Apparently, there was inadequate information and some hesitancy to recognise that there was a serious problem," the then chief of Western Air Command said.

Asked whether the absence of the chief of defence staff had in any way affected India's reaction, he said it could be no excuse for being indecisive.

"But is the absence of a CDS an excuse for inefficiency?" he asked.

"As far as Gen Malik is concerned, did he elect to stay back (in Poland) even after being told that the situation in Kargil was serious?" Vinod Patney wondered.

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Postby JCage » 26 Feb 2005 03:10

Patney is the AF version of the Army's Ashok Mehta. Both take it upon themselves to revel in interservice rivalry.

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Postby Umrao » 26 Feb 2005 04:00

IMHO, there is a element of truth in what Patney says.
Gen VP Malik did not conduct /(provide the leadership)the operations befitting a IA Chief.

He was most defensive Army Chief in the cabinet meetings asking months to prepare for a surgical strike, Aka Jhapad.

To an extent IMHO Akhand blowing hot and cold was due to not very reasuring COAS during those times....

ANy way we dropped too many cathes to win the war with thumping Jhapads especially having made young CO/NCO cannon foder to the TSP terrorists sitting up the mountain.

Sad but true..

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Postby Vivek_A » 26 Feb 2005 04:09

Spin: It's not just what he's saying here. He's got a history of making comments like this.

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Postby khan » 26 Feb 2005 20:43

Umrao wrote:He was most defensive Army Chief in the cabinet meetings asking months to prepare for a surgical strike, Aka Jhapad.
The army is the only force that does not have overwhelming speriority against the Paki's.

The talk probably went like this:

PM: Can you do a surgical strike against XXX location (in POK) ?
Chief: Yes, but it will be very difficult since we are fighting over the mountains and we don't have overwhelming superiority. Even if we try, this could end up being a mess with a high casualty rate on our side.

PM: hmm... So you cannot guarantee success?
Chief: Far from it.

PM: What do you need to guanrantee success?
Chief: We will need to get XXX equipment from Israel, aclaimatize more troops to the high altitudes or cold weather and so on.

IMO this is reminiscent of the situation where Indira Gandhi wanted Manekshaw to attack Eask Pak (Now Bangladesh) asap while Manekshaw wanted to prepare better. In the end it is better to only start wars/conflicts that you know you can win - *decisively*.

Bottomline: Malik did his job. He wasn't confident about a succesful outcome to a surgical strike and indicated it do the polotical leadership. The politico's could have overruled him, but they chose not to. The system worked as it should have.

Of tangential interest, what would have been the ramifications of:
-A succesful surgical strike?
-An unsucessful strike leading to Indian prisoners and heavy casualties? Would we be prepared to escalate further to save face? Isn't this a choice ABV would *not* have wanted to make?

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Postby SaiK » 02 Mar 2005 04:11

http://outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodnam ... F%29&sid=1
'Threat Of Nuclear War In Kargil Was A Bogey'
The man in charge of the air operations during the Kargil war on the command and control failure in the army, the flawed military advice given to the then political leadership and more...
SAIKAT DATTA

As the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Air Command, Air Marshal Vinod Patney was the man in charge of the air operations during the Kargil war. He was awarded a Sarvottam Yudh Seva medal for his role in the operations. Soon after Kargil, Patney—commissioned in the fighter stream and awarded a Vir Chakra for gallantry during the 1965 war—took over as the vice chief of air staff and was witness to the efforts made to plug the gaping holes in the security establishment post-Kargil.

A week after Outlook published relevant sections of an internal assessment of the Kargil war by the army, Patney spoke to Saikat Datta on various aspects of how the war was fought.
He also raises pertinent questions on the command and control failure in the army, the flawed military advice given to the then political leadership and refutes the contention that the Indian air force was in any way responsible for the delay in air operations. Excerpts from the interview:

Much has been made of the fact that air operations


'Did Gen Malik elect to stay in Poland after being told the situation? The Army believed nothing could go wrong. Peace reigned supreme!'

were introduced only on May 25. You were the AOC-in-c of Western Air Command, which directed the air operations in Kargil. What is your take on this?
There is a mistaken perception on the reasons of delay if any in using air power to eject the intruders. We were ready, but in the initial stages the army asked us only for our attack helicopters. We pointed out to them that these were no good at such heights. There was a degree of hesitancy within the system and hesitancy to seek the directions of the government. The army was also unsure of the level of ingress in the Kargil sector. Unnecessary discussion as to who should approach the government before using air power was settled when it was decided to call a COSC meeting. Apparently, there was inadequate information and possibly some hesitancy to recognise that there was a serious problem on our hands at the COSC meeting held on the same day.

Which means that the senior military leadership was unaware of the seriousness of the situation?
Exactly. Had the extent of ingress been known early enough there wouldn't have been any hesitancy in going to the government. Around May 12-13 we (the IAF) started moving our forces into Kashmir as well as using the Leh airfield. Our helicopters as well as fighters were in position. The entire system in the Western Air Command was geared for war.

So where, then, was the problem?
Could any government have stopped from taking a decision about the use of air power had it known about the level of ingress? There have been statements that the government delayed the use of air power and did not allow us to go across. My question is, did the military emphatically advise the government on the military wisdom of crossing the LoC? The decision not to go across goes against every canon of military strategy. I can't think of any other situation where a superior air force operated solely within its border in spite of an aggression from the weaker side.

But General Malik left for Poland on May 11, after the intrusions were discovered and returned much later. Senior officers, like Lt Gen H.M. Khanna, the northern army commander, were in Pune. There are reports that Maj Gen V.S. Budhawar, the divisional commander, was busy collecting animals for his zoo. Could this be construed as a paralysis in command and control?
When I spoke to my man on the ground, Air Vice Marshal Nana Menon, in charge of air operations in Jammu and Kashmir, he told me the military leadership in northern command was still busy discussing exercise Brahma-Astra which was planned earlier. When I asked him to discuss with the GOC-in-c (Lt Gen Khanna), I was told that he had pushed off to Pune.

As far as Gen Malik is concerned, did he elect to stay back (in Poland) even after being told that the situation in Kargil was serious? The fact of the matter is that everyone in the army was convinced that nothing could go wrong. Peace reigned supreme!

In fact, most of the senior officers were awarded medals while the junior leaders were penalised.
Many among us were surprised. But I cannot answer this question and don't want to comment on this as I am not aware of the facts.

Could air power have played a decisive role in the conflict? What about fears that this could have escalated the conflict?
For the life of me, I cannot fathom why the IAF was not allowed to go across.

'The group of ministers had recommended a chief of defence staff, but PM Vajpayee said no and the new regime is yet to say yes.'


Had we been able to hit the enemy's lines of communication or their supply dumps, we could have shortened the war. See how things changed after we hit Muntho Dalo (a supply dump for the Kargil intruders) and the nature of operations changed drastically. I agree that there was a fear of escalation and the Pakistan air force could also have come across. So be it.
You have to understand that air power is an offensive platform but we were using it defensively. We had a system where we got least dividends for maximum effort.

Could the fact that both countries were overtly nuclear affect the decision-making process?
To my mind the threat of a nuclear war was a bogey. The value of a deterrent is lost when you shout from the rooftops that you will use nuclear weapons. Here was a case of naked aggression against us. Any attempt to use nuclear weapons would be foolish, not only in terms of international opinion, but also because of the inevitable riposte of our response that would follow.

But was the COSC effective? Can the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) help?
The Group of Ministers recommended that there should be a CDS. But prime minister Vajpayee decided against it during his time and the present government has been in place for several months and is yet to say yes. My question is: is the absence of a CDS an excuse for inefficiency? If so, then I doubt if it will help. We have an Integrated Defence Staff, which has not been awe-inspiring. And to expect that a CDS will be a specialist in all fields by virtue of his appointment will be illogical. First we need to put the ids in order. Why depend on a CDS when the best advice to the government comes from a specialist. The COSC fails to function as well as it should and can because of personalities. There isn't anything wrong with the system as such.

How effective were the air surveillance operations?
Our air surveillance capabilities are severely limited. The assets are used on request from the army. When we are so requested by the army, we fly and forward the photographs with interpretation as called for. The Aviation Research Centre (controlled by the raw) also does strategic reconnaissance and has the capability but have no control over it. As the aoc-in-c, where I have an offensive role, I did not get any input on what is happening across, on the other side. It is a sad story that they (Pakistan) could occupy heights on our side and we had to depend on a few shepherds to tell us what was going on.

What were the broad lessons of Kargil and how much has been implemented?
First, steps must be taken to rectify the terrible intelligence failure. There should be greater synergy between the three services to maximise efforts and there should be a recognition of air power. The COSC must establish the role of individual services so that each knows what it is expected to do. As far as implementation of the various recommendations are concerned, during my tenure I did not see any move of a substantial nature come our way.

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Postby viveks » 02 Mar 2005 05:49

I think almost everyone thought that a war should have taken place at that time. We shall have captured the whole of kashmir and asked elements like geelani to pack their bags and leave.

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Postby Singha » 02 Mar 2005 08:47


The decision not to go across goes against every canon of military strategy. I can't think of any other situation where a superior air force operated solely within its border in spite of an aggression from the weaker side.


India's top leadership has always been risk averse and defensive, seeking
to just maintain the current borders instead of EXPANDING and FORCING
those nearby to pay tribute and accept our ways.

I feel a careful study is in order of those who bucked this trend - like the
Kushans who made conquests in the north and the Cholas who established
a Indic empire in Indonesia. the reasons for this, the character of the decision makers must be studied and learnt from.

Offense is the best defence. PAF would have been thrashed and reduced by 50% within a week.

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Postby eklavya » 03 Mar 2005 15:46

When Indian territory had been occupied, one really wonders on what basis the Indian armed forces were required to operate within the limits of our territory. The correct response to Kargil would have been to capture 4x the area in Pakistani Punjab.

PM Shastri had already established the principle in 1965 that an attack on J&K is an attack on the whole of India, and the response will be based on this assesment. We re-wrote the rules to our disadvantage in 1999. Shame.

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Postby RayC » 03 Mar 2005 16:57

The correct response to Kargil would have been to capture 4x the area in Pakistani Punjab.


That is a good response.

But feasible?

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Postby pran » 03 Mar 2005 17:09

I have been reading that the river,canals and bunds provide an obstacle course for an advancing Indian army.Since the adoption of new doctrine,these could be used for advantage to stop the enemy from retreating back behind these obstacles.Instead of occupying land ,decimate their offensive potential on ground,deny them retreat.

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Postby AmanC » 03 Mar 2005 18:22

RayC wrote:
The correct response to Kargil would have been to capture 4x the area in Pakistani Punjab.


That is a good response.

But feasible?


Right your are, Ray. Easier said then done.

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Postby daulat » 03 Mar 2005 19:36

territorial occupation gets us nothing we want/need - a war of annihilation of their war making capability is more relevant. ofcourse we need to be able to live with a collapsed state next door as a result...

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Postby ramana » 03 Mar 2005 19:36

There is a problem with capturing 4x territory across the Intl border without vacating the enemy occupation. This is because after ceasefire the territory across the IB is returned due to various intl agreements but that across the LOC will be retained by the enemy. Note I dont call them Pakis.

ABV did the righ thing in making sure that what is Indian remains Indian. Also all this ignores the Interantional role in Kargil initiation after POKII. The Paki press is agog with revelatory articles about how they were duped.

Also think about it who could have advised Sharif to supercde six ranking TSP generals and pull Mushy a Mohajir from the hat? And mind you one of them was Quli Khan the brother in law of Gohar Ayub and son-in-law of FM Ayub Khan!

We really dont know the background of what was planned and how did India survive the mess. Thats why we have these threads.

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Postby RayC » 04 Mar 2005 02:20

Admins,

I searched the Archived Kargil threads for some articles that were written by Pak /army retd offrs that indicated it was a big flap for Pak.

It was tedious and because of eye strain, I probably missed them.

Is there any way the BRF club the Pakistani articles separate and the Indian Articles separately so that someone can go through them without the comments that are in between?

It will be a wonderful for the researcher.

Another thing is some of the links have expired. Therefore, it might be worthwhile to open the links whatever can be and then saved.

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Postby eklavya » 04 Mar 2005 16:48

a
Last edited by eklavya on 04 Mar 2005 16:50, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby eklavya » 04 Mar 2005 16:49

ramana wrote:There is a problem with capturing 4x territory across the Intl border without vacating the enemy occupation. This is because after ceasefire the territory across the IB is returned due to various intl agreements but that across the LOC will be retained by the enemy.


What is returned, when it is returned, and under what conditions it is returned is a matter of negotiations. Punjabi territory in Pakistan would be the ace in any Indian negotiator's hands.

Not sure what your reading is of the psychology of the Pakistani Army. I am convinced that they would even give up Sindh if it meant keeping their part of Punjab.

As to the feasibility, I have no doubts on this matter.

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Postby RayC » 05 Mar 2005 01:53

Punjab is Pakistan and Pakistan is Punjab.

True.

But two DCBs and a couple of distributories!

Feasible as feasible can be.

Ofcourse, it is my personal view.

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Postby Aditya G » 07 Mar 2005 17:11

Media representations of the Kargil War and the Gujarat riots
By Subarno Chattarji

http://www.sarai.net/journal/04_pdf/14subarno.pdf

I have'nt read this piece yet, but the following lines caught my eye;

....

Star News projected Kargil as a just and necessary war against intransigent intruders. It also contributed substantially to the spectacle
and glamorization of war. Star News coverage, with its slick sets and slicker presenters, was often devoid of serious content and in-depth analysis. It is also significant that hawkish analysts such as K. Subramanyam and Mani Dixit were frequently invited to Newshour discussions. As part of a global media conglomerate, the internationalization of infotainment was most evident in the obvious attempts that Star News made to present a modern India fighting a medieval, Islamist mindset over the border. The Kargil Review
Committee Report notes approvingly that “The media coverage, especially over television, bound the country as never before”.

....


Looking forward to a scrutiny of this article here...

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Postby Raj Malhotra » 07 Mar 2005 19:33

While we have put a lot of spot light on the failure of intelligence and IA in Kargill, but what about IAF? Inspite of observing the Afghanistan war at close quarters and reasonably knowing the orbat of Pakistan, it failed to have ample supply of flare dispensers.

Then it had not built up adequate quantities of PGMs inspite of ordering Su-30MKIs.

If it had not built up the trajectory tables of bombs at high altitude then how was it going to help IA in Siachin if the conflict escalated or more importantly on Indo-Chinese border?


I think when the things got going the IA gritted its teeth and was ready for long haul. The policy planning and equipment deficiencies of IAF were perhaps more glaring.


Now we have to plan for the next conflict. The constraints are more than obvious. We have to react to a provocation within 1-12 hours.

It is only possible if the IAF and IN play the lead in the conflict. The IA will have to play the supportive role. Its SF will go in deep and pin-point the targets, the rest of force will only play the harassment role at the border, while continuing to deal with COIN and providing protection to important installations.

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Postby AmanC » 07 Mar 2005 20:13

When we speak of capturing territory in West Punjab, somehow I feel that the exploits of 1965 war are in our subconsciousness. Though in 1971 there was not much action on the West Punjab front as compared to 1965, but even in 1965 we had mixed results.
It has been many years since the last war was fought in the plains of Punjab and Pakistan has put in much effort in strengthening its defences viz DCBs and distributories in upper West Punjab besides canals designed exclusively in order to stop mechanised columns.
The lower West Punjab, bordering Sind on Pak side where East Punjab's border meets Rajasthan, and then where Rajasthan continues facing West Punjab for some distance, is a more viable option for rapid armour advance.
As Op Parakram recently demonstrated, Indian strike Corps have been either deployed in Rajasthan facing West Punjab-Sind or on Dinanagar-Pathankot-Samba belt on Upper East Punjab-cum-J&K axis. With 9 Corps coming about, the thrust will surely be more on the vulnerable Pathankot corridor but whether it will be towards defensive ops or offensive ops is something which remains to be seen.
What this really means is that the fight for West Punjab territory will be a much protracted affair. With our doctrine now laying emphasis on lightening strikes a la EX Divya Astra, whether we can afford the time to grasp large chunks of West Punjab is something highly debatable.

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Postby Aditya G » 08 Mar 2005 08:08

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.as ... 005_pg7_35

Kargil not a failure for Pakistan’s military: Indian academic

By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: Kargil may have been a diplomatic and political failure for Pakistan but it represented “significant successes,” for the Pakistani military, according to Suda Chandran, an Indian scholar.

Ms Chandran, who after completing a fellowship in America last summer recently published a book on Kargil entitled ‘Limited War: revisiting Kargil and India-Pakistan conflicts,’ is currently at the University of Bradford, where she is engaged in another research project. She argues that “in retrospect, it could be argued that while Pakistan may have failed to achieve any significant objectives, this is certainly not the case with its military. From Pakistani military perspective, at least there were three significant successes.”

She is of the view that while the Kargil conflict revealed the fragile nature of civil-military relations in Pakistan, leading to a military coup and the removal of Nawaz Sharif, before the conflict, the deposed Prime Minister was “inching dangerously close to becoming a democratic dictator after the passage of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.” She notes that Sharif was also engaged in a “direct confrontation” with two other institutions of Pakistan, in which he emerged successful before the coup. First, against Pakistan’s judiciary, and the second with Pakistan’s army itself. General Jehangir Karamat, the then Chief of Army Staff, who was asked to resign. “Clearly, it was not in the interests of Pakistan’s military to have any institution getting powerful enough to challenge the others, including itself. The impact of Kargil leading to the coup was significant.”

Ms Chandran quotes from an account written by Bruce Riedel which says that when Sharif came to meet President Bill Clinton in July 1999, he came with his entire family, suggesting that he feared a military takeover at that time itself. “The coup, in fact, was a major success for Pakistan’s military, which clearly arose from the outcome of the Kargil conflict,” she adds.

The Indian academic is of the opinion that another major success achieved by the military was to wrest the Indo-Pak negotiations initiative from civilian control. Before Kargil, Indo-Pak relations were getting warmer, which witnessed two crucial developments. She writes, “First, the Lahore summit, which saw Vajpayee visiting Minar-e-Pakistan, perceived to be a symbolic gesture of the Indian establishment accepted Partition. Second, the secret negotiations between Sharif and Vajpayee through their emissaries Niaz Naik and RK Mishra respectively. In India, these negotiations were welcomed by everyone, but this was not the case in Pakistan, especially by its military. They perceived the Niaz Naik-RK Mishra negotiations as being undertaken to keep them out of in Indo-Pak rapprochement efforts. Kargil derailed this civilian negotiation but also made Pakistani military as the final arbiter and negotiator in deciding Indo-Pak rapprochement. The Agra summit and Post-Coup events proved the Pakistani military can promote or disrupt Indo-Pak relations.”

According to Ms Chandran, Kargil was also a success from the Pakistan military’s perspective, as it revived militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, and also increased “terrorist attacks” all over India. Before the Kargil conflict, violence has had come down significantly in J&K and there was a widespread support for a political approach. “It is in the interests of Pakistan’s military to keep militancy alive in J&K, which is a bargaining card with India. Without militancy, India’s stance vis-à-vis Pakistan could harden; also the international community would push Kashmir to the back burner. After Kargil, the militant attacks were not only revived but also intensified. The fidayeen attacks are a post-Kargil phenomenon,” she explains.

Ms Chandran considers it “debatable” whether Pakistan’s military had these specific objectives in mind before planning Kargil. However Kargil did result in strengthening the army’s position inside Pakistan and vis-à-vis India. She believes that only the planners of Kargil would know what specific objectives they had in mind, “but the fact remains, it cannot be termed a failure of Pakistan’s military. In fact it has achieved more than what it could have asked for: assumed power inside Pakistan; brought Indo-Pak negotiations under its control; revived militancy in J&K; and made it clear to the international community that no compromise can proceed without its explicit participation,” she argues.

However, Kargil, she points out, was a “disaster” in other ways. The international community condemned Pakistan for initiating hostilities. No one believed that those who fought in Kargil were mujahideen and not Pakistani regular troops. There was also widespread support by all countries, including China and the US, that the Line of Control (LoC) should be respected and Pakistan should withdraw its troops, or in other words, the restoration of the status and its continued respect. Instead of Kashmir getting internationalised, Kargil and the LoC were internationalised, but in India’s favour, she adds. She notes that unlike India, there have been few studies of the Kargil conflict in Pakistan, but mentions those by Dr Shireen Mazari and Brigadier Shaukat Qadir.


Note "Pakistan military" actually means "Pakistan Army" in this context


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