Doctrinal and other transformation essential for the IA

daulat
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Postby daulat » 15 Dec 2005 20:54

Anoop, you are painting an Op Cactus scenario, which with respect I think we can fairly easily deal with.

Imagine that there is a coup in Madagascar (substantially larger than the Maldives) and the legitimate government requests RSA and India for help. There is a largish population and numerous sites to secure. RSA can probably get SF and Paras into theatre fairly quickly, we can be there shorly afterwards. Any heavy equipment is going to come from IRDF, or a week later from Cochin or perhaps from Diego Garcia and/or an MEU that happens to be cruising the IOR. Imagine a scenario where we have to jointly liberate the main population centres in a coalition of RSA/MEU and IRDF?

Or there is an Islamist revolution in Oman and the ummah bro's are shy of intervention and our precious energy supplies are at severe risk. Choking off the entrance to the Gulf is going to get a lot of people upset. Depending on whether these are shias or sunnis will also put a spin on the intervention scenarios. Not to mention any Pak misadventure on our logistics chain...

I will not even try to imagine a Zimbabwe or Malawi scenario! And I suppose we can leave Somalia and others alone!!

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Postby RayC » 16 Dec 2005 12:16

Anoop wrote:So really, a Cold Start requires huge ammo dumps near the border and the threat of armor moving in if Pakistan decides not to take the slapping?


It is not only ammunition, but rations, spares, workshops, delivery squadrons, reinforcements, Ordnance units, Hospitals etc etc. A logistic node so to say. Further, the road/ track network should also be such that it supports the avenue of the offensive and these organisations have to be geared to move up to keep progress with the battle.

The move in will not be a promenade. The Pakistani army would contest the move with armour and its anti tank elements including attack helicopters. Therefore, to ensure less Pakistani interference, IAF and AD artillery will have to play a major role and this will require tremendous finetuning since the IAF would also have other functions to fulfill including interdiction so as to isloate the battlefield as far as feasible.

The above are just a few thoughts that comes to mind, but there are many other interconnected and individual factors that play a role.

In such a scenario, where the battle is fluid and changing moment to moment, the integration of all the combat and combat support and combat service support assets become essential for optimising the resources being injected into the battle.

Thus, a realtime information of the progress of battle for all the constituents involved in the direct battle and of those who have to ensure that all material are poised and delivered in an optimised and efficient manner is but a must.

Hence, NCW or whatever name you wish to give to provide such a realtime or near realtime information, and thereafter analysed intelligence, becomes an essential part of the conduct of battle.

It is a truism that India cannot translate NCW in the same manner as the US, but something towards that goal is not impossible.

In so far as the CDS and its progress and the problems involved, if one can get hold of the ARTRAC magazine PINNACLE, there are many articles on the subject including one from General Roychowdhury and Lt Gen Joshi who was the first one heading the organisation.

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Postby RayC » 16 Dec 2005 12:18

Daulat,

Interesting scenarios.

Quite feasible.

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Postby Singha » 16 Dec 2005 12:41

Lets get started on the laundry list. Pls mark items ** for must have and
*** for nice-to-have but not critical.

1. **
obviously a large LPHD has to obtained and be the core of the effort, housing
the command staff and comms room.

2. **
Mi17V helos have to be embarked to airlift or sling supplies/men both from
the LPHD and from cargo ships. the mast structure of most cargo ships in
SCI service are unsuitable for medium helo ops. Perhaps they need to build
and test a modular helipad that can be bolted onto the bow region of SCI
ships within a few hrs during a emergency and leave the deck brackets in
place on all ships. the british cargo ships of WW2 era used to have some
strong underdeck supports in certain places to handle installation of self defence guns..far sighted seafighters the british are.

Without Mi17V plug-n-play support one is reduced to
- comandeering or towing small ships into the region.
- slingbags of sacks are slowly loaded from the hold into these ships by
shipboard cranes
- another unloading and transport mess on the beach.

we had better start experimenting with such concepts. the next venture
wont be picnic like maldives.

3. **
second, naval gunfire support - the current 100mm guns are totally inadequate for the task and not great as AA either. opportunities for shelling ships are a tad thin these days so they are neither here nor there.
So INs future FFG/DDG should have a full 5" 55 cal gun that can
handle the ER shells the army uses from folks like bofors and solchem.
50km is a minimum benchmark, sustained 8 rds per minute, burst 15 rds,
multi trajectory shots to arrive at same time "virtual salvo" capability as usual for the ground based cousins.

4. **
UAV / recon helos - helicopter UAVs suitable for launch from FFG ; Heron-M/S2-M launch and recover from LPHD, ADS, Vikramaditya.
they may need stronger undercarriage and more lift control devices.

5. ***
A light fastfire 105mm howitzer to replace the ancient 105mm we have.
Lots of it.

6. **
A IFV vehicle mod with integral autoloaded twin-mortar 80mm that can lay down a devasting 40 rds per minute.(Ahbay-M)

7. ***
4x4 and 6x6 wheeled recon vehicles with good comms, sensors and protection. Huffy and Tuffy might fill that role.

8. **
A well oiled transport chain stretching back to new depots in south india
oriented towards filling the pipeline to a fighting brigade on 12 hrs notice
and keeping up the pace for 2 months continuously. depots, suppliers,
heavy trucks, efficient docks at naval ports, containers....

9. **
Man portable MR and SR BFSR radars. need to productionize the BEL MR
radar also.

10. **
Tractor system to swiftly lay down barbed wire and mines in rough terrain, supported by bulldozers to knock obstacles down or push them
aside.

11. **
air portable medical unit with palletized gear to setup complete op theater
and first aid posts within an hour of first boots on ground. may need some
redesign of current equipment and packing strategies.

12. **
MTA / AN32UPG both with AAR to sortie from south india and cross 2k-3k
km of open ocean before landing in dusty strips that IL76 cannot use.
This will need long practice via trips to south africa and zimbabwe ..

13. **
Palletized and portable ATC system and approach radar to replace those
blown up or damaged by retreating 'rebel forces'

14. **
L70 upg or VL-mica system for air defence of the first airbases and
ports captured. air portable ofcourse.

15. **
a large cadre of interpreters schooled in every middle eastern,
east and north african and IOR island language -- JNU school of foreign
languages must be roped in to train officers - each officer in IA must be
asked to learn atleast one such language . this will help to control
mistakes like troops mistaking a agitated and confused mob for a
attack and doing the usual american thing on them

16. **
A 40ft containerized system of Comm nodes which can be lifted onto
cargo or LPHD holds, plugged in and function as divisional HQ Nodes with
direct videolinks all the way back to sena bhavan and PMs residence.

17. **
naval oceanographic ships modified for SIGINT duty capable of 20 knots
sustained

18. **
Minehunting vessels and divers to clear damaged ports of hazards and
clear lanes for trailing 15 knot transport ships.

19. ***
dedicated submarine to release and recover SF marcos for recon ops.
(rip out a old U209 or two of its torpedo room and lean man it to create
space, we cant afford 50m jimmy carter unkilplugs)

Pls keep additing to list incrementing the serial nos from 20....

The Plan is to put fear of god into every wannabe musharaff between
new guinea and south africa.

Some amt of US airlift support can be expected via C-17 and C-5 sorties
into big concrete airports.

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Postby RayC » 16 Dec 2005 13:26

Some inputs to assist discussion in continuation of my post on doctrines not merely to buy weapons:

• Defining military missions to attain desired national ends.

• Establishing the value of alternative mission outcomes.

• Examining a range of scenarios to identify where military capability
shortfalls exist.

• Developing operational concepts to supply the needed military
capabilities.

• Evaluating alternative force modernization packages that incorporate
new operational concepts, to determine the best opportunities
for supplying the needed military capabilities.

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Postby daulat » 16 Dec 2005 14:46

RayC - you are identifying topics worthy of PhD's in their own right! :)

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Postby Anoop » 16 Dec 2005 18:34

Trust Singha to throw everything including the kitchen sink at the problem :) . I'll have to digest the amount of tech information in that post slowly and get back to you.

Daulat,

I re-read Gp. Capt. (R) Bewoor's account of Op Cactus again and somethings are worth repeating:

- The response time was something terrific; 8 hrs mobilization for the Para Bde which included recalling personnel from training; in 12 hrs, 2 IL-76 depart; 3 companies of Paras on the ground in 15 hours.

- On the other hand, the airstrip was not occupied by hostiles. If that had been the case, would the mission have succeeded? Apparently, paradropping on that island would not have been possible due to the small DZ area and high winds. They may have found another way, but what that would have been, we'll never know.

The other scenario in the ME that you mention is the US Navy's backyard. We won't be going in by ourselves. That leads to the question of inter-operability. Yet, it is a far cry to expect two different nations to complement each other at such short notice, so we will need a self- contained force. Co-operation might come later in re-supply etc.

Eastern Africa was exactly what I had in mind, though I hadn't thought through the details. I fully agree that we shouldn't be going in where rebels have had a longtime presence; that is counter-insurgency away from our shores and we've got enough COIN duties here as it is. Further, our ability to succeed will depend on that govts' political steps, over which we have no control and so we shouldn't be sending troops.

I am still trying to organize my thoughts on what's required and will post again when I think of something to say.

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Postby daulat » 16 Dec 2005 19:51

Anoop, yes I read that too recently. Very informative. The DZ does indeed look very small, but IMO, we should be prepared to make contested landings in places like that. Given sufficient air/naval support, we could have still inserted paras there - perhaps with special low level drop tactics. we didn't have fighter/attack coverage at that range before. we do now.

to me this is strong evidence of the need for our own MEU equivalent force. Doesn't have to be a lot. Perhaps even a Battalion, which can be there long enough to say secure an airfield and allow more to be flown in.

If you take the Madagascar scenario - on further thought, local opposition will likely be lightly armed, but still damned dangerous. The RSA forces may lack the weight to land there in strength but could still get there fast and furious, and we would struggle to get sufficient air dropped forces in ourselves - so would Unkil probably, but naval forces could get there quite fast. Now - is there a scenario where the SA's holds the airports and docks long enough for us to get there?

On the Oman scenario - actually this is perhaps closer to reality. It is Unkil's backyard, it will also probably involve NATO or atleast the UK and France on their own basis. Unkil also has massive forces just a short hop away. But Unkil will lack boots on ground - which is where we come in. If we let the MEU blast their way up the beach as they are well trained and equipped to do, we can come in as the shaft of the spear and sweep inland. Unkil will swamp the air and waters, we will be on the ground. Lots of interop issues right there...

As the shaft - we can cut Singha's excellent list in a wholly different configuration than if we were going to Madagascar.

It is perhaps educational to study some of the recent French insertions into various trouble spots in Africa. They manage to get quite considerable forces into theatre very quickly. And they don't rely much on Unkil, unlike the Brits.

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Postby shiv » 16 Dec 2005 20:08

One of the requirements of "doctrinal transformation" is joint operations - eg Army-Air Force, Army-Navy, Air-Force Navy etc.

Op Cactus was an example of such cooperation. I have read in a book (wohse review will appear on SRR) that one of the problems in India is that there is no institutionalised cooperation between the services. What cooperation there is is based on personal relationships.

This may not do for the future. Mechanisms must be brought in to reduce inter service rivalry and institutionalise the coopeation to make joint operations a reality.

The CDS as and when it comes, may go some way in this direction - I don't know if that is enough in itself.

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Postby daulat » 16 Dec 2005 20:12

CDS is necessary but not sufficient. there has to be much more joint working - at the staff, and operational level. lets start at the staffs atleast and begin the planning process.

also there must be a lot more rotation of junior officers between the services on short detachments - admittedly difficult when you are dealing with specialised jobs - but you can always stick people into the infantry for a short while!, and a lot more joint training

perhaps the services can have combined schools for some of the generic stuff? languages, comms, admin, whatever else...

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Postby Y I Patel » 16 Dec 2005 23:41

Maybe slightly OT on this thread, but what the heck.

I do not usually do so, but this time I am going to cross post liberally.

In all my years of reading about J&K (and believe me, they are many) this is the best article I have ever come across on the subject. I am deeply saddened that the author is not an Indian.

Read, and like me, learn a lot of new things on a subject you thought you were familiar with!



Mark Thomas's article in US Marine Corps LIC Journal

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Postby Raj Malhotra » 17 Dec 2005 10:18

Prepositioning lot of fuel and ammo close to border will invite interest of PAF, PGMs and Pak SF

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Postby RayC » 17 Dec 2005 10:46

Unfortuantely I am unable to find the time to reproduce the article by Lt Gen PS Joshi, the first Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff (CIDF) "Synergy and Jointmanship in the Defence Services" published in the ARTRAC magazine PINNACLE.

The synopsis of the article runs like this:

"The words 'Synergy' and 'Jointmanship' are not new to the Indian Defence Froces. Regrettably, very few have a clear conception about what 'Synergy' and 'Jointmanship' are all about - or rather waht they are not - what they are expected to achieve, how to organise a Joint HQ at the level of the Service HQs and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and mops timportant, how to make it function in practice.

The article explains the concepts, needs and the major spheres of activities of HQ Integrated Defence Staff. It enunciates the conditions special to this country and why the system obtaining in other armed forces cannot be replicated in India."

It is interesting that the author mentions the success the UK has achieved in combatting insurgency in Northern Ireland as well as meeting her global and NATO tasks overseas at the same time through their structure of Joint Command. He mentions that the UK has over 100 missions of various sizes involved in training, peace keeping and peace enforcement.

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Postby Anoop » 17 Dec 2005 11:03

It was mentioned here that the US Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the first entry force in an overseas deployment. Here's what a typical MEU looks like:

http://www.usmc.mil/22ndmeu/What_is_a_MEU.htm

The MEU is composed of four basic elements:

Command Element - Serves as the headquarters for the entire unit and allows a single command to exercise control over all ground, aviation, and combat service support forces.

Ground Combat Element - Provides the MEU with its main combat punch. Built around a Marine infantry battalion, the GCE is reinforced with tanks, artillery, amphibious vehicles, engineers, and reconnaissance assets.

Aviation Combat Element - The ACE consists of a composite medium helicopter squadron containing transport helicopters of various models and capabilities, attack helicopters and jets, air defense teams, and all necessary ground support assets.

MEU Service Support Group - Providing the MEU with mission-essential support such as medical/dental assistance, motor transport, supply, equipment maintenance, and landing is the mission of the MSSG.

The MEU consists of approximately 2,200 Marines and Sailors embarked aboard several amphibious ships. Prior to deployment, the men and women of the MEU undergo a rigorous 26-week training program designed to prepare them for any eventuality.

Some, but not all, of the missions the MEU can undertake while deployed are:

- Peacekeeping/Enforcement

- Humanitarian/Disaster Relief

- Security Operations

- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

- Reinforcement Operations

- Amphibious Raids/Assaults/Demonstrations

- Tactical Deception Operations

- Airfield/Port Seizures

- Show-of-Force Operations

- Reconnaissance and Surveillance

- Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities

- Visit, Board, Search and Seizure of Vessels


From the same site:


Recce: Drawn from the 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company, the MEU's Force Recon Platoon is the core of the MEU's Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF), a sub-unit within the MEU that is able to execute specialized combat missions such as deep reconnaissance, demolition operations, direct action, close quarters battle, and maritime interdiction.

Battalion Landing Team (BLT): To accomplish this, the battalion's organic complement of three rifle, a weapons, and a headquarters company are reinforced by a variety of forces from throughout the 2nd Marine Division, including tanks, assault amphibian vehicles, combat engineers, etc. Collectively, the reinforced battalion is referred to as a Battalion Landing Team.

The companies of BLT are:

- As BLT 1/2's primary heliborne assault force, Alpha Company is trained to be delivered into battle aboard the helicopters of HMM-261 (Rein). Prior to deployment, the company trains extensively in helicopter operations.

- Bravo Company is BLT 1/2's designated mechanized company. In addition to its organic complement of three rifle and one weapons platoon, Bravo Company has integrated the battalion's Assault Amphibian Vehicle platoon that enables it to conduct ship-to-shore movement and execute subsequent mechanized operations ashore.

- Although all of BLT 1/2's companies are trained in motorized and convoy operations, Charlie Company has taken this skill set a step further by undergoing intense training in conducting truck or Humvee-borne raids.

- The mission of Weapons Company is to provide heavy fire support to the rest of the battalion, and is broken down into several sections:
81-mm Mortar Platoon Combined Anti-Armor Team Tank Platoon
LAR Platoon Javelin Section Naval Gunfire Control Section

- Attached to the BLT from the 10th Marine Regiment, Golf Battery provides heavy indirect fire support with its six M198 155mm Howitzers.

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Postby Anoop » 17 Dec 2005 11:17

The US Army Brigade Combat Team TOO from Orbat.com:

http://www.orbat.com/site/toe/toe/usa/brigadecombattoe.html

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Postby RayC » 17 Dec 2005 14:13

Anoop,

The last two link does make the idea much clearer.

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Postby RayC » 17 Dec 2005 14:20

This would indicate Oman's equation in the ME

http://countrystudies.us/persian-gulf-states/67.htm

There is great potential.

And I believe the Omani King is India educated.

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Postby Raj Malhotra » 17 Dec 2005 20:30

Due to geopolitical reasons, it is impossible to get even a few days for the IA to mobilize.


But I think that “presence of units” for “cold start” of IA can actually be used to control escalation and to conduct a “teach a lesson war” on Pakistan.

After any provocation and resultant political decision, the war local or full scale must be started within few hours of the decision to strike against the enemy. The first strike will have to be launched by IAF, IN and cruise missile units of IA.

The IAF will have to take out important communication and transport nodes along with fuel & ammo dumps of Pakistan in first few hours.

This will retard the capacity of PA to mobilize quickly. While cold start units of IA will get more lee way to mobilize and gather on the border for shallow thrusts on the Pak H&D.

At this stage, India could offer cease fire, with Pakistan on back foot.

So cold start can be used to control escalation, or more appropriately it can be second step on control ladder rather than the first step.

IA has to concede the role of first strike to IAF, IN and its own cruise missile units.

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Postby satya » 17 Dec 2005 23:24

Hi guys,

its an interesting article regarding '' meanings of military transformation'', worth reading:

http://www.comw.org/pda/0302conetta.html

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Postby Anoop » 18 Dec 2005 00:20

I went through a lengthy exercise of what an IRDF MEU would look like and came to the conclusion that ship borne RDF are not very viable in the Indian context due to limitations of range and speed; I should have checked that first :( . Anyway, I'll just put it up here for comments. I am following the numbering system from the earlier posts on the IRDF.

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V. The MEU Look-Alike of the IRDF.

The entry force of the IRDF, if modeled on the US MEU, will have:

1. Recce platoon: Perhaps staffed by MARCOS (when I re-read BR’s pages on MARCOS, I was reminded that it was drawn from 340 (I) Bde and it had assisted in beach landing recce during Op. Pawan). If landing craft are inflatable power-boats, they are limited to foot mobility. For their deep recce mission, vehicles will come ashore later from the mechanized company of the BLT.

2. Battalion Landing Team (x 2): Each consists of:

(i) 1 Heliborne Assault Coy: A Sea-King can transport only one platoon at a time, so it will require multiple trips to insert a company. The Magar Class Amphibious Warfare vessel and the LST-L vessels being built has space for 2 helicopters each, but I imagine that the second one should be a smaller helo like the Dhruv or the Chetak for recce and CASEVAC roles. For 2 BLTs, the requirement doubles, but given the current limitations on the number of ships available (see below), it appears that each BLT cannot have its own dedicated Heliborne Assault Coy.

(ii) 1 Mechanized Coy: Even if 1 Coy consists of only 2 Rifle Plts (as opposed to the usual 3) and 1 Coy HQ, for each Mech Coy, we will need 6 APCs like the BMP-2, each capable of transporting 1 section. Each Magar Class vessel has space for 8 APCs and 15 tanks. So unless the number of tanks are reduced in favor of APCs, one IRDF “MEU” will need more than 1 Magar Class vessel, which is currently not feasible considering that we have only 2 of these, and possibly a third. So, we could accommodate 12 APCs instead of 8 and reduce the number of tanks (PT-76s) to 10, which will give 3 tank Troops (of 3 tanks each) and 1 Troop HQ tank, if weight balancing considerations are met. With the expected commissioning of 3 new LST-L vessels, the situation changes for both the Heli Assault Coy and Mechanized Coy, permitting 1 IRDF “MEU” to be supported by 2 such vessels.

(iii) The equivalent of Charlie Coy (convoy and Humvee) cannot be fully accommodated on one Magar Class vessel – there is room for personnel (more than 3 Coys can be accommodated), but no room for vehicles. So 1 vessel of the Mk.2 /Mk.3 Landing Craft will need to be added to the “MEU”. Each can carry 1 Coy and, if the two 2 PT-76s and 2 APCs are sacrificed, we could use 4 or 5 4WD mounted with MGs to substitute as the Humvee component. I don’t know if convoy trucks can be carried in these vessels for dimensional reasons.

(iv) Support Coy: This will need to be accommodated in the Magar Class vessel along with the Mech and Heliborne Coys and will include Mortar Plt, RL Plt, MMG Plt and Signals Plt. Again, vehicle limitation, not personnel accommodation limitation seems to be a problem. Can somebody tell me what vehicles a Mortar Plt needs? I suppose the Windy-505 will meet the needs of the MMG and RL Plts, but how many are required?

Added later: 1 Mortar Plt has 48 crew in a regular IA infantry battn, which translates into 9 mortars, each with 5 members (for an 81 mm mortar)

Global Security page

From the book "Combat Service Support Guide" by Maj. J. Edwards, Stackpole Books (an amazing resource for people interested in logistic aspects), ammunition pallets for the 81 mm mortar rounds come in roughly 4'x4'x3' pallets, each containing 90 rounds. So it appears that one regular 4WD jeeps will be able to transport both mortar and ammo.

The obvious omissions in this list are Arty and Service Support. I need to educate myself on those aspects first.

3. Force Protection and Supply Vessels:

I am assuming that the most probable threats to the MEU will come from ships and aircraft, not from submarines. So each MEU will be escorted by either 1 Type 25 Khukri Class or 1 Veer (Tarantul) Class corvette. The range on the former is about 4000 miles, while that on the latter is only 2000 miles. The range of the Magar Class is 3000 miles. While we have 13 of the Veer Class vessels, we have only 4 of the Khukri Class, so the IN may be willing to spare the latter more for such a role.

Is this level of escort sufficient?

The most significant problem is the limitation of range and speed of these vessels. The distance between Muscat, Oman and Mumbai is 6975 nautical miles! This limits the IRDF “MEU” to South East Asia – the distance between Andaman and Nicobar and Kaula Lumpur is only 755 nautical miles, ignoring the need for landing at KL, for the moment. The speed of the Magar Class vessel is 14 knots, which would take 55 hours sailing to cover assuming no stops – not much use as a Rapid Deployment Force!!
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Last edited by Anoop on 18 Dec 2005 04:50, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby daulat » 18 Dec 2005 02:27

Want to pick up on two separate themes here

1. as part of cold start, we can initiate a massive interdiction air campaign immediately - not so much to blow up PA units, but rather to hit bridges, marshalling yards and road choke points - so that the PA cannot mobilise or get quickly to the front. if they are sitting ready in their barracks, thats fine too. buys us mobilisation time. air interdiction can take the form of tactical air as well as cruise missiles and must hit the nodes where the logistics flow will happen. opens up options for me without necessarily raising the threshold too high. My hunch is that Mush and friends will hold back from nukes until IA has grabbed his juguar vane between the teeth

2. for the IRDF MEU clone, can we sacrifice armour for CAS helicopters? will be flying artillery and recon for the unit. and if its the right helicopter can also do insertion and casevac. Would be ok for my Madagascar scenario, perhaps less ideal for my Oman scenario. Either way, Anoop your observation is correct - we have insufficient ship capacity for direct intervention. If someone holds the docks for us, I think we can do better. I think I like Singha's idea for an HMS Ocean type craft.

the other option is to integrate forces/operations much more with Unkil and Angrez, who have the seaborne capacity. But that is a long way off.

sorry and the third thing, Anoop you mention speed of ships - that problem will affect everyone. We may need to think about Air insertion then Ship if we want to take decisive action. Also has more risk. The units will have to rehearse their scenarios A LOT before anything real starts to happen.

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Postby Anoop » 18 Dec 2005 04:18

Daulat,

Some quick responses on the IRDF thingie:

- I thought a little more about the speed issue and it appears that we may have been spoiled by the Op. Cactus response time. That is an exception and we shouldn't expect it to be the rule. However, the range issue cannot be wished away unless we get docking space in Diego Garcia. Iran would have suited nicely, but oh, well.....

The issue with airborne insertion is the quantum of force that can be delivered. Mostly, it will be infantry - para or otherwise.

Here's an article that discusses Canada's strategic airlift options:

http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/monj05g.htm

See Table 1 for the types of vehicles that can be transported. Unless the follow-on teams arrive soon, the first team in would be hard pressed to sustain battle.

- But if we relax the response speed issue and concentrate more on sustaining forces in the theatre, then we cannot wish away the ship based component. But for such large distances, we need troop transport ships like the B-561 Nicobar Class because of efficiency reasons and we are also assuming that disembarkement will not be contested. However, equipment will still have to be transported by the mother of LST-L. The LPD of the Austin Class seems to be the answer for India, because it can carry 4 LST-L equivalent, each capable to carrying 1 MBT:

http://navysite.de/ships/lpd14.htm

Of course, we will still have to call on ports along the way.

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Postby RayC » 18 Dec 2005 13:16

"Strategic thoughts draws its inspiration each century, or rather at each moment of history, from the problems which events themselves pose" is what is stated in Raymond Aron, “The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought,” in Alastair Buchan, Problems of Modern Strategy, London: ISS, 1970.

Therefore. what should be India's strategic outlook?

In this thread, we are still grappling over the same and have gone beyond looking at the issue. Unless we can analyse what is the strategic aim, the models and organisation will just be in the esoteric plane.

There is no doubt that most of us subconsciously are aware of what is the aim, which I presume to be veering to the obvious subcontinental vectoring as also ensuring a regional thrust, even if on a limited scale.

While I don't claim to be an expert or even very sanguine of the veracity of my views as many here, yet to draw upon what has transpired on this thread, the Oman aspect appears an interesting view.

I prefer to debate and throw up thoughts without being an Oracle since better minds than me are still meandering forelorn and lost.

What is India's threat perception that can be addressed without upsetting the applecart?

Given the option between China and Pakistan, the latter requires to be "informed" that any misadventure would be to her peril. China being preoccupied with her modernisation to be a challenge to the US, I presume will not at this moment be India centric belligerent without a provocation. Our nuclear deterrent to some extent would be a wet blanket to any adventure that she may embark.

To paraphrase Sun Tsu, it is better to ensure victory without having to fight a battle. If that be, then Pakistan encircled is an adequate "threat in being" than trying to bite any chunk of her territory. The other aspect could be giving her a dose of her own medicine of morally supporting the sub nationalism that is surfacing in nearly all the states in Pakistan.

Now, if India has a foothold in Afghanistan, Oman and Tazakhistan, it would posssibly be an adequate "threat in being" without even claiming to be so by which international hackles could be raised!

Yet, at the same time, it must be understood that nations inimical to India like China would attempt to turn the clock back on India. Therefore, there has to be some force that can be positioned at the earliest before such nations can topple the govts which are favourable to India.

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Postby daulat » 18 Dec 2005 16:24

and in this great chess game, i note that we are warming up further with Mongolia and Japan, whilst our interest in the -stan's are already known. The situation with China will I think remain in a state of stability, but a stability that can only be maintained by constant vigil and a strong arm. China has focused on its economy as being paramount for achieving power - which is the new strategic reality. They realise that actually to progress, they need our markets and our capabilities, they will seek to maintain some form of balance rather than seek to destroy us.

The Japanese navy is on the quiet an extremely large and potent force - with unkil's blessing ofcourse, but is essentially a brown water fleet. We should think about sharing the IOR/Pacific Rim between us. China needs Japan just as much if not more than us, but they will be forced to find an accomodation also.

our rabid feral pie dog next door ofcourse continues in its own demented way down the toilet bowl, hoping to take us with him - here we must contain and isolate, and therefore negate. The pie dog's influence in W. Asia is also not what it was, atleast politically. Which probably explains why pie dog #2 is being warmed up to our east.

One factor to note is that many of the Gulf nations employ large numbers of pakistanis in their armies - as the boots on the ground, possibly doing the dirty smelly jobs that their masters consider beneath their dignity. I wonder if this will be the source of the 'revolution' in the future? Take a few islamist pakistani NCO's, add a sprinkling of disaffected local officers, a mullah here or there large numbers of footsoldiers, and suddenly you have a fairly effective military force at hand for revolution/coup d'etat purposes with no real ties to the land.

Or consider the situation where one of these Gulf countries has to wage war against another entity where the foe may be orientated towards a pakistani perspective. where will the loyalties of the gastjaeger be then?

(derived from the German meaning - 'guest fighter')

RayC, if I read your above posts correctly, you are talking of basing in Oman, rather than coming to the assistance of Oman?

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Postby Anoop » 18 Dec 2005 18:40

> What is India's threat perception?

(a) It is having to fight an inconclusive war with Pakistan, that is thrust upon us. This will interrupt economic growth and expend resources without achieving much.

(b) It is being denied influence in strategically poised countries (near shipping lanes, energy sources) due to expanding Chinese influence there.

Just as India does not wish to fight an inconclusive war with Pakistan, China does not wish to fight one with India. Therefore, our strategy should be to expand our influence without getting into a fight. An example is the Chinese presence in Coco Is. Militarily, it is a simple job to overwhelm it. Yet, an attack on it constitutes an attack on Chinese forces, and hence on China. This gives us pause and the Chinese presence there constitutes a "marking" of territory as well as an elint asset.
-------------

We should attempt to turn the tables in the same manner at other places. However, IMHO, we should not be cultivating military presence in places like Vietnam, because it plays directly on Chinese fears of a US-led coalition out to undermine it and can cause it to react irrationally.

The first thing is to undermine Chinese influence in Bangladesh, which is easier said than done. But we will not be respected by the Chinese unless we show the same resolve in our near-abroad as they do.

Looking further ahead, I wonder if the age of "mutual-defense treaties" is past. These are usually so one-sided as to be laughable, yet it is a statement of intent to defend our interests in that State and provides legal cover for military intervention.

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Postby Tim » 18 Dec 2005 21:13

On the jointness issue (since I teach it for a living), it's worth noting that this is absolutely not easy for anyone. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act was an effort by Congress to FORCE the US armed services to behave in a joint manner. 20 years later, it is still only partially implemented - although it's getting better.

Services maintain their own separate doctrines and traditions for a number of reasons. Breaking those down is an arduous and sometimes brutal task. Given the historical and budgetary predominance of the Indian Army, and the difficulties creating a CDS, I'm not sure it will be any easier for India to create joint institutions than it was (and still is) for the US.

The next item on the US agenda is somehow mandating interagency cooperation - DoD/State/Treasury/Customs/Intel COmmunity etc. Depending on what India is transforming for, that also may be a vital piece of the doctrinal puzzle. Learning how to work with other national institutions for various goals is something the US is still struggling with, and something that may eventually have to be addressed by Congress as well.

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Postby Raj Malhotra » 18 Dec 2005 21:24

I do not see CDS happening during congress regime. They have traditionally been apprehensive of alternate power center emerging.


One should assume CDS to be dead for the time being

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Postby satya » 18 Dec 2005 22:10

Considering there r more than 400 batt. of para mil. forces under GoI roughly translating into 500K manpower . If 30% of this manpower is reserved exclusively for Armed Forces Personnles , translating into 150K who r retiring from active army service in their early 40s can serve easily 15-18 yrs with a vast experience for COIN ops , not only it can absorb 10,000-15,000 retiring soldiers , it can lead to a starting saving of around 1000 crores for IA from its pension part of budget .

My point is how to effective cut down tht 17% hole in Defence Budget going for pensions .

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Postby shiv » 19 Dec 2005 09:26

RayC wrote:
Therefore. what should be India's strategic outlook?

In this thread, we are still grappling over the same and have gone beyond looking at the issue. Unless we can analyse what is the strategic aim, the models and organisation will just be in the esoteric plane.


If India was led by a King (or an oligarchy), then India's strategic outlook would be the same as the strategic outlook of the king or oligarchy.

In actual fact democratic India's strategic outlook has to be a distilled function of the requirements of its people.

Peace, food security, prosperity, peaceful coexistence of all religious faiths and social and linguistic groups and health for all seem to me to be aims that are generally accepted as relevant to India.

Each of these points needs to be taken up individually to see who, or what, seeks to undercut or thwart the aim.

Very briefly:

1) Peace: Thrat to peace - foremost threat from Pakistan, lesser threat from China

2) Food security: Trade and shipping, and restrictions on information sharing and unfair trade/patent laws can impact on this. Our direct "enemies" here do not include Pakistan.

3) Prosperity: This requires safe trade, energy supply and infrastructure. Trade and energy supply are the areas in which our needs may conflict with those of other nations. We are competing with the US, China and Europe here.

4) Peaceful coexistence of all religious faiths and social and linguistic groups: This is partly internal and partly external. One important point that a lot of (usually non BRF) people miss is that no matter how much you sort out things internally - external support for discontent and insurgents need to be addressed an not ignored. Here again Pakistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and China all have internal problems that impinge on India.

5) Health - I will ignore this for the purpose of this thread.

Assuming I have listed a significant percentage of factors important to India - we find that Pakistan is only part of the problem. "Attacking Pakistan" and capturing Punjab cannot be a "national aim".

But we do need to be proactive when needed to achieve those aims. Even looking at the things that need to be done is an important first step. RayC's encirclement policy seems very interesting.

In what way would the army have to change to reflect the meds I have listed - assuming I am not way off the mark.

JMT

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Postby RayC » 19 Dec 2005 09:34

Tim has a point on Jointmanship.

Jointmanship in the current services paradigm in India is still a far cry.

Yet, at the same time, I would like to state that the equation between the higher ranks of those who are from the NDA is far more accomodating to each others' views than should I say with other entry. Of course, this is not an axiom I will hasten to add.

Therefore, there is a requirement to ensure that at regular periods of one's service career, there are courses on issues of joint command and staff that ensures that allows an intermix of all three services, which fosters better bonding amongst the service.

At the same time, I will hasten to add that it is easier said than done.

There is no doubt that if one knows personally another of the sister services, there will be an easier exchange of ideas when planning towards a common goal.

To set the cat amongst the pigeons, I will say there is merit in the British concept of "the old school tie"! ;)

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Postby shiv » 19 Dec 2005 20:47

One more take on threat perceptions.

Our threat perceptions must be shaped by studying all the countries that impinge on our security and understanding what THEIR threat perceptions are.

Pakistan for example is evolving from a state that irrationally considered that it could walk in and take over parts of India to a state that seeks to inflict pain for pain's sake. The country is dysfunctional, but that dysfunctionality has come only after India became visibly more powerful militarily and economically. Pakistan is a weak state that can be pushed in various directions, and its actions may be dictated by what China and the US want to gift to Pakistan in order to make trouble for India or someone else. Encircling Pakistan seems like a tempting idea. Oman?

China is exapnding its economy faster than its leaders can handle it. It has environmental issues and issues with regard to massive migration from rural to urban without equal rights for rural migrants. Banks have also given out bad loans, but FDI is supporting them. Besides China has issues with Taiwan and is looking at re-unification. China has issues with SE Asian nations re the Spratlys, and China distrusts Japan for historic reasons. The US has a big presence close to the densely populated Eastern China and along its sea lanes which are vulnerable beyond Chinese coastan waters. China may not be looking for war with India (or anyone), but India should not drop its pants and ask to be buggered. We need to be friendly with China and yet be in a position to hurt China if it acts funny. Absolute domination of the Indian ocean may be an idea.

Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh are socio-political problems.

The US can be a good friend, but it seeks to balance india with Pakistan no matter what the rhetoric. That is part of its policy of maintaining status quo in Asia. For that they have to believe the Pakis when they howl and cry and say "Bad India will eat us up". The US should be balanced too - with deep friendship if preferably but good relations with Russia, Europe and China in case US interests require playing about with Indian interests. The only scenario I can see is instability in Pakistan causing intolerable trouble to India with the US preventing a response by masive support to Pakistan. India can be a positive influence in keeping the Indian ocean safe for shipping - right from the Prisan Gulf to the Malacca straits.

Myanmar and SE Asia need to be engaged. I dont know bugger all about Myanmar so unless I read up I won't be able to comment.

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Postby RayC » 22 Dec 2005 13:56

Thomas C. Schelling argued that “victory” inadequately expresses what a nation wants from its military forces. Mostly it wants, in these times, the influence that resides in latent force. It wants the bargaining power that
comes from its capacity to hurt, not just the direct consequence of successful military action
. Even total victory over an enemy provides at best an opportunity for unopposed violence against the enemy populations. How to use that opportunity in the national interest, or in some wider interest, can be just as important as the achievement of victory itself; but traditional
military suicide does not tell us how to use that capacity for inflicting pain.

Any opinions on what Thomas Schelling has to say and in context with the arguments so far postulated by members on this thread?

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Postby daulat » 22 Dec 2005 15:12

I think thats a correct interpretation. What is the point of military victory? (historically) it is always economic gain of some sort, loot at the lowest common denominator, or the right of taxation at a more abstract level. for us it could be not so much that but more of an economic safeguarding - a neutered pakistan allows us to progress economically much more. we have no desire for land grab, population control, etc., etc. pakistan has no economic benefit to india at all.

but we do wish for energy security (hence we will guard oman, work with indonesia) and we wish for trading security (keep the IOR open) and we wish (should wish) above all to not allow our citizens or our friends to be harmed by irrational players

objectives against pakistan are therefore regime and societal change and then we can live warily happily ever after. objectives with china are stability - so that we can both prosper. objectives with others are to establish respect. (in order of difficulty). none of these scenarios require actual war fighting, but they all imply having the ability to do so, and to do so decisively.

the 2nd and 3rd are understandable and "normal" models. i would wager that atleast in modern times, there has not been the equivalent of a pakistan on the world stage... i doubt that there has been one in history either... if there were, it probably got stamped out quickly by a stronger power. actually when i think about it, pakistan has no real strategic objective in its war against India - other than to cause harm. i don't think that they know what to do beyond that point. they have no vision of their state beyond the confines of military thought, not even loot seems to figure in their calculus, leave alone taxation.

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Postby shiv » 22 Dec 2005 20:24

RayC wrote:Thomas C. Schelling argued that “victory” inadequately expresses what a nation wants from its military forces. Mostly it wants, in these times, the influence that resides in latent force. It wants the bargaining power that
comes from its capacity to hurt, not just the direct consequence of successful military action
. Even total victory over an enemy provides at best an opportunity for unopposed violence against the enemy populations. How to use that opportunity in the national interest, or in some wider interest, can be just as important as the achievement of victory itself; but traditional
military suicide does not tell us how to use that capacity for inflicting pain.

Any opinions on what Thomas Schelling has to say and in context with the arguments so far postulated by members on this thread?


I tend to create a model in my mind to work out certain things.

I imagine that I am the head of a small area of land where my family live - maybe 20 people - maybe 100.

Those people need, on a very small scale, exactly what a nation of 250 million. or even 1 billion people need. If I apply the concept of "armed forces" to this small model - I am looking at a few security guards as well as the option to raise the number of armed people to a dozen or more fighters.

Why would I need them?

I would need them first to protect my own territory from riders whomay want to come in for whatever reason. But I need them for other reasons too. Perhaps there are cattle that wander out - and people who go with the cattle and they may beed security. People may need to go some distance to fetch fuel or water - and that needs to be secure. Relitives and friends may visit and their security needs to be assured.

While achieving this looks like "adequate" security it often is not. My neighbor may deliberately ally with others or may deliberately get more people into arms - pulling out people from agriculture etc for the specific purpose of wiping me out and taking over my land.

Furthermore - if there is a drought a neighbor may put armed men around the water hole and try and keep everything for himself.

Or he may start chopping too many trees in the forest to store up extra firewood and deprive my village and others of that firewood.

To cope with ******** neighbors such as these, my "army" has to be much more than the limited force I mentioned earlier. I need information that these things are going or or are going to happen. I need to prepare to prevent or pre-empt these things.

Victory and defeat are intimately tied up with preparation and aims. If I have a few of my men waiting at the water hole, or near the forest but not harming anyone, the asshole neighbor will have to worry about that before he can even think of taking over the water hole or cutting too many trees

Finally I may have to cope with a Pakistan. A Pakistan is a neighbor who is afraid of me and lives preparing for war with me. He needs to be dealt with using a degree of finesse. He needs to know in no unceratin terms that messing with me will lead to pain for him. But if he does not mess with me he can stand to gain.

JMT

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Postby satya » 22 Dec 2005 20:36

Shiv,

best definiton dude of 'victory', so simply defined.

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Postby Anoop » 11 Jan 2006 17:51

Regarding the ship assets for an IRDF "MEU", not surpisingly, we find they are all stationed at ANC:

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/newsrf.php?newsid=5035

At the exercises which begin off the Haddo Wharf here tomorrow, the Navy will simulate a patrol along the Strait followed by the presentation of detailed concept papers on how the Navy’s 15 warships permanently based under the integrated Andaman & Nicobar command — eight landing crafts, four amphibious landing ships and three fast attack craft — may be pushed south to join its four neighbours for security in the sensitive sea lane. Maneouvres will include search and rescue, replenishment at sea and cross-deck landing operations.

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Postby RayC » 11 Jan 2006 20:24

Anoop,

What should be the concept for a campaign against an adversary which possess WMD?

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Postby Lalmohan » 11 Jan 2006 20:48

you need to categorise the WMD types

1. Nuclear
2. Biological
3. Chemical
4. Ecological - ability to cause flooding, etc.

and likely mode of delivery

1. conventional weapons - artillery
2. rocket/missile weapons
3. unconventional delivery - terrorism

some of these scenarios only have strategic responses, whilst others are highly tactical in nature

speed would seem to be of the essence in all scenarios - to rapidly neutralise the threat, either before (preferably) or during any hostilities, and control escalation. the ground conditions in India do not encourage the usage of full NBC gear for any realistic period, so protracted operations and logistics in these scenarios becomes too unweildy and impractical

no first use is a good policy, but it must be backed up by assured massive retaliation of overwhelming force

Pakistanis have little concept of the reality of WMD usage (nor do many Indians for that matter, but its not as bad) - they are therefore quite unstable and dangerous, unlike China, which has a more rational calculus in this regard.

our chief problem is to figure out the rationality of the opponent in order to guage a response

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Postby Anoop » 12 Jan 2006 10:16

RayC wrote:What should be the concept for a campaign against an adversary which possess WMD?


Ray sahab,

I have very little to add to the existing concept of a Cold Start. More than the projected speed of response, I feel it is the shallowness of the thrust, ensuring that we stay under the adversary's nuclear rubicon, that brings stability and a limit on escalation to the war scenario.

The assured speed of our response is critical to fix deterrence in the adversary's mind. Everything we can do to convince Pakistan or China of the futility of armed aggression against India is for the better. In that sense, a presence on Pakistan's other border will be worth its weight (and wait!) in gold, but perhaps that is never forthcoming. Similarly, expanding Indian influence among our Eastern and Northern neighbours will push the "border" back towards China. Failing that, effective deterrence will have to depend on our swift ability to counter both Pakistan's and China's moves that deny them the ability to present a fait-accompli and a new reality that is in their favor.

The above scenarios are predicated on India responding to a conventional attack. If we are to consider India acting in a punitive manner, this has limited utility. But I believe that India will not respond with regular armed forces to the type of terrorism we have seen so far, prefering instead to grind away slowly. But if a deniable WMD attack occurs e.g. a dirty bomb, then the choices become more difficult. In such a case, what will be an appropriate response? If we treat it as a Pakistani first use and respond disproportionately, we will almost certainly invite further nuclear retaliation because Pakistan would be worse off not responding and we cannot completely guarantee the destruction of their strike ability. If we respond proportionately, we will have deviated from our nuclear doctrine and set a precedent where a NFU policy has been shown to be disadvantageous. A purely conventional response will be the easiest in the face of the extreme pressure to restrain, but it will have to be very severe to deliver sufficient punishment. I don't know if we have the ability to do that and still keep the war from going further nuclear.

What are your views on this subject?

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Postby Lalmohan » 12 Jan 2006 14:51

all roads lead to Cold Start... i was feeling the same way.

as for BCE attacks - i think that regardless of platform, their impact will be localised, and perhaps managable

it is primarily N that has to be catered for - in the military scenarios, the NFU and assured retalliation outcomes work well... the whole logic breaks down in the assymetric delivery model, plausible deniability etc.,

the conditions under which mushy authorises a dirty bomb would have to be very dire indeed, let alone a suitcase/bullock cart bomb

it is still not clear to me that pak has properly mated their chinese copy warheads to their korean missiles. i suspect that their prime delivery vehicle still remains the truck.


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