Let us Understand the Chinese

[Suraj]

wrdos may be Chinese, but he lives and works or studies in Japan, as far as I can recall from what he said in the past. So his ability to access BR doesn't provide any data about BR accessibility in China.

[RayC]

wrdos

Good to know that you are a Christian. But there are many denominations. Which one to you subscribe to?

Do let me know, whereas the Vatican has the sole authority to appoint the clergy and the Catholic hierarchy, why is it that China appoint what is acceptable to the Regime.

Do also tell me why does the Chinese govt vet the sermons of Islamic mullahs in Xinjiang? Why are children below the age of 18 not allowed Islamic education or allowed in the mosques?

Therefore, state controlled religion is no religion. It is a farce and a fraud that is being perpetuated.

[RayC]

wrdos may be Chinese, but he lives and works or studies in Japan, as far as I can recall from what he said in the past. So his ability to access BR doesn't provide any data about BR accessibility in China.

That is surprising.

I believe there are excellent academic institutions in China as they inform us.

Why should he/ she go to Japan, especially when the Japanese have been very oppressive in the past to the Chinese and China!!

Imagine the temerity of Japan - such a small country to practically subjugate and mistreat such a huge nation as China!!

[Rishirishi]

edited.

[Sanjay M]

China Moving Up from Low to High-End Goods

[shyam]

Forget 2050. Look at China's output today. They are rapidly approaching the US in overall economic terms. China produces 5 times the crude steel of the US and growing by 10% per year. China produces 1.5 times the coal of the US. In consumer goods, China's automobile production is approaching the 10 million mark and is growing at 20+% per year. The US auto production is around 15 to 17 million and falling. The GDP in PPP terms of China is around 7 trillion dollars - growing around 10% a year, while the US is around 12 trillion. By 2020, China will definitely have the largest economy in the world. Once that happens military and diplomatic strength will follow. Beyond that time it will take a coalition of Western countries - US / NATO etc. to match the China's global muscle. By 2050 comparing China to the US will be like comparing the US to Great Britain today.

I think that once current US economic crisis is over, most of the savings China made by exporting to US, invested in US, will be wiped off.

[Sanjay M]

China Physics Publications Rising

But still ranked 65 in actual citations of their papers.
I wonder how India ranks?

[Rahul M]

China Physics Publications Rising

But still ranked 65 in actual citations of their papers.
I wonder how India ranks?

talking from experience, most of the stuff coming out of the PRC are cr**. some of my friends go whenever they see a paper by a PRC chinese. arxiv is full of papers by chinese authors in many of which even the topic title has little to do with the subject matter.

unfortunately, although we still do better, it's not by much. rankings and other stuff mean zilch anyway.

[Rishirishi]

I am continuing my post.

Chinease infrastructure:

I have tavelled arround in the Shanghai and Guangdong provices. Chineae have managed to build magnificant infrastructure. Some claim that it is as good as what is found in the west. I have lived in Northern Europe and can report that the Chinease have better highways then Germany, better airports then UK and Smother trains then the Swiss. Frankfurt and even the Bank area of London, fades away against the Bund in Shanghai (that said, i doubt weather the buildings technically are better then the European ones (talking of ventilation systems, heating, quality of material etc).

But the strange thing is that when you start to take a peek inside in the neighbourhoods (even new ones), they resemble more like Pahar Ganj in Delhi then Hollowood in LA. The streets are narrow and filled with garbage. Small shaddy corner shops dominate the picture. In the begining I was wondering how on earth a city could be so modern, when the salary level was so low. (you can get a manual worker in Shanghai for less then Rs 5000 per month). I have some pictures, that I will post (if i can find them). The professional class actually makes less then Indians. In India, a person with 10 years experiance working for a good company can draw from Rs 50 to 150 k per month. In china the salary is half of that.
But it is much cheaper to purchase a flat (you can get a very nice flat for less then Rs 5 million), becuase the the government constantly makes available new land to build on and infrastructure to go with it. Electricity is cheap and available, the same goes for water (but of poor quality), and public transport works.

But the real qustion is of cost and benefit. All the infrastructure is built at a cost, but is it really cost effective. All over the place you encounter "showpice projects". Like the Maglev in Shanghai. It is an awsome trian that takes you from the equally awsome Shanghai airport (pudong) to downtown Shanghai in just 7 min (30 km).

Now the cost of the prject is close over 1,5 billion dollars (more then the phase 1 of Delhi metro). And it is useless for commuting. The train is so fast that it does not stop in between, and takes you to the ourskirts of the city, from where you catch the metro or Taxi.
Why not just hop into a Taxi and be driven directly to the destination, which takes you less time, at same cost? Had it not been smarter to extend the regular metro system of Shanghai to the airport and took it directly to the terminal?
The Maglev has actually become a tourist attraction, but is not used by regular travelers.
Simmilar case can be said about a lot of project in China. Huge massive projects, that are very nice, but one wonders if anyone has been acountable for the use of public money?
But a lot of the infrastructure is useful, like the highways, ports, airports etc.

The Chinease are good at making things happen, where the projects are executed with military efficiency.

Compared to India.
In India we have the democratic problem, where people love to play "show stoppers". Try to build anything and it will be marred with controversies, political issues etc. Even the media acts against anyone who wants change.
Example that I just cant get out of my mind:
The Mumbai authorites came up with a scheme where the slum dwellers got an appartment in exchange for vacating the land. (the area was at least the size of the slum house, in most cases larger, each appartment had toilet, bath and kitchen).
The scheme was a sucess. The slum dwellers got better housing, the builder made money, and the city got more dwellings, and the slum with its unhygenic condition was removed. One would believe that the media and public would worship such policies.
Wrong: The front of the newspapers carries a picture of some sad, old idiot who misses the community in the slum and regrets the whole thing. He wishes he was back in the slum, becasue it was more social. The newspaper devots 95% of towards this cribber, and just mentions in a short paragraph that some other residents are happy, becasue they now have acess to toilets and water proof housing (which they can sell). After reading the article one gets a feel that the scheme is a total miss and one sould not ruin the Shanti Shang-Ri-Lah.

India has the knowhow, and the people to build great infrastructure. But there are 3 problems. The first one is the antiquated laws, where every one seems to have a veto power to stop the project. The second one is the public, with always takes a very cynical view of things. The third problem is the press, which is over critical.

[VinodTK]

Olympics protesters clash with police in Beijing

[RayC]

Hukou 'an obstacle to market economy'

By Rong Jiaojiao (China Daily)
Updated: 2007-05-21 06:38

When Du Yumeng was born in December 2005, she was probably not aware that she had been classified into a different category from other babies - a category which includes people toting wheelbarrows of fresh fruit, selling steamed buns from a corner booth or peddling phone cards. They all share one thing in common - a rural 'hukou', or household registration.

Set up in 1958 in order to control mass urbanization, China's hukou system effectively divides the population in two - 'the haves' (urban households) and 'the have not's' (rural households).

Under the system, rural citizens have little access to social welfare in cities and are restricted from receiving public services such as education, medical care, housing and employment, regardless of how long they may have lived or worked in the city.

Even though Yumeng's parents had been working in Beijing for 10 years, she had to be born back in her father's hometown of Shuangfeng Village, Anhui Province. This was primarily due to her parents' lack of access to services in Beijing and the need for a birth permit from Shuangfeng, where the hukou is registered.

Aged 31, Yumeng's father, Du Shujian, receives a monthly income of 2,000 yuan ($250 dollars) as an interior construction worker. He has been deprived of urban medical and social welfare ever since he arrived in Beijing 10 years ago.

What's more, because of the restrictions of the hukou system, Du is prohibited from buying an affordable house in Beijing - you need a Beijing hukou for that.

"I have decorated so many apartments for Beijing citizens, but I don't know when I can have my own," Du said.

"And my daughter - I feel sorry for her as she had no choice but to have the same rural hukou as me, though she is too young now to know what it means for her."

The evidence of China's economic success is clear for anybody to see, with a forest of construction cranes permeating almost every major city. This however, has only exacerbated the problem of urbanization, by drawing more and more rural dwellers off their farms and into the city in search of a better life.

The subsequent expansion of the service industry in the cities, in line with the expanding middle class, has created a vacuum in the secondary sectors that rural laborers hope to fill.

Government figures estimate that there are about 120 million migrant workers who have moved to cities in search of work, though the real figure could be much higher.

Beijing has borne the brunt of this mass urbanization as the city spawns building after building in preparation for the 2008 Olympics. A growing number of migrants like Du who relocate to find better jobs here tend to stay longer or even resettle with their entire families.

A study by the Renmin University of China revealed that this 'floating population' in Beijing, currently stands at over 3.5 million, with most staying an average of five years in the city.

Ruminating reform

As China is struggling with the social effects of a widening rural-urban divide, there have been growing calls to reform the hukou system, owing to the fact that millions of farmers have illegally started moving to towns and cities in order to find work.

In a week-long poll conducted in March by website Sina.com and the China Youth Daily social survey centre, 92 per cent of the 11,168 respondents said that the system was in need of reform.

More than 53 per cent said restrictive policies attached to the system, such as limits on access to education, healthcare, employment and social insurance should be eliminated. More than 38 per cent called for the system to be scrapped entirely.

"Hukou has played an important role as a basic data provider and for identification registration in certain historical periods, but it has become neither scientific nor rational given the irresistible trend of migration," Professor Duan Chengrong, director of the Research Center for Population and Development at the Renmin University of China, said.

At a national public security conference on March 29, officials from the Ministry of Public Security proposed a way to deal with the inequalities across Chinese society and bridge the divide.

The conference suggested eliminating the two-tiered household registration system and to allow freer migration between the cities and the countryside.

However, simply allowing freer migration does not address the many problems that migrant workers face when they finally get to the city.

According to Zhang Chewei, deputy director of the Research Institute of Population Science at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, the system denies migrant workers their fundamental right as a Chinese citizen to be treated equally.

He cited that a Beijing citizen earning less than 2,500 yuan ($313) a year could receive monthly subsidies as well as medical insurance, a pension and even low-cost housing. That was in contrast to the few benefits given to farmers living on the same income.

Education for migrant children is an equally controversial topic, with migrant families often charged discriminatory tuition fees at urban schools - a practice that is officially prohibited.

Each migrant worker for example, must shell out between 20,000 to 30,000 yuan ($2,500 to $3,750) for a child to enrol in a local primary or middle school.

Zhang remarked that, "As migrant laborers have made their contribution to urban development, they should also be given fair treatment when it comes to social benefits and justice."

Besides the unfair treatment, Professor Duan believes that the hukou system is also "an obstacle to the market economy". "The trend is towards eliminating it," he added.

Professor Duan went on to say that while the hukou system has failed to stop the influx of rural dwellers into the cities, it has impeded their integration into those areas and their access to the most prized jobs.

"Hukou reforms therefore, could allow China to channel labor to where it is most needed, rather than to areas most popular among the labor pool," Duan said.

However, the lack of control over the surplus migrant labor force, not to mention their families, continues to weigh heavy in the decision-making process. The inadequate infrastructure of many Chinese cities also affects the process.

"If the new hukou system is not matched by the introduction of social programmes, the only kind of freedom that official red seal will provide for is the freedom to create urban slums," said Duan.

"More equality in the availability of urban education and healthcare should be granted for all workers and their families, while more rural townships need to provide useful public services so that there would not be so many people yearning to move to the cities."

The International Organization for Migration, which opened a new liaison office in Beijing last month, is set to launch a US$3 million project in a bid to help Chinese government agencies and social organizations improve their mechanisms and services to protect the rights of migrant workers.

Twelve provincial areas, including Hebei, Liaoning, Shandong, Guangxi and Chongqing, have launched trial reforms to help bring an end to the differentiation between rural and urban residents.

Beijing, Shanghai and some cities in Guangdong Province have loosened some of the restrictions that previously hindered people from changing their hukou. Northeast China's Heilongjiang Province is also initiating trial reforms in its household registration system, and aims to have them fully implemented across the province by the end of the year.

When being told that he may one day be able to change his rural hukou for a Beijing city hukou, Du Shujian could not hide his excitement, and asked: "Do you know when exactly?"

"It is not for me, you know," he remarked.

"I have been in Beijing for 10 years and I survived, but it will mean a lot for my daughter - I want her to attend a decent kindergarten and elementary school, just like other Beijing kids."

Hukou 'an obstacle to market economy'

Rishirishi,

Comments please.

[Rishirishi]

Hukou 'an obstacle to market economy'

By Rong Jiaojiao (China Daily)
Updated: 2007-05-21 06:38

When Du Yumeng was born in December 2005, she was probably not aware that she had been classified into a different category from other babies - a category which includes people toting wheelbarrows of fresh fruit, selling steamed buns from a corner booth or peddling phone cards. They all share one thing in common - a rural 'hukou', or household registration.

Set up in 1958 in order to control mass urbanization, China's hukou system effectively divides the population in two - 'the haves' (urban households) and 'the have not's' (rural households).

Under the system, rural citizens have little access to social welfare in cities and are restricted from receiving public services such as education, medical care, housing and employment, regardless of how long they may have lived or worked in the city.

Even though Yumeng's parents had been working in Beijing for 10 years, she had to be born back in her father's hometown of Shuangfeng Village, Anhui Province. This was primarily due to her parents' lack of access to services in Beijing and the need for a birth permit from Shuangfeng, where the hukou is registered.

Aged 31, Yumeng's father, Du Shujian, receives a monthly income of 2,000 yuan ($250 dollars) as an interior construction worker. He has been deprived of urban medical and social welfare ever since he arrived in Beijing 10 years ago.

What's more, because of the restrictions of the hukou system, Du is prohibited from buying an affordable house in Beijing - you need a Beijing hukou for that.

"I have decorated so many apartments for Beijing citizens, but I don't know when I can have my own," Du said.

"And my daughter - I feel sorry for her as she had no choice but to have the same rural hukou as me, though she is too young now to know what it means for her."

The evidence of China's economic success is clear for anybody to see, with a forest of construction cranes permeating almost every major city. This however, has only exacerbated the problem of urbanization, by drawing more and more rural dwellers off their farms and into the city in search of a better life.

The subsequent expansion of the service industry in the cities, in line with the expanding middle class, has created a vacuum in the secondary sectors that rural laborers hope to fill.

Government figures estimate that there are about 120 million migrant workers who have moved to cities in search of work, though the real figure could be much higher.

Beijing has borne the brunt of this mass urbanization as the city spawns building after building in preparation for the 2008 Olympics. A growing number of migrants like Du who relocate to find better jobs here tend to stay longer or even resettle with their entire families.

A study by the Renmin University of China revealed that this 'floating population' in Beijing, currently stands at over 3.5 million, with most staying an average of five years in the city.

Ruminating reform

As China is struggling with the social effects of a widening rural-urban divide, there have been growing calls to reform the hukou system, owing to the fact that millions of farmers have illegally started moving to towns and cities in order to find work.

In a week-long poll conducted in March by website Sina.com and the China Youth Daily social survey centre, 92 per cent of the 11,168 respondents said that the system was in need of reform.

More than 53 per cent said restrictive policies attached to the system, such as limits on access to education, healthcare, employment and social insurance should be eliminated. More than 38 per cent called for the system to be scrapped entirely.

"Hukou has played an important role as a basic data provider and for identification registration in certain historical periods, but it has become neither scientific nor rational given the irresistible trend of migration," Professor Duan Chengrong, director of the Research Center for Population and Development at the Renmin University of China, said.

At a national public security conference on March 29, officials from the Ministry of Public Security proposed a way to deal with the inequalities across Chinese society and bridge the divide.

The conference suggested eliminating the two-tiered household registration system and to allow freer migration between the cities and the countryside.

However, simply allowing freer migration does not address the many problems that migrant workers face when they finally get to the city.

According to Zhang Chewei, deputy director of the Research Institute of Population Science at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, the system denies migrant workers their fundamental right as a Chinese citizen to be treated equally.

He cited that a Beijing citizen earning less than 2,500 yuan ($313) a year could receive monthly subsidies as well as medical insurance, a pension and even low-cost housing. That was in contrast to the few benefits given to farmers living on the same income.

Education for migrant children is an equally controversial topic, with migrant families often charged discriminatory tuition fees at urban schools - a practice that is officially prohibited.

Each migrant worker for example, must shell out between 20,000 to 30,000 yuan ($2,500 to $3,750) for a child to enrol in a local primary or middle school.

Zhang remarked that, "As migrant laborers have made their contribution to urban development, they should also be given fair treatment when it comes to social benefits and justice."

Besides the unfair treatment, Professor Duan believes that the hukou system is also "an obstacle to the market economy". "The trend is towards eliminating it," he added.

Professor Duan went on to say that while the hukou system has failed to stop the influx of rural dwellers into the cities, it has impeded their integration into those areas and their access to the most prized jobs.

"Hukou reforms therefore, could allow China to channel labor to where it is most needed, rather than to areas most popular among the labor pool," Duan said.

However, the lack of control over the surplus migrant labor force, not to mention their families, continues to weigh heavy in the decision-making process. The inadequate infrastructure of many Chinese cities also affects the process.

"If the new hukou system is not matched by the introduction of social programmes, the only kind of freedom that official red seal will provide for is the freedom to create urban slums," said Duan.

"More equality in the availability of urban education and healthcare should be granted for all workers and their families, while more rural townships need to provide useful public services so that there would not be so many people yearning to move to the cities."

The International Organization for Migration, which opened a new liaison office in Beijing last month, is set to launch a US$3 million project in a bid to help Chinese government agencies and social organizations improve their mechanisms and services to protect the rights of migrant workers.

Twelve provincial areas, including Hebei, Liaoning, Shandong, Guangxi and Chongqing, have launched trial reforms to help bring an end to the differentiation between rural and urban residents.

Beijing, Shanghai and some cities in Guangdong Province have loosened some of the restrictions that previously hindered people from changing their hukou. Northeast China's Heilongjiang Province is also initiating trial reforms in its household registration system, and aims to have them fully implemented across the province by the end of the year.

When being told that he may one day be able to change his rural hukou for a Beijing city hukou, Du Shujian could not hide his excitement, and asked: "Do you know when exactly?"

"It is not for me, you know," he remarked.

"I have been in Beijing for 10 years and I survived, but it will mean a lot for my daughter - I want her to attend a decent kindergarten and elementary school, just like other Beijing kids."

Hukou 'an obstacle to market economy'

Rishirishi,

Comments please.

Very interesting post. It points out two aspects of Chinease rule. The first one is the governments obsession with appearance and the second is the strategy to control things. I will answer your question in depth.

The Chinease communist party rules like a military organisation. Each area has a party member in charge, who has to deliver growth. If he can show good growth an statistics, he/she will be promoted. Hence there is a vested interest in the growth, rather then the benefit to the peope. It is good in one sence, becuase the local in charge, is focussed on improvement, but the problem is longterm planning. The leader will try to deliver "spectacualr", which is going to be his ticket to a better postion. Hence the leader will force banks to finance growth at "any cost". Even if it means, forcing banks to finance loss making enterprises (which is a HUGE problem), overspending on showpiece infrastructure, maupalating statistics or simply controlling acess.

In Guangzhou for example, I was talikng to a girl, who runs a hotel business. I wanted to fix an appointment, but she said the bus will take at least 40 min (a 5 min drive by taxi). She seem to be doing fairly well, so I politely asked if she did have acess to a bike or a car.
The government had stopped handing out new permits to use bikes (and were not reniweing the existing ones, and small cars are not encoraged at all. There are very few small cars, rather you will see midsize and large cars (honda city class and above). Hence the way to make the road infrastructure adequate, the govenment had restricted the usage. Unfair for some, but very nice to a visitor like me (smile).
The same logic is applied to non, city dwellers. They live in factory compounds, where they get boarding and a place to sleep. But they do not bring over their famillies, as the cities could not really have supported the extra burden.
But in one way it is good, as the funds are channeled back to the ruaral areas, in stead of creating slum areas in the city. But what price can you put on a splitted family, that too for a few hundred dollars per month. What do you do when you cant feed the population? you enforce a one child policy.

The Chinease dilemma.
How do you reform such a system? The party knows all to well that it has to keep on delivering growth, or there can be severe unrest in the country. China does not have good mechanisms for allocationg resources. There is no leagal system with fair trals and how do you know that the party leader is doing the right thing? How long time would it take to create a leagal system, with prosecutors, judges and lawers etc?

A lot of people seem to favor or at least admire the Chinease dictator model of growth, without really understanding the dynamics behind it. They do not see the longterm effects of the model.

Out of the top 25 economies of the world, all are democratic, is that a coincidance?. Getting a democracy to work is very very difficult. It is a miracle that India, with its huge diverse population, has managed it. All the way from the panchayats to the central government, there is a system (not always functioning well, but at least it is in place).

Strangely India has managed to build the infrastructure that really matter, A leagal system, a free and fair financial system, the right of ownership, a fairly well functioning education system (kids do manage to get great careears out of it), multi party system etc. I do not think people realize the true value of thease institutions.
What India now needs to do, is to finetune and reform its beaurocracy, which is still living in the pre libralisation era.

A lot of writing from my side. questions are welcome.

[sum]

16 Chinese cops killed

EIJING: Separatists fighting for splitting a portion of China on Monday attacked an armed police station killed 16 policemen. The incident vindicated China's worst Olympic fears about terrorists' attacks before and during the 2008 Beijing Games scheduled to begin on August 8. ( Watch )

Terrorists managed to penetrate the high-security system that has been put in place in Xinjiang province, the scene of separatists' movement seeking an independent East Turkmenistan, over the past several months. The terrorists using hand-made bombs and knives also left 16 more policemen injured.

The incident in bound to spur Chinese authorities to further tighten security in the national capital, which has already begun to receive athletes and visitors for the Games. Beijing authorities had earlier said they had uncovered a plot by Xinjiang terrorists trying to blow up the Olympic infrastructure.

The government has taken elaborate measures tightening the issuance of visas to foreign travellers and asking real estate agents and hotels to avoid renting rooms to people from Tibet and Xinjiang in order to avoid any possible attacks during the Olympic Games. But the latest incident is likely to cause even greater worries among the Chinese leadership.

The police said they have arrested two terrorists, one of whom got a leg injury, soon after the raid on the policemen jogging just 200 meters away from the border armed police division head quarters at Kashi in western China. The jogging policemen were hit by explosives thrown from a passing lorry and later attacked with knives at 8am.

The attack killed 14 policemen on the spot while two others died on the way to hospital, police sources said. No civilians were hurt in the attack.

The official media quoted Tian Yixiang, the security chief for the Games, as saying that the main security challenge came from Xinjiang terrorists and the Falun Gong cult, which is banned in China. Falun Gong activists are suspected by Chinese authorities to be planning to destabilize the government although its leaders have either been jailed or hounded out of the country.

Xinjiang officials had recently claimed to have cracked down on five terrorists groups and detailed 82 suspected terrorists. Officials in Beijing had claimed that three suspects involved in an attempt to carry dangerous liquid in a Southern Airlines flight have admitted they were planning sabotage. The latest incident shows that separatists have not been fully disarmed and can continue to cause serious danger.

How on earth did two people just kill 16 cops and only one of them suffers a minor leg injury with the other untouched??

Shades of the Paki army(240 surrendering to 20)??

[Vikas]

Rishi,
After all has been said and done, the fact remains that China has prospered at a breakneck speed with loads of people coming out of poverty and misery like never before. When people talk about democracy and freedom, it sounds kind of weird. For ages folks the world over, have lived under all kind of Kings and despots without any ouch! of protest. This democracy movement is a product of last maybe 100 years. Chinese have lived under Kings and warlords since time immemorial.So what makes people think that china eventually will have to face the fault lines and will stumble as we go forward. They could continue as they have for so many centuries.

Another thought that I fail to comprehend is that folks keep talking about NPA's and as you said "force banks to finance growth at "any cost". Even if it means, forcing banks to finance loss making enterprises (which is a HUGE problem), overspending on showpiece infrastructure".
How is that these loses don't show up and Chinese govt is successfully able to tide over it. I am sure other countries would love to do it if they knew the trick of building spectacular infrastructure and yet not feel the pinch of bad performing investments.
I do not admire Chinese way of growth but surely would love to understand how they do it with no public protest at large scale and generally achieving what they started to achieve in the beginning.

Would like to hear your thoughts on this.

[Pulikeshi]

Hukou 'an obstacle to market economy'

"I have been in Beijing for 10 years and I survived, but it will mean a lot for my daughter - I want her to attend a decent kindergarten and elementary school, just like other Beijing kids."

Hukou 'an obstacle to market economy'

The Hukou system will not go away soon. The Urban "fat cats" have no intention of sharing their sparse resources with their poorer "slaves" from rural China. There is no Deve Gowda and his gang sweating for the "son of the soil"
When one talks of Human Rights in China - this topic comes as a quick example from many young people. However, this problem is becoming endemic to all successful cities from what I know and is a kind of Apartheid unofficially tolerated by the state.

One fundamental DDM about this article is that there is no "market economy" in China.
For the most sophosticated - there is no such thing as an Economy, there are only markets -
But I know that is too much to ask even from our esteemed International DDM

[RayC]

It is not easy to realize how strange it is when you live in an existing system, but when you have the chance to talk with people from other countries, you realize the huge difference.

I enjoyed my talk with my great friends tonight, and we talked about the Resident Permit (Hokou) system in China. To be honest, I didn't feel it too strange before I explained it with my own mouth. After that, even I think it is not reasonable at all, and astonished to hear what came out of my own mouth. Let me explain it to you. I enjoyed my talk with my great friends tonight, and we talked about the Resident Permit (Hokou) system in China. To be honest, I didn't feel it too strange before I explained it with my own mouth. After that, even I think it is not reasonable at all, and astonished to hear what came out of my own mouth. Let me explain it to you.

What is Hukou What is Hukou

Hukou is basically a resident permit given by the government of China. It is issued on family basis. Every family have a Hukou booklet that records information about the family members, including name, birth date, relationship with each other, marriage status (and with whom if married), address and your employer... Hukou is basically a resident permit given by the government of China. It is issued on family basis. Every family have a Hukou booklet that records information about the family members, including name, birth date, relationship with each other, marriage status (and with whom if married), address and your employer ...

Everyone has a Hukou in China. Everyone has a Hukou in China.

Hukou before 1980 Hukou before 1980

Before 1980, Hukou is extremely important. People are required to stay at the small area they were born (where the Hukou is), and stay there until they die. They cannot move around. They can travel, but there is no access to job, public services, education, or even food in other places. It is just like visiting other places with a B-1 (business) type of visa - you can visit, but cannot work there (it is illegal), cannot go to school (not accepted), cannot go to hospital (without a hukou, you are not treated). For food, in those old days, you cannot buy food no matter how much money you have. You need to use Liangpiao (The currency for food) with money together to get food. Liangpiao is only issued by the government of the place your Hukou is registered. So basically, you can survive with the Liangpiao you get for some days, but not long (especially taken the consideration that Liangpiao issued by one province or city cannot be used in another province or city). Before 1980, Hukou is extremely important. People are required to stay at the small area they were born (where the Hukou is), and stay there until they die. They cannot move around. They can travel, but there is no access to job , Public services, education, or even food in other places. It is just like visiting other places with a B-1 (business) type of visa - you can visit, but cannot work there (it is illegal), cannot go to school (not accepted), cannot go to hospital (without a hukou, you are not treated). For food, in those old days, you cannot buy food no matter how much money you have. You need to use Liangpiao (The currency for food ) With money together to get food. Liangpiao is only issued by the government of the place your Hukou is registered. So basically, you can survive with the Liangpiao you get for some days, but not long (especially taken the consideration that Liangpiao issued by one province or city cannot be used in another province or city).

So basically, at that time, without Hukou, people cannot move. There are very few people move around in the country, but their status is practically the same as illegal immigrants in US So basically, at that time, without Hukou, people cannot move. There are very few people move around in the country, but their status is practically the same as illegal immigrants in US

To move Hukou from one place to other is very hard - just as hard as getting green card for US It is even harder to move from rural area to city - basically, there are too types of Hukou, one is rural Hukou, and the other is city Hukou. To move from rural to rural is easier, but to move from rural to city is very hard - it takes years. Only in very few situations does the change happen: 1) You enter a university in city, or 2) You marriage someone in city. Both of the cases, you need to wait for a long period of time to get it. There is limited Hukou open every year, so you need to compete to get it. To move Hukou from one place to other is very hard - just as hard as getting green card for US It is even harder to move from rural area to city - basically, there are too types of Hukou, one is rural Hukou, and the other is city Hukou. To move from rural to rural is easier, but to move from rural to city is very hard - it takes years. Only in very few situations does the change happen: 1) You enter a university in city, or 2) You marriage someone in city. Both of the cases, you need to wait for a long period of time to get it. There is limited Hukou open every year, so you need to compete to get it.

Hukou after 1980 Hukou after 1980

After the year of 1980, a lot of things change. In practice, Hukou is not enforced as strong as before. The starting point is that Liangpiao is not required to buy food - money along work. For work, there are still huge difference for people with a Hukou or without a Hukou (the same till today), but it is possible to move. After the year of 1980, a lot of things change. In practice, Hukou is not enforced as strong as before. The starting point is that Liangpiao is not required to buy food - money along work. For work, there are still huge difference for people with a Hukou or without a Hukou (the same till today), but it is possible to move.

This made it possible for many immigrant workers to leave their land and go to cities to seek for labor-intensive work. Typical works are workers in texile factory, consitruction workers, and nannies. However, the education of their children is still a big problem. They cannot receive education as other children, so some places, they setup school only for people without Hukou (immigrant worker school). Personally, I feel it even bad than the old "black and white seperation" policy. This made it possible for many immigrant workers to leave their land and go to cities to seek for labor-intensive work. Typical works are workers in texile factory, consitruction workers, and nannies. However, the education of their children is still a big problem . They cannot receive education as other children, so some places, they setup school only for people without Hukou (immigrant worker school). Personally, I feel it even bad than the old "black and white seperation" policy.

Today Today

Today, Hukou does not play that important role as before, but there are still a lot of difference. Here are some examples: Today, Hukou does not play that important role as before, but there are still a lot of difference. Here are some examples:

1) Medical Insurance. For example, people living in Shanghai without Shanghai Hukou are not covered by social medical insurance. If the person get ill, he/she needs to pay for it by him/herself. This is not a big deal though, since more and more commercial insurance can help on this. 1) Medical Insurance. For example, people living in Shanghai without Shanghai Hukou are not covered by social medical insurance. If the person get ill, he / she needs to pay for it by him / herself. This is not a big deal though, since more and more commercial insurance can help on this.

2) Job. Many job only opens to people with Shanghai Hukou. This is some type of discrimination, but some employers have to do that because there are still difference by the regulation. 2) Job. Many job only opens to people with Shanghai Hukou. This is some type of discrimination, but some employers have to do that because there are still difference by the regulation.

3) Safety. Guangzhou is an extreme case. Four years ago, when I visited Guangzhou, my friends told me to bring my national ID card with me at any time. Police may stop anyone at any time on the street to check the ID card. If they find the address of the ID card is not in Guangzhou, and the person don't have a temp resident permit, they have the right to detain the person and return him/her to their place of origin. This is the common practice in many cities. This regulation was abandoned as late as 2003, when a guy named Sun Zhigang was beaten to death during the detain period of time. 3) Safety. Guangzhou is an extreme case. Four years ago, when I visited Guangzhou, my friends told me to bring my national ID card with me at any time. Police may stop anyone at any time on the street to check the ID card . If they find the address of the ID card is not in Guangzhou, and the person don't have a temp resident permit, they have the right to detain the person and return him / her to their place of origin. This is the common practice in many cities. This regulation was abandoned as late as 2003, when a guy named Sun Zhigang was beaten to death during the detain period of time.

Hukou and Me Hukou and Me

Hukou has a high impact for me. I didn't go to kindergarten in my whole life, since at the time I moved to city at the age of 5, I didn't get my Hukou yet. It took long time to get it, so the kindergarten refused to accept me. I stayed at home until I am 7 and got Hukou. If I didn't got Hukou at that time, the risk was, I could not even go to primary school. This is a real story. Hukou has a high impact for me. I didn't go to kindergarten in my whole life, since at the time I moved to city at the age of 5, I didn't get my Hukou yet. It took long time to get it , So the kindergarten refused to accept me. I stayed at home until I am 7 and got Hukou. If I didn't got Hukou at that time, the risk was, I could not even go to primary school. This is a real story .

From my primary school to the end of my high school (1982 - 1995), my Hukou is at Luoyang. When I entered Shanghai Jiaotong University, my Hukou was transferred temporarily to SJTU for four years. When I graduated, it was a critical period of time that I have to find a local high-tech job, and I was qualified for the limited number of open Hukou positions. The standards are high - you have to be in certain major, with good record, and hired by compaines in certain area. It works exactly as how immigration works in Canada or US Back to my story, I obtained the Shanghai Hukou. Then I transferred my Hukou from the university to a place in Shanghai (I even don't know too clearly about what that place is). Only after I bought my own apartment three years later could I transfer my Hukou from that place to the address of my apartment. That is the long story. My current resident permit is at Shanghai, at my own apartment. From my primary school to the end of my high school (1982 - 1995), my Hukou is at Luoyang. When I entered Shanghai Jiaotong University, my Hukou was transferred temporarily to SJTU for four years. When I graduated, it was a critical period of time that I have to find a local high-tech job, and I was qualified for the limited number of open Hukou positions. The standards are high - you have to be in certain major, with good record, and hired by compaines in certain area. It works exactly as how immigration works in Canada or US Back to my story, I obtained the Shanghai Hukou. Then I transferred my Hukou from the university to a place in Shanghai (I even don't know too clearly about what that place is). Only after I bought my own apartment three years later could I transfer my Hukou from that place to the address of my apartment. That is the long story. My current resident permit is at Shanghai, at my own apartment.

If I go to Beijing, I will have some trouble. According to the regulation, I need to obtain a temp resident permit in Beijing. The "temp resident permit" is a big step ahead from the original Hukou system, since at least, I can get something to proof I can legally stay in that city (vs previously there is no way to do that). However, it is still a very bad thing. People cannot help asking "Why I need to TEMPERARILY stay in my OWN country"? If I go to Beijing, I will have some trouble. According to the regulation, I need to obtain a temp resident permit in Beijing. The "temp resident permit" is a big step ahead from the original Hukou system, since at least, I can get something to proof I can legally stay in that city (vs previously there is no way to do that). However, it is still a very bad thing. People cannot help asking "Why I need to TEMPERARILY stay in my OWN country" »

Challenges it Brings Challenges it Brings

Although the current system is widely regarded as unfair and inhumane, I do see the challenge to remove this system. The benefits the government gives to people with different Hukou are so different, especially in city and village. I believe if it is abandoned, a short time chaos will happen - many people move from village to city, and from smaller city to larger cities. If it is not handled well, it will cause big problem. It is just the case like if all the borders in the world is opened and people can move freely from one country to the other over night, you can imagine what will happen. Although the current system is widely regarded as unfair and inhumane, I do see the challenge to remove this system. The benefits the government gives to people with different Hukou are so different, especially in city and village. I believe if it is abandoned, a short time chaos will happen - many people move from village to city, and from smaller city to larger cities. If it is not handled well, it will cause big problem. It is just the case like if all the borders in the world is opened and people can move freely from one country to the other over night, you can imagine what will happen.

How to solve this historical problem is a big challenge for this generation of people in China. How to solve this historical problem is a big challenge for this generation of people in China.

PS When we discussed about business, I said, in history, people in China don't move as frequent as in US, so the demand for selling and buying houses are not that big. People asks: "Why? Why people don't move". I said "Well. It is a long story to tell." You have seen the whole story here. Pretty long, isn't it? PS When we discussed about business, I said, in history, people in China don't move as frequent as in US, so the demand for selling and buying houses are not that big. People asks: "Why? Why people don't move ". I said" Well. It is a long story to tell. "You have seen the whole story here. Pretty long, isn't it?

PS2. I drove to my friend's house in San Francisco tonight. It is 51 miles. It is hard to believe in China - to go to a place 82 km away for dinner and get back the same night? It is crazy. PS2. I drove to my friend's house in San Francisco tonight. It is 51 miles. It is hard to believe in China - to go to a place 82 km away for dinner and get back the same night? It is crazy.

Posted by Jian Shuo Wang at June 10, 2006 3:59 PM Posted by Jian Shuo Wang at June 10, 2006 3:59 PM
Copyright: You are free to redistribute this work, as long as you keep this disclaimer and this link : http://home.wangjianshuo.com/archives/2 ... _china.htm Copyright: You are free to redistribute this work, as long as you keep this disclaimer and this link: http://home.wangjianshuo.com/archives/2 ... _china.htm

[RayC]

China's Household Registration (Hukou) System: Discrimination and Reform


Friday, September 2, from 2:00 - 3:30 PM

Room 2168 of the Rayburn House Office Building

Statement of

Fei-Ling Wang

Professor, The Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia



I would like to first express my appreciation for the opportunity to appear before the Congressional Executive Commission on China and discuss China’s hukou (household registration) system today. I believe there are few other institutions more important than the hukou system in defining and conditioning politics, social life, and economic development of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Currently, this long-lasting and highly peculiar Chinese institution continues its crucial functions while demonstrating significant changes.

In this written statement, I would like to first briefly describe the current status of the hukou system and its leading functions. The I will outline the major changes and reforms of the system in recent years. Finally, I would like to point out that the hukou system has a complex role in China that makes its reform both highly difficult and extremely consequential. In short, the hukou system facilitates a rapid but uneven economic growth, creates significant social and regional disparities and injustice, stabilizes the PRC sociopolitical order, and generates powerful tensions in the areas of human rights, equity of citizenship, and simple ethics.1

Hukou System in today’s China Formally adopted in the 1950s, the hukou system can actually be traced back to the fifth century B.C. during the Warring States period. It was institutionalized and adopted with varied degrees of effectiveness and extensiveness as an important part of the Chinese imperial political system by the dynasties from the Qin (third century B.C.) to the Qing (1644-1911). The Republic of China (ROC) and the PRC both established a national hukou system. However, the hukou system achieved an unprecedented level of uniformity, extensiveness, effectiveness, and rigidity only in the PRC since the 1950s.2

On 9 January 1958, Mao Zedong promulgated The Regulation on hukou Registration of the People's Republic of China, formally creating the PRC national hukou system. Twenty-seven years later, on 6 September 1985, Beijing adopted its Regulation on Resident's Personal Identification Card in the People's Republic of China. These two regulations and their implementation procedures are the main legal basis for the PRC hukou system. Every Chinese citizen knows and is affected by the hukou system, yet the system has remained an administrative system, highly-nontransparent, not mentioned in The PRC Constitution.

The PRC State Council and its ministries, mainly the Ministry of Public Security, and the local public security bureaus and police stations are the administrators of the hukou system. Specialized hukou police officers are assigned to be in charge of hukou matters in each hukou zone: a neighborhood, street, danwei (unit), or a township. The hukou system requires every Chinese citizen to be officially and constantly registered with the hukou authority (the hukou police) since birth, as the legal basis for personal identification. The categories of non-agricultural (urban) or agricultural (rural), the legal address and location, the unit affiliation (employment), and a host of other personal and family information, including religious belief and physical features, are documented and verified to become the person's permanent hukou record. A person’s hukou location and categorization or type were determined by his mother’s hukou location and type rather than his birthplace until 1998, when a child was allowed to inherit the father's or mother's hukou location and categorization.

One cannot acquire a legal permanent residence and the numerous community-based rights, opportunities, benefits and privileges in places other than where his hukou is. Only through proper authorization of the government can one permanently change his hukou location and especially his hukou categorization from the rural type to the urban one. Travelers, visitors, and temporary migrants must be registered with the hukou police for extended (longer than three days) stay in a locality. For longer than one-month stay and especially when seeking local employment, one must apply and be approved for a temporary residential permit. Violators are subject to fines, detention, and forced repatriation (partially relaxed in 2003). hukou files are routinely used by the police for investigation, social control, and crime-fighting purposes.

Officially and internally, the PRC hukou system has one common governance duty (to collect and manage the information of the citizens' personal identification, kinship, and legal residence) and two "unique missions": to control internal migration through managing temporary residents/visitors; and to have a tiered management of zhongdian renkou (targeted people) in the population.3

In practice, the PRC hukou system has performed three leading functions. First, it is the basis for resource allocation and subsidization for selected groups of the population (mainly the residents of major urban centers). This function has shaped much of the Chinese economic development in the past half century by politically affecting the movement of capital and human resources. The government has been traditionally heavily favoring the urban centers since the 1950s with investment and subsidies.

Second, the hukou system allows the government to control and regulate internal migration especially the rural-to-urban migration. The basic principles of the PRC migration control have been to restrict rural-to-urban and small-city-to-large-city migration but encourage migration in the reversed direction. China's urbanization, as a consequence, is relatively small and slow compared to its economic development level. China's urban slums are also relatively small and less serious compared to those in many other developing nations such as Brazil or India. Third, the hukou system has a less well-known but very powerful role of social control especially the management of the so-called targeted people (zhongdian renkou). Based on hukou files, the police maintains a confidential list of the targeted people in each community to be specially monitored and controlled. Such a focused monitoring and control of selected segments of the population have contributed significantly and effectively to the political stability of China's one-party authoritarian regime.

In the 2000s, the hukou system still enjoys a strong institutional legitimacy in China. Unlike the similar but now disgraced and disintegrated propiska (residential permit) system in the former Soviet Union, the PRC hukou system is still both legal and strong. With some reforms and limited alterations, the hukou system continues to be a backbone of Chinese institutional structure and fundamentally contributes to the seemingly puzzling coexistence of China’s rapidly developing market economy and the remarkable stability of the CCP's (Chinese Communist Party) political monopoly.

Reforms and Changes in Recent Years

The hukou system has been an administrative system with sketchy legal foundations. It has been governed and regulated by mostly "internal" decrees and directives.4 There have been talks in Beijing about making a PRC hukou Law to firmly ground this important system in "modern legal languages" since the 1980s.5 Yet, by 2005, this effort is still at a very early stage with no date of completion in sight.

The hukou system's much examined function of resource allocation and subsidization to the urbanites has now been reduced and even replaced by the advancing market forces, as the urban rations of food and many other supplies have now either disappeared or become insignificant.6 Furthermore, there has been fairly extensive cosmetic reform efforts aiming at erasing the unsightly distinction between rural and urban residents.

The administration of the well-known function of internal migration control is now reformed, relaxed and localized, given rise to increased mobility of the population in general and the rural laborers in particular.7 Since 1997 and especially since 2001, there has been so-called "deep reforms" of the hukou system, primarily concerning its migration-control function. Various schemes such as the so-called "blue stamp" hukou (functions like a “green card” issued to aliens in the United States), temporary residency (functions like working visas), and the locally-defined “entry conditions” for permanent migration,8 nick-named “local hukou in exchange for talents/skills and investment,” have significantly increased the mobility of selected groups of people. Now, anyone who has a stable non-agricultural income and a permanent residence in a small city or town for at least two years will automatically qualify to have an urban hukou and become a permanent local resident.9 Some medium and even large cities are also authorized to do the same, with a higher and more specific income, employment, and residence requirement.10 Yet, the hukou system still demonstrates its remarkable continuity as the governing principles of internal migration regulation remain fundamentally unchanged. Other than the needed labor, especially skilled labor, and the super-rich, China's major urban centers take in few "outsiders."

Some provinces ventured further. Guizhou, one of the poorest provinces, decided to give a small city/town urban hukou to anyone who meets the income and residence requirements immediately, waiving the usual two-year waiting period. Shangxi, another less developed province, used urban hukou to reward migrant ruralites who have moved to those remote regions to reclaim desert land through tree-planting.11 However, merely eight months into the reform, in mid-2002, this national wave to rename rural/urban distinction was ordered by Beijing to stop, pending "further instructions." The suspension seems to be primarily the result of the lack of funding and infrastructure to quickly accommodate new urban residents' massive need in education, health care, and social welfare.12

The third leading, albeit much less known but highly crucial, function of the hukou system, the management of the targeted people, however, remains to be highly centralized, rigid, and forceful, although its effectiveness has been declining steadily. The changes of the management of the targeted people function so far are mainly technical and marginal. There actually is a tendency for this sociopolitical control function to be improved and enhanced in the 2000s. In the summer of 2001, when the rural-to-urban migration quota was partially replaced in the PRC, one MPS senior official called for further "reducing the undue burden on the hukou system by getting rid of its economic and education functions" so to "enhance the hukou system" and "restore its original" main mission of population management and social control.13 Indeed, the police has been internally calling for a further enhancement of the targeted people management in its battle against Muslim terrorist cells in the remote regions of Western China, where many non-Han ethnic groups live.14

To manage the massive files of the hukou system, the MPS started to establish electronic hukou database in 1986 and got special funding for national computerization of the hukou system in 1992. By 2002, almost all (more than 30 thousand) police stations have computerized their hukou management. 1,180 cities and counties joined regional computer networks for file-sharing of the hukou records of a total of 1.07 billion people (about 83 percent of the total population), and 250 cities joined one single national hukou computer network to allow for instantaneous verification of hukou information covering 650 million people (about half of the total population).15 In 2002, the MPS further required all hotels with 50 beds and larger to have computer links to instantaneously transmit the photos of all guests to local police station.16

The new leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao since 2003 has shown signs of considering the negatives of the hukou system as a political liability and trying in certain way to ease further some of the rough edges of the system; however, the 2001 reform of the hukou system remained very much unaccomplished four years later, especially above the level of small towns and cities, and led to significant regional discrepancies. By mid-2005, the PRC hukou system has developed an even stronger character of regionalization.

On March 17, 2003, a young migrant from Wuhan of Hubei Province named Sun Zhigang was arrested for having no identification papers by the police in Guangzhou, where he was actually lawfully employed and registered. He was in typical manner abused by the police and brutally beaten to death three days later by fellow inmates during the repatriation process. The case was reported by influential Chinese news outlets and led directly to a public outcry against the irrationality and injustice generated by the hukou system, especially the practice of forced repatriation. A dozen perpetrators, including several police officers, were sentenced to death or long jail terms. As a result, the PRC State Council canceled the 1982 “Measures of Detaining and Repatriating Floating and Begging People in the Cities,” issued “Measures on Repatriation of Urban Homeless Beggars” on June 18, 2003, and “Measures on Managing and Assisting Urban Homeless Beggars without Income” on June 20, 2003, establishing new rules governing the handling and assisting of destitute migrants. Many cities, including the most controlled Beijing municipality, decided soon after that hukou-less migrants must be dealt with more care; they are no longer automatically subject to detention, fines, or forced repatriation, unless they have become homeless, paupers, or criminals.17

This change of repatriation policy was a much needed reform and has been widely praised as a humane move by the Hu-Wen “new politics.” However, as an interesting twist that vividly reveals the political reality in the PRC, the editor and the reporter of the newspaper, Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern urban news), who broke the Sun Zhigang story, were soon arrested and sentenced to prison for multiple years under trumped up charges of bribery and corruption in 2004-05. Furthermore, empirically, perhaps as a good sign to show the complicated role of the hukou system, the relaxed measures of forced repatriation has seemed to cause the surge of paupers in places like Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in the two years afterwards. Hence the discussion of a “Latin-Americanization” and the concern about decay of the Chinese urban business environment emerged in the PRC’s relatively free cyber space by mid-2005.18 To be sure, the latest hukou reform has relaxed and decentralized internal migration control mechanisms (mainly in the small cities and towns) but has not touched the sociopolitical control functions of the system. The majority of the over 100 million migrants or "floating population" still appear to be unable to change the location of their hukou permanently. In Ningbo of Zhejiang Province, a national model of the hukou reform, only about 30 thousand migrants, less than two percent of the two million migrants from the countryside (who constitutes one-third of the city's total population) are expected to qualify for local hukou during the reform.19 In Shijiazhuang of Hebei Province, only 11 thousand migrant workers (out of 300 thousand in the city) were qualified to apply for local hukou in 2001. A key problem has been the difficulty for a migrant to find a stable job in the city, which has already been plagued by high unemployment for years.20

Limited and controlled, the latest hukou reform has started to change the unsightly and discriminatory legal distinction between rural and urban hukou holders. It is a major albeit highly symbolic victory of the advancing market institution and new norms of citizenship and human rights in China. However, "the hukou system has not been abolished but only enhanced and improved with scientific means," declared a Chinese leading hukou expert associated with the MPS. The universal residential registration, the basic principles of internal migration control, and the uniquely Chinese style sociopolitical control through the management of targeted people all continue and will be further "strengthened." The hukou reforms are to be "well-synchronized; must consider the rational flow and allocation of talents and labor, and guarantee the stability of socioeconomic order."21

Usefulness versus Liability: the Future of the hukou System

The PRC hukou system has been playing profound and complex roles in Chinese political economy. It has contributed significantly to China’s sociopolitical stability by creating an environment that is conducive to the perpetuation of an authoritarian regime, albeit still leaving some room for a possible elite democracy to develop. It has allowed the PRC to circumvent the so-called Lewis Transition and hence to enjoy rapid economic growth and technological sophistication in a dual economy with the existence of massive surplus labor, while producing tremendous irrationalities, imbalances, and waste in the Chinese economy and barriers to further development of the Chinese market. Finally, the PRC hukou system has created clear horizontal stratification, regional gaps, and personal discrimination that not only directly challenge social justice and equity but also potentially call China’s political cohesion and national unity into question.22

There are clear institutional and policy usefulness of this otherwise ethically clearly questionable system, which makes its reform a highly difficult and complicated mission. In a way, the “positive” economic impact of the hukou system in China may be viewed as similar to that of the Westphalia international political system on the world economy since the end of the Middle Ages. Under the Westphalia system, there is a political division of the sovereign nations, a citizenship-based division of humankind, and an exclusion of foreigners maintained by the regulation and restriction of international migration. These may have indispensably contributed to the development of the modern capitalist market economy that has brought unprecedented economic growth and technological sophistication in the “in” parts of the world, primarily the nations that today form the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The world economy has developed spectacularly in the past few centuries, but in the 2000s, 80 percent of humankind still lives in the less developed nations, excluded from most of the world’s achievements.23 China’s prosperous urban centers in its eastern and coastal regions, compared with the country as a whole, may be functionally viewed as roughly equivalent to the OECD nations in comparison with the world. A key difference, however, is that the citizenship-based institutional divide between the OECD nations and the rest of the world is much more rigidly defined and forceful, hence more effectively enforced than the hukou barriers that separate the urbanites in Shanghai and Beijing from the ruralites in the inland Chinese provinces. Furthermore, a central government in Beijing that regulates the hukou system and provides some cross-regional resource reallocation may have made the hukou system a bit more tolerable to the excluded.

The usefulness of the hukou system, especially seen in economic growth, is accompanied by tremendous negative consequences that are constituting increasingly heavy liability for the Chinese political system. A leading consequence of the PRC’s hukou system has been, not surprisingly, a relatively small and slow urbanization in China. It almost stopped and even decreased for about two decades under Mao Zedong. During the reform era, China’s urbanization has been significantly slower than its economic growth and industrialization rate, even though the adaptive measures and the practical relaxation of the hukou system have accelerated urbanization since the late 1980s. By 2000, China’s urbanization was still only less than 30 percent, whereas countries in the same range of per-capita GDP had an urbanization of 42.5–50 percent. Although by some indicators China’s economic development in the late 1990s was at the level that the United States attained from the 1950s through the 1970s, China’s urbanization was comparable to that in the United States only in the 1880s and 1890s.24

Slow urbanization perpetuates a stable dual economy featuring a rural majority of the population and a stable, large, ever-increasing rural-urban disparity of income and resource distribution. Officially, the urban and rural incomes were disparate by a factor of about 2.2 in 1964, 2.6 in 1978, 2.7 in 1995, and 2.8 in 2000. Semiofficially, the urban-rural income gap was estimated to stand at a factor of about 4.0 in 1993.25 Including indirect income in the form of state subsidies, the gap stood at a staggering 5.0–6.0 by 2001.26

A rigid and stable dual economy based on the exclusion of the rural population has systematically and artificially suppressed the rural Chinese market and may have severely limited the growth potential for the Chinese economy as a whole, which needs domestic demand to increase continually.

In addition to perpetuating a dual economy and retarding the rural consumer market, the hukou system has created significant irrationalities in labor allocation and utilization. A two-tier, well-segregated labor market for local urban hukou holders and outsiders exists in Chinese cities, leading to inequalities and inefficiencies within the same locality.

An obviously negative impact of the hukou system has been that it brews regional disparities and inequality. As a high price of hukou-assisted rapid growth, China has had a very uneven economic development across regions. A group of influential Chinese scholars concluded that “there are three main disparities in contemporary Chinese society: the disparities between the peasants and the industrial workers, between the urban and rural areas, and among the regions.”27 The PRC hukou system is fundamentally responsible for all three.28

Six provinces or metropolises in eastern China, out of 31, received 54 percent of all Chinese research and development funding in 1994; the eighteen provinces in central and western China got only 35.9 percent.29 In 1990, Beijing had the highest per-capita government spending at 633 Yuan RMB, about 2.7 times the lowest, 106 Yuan in Henan Province, only a couple of hundred miles away. In 1996, Shanghai had the highest per-capita government spending of 2,348 Yuan, 8.45 times the lowest, 278 Yuan, still in Henan Province. In 1998, per-capita investment in the three metropolises Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin was 7.3, 5, and 3.1 times higher, respectively, than the national average, while the like in Guizhou Province was only 33 percent of the national average.30

At the end of the 1990s, per-capita annual GDP in Shanghai was over twenty-eight thousand Yuan RMB, twelve times higher than in Guizhou Province (merely 2,323 Yuan). The average annual wage in the coastal province of Guangdong was twice that in neighboring Jiangxi Province (3,595 vs. 1,713 Yuan).31 It is estimated that the east-west annual income gap grew from 48 percent in 1986 to 52 percent in 1991(2,283 Yuan in the east and 1,095 in the west). In 2000, urban hukou holders’ highest per-capita annual income was 11,802 Yuan (in Shanghai); the lowest was only 4,745(in Shanxi). Rural hukou holders’ highest per-capita annual income was 5,596 Yuan (again in Shanghai), and the lowest was only 1,331(in Tibet). By 2001, the highest per-capita urban income was 4.8 times greater in eastern than in western China.32

Politically, the regional gap is contributing to the rise of regionalism and regional protectionism that have already become major destabilizing factors in China in the early 2000s.33 In response, Beijing has issued numerous decrees to tear down economic barriers erected by local corporatist and protectionist activity.34 The central government’s political stability and power and even the unity of the nation may be at stake.35 In many ways, the Chinese economy is not just a dual economy of rural and urban sectors but more a collection of several regional economies that are at various stages of development, with hugely different degrees of economic prosperity, separated chiefly by the hukou system. In other words, developed societies and the poorest societies coexist within one nation not only vertically but also horizontally.

Consequently, the hukou system had twisted the Chinese social life to create a peculiar horizontal stratification. This system may have provided organization and social stability to a large nation, especially in a time of rapid economic development and social and cultural change. It forms solid groupings and associations beyond family and employment relations. Ethically, however, institutional exclusion produces troubling questions about the equity and equality of the human and civil rights of citizens of the same nation. A slow urbanization naturally segregates the citizens and creates cultural biases against the excluded rural population.

Furthermore, institutional exclusion discourages and even hinders the development of creativity and ingenuity that often accompany people’s horizontal and vertical mobility in a society. Chinese culture, social stratification, and social norms and values have all developed regional characteristics as well as a rural-versus-urban differentiation.

The excluded Chinese peasants still by and large accept their fate under the PRC hukou system as it is. The extent to which those who are excluded in the rural and backward areas, three-quarters to two-thirds of the total Chinese population, will continue in their role as the reservoir to hold the unskilled millions, hence to make a multigenerational sacrifice for rapid modernization of the Chinese urban economy, remains increasingly uncertain. Unemployment pressure alone, likely to be significantly worsened by China’s new WTO membership, may make hukou-based institutional exclusion even less bearable. The hundred-million-strong migrant (liudong) population—registered holders of temporary hukou and unregistered mangliu (blind floaters)—clearly a second-class citizenry outside their home towns in their own country, has already become a major source of the rising crime rate and even of organized crime in the PRC.36 How much and how quickly trickle-down and spillover effects of prosperous, glamorous urban centers will be felt in rural areas will be key to the continuation of China’s sociopolitical stability.

How long a hukou-based rapid but uneven economic growth can last, at the expense of excluding the majority of the population, remains a legitimate and profound question. Another leading concern is the running-away of vertical and horizontal social stratification of Chinese society. The combination of these two stratifications not only has affected the allocation of resources, opportunities, and life chances in general for every Chinese, but also has largely shaped Chinese values, behavioral norms, and culture that are not conducive for rule of law, equity of human rights, or individual freedom. A small, elitist, urban hukou holders living in major urban centers, are masters of this people’s republic at the expense of excluding and discriminating against the majority of the people, who are growing in discontent and rightfully angry.37



Clearly, the PRC hukou system right now poses serious ethical, legal, and international questions that demand creative and effective solutions. The hukou system has systematically created barriers against labor mobility, thus limiting the rationalization of a young market economy there and perpetuating poverty for the majority of the population living in the rural areas as the excluded under unfair treatment and naked exploitation. The lack of genuine vertical and horizontal mobility, in addition to the lack of freedom of speech and individual and property rights, has seriously impeded creativity and innovation in China. The system contributes to the growing regionalization of the Chinese political economy with profound consequences for the Chinese economic development, the capacity of the central government, and even the unity of the Chinese nation.

Yet, to Chinese leaders, the hukou system still appears to be a familiar, important, reliable, and effective statecraft. Currently, much of this system is still largely internalized as a part of the Chinese culture and enjoys a high degree of legitimacy, even among the excluded. Obviously, the hukou system relies heavily on the political power of the CCP to continue; yet the functions of the system have also become highly critical to the stability and continuation of the CCP political system. Mounting tensions the system brews and the resultant scrutiny and criticisms are likely to force more changes as the PRC state may have to retreat further. Ultimately, the fate of the hukou system will reflect and determine the fate of the current PRC sociopolitical order and China’s chance of realizing its enormous economic potential.



Notes:

1. For a comprehensive study of the hukou system, see Fei-Ling Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou System, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005. For the reforms of the hukou system, see Fei-Ling Wang, “Reformed Migration Control and New List of the Targeted People: China’s Hukou System in the 2000s,” The China Quarterly, (March) 2004, 115-132. For earlier studies of the system, see Tiejun Cheng, Dialectics of Control: The Household Registration (Hukou) System in Contemporary China, Ph.D. dissertation, SUNYT-Binghamton, 1991. Tiejun Cheng & Mark Selden, “The Origins and Social Consequences of China’s Hukou System,” The China Quarterly, 1994. Dorothy J. Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1999.
2. Solinger 1999 ; Delia Davin, Internal Migration in Contemporary China. New York, Palgrave, 1999; Michael R Dutton, Policing and Punishment in China: From Patriarchy to "The People," New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Lei Guang, "Reconstructing the Rural-Urban Divide: Peasant Migration and the Rise of 'Orderly Migration' in Contemporary China," Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 10-28, 2001, 471-493; Jianhong Liu, Lening Zhang & Steven F. Messner, eds., Crime and Social Control in a Changing China, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001; Hein Mallee, "China's Household Registration System under Reform," in Development and Change, vol. 26-1 (January 1995).
3. Jiang Xianjin & Luo Feng eds., Jingca yewu shiyong quanshu-zhian guanli juan (Complete guide of police works-volume on public security management), Beijing, Quinzhong Press, 1996, 218 & 220. BPT-MPS (Bureau of Personnel and Training-Ministry of Public Security), Huzheng guanli jiaocheng (The text book on hukou management), Beijing: Qunzhong Press, 2000, 5 & 161-173.
4. Wang Huaian et al eds.: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fali quanshu (Complete collections of the laws of the People's Republic of China), Changchun: Jilin Renmin Press, 1989.
5. One Chinese National People's Congress (NPC) deputy did propose a bill for hukou law in March 2001. (Associated Press, Beijing, March 15, 2001). But it had no chance to be even included in the legislature agenda. Such symbolic actions were seen at the annual meetings of the NPC every March in 2002-05.
6. Urban hukou holders in major cities, however, still enjoy significant state subsidies in housing, healthcare, employment, and especially education. In 2001, for example, a Beijing resident can get into college with a minimum admission score 140 points (or 28 percent of the national average score) lower than that in Shangdong Province. Zhongguo qingnian bao (Chinese youth daily), July-August, 2001.
7. Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhang, “The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes and Changes,” The China Quarterly, 1999: 831-840.
8. Renmin Ribao (People’s daily), Beijing, September 24, 2001, 9. South China Morning Post, September 29, 2001. Nanfanf dushibao (Southern metro daily), Guangzhou, September 8, 2001. China New Agency News Dispatch, Guangzhou, September 24, 2001. Hunan ribao (Hunan daily), Changsha, January 20, 2002 and Renmin ribao-huadongban (People's daily-East China edition), Shanghai, January 9, 2002. Nanfang dushi bao (Southern urban daily), Guangzhou, September 8, 2001. Xinhua Daily Telegraph, Beijing, December 24, 2001.
9. But "all the migration registration procedures are still to be followed strictly." Zhongguo minzhen (China civil affairs), Beijing, No. 11 (November), 2001, 57.
10. Renmin Ribao (People's daily), Beijing, September 4, 2001.
11. Xinhua Daily Telegraph, Beijing, August 9, 2001.
12. China News Weekly, Beijing and Huaxi dushi bao (Western China metro news), Chengdu, September 5, 2002.
13. Interviews reported by China Net's News Center on http://www.newsw.china.com, August 20, 2001. Accessed on March 23, 2002.
14. Cheng Zhiyong and Bo Xiao, eds. Qiangzhan yu qiangan (Gun-battles and gun-cases: selections of case reports on anti-terrorism in Xinjiang), internal publication. Beijing: Qunzhong Press, 2000, 129-130, 164, & 253-254.
15. DOP-MPS (Department of Politics-Ministry of Public Security), Gongan yewu jichu zhishii (Basic knowledge of public security works), Beijing: Qunzhong Press, 1999, 75-76. Zhongguo qingnian bao (Chinese youth daily), Beijing, January 5, 2002.
16. "E jingcha kaishi liangxian, huji dangan jiang dianzihua" (E-police starts to emerge and hukou files will be electronic), www.news.china.com. Accessed on February 19, 2002. The police believed that several high profile criminal cases in 2002 were solved due to the hukou police's routine but now faster gathering and monitoring of hotel registration information. Author's interviews in Beijing and Shanghai, 2002.
17. Zhang Yinghong, “Sun Zhigang zhisi yu zhidu zhier” (The death of Sun Zhigang and the evil of the [hukou] system), Apr. 28, 2003, www.mlcool.com; Caijing shibao (Financial and economic times), Beijing, June 15, 2003; Changsha wanbao (Changsha evening news), June 13, 2003; Xinhua Daily Telegraph, Beijing, June 21, 2004.
18. Zheng Binwen, “China should carefully prevent Latin Americanization,” www.yannan.cn/data/detail.php?id=5889 May 29, 2005.
19. "Ningbo hukou bilei hongran daota" (The hukou barriers collapsing), in Nanfang zhoumu (Southern weekend), Guangzhou, August 31, 2001. Zhongguo qingnianbao (Chinese youth daily), September 17, 2001.
20. Josephine Ma, "Farmers Turn Noses up at Life in the City," South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, October 17, 2001.
21. Wang Taiyuan's interview with People's Net News on October 1, 2001. Accessed on January 19, 2002.
22. Fei-Ling Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou System, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005) especially pp. 129-165.
23. UNDP (United Nations Development and Planning), Human Development Report 2001, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, 144 and 157.
24. Robert W. Forgel, "Aspects of Economic Growth: A Comparison of the U.S. and China," a conference paper, Chengdu, China, 1999, 1–2.
25. Zhong Yicai, “Chengxiang eyuan shehui de yonghe yu yingnong jingcheng” (The merging of the dual urban-rural societies and the pulling of the peasants into the cities) in Shehui kexue (Social sciences), Shanghai, no. 1(1995), 55–58.
26. State Statistics Bureau, "Cong gini xishu kan pingfu chaju" (Gap between rich and poor based on the Gini index), in Zhongguo guoqing guoli (China national conditions and strength), Beijing, No. 97 (January, 2001), 29.
27. Hu Angang, Wang Shaoguang & Kang Xiaoguang, Zhongguo diqu chaju baogao (Report on China's regional disparities), Shengyang: Liaoning Renmin Press 1995, 223.
28. There are, naturally, many other factors responsible for the East-West gap in China. Dali Yang (Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions in China, London: Routledge, 1999) described a Chinese political system in which the PRC has been led by an east coast “oligarchy” and the interests of the East dominate.
29. Guo Tong, “Keji touru: Dongzhongxibu bupingheng” (R&D investment: Uneven among the east, central and west), Zhongguo xinxibao (China journal of information), Beijing, Aug. 3, 1995, 1.
30. State System Reform Commission), Gaige neichan (Internal reference on economic reform), Beijing, internal publication. Selected issues, 1998# 273, 22. Hu Angang & Zou Ping, Shehui yu fazhan: zhongguo shehui fazhan diqu chaju yanjiu (Society and development: A study of China’s regional gap of social development), Hangzhou: Zhejiang Renmin Press, 5.
31. Hu and Zou 2000, 3.
32. State Planning Commission figures, Jingji gongzhuzhe xuexi ziliao (Study materials for economic workers), Beijing, no. 68(1994), 7. Hunan ribao (Hunan daily), Changsha, Apr. 18, 2001.
33. Some provincial and prefecture governments set up and enforce quotas for shipping in goods from outside. Chen, Dongyou ed., Zhongguo nongmin (Chinese peasants), Nanchang: Jiangxi Gaoxiao Press, 1999, 206. Even the official journals start to list various “striking” cases of regional and local protectionism that damages law enforcement and market development. Dadi (Earth), Beijing, no. 101(May 2001), 46–47.
34. One early effort was the State Council’s Directive on Breaking down Regional Blockade of the Market, Nov. 10, 1990. A later such effort was the almost identically titled State Council Decree 303 of Apr. 12, 2001.
35. Hu Angang et al. 1995, 27–31, 90–97, and 258–78; Minxin Pei, "China's Governance Crisis," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81-5, Septemebr-October, 2002, 96-109.
36. Li Zhongxin 1999, 11–13 and 23–24.
37. Incidentally, among my interviewees, privileged urban dwellers tend to take the PRC hukou system for granted and assert that the hukou system “really does not make much difference in life,” while the excluded “outsiders,” especially the ruralites, insist that the hukou system affects their lives personally, persistently, and pro

[RayC]

Sorry I posted that in full since I could not find the link.

It was on my cmptr and I thought this an important aspect of Chinese lifestyle.

[Virupaksha]

Micromanaging a person's life from a distant remote control seems to be the only reason for this hokou system. When I read the "greencard" for shifting from rural to urban, I almost fell out of the chair. No wonder the cities of China have less slums!

The control and social manipulation which this system provides is astonishing! Thanks for this paper, RayC.

[RayC]

The hukou system fascinates me. A great tool for control.

I wonder what other means are there to control the population to obey draconian measures!

[Rishirishi]

The hukou system fascinates me. A great tool for control.

I wonder what other means are there to control the population to obey draconian measures!

The local do not need any means, they do as they please. Want to move a town with a million people, no problem, just make a good economic case for it and get the approval from the Party high command. If any one protests, send them to 10 years "correction" facility, the media is in you pocket and will give a detailed coverage of the benefits, they will show patriotic people, willingly giving up their houses for better ones.

Micro control is a very very bad thing. Imagine if you have this great business idea and want to relocate, to a more favrable region, or if you fall in love, or the climate does not suit you, or if you are getting better employment possibilites. Imagine having to ask a beaurocrat to move near your girlfriend.

[Virupaksha]

Rishi,

The system is bad period. However that is not what was amazing about it.

Understanding what one can do, what one cannot with this system is more interesting to me. For example, if China sees that a particular ethnic group is becoming dominant in a particular profession, say law - using this system, it can selectively establish law colleges in a different neighborhood and deny the particular ethnic group 0 access to law colleges.

In India, the army does recruit predominantly in some areas, however with the free movement of people, any interested person can come in, whereas in China?? In short they can pick and choose which ethnic group can become dominant in one profession. Imagine complete removal of all army recruitment and arts colleges in Tibet but heavy investment in medical and engineering colleges, what will the Tibetans become? From the top, everything looks normal, however the people will not have access to their history, art, how the childrens textbooks are printed, people will stop understanding them and so on.

Say, tomorrow for a poor peasant somewhere in rural area, the only urban permit, he will get is in Tibet, What does it mean - demographic change, with the sign of a pen with no projects or money needed per se.

[Rishirishi]

Rishi,

The system is bad period. However that is not what was amazing about it.

Understanding what one can do, what one cannot with this system is more interesting to me. For example, if China sees that a particular ethnic group is becoming dominant in a particular profession, say law - using this system, it can selectively establish law colleges in a different neighborhood and deny the particular ethnic group 0 access to law colleges.

In India, the army does recruit predominantly in some areas, however with the free movement of people, any interested person can come in, whereas in China?? In short they can pick and choose which ethnic group can become dominant in one profession. Imagine complete removal of all army recruitment and arts colleges in Tibet but heavy investment in medical and engineering colleges, what will the Tibetans become? From the top, everything looks normal, however the people will not have access to their history, art, how the childrens textbooks are printed, people will stop understanding them and so on.

Say, tomorrow for a poor peasant somewhere in rural area, the only urban permit, he will get is in Tibet, What does it mean - demographic change, with the sign of a pen with no projects or money needed per se.

I understand what you are saying. But such a system can also be used by politically active minorities, to gain privlages and strengthen their hold on certain areas.
Indias problem is political will, not the lack of any tool.

The system is gradually being abolished. They can't totally abolish it, because the entire village populations will then be entitilled to the privlages of the rich south cities. But it is less relevant today, as anyone can live anywhere now. Even forigners can live at the place of their choice without problems. But they have to live at least 500 meters away from the any police station or public building.

[Gerard]

How Chairman Mao led China to humiliation

[Gerard]

China wary of a 'normal' Japan

[Gerard]

China's failed colonial policy means greater Olympics risk

Most Chinese believe that their country has ruled both Tibet and what used to be called East Turkestan since time immemorial, but in practice they only came under direct Chinese control in the mid-18th century, around the same time that the British were seizing control of India.

[Lalmohan]

the Chinese believe that these other territories were theirs because they allegedly paid them tribute or allegieance to the emperor. sometimes this happened because the ambassador sent out to secure the allegieance was too afraid to tell the emperor otherwise and confirmed that xyz barbarian gladly submitted to the emperor, but not having enough sheep was unable to send much tribute, etc., etc., regardless of what actually transpired when said ambassador showed up in zyz barbarian lands. these reports were officially transcribed in the court records and therefore made legitimate in chinese official eyes

turkestan was always a buffer between china, persia and later muscovy and the ottomans - its fortunes varying depending on who was ascendant. tibet was more stable given its hard stop against the himalayas and general inaccessibility

[RajeshA]

China kills 500,000 cats for Beijing olympics

Miaoo

[Rahul M]

China kills 500,000 cats for Beijing olympics

Miaoo

/sniff ! I love cats !

[Philip]

Murderous Mandarin scumbags! Don't they know that the cat was worshipped in Egypt and it is bad joss to do so?I hope that Jin & Tao and his ilk are mauled by an army of alley cats in return.Great misfortune will follow for China,mark my words!

[Rahul M]

Murderous Mandarin scumbags! Don't they know that the cat was worshipped in Egypt and it is bad joss to do so?I hope that Jin & Tao and his ilk are mauled by an army of alley cats in return.Great misfortune will follow for China,mark my words!

This was posted earlier on BRF.
http://www.peta.org/feat/ChineseFurFarms/index.asp

please watch the video in full.

behaviour towards the weak and defenceless tells us a lot about the mentality of a person. that can be extrapolated to a nation too I guess.

[Singha]

it seems Soniaji, yuvraj and his sister have reached beijing, notwithstanding that fact
that after inviting almost all heads of state, they did not invite either of our president
or PM.

[Vikas]

But then Soniaji, yuvraj and his sister (+ Sh. Vadera ji) think that they are the de-facto heads of state. It is like General Secretary of the communist party used to represent FSU in all international events.

[putnanja]

it seems Soniaji, yuvraj and his sister have reached beijing, notwithstanding that fact
that after inviting almost all heads of state, they did not invite either of our president
or PM.

I was thinking about the same thing. How can Sonia go to the olympics when the PM of India, and her own partyman to boot, is not invited? Do they have no sense of shame? the yuvaraj was talking all about India being great power etc, why he is ignoring this big snub to India then?

[rajrang]

it seems Soniaji, yuvraj and his sister have reached beijing, notwithstanding that fact
that after inviting almost all heads of state, they did not invite either of our president
or PM.

I was thinking about the same thing. How can Sonia go to the olympics when the PM of India, and her own partyman to boot, is not invited? Do they have no sense of shame? the yuvaraj was talking all about India being great power etc, why he is ignoring this big snub to India then?

Is it really true that China will dare to humiliate India to this extent - not inviting the president or PM? I hope one of the readers on this forum will be able to confirm or disprove this. How come the Indian opposition is not raising a hue and cry?

[Karan Dixit]

MMS has better things to do than go to Olympic. Sonia on the other hand has nothing else to do.

In my humble opinion, there is no need for this "hai toiba".

[Rahul M]

X-post for the sake of the above discussion :

they have already snubbed us. MMS/Prez didn't get invited in the first place.

Its not their fault. They explained that, they send the invitation and it is upto that government to choose whom they would want to attend. In this case, clearly, GOI wanted raj mata and yuvraj to attend the games.

is that so ? looks like DDM has misinformed us. do you have a source ?
thanks.

Here is the article. I'm wrong on decision part though. It seems IOA decides whom to go to the olympics.

We didn't snub PM: China

Beijing also clarified that it is the national Olympic committee of the nation concerned which invites the head of a government or state.

[RayC]

Rishirishi,

Travel into the hinterland and let us know how it is there?

[RayC]

If indeed what China states that it did not snub Manmohan and instead invited Sonia and her family, it is a sad commentary on India as a nation!

Sonia has no official status, Manmohan has.

IOC thus shows sycophancy, and anyway, it is disgrace as it is!

[hnair]

Sonia has no official status, Manmohan has.

But she is the Supreme Ruler, a concept the PLA understands and is comfortable with.

VikasRaina, if I am a slum dweller and I am barely able to survive through SARS, what would I like to happen to me? Filthy status quo (as practiced in India) or razing down of my shanty because some local party jerk decided that my tar paper shack is the "root cause" of the outbreak? Even if it is proven that SARS is caused by social elites eating civet-balls and not because I poop@railway track, my future suddenly becomes uncertain. Not even a method to raise valid questions of my fate. I heard first hand about gunning down of families because one of them tried to run away during a quarantine. Imagine that happening in India. The max we have heard of slum clearance in India is that old dude fretting about "too much personal space", a rather pleasant alternative for any one with a conscience

If the weak Pakis can survive and be happy under Talibunnies/PA, then the vastly more richer China will do well. But that is not the point. The Chinese people's only two channels of communication to the outside world are their tightly controlled govt media and to a lesser extent, the western entertainment complex. As RayC-sir has pointed out, you develop a certain comfort if you dont know the alternative.

Eg: If Bangladesh has a more effective rural banking system, SBI/private bank honchos will be forced to study that system due to citizen/market pressure. Same in west. But not so in China. They will never know that 1) Bangladesh exists 2) has a banking system.

Our firms compete and conduct fratricidal business. Something they cant do in China. It is all "planned and partitioned" out.

etc etc. PLA needs to stop being a handmaiden for western business interests. period.