Time to rethink NFU

Prateek · Post by **Prateek** » 07 Jan 2003 04:55

Indian defence analysts have definitely ensured to take care of Mushraaf's comments that said, "Pakistan will respond with a nonconventional war". The new Indian policy defines India of using nukes, if faced by nukes, chemical or biological war.

Mushraaf later responded do define his non-conventional war meant guerilla war. So our threshhold against all non conventional wars is not yet complete !?

Though, I see a lot of change with GOI policies on the nukes, I would have been more happier if India had announced that "India will use every weapon in its arsenal, (with out naming any weapons!) if threatened by WMD's of any kind" . India should announce that NFU holds good, everytime of the year, as long as we are not threatened by the WMD's. This should have defined India's threshhold much more clear to the rest of the world.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 07 Jan 2003 05:11

Even though the prinicpal challengers - TSP and China have signed the CWC as non weapon powers, there is extensive evidence of their surrogates terrorists trying or having acquired such weapons. The DND did not mention the responding to BCW with nukes. It is prudent policy to bring it in line with the super power. Yes the TSP spokesman is certainly worried for the new doctrine is an escalation but if he has no intent of using BCW which by treaty he does not have why should he be so worried?
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BTW this is the type of nuancing I wanted for the NFU. For it deals with the terrorist threat as the formal powers dont have such weapons by signing the CWC treaty.

What needs further clairification is the nuke threat by surrogate terrorists. Leila -1 here we come! Should the statement clarify that those countries harboring such terrorists who resort to WMD can consider themselves as having breached the NFU clause?

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 07 Jan 2003 06:29

Ramana:

Does section 2.5 of the DND not address the use of nukes by surrogates:

2.5. India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 07 Jan 2003 07:14

Calvin,The para refres to non use against non weapon states. What I was talking about are proxies like jihadis, etc.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 07 Jan 2003 08:10

Ramana: The first part of 2.5 certainly refers to non-weapons states, but read the second part carefully.

The negative of what is stated (in the context of NFU, and a second strike) is:

India *will* resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which possess nuclear weapons, or are aligned with nuclear weapon powers.

Also, Section 2.4 of the DND reads:

2.4. The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.

We had read the "entity" in 2.4 as meaning a coalition, but it can equally be read to mean a non-state actor.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 07 Jan 2003 08:40

Originally posted by John Umrao:
Bhishma KS in TOI.
********
LEADER ARTICLE
Essence of Deterrence
K SUBRAHMANYAM

[ TUESDAY, JANUARY 07, 2003 12:03:16 AM ]

The crux of command control is the command chain when the prime minister is in a position to exercise it and when he is not because of a decapitation attack on the Capital wiping out the entire political and military leadership.
...
first step is to have the strategic forces’ command far away from New Delhi with full knowledge of targeting plans for retaliation
Second, the political succession has to be clearly defined.
...
ensuring the survivability of the retaliatory capability through deception, camouflage, mobility and redundancy in strike capabilities. It must also impress upon the adversary that he cannot successfully target the force and get away without punitive punishment. While the former considerations justify secrecy, the latter calls for a transparent projection of capabilities without compromising secrecy.

hmmm..

People other than brf seem to know these things.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 07 Jan 2003 22:34

Reflecting on the adopted doctrine it is better than the draft for it expands the deterrence to CBW. Only lacuna is still to put the onus of terrorists/proxy entitities on the states harboring them. A statement from RM saying that states harboring entities using WMD will be subject to the conditions of the doctrine will be a positive incentive for them to clean up. Currently TSP claims it has no control over its rogues. A nuancing of the doctrine might be an incentive for them.

Also what is needed in addition to the forming all these committees etc is to show the will to use all means at its disposal. To date India has shown itslef to be very amenable to pressure from US in particular and UK in general. What is needed is to show some resolve to face down these two powers. For example no one doubts Israeli resolve which is not supposed to have nukes in case of a catastrophe. With respect India it is not so due to the political will and the Lahori Club/Wagh candlewallas.
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From the PIB site:

The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) met today to review the progress in operationaizing of India’s nuclear doctrine. The Committee decided that the following information, regarding the nuclear doctrine and operational arrangements governing India’s nuclear assets, should be shared with the public.

2. India’s nuclear doctrine can be summarized as follows:

Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;

A posture of "No First Use" nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;

Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.

Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.

Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states;

However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons;

A continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations, and continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests.

Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

3. The Nuclear Command Authority comprises a Political Council and an Executive Council. The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.

4 The Executive Council is chaired by the National Security Advisor. It provides inputs for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the Political Council.

5. The CCS reviewed the existing command and control structures, the state of readiness, the targetting strategy for a retaliatory attack, and operating procedures for various stages of alert and launch. The Committee expressed satisfaction with the overall preparedness. The CCS approved the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Forces Command, to manage and administer all Strategic Forces.

6. The CCS also reviewed and approved the arrangements for alternate chains of command for retaliatory nuclear strikes in all eventualities.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 08 Jan 2003 01:46

B.Raman has been writing: National Security Doctrine for India

-----------
NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE
by B. Raman

Any national security doctrine (NSD) of India has to cater to the possibility of threats from two sources--- China and Pakistan.

2. The threat from China was rated high till 1988 because of the unresolved border dispute between the two countries, the clandestine military and nuclear assistance given by the Chinese Government to the Pakistani Armed Forces in order to keep the Indian Security Forces preoccupied on two fronts and the support extended by the Chinese intelligence agencies to the tribal insurgent groups of India's North-East. The border dispute had led to a war between the two countries in 1962. Between 1967 and 1979, many of these insurgent groups went to Yunnan in China vis North Burma and were trained and armed by the Chinese intelligence.

3. The visit of Rajiv Gandhi, the then Indian Prime Minister, to China in 1988 and his meeting with Deng Xiao-peng set in motion the process of improving the bilateral relations. In 1988 and thereafter, the two countries agreed on a number of confidence-building measures, set up a joint working group to discuss the border problem on a sustained basis and decided not to let the pending border dispute come in the way of an improvement in the relations in the economic, cultural and other fields. The Chinese intelligence, which had already started reducing its clandestine assistance to the tribal insurgent groups from 1979, totally stopped it after 1988.

4. Despite this, China continues to pre-occupy the attention of India's national security managers due to the following reasons:

* The very slow progress of the talks on the border issue giving rise to misgivings that it probably wants to keep this issue alive till it has totally pacified Tibet to its satisfaction. Though there is no more unrest in Tibet, which has been developing economically, the Dalai Lama still enjoys a large following there. The Chinese are determined that when the present Dalai Lama dies, his successor would be a man of their choice. They apprehend that this could give rise to serious unrest, which could be exploited by the Tibetan diaspora in India and elsewhere. By keeping the border issue alive, China wants to retain a pressure point which it can exploit should India show reluctance to keep the Tibetan refugees under control. In national security matters, the Chinese, unlike the Indians, work on a long-term basis and try to develop today options which they may need years hence should circumstances so warrant.
* China's continued clandestine assistance to Pakistan in the military nuclear field and in the acquisition of a missile-based delivery capability. Even as Beijing was entering into an agreement with Rajiv Gandhi on improving bilateral relations, it was secretly entering an agreement with Islamabad for assistance in the missile field.

* China's decision in 2001 to assist Pakistan in the construction of the Gwadar port on the Balochistan coast, which would reduce Pakistan's present dependence on the Karachi port, which is within easy reach of the Indian Navy, and give the Pakistani Navy a greater operational flexibility.

5. The threat from Pakistan has always remained and will continue to remain of a very high order due to the following reasons:

* Pakistan's inability to reconcile itself to the loss of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and its obsessive urge to gain control of this territory by hook or by crook.
* Its equally obsessive urge to avenge its defeat at the hands of India in 1971 and its loss of the then East Pakistan.

* The predominant role of the revenge-seeking Pakistani Army in its national security management, with practically no role for an elected political leadership in this matter.

* Its refusal to work for a reduction of tension and for the improvement of relations in other fields till a negotiated solution could be found to the Kashmir question.

* The complexes and the feelings of insecurity from which the Pakistan Army suffers vis-a-vis its Indian counterpart.

* The role of the pan-Islamic extremist elements in moulding perceptions towards India, whether in the civil society or in the national security apparatus.

6. Its 1971 defeat at the hands of India brought home to Pakistan the ground reality that it could never hope to achieve its territorial objective through a conventional war on India. It, therefore, embarked upon a policy of waging a proxy war through the use of terrorism as a weapon against the Indian State. Pakistan had been using terrorism against the Indian State since 1956 when the Naga insurgency broke out. Whereas its use of terrorism against India before 1971 was a defensive measure to keep the Indian Security Forces preoccupied with internal security duties so that they could not pose a threat to it, its use after 1971 was an aggressive measure having the dual objective of continuing to keep the Indian Security Forces bleeding and preoccupied with internal security duties and achieving its strategic objective of annexing J&K without the direct use of its Army in a conventional war.

7. Till Pakistan achieved a military nuclear capability in the late 1980s, which was subsequently openly demonstrated in the Chagai nuclear tests of 1998, it kept its proxy war restricted to the training and arming of Indian separatist groups, whether in Punjab or J&K, which had taken to arms against the Govt. of India due to various grievances. The acquisition of the military nuclear capability made the Pakistani military leadership conclude that the possibility of an Indian-imposed conventional war in retaliation for its proxy war had been reduced considerably, if not largely eliminated, and hence it could further escalate its proxy war by training, arming and infiltrating into India its own nationals under the guise of jihadi volunteers from different pan-Islamic organisations to intensify the jihad against India. Till 1995, the role of these mercenaries was largely confined to J&K, but since then Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been using them in other parts of India too.

8. Pakistan looks upon its nuclear arsenal and its missile delivery capability not as a weapon of deterrence to deter India from using its nuclear capability against it, but as a weapon of intimidation to prevent India from retaliating against it through its armed forces for its proxy war and as a weapon of psychological pressure by creating fears of a possible nuclear holocaust and thereby moving the rest of the world, particularly the US, to exercise pressure on India on the J&K issue. Its consistent refusal to subscribe to the no first use of nuclear weapons declaration and its repeated reiteration of its readiness to make first use of its nuclear weapons to prevent the Indian Army from over-running its large cities and crushing its Army are part of its intimidatory tactics.

9. The nuclear threat from Pakistan is compounded by the presence of pan-Islamic jihadi elements which justify the use of the weapons of mass destruction to protect Islam, if necessary. The possibility of the nuclearisation of terrorism originating from the terrorist hub of Pakistan is a matter of great concern not only to India, but also to the international community as a whole, confronted with the threat of pan-Islamic jihadi terrorism.

10. Since Gen. Pervez Musharraf seized power on October 12,1999,Pakistan has embarked on a policy of over-projecting its nuclear and missile capability in order to reassure its own population of the adequacy of its capability and to intimidate India and prevent a retaliatory conventional strike against its proxy war.

11.The objectives of India's NSD vis-a-vis China are two-fold and simple:

* How to prevent a repeat of 1962, by maintaining an adequate level of conventional military capability to deter any Chinese temptation to enforce its territorial claims against India by force?
* How to maintain a credible nucleat deterrent against it?

12. The NSD objectives vis-a-vis Pakistan are manifold and much more complex:

* How to find a controlled retaliatory response to Pakistan's proxy war without allowing the response to degenerate into a war involving the use of nuclear weapons?
* How to neutralise the Pakistani attempts to intimidate and demoralise the Indian population through over-projection of its nuclear and missile capability and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric?

* Whereas any war with China will most probably be fought in Indian territory, any war with Pakistan will be in Pakistani territory. How to prevent India's overwhelming conventional superiority from pressing the panic button in Pakistan's military leadership and triggering off a nuclear response ?

* How to achieve India's military objectives in the shortest time possible before international intervention comes in the way of the further conduct of the war?

13. In response to these questions, a number of possible options had figured in the debate on national security in recent months. Amongst the various oprtions suggested/considered were:

* Greater transparency about India's nuclear and missile capabilities to reassure our own population and to have a sobering effect on Pakistan's adventurist Generals.
* A public announcement of India's nuclear command and control mechanism.

* Discarding India's no first use of nuclear weapons policy.

* India's readiness and ability to fight a limited conventional war without allowing it to escalate into a nuclear confrontation.

* A counter-terrorism doctrine to exploit Pakistan's vulnerabilities through covert action to make it pay an increasingly prohibitive price for its proxy war.

* Co-operative action through other concerned powers to prevent Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction capabilities from falling into the hands of its terrorists.

14. The announcement by the Govt. of India of India's nuclear command and control mechanism and the contours of its nuclear doctrine on January 4, 2002, was the necessary first step in this direction. The no first use policy has been reiterated, but in a nuanced form by underlining that India's nuclear capability is meant to deter not only a nuclear strike, but also a strike with chemical or biological weapons. India's capability and determination for a massive retaliatory response has been reiterated.
15. However, the nuclear doctrine by itself will not complete the national security doctrine unless it is supplemented by a counter-terrorism doctrine to enable India exercise its right of active defence against the Pakistani use of terrorism as a weapon to achieve its strategic objectives. Such a doctrine should have a mix of carefully-controlled overt and extensive, sustained and deniable covert actions. The national security managers should now devote themselves to this task. It brookes no delay.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com )

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 08 Jan 2003 02:04

Grey areas cloud PM's nuclear chain
By Our special correspondent

http://in.news.yahoo.com/030106/58/1zrqv.html

New Delhi, Jan. 6: The forma-lisation of a Nuclear Command Authority by the Cabinet Co-mmittee on Security has raised questions on the chains of command to be followed in the political and military establis-hment in executing the nuclear doctrine.

The announcement by the CCS, over the weekend, was in itself not a surprise. Indeed, it has been expected for the last four-and-a-half years since the 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests. If at all, the strategic community wonders why it has taken so long. The inference drawn is that New Delhi was under pressure to show that it was a responsible nuclear power.

However, the announcement did not make public the chains of command in the civil and military establishment. This is seen by nuclear weapons' states — like the US and UK — as a necessity to make the command and control structure credible.

As it is, there are multiple agencies tasked with responsibility on nuclear issues. Some of these — like the department of atomic energy — are civil and some — like the army's 333 Missile Group — are military.

The NCA itself will have two layers — a political council headed by the Prime Minister and an executive council headed by the national security adviser. The status of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), whose first head is likely to be an air force officer, is unclear.

Defence ministry sources said the CCS had only announced the intention to create the post of commander-in-chief of the SFC. The defence ministry will have to be given directives to create the SFC before it is notified. After that, an establishment for the SFC has to be created. It is possible that it will not be headquartered in New Delhi. The command and control mechanism may be located deep in the hinterland with the arsenal spread out in multiple silos.

The Kargil Review Committee headed by defence analyst K. Subramaniam had recommended the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), who would be the "first-among-equals" among all the service chiefs and would also function as the principal advisor to the government on security and military issues.

The CDS would also have a Strategic Forces Command, along with the Integrated Defence Staff and a tri-service command based in the Andamans, reporting to it.

However, neither has the CDS post been sanctioned — it is pending with the Cabinet which has to sort out inter-services' claims to the post — nor has the reporting of the authority for the SFC been enunciated. In all likelihood, pending the creation of the CDS post, the SFC will report directly to the chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee.

As things now stand, defence experts perceive the chairman of the NCA's executive council — the national security adviser, the post currently held by Brajesh Mishra — emerging as the sole link between the military establishment and the political leadership. The Chiefs of Staff Committee will, in effect, be reporting to him.

The civilian chain of command has also not been made public. In a setting in which the Prime Minister — who has been vested with the sole authority over the nuclear button — is unable to function, conventional nuclear command and control hierarchy demands that the next in the line of succession be identified. In the US, for instance, where the President has authority over the nuclear button, the structure identifies 16 others in the line of succession.

Strategic experts also point to the role of the political council. "It is not clear what exactly the political council will do because it makes more sense for one authority to be decisive," said Bharat Karnad, who was a member of the National Security Advisory Board that submitted the draft nuclear doctrine in August 1999.

There is little change in the doctrine that the CCS expounded on Saturday from the one submitted by the NSAB. The only difference is that the government now factors in the possible use of a nuclear weapon if the country and its forces are attacked using chemical or biological weapons (apart from nuclear weapons).

Karnad says this was also envisaged in the draft nuclear doctrine submitted by the NSAB.

"The CCS has no doubt discussed the chains of command and it is clear that while the authority vests at first with the civilian-political authority, how far down the line do you go before it passes on to the military?" he wondered.

Strategic experts say there is little difference in the structure of the NCA that Delhi has announced from that of its counterpart in Pakistan. But since the political leadership in Islamabad is in the hands of the military, the army will always wield the authority over its nuclear arsenal.

In Pakistan, after the President, General Pervez Musharraf, the line of succession passes on to army officers of lieutenant-general rank — chairman of Pakistan's Strategic Forces Command and corps commanders.

A `nuclear' force in being

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 08 Jan 2003 02:18

I dont see the problem. Is the US chain so transparent? All this self doubting is not worthwhile. The point is those who need to know -enemies do know. So except for good copy what does Karnad get out of this.
Expanding the deterrent from core to BCW is a major step and was not in the DND. For eg. it took the US until 1991 to come up with this before the Gulf War. As it erodes the negative security assurances of the DND to the non weapon states it must have caused a lot of heartburn in the GOI. And carping about Brajesh Mishra/NSA is useless. Even in the US the NSA is major domo.

Besides there is the question of need to know. Why make all this public as it would invite certain targetting. With this ambiguity it makes the task that much harder for any challenger for he has to worry about after llife and other challengers.

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 08 Jan 2003 02:18

India has back-up nuclear command in place

India has more than one alternative nuclear command structure in place, authoritative official sources say. In the event of a surprise attack, "these alternative command authorities will be in a position to take retaliatory action".

In declaring this, New Delhi provided the missing piece in the nuclear doctrine it announced earlier this week. With a public command structure and a policy of no-first-use, critics had said India was inviting a surprise nuclear attack.

An alternative command puts the final touch to India's nuclear deterrent. "If an enemy knows that such a command exists, but does not know where they are "this will "deter" a surprise attack, said sources. India may have "two or three" alternative command structures.

Both the location and nature of the command would remain secret. "It is essential that the enemy does not know where the alternate command is located. This will never be disclosed," the sources said. The succession ladder of various officials had also been worked out.

During the Kargil war and last year's mobilisation crisis, sources said, India had made "adequate preparations" on the nuclear front and "could have retaliated if there had been any need".

http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_133868,0008.htm

AkshayM · Post by **AkshayM** » 08 Jan 2003 03:00

ramana, what does negative security assurances mean?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 08 Jan 2003 03:52

See line 5 in the PIB post.
It means India wont use nukes on non-nuke states. Kind of reassuring those who dont have it that India wont use them.

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 08 Jan 2003 04:18

A no-first-use doctrine for better security
Controlling the nuclear genie

Jasjit Singh
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=16245

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 08 Jan 2003 06:03

Originally posted by ramana:
See line 5 in the PIB post.
It means India wont use nukes on non-nuke states. Kind of reassuring those who dont have it that India wont use them.

I just wonder to what extent the "Log kya kahenge?" factor plays a role in the Indian subcontinent's politics, as well as in international relations.

Put simply, Pakistan and some others seek to portray India as a bully seeking to be a regional hagemon - a cat among pigeons like Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan etc. India seeks to appear more like Obelix, the good guy, big, tough but harmless to the other good guys.

The non-use reassurance is part of that I suppose.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 08 Jan 2003 07:39

Shiv,

I think you are dead right on this issue.

However, the cat better let the little guys know that they better not be remote controlled by the bigger cat up north. BD in particular. BD in particular has started shouting just like TSP. This clowning has to stop and India better find a way - besides the deportation - to make them understand that there are red lines beyond which they cannot go.

Wonder if Chicom will at some time provide an umbrella for these little guys - specially Burma.

Prateek · Post by **Prateek** » 08 Jan 2003 08:39

Shiv could be right. But I always wonder, WHY is it that after living in such a rough neighbourhood and even after having seriously negetive experiences with them, the Indians are not being TOUGH. It's high time Indians begin acting tough when we deal with the rogue nations. No point in being nice all the time while living with a tough and rogue neighbourhood.

kirtisimha · Post by **kirtisimha** » 08 Jan 2003 09:43

PTI[ TUESDAY, JANUARY 07, 2003 03:14:39 PM ] Musharraf heads Pak's nuclear command

The decision to use nuclear weapons, however, is not wrested with Musharraf or any individual but the NCA would take a unanimous decision, local daily Dawn said in a report on the country's secretive nuclear command structure, while reporting on a special presentation on the command structure made by NCA to Jamali on Monday.

They could not resist it could they

..... 'Unanimous' cool! I wonder what that word means in a Paki dictionary.

kirtisimha · Post by **kirtisimha** » 08 Jan 2003 09:52

Shiv-India seeks to appear more like Obelix, the good guy, big, tough but harmless to the other good guys.

Yeah! High time we start deriving Oblique pleasure in destroying Paki - Jehadi Romance

tiruvar00r · Post by **tiruvar00r** » 08 Jan 2003 10:11

Actually the analogy works beautiully. India is the obelix of Asia...maybe the world. (we were dropped into a cauldron of twice born magic potion when (the great) bharatvarsha was a baby).

MAybe we should Kick butt like obelix once in a while.

Wonder who dogmatix is...britain?

member_3867 · Post by **member_3867** » 08 Jan 2003 14:46

Admin, Please free to move this post to the correct thread or delete it.

Did anyone read the following book

Crescent and Chakara
The Final India-Pak war.
by Jay S Babu.

It talk about nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 08 Jan 2003 19:45

While we discuss the Indo-TSP/China situation WRT nukes, there is a drama being played at the other end of Asia: NK. Depending on how events play out there they could have some impact on the situation in India.

One of the fallouts of the situation, experts say, is the nuclearization of Japan, SK and may be even Taiwan.

Here is a audio on immediate actions that one could take WRT NK - from Worldview, NPR, Chicago. It is one hour long, broken into two interviews.

Manne · Post by **Manne** » 09 Jan 2003 16:06

Exclusive from Rediff

Abandon NFU, Security Board tells govt

What was that about being ahead of the curve ?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 09 Jan 2003 20:24

An a FYI (this is an audio feed):

History of U.S. nuclear involvement in Korean peninsula

Interview with Peter Hayes — Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development

Some very interesting bits of info in there. It is a hour long interview.

Vikram · Post by **Vikram** » 09 Jan 2003 21:01

Originally posted by Manne:
Exclusive from Rediff

Abandon NFU, Security Board tells govt

What was that about being ahead of the curve ?

The following were already suggested on BR many moons ago.

1. Abandon NFU

2. The report wanted India to be proactive in tackling Islamabad's support to terrorists and urged New Delhi to lend political, diplomatic, and moral support to the people of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, including Gilgit and Baltistan. It said whenever Pakistan raised the issue of Jammu and Kashmir at international forums, India should turn the focus on Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

3. Interestingly, the security experts suggested the government use the term terrorist' for various outlawed groups operating in Maharashtra, Assam, Andhra Pradesh, and Bihar. The media tends to use terms such as ultras, militants, or insurgents...

There couldn't be a better National Security Advisory Board than BR.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 09 Jan 2003 21:49

Should BRF address the shortcomings noted in the report and have alternative policy papers as suggested by the board?

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 09 Jan 2003 22:12

Realizing that BRF has an increasingly wider circle of sophisticated readers/lurkers/members, it makes sense to do this.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 09 Jan 2003 23:08

Kaushal please do the honors and open a thread with the text of the RedIff report and highlight the lacuna and proposals. We can then develop a list of things needed and assign to our members.

Manne · Post by **Manne** » 10 Jan 2003 10:16

Originally posted by Kaushal:
Realizing that BRF has an increasingly wider circle of sophisticated readers/lurkers/members, it makes sense to do this.

Wish you all the best Kaushal.

Vikram, I know yaar !!! I guess my post gave the opposite impression...

kirtisimha · Post by **kirtisimha** » 10 Jan 2003 16:01

North Korea withdraws from NPT

Agence France-Presse
Seoul, January 10

North Korea announced its immediate withdrawal from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty on Friday but said it may reverse its decision if the United States agreed to resume oil supplies.

North Korea's latest act of brinkmanship came as senior regime officials held talks on its standoff with the US with a close ally of former American president Bill Clinton.

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 11 Jan 2003 02:20

Op-ed by Tom Plate in the San Francisco Chronicle likes and supports India's NFU stance. Says the world would be better off if more countries did the same....

Nukes are to deter, India says

IF THERE IS a silver lining amid the war clouds that hang over South Asia these days, it is that those clouds are not likely to be nuclear -- at least if India has anything to say about it.

Long before it first tested nuclear weapons -- in 1998 and ever since -- New Delhi has insisted it wouldn't use nuclear weapons unless its territory were fired on first. No ifs, ands or buts about it: Nukes would be launched only in retaliation for a nuclear strike; they exist only to deter; they wouldn't be fired off even in the heat of close-fought battle -- an enemy would need to use them first.

Recall that India faced worldwide censure, especially from the West, when it conducted its surprise 1998 underground tests, which, of course, triggered the Pakistani nuclear tests that predictably followed. The anti-India outcry was led by the United States, which, however, refuses to adopt an unequivocal non-first-use policy (and, of course, used the A-bomb in Asia decades ago).

Now, with the fullness of several years' perspective, India may deserve international acceptance more for its continued non-first-use stand and careful nuclear administration than mindless condemnation for its having gone nuclear in the first instance. Just last week, even as Pakistani and Indian officials were hurling their usual belligerent words at one another, the Vajpayee government not only reiterated its no-first-use policy -- but backed it up with an important disclosure designed to ensure that no mad-dog general can pull the nuclear trigger.

A new weapons command system has been put into place so that nuclear retaliation can only be triggered by an explicit civilian decision at the top. And at the top of the new Nuclear Command Authority sits the prime minister -- no one else.

India's stance undoubtedly is rooted in reasons beyond the ephemeral: among them its Gandhi ahimsa (nonviolence) and adroit Nehru-type diplomacy. What's incontrovertible, however, is that this policy could set a valuable precedent were it to be universally emulated. For, by flat logic, if no state with nuclear weapons were ever to use one first, none would ever be used.

Among the current nuclear club, only one other state -- neighboring China (interestingly, another Asian player) -- also rules out first use; otherwise, the Indian policy is an orphan in a global ocean of ambiguity or outright pugnacity. It is especially unfortunate that the United States, a shining democracy, takes the same view as Pakistan, which is not. Neither, tragically, will unreservedly drop the option to use nuclear weapons first.

The shamefulness is all the greater for America. Here we are, surrounded by non-threatening, non-nuclear neighbors Canada and Mexico. At least Islamabad can point out it's living in the shadow of India's fearsome conventional-forces superiority.

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 11 Jan 2003 02:27

jr^2, it is interesting that such praise for NFU is coming (the first that i have seen in a long time in the western media which is uniformly condemnatory of anybody other than themselves -grudgingly the P5 - having nukes) just as India is having second thoughts about the propriety of such a doctrine for India. In any event, we will take the praise, perhaps aware that any change in India's stance will be nuanced and will not happen instantaneously.

Kaushal

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 11 Jan 2003 04:06

Kaushal, This is called carrot trap to edge India not to go for FU. India's FU will change the dynamics totally and is actually a threat to GOTUS "war on terror" with the D Day coming close.
This is a gorilla trap in the making with a small window.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 11 Jan 2003 06:51

IMHO, the suggestion for India to leave the NFU camp has a tactical reason. The major reason (and may be the only one) for TSP to be FU is the superiority of the Indian conventional forces. The assumption here is that TSP does have some sane people who are incharge of the nuclear button (specifically right now Mush and Co.).

The fear the West (US in particular) has over the TSp nukes is that IF Mush falls the nukes may fall in the hands of a Jedic group: in short a First First Use (FFU) is possible. If this is a possibility the US steps in.

It is in India's interest that the US steps in no matter who has the finger on the nuke buttons in TSP. By going FU India may just force the issue of FFU on Mush and Co - the sane group. Which may invite a US intervention in TSP even before the nukes fall into the hands of the Jihadic group. In short all India (or anyone else) has to do is create an illusion of a Jihadic mentality in anyone who is incharge of the nuke button in TSP. No need for conventional forces to be put on alert, etc. As long as the border traffic from TSP is below some "acceptable" level, this should work.

Comments?

Manne · Post by **Manne** » 11 Jan 2003 09:55

Originally posted by acharya:
This is a gorilla trap in the making with a small window.

Can you explain this acharya ? Why is the window small ? Can India not give up NFU any time it pleases ?

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 11 Jan 2003 10:48

The effect of a FU outside the region will be felt significantly during the most crucial stages of war on terror but will be lessoned after that.
FU can be enabled anytime which will impact locally.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 12 Jan 2003 08:25

BBC: India's nuclear muscle

The pit goes into the warhead," he said. "And the warhead is kept in another place. And the delivery system - that is an aircraft, a missile of a submarine - is in another place again. It would take something from six to eight hours - maximum 12 hours to get the complete weapon assembled and ready to launch. Then it would take about 11 minutes to impact on Pakistan."

So, India has a no-first-use policy, which Pakistan does not. In other words, India is prepared to absorb one strike - sacrifice at least one city. Then, no more than 12 hours later, after it's put its weapons together, it would hit back with everything it's got.

The last para seems to be inaccurate. One would expect India to load up and not wait for the "no more than 12 hours" period. FD?

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 12 Jan 2003 09:48

My cross post from the other thread titled "What N.Korea abandoned NPT", since it has a bareing to other NPT signatories to bolt from the NPT barn.

The reason N.Kore abandoned NPT now is that the US as the five nuclear nations instead of taking actions to fulfill the NPT commitment to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons, has changed its nuclear policy in Dec-02 to go the WRONG WAY.

In a significant change of policy, it is now US policy to pre-emptivly use Nuclear weapons against any nation or force that the it perceives to pose a Nuclear, Biological or Chemical weapon threat . This new policy had

1. seriosly erorded and lowered the threshold of Nuclear weapon use by USA.

2. for the first time US has stated that it is free to use Nuclear weapons against a nation/force even without declaring war against the nation/force.

This new US nuclear posture makes the countires that have signed the NPT to be I'st class suckers, having given away their right to pursue nuclear weapons in return for a frail NPT promis by N5 that N5 countires will not threaten nuclear use on those countries who have signed NPT, AND the N5 will seriously persue nuclear weapons disarmament themselves (albiet with not committed date or time frame by the N5).

NPT countires having given away their right to Nuclear weapons for a song, this climb down by US on its commitment to NPT has left non-nuclear NPT signatory with nothing in return for their sacrifice.

Thus N.Korean abandonment of NPT is very justified and resonable. If US policy makes it free to pre-emeptively use nukes on N.Korea then N.Korea has a right to defend and deter against such attack by developing any weapons it thinks suitable including a counter nuclear weapon. Self defense is the right all nations and N.Korean is simply defending its legitimate right.

Other NPT countries for sure now look stupid having give away their security & right for noting in return.

The new US policy is the last nail in the coffin of NPT, may it RIP.

India nuclear policy of Jan-03 has only taken a leaf from some element of the new US policy, in that India will use nukes if its territoty or forces are attacked with NBC weapons. But unlike US new policy , Indian policy does NOT:

1. call for pre-emptive nuclear strike based on mear threat perception & without declaration of war,
2. use against non-nuclear nation

Like it or not Nuclear weapons are great playing field levellers in the comity of nations. I can understand Dr. APJ Kalam's vision of breaking the western monopoly on missiles and spreading it far & wide.

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 13 Jan 2003 00:18

Column by Christopher Hitchens. Says that in fact, all NFU policies do (and should?) camouflage an intent of FU.

Prevention and pre-emption -- The tortured logic of war and self-defense
http://www.msnbc.com/news/856645.asp?0dm=O17UO

Jan. 8 — It is said that during the 1973 Yom Kippur War — known on the other side as the Ramadan War — an Israeli military spokesman was asked for the fourth or fifth time whether the Jewish state would use nuclear weapons if its ground forces continued to suffer defeat. He repeated the official mantra — “Israel will not be the first country to deploy nuclear weapons in this region” — and then stepped back from the microphone (which he believed to have been switched off) and whispered to himself, “And we won’t be the second one, either.”

WARFARE IS AN enterprise where, very noticeably, nice guys finish last.

INDIA-PAKISTAN EXAMPLE

Take the extremely flammable situation along the Indo-Pakistan frontier. Pakistan is much smaller than India and has a much smaller army. It also has a “waist,” geographically speaking, which means that a sudden Indian “conventional” strike could punch across the border, cut Pakistan in half, and separate its capital city, Islamabad, from its only seaport in Karachi. It is this strategic nightmare that determined the Pakistanis on the acquisition of a nuclear capacity, with which they could destroy Indian armor and infantry as it was massing. Which side would then be the aggressor? The one that was massing, or the one that vaporized the potential assault force?

In the early Clinton years, the Pakistanis became sure that they were about to be attacked and prepared to launch, and the American officials who stopped the clock with only minutes to go are still inclined to shiver as they recall the moment. General Musharraf has since boasted publicly that if India had taken one extra step over the Kashmir question in late 2001, he would have ordered a pre-emptive nuclear attack. But this demented logic holds for all nuclear powers, all of whom are aware that the only real use for such devices is in an overwhelming first strike.

..But tautology lurks at every corner, and the distinction between “pre-emptive” and “preventive” becomes a distinction without a difference, and only hindsight really works (and not always even then). The lesson is that all potential combatants, at all times, will invariably decide that violence and first use are justified in their own case.

venkat_r · Post by **venkat_r** » 13 Jan 2003 19:34

Kaka says no..
India not to review no-first-use of nuclear weapons policy
India will not review its no-first-use of nuclear weapons policy since it has an adequate strike back capability in place in the event of a nuclear attack, Defence Minister George Fernandes said on Monday.