Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Arun_S
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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Arun_S » 01 Nov 2003 19:56

RMA at phycological and organization level:

Yes Sir, Yes Sir no more, this is the strike corps



VIKAS KAHOL

CHANDIGARH, OCTOBER 31: No more sirring in the uniform now. Not if you happen to be in the Army’s 2 Corps, the strike formation. Address a senior officer as ‘sir’ and you will have to pay a penalty—a bottle of beer within six hours of the ‘misdeamenour’. No more late hours at work either. Evenings are for games. And officers found clearing files on Sundays or after the office hours will be declared ‘inefficient’.

These were some of the do’s and don’ts handed out by Lt Gen G D Singh, General Officer Commanding of the Ambala-based 2 Corps, in a DO letter. In one stroke, the General has tried to banish all that he thinks is fallacious in his army.

The edict decrees that all officers will henceforth address their seniors not as ‘sir’ but by their ranks. So, he would like to be called General.

The 19-page letter touches various aspects concerning soldiers. ‘‘It should be ensured that every soldier gets a break of one complete day in a week, and the officers should implement it ruthlessly.’’ Expressing his displeasure at the increasing paperwork, the GOC has ordered a more efficient use of the phone. Orders, he says, should be passed through log book in HQs. The order also calls for making JCOs and NCOs computer savvy.Frowning at the preponderance of danda-wielding guards in cantts, the General has ordered that they be banished at once. And the number of armed guards be reduced to the bare minimum.

General’s commandments
• Vehicles: Tinted glasses are out
• JCOs: More respect to them
• Officers Mess: Ostentatious functions are out, so are entertainment programmes by officers wives
• Unit activity: No AC in CO’s office
• Leave: Full leave for everyone.
• Soldiers: Not to be detailed as helpers to unauthorised persons, or as nannies, caddies or ball boys.
• Canteens: No polythene please.

On the use of official transport, his instructions are clear-cut: it should not be be used for going to office, except by the Flag Officers, COs and PSOs who can’t claim transport allowance. Service transport will also not be used for going to club functions, private parties, schools, et al.

And certainly not on Sundays unless it is for collective welfare activity or for families of officers, JCOs, and other ranks while going or returning from leave.

Conceding that implementation will be dificult, the GOC states that officers can point out any lapses to him. In case of laxity in implementation, he would not ask for any explanation from the formation or unit but ask them to deposit Rs 2,000 to Rs 10,000 in the GOC’s fund from the commander’s fund or regimental fund. This would be an official transaction.

He concludes by asking the senior most officer in each station to help him implement the orders by calling him up on every 1st and 15th of the month.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Anaath » 01 Nov 2003 19:59

The US Army’s open self-criticism and analysis of the type that CALL at Fort Leavenworth does is definitely something commendable. In India, where there is a concerted effort being made to create an effective bureaucratic milieu for civilian-military cohesion (the new NDU, the new NSCS, the “new” post-Santhanam IDSA etc.), such openness would be most welcome.

However, we still live in a country where if a COAS says “Good Morning”, some (not all) in the media will choose to interpret it as “Army Chief declares morning to be a fine time to attack…” or something else along those lines that is equally sensational and ridiculous.

That having been said, we need more openness and more debate and more thinkers and more sources of inspiration, not less.

Also, we need to continue to adopt a carefully focused “problem-solving” approach that develops technical and procedural solutions to our unique circumstances (instead of merely modifying imported equipment and tactics like the old BIA used to do).

The fact remains that the problems we face in infiltration, high-altitude warfare, jungle warfare, desert warfare, perimeter defence, warfare against irregulars and pseudo-irregulars are uniquely challenging. That is the reason why HAWS and CIJWS have so many aspirant foreign trainees.

However, any IA doctrinal and tactical innovations in the context of J&K remain remarkably unnoticed by the public.

Outside of the brilliant concept of RR, the time tested grid+QRT combination, the (Israeli+Indian sourced) counter-Infiltration equipment, Sadhbhavana(WHAM) and perhaps some SIGINT capabilities, there doesn’t seem to be much information out there about how the IA is evolving its approach. Perhaps the IA should consider an awareness and education campaign to rectify this.

In short, where are our own answers to General Sir Gerald Templer?

Doubtless, there are several. Who is telling their stories? The Army definitely needs to.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby daulat » 01 Nov 2003 20:29

the IA also operates in a culture of extreme secrecy. I have met former officers who are reluctant to discuss operations many years after they have taken place and even been discussed in public fora or the media!

on the other hand, the DDM is ever ready to criticize the forces for shortcomings, though it tends to be of the form of 'our poor boys were let down by x,y,z'

as TSJ says, there is no official candid critique in the public domain.

the article on 2 Corps is very revealing, its high time that the army did something concrete about adjusting to a more modern societal structure. the jawan is not a coolie/bearer/man servant - he is a fighting man to be treated with respect. too often the old indian/british culture of the officers (gentlemen) and men (peasants) has been the dominant mode

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby TSJones » 01 Nov 2003 21:11


Will people stop compaining about the infantry equipment. As SBM has pointed out by and large the equipment is adequate.

We have seen the result of the fantastic US equipment - casualties are atthe same rate.

You can only protect so much


Well, in that case no RMA is needed. Everything is tip top. What's all the barking about?

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby debjani » 01 Nov 2003 21:28

TSJ,

Post mortem or after action reports are confined to the forces themselves.

I am not too sure how far they seriously address issues though Lessons Learnt are sure there.

Military Journals do carry Lessons Learnt. Of course, they are personal opinions.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Surya » 02 Nov 2003 03:28

TSJ

The barking is not about the helmets and the rifles.

The whining was.


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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby shiv » 02 Nov 2003 09:36

TSJ - I don't mean to reduce the impact of the questions you raised about Kargil, but let me state some impressions I have gained from general reading.

Yes, on the face of it, sending men up hills for frontal assualts seems stupid. But what happened is also an indicator of the fact that the Indian army is solidly disciplined and behind the civilian leadership - to the extent of "stupidly assaulting mountains" when there may have been other alternatives,

What were the other alternatives?

The most stupidly simple thing, as everyone including the Army pointed out, would have been to cut off the supply lines and wait for the Pakis on the mountains to starve out. That is where the crunch was.

Cutting off supply lines meant invading Pakistan and the civilian leadership forbade that. The Indian army complied, and did what they could within that restriction.

I won't speak of the IAF - that has been discussed at length at other times.

The other thing about Kargil was the "gamble factor". The Pakistanis (India assumed) gambled that India, under intense pressure as in 1965, would probably do a repeat of 1965 - that is open another front.

Opening another front would have been desirable for Pakistan as that would show Indian agression by the act of attacking Pakistan when pressured by "India based Kashmiri freedom fighters". Besides, any war would have been cut short by international intervention when Pakistan would have threatened to use nukes to protect itself against "A fragmenting and desperate India attacking Pakistan to divert attention from a freedom struggle by secessionists within Indian Kashmir." -an allegation that Pakistanis have made time and again.

The Indian political leadership did not want to go down that route and decided that the local problem would be dealt with at a local level with a degree of ferocity and tolerance to casualties - an act that the Pakistanis probably did not anticipate.

Oh yes a lot of other things could have been done, but with 20-20 hindsight would you be able to suggest what else could have been done considering that India was caught with its pants down?

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby srai » 02 Nov 2003 13:20

Originally posted by Surya:
Will people stop compaining about the infantry equipment. As SBM has pointed out by and large the equipment is adequate.

We have seen the result of the fantastic US equipment - casualties are atthe same rate.

You can only protect so much.

...
True ... but the question is how would IA have faired with its equipment?

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby JCage » 02 Nov 2003 15:48

Sure,but the IA is far more adept at the hearts and minds things than the US is.You would hardly see IA soldiers acting like the US chaps.Cultural and institutional differences.
That plus experience in COIN would surely help.APrt from that RMA or not,unavoidable casualties via hit and run attacks at checkpoints and IED's would occur at the same rate.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby debjani » 02 Nov 2003 22:07

TSJ,

I will TRY to answer your queries as well as I can, though it maybe imperfect.

The COIN issue is off topic, but I will still attempt.

We require RMA. Of course, it cannot be on the scale of the US, but a start can be made. The comparison should be with the capabilities [perceived and reported] with our adversaries. This is obvious. If indeed we go to war, it will be with them; and the proof of the pudding will be there and nowhere else. To have a hi fi armed forces with a population back to the bullock cart age is bollocks. Thus, I am at times peeved with these pipe dreams spewed up by folks enamoured by glossies of the armament industry even if these dreams are spurred with very high patriotism and love for the nation. I commend them for being better citizens or NRIs but I believe in the adage – Cut your coat as per the cloth. Maybe, I am wrong and they are right.

While we will be able to reckon with the US in conventional warfare, but it is in the realm of daydreams and non drug assisted hallucination to consider the US as an adversary for the present. Therefore, I will be not be comparing with the US.

Read my last post. Some of the problems are enumerated there. The RMA requires to be generated to solve those problems and the RMA should be ‘environment’ sensitive i.e. applicability to the terrain where it is being applied. [You wondered about aircraft bombing in High Altitude. Indeed it requires different skills and tables since the target end is in rarefied atmosphere; likewise with artillery (but we have mastered that)]. Likewise, artillery is ineffective in jungle or forest. Maybe we require IR or TI imaging. Infantry requires equipment, but we cannot overload them [it is still foot soldiering, especially in the mountains] and we cannot have multi role soldier unless the weapon used is multi role. Our problems are different from the US.

We don’t have a great feedback system, war or peace. I agree on that point. The reason possibly is that we have a different culture. We value the family and the family secrets are not divulged. The corollary is that we have Regiments based units [where you live your army life] and so ‘flaps’ are not reported. That is why great after action reports are not routine.

About the cultural difference. I have interacted with US and Canadian military men; some on the Net. They feel that the Sgts and Warrant Officers are the backbone of their armies and actual battles and have a poor opinion about their officers [I maybe wrong]. In our country, because of the ‘paternal attitude’ [the ‘mai baaap’ [dispenser of destiny] syndrome encouraged by the British] we are Officer led. That’s why so many casualties amongst the Officer class.

Further in COIN, I think we are more tolerant and more Human Rights sensitive than the US army. If you do a violation, your President justifies it as ‘the right to self defence’ and so NO [NO]country or human right organisation protests. We make a mistake, we have everyone on our back…the human rights, the government, Asia Watch, Oxfam, Amnesty international, the international media. You name the [expletive], and they are there. Worse is that the shrillest are Indian pinkos like Kuldip Nayar and other freaks.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Sukumar » 03 Nov 2003 05:52

Ray:

While the IA officers definitely lead from the front - I thought it was the senior NCOs and JCOs who keep the institutional memory of the IA and form its long term back bone ??

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Tim » 03 Nov 2003 06:00

Let me throw in a different spin - I've done some work on RMAs in various countries, in various periods, under various definitions.

There are two key questions.

First, what do you mean by an RMA? Do you mean changes in the ability of state-level structures to make war? Or are you referring to the operational capabilities driven by the development of new technologies?

Those are the two most common definitions. For the first, look at MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray's "The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050" (Cambridge University Press, 2001). This is really an outstanding work by military historians - broad in scope, but actually quite nuanced and remarkably successful (for a historical work) in utilizing social science concepts. If this is what you're looking for, India's a long way away - and so, for the moment, is everybody else. Their definitions revolve around huge macro-shifts, like the social change of the French Revolution and development of conscription, or the "nation at war" concept of the early 20th century.

The other definition abounds in current US (and other) writing. Google "Joint Force Quarterly", and in virtually every issue there is another article or two on RMA, transformation, network centric warfare, or whatever else is the leading topic of the day.

The problem here is two fold. First, under this definition, RMA can mean almost anything. Aircraft carriers? RMA - obviously. Except that it took the US three years of war to get it right, the Japanese got close but never really mastered it, and the Brits - who invented the darned things - fell hopelessly behind within a decade.

Tanks? RMA. But it took 20 years to learn how to use them. Under those circumstances, what's "revolution" and what's "evolution"? The term can become meaningless.

Second problem - it's technologically deterministic. The most important changes may not be technological, but organizational - or even strategic. Vietnam won with an army that (outside of infantry equipment) would have been quite at home in the First World War - infantry heavy, conscript formations, even a little light on heavy equipment (except for the major conventional offensives). For the Germans in 1940, their tanks were arguably less effective than France's - thinner armor, smaller guns. What they had were radios (allowing better C2) and good doctrine, and good leadership. But most German generals after the 1940 campaign actually attributed their success to better morale and ideological commitment. The spearhead units at Sedan took 70% casualties, and basically won on a last throw of the dice that the French reservists couldn't quite handle.

One more issue - to me, an RMA (whatever it means) requires a threat. India faces several different kinds of threats, some of which are amenable to technological solutions and some of which are not.

The US, now embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan, also faces some of the same problems. It may be that technology is not a panacea - that, in fact, light infantry training (an old habit in many armies) is the "RMA" for insurgency/terrorism/low-intensity conflict, and that technology only provides a minimal amount of leverage for that problem.

Figure out what India is transforming for, and you may be able to evaluate its success. My own sense is that at the moment, it is procuring emerging technologies when and where it can, but that directing them to a single threat and transforming the force appropriately hasn't happened yet. And given the varied threats the Indian army must respond to, that may be a reasonable approach.

Sometimes evolution is better than revolution.

Just a thought,
Tim

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby debjani » 04 Nov 2003 10:26

Tim,

The points are valid.

I reckon it has to be state level to wage an 'efficient' war if called upon to do so as the last resort. In my earlier post I have enunciated what is RMA as per the US and even there there are many views. In fact, it is all encompassing. I reckon that blind application of what others are doing is but as it has been said 'Monkey see, Monkey do'. And that won't do. Strategic perceptions are different and finances are what really govern the flights of fancy.

In so far as India is concerned, I have tried to enumerate the 'problems' as I see it. The RMA has to be tailored around that.

The biggest problem in the conduct of war is 'timely info' and 'reserve management' i.e. move the reserves to change the combat ratio to one's advantage, having lured the enemy into the killing area. Our vast terrain array presents unique problems and a single prescription does not hold good. Likewise, the CI has added another dimension.

Since you have worked in various countries on RMA, what are your suggestions given India's threat perceptions, economic strength and the via media taking into consideration the geo strategic environment that affects her threat perception, while at the same time not affecting the need for social upliftment, poverty eradication and race to enhance her economic power?

Further, I sure would love to know what RMAs could be on the anvil for operational capabilities driven by current technological innovations.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby shiv » 04 Nov 2003 13:24

I have just started reading abook called "Armed conflict" by a Brian Steed.
The Introductory chapter iteslf has an interesting pasage that I thought is relevant here.

The author uses a set of analogies to compare them with problems faced by the US and its RMA in modern warfare:

OCRed from "Armed Conflict: The Lessons of Modern warfare", by Brian Steed


"I describe these images in the following para­graphs:

· An armored knight being dragged from his mount in a crowded village square.
The press of the mob and the lack of maneuver room force the weapons and armor
of the knight to be as much a part of his fall as the grasping hands of the
peas-ants.
· A person from the projects has won a Ferrari in a lottery. The fear of damage,
vandalism, or theft forces the new owner to keep the vehicle secured within the
confines of a well-protected garage. Occasionally the vehicle ventures forth,
but only for a rare drive along the interstate.
· A moderate businessman from New York City in the summer of 1863 has hired a
conscript to fill his posifion in the latest Civil War draft. Aviolent mob
attacks and destroys the man's home, and his precious luxuries are scattered in
the flames or among the looters in the New York draft riots.
· In popular science fiction, technologically advanced space­ships are destroyed
with great regularity, then replaced with new versions of the vessels.
Typically no mention is made of cost, because money is rarely addressed in the
movies and books of this genre. Examples of this are the movies and tele­vision
series based on the Star Trek theme. In the movie Star Trek HI, the USS
Fnterpn~se is destroyed; the crew is presented with a replacement at the end of
Star Trek IV

Each of these images plays an important part in the underlying theme of this
book.
The knight represents the dominance of the U.S. military in the unrestricted
venues of the air, oceans, deserts, and plains of the world. Like the knights
of old, the U.S. military can use its tech­nology advantage and awesome
machines to their full extent in open areas. However, also like the knights of
old, these current warhorses are vulnerable in unfavorable terrain. The battle
ofAg­incourt (1415 C.E.) along with the battles of Crecy (1346 CE.) and
Gourtrai (1302 C.E.) showed the weakness of cavalry in confined or marshy
terrain and when faced with an entrenched and prepared infantry. The power
demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm was not a vision of battles to come. It
is, instead, analogous to the ac­tion of the proverbial mounted knight in
unrestricted terrain. If the United States is drawn into the city either to
rescue or assist an un­popular local leader or international policy, the
Americans face the same possibility as the knight in our image or in the cases
ofAgin­court, Crecy, and Courtrai. This was demonstrated vividly in Mo­gadishu,
Somalia.
The knight was pulled down not simply by the weight of his tech­nology but by
his lack of understanding of the revolting peasantry. Not to describe the world
as peasantry, but this is a real concern to many Americans and many American
foreign policy executors who often treat the rest of the world as the peasant
class. Those who strike at the United States with terrorism do so much as the
peasants used their strength of numbers to overwhelm their perceived unjust
lords.
The Ferrari is an expression of the love affair of the American mil­itary with
technology and gadgets. The pursuit of technology has given the United States
some of the most powerful machines in his­tory, but these machines are also
complicated, expensive, and sen­sitive when engaged at close proximity. They
also require a tremen­dous logistical burden to keep them supplied and mobile.
The United States could afford to lose tens of thousands of tanks in com­bat in
World War II. In Vietnam it could lose hundreds without much concern. In the
early years of the twenty-first century, the U.S. Army will have only a little
more than a thousand of the highest-technol­ogy tanks, each one costing nearly
$6 million. How many can the United States afford to lose? An example of this
is the 1999 Ameri­can deployment of Apache helicopters to Albania, where they
were never used. Whether the U.S. withheld them for training, logistical, or
threat concerns is irrelevant; we had hundreds of millions ofdol­lars invested
in equipmenL positioned to fight but never brought into the conflict. Will
America continue to protect these high4ech won­der vehicles for some future
conflict against a "near-peer" competi­tor when American foreign policy needs
their capabilities in the new war against terrorism? Is the United States
protecting America's Fer­rari, as it were, for infrequent road trips when it is
really needed for the daily commute? The Ferrari image also conveys a lack of
respect for the community in which the owner lived. His desire to protect his
prized possession from the hands and eyes of his neighbors demonstrates
arrogance that is often attributed to American policy and practice.
The businessman who suffers the anger of the draft riots is a warn­ing to all
who propose the use of surgical strikes by American tech­nological wonder
machines while allies provide the ground forces to do the dirty work. The
expense of high~technology gadgets has risen, and the fear of casualties has
become nearly paralyzing for American political and military leaders. This has
caused the United States to look toward allies and coalition partners to
perform the work of placing soldiers on the ground and in harm's way. In Bosnia
and Kosovo, America hesitated to act, because any conflict there would have
been complicated and rife with the difficulties of sup­porting soldiers placed
on the ground-not the antiseptic fight that the American people had become
familiar with during Operation Desert Storm. The United States struggled
diplomatically to get other nations to provide the ground forces while it
provided the high4ech, safe air, naval, and logistics support. The revolt of
the world community was prevented by the implementation of the Day­ton Peace
Accords, which called for a substantial American ground force. However; unlike
the fictitious rich gendeman, the United States must be wary of trying to hire
replacements to put the nasty but sn.lkmportant work on someone else's
shoulders.
The replacement of the spaceship demonstrates some of the cur­rent predictions
of future military force striicture. The exploding ex­pense of high4ech
weaponry will force nations to build smaller mil­itaries for the same money.
Unlike the example of Star Trek, money is an issue. In 2020, ten M1~ tanks will
be irreplaceable within a reasonable time frame. The tank production facility
will not be op erafing, and restarting the plant would bring the per unit cost
to well over $10 million. If the loss of a few tanks could have this impact on
the American military, what would be the impact of the loss of the current USS
En1erpn~se, which has a price tag figured in billions of dollars? The U.S~
leadership and the American people should not become too enamored with wonder
weapons without first under­standing the long-term costs in terms of money,
maintenance, train­ing, and morale associated with their operation and possible
re­placement.
The imagesjust discussed provide the major concerns that create the need for the
discussions to follow. These discussions rest on a foundation made up of the
following premise. The basics of military success are encapsulated in five
elements: identification, isolation, suppression, maneuver, and destruction.

· Identification is the ability to define and locate the opponent.
· Isolation is when the opponent is denied the ability to gain outside resources
and assistance.
· Suppression is the process of denying the opponent the free­dom of movement
and ultimately maneuver.
· Maneuver is a combination of movement and firepower-either in a physical
sense, a perceived sense, or in cyberspace-to achieve a position of advantage.
Advantage means the plac­ing of strength against an opponent's weakness. Once
again this may be in reality or in the opponent's perceptions.
· Destruction is the end of the enemy resistance through either physical
destruction of resources or destruction of the oppo nent's will. "


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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Y I Patel » 04 Nov 2003 20:35

A quick note: it was reported today that the army is going to have a new DG post for operational logistics, to handle an increased pace of operations. This is a step in the right direction.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby debjani » 06 Nov 2003 13:38

Ok. Let us say we have nothing more on the concept of RMA to add.

Within the ambit of whatever we discussed, what should be our line of approach to
1. acquire eqpt. Which ones reqd?
2. What should be the organisations?

Obviously, the strategic perception should be kept in mind. One could even enunciate this.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Sukumar » 08 Nov 2003 21:19

Ray, this opinion comes from an arm chair officer while you are a real one. I think the idea of doing an RMA like the US and talking of revamping equipment and buying more toys for the armed forces is fundamentally flawed. It is also how business has been done for many decades now.

I think the logical progressions of a true RMA (or evolution) is:

1. Perform a strategic security review - analyze the country's threats today and say 15 years into the future
2. Based on the review, evolve a national security policy
3. This policy should drive the evolution of a joint strategic doctrine for all three services. How they will fight and win a war together or nip a looming threat in its infancy - whether nations or a group of individuals
4. Based on this strategic doctrine - develop a tactical operations doctrine for the three services - what they will do to fight and win - together
5. The strategy and operations doctrine will define the types and numbers of equipment the three services need
6. It will also define a very key thing - training doctrine and organization.

There is no point of talking about equipping and training to fight the previous war better. History showed the results for the allies at the beginning of WW2.

Whatever happens, one thing I would really like to see is - ALL soldiers, sailors and airmen dressed well and consistently, provided with a comprehensive kit of equipment and safety to do their jobs - along with a privately run veterans organization that will take care of their widowed spouses, retired personnel, healthcare and social needs - WELL. That itself will see a quantum jump in effectiveness.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby JCage » 09 Nov 2003 11:12

Sukumar,
This may be of interest.Looks like they take you seriously at the MOD. :)

http://www.thestatesman.net/page.arcview.php?clid=2&id=54365&usrsess=1

Defence vision 2017: Pak, China no threat

Srinjoy Chowdhury
STATESMAN NEWS SERVICE

NEW DELHI, Oct. 25. — Pakistan, in the next decade-and-a-half, does not have the potential to pose a serious threat and China would be too busy trying to become an economic superpower to involve itself in military action.
This is the understanding of top Indian defence officials producing the crucial 15-year long-term perspective plan for the ministry and the government. The defence five year plans will be readied and annual defence budgets prepared based on the strategic structure outlined. This document, which attempts to assess what the situation will be in 2017, is in the final stages of preparation. It outlines the threat perception, both external and internal, the international situation as relevant for India and even some economic issues.
Preliminary reports suggest two significant developments. The strategists believe that nuclear Pakistan has no potential for serious military threats though small conflicts cannot be ruled out. The economic gap between India and Pakistan would widen in five years or more. India is expected to become more superior economically and stronger militarily. But Pakistan will continue to trouble India — the low intensity conflict in J&K being the example.
In the case of China, the assumption is that it is building up its economic strength to become a superpower within the next 15 years. As a result, the temptation to carry out military threats while the rebuilding process is continuing is likely to be less. There is a belief that China’s rivalry with India could be more economic than military. There is also a counter argument that says China is rapidly modernising its military and building up infrastructure, including in Tibet, and it could be a challenge to America. Its military strategy is also becoming more flexible with the creation of rapid reaction forces. The Chinese Navy could become more active as well. As a result, India needs to have a strength that could be a deterrent in case of hostile intentions. America is expected to maintain a presence in the Indian Ocean region.
The Perspective Plan also aims to outline what kind of wars India could be fighting in the next 15-20 years. The possibility and requirements for the continuing low-intensity conflict, limited war and a full-scale war has been looked at. A full-scale war or “large-scale trans-border operations” is possible, but is unlikely keeping in mind the international situation. Operation Parakram, it has been said, never led to war against Pakistan. A long full-scale war would also be prohibitively expensive.
A low-intensity conflict, on the other hand is much cheaper. All it requires is infantry weapons and ammunition and perhaps, some artillery. The possibility of limited war has been looked at. This depends on the time and extent of the war. Based on the perspective plan, the “gaps” in the military structure will have to be filled.
Pakistan’s low intensity conflict is expected to continue and India’s position is of credible deterrence. In the case of China, the armed forces have been looking at affordable deterrence, but defending the borders (mostly J&K and Arunachal Pradesh) and Bhutan if necessary.
-------------------------------------------

On a side note I love this thread and hate my ISP.
:(

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Kapil » 09 Nov 2003 11:18

Sukumar,
Did you get m y email a few days back?

Regards,
Kapil

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby debjani » 09 Nov 2003 12:36

Sukumar,

The steps that you have enunciated are very apt.

1. What would be the security environment in 15 years?

[a]The ‘ugly stability’ between India and Pakistan, in all probability, will wax and wane as it would be in the interest of ALL ‘powers that be’ to ensure that India does not cross the threshold as an independent economic power. Economic power status naturally leads on to military muscle vigour which in turn leads to hegemony. Terrorism and LICO will therefore continue.
This would thus be in the interest of powers that be as also in the interest of ‘smaller’ neighbours.

[b] Similarly, the same analogy would apply to China only in so far as the interest of the ‘powers that be’. However, the smaller neighbours like Pakistan or Bangladesh who have psychotic religious animosity with India would not join this stream. Burma would be ambivalent [?] and Sir Lanka would be chary about antagonising owing to the Tamil population.

[c]China’s interest to be a reckonable global power is obvious. Her ‘forays’ in the Indian Ocean in the form of her ‘assistance’ to Burma and to Pakistan’s Gwadar port and now assistance to Indonesia should indicate the importance of encircling India along the seaways. Likewise, is her encirclement activities on land should not be lost sight of. The Shanghai Five is not as innocent as it may appear. Nor is the question of cosying up with the Korean problem with the US. Sabre rattling against Taiwan is eyewash since it can always ‘take it over’ when she so desires even if it would be a trifle costly in a direct confrontation because of US interests.
China’s diversion of the Brahamaputra is also an interesting angle when seen along with Bangladesh’s gripes about sharing of waters with India.

Of course the above is debatable, but a starter of discussion if folks want to. In fact, it would be interesting.

What are the problems?

There are many. However, the basic question is ISR – Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. If inputs are realtime it will assist in planning, reworking plans realtime, moving reserves correctly and generating the correct combat ratio at the point of decision while at the same time holding the enemy at bay to put it in simplistic manner. However, it is easier said than done.

What should be the approach, re-organisation and equipment?

Let’s discuss. Of course, within the parameters of a realistic defence budget of the time.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Sukumar » 09 Nov 2003 16:50

Ray, you moved too quickly from a cursory examination of step 1 to step 4.

Like Nitin's excerpt said if the concurrence is that Pak is not a major danger and will be a LIC creator and CHina is going to be too busy being a super power (which by the way sounds like a Maginot line mentality and unrealistic to me, too much Neville Chamberlian and too little Churchillian) - what is India's strategy going to be ?

Is it going to be building fences and losing soldiers every day ? ( in which case you dont need artillery divisions and new tanks). Is it going to involve active commando raiding of the root cause problem - terrorist camps. Is it going to involve limited conventional war ? Is it going to involve strategic major war to eliminate Pak ? Similarly, what about surprises from China thro a proxy ? This strategy will drive a joint operations doctrine.

For example: A joint operations doctrine will say the IAF needs to have a strategic strike capability. This will include degradation of Pak's industry infrastructure in 12 days and degradation of their frontline infantry formations to less than 50% capability by 17 days etc. Other examples include the formulation of a joint special forces strategy, when/where/how to use airborne forces, armor etc, amphibious capability integration into warfighting.........

Then lets start talking tactical stuff including equipment and the need for ISR - if you get my drift. That will also lead to how the forces should be organized (one of my favorite topics) and trained.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby debjani » 09 Nov 2003 21:11

Sukumar,

Perspective Planning is an interesting field. The military view naturally is under the shadow of the official thought process of the government. These documents indeed are impressive and couched in the latest terminology of foreign military papers.

However, I wanted to move out from the beyond the shackles of' 'approach papers', thoughts of the RAND Corporation, etc and was actually trying to goad or tickle an independent view, especially from the posters of the BRF who are rather well read and yet not influenced by the government or official military perceptions. Naturally, I tried to restrict to what is feasible and not what is what would be possible with the US because that will be mere pipedreams and missing the issue.

Nitin post, if analysed closely [did you write it? If so my apologies] is the type of thought which keeps all the options covered. Like, Pakistan will not pose a threat and a little way along states, 'The possibility and requirements for the continuing low-intensity conflict, limited war and a full-scale war has been looked at. A full-scale war or "large-scale trans-border operations" is possible, but is unlikely keeping in A full-scale war or "large-scale trans-border operations"mind the international situation'. This is typical of the official documents too! LOL. So what does it mean? The same threat, as is now. A long drawn out war with anyone is not possible. If it has to be there, it has to be short. Therefore, it boils down to the fact that we must engineer our concepts, tactics, equipment for the worst case scenario i.e. A full-scale war or "large-scale trans-border operations". However, the rider should be that we must ENSURE that it is SHORT. That is the bottom line; limited wars in this 'envelope' would automatically get addressed.

In so far as China is concerned, indeed she is more concerned being a superpower. However, inspite of her disarming moralistic homilies, what if she attacks 'to teach India a lesson' [remember the phrase?]? How polite, gentlemanly and diplomatic. Attack us and then spout childish gibberish.

LICO is different from being geared for war. Therefore, it will require a different approach in strategy [ Do we have it?], tactics and equipment.

However, whatever be the strategy, tactics etc, the fact the ISR and Networking and Information Superiority [both are foreign military papers obtained and so I am equally guilty in using such terms] is important since it will enhance speedy decision making and managing options, be it defence or offence, seems to be the fulcrum to whatever we aim to do.

Of course, it has to be a joint warfare. Yet, one must not lose sight of the economy, social requirement etc and prioritise the approach. Everything cannot be done immediately and may not be even in 15 years, though could be mentioned as a footnote.

Sure would be interested to hear from you.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby debjani » 09 Nov 2003 21:37

Sukumar,

Perspective Planning is an interesting field. The military view naturally is under the shadow of the official thought process of the government. These documents indeed are impressive and couched in the latest terminology of foreign military papers.

However, I wanted to move out from the beyond the shackles of' 'approach papers', thoughts of the RAND Corporation, etc and was actually trying to goad or tickle an independent view, especially from the posters of the BRF who are rather well read and yet not influenced by the government or official military perceptions. Naturally, I tried to restrict to what is feasible and not what is what would be possible with the US because that will be mere pipedreams and missing the issue.

Nitin post, if analysed closely [did you write it? If so my apologies] is the type of thought which keeps all the options covered. Like, Pakistan will not pose a threat and a little way along states, 'The possibility and requirements for the continuing low-intensity conflict, limited war and a full-scale war has been looked at. A full-scale war or "large-scale trans-border operations" is possible, but is unlikely keeping in A full-scale war or "large-scale trans-border operations"mind the international situation'. This is typical of the official documents too! LOL. So what does it mean? The same threat, as is now. A long drawn out war with anyone is not possible. If it has to be there, it has to be short. Therefore, it boils down to the fact that we must engineer our concepts, tactics, equipment for the worst case scenario i.e. A full-scale war or "large-scale trans-border operations". However, the rider should be that we must ENSURE that it is SHORT. That is the bottom line; limited wars in this 'envelope' would automatically get addressed.

In so far as China is concerned, indeed she is more concerned being a superpower. However, inspite of her disarming moralistic homilies, what if she attacks 'to teach India a lesson' [remember the phrase?]? How polite, gentlemanly and diplomatic. Attack us and then spout childish gibberish.

LICO is different from being geared for war. Therefore, it will require a different approach in strategy [ Do we have it?], tactics and equipment.

However, whatever be the strategy, tactics etc, the fact the ISR and Networking and Information Superiority [both are foreign military papers obtained and so I am equally guilty in using such terms] is important since it will enhance speedy decision making and managing options, be it defence or offence, seems to be the fulcrum to whatever we aim to do.

Of course, it has to be a joint warfare. Yet, one must not lose sight of the economy, social requirement etc and prioritise the approach. Everything cannot be done immediately and may not be even in 15 years, though could be mentioned as a footnote.

Sure would be interested to hear from you.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby JCage » 09 Nov 2003 21:48

Ray,
That post was an article by Srinjoy C based on some official document.Right you are-on the dot-that its official speak all the way.
I guess we are all in agreement that a ISR Revolution would really enhance the IA's present day fighting potential.Do we go deeper into that?

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby debjani » 10 Nov 2003 01:28

Originally posted by nitin:
Ray,
That post was an article by Srinjoy C based on some official document.Right you are-on the dot-that its official speak all the way.
I guess we are all in agreement that a ISR Revolution would really enhance the IA's present day fighting potential.Do we go deeper into that?
Well in a generalised way. I myself am not aware of the oficial view and I don't even want to know it since I don't want to get inhibited. I am also a trifle chary about official stuff. Good English. and that is about all since it is as the Punjabis say - Aye bhi wah wah, tan bi wah wah.

Like, in ISR if we are looking at Surveillance, then we have a start. The Phalcon. How will that affect? By itself, it will be enough? If not, what all should it have to assist? If it has that, how will it help? The article states that 'nuclear Pak' is no threat. Who is fooling whom? They are a threat since they have always acted irresponsibly. Therefore, this threat requires some way to be eliminated in the event of them starting a war. One must understand that with Musharraf toeing the US line, it is a tinder box since the fundamentalists have been a force to reckon with in Pakistan.

In this forum I have seen posts of Spec Ops groups being required. Fine. Why? What could be the task? How will they op? What org? What weapons? These are all very generalised. However, we should also keep the defence budget in mind. Its no use saying that we should have 50 Low Orbit Satls and some Geo stationary satls. Can we afford it? If not, how many should do, if indeed we require them?

The LICO is affecting all. How can we be more effective?

Open source material can help to educate in a generalised way those who have no access to them or are not aware. For instance, those who are in Delhi have excellent access to military libraries, but not so in other parts of the country. They [Delhi folks] would have a better picture of the scenario [from open sources]. They could share those ideas.

It is essential that those who are more aware [I am awfully keen to learn] share their views so that the discussions on the threads are realistic to our environment rather than comparing ourselves with the US or use Iraq or Afghnistan as a model. If you remember the Kargil thread, I had to use a mathematical model so that speculation of the timing of preparation by Pakistan could be put in its correct perspective.

On RMA I could say India requires nano technology, Attack Microbotics and MEMS [Micro Electo Mechanical System] but that would be in the sci fi for India at this moment in time. Yet, if someone educates us on them as a sidenote, then it would be worth the info.

Of course this is just a thought. Its 0225h and time to bed since the logic may have become fuzzy and I maybe rambling.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Anoop » 12 Nov 2003 09:53

Originally posted by Ray:
In this forum I have seen posts of Spec Ops groups being required. Fine. Why? What could be the task? How will they op? What org? What weapons?
One possible change could be in combining Spec Ops teams with DMI and RAW operatives even prior to open hostilities.

The tasks would be improving interoperatability in times of open hostilities, filtering military intelligence in order to apply the right kind of pressure (build-up of forces, sabotage of communications/logistical lines, assasinations) on the adversary. The idea is to devolve operations to a greater extent and prevent the delays in processing intelligence before action.

They will operate like intelligence personnel, but with the added responsibility for acting on intelligence as opposed to merely collecting and disseminating it.

Their weapons would be the ability to infiltrate
and function as deep cover agents in times of 'peace'. The hardware needed would be mainly secure communication equipment. In times of open hostilities, their role would be to attack lines of supply, targetting high ranking officials (doesn't have to be by getting up close and personal - could be by being able to call in airstrikes after fixing locating) and disrupting the enemy's electronic communication.

Does this sound like a glorified intelligence outfit more than a Spec Ops outfit? As far as I know, in the current doctrine, Spec Forces are used mostly for forays into enemy territory. What I suggest is a buildup of asset network to complement that of the MI and RAW.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby shiv » 15 Nov 2003 07:31

Let me use this opportunity to "up" this thread and write about a bok I am curently reading that is opening my eyes about RMA.

As I mentioned earlier in this thread the book is called "Armed Conflict - the lessons of modern warfare" by Brian Steed - and it is a post-911 book.

I am only 25% of the way throigh the book. The author desfribes in great detail 5 major battles in 20th century wars to illustrate what he is trying to say.

He speaks of what routes low tech nations will take to overcome the odds against them when faced with an enemy that is ultramodern, with unbelieveble firepower. Even without completing the whole book - some lessons are clear.

"RMA" can mean a lot of things at many levels - starting at the higghest level of "grand strategy" where - as ray pointed out to us, one can opt to lose some battles for an overallgain in another direction. RMA of course can alos mean all the hi-tech gadgets that fascinate me so much - which is what I thought RMA was all about. But I was misinformed.

I still don't have any clear answers in my mind ro questions posed by ray in this thread but it seesm clear that India's aim should be somewhere between the sort of hi-tech mechanised networked state that the US has gotten itself into (with its own costs and problems - anyhow India can't afford that) and its current state.

If I were to hazard a guess - I think areas in which India could concentrate are in mobolization and mobility. Developing the ability to rapidly build up firepower in particular areas with a very short reaction time, along with a solid integration of all intel/surveillance inputs - atleast within the Indian landmass.

Mobility inposes its own restrictios because tanks mean roads. bridges and triins and inability to reach some areas.
Choppers and planes are gerat but expensive and relatively low in load carrying capacity. So in some terrain the man wil matter most. We need to have agood awareness of terrain that we need tooperate in and then decide whether force projection means tanks, artillery, choppers or well equipped me with or without air support.

Frankly I think the India army, as with the British Army, has been farily good at this - thatis my opinion. But we need to keep moving, because theer are lacunae as far as I can tell - especially with the ability to mobilize and build up ovewhelming force rapidly.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby member_5768 » 15 Nov 2003 21:26

Check these out:

http://www.comw.org/rma/

and

http://www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/index.htm

The second link isnt immediately relevant but u have to go through the links to see a VAST range of articles on past,present and future.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby JCage » 16 Nov 2003 15:56

Like, in ISR if we are looking at Surveillance, then we have a start. The Phalcon. How will that affect? By itself, it will be enough? If not, what all should it have to assist? If it has that, how will it help? The article states that 'nuclear Pak' is no threat. Who is fooling whom? They are a threat since they have always acted irresponsibly. Therefore, this threat requires some way to be eliminated in the event of them starting a war. One must understand that with Musharraf toeing the US line, it is a tinder box since the fundamentalists have been a force to reckon with in Pakistan.
Ray I am in full agreement with you that the article is partly full of "feel good,nothing will happen" stuff. Then there is the official factor. Lots of common sense paraded as revelations and some funny stuff thrown in. ;)

About the Phalcon-its a start..imho.But not enough.

What does it bring to the table-
1.AIr superiority is now assured. IOW low level nuke strikes on an advancing IA formation (for eg) is much much harder to conduct with even a remote chance of success.

2.Sensor fusion. The Phalcon uses a Comint-comm intelligence + electronic intelligence (Elint)sensor fusion system. If any 1 of these systems picks up something 'interesting' then the radar can immediately search there. So in effect apart from the obvious advantages of the method to the Phalcons primary role itself..in quasi peacetime(say heightened alert),the Phalcon could be used as a listening post to eavesdrop on pakistani deployements etc.

3.Which brings us to the third question-how deep is the IA/IAF partnership. The IN for example has a superb collection of Elint a/c (all incidentally use Indian gear). AT Kargil IAF shared data with IN, with these aircraft flying with IAF escort. Hence similarly to truly use the Phalcon we need a combined arms intell centre.
It was reported that the IAF and IA were to integrate their AD commands/systems. Such a development would be a start.

4.Its been now reported that the IAF plans for 5 Phalcons-this would be per the adagae the more the better. Similarly ISRO has experience in SLAR systems-side looking airborne radar systems. LRDE has now demonstrated Phalconesque active Tx/Rx modules in the L Band(the L in phalcon being the same). The Army should push for a development of an airborne SLAR to be fielded by fixed wing aircraft. Merely UAV's -such as the Searcher etc shouldnt be the holy grail.
SLAR systems are the core of the US-JSTARS. What PhalcOn is to(primarily) air to air..JSTARS is to air to ground. Can detect and track every moving vehicle etc. Is of paramount importance to any decision to commit forces when and where,as you noted -which is what the Army would want from true RMA.

Will write more later..

Thanks,
Nitin

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Anaath » 16 Nov 2003 20:23

With regard to the PHALCON and the anticipated ELINT+SIGINT benefits from it, it must be said that a mini-RMA could and should emanate from their deployment.

Thinking tactically, it would be very nice if the Army had better options available to it than to merely send a patrol up the ridge to “investigate the situation” the next time some Bakarwals report malcontents astride the heights.

From this perspective, would it be useful to have an independent Army capability that could use technology to provide optimal Situational Awareness?

UAVs are now making their presence felt in this area and that is most welcome. Sensors (active and passive) are another asset. BFSRs are still another. What else is available?

Further, should the army consider a staff specialty up and down the echelons that has a specific Situational Awareness mandate (incorporating inputs from foot or mounted scouting patrols with or without HHTIs)?

Should we ponder whether a PSO entitled DG Situational Awareness (possibly reporting to the VCOAS like the newly created DG Operational Logistics) is necessary?

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Rudra » 16 Nov 2003 22:31

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/031116/photos_wl_sa_afp/031116075338_uwyrj6rs_photo0

this pic shows a army patrol on lower deck of
brahmaputra bridge in guwahati. the radio looks
much more compact than I have seen previously.
does anyone know if this is a newly introducted radio?

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby ehsmang » 17 Nov 2003 08:56

My 2 cents...

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby ehsmang » 17 Nov 2003 09:03

My 2 cents...

The current Infantry modernisation programme named "....4B" is adequate. What is needed I think is how to integrate/network ( NCW..network centric warfare) the various assets available with Army, AF and Navy to achieve more synergy.
I think RMA is more about achieving increasing syergy between the various arms of a service and between the three services ( intra & inter service), than it is about fielding new eqpt ( though it helps to have the best eqpt).

So we should be paying attention on how to network the smallest formation on the field back up to the Army HQ!!! and beyond to the PMO. IMHO, we have the skills, competence to achieve this. What is needed are mechanisms/forums for closer civilian- military interaction to achieve this in a sensible time frame.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby vishal » 17 Nov 2003 11:26

Its not necessary to have one big RMA for for things to get radically different on the ground or for dramatically improved effectiveness. For the jawan on CI duties on the LoC, it is revolutionary enough to have lighter radio sets over which the unit gets instructions from the UAV command post about the location and direction of infiltrating terrorists. They then vector in on the targets location using GPS sets and pinpoint the terrorists using hand-held thermal imaging devices & NVGs.

There might be many such mini-RMAs underway in the armed forces independent of each other and in the absence of a huge budget to set one monster plan in motion it would effective enough to give a common direction to them and have all these mini- RMAs converge into an element of jointedness. What might be needed is some one to take a 30,000 feet view of all the things that are being implemented at the micro level as part of different projects and see the bigger picture.

Different evolutionary steps converged resulting in a quantum leap in capabilities. Easier said than done though.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby debjani » 17 Nov 2003 19:51

The RMA envelope as applicable to the US is not applicable to India for obvious reasons.

RMA, though has many connotations [practically like beauty being in the eye of the beholder], an amalgam of technology or societal changes to pursue our military aim, could be the starting block for addressing the same for India.

Our approach to RMA should be a trade off between our economic capabilities [keeping other domestic socio economic compulsions in view] and the Threat. In so far as the 'Threat Perception' is concerned, it should be looking not only to the short term, but also medium term, if long term is beyond the economic 'grab'. Given our changing economic parameters, whatever we do have to be evolutionary. In so far as the 'revolution' is concerned, it maybe be sufficient to keep it in the realm of 'revolutionary' or 'exceptional', given today's approach to technology and its application to strategy and tactics and vice versa.

Therefore, the issues are:

1. What is the Threat?
2. What are our shortfalls and remedies?

There is of course no need to crank in 'revolution' for the sake of form or fashion. The bottom line should be making the defence infrastructure offence and defence capable given the 'perceived capability of the adversaries'. It must also be borne in mind that today's non adversary may turn an adversary over the passage of time owing to emerging fissure points around the world or aspirations of some countries to spread her hegemony.

THREAT AND METHODOLGY

In so far as Pakistan is concerned, the 1.3:1 ratio in superiority does not empirically indicate an outright win. Yet, even though the fantasy that the Muslims are far superior in fighting prowess has been shattered forever in 1971, it is essential to also shatter another Pakistani pipedream - that they can contest India. If we are not to increase the manpower ceiling and yet aim to achieve a more reckonable result, it will require:

1. Engineering science and technology to project our military might to the 'centres of gravity' as also neutralise the nuclear arsenal and facilities. This is the fulcrum since it will neutralise the military power projection capabilities of Pakistan as also the restraints of the nuclear threshold. This is easier said than done, however, science and technology requires addressing these issues. 'Off the shelf' science and technology should be broached so as to save astronomical costs that research and development will entail.
2. The next issue is a 'revolution' in the military thinking. Set piece, classical approach will only result in set piece results and a slog. The application of military might should aim paralyse the adversary. 'Centres of gravity' should be addressed ab inito and at the same time organise [this is the problem] a quick link up that is sanitised for follow up echelons.

The cross border terrorism will then die down. Yet, it would be interesting to know how cross border terrorism can be wiped out without going to war, since that is a better option.

In so far as China is concerned, an outright war is not in the interest of India. The strategic depth of China also is formidable, as is ours. It will be cost prohibitive for both sides to consider war as a solution to outstanding issues. Also, the terrain does not favour a quick fix solution either, especially in the NE or the Central sector. The only way to obviate this is to be able to airlift an expeditionary force into Tibet. US cannot even to this. Thus, at best, India should limit her objectives to regain occupied territories without upsetting the apple cart. Tibet and Xingjian should be of prime interest. [The Chinese thread is interesting in this context]. Notwithstanding, one should be prepared for the worst. The objective should be to first neutralise any hegemonic ambitions of China. Therefore, India's diplomatic and military presence in the 'spheres of influence' right up to South China Seas and Indonesia should be pursued aggressively.

SHORTFALLS AND REMEDIES

Pursued in a limited way, the following requires addressing:

1. Reduced Force Generation Time.
2. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Infrastructure.
3. Command and Battlespace Networking.
4. Addressing the Threat without minimal loss of life.

I leave it to the diplomats, economists, strategists, science and technological wizards on BRF to give the answers since they are better versed to do so than me.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby shiv » 19 Nov 2003 06:29

Originally posted by Ray:

SHORTFALLS AND REMEDIES

Pursued in a limited way, the following requires addressing:

1. Reduced Force Generation Time.
2. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Infrastructure.
3. Command and Battlespace Networking.
4. Addressing the Threat without minimal loss of life.

I leave it to the diplomats, economists, strategists, science and technological wizards on BRF to give the answers since they are better versed to do so than me.
Interesting points Ray.

Would I be wrong in adding a fifth point to the four you have made by saying that RMA would also require close coordination between the various branches of the armed forces and a degree of common understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of each arm.

It would seem to me that points number 1, 2 and 4 that you have made would involve elements of different armed services working jointly.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby debjani » 19 Nov 2003 10:02

Shiv,

Thats right. Battlespace networking in all dimensions is absolutely essential. That is why the aerospace command that the Air Chief spoke about is pertinent.

Unfortunately, everything remains conceptual and drags.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby shiv » 24 Nov 2003 18:59

Taking a break from writing my book on Pakistan, let me write a ramble on this thread which I find interesting.

Every time a read a book, I tend to post something from the book on here almost as "revision", and this time it is no different. Yes- it's that book again - The future of armed conflict.

But before I write anything more let me lift an analogy out of my own field medicine. The emergence of a new drug or a new technological breakthrough (eg keyhole surgery) tends to follow the same path. First - it is welcomed with great enthusiasm and used everywhere as the answer to everything and usage peaks. Later it is realised that there are drawbacks and usage plummets. Finally a steady state is reached between the high and the low with the information that this drug/procedure is very good for abc, fairly good for jkl, and no good for xyz.

Always, in a tech breakthrough, there are pioneers, the early adopters. When the early adopters are accompanied by trumpeters and salesmen to hype the product, everyone wants a piece of the pie, but it is only much much later that drawbacks and the actual value or lack of value of a product is understood.

Tech breakthoughs adopted by US forces are invariably accompanied by hype - the trumpeters. Everybody wants a piece of that tech as a result, but it is often the US itself that learns lessons about the product and finds out whether it is really useful or not. In fact that is what comes out clearly in thebook I am reading. Any adversary facing the sort of tech that the US is able to put up is constantly seeking to nullify the advantage of that technology by fighting in areas and at times when that tech cannot be used.

I was started off on this train of thought by the discussion in another thread of the possibility of making the LCA as stealthy as the F 22. The thought occured to me - what for? Who would the LCA be fighting to require that degree of stealth? Not the US surely. China? A stealthy LCA attacking mainland China?

The reason I ask these questions is because I want to stick my neck out and make a prediction, and I think predictions are important in preparing for future battles.

I foresee that the Pakistani army itself is moving in the direction of a medium tech guerilla army. They are themselves saying so. They will move down from the need for massive armored columns and firepower support to one of stealth, suicide attacks backed by hi-tech signals and communications - just the way Al Quaeda and the Iraqis are doing. The will attack economic and symbolic, emotional targets. Both WTC and the parliament attack were just that.

That is what we need to prepare for in our RMA. What do we have for that? What do we have to break the back of system that produces this type of warrior?

shiv
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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby shiv » 02 Dec 2003 08:25

One more post - just as I have finished reading that book on the Future of Armed conflict.

It was an eye opener. The authour says how low tech adversaries have adpted and will adapt top figh the high tech RMA that the US has used and end up defeating US forces on occaion - not by beetr tech, but by drawing US forces ito areas where tech does not work, or by prolonging the conflict so that although the US would win every battle, it would pull out of the war eventually as the war became politically untenable.

Regarding RMA he has several things to say - I wil just quote a few examples - because they relate to issues we have discussed here comparing US leads with what the IA is doing.

He speaks of GPS. He says that dependence on GPS is great - but soildiers will still have to know how to navigate withoout it - because the systems are not fail safe and human/physical reasosn meay render GPS useless.

He speaks of training by simulator, which is good, up to a point. But beyond that the soldiers only learn how to fight simulated wars. real live fire is needed eventually.

Heavy, high tech armor and equipment: Heavily burdened and clothed soldiers suffer exhaustion and dehydration sooner in hot environments. Because of that they may decide to make crucial but mistaken decisions. For example - solidiers setting out on a "routine" 2 hr patrol with guns, body armor, comm equipment etc may opt to leave behind drinking water - and that could make the difference between life and death. Also heavily burdened hi tech soldiers need a heavier logistics chain to maintain them in comparison with the lightly armed, lightly armored soldier "living off the land". These factors can equalise any tech advantage of RMA

Terrain: In open terrain - noboy can beat a modern force with modern RMA such as the US has. So the adversary will not seek a fight in open terrain, but will try to draw the fight into areas of complex terrain where the tech advantage is nullified. We find lower-tech armies/terorrists prefering to fight in complex urban terrain (Iraq/Srinagar/Akshardham/Chechnya) - or forests (Kashmir/Vietnam) or mountains (Kashmir/Afghanistan)

So befeore any army jumps into tech RMA one needs to see how and where the tech RMA advantage can be nullified - because that is EXACTLY where the enemy will fight.


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