Kargil Revisited - III

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Postby Aditya G » 08 Mar 2005 08:13

Kargil war — Indian Army admits making blunders http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.as ... 005_pg4_24

...
And there was lack of initiative at the JCO-NCO level :?:
...

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Postby Anoop » 08 Mar 2005 08:27

Aditya,

That statement needs to be seen in context. Traditionally, the IA has been run by officers - the NCO/JCOs act as the interface between the officers and the troops and are responsible for translating the officer's orders and intents into action by the troops. They have rarely been tasked with taking the initiative in the planning stage. Things will change, but slowly, in an organization as large and tradition bound as the IA.

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Postby ramana » 12 Apr 2005 02:19

Book Review in Pioneer, 12 April 2005.

Looking Kargil in The eye

M Divakar

THE FOURTH ESTATE: A FORCE MULTIPLIER FOR THE INDIAN ARMY BY COL SC TYAGI, GYAN, RS 540
Ever since India fought the limited Kargil War, numerous books have been published on the role of the media during the war - popularised as India's first war in a media society. The latest to the addition is Col SC Tyagi's The Fourth Estate: A Force Multiplier for the Indian Army, which examines the importance of 'enhanced synergy' between the media and the military.

'Force Multiplier' as a term has assumed interesting connotation. It is a radical departure from the earlier term 'media management'. Some media analysts, however, desist from using both the terms and suggest the media should be cleverly 'used' to ensure maximum gain and little harm. This opens up an interesting debate on the connection between the media and national security policy (the military becomes a component of it). It is reasoned that for a 'strong administration' with clear-cut policies, news is news and policy is policy and the twain are only remotely connected in a causal way. Less certain administrations with undefined policies are subject to greater degrees of influence by dramatic reporting. In the light of this while reporting may have an impact on policy, a savvy government will use the media to educate and press its own agenda.

Initiating the discourse, the Introduction raises fundamental questions like, "Did the media role assist the Armed Forces during Kargil?" "Is media-military symbiosis synergetic in India". Much of the answer can be determined through the chapter 'Kargil: Military and Media'. However, it is the Conclusion that throws up some very practical suggestions.

Not surprisingly, the section on the Kargil war covers half the book. Two noteworthy aspects need elaboration. First, during the course of the war, described by the author as nationalistic or patriotic reporting, the maturity of the media in terms of documenting day-to-day events and its ability to capture the 'big moment' and crucially to sustain it is commendable. "Media played an intangible but vital role in highlighting that it was Pakistan who violated the LOC and until the status quo was restored and all intruders return from Kargil, the Indian response was justified." That India won - diplomatically and militarily - the Kargil war, owes to a great extent the role the Indian media played in sustaining its concern at Pakistan's provocation and support to militant Islamic elements. Not surprisingly, the international media too responded by labelling Pakistan the aggressor nation. The Clinton Administration is reported to have provided India with a secretly taped phone conversation between the Pakistan army chief and his local army commanders, evidence which India was able to successfully use in its global information campaign. India also won much support on Capitol Hill.

Second - post-war evaluation described as investigative or post-mortem reporting - the media's dispassionate analyses of the conduct of the war, from errors of command and strategic judgements to the 'blame game' 'victimisation' and 'witch hunt' of soldiers down the line. The scrutiny, as the author informs us through numerous news reports, was initiated during the war itself but was underplayed owing to the larger objective of winning the information war, which the media successfully did. While the coverage by and large showed sound judgement in balancing professionalism and national interest, it is equally creditable that the media has not allowed the post-war evaluation to lose momentum.

The recent disclosures in a newsmagazine on Kargil war report acknowledging grave lapses in the operations while undoubtedly an outcome of the Army's own internal mechanism of reevaluation and reassessment is also to a great extent part of the media pressure that has been sustained over the years. Even some Pakistani commentators like Ayaz Amir have praised the report and the ability of the Indian system to look Kargil in the eye. The Army report very candidly views its failure or shortcomings in the realm of omissions, of not being adequately prepared for the threat from Pakistan. Other aspects like senior commanders reaching late; lapses in command and control; total intelligence failure; sense of complacency are startling in its candour. Clearly many blunders were committed during the war, which the system is now "officially" recognising.

It is only natural that as a progressive democracy we not only continue to examine the 'why, what and how' of Kargil but take corrective measures and more importantly draw the line as to who were responsible and at what level the lapses occurred. One does not need to hazard a guess as evidences now clearly point towards the Northern Command and the Corps in Srinagar as well as the AHQ. Tyagi unhesitatingly cites numerous reports and commentaries questioning the gross underevaluation of the enemy, confusion and a lack of clear thought process among the top brass. "Having erred on anticipating and preventing the intrusion from taking place, senior commanders in charge of the operation sought to underplay the intrusion (probably to avoid getting the sack) while simultaneously trying to evict in great haste the intruders irrespective of the cost of the human lives." However, it still begs the question: Can punitive measures be taken, given the fact that all the senior commanders have thus retired? This might not be an unreasonable question but what is reasonable and within the domain of the system is to pinpoint the faults and clear the picture.

The very function of the media in terms of day-to day reporting during the Kargil war has created an enormous pool of information resource in the public domain. The author has done a commendable job to collate the facts. In the military-media interface, the Kargil War will remain an interesting reference point and a source of recurring analyses.


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Postby ramana » 21 Jun 2005 01:10

SaiK
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Posted: 20 Jun 2005 Post subject:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

where is the kargil revisited thread?

http://us.rediff.com/news/2005/jun/20nuke.htm

mmmm... what do you all say? lets assume this is true. i can see many who would just line up this being absolute false., but that would not make a good strategic discussion? imho.

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Postby Umrao » 21 Jun 2005 02:03

The question to grapple with folks at BRF is more like this
(Remember BRF where Tomorrow comes today, while other await it to dawn’)
The question to grapple goes like this
'Was Unkil favorably disposed towards a rapprochement between two elected governments of India and Pakistan?"
Remember this was in 1999 way way before 2001 terror attacks on WTC towers.

Kargil war (was in May/June 1999 fresh after the shakti tests in May 1998) Unkil was working more towards defang mode and to punish India ( Dr Tim can speak eloquently about this and is an authority too).
Nawaz and Vajpayee were trying to make a peace bid in 1999 and if it succeded the non proliferation ayathollahs would be out of job and the geo strategic games of unkil would become more complex.
The solution prop up the Kamando and Kargil came about. The mere fact that Nawaz was not consulted or in loop when Mushy started Kargil misadventure in it self speaks a lot about the way things happened then…
After that WTC happened, the rest is all documented in GOAT series (threads) in BRF

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Postby Raj Malhotra » 21 Jun 2005 15:00

Umaro

My feeling is that Nawaj was always "reasonably" within the loop. Offcourse PA works more independently compared to IA.

Nawaj is lying!

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Postby Abhijit » 22 Jun 2005 00:34

Raj Malhotra wrote:Umaro

My feeling is that Nawaj was always "reasonably" within the loop. Offcourse PA works more independently compared to IA.

Nawaj is lying!

Or it could be completely different - that Unkil was in the loop but not nawaz. Afterall, mushy couldn't have had the balls to launch something like this without a wink and a nod from somewhere in unkil's labyrithine departments - i am not saying that clinton was officially aware (though he could be) but it stretches imagination to think that unkil as a whole was unaware of the game - maybe the scale was not knwon before. Unkil could have been caught offguard as much as mushy by India's reaction. (while on this, Spinrao, it was the same aar ya paar bhashan vajpayee who stood firm on this)

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Postby ramana » 22 Jun 2005 00:45

Everyone looks at the control of nukes by the RATS in TSP through their own eyes and see a failure or breakdown in the civilian/military handling. However if we see the situation thru the RATS eyes, they control the nukes as the civilians exist in power because of them. From all accounts the TSP nuke program was controlled and nurtured by the RATS. Hence by virture of holding the nukes and propping up the civilians, it was not a big deal for them to activate the nukes whle Nawaz Sharif was in DC. They might even have informed DC to increase the pressure to provide a face saving gesture like having GOI let them retreat or withdraw.

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Postby svinayak » 22 Jun 2005 01:06

And also may have forced Unkil to accept the coup since they are in control of the button.
The rise of the strategic wing of the PA into the ruling elite is a direct result of the power play between this group and unkil after 1998.

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Postby Tim » 22 Jun 2005 05:48

Umrao,

I think that virtually every American analyst would identify Kargil as a fundamental "sea-change" in Indo-US relations, and a major turning point in the relationship that led directly to the Joint Vision Statement of 2000. I think almost any American or Pakistani analyst would identify Kargil as one of the lowest points in US-Pakistani relations. I think that Indian analysts tend to be split on the issue.

My own belief is that Clinton seized the opportunity tilt strongly towards India - a policy he had been advocating since his election in 1992, but had never actively pursued (for a lot of reasons, including a few domestic distractions). Because the Indo-US relationship is very different from the US-Pakistani relationship, this change was not nearly as dramatic in some respects as the tilt towards Pakistan in 1971 - at least in part because India had no interest in pursuing the kind of client/ally status that Pakistan hungered for throughout the Cold War.

But the Pakistanis were very badly shaken by Clinton's strong support of India and demand for a return to the status quo. Clinton's insistence on a return to the Line of Control - from a US policy perspective - was a much more assertive line than the US had ever expressed on the Kashmir issue, and threatened (in Pakistani eyes) to codify it as the de facto border.

Obviously, a lot of people will disagree, and I'll ignore the requisite flames. But I've seen no evidence of US knowledge of or involvement in the Pakistani side of the Kargil fiasco, and I've been working on it (on and off) since it happened - see one of the early issues of BRM, among other things.

For those who are interested, I'm told the CCC book on the Kargil crisis will come out shortly. It's only been in publication for about three years, which may make it a little less than timely :D . Holding one of the major meetings at the height of the May/June 2002 crisis certainly made for some interesting perspective. I'm not sure how much groundbreaking material will be in it - a lot of things that seemed like new discoveries in 2002 may be pretty old now. It should have a much more sophisticated effort to describe the Pakistani side, although it remains unclear how much of the actual truth we got to in the course of the project.

Tim

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Postby Vivek_A » 22 Jun 2005 07:08

Tim

Funny you should mention the CCC book. Your CCC(?) conference co-attendee :) Shireen Mazari has something to say about that.

http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jun2005- ... ped/o1.htm

Our masochism is not limited only to women's issues. We continue to allow academically dishonest researchers to access data and institutes in this country. In earlier columns, I cited the case of Peter Lavoy, Director Centre for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, USA, who refused to accept a chapter for a book on the Kargil conflict by a Pakistani academic that he himself had tasked, because it did not fit into his plan of things. Despite his own political agendas, Lavoy was back in Pakistan last week on a new project and again gaining access to data sources. One has no problem with divergent viewpoints, but academic dishonesty is not acceptable. Why we in Pakistan should entertain such academics is mystifying, except in the context of a masochistic desire to be abused once again.

And with reference to Kargil, an English language daily reported that Hussain Haqqani's new book on Pakistan includes a reference to the now-discredited Bruce Reidel claim that Pakistan had readied its nuclear warheads during Kargil. Given that Mr Haqqani was present in Monterey when General V.P. Malik, India's Chief of Army Staff at the time of Kargil, categorically rejected Reidel's claim as an outright falsehood, why would he now revert to this falsehood, unless it serves to add to the vilification of Pakistan in the US? Clearly, Pakistanis also seem to be unable to distinguish between attacking a government and attacking the state.


does anyone have the famous group photo?

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Postby Vivek_A » 22 Jun 2005 07:14

AHA!!

Image

Shrill is in the front row

Tim is in the 3rd row from the bottom, on the left.

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Postby Vivek_A » 22 Jun 2005 07:16

One order of medim rare crow for the Paki expert

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/rece ... il_rpt.asp

Providing the Pakistani perspective on the same issue, Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi pointed out in his paper that there is sharp divergence of viewpoints on the Kargil conflict within Pakistan's official and non-official circles. Officials still view Kargil as a diplomatic success for Pakistan, which according to them resulted in the internationalization of Kashmir. Rizvi argued that a major lesson of the Kargil conflict is that no military expedition could be a success if it is undertaken without accounting for the totality of the environment, which includes domestic, political, economic, and international opinions and sensitivities.

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Postby Tim » 22 Jun 2005 09:36

Vivek,

I had never met Shireen before the conference. It was an interesting experience.

I think if people read the chapters on Pakistan, they will differ significantly from the quasi-official line that Shireen put out a couple of years ago. There's still an awful lot of grey area that hasn't been resolved there, though.

Your quote from the proceedings of the first Monterey meet is accurate. It also took place in May 2002.

Pakistani analysts have altered their position on that issue somewhat in the last three years - or, at least, some of them have. The fact that even then - in 2002 - there were sharp differences of opinion between official and non-official circles suggests diversity of opinion, and surely the last line suggests the weakness of the official position. Those differences have widened in the last three years, but the official line still refuses to publicly admit error or the presence of Pakistani forces.

I'm the guy with the red beard in the photo. And, to be honest, I'm not an expert on Pakistan. Just a guy with some knowledge and a somewhat different perspective than a lot of others who know the country much better.

Tim

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Postby eklavya » 22 Jun 2005 18:55

Nawaz Sharif went to DC in July 1999 because the Pak Army was suffering unacceptably heavy losses at Kargil. Pakistan wanted to put a diplomatic facade on what was essentially a military defeat, Musharraf's military defeat. All this nuclear hooey is so many wasted taps on the keyboard.

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Postby Umrao » 22 Jun 2005 19:15

That was very modest,
You are also founding member of many a defunct Pakistani fora

'Ati vinyam dhoortha lakshnam'

'Excess of modesty...

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Postby Jaspreet » 22 Jun 2005 20:53

Ati vinyam dhoortha lakshnam

I need to read up on all these. Someone already seems to have enumerated that which I discover through bumbling and making mistakes.

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Postby Aditya G » 22 Jun 2005 23:40

extract from Gaurav Sawant's book on Army Aviation Corps:
http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/kargil-sawant.html

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Postby Rishi » 23 Jun 2005 20:20

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050623/edit.htm#6

Nuclear threat or bluff?
by K. Subrahmanyam


THE old time-worn story of Bruce Riedel, who was on President Clinton’s National Security Council staff during the Kargil crisis and was present during the Clinton-Nawaz Sharif negotiations on July 4, 1999, has captured Indian media headlines once again.

The story has been quoted in the new book of well-known Pakistan columnist Hussein Haqqani “Pakistan between Mosque and Military”.

The Riedel story, in the version in which it was released first in the paper of the Centre for the Advanced Study of India, Policy Paper, University of Pennsylvania (2002) and quoted subsequently in other publications leaves one with the feeling that it is not the full story and has given only a doctored version to achieve a particular purpose.

According to the story, President Clinton asked Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during his July 4th meeting if he knew his military was preparing nuclear-tipped missiles.

The President further enquired whether Mr Sharif realised that if even one bomb was dropped — and Mr Sharif finished the sentence — “it would be a catastrophe”.

Mr Riedel’s story continued,” Mr Clinton asked, Did Mr Sharif order the Pakistani nuclear missile force to prepare for action? Did he realise how crazy that was? You have put me in the middle today, set the US to fail and I would not let it happen. Pakistan is messing with nuclear war.”

That Nawaz Sharif agreed to withdraw his troops at the end of the meeting is not quite relevant to Mr Bruce Riedel’s nuclear horror story. What is relevant and what Mr Riedel does not tell us anything about is what did the US President do when he got the information that the Pakistani military was preparing the nuclear-tipped missile?

He knew very well that the Pakistani nuclear weapons were not under the control of the Prime Minister but of the army chief. Therefore, the logical step would have been for the US President to get in touch with the Pakistani army chief and warn him of the consequences that would follow if even one bomb was dropped.

Pakistani Army Chief Musharraf was a friend of General Antony Zinni, the then Commander of the Central Command. Did the US President direct General Zinni to talk to General Musharraf?

Secondly, surely if a nuclear weapon was getting ready to be used within the jurisdiction of the Central Command, then that command should have gone on alert and should be ready to take appropriate action.

Mr Riedel does not tell us anything about such steps. His version would leave one with the impression that President Clinton and the US military command did not take the threat seriously.

Or perhaps, Mr Riedel thought that the rest of the world had no business to bother about how the US reacted when a country prepared to use a nuclear weapon on its neighbouring country.

If the US did not take the threat seriously enough to react to it and the reaction was not meaningful enough to be recorded, then how did Mr Riedel expect the rest of the world to take his version of the Pakistani threat seriously?

Mr Riedel’s version has been quoted by other Americans to highlight how dangerous the Indo-Pak nuclear confrontation can be. But none of the American strategists have ever asked how did the US react to this threat.

If the US did not display any reaction beyond subjecting poor Nawaz Sharif to an interrogation on the nuclear danger for which he had no responsibility, what message could it have sent to other rogue states?

Logically, North Korea could have inferred from Mr Bruce Riedel’s article that if PyongYang were to prepare its nuclear weapon for use against South Korea, the President of the United States would be raising rhetorical questions on nuclear danger and be doing nothing.

That, of course, is not news. That was what General De Gaulle said in the sixties about the American concept of extended deterrence. He said that the US would not risk Washington and New York to save Paris. Therefore, France must have its own deterrent.

Mr Bruce Riedel story would fully justify the Indian acquisition of its own retaliatory capability against a rogue state like Pakistan. He clearly tells us that the US President only gave a lecture to the Pakistani Prime Minister on the catastrophe that would result if a bomb was dropped when that Prime Minister had no control over the bomb but took no action whatsoever to warn the General who could have launched the weapon.

Therefore, since in the absence of any warning from the US, General Musharraf did not proceed further with his nuclear threat even when he had to accept defeat and withdraw from Kargil, then it should how been due to the deterrence exercised by the Indian retaliatory capability.

The conduct of the US in May-June 2002 was the same as on July 4, 1999. Pakistanis rattled their nuclear sabre.

The US Ambassador in India lent credibility to the Pakistani nuclear threat by directing all US citizens to leave India. The US Administration otherwise kept quiet though some of the foreign ministers of the European Union countries came out in condemnation of the Pakistani sabre rattling.

Surely, the Pakistani nuclear sabre-rattling and the US behaviour lending credibility to it should have confirmed the North Koreans in their strategy of nuclear sabre-rattling in their part of the world and the Iranians in their fears that living next to nuclear sabre-rattling Sunni Pakistan, they cannot afford to give up their uranium enrichment option.

Both North Koreans and Iranians would be grateful to Mr Bruce Riedel for his thesis that the US is not likely to react to nuclear threats posed by rogue states to their neighbours.

Often the Cuban missile crisis is cited to highlight the possibility of a nuclear war. What the Cuban missile crisis, taken together with Mr Riedel’s Kargil account and Ambassador Blackwill’s advice to the US citizens in India to leave this country during May-June 2002 establishes is the US will react against a nuclear threat when it is directed against its own home land or people and the US would not act if nuclear threats are directed against other countries.

I do not know whether this is the real US policy. But Mr Riedel’s story and Mr Blackwill’s advisory would make it appear to be so. Surely, this is not the way of discouraging nuclear proliferation.

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Postby Sriram » 23 Jun 2005 20:41

He knew very well that the Pakistani nuclear weapons were not under the control of the Prime Minister but of the army chief. Therefore, the logical step would have been for the US President to get in touch with the Pakistani army chief and warn him of the consequences that would follow if even one bomb was dropped.

Pakistani Army Chief Musharraf was a friend of General Antony Zinni, the then Commander of the Central Command. Did the US President direct General Zinni to talk to General Musharraf?



Hats off to Sunil for asking the similar questions almost a year or two back.

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Postby ramana » 23 Jun 2005 20:50

KS comments on the Bruce Reidel report that has resurfaced in Hussain Haqqani's book on Kargil. Anyone recall the Seymour Hersh account of the 1990 crisis when the Robert Gates mission was sent to dissaude Ghulam Ishaq Khan's dream of dropping a nuke on Delhi as opening gambit? Hersh reported that in the White House mtg, a US military figure was wondernig if the TSP could be iadvised to drop it on Mumbai neighborhood. Contrast this with the Nixon alerting the forces in 1973 Yom Kippur War to prevent Israeli escalation.

Folks was Kargil a joint ops that failed? Why the US silence with regard to Mushy's threats in 1999? There was no jihadi takeover fears then. For the jihadis were already in charge!!!

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Postby Paul » 23 Jun 2005 21:38

Ramana: We talked about this earlier. If Kargil was a Joint ops or launched with tacit approval from Zinni, then why rule out the possibility of a similar operation in Siachen in the near future.

They may launch a similar ops in Siachen as a cover for their H&D in case they hand over Bin Laden for VIP treatment at Gitmo Bay. and this would have tacit approval from Unkil again. All this talk of withdrawal may be a cover for a future Paki operation as described above.

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Postby Jagan » 23 Jun 2005 23:32

I think it is really pushing the boundaries of reality by suggesting kargil was done with the Tacit approval of / or was a joint operation with the US

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Postby kgoan » 23 Jun 2005 23:49

KS' article and his take on Reidels paper simply seems to strengthen the conclusion BR reached before that kargil wasn't a Pak Army ploy to highlight the Kashmir issue or even to conquer Kashmir. It was to conquer Pakistan.

I don't think there's enough information to reach a firm conclusion or even to resonably deduce that there was US involvement from the start.

If there was US involvement, it was more likely the US was simply wary of Nawaz's attempt to become Amir and a possibly hostile Sunni theocracy armed with nukes complementing Iran. Such a force would be irresistibly attractive to the Arabs.

So they may have preferred the "secular" Pak Army than see that occur. Note Cohen's pushing of this theme for *years*.

On the whole US nuke thing: Seems to me that the US is so terrified (quite correctly, IMO) of a JDAM (jihadi delivered atomic munition) from a Pak source, that they flatly refuse (quite wrongly, IMO) to even risk investigating the Pak Army's links to 9-11 in case what turns up forces them into a corner and a confrontation with the Paks.

I see no reason for us to *assume* that this risk of a Pak JDAM on CONUS was only realised by the US *after* 9-11. It's entirely possible that the US realised the problem earlier but failed to realise the extent of the danger. Recall the article (by the watergate reproter, forgot the name), where he writes that when George Bush came to office he was told of 3 national security threats to the US.

The first two were mentioned. The third wasn't - for security reasons. At the time we all thought, given the context, that pakistan was a resonable inferrence ffor the mysterious "third" threat. And after seening years of US covering up and euphemisms for Pakistan ("third country soverignty" ferchrisakes!), it still seems reasonable.

In which case, the idea of the US risking anything for anyone else with their own cities at stake is ridiculous. They, quite naturally, won't.

Yeah, this is speculation but; note that OBL was a "known" quantity before 9-11. He was known to be interested in WMD's. His links with the Pak/Talibans was well known. So it seems to be resonable to say that the US *was* concerned about a jihadi JDAM *before* 9-11, (and that 9-11 simply accentuated things), and that it *was* something the US had to keep in mind during Kargil.

So I'd say it's a fairly *reasonable* hypothesis to make. And it gives another, quite interesting, possibile interpretation of US actions during Kargil.

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Postby ramana » 24 Jun 2005 00:12

So I'd say it's a fairly *reasonable* hypothesis to make. And it gives another, quite interesting, possibile interpretation of US actions during Kargil.



kgoan, go on.

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Postby kgoan » 24 Jun 2005 02:05

Ramana, it's a conspiracy theory based on reading Pak political moves prior to anything big:

One hypothetical argument could go as follows:

1. The US is *always* involved. This isn't because the US is a big bad gorilla but becasue of Paks historic role as a rentier state, note that not even Ayub's takeover happened without the US' knowledge.

2. No significant political move in PakLand is independent of it's impact on India. Consequently, outside powers *always* factor the "India card" in Pak politics. And Pak politics had been for a decade focused on control of the CA sites. OBL was, as we now know, crucial to the larger aim there. But he has a second just as important role, in this scenario.

3. Pok II made us some real enemies because we scared people. Paks response *reassured* the west that we were *not* un-constrained.

4. The BJP's moves on Pakistan seriously destabilised the "balance" and the very real possibility of the "constarint" on us being significantly weakened - if not removed. Nevertheless, with the BJP of all parties, whom no one conceived of making "peace" with Pak, doing the whole bus diplomacy thing, it shook the standard analysis of Pakistan providing some form of "balance" against India.

That balance *had* to be restored.

6. If Nawaz was Amir, religiously sanctioned, he could *anything*, - even pull a Benazir and handed India a list of names. Worse, clearly nawaz wasn't a mad anti-Shia type - and his Saudi links couldn't guarantee that a Pak-Iran understanding would never occur.

Further, Xerox had clearly shown that the "democracy decade" in Pakistan could lead to Pak and Iran reaching an understanding.

7. To cap it all of, the Pak had something no-one else had - OBL, a possibly legitimate claimant and threat to the US control of Saudia, if played correctly.

8. All this is rampant "conspiracy" theory speculation. And it depends on one point only: i.e. That while India, Iran, Saudia and Pak are known quantities, *everything* falls apart if Pak *fails* to maintain it's hate-India stance *and* actions.

If it does, the geo-political change it could make (at-the-time) would have been staggering. India *would* have brought in the Russians - the Chinese are *always* pragmatic. A less hostile Pak opens up the whole India-Pak-Iran and CA region, with the real pressure on US control of Saudia.

True, all of this seems like a wacky wet fantasy. (But then since "past is past, who remembers Rumsfeld and Cheney making *repeated* speeches about India being a threat to the US?)

And the Paks also had their ambitions. Given *just* little less anti-Indian hostility, they really could have become the strategic glue, the "gateway" and key node to it all if they were willing to facilitate the merger of India with Iran and CA. They would finally have had *real* H&D!

Kargil prevents all that by reinforcing Pak hostility to India.

Where does OBL and his JDAM come in? In this scenario, in a rather simple way and absolutely fundamental way. It's a No-dong. That's his second role.

i.e. Most people simply fail to realise that the key to understanding nuclear deterrence is *not* the nukes per se. Once that point is crossed *everything* depends on delivery. Deterrence is *not* a nuke. Deterrence is the ability to deliver a nuke on an adversary.

Without reliable delivery mechanisms, a nuke is a bullet without a gun. Deterrence is gun *and* bullet. One without the other is useless.

All this is, again, a hypothesis built up on a flimsy framework. Fair enough. But its an interesting game to play no?

Note:

This does *not* require the paks or India or Iran or anyone to be thinking along these lines at that time. i.e. It does not mean the US was preventing a deliberate scheme outlined above.

i.e. Think of Kargil as a way of preventing a *possible* evolutionary sequence of Indo-pak ties that could lead to serious challeneges to US power via Iran and CA - even if *neither India or PakLand ever intended it to*.

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Postby kgoan » 24 Jun 2005 02:14

And on a different note, I got access to this weeks TFT from a friend who has institutional access. Here's an interview with Nawaz:

Rauf Klasra talks to Nawaz Sharif for The Friday Times
June 24-30, 2005 - Vol. XVII, No. 18

JEDDAH: Exile has given former premier Nawaz Sharif time to think and ponder what might have gone wrong. He has put on weight but looks younger with a hair transplant. Sitting in his new palace in the desert kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sharif nostalgically recalls the time he spent as a power player, the behind-the-scenes wheeling-dealing, the run-up to the coup, General Musharraf?s ambition and the low-down on Shaukat Aziz, the current prime minister.

He recounts to TFT how Aziz frequently met him when Sharif was prime minister and how Aziz could not think of aspiring beyond an administrative position in the Ministry of Finance or at the State Bank of Pakistan. Now, says Sharif, he is the prime minister because of the military establishment.

Sharif?s party stalwart and his former cabinet minister Ch Nisar Ali Khan also sits with Sharif as TFT talks to the exiled premier. He almost speaks philosophically on personal and political issues and admits that he made mistakes, though he adds that he has also learnt his lessons. He feels that no one can cling on to power ad infinitum and that just like others before him had to go, Musharraf too would see his end. Indeed, he thought the countdown has already begun and political parties should not provide him any breathing space.

Sharif wants the politicians to establish that they too have a sense of honour and are committed to democracy and will not lap up the crumbs the military is throwing their way. As he sat talking, he expressed concern over reports of a deal between Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf, particularly after he heard Musharraf on TV confirming that he (Musharraf) was in touch with the PPP. An alarmed Sharif picked up the phone and talked to Bhutto. He says he also made a call to Asif Ali Zardari after the latter was released and congratulated him.

Sharif told TFT that he did not see any possibility of a deal between the PPP and the army. Only if Bhutto herself told him would he believe that such a thing had happened. Sharif feels that the major part of their troubles is over and things are finally heading towards their ?logical end?. It would be disastrous for any opposition party to bail Musharraf out.

He told TFT that he had also been contacted in the past several times by the military government to strike a deal. He even received the owner of a newspaper group from Lahore with an offer to allow Shahbaz Sharif to return to Pakistan after the October elections of 2002 and lead the PML-N. But Sharif said no to all such offers. He thinks that if he (Sharif) were to concede Musharraf as president-in-uniform, the establishment would allow him to fly back in a matter of hours. But Sharif won?t do that. There?s even a bit of idealism involved in his stance. He wants to prove to the military and the people of Pakistan that finally there is a politician who is not saleable. He said he would prefer to sit in Jeddah for many more years rather than returning to Pakistan after striking a deal with Musharraf. The time, he says, has come for politicians to stand up to the military and say enough is enough.

That is the only way to break the cycle of military interventions, Sharif tells TFT. Politicians must acquire power through votes, not through back-channel deals. He also thinks that Pakistan will never rise to its potential without democracy and the rule of law. Allied with this, he says, is building institutions and keeping their sanctity above individuals. He tells TFT about a BBC programme he saw while in Landhi Jail. The programme had invited several former Indian prime ministers and Sharif was impressed with how all of them termed democracy as the biggest achievement of India since 1947. None of them termed Indian economy or India?s military power as the biggest achievements, Sharif said.

Interestingly, Sharif told TFT how and why he had resigned in 1993 after the Supreme Court had restored his government. The story normally known is that he was forced by General Waheed Kakar, then army chief, to resign. But Sharif claims that he decided to resign himself and informed Kakar of his decision. He could not carry on with a hostile president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan. The only thing Sharif wanted Kakar to do was to ensure that GIK, who had led to the constitutional crisis, should also be made to go. Sharif?s decision greatly shocked Kakar but he went along after he saw that Sharif was quite adamant. Kakar then asked Sharif to become the caretaker prime minister and hold new elections, but Sharif refused to lead a caretaker set up. Kakar used strong language against GIK to assure Sharif that GIK would have to leave. ?Sir, he will go, rest assured it will happen. In case he does not, I will force him to do so? Kakar told Sharif.

But as Sharif told TFT, he did not like to hear an army chief talk like that. Sharif thinks no one should insult a president of Pakistan elected by the civilians. He thinks the military has developed a kind of contempt for the civilians. The other important decision Sharif took was to force General Jehangir Karamat to resign. Sharif was furious to know that his army chief had gone public on the formation of a National Security Council. Sharif thought Karamat had overstepped his authority as army chief and thereby lost the trust of the political leadership. He thought his authority would be eroded unless he did something. He called up Karamat and told him in clear words that his speech was absolutely unacceptable to him (Sharif) as prime minister. Karamat realised his mistake but Sharif asked him to step down. DG-ISI Lt-Gen Nasim Rana brought Karamat?s resignation the same day.

TFT asked Sharif why he had not used the same tactic with Musharraf. He went quiet. It seemed that he had not thought about why he hadn?t done that with Musharraf. When he spoke, he said that both situations demanded different strategies. But it was clear that Sharif had taken a hasty decision to sack Musharraf and failed to achieve the desired results.

Sharif denied the claim by General Ali Quli Khan that Sharif had held secret meetings with Musharraf before elevating him as army chief in October 1998. He said there were many reasons for his decision to promote Musharraf as army chief. Sharif did not want to make Ali Quli chief after receiving reports that the later had reacted strongly to Karamat?s resignation. There were also political considerations since Ali Quli was a close relative of Gohar Ayub Khan and the Saifullah family. Sharif did not want to take a chance of the government falling to political intrigues at some later stage. Interestingly, Sharif told TFT that contrary to public perception, then National Assembly speaker, Gohar Ayub, who was also the brother-in-law of Ali Quli, never lobbied for the latter. Sharif thought Musharraf did not carry political baggage. Also, Musharraf was recommended by Sharif?s close advisors Ch. Nisar Ali Khan and Khan?s brother, Lt-Gen (retd) Iftikar Ali Khan, then Defence Secretary. Nisar and Musharraf were friends for 20 years.

Sharif says he was surprised upon receiving reports that Musharraf and his coterie of officers were holding Sharif responsible for having gone to the United States to seek a cease-fire. He told TFT that it was Musharraf who had beseeched him to seek American intervention to stop the Indian troops from attacking Pakistan. He knew that the Kargil plan was ill-conceived and had landed the Pakistan army in a tight spot. Troops were badly trapped on mountains with no ration and ammunition available with them. The Indians had bombed every inch of the positions held by Pakistani soldiers. All communications lines were damaged by Indian bombardment. Pakistani soldiers were eating grass and snow to survive in the face of terrible shelling with practically no possibility for any reinforcements. Sharif was told that in the last days of the Kargil war, it had become a ?one-sided affair?. Indian troops were simply killing the trapped Pakistanis soldiers on the mountains without any resistance from this side. The situation reached such an alarming level that Sharif was even told that if the Indians were not made to agree on a ceasefire, Pakistan might lose the Northern Areas in case of an Indian forward thrust.

At this stage, Sharif decided to ?save? the military?s honour in light of the briefing given him at Lahore?s Governor?s House by all the service chiefs, including General Pervez Musharraf. Sharif instantly agreed to go to the States even though his cabinet ministers like Ch. Nisar Ali Khan and the Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif were opposed to it. Nisar had told Sharif to let the generals face the consequences of their actions since they had started the operation without the government?s approval.


In this background, when Sharif received secret reports that Musharraf was now putting all the blame for the Kargil on him (Sharif), he decided to sack Musharraf without caring for the consequences. When TFT asked Sharif why he had not consulted Shahbaz Sharif and Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, who were reportedly present in the PM?s House at the time of Musharraf?s removal, Sharif said the time to act had come and that?s what he did. Also, he had taken the decision and felt that Shahbaz and Nisar Ali Khan would try to dissuade him.

Sharif says he is the only civilian PM who tried to take on and tame unruly army chiefs. And he did this to establish the writ of the civilian government. Sharif is not apologetic when he is reminded that he was a product of General Zia-ul Haq. He thinks that no one can enter politics without army?s blessings and that fact can only change when politics is restored in Pakistan and the military is pushed out of the arena. He says that is exactly what he tried to do. Sharif does not regret his decision to sack Musharraf. He laughs at Musharraf?s statement that had Sharif not sacked him, he (Sharif) might have lasted his tenure as prime minister.

After he was arrested by the military, Sharif has no idea what powerful people were trying to do to save his life. Saudi Arabia?s Crown Prince Abdullah was the first one to sharply react over the sacking of Sharif whom he called his ?brother?. The Amir of Qatar besides the late UAE president too had roles to play in the whole exercise. Musharraf took the decision after Prince Abdullah prevailed upon him. It had nothing to do with any deal between the army and Sharif.

Intriguingly, Sharif partly agrees that had he refused to get out of jail, Musharraf could not last long, particularly after the formation of the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy. It could have gone either way. He is bitter over how the establishment did not let him accompany his father?s body back to Pakistan. Pakistan?s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Abdul Aziz Mirza, who was ironically made Chief of Naval Staff with Sharif?s signature, came to see Sharif. He put some conditions to him. While others could go, Sharif, his brother Shahbaz and Sharif?s wife, Kalsoom Nawaz could not accompany the body to Pakistan. Nawaz rejected the conditions. A few days later he received a call from Musharraf who expressed surprise that he (Sharif) did not come to Pakistan with his father?s body. So Sharif told him what the ambassador had said to Sharif. Musharraf pretended that the ambassador had given Sharif a wrong message and he (Musharraf) would take strict action against Mirza for doing so. Sharif wonders how the ambassador could have given him a wrong message and if that were so, why had no action been taken against him so far.

About the possibility of returning to Pakistan, Sharif says: ?Who knows when I might decide to return. It could be tomorrow.? He refuses to say harsh things about past League colleagues and friends like Ch. Shujaat Hussain, Ch. Pervez Elahi, Mushahid Hussain, and Sheikh Rashid Ahmed et al who have chosen to cross over to the other side. Sharif says he only needs committed friends not ?opportunists? People come and go but ideology remains intact. He takes big satisfaction in the fact that his party?s vote-bank is intact and people are still with him. It is a matter of time before he returns to lead his party. Sharif knows that the military has been trying to lure Shahbaz into some kind of deal but he thinks Shahbaz has a strong ideology and would not become part of such conspiracies. Those thinking otherwise are fools.

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Postby ramana » 24 Jun 2005 03:06

What emboldened Sharif to take on the Army? How was he convinced that his orders would be carried out? Maybe the episode with Karamat might have deluded him. Maybe the Army did not want two successive chiefs to be dismissed/resigned. Bad for H&D.


---------
Also note the part where he fears loss of Northern Areas if the fighting is not stopped.
Last edited by ramana on 24 Jun 2005 19:41, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby Raj Malhotra » 24 Jun 2005 13:45

Frankly it is much better to keep theories simple:-

My take:-


Two Shallow men Nawaj and Mush were in it together. Now the failure has no takers. US may have got some inkling but it could not have imagined how big things would get. And I think neither did Nawaj. Mush wanted it to get big and dirty and when shit hit the fan he chickened out.

concluded

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Postby D_Prem » 25 Jun 2005 03:43

[Guys this is my first post]

The reason why I joined this forum was that I was inspired by the patriotism of the members, in that they were planning to put up a website on Kargil.

It is rather unfortunate that such a website, which is particularly dedicated to Kargil hasnt come about yet. Nevertheless, as they say "dair aaye, par dursut aaye!"

So in view of the above, I am willing to extend help to the people who are interested in creating such a website. I know HTML and I have designed the website for the company that I work for. Although I do not live in India anymore, [and this perhaps might hinder the making of the website] but I will cooperate fully to the creation if I am given a chance.

Thank you,

Jai Hind! :D

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Postby SandeepA » 25 Jun 2005 04:11

desh_premi
You need to first change your name per forum guidelines.

D_Prem
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Maps ... high res pics

Postby D_Prem » 01 Jul 2005 22:03

Hey,

I might be a bit late on this and perhaps many of you already know about it. But regardless of that, high res pics (of any place on the earth) are available on the new Google Earth site. Here's the link:
http://earth.google.com/

For the folks who are planning to make a website, this probably would be the most ideal way to get high res, color ....never b4 seen images of Kargil!
Would be great help in understanding the terrain and the way the attacks took place.

Anyways, there is a file associated with it that you gotta download. Here's the link for taht:
http://www.majorgeeks.com/download4659.html

Cheers,
Prem.

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Postby Arun_S » 03 Dec 2005 03:24

Here is a Post Graduate thesis many will like to learn from and archive:

[url=http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/Acosta03.pdf]NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, Montrey California
Thesis: HIGH ALTITUDE WARFARE- THE KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE
Marcus P Acosta
June2003[/url]

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Postby satya » 03 Dec 2005 04:11

Arun

as per the thesis u have posted, majority of indian casualties were due to 'high altitude sickness'' rather than enemy fire whereas the general impression i had so far was tht majority of indian casualty was due to enemy artillery fire, can u shed some light on this.

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Postby Arun_S » 03 Dec 2005 06:34

Sorry I missed that not sure which page you are referring to and how arrive at that impression?

Cold weather and High Altitude was surely respeonsible for reverses in intiial attacks, if you recall there was considerable time spent to acclamatize new reinforcement before the next round of (this time successful) campaigns were launched to crush & kill of what became Pakjabi race-down the hill Army.

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Postby RayC » 03 Dec 2005 10:12

Operations are planned without resorting to emotions i.e. crush and kill etc.

It was to evict and defeat the enemy.

Adequate time was spent on acclimatisation is a truism but lest one misunderstands this "adequate time" spent was for basic acclimatisation and not "full" since acclimatisation has a series of stages (depending on the altitude to be occupied) and has very rigid regimen. Obviously, such a regimen could not be followed owing to a variety of reasons.

While the Pak Army was adequately stocked for the immediate operations, however, they relied more on the Koran than their military training and planning.

One of the reasons for success of the Indian Army was that officers led from the front.

In so far as senior officers being out of shape, it is a comparitive statement. To expect a 40 plus officer to be as fit as a 20 year officer or men is a matter of opinion.

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Postby Shankar » 03 Dec 2005 11:43

No way the pakistan could have stayed on the icy heights for long -it was always a matter of time .If I am to list out the reasons of indian armys quick success it would be something like this

1) FH 77B FH 77B FH77B the arty strikes were devastating adequately assisted by the MBRL s .The pakistani army knew no army in the world can withstand that kind of bombardment for long and that too in such inhospitable terrain .

2) Like Ray said the young officers mostly in capt and major rank showed true leadership which in a battle front means be a part of the strike team taking the bullets and shooting the enemy not sitting in atent over a laptop .

3)Safed sagar was more a deterent t to PAF from taking on our arty positions in close air supprt missions . While the strikes were demoralising and supply lines were damaged they would have been more effective if the silly dont cross the loc instruction was not there .

If you compare the tons of explossive delivered on mountain tops from Fh 77b s and mirages the reason for this comment will be obvious.

4) Indian navy ships taking up blockade position very very close to pakistani coast line -it was very intimadating andmade the generals realise how close they were to total disaster

The us intervention in the last stages were plain icing of the cake -by making them withdraw clinton actually saved the nation state of pakistan from total disintegration which would have harmed us military interests inthe region .

May be the whole thing could have been avoided if the local corps and brigade comanders were more tuned to ground realities but then thes facts are still to come out and all I read is from reporters writting books may be a white paper by indian army would settle the issue once and for all .

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Postby RayC » 06 Dec 2005 15:53

May be the whole thing could have been avoided if the local corps and brigade comanders were more tuned to ground realities


Remember one Brigade was occupying the area that requires a whole Division to defend as is the case now.

It is not that the realities were never known. It is just that there is "x" number of troops/ units/formations are available for "y" number of active combat tasks and "z" number of armed peace tasks. And some troops. units/ formations have also to return to peace stations.

Therefore, it was all a question of permutation and combinations that was visualised by the AHQ against the threat that was in being.

The fact that one Div is no longer in the CI grid and instead is defending Kargil and Dras obviously is at the expense of the efficiency of the CI grid.

It maybe noted that the army strength is governed by the Manpower Ceiling.

That is one of the reason why the addition of a plethora of new weaponry without commensurate increase in manpower is but a case of robbing Peter to pay Paul. Battles are won by what is known as the "bayonet strength" and if that depletes because weapons which are not technically rifles with bayonets per se are manned by those originally counted as the bayonet strength, then the outcome can be well imagined.

An interesting situation where one requires certain equipment and yet.......

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Postby Anoop » 06 Dec 2005 18:44

Ray sahab,

How is the required "bayonet strength" determined? Is it fixed for peace-time unit strength or can it be made up with reinforcement during combat?

Thanks

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Postby RayC » 06 Dec 2005 21:24

Anoop,


To put it very elementarily.

Bayonet strength is the number of chaps who will assault, let us say, a bunker. The remainder are the support group who cover the assault by fire from the flank by suppressing the enemy from using his weapons and keeping the enemy's head down.

When you attack you have to fire from your rifle/ sten and then in Close Combat, use your bayonet.

Normally out of a section of 10, 6 are what is termed as a bayonet strength. It must be remembered that in an assault, not all the 6 will reach the objective i.e. the bunker. They can be injured or maybe dead. Therefore, at the opbjective end, there has to be adequate strength that delivers the death blow.

One fights through bunker by bunker (Fighting through the Objective) in the given area of responsibility.

Then having captured the area one has been given as its objective, one reorganises and lets the next echelon pass through and so on till the whole objective is captured.

Then one does the Final reorganisation.


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