Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

AmanC
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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby AmanC » 27 Oct 2003 18:11

Corps of Signals is indeed revolutionising its approach to the task of communications support to the formations and quite a lot has been achieved on ground. Since I'm a Signals brat I will try my best to refrain from eugolising the Signallers :) . The real target of course will only be achieved when the battalion HQs are on real time date link, and not just voice, with higher formations at all times during battle. The Corps has also raised specialised EW battalions to deal with CI Ops which are solely devoted to RR formations.

But so much of this info is classified that I doubt we can discuss the progress being made at present. Perhaps some parameters can be set for making general references because communications has revolutionised the modern warfare and is an important peg of this discussion.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby shiv » 27 Oct 2003 18:27

Originally posted by Ray:
This bullet bit was for you Shiv so that you could give us the medical side of the issue.
Ray I guessed that might be the case - but from the surgical viewpoint a high velocity penetrating injury is just that and the surgeon tends to expect everything from a clean penetration, to widespread cavitation damage, fragmentation, tumbling, debris sucked in and injury to anything.

What the paper does is to analyse in detail how early each type of bullet tends to start doing more than mere penetration. That in itself is less interesting medically than in terms of how a bullet can be made to maim more easily and effectively while maintaining its velocity over a long distance.

Of coure - what bullets do to humans is very interesting to learn about when one first reads about it and I recall spending hours in the library looking up unusual things. There was an old old textbook that was describing weird war wounds.

One British soldier in WW 1 was brought in with an entry wound on the left buttock. It seemed that the bullet had entered upwards from the left buttock, had passed up via the buttock into the abdomen, and then up, inside the left side of the chest through the left lung. It had then reached the left shoulder after which it mysteriously made a U-turn to pass downwards down the left arm to emerge from am exit wound on the inner side of the left arm.

A detailed questioning of the soldier, who recovered from his injury revealed that he had been lying flat on a shallow incline, aiming his .303 with his left arm extended to steady the rifle (in the standard position of a soldier aiming a rifle while lying flat on the ground). In this position, his left buttock, abdomen, left lung, left shoukder and the left arm were in a straight line and a bullet (friendly fire) from someone behind him entered his buttock and passed in a straight line to emerge from the inside of his extended left arm. The lesson was that one must not expect that the entry and exit wounds are necessarily predictive of the path of the bullet, unless one knows the position in which the injury was sustained. Sorry to digress.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Manne » 27 Oct 2003 19:46

I may sound stoopid but -

the 5.56 benefits hold true if you assume an enemy that does not leave behind wounded and does not have numbers to spare. If you are faced with an army that leaves behind its wounded and has no big numbers problem (like the marauding enemy in Braveheart) then all the 5.56 pros (except the weight bit maybe) go outta the door.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Rudra » 27 Oct 2003 20:04

Manne , it leaves leaves the soldier with more ammo
and a less heavy rifle to carry around. this translates to more sustained combat power.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Manne » 27 Oct 2003 20:31

GD,

While I have already accepted that weight could be the only benefit, let's take this further. Why do we want to stop at 5.56 ? An even lower size would mean even more sustained firepower. Perhaps we should make a weapon out of sandb-lasting technology ? Plenty of it in the desert lands of Thar :)

but seriously, I was only offering a perspective I felt had not been voiced so far.

[added later]
GD, cluster bombs that shred anything and everything that stand in their way operate on the same principle and are much more powerful than what you mention below

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby daulat » 27 Oct 2003 20:44

the high velocity bullet unless it hits a vital organ does little damage - punches a neat hole through; which allegedly was one of the short comings of the Wehrmacht's Luger pistol! the tumbling projectile (once it hits the body) concept has been around for the 7.62mm round also, but the 5.56mm concept was built around wounding first killing as a bonus, and light weight, hence the tumble was pretty important.

in CI roles, the 5.56mm is not good since the wounded terrorist on the ground can still detonate bombs etc., whilst what you really want is for him to stop moving quickly. a bit like why a hunter would use a .457 and above on big game and not a .322 or something smaller. the big gun would stop the hunter from getting gored/stamped/mauled by the oncoming momentum of the prey

against a convential enemy in a plains type battle of manouevre, i suspect that 5.56 is plenty good enough, since most of the killing is going to be coming down from the air or artillery - a la RMA; and the personal arms just 'make up numbers' so as to speak

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Vick » 27 Oct 2003 20:58

Correct me if I am wrong, but isn't RMA's core concept information control?

How info is gathered, interpreted, disseminated, and used. Basically attaining total situational awareness and having the ability to give that awareness to any BlueFor that needs it, when he needs it.

In that regard, how is the Indian Army and military fairing? This type of RMA intrinsically requires soldiers to be more than just a grunt and be trained in computers and other widgets.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Rudra » 27 Oct 2003 21:33

Manne, small steel darts fletchettes have been used by police for a while ..in UK iirc.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby daulat » 27 Oct 2003 22:45

Originally posted by Vick:
Correct me if I am wrong, but isn't RMA's core concept information control?

In that regard, how is the Indian Army and military fairing? This type of RMA intrinsically requires soldiers to be more than just a grunt and be trained in computers and other widgets.
not necessarily, it places more emphasis on officers and NCO's to be plugged in and situationally aware, for the OR, it would be nice, but is not essential.

however this raises the problem that was last encountered by the IA in WW1, that of what to do when the officer gets killed. Post 1857, the IA concentrated all decision making in the (white) officers, so in the trenches when the officers got picked off first (as they led the charge over the top), quite frequently the men would not know what to do since their training didn't tell them what to do

if the Junior officers and NCO's can be kept alive (which in an RMA situation is more likely than in WW1) then the grunt can still do much of the grunting. even the US/UK armies still work that way

the IN and IAF do not have this issue, since largely the fighting is being done by someone very well educated

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby debjani » 27 Oct 2003 22:46

RMA is not only about info control. It means an integrated battlefield with real time intelligence [different from info]and combat elements being at the correct place with correct strength to defeat the enemy. A very simplistic explanation though. Or defeating the enemy with minimum contact [and thus less casualties] through technology replacing the soldier to the extent feasible.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Vick » 27 Oct 2003 23:03

Well, let's take the most recent large scale IA operation, the Kargil War. How long did it take for a piece of intel, regarding the frontline, take to go from the gatherer to the interpretor to the disseminator to the person who would most need it?

For example a pic of a supply depot taken by a recon bird. How long did that piece of intel take to reach a strike bird?

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby member_201 » 27 Oct 2003 23:12

Vick, this article might help;

The Invisible Heroes

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby putnanja » 27 Oct 2003 23:54

Much talk is on regarding the Stryker.
Stryker will not be a replacement for Abrams. It is designed more as a infantry carrying light armoured vehicle, which can be easily deployed through C-130s. The Strykers are being equipped with the infantry brigades, and not with armoured brigades.

As of now, their protection against even RPGs is suspect, but there have been reports that it was fixed before it was deployed in Iraq.

These Strykers have very good navigational and communication equipment. There was an episode on Discovery channer on these vehicles, and the interior looks more like an aircraft cockpit. They download information realtime about any location. It then displays a map and directions to that location. All this on realtime. And they are in constant touch with the base, and the base centre knows where each and every vehicle is.

Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV)

http://www.army.mil/features/stryker/default.htm

STRYKER 8-WHEEL DRIVE ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES, USA

http://www.ausa.org/PDFdocs/stryker.pdf

Study finds new Army vehicle too vulnerable

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby sudipn » 28 Oct 2003 00:05

Rakesh,
That article on aerial photography was great stuff. But i am sure there are algorithms of converting a 2D picture to a 3D picture. A great example is a commercial product by the "Pinsharp company" in UK. http://www.pinsharp3d.co.uk/gallery/index.html. A close friend of mine has done his Phd from cornel on just this (one of those IIT wiz kid stories :-)).
A 3D image I believe would give more insight to an analyst analyzing the pictures not to mention making the whole process automated, fast and a lot easier to work on.
Also I believe it is possible to render these 3D pictures on a normal screen as suggested by the Pinsharp website in their sample 3D pictures.

Lets take a scenario
1>photo rec takes a digital picture over a landscape.
2>Picture beamed down in real time.
3>picture processed into 3D images in near real time. Zoom in and zoom out features available at the click of a mouse. Bingo the enemy is detected ...
4>Strikes ordered and the camps taken out.

I evangelize this type of a scenario for the Indian army. This is possible with existing software. Just needs to be packaged….

IT has worked wonders for India I for one think it should be used to render the knock out punch too.

Sudip

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Vick » 28 Oct 2003 00:15

2D to 3D is pretty passe in terms of tech. The computer game SimCity 4 can take any USGS satelite topo grayscale pics and convert them into 3D game regions.

Depending on the swath of territory, the game can do the 2D to 3D conversion in about 30 mins on a 1.4GHz and 256 RAM. From experience :)

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Rudra » 28 Oct 2003 00:20

as a interim first step, IAF could scrap all the
old film cameras and obtain new digital recon cameras. plane lands at airbase and gigabit ethernet cable plugged into recon pod for downloading its memory into RAW system. large server
farms work on reading the imagery and doing pre-processing. based on set pattern matching filters, all images with interesting data are automatically sent to human handlers sitting infront of large 21" colour monitors.

interesting imagery is annotated online with notes seamlessly using the GUI. saying things like "concentration of 10 hidden al-khalids" .

finally imagery starts going out over hi-band
optical fiber links connection ARC/RAW-imint center to ALL IAF bases and IA HQs down to brigade level.

the mission planning of strike a/c would also move from pilot sitting in cockpit 10 mins to pgm the computer with the mission and waypoints, instead a rugged SD/PCMCIA card with all parameters is handed to each pilot in briefing room. pilot starts computer and lets the info be uploaded from mem card asap within 2 mins.

the first jaguars roar the airfield fence 1 hr after the recon bird has landed, armed with WCMD IIR homing bomblets....

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Rudra » 28 Oct 2003 00:22

iirc the Jags upg mission computer has precisely
this ability to uptake from pcmcia card the mission
parameters. cuts down the launch time of sorties.

I wonder if anytime is needed to 'align' a fighter
a/c INS system before leaving? or its aligning a
snap now with GPS info?

in second phase, recon a/c start downloading imagery from the air directly to distributed dumb ground receiver stations connected by optical fiber to RAW-den or even via relay EW a.c orbiting at high level within india as recon bird goes over enemy territory.

in third phase, hi-prio filtered imagery is processed in a compact supercomputer onboard 'paul revere' type knowall-IL76 orbiting inside india and uploaded directly into WSO stations on Jags and MKis topped up and waiting at launch points.

in fourth phase, the nav/IIR homing systems of
missiles are remotely updated by rishi valmiki-IL76 with target coordinates as they filter back in realtime from recon assets. dumb large missile trucks within india just point their satcom antennas up and wait. the crew provides security of launch site but otherwise hands off.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Gerard » 28 Oct 2003 01:51

US warfare equation 'full of baloney'

"I first started hearing about revolutions in warfare after some guided munitions hit a bridge in the Vietnam War. Since then, the declaration of another new revolution in warfare based on the accomplishments of guided munitions and aircraft has occurred for every single American war ever since. These declarations have become as predictable as they are full of baloney."

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby sudipn » 28 Oct 2003 02:03

Rudra,
Thats an excellent thought. It does deserve great deal of consideration.
Speaking of which I have observed that many "brites" regularly post very intreguing thoughts. That does deserve consideration at the very highest level.
I think its about time we "brites" set up a lobbying/pressure group to forward such worthy suggestions to the right ppl in the defence ministery. Guys if someone has to come up with an idea somewhere why not us why not here.
It all could be done very simply, this forum puts up issue like this on a very regular basis. PPl also come up with very intreguing/ interesting theories. Say we club like the best 5 of then every couple of months and ask the MOD if these theories hold their ground.
Who knows one of them might just work wonders. We might actually be able to make a positive contribution.

Guys I think if something has to be done why not us why not now.

Sudip

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Rudra » 28 Oct 2003 02:28

Sudip, all the eminent BR 'thinkers' tend to write articles on BR monitor ..which apparently is read by some powers-that-be.
so in a way what you say is being done.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby member_201 » 28 Oct 2003 02:29

The forum is also daily monitored and thus any intriguing & interesting thoughts are examined if they are feasible in the larger framework of things. We are being watched, which is a good thing.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby ehsmang » 28 Oct 2003 07:51

rather long cut & paste job.....

" NCW is defined as an information superiority-enabled concept
of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors,
decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command,
higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree
of self-synchronization," . "In essence, NCW translates information
superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the
battlespace."

Networking sensor information will be a crucial capability on tomorrow's battlefield. "It's not the technology by itself. It is the fact you can network the
information from the sensors; you have to have those first.
This emerging technology makes it easier to connect those nodes and distribute
the information they collect to the warfighting force.

In practice, the goal of network-centric warfare is to provide combatants in the field
with all the information they need -and the ability to send new information back up the
stream -- in real time. It also would provide relevant information to each level of
command simultaneously, eliminating the need for field commanders to divert attention from
the immediate concerns of battle to brief their superiors. It also could speed the
gathering of new information from disparate points and disseminating it to those who need
it the most. "When you are able to network a force you can provide shared awareness by
overcoming the limitations of individual sensors," Garstka says.
This could mean blending information gathered from unmanned aerial vehicles,
manned aircraft, satellites, and even soldiers on the ground. "In the past, these
types of sensors were reported to various pigeonholes and the information was not
available to be shared," he says. "But sensors dominate reach -- we can strike anything
we can find."

While there is a broad range of enabling technologies behind network-centric warfare,
the need for new technology is nearly as important as finding the best way to employ the
technology already m place. For example, a variety of existing sensors could provide an
integrated air picture in real time. Yet bringing that information to those who need it
means everything that flies -- and everyone connected with the air mission--
must be on the network. The same is true for joint-theater air and missile defenses.
It also applies to logistics, medical support, battle damage assessment, as well as
tracking and striking mobile targets.

Some notions of network-centric warfare divide it into three "grids":

command and control, or "information";
sensors; and
engagement, or "shooters."

The information grid provides the network-centric warfare computer and communications
infrastructure and the means to receive, process, transport, store, and protect
information for the joint force, as well as assure its validity.

Sensor grids are all air-, sea-, ground-, space- and cyberspace-based sensors,
whether they be dedicated, part of weapons platforms, or employed by individual soldiers.

Engagement grids, meanwhile, make the most of the network-centric heightened
battlespace awareness to mass and quickly bring to bear the shooters on land, sea,
and in the air. Engagement grids execute operations at a decisive speed and tempo;
shape the battlespace; maximize joint combat power, and lock out enemy courses of action.

Perhaps the greatest distinction between traditional, or "platform-centric,"
warfare and network-centric warfare revolves the linkage between decision-makers,
sensors, and shooters; platform-centric warfare tightly links all three, while
network-centric warfare may separate these assets and then link them m different ways.
More to the point, in platform-centric operations, the platforms own the weapons,
which in turn have their own sensors. In network-centric warfare, sensors do not
necessarily belong to shooters -- or shooters to decision-makers.

The real problem for network-centric warfare planners is not so much technological as
it is procedural. A host of issues confront military and aerospace planners.
"One of the big questions from a humanfactors standpoint is not just do we have the
technology, but what do we really want to do with it?" Andrews says, noting it also
is a question that is facing the commercial sector.

As an example, should the network of a military aircraft provide information to the
pilot, or primarily to the aircraft's sophisticated automated systems?
Is the pilot to be the operator or the executive agent? A modem bomber can fly quickly to
its target following terrain at low altitudes, launch its precision-guided weapons,
and return to base with no live pilot input whatsoever. With networked sensor inputs
along the way, it could even alter course, switch targets, or change landing sites
without the pilot taking action. But if that is the approach, what is the role of the
human pilot in network-centric warfare?

While the battlespace of the future will be increasingly populated by automated tools and decision aids, human commanders and warfighters will remain at the core of all network-centric warfare efforts, in some cases in roles never before seen in battle.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby kgoan » 28 Oct 2003 10:18

For those interested, the US experience in Iraq is being looked at by the National Defense magazine.

One peculiar development seen in the Iraq war was the presence, throughout the theater, of U.S. military teams led by 35 officers from the Joint Forces Command. Their sole job was to observe the war as it unfolded and assess the performance of the military services from a "joint" perspective.
.
The Table of Contents for the Nov issue is quite interesting. Among the articles is an update on the US concept of the Land Warrior and the Stryker issue that Ray brought up.

After the last version of Land Warrior failed reliability tests earlier this year, the Army switched gears and decided to make the system less complex and modify the hardware to make it compatible with the new Stryker infantry vehicle.

The Land Warrior was designed to provide communications and networking capabilities to dismounted soldiers that so far only have been available to mounted forces. The idea is for members of a platoon to be able to pass around battlefield procedural messages, graphics, alerts and other pieces of information that currently are communicated by hand signals and voice.
.
Note, the first link includes backissues of this mag, folks might find some the articles interesting.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby debjani » 28 Oct 2003 12:13

Let's look at RMA.

I produce part of an article that was published in the PINNACLE [since they don't have a website.] Sorry, it is too long. The aim is to bring in posters who are otherwise shy since RMA is still in the realm of mumbo jumbo. But keep my first post in mind when you offer comments not on the article but on the subject in hand. This will allow clarity of progression of thoughts.

This article gives India's compulsions. This would allow some focus to the discussion.

INDIA'S QUEST FOR RMA

What constitutes an RMA?

Hamlet would have found it easy to answer. It is too carried and has too any interpretations.

The RMA parameters are nebulous. RMA is an extension of the Soviet Military Technological Revolution [MTR] percept, matured by the USA to conform to her new global compulsions. While the MTR was technology specific, the RMA is all encompassing.

Some claim that historically there have been three RMAs i.e. agrarian, industrial and now information, while others contend that there have been fourteen. A large majority feel that it is technological revolution specific. Yet, prima facie, social aspects too have revolutionised warfare - the advent of Nation States revolutionised combat organisations and techniques; in the Napoleonic era, social transformations contributed to levée en masse [national armies], Mao Tse Tung's guerrilla warfare exposed the inferiority of technology vis a vis the will of the impoverished charged with ingenuous revolutionary zeal.

Yet, another thought subscribe that RMAs are intrinsically 'revolutions' within 'evolutions', Blitzkrieg, is a much quoted example of an 'evolutionary revolution' since the Germans incorporated the existing technology [including communications] and devised the doctrine to reach Dunkirk with lightning speed. It was thus 'evolutionary' for the Germans, and yet 'revolutionary' as far as the Allies and history is concerned - the 'shell shock' was too revolutionary to accept defeat gracefully and concede the brilliance in the evolution of the technique to defeat whilst the Allies slumbered!

The interpretation of an RMA is divergent even in the USA. It is enunciated as 'a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which. Combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational ad organisational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations'. On the other hand, the former US Secretary of Defence, William
Cohen contends that RMA means putting more resources in preparing US forces for an uncertain future and less in trying to shape that future military environment through American military engagement overseas or being ready to respond to near term [and lower risk] challenges to the US interests by relatively weak and traditional threats posed by Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong II.

Bare boned, an RMA occurs when a nation's military seizes the opportunity to transform its strategy, military doctrine, training, education, organisation, equipment, operations and tactics to achieve decisive military results in fundamentally new ways. Obviously, technological, political and societal pressures play their parts in such seizures of opportunity. Therefore, there are many viewpoints as to what RMA actually is. Within this fuliginous realm India has to find her niche in the RMA exercise.

RMA IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

RMA is an expensive exercise. Notwithstanding the geo-strategic compulsions, budgetary constraints will govern the extent that RMA can be applied. A comparative funding of the USA and India wo9uod indicate the extent to which India can embark in the realm of RMA.

$ 54 billion, in the fiscal year 2000 budget, was proposed by President Clinton to the Congress in January 1999 as just a part of the RMA expenditure. The Indian Defence Budget, near the time, was Rs 45,654 crores [US $ 10. 75 billion] which in comparative terms was 2.28% of the GDP and 14% of the Central Government Expenditure.

Yet, if the threat is paramount, then India may, like Pakistan, 'eat grass'.

The Threat

India has a nonpareil global strategic status. It is not a great power - yet it is not just another ordinary regional pretender. Population, size, economic and technological base, emerging global business engagements, cartographic position and military strength, impel India upfront in the international geo-political scenario. The impetus - reluctant that it may be - to carve its niche is accelerated by the 'ugly stability' that prevails in the neighbourhood cause by the proxy war and the Line of Actual Control [LAC] imbroglios. In this competitive vignette, Pakistan and China continue to be a threat. In this threat scenario, the range of military operations could span a conflict spectrum from low intensity - as is current - to high intensity. Therefore, the security concerns of Indian cannot be the mundane.

The budgetary constraints restrain the impacting of RMA on the Indian threat response to a conservative matrix. Hence, it is pragmatic to engineer the threat response to the formulations of the geo-strategic compulsions of friendly nations to the extent politically feasible and merge the requirement within that umbrella. To wit a loose Japan - Taiwan - India 'understanding' would counter the very potent China - Myanmar - Pakistan nexus.

China and Pakistani Strategy and Military Strength

Chinese strategy emphasises on surprise as has been repeatedly displayed in the conflicts she has engaged in., in the post Communist era. On the other hand, Pakistan has been most unpredictable and highly irresponsible as was displayed in Kargil, where she embarked on a military disaster ab initio, defying all tenets of warfare.

The compulsive imperative, thus, is to understand the strategic ethos of the neighbours for a pragmatic response via RMA.

" China. Beijing describes it long term goals of developing Comprehensive National Power [CNP] along with implementing an advantageous strategic equation in homilies. These homilies are 'positive' in moral terms. They are inert, accommodating, benign, and peaceful. 'Peace and Development', the non use of force in dispute resolution, non intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, the defensive nature of her military strategy, 'no first use' of nuclear weapons, support of nuclear free zones and the claim that she would never deploy her military forces on foreign soil are but such examples. These lofty sounding assertions obfuscate and downplay the aggressive intent of China's national development programme and its approach to the use of force, which is contingent, rather than being inherently passive or defensive. Beijing, thus, has transformed ambiguity into an art. She has discreetly translated her aggressive and hegemonistic ambitions; Deng Xiaoping's '24 Character Strategy' is an indicator of the Chinese mindset. It is thus not unusual, though very disturbing, to find that China's strategic ambiguity finds positive response from foreign governments and general public, including an influential section in our own country.

China's peace oriented homilies are backed by the sound 'Doctrine of Pre-emption and Surprise' embodying surprise, deception and shock effect. This has been the modus operandi in all her military and political actions.

Militarily, China is already advanced into RMA with technology and tactics governing aspects of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance [C4I2SR], joint service and combined arms operations. Special emphasis of the Chinese has been on air and air defence, electronic and information warfare and long range precision strikes. Given that the Chinese are adept in deception and deflection, India should not become complacent with China's apparent Taiwan centric activities. The overall modernisation of China's Armed Forces is ominous, not only along the Tibetan border, but along our sea interests, including the Andamans.

Portentous is the observation of the PLAAF Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Zheng Shenxiahave, who postulated that without China adopting a pre-emptive doctrine the chance of a PLA victory is limited.

" Pakistan. Pakistan's inadequate economy infirms here from matching India. She will continue to be dependant on her nuclear blackmail bogey to make the world pay a princely ransom, Kashmir will be centric to her interests and 'freedom fighters' would resurrect like phoenixes to bleed India white, even in areas beyond the restricted pale of common religious affinity. Concurrently, Pakistan would lean on China to assist modernising her armed forces, which would also be to China's advantage. In the event of a conventional war, Pakistan would capitalise on the advantages she accrues - one, India's slow mobilisation and two, on the international community diktat of halting a war within the 'three week' matrix. Beyond this timeframe, as is well known, Pakistan would collapse like a pack of cards because of here economic bankruptcy and lack of strategic depth. Sadly for Pakistan, her double standard in the 'war against terrorism' has caused her lose a sizeable number of powerful backers and hence reliance on this matrix may not totally gel. Notwithstanding, she will Machiavelli like pose that 'militants' are 'not in total control' and thereby ensuring a blackmail handle, not totally devoid of international sympathy, for a 'helpless but valiant' ally!

Pakistan's insecurity manifests itself in the military- tactical - strategic doctrine of Pakistan, as summed up by General Karamat, the then Army Chief:

" Tactical Defence. Engaging conventional forces through the various phases of operations. It is an offensive defensive concept to engage the enemy effectively and jeep him at bay while making deep inroads into this territory through all available gaps/ vantage points or by simply outflanking them.

" Strategic Deterrence. This would inevitably carry the nuclear dimension but only to deter or dissuade the enemy from actually exercising the nuclear option. For, once the nuclear option is invoked, deterrence ends with unpredictable consequences. It could provoke the dreaded 'first use', mainly in a countervalue mode to hit major population and communications centres with unacceptable collateral damage to life and property. Whether the victim of the strike would at all be in a position to retaliate, could be anybody's guess. Considering India's geographical sweep and the magnitude of nuclear arsenals, it would be appropriately be better place to retaliate than Pakistan.

" Viable Economy. It is refreshing that unlike the political leadership (including the Foreign Minister), the Army Chief, should have been the one and the only one to have raised the issue. That is inspite of the fact that the Army would be the worst hit by any downsizing or cuts in the defence budget. Thus, only an affordable defence can be credible defence. Hence, the importance of a 'viable economy' as a cornerstone of sound defence.

Both the countries are enhancing their capabilities in improving their military and civil infrastructure, especially China, so as to be able to have a 'reduced force generation time' from the start and an 'increased battlefield tempo'. Their aim to prevent India from seizing the initiative from the start and instead have the same themselves, or in the worst case scenario, they re-seize the initiative at the shortest possible time.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby ptraj » 28 Oct 2003 17:09

IE article:

The Army’s elite contingent is haemorrhaging as the best and the brightest choose corporate over combat.

"..none of the men who have quit in the recent past fits the stereotype of the superseded no-hoper who leaves the Army for a comfortable corporate. Rather, they were at the peak of their Army careers, with enviable 12-20 year service records, the right decorations and bright futures. In other words, they were the best. "

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Adi » 28 Oct 2003 17:58

self-edited: removed post for security reasons(or perhaps paranoia, however I prefer playing it on the safe side)

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Rudra » 28 Oct 2003 18:03

GOI would do well to listen to these people. to the avg 10th pass neta, SF means VIP security to guard his own corrupt arse. But I would hope the top NDA leadership is well above the avg state-level neta.

a dedicated aviation wing with Dhruvs for short range and infiltration and AN32 for long range is a must. We finally have little lack of funds for that and should not delay the matter.

I would rather SF go after folks like masood azhar than 2c jihadi loafers in J&K.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby daulat » 28 Oct 2003 18:15

imo - there are different interlocking rma scenarios for india

1. non hostile neighbours: why fight us? we are friends, we get rich together

2. china: we know where you are and what you are doing - we can make it very difficult for you to move on land and impossible for you to move in the air and in the water; conventional deterrence - isnt't it better to get richer together? you wanna go nuke, fair enough, but we can hurt you back, lets talk about money...

3. tsp: we can find all the cogs of your war machine and bring them all to a halt WITHOUT risking our main force - who can then prise you open at will; i.e. don't even think about it, you wanna go nuke? fine, we flatten you

4. COIN: we find you, we kill you - assured

5. tspa/coin charade: we know where you came from, we destroy that place, and the cogs that put you there

the technical implications of each model are different, as indeed are the force structures and armaments to be used. there needs to be much more integrated operations between air and ground

for example lets take the tspa/coin scenario - ghatak platoon in hot pursuit of fleeing terrorists near loc runs into cover fire from tsp post. platoon calls arty onto post or engages them with small arms (anza suppression mode) whilst heli/cas units bombs post and/or fleeing terrorists

implications: long and short range surveillance, comms, situation awareness, joint planning, force preparation, air-ground integration, pgm's, escalation control, political management, etc.

i remain utterly impressed by the US patrol calling in an F-16 strike against the tsp post firing at them across the durand line, in what was effectively a sub platoon level action

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Anaath » 28 Oct 2003 18:25

Originally posted by Daulat:
i remain utterly impressed by the US patrol calling in an F-16 strike against the tsp post firing at them across the durand line, in what was effectively a sub platoon level action[/QB]
This requires a fundamental paradigm shift both among those seeking air support and those delivering it.

In “I Could Never Be So Lucky Again”, Gen. Jimmy Doolittle mentions how US Army communications officers in 1942 N. Africa requested (and often received) Fighter cover for lone jeeps laying telephone lines across the desert.

Note that there is no “21st Century RMA” here.

What is notable (and worthy of "Monkey see, Monkey do"?)is a culture and system that allow for jointness, even in trivial tactical situations.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby debjani » 28 Oct 2003 18:44

Originally posted by Rudra Singha:
GOI would do well to listen to these people. to the avg 10th pass neta, SF means VIP security to guard his own corrupt arse. But I would hope the top NDA leadership is well above the avg state-level neta.

I would rather SF go after folks like masood azhar than 2c jihadi loafers in J&K.
I didn't get this drift of SF guarding VIPs and RMA.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby daulat » 28 Oct 2003 18:46

Originally posted by Anaath Das:
What is notable (and worthy of "Monkey see, Monkey do"?)is a culture and system that allow for jointness, even in trivial tactical situations.
some quesions come to mind

does a canadian style single armed forces model facilitate integrated ops?

does us army and usaf tac work hand in glove so as to be indistinguishable? is it across the board?

does 'extreme cas' only get called by spec.for and not GI 'joe schmuckatelli'?

how much of the info war is taking place in the air con tent with the 200 monitors (as seen on GW2) vs. the young lt. cr@pping his pants on the frontline?

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Anaath » 28 Oct 2003 18:52

In the spectrum of integrated forces, we have the Indian (pre-1945 origins) model on one extreme. At the other extreme are the Canadian and IDF models.

The Theatre Command concept (present-day US) is somewhere in the middle and probably more practical for us to implement.

India can never again afford to neglect seapower for its own sake. We cannot also afford to put airpower to less than maximal use.

So the Canadian and IDF models are probably not ideal for us.

Added later:

The RMA angle of USA+USAF jointness has no better exemplar than their SINCARS radio.

Perhaps the tech. gurus here can address system-driven jointness of that ilk.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby JCage » 28 Oct 2003 19:51

Hi,
This thread has moved on and I have ISP problems hence my delay in replying.
Anyway,
Manavendra/rudra,

GPS *is* common in the IA.
When referring to funds I was referring to comms upgrade as well to total state of the art stds on the lines of what Aman has referred.
The timeline is as follows :
In 98 I can confirm a non COIN unit already had GPS .
These were imported in all probability.
BEL made its first protoptypes for the army,af then and had them trialled.Based on feedback the improved ones were ready by 2000.Today BEL and tata guys both manufacture GPS sets a plenty and they are available.Bulk GPS procurement is hence entirely Indian while sufficient units were imported before.
See www.gisdevelopment.net for timeline.

Please note that even all comms gear and other stuff like BSR's is supplied with inbuilt GPS .These are light portable GPS receivers with numeric displays.
The more expensive GIS stuff is more limited.
Hope this is clearer.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby mody » 28 Oct 2003 20:09

Don't really know where else this can be discussed

Rajiv Shukla says revamp RAW

http://in.news.yahoo.com/031028/43/28vsx.html

Railway officials! Postal service Officers! If what the article says is true then there needs to be some serious revamping of teh intellignce agencies and diferent set of qualification requirements for joining RAW. A considation of all the different intel. agencies is definitely a good idea, so as to have better coordination between all of them and better use of teh resources.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Umrao » 28 Oct 2003 20:46

Shivji>> Very interesting episode of bullet in the buttock emerges left handed.

questions.

can we assume the bullet to be travelling in avery viscous medium once it enters the body?
Assuming the inside tissue is soft and can be compressed as bullet travels.

Can we assume that the bullet once inside the viscous medium is not dis integrating into particles (assuming the bullet to be rigid body)
and could be deflected by bone/harder tissue if the angle of bullet entry is shallow (tangential)?

It can be safe to assume that there is a (co)relation between the bullet velocity and the clean exit of the bullet from the body?

I heard bullets to have entered from the rib cage to lodge (in the brain) or emerge from the skull.

***
PS On further googling I found this . It could be of interest to Shiv and Ray.

http://www.rsu.edu/faculty/LWebre/PenTrauma.PPT

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby shiv » 28 Oct 2003 21:22

Originally posted by Ray:
L

Militarily, China is already advanced into RMA with technology and tactics governing aspects of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance [C4I2SR], joint service and combined arms operations. Special emphasis of the Chinese has been on air and air defence, electronic and information warfare and long range precision strikes. .
I am afraid that this para makes little sense to me.

Could someone translate and say what the Chinese are doing in terms of RMA.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Sahil » 28 Oct 2003 21:23

How valid is the letter by CI minister saying that RAW is (in summary) pretty much useless?

And when will Indian Army strike the camps training the militants in POK? Cannot the intelligence agency's do it? i mean sending in a car bomb or something?

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Rudra » 28 Oct 2003 21:30

china has little or no RMA other than a few showpiece 'fist units' - scads of pics on internet fora carefully posed.

if we need to find role models lets atleast look at the real ones.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby Vick » 28 Oct 2003 21:44

China may not be a role model but that doesn't mean that they have not learned RMA lessons over the last decade. The Gulf War 1 was what really set them thinking. The thought process and the gobs of cash and political influence available to the PLA have certainly increased their capabilities in the RMA universe.

They may not be at RMA Shangri'la yet but I wouldn't so readily discount the length of road they have already traveled.

Also, remember that the PLA is boss, the PLAN and PLAAF are subordinate orgs. That structure may be an advantage in terms of forcing jointmanship.

In India's case, jointmanship initially was a process of dragging the services kicking and screaming to the table. Even now, the CDS is not assigned. Unified commands on the mainland are still a distant dream. On top of that, the Indian military doesn't have the money or the political influence the PLA has to push reforms through yet it has the corporate inertia to stifle and slow to a crawl any far reaching reforms the politicians or the bureaucrats may try to impose them. Basically, worst of both worlds.

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Re: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

Postby TSJones » 28 Oct 2003 22:03

So what is RMA? Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld says it is a combination of the old as well as the new.

But really, this is precisely what transformation is about. Here we are in the year 2002, fighting the first war of the 21st century, and the horse cavalry was back and being used, but being used in previously unimaginable ways. It showed that a revolution in military affairs is about more than building new high tech weapons, though that is certainly part of it. It's also about new ways of thinking, and new ways of fighting.

In World War II, the German blitzkrieg revolutionized warfare. But it was accomplished by a German military that was really only about 10 or 15 percent transformed. The Germans saw that the future of war lay not with massive armies and protracted trench warfare, but rather with its small, high quality, mobile shock forces supported by air power and coordinated with air power, capable of pulling off lightning strikes against the enemy. They developed the lethal combination of fast-moving tanks, mobilized infantry and artillery supported by dive bombers, all concentrated on one part of the enemy line. The effect was devastating on their adversary's capabilities, on their morale, and it was, for a period, on the cause of freedom in the world.

What was revolutionary and unprecedented about the blitzkrieg was not the new capabilities the Germans employed, but rather the unprecedented and revolutionary way that they mixed new and existing capabilities.

In a similar way, the battle for Mazar was a transformational battle. Coalition forces took existing military capabilities from the most advanced laser-guided weapons to antique, 40-year-old B-52s -- actually, 40 years old doesn't sound antique to me -- [laughter] -- but the B-52s had been updated with modern electronics -- and also to the most rudimentary, a man on horseback. And they used them together in unprecedented ways, with devastating effect on enemy positions, on enemy morale, and this time, on the cause of evil in the world.

Preparing for the future will require us to think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. An ability to adapt will be critical in a world where surprise and uncertainty are the defining characteristics of our new security environment. During the Cold War, we faced a fairly predictable set of threats. We came to know a great deal about our adversary, because it was the same one for a long period. We knew many of the capabilities they possessed, and we fashioned strategies and capabilities that we believed we needed to deter them. And they were successful. It worked.

For almost a half a century, that mix of strategy, forces and capabilities allowed us to keep the peace and to defend freedom. But the Cold War is over. The Soviet Union is gone, and with it, the familiar security environment to which our nation had grown accustomed.

As we painfully learned on September 11th, the challenges of a new century are not nearly as predictable as they were during the Cold War. Who would have imagined only a few months ago that terrorists would take commercial airliners, turn them into missiles and use them to strike the Pentagon and the World Trade Towers, killing thousands? But it happened.

And let there be no doubt, in the years ahead, it is likely that we will be surprised again by new adversaries who may also strike in unexpected ways.

And as they gain access to weapons of increasing power -- and let there be no doubt but that they are -- these attacks will grow vastly more deadly than those we suffered several months ago.

Our challenge in this new century is a difficult one. It's really to prepare to defend our nation against the unknown, the uncertain and what we have to understand will be the unexpected. That may seem on the face of it an impossible task, but it is not. But to accomplish it, we have to put aside the comfortable ways of thinking and planning, take risks and try new things so that we can prepare our forces to deter and defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged to challenges.

Well before September 11th, the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense were in the process of doing just that. With the Quadrennial Defense Review, we took a long, hard look at the emerging security environment and we came to the conclusion that a new defense strategy was appropriate. We decided to move away from the "two major theater war" construct for sizing our forces, an approach that called for maintaining two massive occupation forces capable of marching on and occupying capitals of two aggressors at the same time and changing their regimes. This approach served us well in the immediate post-Cold War period, but it really threatened to leave us reasonably prepared for two specific conflicts and under-prepared for the unexpected contingencies of the 21st century.

To ensure we have the resources to prepare for the future, and to address the emerging challenges to homeland security, we needed a more realistic and balanced assessment of our near-term warfighting needs. Instead of maintaining two occupation forces, we will place greater emphasis on deterrence in four critical theaters, backed by the ability to swiftly defeat two aggressors at the same time, while preserving the option for one massive counter-offensive to occupy an aggressor's capital and replace the regime. Since neither aggressor would know which the president would choose for a regime change, the deterrent is undiminished. But by removing the requirement to maintain a second occupation force, as we did under the old strategy, we can free up resources for the future and the various lesser contingencies which we face, have faced, are facing and will most certainly face in the period ahead.

To prepare for the future, we also decided to move away from the so-called threat-based strategy that had dominated our country's defense planning for nearly a half-century and adopt what we characterized as a capability-based strategy, one that focuses less on who might threaten us or where we might be threatened, and more on how we might be threatened and what we need to do to deter and defend against such threats. Instead of building our armed forces around plans to fight this or that country, we need to examine our vulnerabilities, asking ourselves, as Frederick the Great did in his great General Principles of War, what design would I be forming if I were the enemy, and then fashioning our forces as necessary to deter and defeat those threats.

For example, we know that because the U.S. has unparalleled land, sea and air power, it makes little sense for potential adversaries to try to build up forces to compete with those strengths. They learned from the Gulf War that challenging our armed forces head-on is foolhardy. So rather than building competing armies, navies and air forces, they will likely seek to challenge us asymmetrically, by looking at our vulnerabilities and building capabilities with which they can, or at least hope, to exploit them.

They know, for example, that an open society is vulnerable to new forms of terrorism. They suspect that U.S. space assets and information networks, critical to our security and our economy, are somewhat vulnerable. And they are. They see that our ability to project force into the distant corners of the world where they live depends in some cases on vulnerable foreign bases. And they know we have no defense against ballistic missiles on our cities, our people, our forces, or our friends, creating incentives for the development of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.

Our job is to close off as many of those avenues of potential attack as is possible. We need to prepare for new forms of terrorism, to be sure, but also attacks on U.S. space assets, cyber attacks on our information networks, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. At the same time, we must work to build up our own areas of advantage, such as our ability to project military power over long distances, precision strike weapons, and our space, intelligence and undersea warfare capabilities.

Before the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington we had decided that to keep the peace and defend freedom in the 21st century our defense strategy and force structure must be focused on achieving six transformational goals:

First, to protect the U.S. homeland and our bases overseas.

Second, to project and sustain power in distant theaters.

Third, to deny our enemies sanctuary, making sure they know that no corner of the world is remote enough, no mountain high enough, no cave or bunker deep enough, no SUV fast enough to protect them from our reach.

Fourth, to protect our information networks from attack.

Fifth, to use information technology to link up different kinds of U.S. forces so that they can in fact fight jointly.

And sixth, to maintain unhindered access to space and protect our space capabilities from enemy attack.

Our experience on September 11th, and indeed in the Afghan campaign, have served to reinforce the importance of moving the U.S. defense posture in these directions. Our challenge in the 21st century is to defend our cities and our infrastructure from new forms of attack while projecting force over long distances to fight new and perhaps distant adversaries.

To do this, we need rapidly deployable, fully integrated joint forces capable of reaching distant theaters quickly and working with our air and sea forces to strike adversaries swiftly, successfully, and with devastating effect. We need improved intelligence, long-range precision strikes, sea-based platforms to help counter the access denial capabilities of adversaries.

Our goal is not simply to fight and win wars, it is to try to prevent wars. To do so, we need to find ways to influence the decision-makers of potential adversaries, to deter them not only from using existing weapons, but to the extent possible, try to dissuade them from building dangerous new capabilities in the first place.

Just as the existence of the U.S. Navy dissuades others from investing in competing navies -- because it would truly cost a fortune and would not succeed in providing a margin of military advantage -- we must develop new capabilities that merely by our possessing them will dissuade adversaries from trying to compete.

For example, deployment of effective missile defenses may dissuade others from spending to obtain ballistic missiles when they cannot provide them what they want, which is really the power to hold the United States and our allies' cities hostage to, in effect, nuclear blackmail.

Hardening U.S. space systems and building capabilities to defend our space assets could dissuade adversaries from developing and using small killer satellites to attack and cripple U.S. satellite networks. New earth-penetrating and thermobaric weapons could make obsolete the deep underground facilities where today terrorists hide and terrorist states conceal their weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

In addition to new capabilities, transformation also requires rebalancing existing forces and existing capabilities by adding more of what the Pentagon has come to call low-density, high-demand assets, which is really a euphemism, in plain English, for "our priorities were wrong, and we didn't buy enough of what we need." [Laughter.]

For example, the experience in Afghanistan showed the effectiveness of unmanned aircraft. But it also revealed how few we have and what their weaknesses are. The department has known for some time that it does not have enough manned reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, command-and-control aircraft, air-defense capabilities, chemical and biological defense units, as well as certain types of special operations forces.

But in spite of the shortages of these and other scarce systems, the United States postponed the needed investment while continuing to fund what were, in retrospect, less valuable programs. That needs to change.

Moreover, as we change investment priorities, we have to begin shifting the balance in our arsenal between manned and unmanned capabilities between short- and long-range systems, stealthy and non-stealthy systems, between shooters and sensors, and between vulnerable and hardened systems. And we need to make the leap into the information age, which is the critical foundation of our transformation efforts.

As we deployed forces and capabilities to defend U.S. territory after September 11th, we found that our new responsibilities in homeland defense have exacerbated these shortages. No U.S. president should be placed in the position where he must choose between protecting our citizens at home and protecting our interests and our forces overseas. We, as a country, must be able to do both.

The notion that we could transform while cutting the defense budget over the past decade was seductive, but false.

Of course, while transformation requires building new capabilities and expanding our arsenal, it also means reducing stocks of weapons that are no longer necessary for the defense of our country. Just as we no longer need a massive, heavy force designed to repel a Soviet tank invasion, we also no longer need many thousands of offensive nuclear warheads we amassed during the Cold war to deter a Soviet nuclear attack


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