Agni-V ICBM: New capabilities, technologies, strategies

[jaladipc]

I think there are a significant % of folks here and the strategic circles that werent satisfied with the yield of POK-2 testing including me

But I think we do have to consider the circumstances at that time. The quantity of Pu and Tritium needed for making the bum and the enrichment capability we have at that time. IT was only post POK BARC made significant achievements in terms of re-processing and tritium extraction.

IF thats the case, should we assume that the yields tested were meant for sampling? and can be significantly improved to higher yields?

IF we believe what what to that the TN is a total fizzile, and the yindoo deterrent is only based on FBF, would the DRDO dare to go for MIRV capability with same payload?

There were many reports that might not surfaced in public, that BARC did some significant improvements and achievements in terms of new TN bums with higher yields but only did so in the labs and simulation. Is the new yindoo boosted version of say 300kt TN weighing 250-300kg MIRVed a solid deterrent to deter chinks?
Apparently when the reports didnt even surfaced about the new capabilities , let alone open testing wont deter any enemies. Hence the need for real testing to show the meaning of true deterrence.

[Karan M]

Kanson's claims dont stand up to scrutiny, I'm afraid.

Lets consider: Santhanam who is the guy questioning the TNW test results, was the man in charge of the seismic test apparatus. Its a multi-stakeholder approach and which actually supports the maturity of both BARC and DRDO which worked together. Its also good practise to have multiple agencies involved for transparency (though it adds to logistics).

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaShakti.html

Project Leaders:

Dr. Avil (Abdul) Pakir Jainulabdeen Kalam
Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister
Head of the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO)
Dr. Rajagopala Chidambaram
Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
Chairman of the Department of Atomic energy (DAE)

Development and Test Teams

Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) Leads
Anil Kakodkar, Director of BARC
Satinder Kumar Sikka, Lead for Thermonuclear Weapon Development
M.S. Ramakumar, Director of Nuclear Fuel and Automation Manufacturing Group;
Lead for nuclear component manufacture
D.D. Sood, Director of Radiochemistry and Isotope Group;
Lead for nuclear material acquisition
S.K. Gupta, Solid State Physics and Spectroscopy Group;
Device design and assessment
G. Govindraj, Associate Director of Electronic and Instrumentation Group;
Lead for field instrumentation
DRDO Leads
K. Santhanam; lead for test site preparations

K. Santhanam of the DRDO, who was in charge of the test site preparations, gave the two keys that activated the test countdown to Vasudev, the range safety officer, who was responsible for verifying that all test indicators were normal. After checking the indicators, Vasudev handed one key each to a representative of BARC and of the DRDO, who together unlocked the countdown system. At 3:45 p.m. the three devices detonated.

So is it even credible to think that Santhanam could have done his job without even being aware of what he had to measure (which the BARC people would have told him beforehand what to measure)?

He explains further:

http://news.rediff.com/report/2009/sep/ ... tests1.htm

During the press conference the most repeated question was why did he not speak before about the sensational failure of India's thermo- nuclear testing? Why now? Santhanam said, "Please note that the tests were conducted in May 1998.The DRDO was in charge of all the field instrumentations to measure acceleration and to record measurements from a variety of instruments and recorders. After the tests were over, we visited in (Pokhran, Rajesthan) the shafts where the thermo- nuclear device was detonated. We found that shafts by and large remained undamaged. So, we moved on to other shafts where the fission bomb was detonated. The fission bomb was estimated to be 20-25 kilotons. It left behind the large crater which was larger than the crater formed in 1974, when India's first peaceful nuclear test was conducted. I had some reservations about whether the thermo-nuclear device actually worked as per our expectations. I had serious doubts about that. We had to check and double check before we could arrive at the actual yields from the test. It was put in the classified report at the end of 1998."

Sathanam added, "Thereafter DRDO and Bhabha Atomic Research Center's scientists held a meeting. Despite fairly long discussion the two agencies agreed to disagree. Under these circumstances, the chairman of the meeting said he would discuss the matter with the minister and then decide on the future course of action. The Data was classified and the fact is that we should not have to have it in the public domain until the government chooses to declassify it."

Second, is the belief that somehow the DRDO guys will only receive the "physics" package - and would not be aware of the bomb itself. They would have been involved in many design level details and possibly even manufacturing. The DRDO maintains some of the best precision manufacturing capabilities in the country, enabling them to even LSP Agni missiles. They can also do a job with secrecy. In the previous test in 1974:

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/I ... tBomb.html

In July nuclear physicist Dr. Basanti Dulal Nag Chaudhuri took over as science adviser to the Defense Minister, and as Director of the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). The following month, he and Ramanna began working together to recruit the Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL), located in Chandigarh, to develop the explosive lenses for the implosion system.

During 1971 work on weapon design continued. Srinivasan working with K. Subba Rao developed models of the fission process on a nuclear bomb, and equations to predict its efficiency. Chidamabaram completed his work on the plutonium equation of state, and Ramamurthy developed computational models of the implosion, nuclear reaction, and disassembly process to predict the devices behavior. Throughout this period Ramanna and his lieutenant, P.K. Iyengar, held frequest reviews of the projects progress.

In April 1971 Nag Chaudhuri appointed Nagapattinam Sambasiva Venkatesan to Director of TBRL with specific instructions to assist in developing the nuclear device.

As to the significance of these lenses:
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaSmiling.html

The implosion system was designed to compress the core to twice its normal density. The lenses that were developed used the fast-slow explosive design pioneered by the U.S. in World War II. Like the Gadget exploded at Trinity in 1945, they used an RDX-TNT mixture as the fast explosive, with baratol (barium nitrate and TNT) used as the slow explosive. Chengappa descibes the inner slow explosive component as being in the shape of "Shiva ling am" -- a phallus in Hindu religious art which is squat and blunt in form. The device used 12 lens, which is described by Chengappa [pg. 182]: "the way the explosives were placed around the plutonium sphere resembled the petals of the lotus". This presumably indicates that each hemisphere of the implosion system consisted of 6 longitudinal lens segments (asymmetric diamond shaped lenses) joined together at the pole so that they formed triangular teeth at the equator which interlocked with the opposite hemisphere. This design is simpler and less sophisticated than the 32-lens "soccer ball" system developed by the U.S. during World War II. From 1971 through 1973 Venkatesan at TBRL fired over 500 lenses during development.

The point is even today, the DRDO team may have been involved in several aspects of the explosives, manufacturing etc. And why not? You work with whosoever has experience in the field.

So, even considering the DRDO guys did not contribute to the design itself (very unlikely based on prior events), they would have definite need to know the specifics of the bomb design to learn about what it could tolerate in terms of forces, pressures, design fuzing for it, switches etc. Apart from knowing the physical specifics of the packages down to the last detail so as to accurately model it for their delivery - via Agnis etc. Every pound of weight, etc will count.

Note several members of the BARC team were involved in both tests - even if the TNW failed, their legacy is secure. These men did their job in getting us to the point we have a working fission device!

Next - the claim that somehow DRDO is the only agency auditing missile development and we have to take their word for it. Err...no. The armed forces are routinely brought in to observe the missile tests after detailed briefings & this is clearly done as a measure of transparency and to generate user buy-in. Naval ships are used for telemetry, service officers deputed to work with the DRDO to prepare the user for induction and training of the missile. At every stage, there is nowadays a fair bit of transparency.

These are all hard lessons learnt in order to convince a customer of the validity of each system, when imports are often available and used to benchmark local systems. DRDO also brings in ISRO members to audit technical aspects of their programs. The A-3 failure IIRC had an ex ISRO chair auditing.

Even after induction, user trials are regularly held. These indicate whether there are any lacunae in training, any issues with production quality etc and are essential. For the missiles, we have had the news about some missile failures because subcomponents sourced from some private contractors were not of the required quality. So now DRDO has set up a quality assurance agency to audit the critical components.

Point is this is the level of effort required for regular manufacture, even when a one-off design is tested. This is the reason why a single TNW test, where the head of test preparations and his team has reservations about the yield of the test, and does not think his instruments malfunctioned (note: "we checked and double checked" in comments above), may not be enough.

Furthermore, there are audit reports, observations by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, and finally the ever present media leaks, most of them rubbish, but the point remains, that the DRDO has multiple stakeholders monitoring its work & is not the sole decision making authority re: whether its systems work or not.

Coming back to the TNW issue, merlin makes the point that he considers a report to have said the TNW has not been weaponized. This is interesting, because, in another report (deliberately leaving out the rhetoric which will otherwise end up sparking emotions), there is the statement that:

http://www.business-standard.com/india/ ... er/379156/

It is no wonder that the failed TN device has not been weaponised, 11 years after P-2,

...

Point is if India has not weaponized TN - then it bears out the need to test.

Are there alternatives to testing?

Question is: Are there any methods/techniques available to test/refine our TNW capabilities before testing?

[pankajs]

However, here is where our political leadership failed us spectacularly. Their only job was to absorb the international pressure, show some balls and tell the world that we will conduct a series of open ended tests till we are satisfied.

I have a theory on reverse psychology to offer here. We have seen it on display very recently. Pardon this OT.

The Indian government should have said 'we will conduct a series of open ended tests till everyone in the world is satisfied on the yield of the TNW'.

The richter scales would immediately have gone off the charts. The NPA's would have gone to town claiming that the TNW tested has the potential to be scaled up to 1 mt. The Chinese would have claimed the yield was 200 kt instead of 50 kt and that India was understating the yield.

Apologies again.

[Supratik]

Also, everyone is aware that the decision to test only 40KT and 3 bums at the same time was made by the scientists because they were under extreme pressure to collect as much data within as few tests as possible. Hats off to them for what they accomplished under the circumstances. However, here is where our political leadership failed us spectacularly. Their only job was to absorb the international pressure, show some balls and tell the world that we will conduct a series of open ended tests till we are satisfied. That's what leaders are supposed to do - provide air-cover. Instead they demonstrated that they have "half a ball". And they thought they could finesse their way out of the sanctions regime - instead of just saying "up yours". Result - we have a miserable deterrence and endless questions.

We cannot simply blame the political leadership. We do not know and perhaps will never know what kind of threats were anticipated or given specially from Khan. We do not know what message scientists delivered to the political leadership about the efficacy of their design and the success of the tests. If it was a fizzle probably they had only one design or the design needed to fixed which cannot be done in a short time. Given that two PMs before (PVNR) and after (MMS) failed to stand up for tests you have to give
Vajpayee credit for what he did given that our economy was not in great shape and a new political party had come to power for the first time. Vajpayee even with his week knees showed some balls. As BK says it is just a matter of time before the weaponized TNW is tested.

[jaladipc]

Karan,

There are other alternatives to evaluate new designs and improvised bums. But they are limited to lab testing of trigger mechanisms at very low yields and simulations.

But again, If they have to proceed as per the new evaluations, they do need a base design thats already been evaluated to max possible extent.

Now the only question that arises is, if they did have went ahead with further simulations and new designs are they based on the impression of the POK2 thats sizzile or fizzile?

If BARC is under impression that the POK TN is a sizzile but not a fizzile one, how confident are they when scaling up to higher yields?

[Karan M]

Also, everyone is aware that the decision to test only 40KT and 3 bums at the same time was made by the scientists because they were under extreme pressure to collect as much data within as few tests as possible. Hats off to them for what they accomplished under the circumstances. However, here is where our political leadership failed us spectacularly. Their only job was to absorb the international pressure, show some balls and tell the world that we will conduct a series of open ended tests till we are satisfied. That's what leaders are supposed to do - provide air-cover. Instead they demonstrated that they have "half a ball". And they thought they could finesse their way out of the sanctions regime - instead of just saying "up yours". Result - we have a miserable deterrence and endless questions.

We cannot simply blame the political leadership. We do not know and perhaps will never know what kind of threats were anticipated or given specially from Khan. We do not know what message scientists delivered to the political leadership about the efficacy of their design and the success of the tests. If it was a fizzle probably they had only one design or the design needed to fixed which cannot be done in a short time. Given that two PMs before (PVNR) and after (MMS) failed to stand up for tests you have to give
Vajpayee credit for what he did given that our economy was not in great shape and a new political party had come to power for the first time. Vajpayee even with his week knees showed some balls. As BK says it is just a matter of time before the weaponized TNW is tested.

Agreed, what can one do if the TNW does not work? It will take a lot of time and effort to redo things.

I fail to see what else we could have done. But perhaps announcing a moratarium was not required. I am pretty sure Khan would have put immense pressure on India and Indian economy.

As regards BK's statements - can you point out where he said that? He's not very technically accurate and makes some weird recommendations, but still interesting to see what he may have heard.

Dharma,

So basically they have to retest if the first didnt work out. And no alternatives exist?

[shyamoo]

However, here is where our political leadership failed us spectacularly. Their only job was to absorb the international pressure, show some balls and tell the world that we will conduct a series of open ended tests till we are satisfied.

I have a theory on reverse psychology to offer here. We have seen it on display very recently. Pardon this OT.

The Indian government should have said 'we will conduct a series of open ended tests till everyone in the world is satisfied on the yield of the TNW'.

The richter scales would immediately have gone off the charts. The NPA's would have gone to town claiming that the TNW tested has the potential to be scaled up to 1 mt. The Chinese would have claimed the yield was 200 kt instead of 50 kt and that India was understating the yield.

Apologies again.

+1. I like it.

[Karan M]

http://books.google.co.in/books?id=bCyJ ... frontcover

Suggests "super lasers" can allow scientists to generate conditions similar to what happens within the core of a TNW explosion.

States "National Ignition Facility" at the US is doing exactly this. Chapter 8 and 13.
Also:
http://www.eurekalert.org/features/doe/ ... 072105.php
https://lasers.llnl.gov/about/nif/about.php

NIF: The "Crown Joule" of Laser Science

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is the world's largest laser. NIF's 192 intense laser beams can deliver to a target more than 60 times the energy of any previous laser system. NIF became operational in March 2009 and is capable of directing nearly two million joules of ultraviolet laser energy in billionth-of-a-second pulses to the target chamber center.
Aerial View of the National Ignition FacilityThree football fields could fit inside the NIF Laser and Target Area Building.

When all that energy slams into millimeter-sized targets, it can generate unprecedented temperatures and pressures in the target materials—temperatures of more than 100 million degrees and pressures more than 100 billion times Earth's atmosphere. These conditions are similar to those in the stars and the cores of giant planets or in nuclear weapons; thus one of the NIF & Photon Science Directorate's missions is to provide a better understanding of the complex physics of nuclear weapons (see National Security). Researchers can also explore basic science, such as astrophysical phenomena, materials science, and nuclear science (see Understanding the Universe). NIF's other major mission is to provide scientists with the physics understanding necessary to create fusion ignition and energy gain for future energy production (see Energy for the Future).

Given Russia's extensive work in this arena (prior to the FSU collapse, they were even looking at fielding weaponized laser systems), wonder if we can tie up with them. Though I doubt they'd want us to develop this capability and may want a very expensive quid pro quo.

Guess testing comes at cheaper cost, time for the device itself but significant external economic costs.

A facility like the above would be very expensive, time consuming & may end up being a TNW type project in itself.

No easy answers.

[Supratik]

As regards BK's statements - can you point out where he said that? He's not very technically accurate and makes some weird recommendations, but still interesting to see what he may have heard.

IIRC, he has stated similar things in his lectures and writings. Don't have a reference off-hand.

[Prem Kumar]

Supratik: the buck stops with the leader (ABV in Pok-2). Who else do we blame - Pakistan?

Agreed - he showed that he had at least half a ball, while PVNR and MMS displayed none. But even with ABV, while I understand his constraints, I dont agree that they were insurmountable.

Of course, Khan would have put up immense pressure & you cannot calculate all the consequences of your decision to test. But this is exactly where leadership comes in. If every variable was calculable and every consequence predictable, why need leaders - we can ask a supercomputer to make the decision. ABV's job was to ensure that he provided air cover in the broadest possible sense - he is the leader of a Billion people, with a decently strong military, bureaucracy and media. Once the first tests began, he should have galvanized his troops and put them to work. Rally the whole country behind the cause - pretty much every Indian I know was ecstatic that we tested - except Praful Bidwai, of course. He should have used the momentum

a) No moratorium/crematorium business. Tell the scientists to take as long as they wanted (years if need be) to refine & re-test. Assure them that the rest of the nation will make sacrifices for them

b) Remove all restrictions - no excuses like "we can only test a 40KT because our shafts arent deep and we dont want to cause village houses to develop cracks". India is a big enough country that we can find enough space to test a 1 MT weapon

He should have put the country on a war footing & he failed to do it. You think Khan's pressure would have mattered against the collective will and momentum of a Billion people?

[Karan M]

Prem: "He should have put the country on a war footing & he failed to do it. You think Khan's pressure would have mattered against the collective will and momentum of a Billion people?"

Sorry, but this is the sort of rhetoric that cannot substitute for the facts as they were. A large proportion of the billion people would have been inconvenienced economically by stringent economic sanctions (more than that there were) and also, a lot of the people may have been swayed by contrary arguments - after all did not MMS from the Opposition denounce the tests? And the Left's stance is very well known anyhow.

Point is he had to strike a balance between the ideal and what can be done. Testing itself was a big achievement, given the pressures we faced. Plus he would have relied on the team & the advisors to make his decision on moratorium etc.

Ultimately, the question is not why the tests were not perfect - a "cottage industry" deterrent becoming so functional in itself is a big achievement, but the bigger problem is why we waited so long to test. In which sense I would squarely blame the many gentlemen who ruled before ABV, for ignoring realpolitik and not accelerating the program. But then again, to be fair, their choices were squarely linked to the skewed economic policies all the way back to Nehru. If a nation is economically weak, militarization makes it sacrifice butter for guns, because there is not enough of either. The problem is a real root cause analysis will show so many institutional problems.

We should have such a solid framework for decision making that it does not depend on one ABV or not to lay down the path. The path should be clear before hand, with all options mapped out.

[tejas]

Using the excuse of desperate times call for desperate measures, all kinds of common sense reforms could have passed ridding India of archaic labor laws and parasitic state undertakings as well as making the country truly business friendly. It would have killed many, many birds with one stone. Once Unkil's greedy allies buckled under to make a fast buck all sanctions would have melted away. But that would take true, forward thinking leadership. India always punches at the weight level of Guatemala instead of Germany.

With a true market economy rather than the socialist distorted mess we have currently, there is no force on earth that can boss India around.

[Karan M]

BK claims: (www.bharatkarnad.com, pg 2)
he fusion and boosted fusion weapons designs remain unproven, because the design correctives incorporated into the thermonuclear and boosted fission designs that fizzled in 1998, are still untested and, therefore, unreliable.

So corrective measures have been incorporated but await testing?

[ramana]

KaranM, Is the goal high yield or is it TNW? I would be happy with former in a config that is deliverable.

If that is so then its there.

[SaiK]

I think we missed a massive window of oppty during 2009

[ramana]

WOF, says that the first Agni in IGMP achieved a re-entry velocity of Mach 6 and survived temperature of 3000 deg C in May 1989.

[PratikDas]

BK claims: (http://www.bharatkarnad.com, pg 2)
he fusion and boosted fusion weapons designs remain unproven, because the design correctives incorporated into the thermonuclear and boosted fission designs that fizzled in 1998, are still untested and, therefore, unreliable.

So corrective measures have been incorporated but await testing?

Even if that was true, wouldn't that information be a secret? Wouldn't the official secrets act prevent him from blurting it out? If he violated the OSA, wouldn't he be in trouble?

[Prem Kumar]

Karan M: its not rhetoric. It may sound like one because we have come to expect so little of our leaders.

There were 2 ways to look at the 1998 situation of whether to test or not: one was to run endless what-if scenarios, get paralysed with fear and not test at all (PVNR model of inaction). The other was to boldly forge ahead with open ended testing and deal with the consequences as they come (visionary leader model). ABV chose a 3rd path in between.

As I've stated earlier, ABV was better than the rest in that he at least tested. We can look at the glass as half full or half empty.

Its not as if the window has closed. Nothing prevents MMS today from continuing where ABV left off. But we all know that's not going to happen. Hopefully the next Government after 2014 ....

[ramana]

http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/940106/

Was this already posted and analyzed?

Not a sabre for rattling
Arun Prakash Posted online: Mon Apr 23 2012, 03:17 hrs
Agni V is a vital component of India’s nuclear deterrence

Two important developments, within this eventful month, have served to significantly alter India’s strategic profile in the region: the commissioning of the nuclear-propelled attack submarine, INS Chakra, and the successful test-firing of the 5,000-km-range ballistic missile Agni V. Since both convey strong messages in the context of China’s hegemonic intent, they have the potential to be regional “game-changers”; the former by altering the maritime balance of power in the Indian Ocean, and the latter by providing a much-needed boost to the credibility of India’s 14-year-old nuclear deterrence.

The long-awaited launch of Agni V has led to justifiable jubilation amongst DRDO scientists and aroused a degree of jingoistic pride among the citizenry. The purists, who are quibbling over whether this range entitles the weapon to be dubbed an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) or merely an intermediate-range missile, should note that the distance from Jorhat in Assam to Khabarovsk, in the Russian far east, right across China, is just about 4,200 km. However, those dancing on the streets must also bear in mind that for India, committed as it is to “no first use”, Agni V is neither a weapon of war nor a sabre for rattling. It will become a vital component of India’s nuclear deterrent, whose sole purpose is the prevention of nuclear war.

At the same time, the diehard pacifists in our midst would do well to recall the ancient Athenian wisdom that, in a realist world, “The strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must.” Even short of war, there is much that India needs to guard against — coercion, compellence, arm-twisting and blackmail — in order to retain its strategic autonomy. Given that our current geo-political environment is fraught with hazards, Agni V should bring reassurance to our security planners.

As we undertake a realistic assessment of the impact of this weapon-system on our security, it is important to strike a balance between hyper-scepticism, of which enough will be forthcoming from foreign detractors, and delusionary self-congratulation that Indians are prone to indulge in. In the strategic arena, it is important to keep one’s feet firmly on the ground because others, especially potential adversaries, will be undertaking detailed and painstaking appraisals of our newfound capability on their own.

While it was heartening to hear the DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat declaring Agni V to be 80 per cent indigenous, one hopes that the remaining 20 per cent, which comes from external sources, does not pertain to vital technologies such as the solid-propellant rocket motor or the high-precision guidance system. The effectiveness of this missile as a weapon of deterrence will be a function of its accuracy and the explosive yield of its nuclear warhead. Since boosted-fission nuclear warheads are India’s preferred choice, their limited yield of 200-300 kilotonnes demands much higher navigational accuracies so that detonation takes place close enough to the intended target to inflict “unacceptable” damage. This would require the missile to impact within a few tens of metres after traversing 5,000 km. Given their past record, Indian scientists are perfectly capable of mastering these technologies, but should there be any gaps, they need to be bridged at the earliest.

India’s security planners have, so far, downplayed the significance of numbers as far as nuclear warheads and their missile carriers are concerned, and remained vaguely coy while defining a “minimum” deterrent. However, numbers assume critical significance for a “no-first-use” power such as India because it has to risk losing a major part of its arsenal to a first strike, before retaliating with its residual weapons. India’s tardy decision-making and slow production rates have resulted in even Pakistan overtaking us in terms of number of warheads and variety of carrier missiles. It is important that as soon as Agni V completes its test programme, sufficient resources are dedicated to its serial production in sufficient numbers.

In a related context, even the mobility of a containerised truck or rail-mounted Agni V may not provide it immunity from an adversary first strike because very little remains hidden from aero-space surveillance nowadays. It is, therefore, essential that the technological gains of this programme be used to produce a new class of missiles capable of underwater launch from nuclear submarines like the Arihant, or her sisters in the offing. Only then will India’s nuclear deterrent become truly invulnerable and credible.

In the midst of all this excitement, it is important not to lose sight of the overarching strategic vision which must underpin these undertakings and where we seem to be lacking considerably. In the paradigm that India has chosen to follow, the scientific lobby enjoys exclusive and unfettered access to the apex political authority, whereas the users of their end-product (the armed forces) have no say. Not only has the PM been deprived of strategic advice from the end-user of weapon systems, but time and cost overruns as well as performance deficits in our strategic programmes go unchecked.

Now that India aspires to be a major power, it is essential that we create institutions which will not only help us take major decisions regarding strategic technological programmes, such as anti-ballistic missile defence or space warfare, in a rational manner but also subject them to close oversight.

The writer is a retired chief of naval staff
express@expressindia.com

So he is clarify the payload and the need for accuracy with range. So there is no doubt about the yield for the given payload.
No wishy washy stuff about 1998 vintage etc....

On to the K-15 and K-4.

[SaiK]

Now that India aspires to be a major power, it is essential that we create institutions which will not only help us take major decisions regarding strategic

It is imperative to take this analogy to non-technical sphere as well, especially the political system and governance. We have higher stakes in hand as a nation, in leading the world towards future. We have the strongest backbone of all nations, that is Indic-ness. Capabilities can widen influence and spread our core values.

[tejas]

I thought at least the boosted fission device was proven. If India is stuck with 20 kt bums only, the question is not do we test. It is only when do we test. India is too big to sanction. And if sanctions are threatened, the response should be we will smash the MTCR and even NPT into dust. Does Unkil want India in the tent pissing out or outside the tent pissing in?

[NRao]

Why are we struggling so much?

Now that India aspires to be a major power, it is essential that we create institutions which will not only help us take major decisions regarding strategic technological programmes, such as anti-ballistic missile defence or space warfare, in a rational manner but also subject them to close oversight.

Cannot be done until, this is solved:

India’s tardy decision-making and slow production rates

I think someone needs to write a top secret letter to the PM on this matter, which then needs to be leaked .............

Pakistan has learned her lesson. We are not going to see another Kargil.

[NRao]

I thought at least the boosted fission device was proven. If India is stuck with 20 kt bums only, the question is not do we test. It is only when do we test. india is too big to sanction. And if sanctions are threatened, the response should be we will smash the MTCR and even NPT into dust. Does Unkil want India in the tent pissing out or outside the tent pissing in?

What do you think that the Chinese think? There is another thread for deterrence, the only thing that matters is what China THINKS.

IF what anyone knows matters, then sure, test.

Went through this a few years ago.

[Singha]

TSP having more missiles and nukes than India is a report spread by some western sources iirc in 2010. lots of people have taken off from there. no details were provided on how exactly they estimated the pak and indian production rates since neither country speaks a word about it. Israel was also credited with some 400+ warheads, more infact than UK and on par with france.

[koti]

Having an accuracy in single digit numbers, can A-IV and A-V be potentially used as anti A/C type missile?
Our own version of DF-21D perhaps.

[Kanson]

Kanson's claims dont stand up to scrutiny, I'm afraid.

Ok, let's scrutinize your claims. Santanam episode was fairly examined in other threads; we don't know this episode is part of grand strategy. So lets leave Santanam episode for a while.

One & only fact that you cited for your assertion that other than BARC guys like DRDO do involved in designing of Nuclear weapon is from nuclearweaponarchive.org and rest you provided are all your assertion and imagination. Let's first talk of that one & only fact.

Second, is the belief that somehow the DRDO guys will only receive the "physics" package - and would not be aware of the bomb itself. They would have been involved in many design level details and possibly even manufacturing. The DRDO maintains some of the best precision manufacturing capabilities in the country, enabling them to even LSP Agni missiles. They can also do a job with secrecy. In the previous test in 1974:

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/I ... tBomb.html

In July nuclear physicist Dr. Basanti Dulal Nag Chaudhuri took over as science adviser to the Defense Minister, and as Director of the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). The following month, he and Ramanna began working together to recruit the Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL), located in Chandigarh, to develop the explosive lenses for the implosion system.

During 1971 work on weapon design continued. Srinivasan working with K. Subba Rao developed models of the fission process on a nuclear bomb, and equations to predict its efficiency. Chidamabaram completed his work on the plutonium equation of state, and Ramamurthy developed computational models of the implosion, nuclear reaction, and disassembly process to predict the devices behavior. Throughout this period Ramanna and his lieutenant, P.K. Iyengar, held frequest reviews of the projects progress.

In April 1971 Nag Chaudhuri appointed Nagapattinam Sambasiva Venkatesan to Director of TBRL with specific instructions to assist in developing the nuclear device.

In this quote, Ramanna, Srinivasan K. Subba Rao, Ramamurthy, P.K. Iyengar are BARC people. The quote explains in developing Conventional explosives(known as lens) for Nuclear package under guidance and supervision of BARC scientists. I don't know how anyone can say, this gives the impression that, "They would have been involved in many design level details and possibly even manufacturing"

I hope you agree, involving in some work, and having authority on that work is different. Many construction workers do involve in construction a building/bridge but the person who knows and have complete knowledge and understanding of that work is Chief Engineer, right? 'many design level details' - Again this statement is your assertion. What is that 'many' you want to say and where is the proof?

The point is even today, the DRDO team may have been involved in several aspects of the explosives, manufacturing etc. And why not? You work with whosoever has experience in the field.

Again, your assertion/imagination.

So, even considering the DRDO guys did not contribute to the design itself (very unlikely based on prior events), they would have definite need to know the specifics of the bomb design to learn about what it could tolerate in terms of forces, pressures, design fuzing for it, switches etc. Apart from knowing the physical specifics of the packages down to the last detail so as to accurately model it for their delivery - via Agnis etc. Every pound of weight, etc will count.

This takes the cake. You think, this is similar to the movie scripts, 'C'mon, I need to know everything what is inside before I transport your maal', huh? You mentioned, 'down to the last detail', Pls don't take it otherwise, but that claim is outlandish. People who involve in such projects often use the word 'compartmentalization'. If you are in doubt, you can check with experts, who actually made their hands dirty in those projects, next time.

Next - the claim that somehow DRDO is the only agency auditing missile development and we have to take their word for it. Err...no. The armed forces are routinely brought in to observe the missile tests after detailed briefings & this is clearly done as a measure of transparency and to generate user buy-in. Naval ships are used for telemetry, service officers deputed to work with the DRDO to prepare the user for induction and training of the missile. At every stage, there is nowadays a fair bit of transparency.

But the briefing is done by DRDO, right ? And not anyother guys, right? Whoever may be the audience who want to know about the missile, only people who were asked to talk about these missiles are DRDO guys. That's the point i'm also raising.

These are all hard lessons learnt in order to convince a customer of the validity of each system, when imports are often available and used to benchmark local systems. DRDO also brings in ISRO members to audit technical aspects of their programs. The A-3 failure IIRC had an ex ISRO chair auditing.

Yourself has give me points to counter. I don't know you can import Nuclear bum and so there is no need to 'convince a customer' for the reasons you say.

Even after induction, user trials are regularly held. These indicate whether there are any lacunae in training, any issues with production quality etc and are essential. For the missiles, we have had the news about some missile failures because subcomponents sourced from some private contractors were not of the required quality. So now DRDO has set up a quality assurance agency to audit the critical components.

True, once canisterized, these army people, going to fire the missile in times of need. So they need to 'train' by firing missile etc. Nuclear or conventional bum is part of that missile. By firing the missile they also train invariantly firing those bums. Have you anywhere heard of 'Field Workshop' for nuclear bums currently in practise? What is the need to know the insides of nulcear bums separately. If you have a problem and need to service them, there is separate agency to handle that.

Point is this is the level of effort required for regular manufacture, even when a one-off design is tested. This is the reason why a single TNW test, where the head of test preparations and his team has reservations about the yield of the test, and does not think his instruments malfunctioned (note: "we checked and double checked" in comments above), may not be enough.

If it can be viewed in another angle, this is taking one's word against another person word. For the discussion, How you know that Santanam's claims are not motivated? If people want not to believe AK's words, what is there to believe in Santanam's claim. Just becoz Santanam is head for test preparations? If so who is Anil Kakodkar then?

http://www.business-standard.com/india/ ... er/379156/

It is no wonder that the failed TN device has not been weaponised, 11 years after P-2, Point is if India has not weaponized TN - then it bears out the need to test.

To which ANil K replied in Karan Thapar show, that it is not ture. And the arsenal is with SFC.

Are there alternatives to testing?

Question is: Are there any methods/techniques available to test/refine our TNW capabilities before testing?

Why you want to know? I'm asking what is the need to know? Even if BARC do have, why we are expecting BARC to reveal those details? These org work in Strategic realm, just as Supreme Court ordered media, by that extension ordinary juntas, not to delve, reveal and discuss Army/troop movements, there is no need for BARC to reveal anything. And it is also our ignorance to expect BARC to reveal what it does or explain to us in all possible ways to convince us on the work they do and make sure that is believable/acceptable to aam junta like us.

[Singha]

Having an accuracy in single digit numbers, can A-IV and A-V be potentially used as anti A/C type missile?
Our own version of DF-21D perhaps.

er , do you want to sink a A/C in yellow sea while firing from chennai?

the shourya/sagarika is the better and cheaper soln for that role if we want to. a bunch of them stationed in south india, lakshadweep and A&N islands would command a 1200km kind of range with a 500kg "carrier killer" warhead. yes salvo attack with shourya from the top and hypersonic brahmos2 from the bottom.

[SaiK]

wouldn't a sub launched torpedo do that job better? [shqval]

[member_20317]

I think there are a significant % of folks here and the strategic circles that werent satisfied with the yield of POK-2 testing including me

Dharma R ji, though not from strategic circles myself, and while I am surprised that BARC is said not to have got it right, I am of the opinion that this has a lot to do with our ability to stand up and work towards our good. Right now it looks like we can do only as much good for ourselves as these Malechas want to allow us to. This is a new freedom struggle.

I just wish some of the key NSG members renege on their important promises like ENR whatever etc. and the 2014 elections throw up a jumpy BJP guy at the helm who gets forced into a test to display his alpha malehood or femalehood.

IF we believe what what to that the TN is a total fizzile, and the yindoo deterrent is only based on FBF, would the DRDO dare to go for MIRV capability with same payload?

But bhai if your detergent is based on a device with lesser yield/weight ratio would it not make better sense to MIRV or MARV it. Kind of like cluster bombing the area targets instead of going in for one big HE blast.

[chackojoseph]

So basically they have to retest if the first didnt work out. And no alternatives exist?

As I mentioned above, there are two schools of thought.

One thinks retest is necessary and the other thinks simulation can help (but are not against retest).

[Singha]

well ASBM has the advantage we can use A&N to target naval surface groups the moment they clear the indonesian straits and enter the IOR . we could even target them in indo-china sea north of indonesia but that would involve flying over singapore and malay airspace albeit @ 40km altitude. and if anyone comes closer to our shore, ASBM from deep inland can target without warning unlike naval and AF assets operating out of bases more easily trackable.

icing on cake would be if Shourya can release a sensor equipped Mach8 hypersonic Klub-mki 'dart' packed with a 500kg warhead and a rocket/ramjet motor to keep the speed up as it plunges down in a MARVish zig zag path from 40km to sea level to make it harder to track and target. final 50km phase of the attack run could even be in sea skimming mode. that way we could make a klub/brahmos type threat appear magically over the deep ocean with none of our ships or subs in the area....

[Supratik]

Even if that was true, wouldn't that information be a secret? Wouldn't the official secrets act prevent him from blurting it out? If he violated the OSA, wouldn't he be in trouble?

People like BK, KS, etc are "deep state". They reveal only what needs to be revealed.

[Supratik]

@tejas, prem

When I was younger I used to think like that. When you are weak you have to be pragmatic otherwise the barbarians will eat you alive. So you choose to die or live to fight another day. I am not sure how old you guys were in 98 but since I was around there was mass outrage from the usual suspects (even the main opposition party Congress publically criticized the tests before adjusting their response) and if GOI had chosen guns over butter and said lets continue with an open-ended program and eat grass they would have been taken to the dry cleaners for that. So they decided to make incremental gains. We will test again when we "can" or "must" test again.

[NRao]

Other than I do NOT like that this thread is deviating into a deterrence one ................

So basically they have to retest if the first didnt work out. And no alternatives exist?

As I mentioned above, there are two schools of thought.

One thinks retest is necessary and the other thinks simulation can help (but are not against retest).

Sir, kindly add a third one .................... that a simulation has already been conducted ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, in the form of a MMRCA.

But, no matter what, test or no test, simu or no simu, the question that remains is is China willing to take a 200 KT hit. On a major center. A single hit.

IF the answer is yes, then go to the next digit - is she willing to take two hits ........ if yes, three hits .....

Now whatever number one stops, see if India can deliver that many 200 kt hits.

[NRao]

Here is another thought:

Can India weaken China just enough to ensure China can no longer stand up to the US (as an example). Push China back, by say, 30-40 years.

Or:

Take Pakistan totally out of the Indo-Sino equation. Which seems to be happening as we type.

[Singha]

the kind of vision I see for the ASBM+MARV attack is something best seen here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lr5wpM59pqM

decepticons enter earth's atmosphere in a direct flight from deep space and make a plunge for their leader at the bottom of the sea.
the CVBG does not stand a chance....its like a hail of hypersonic stones going through a sheet of glass.

[jaladipc]

Having an accuracy in single digit numbers, can A-IV and A-V be potentially used as anti A/C type missile?
Our own version of DF-21D perhaps.

er , do you want to sink a A/C in yellow sea while firing from chennai?

the shourya/sagarika is the better and cheaper soln for that role if we want to. a bunch of them stationed in south india, lakshadweep and A&N islands would command a 1200km kind of range with a 500kg "carrier killer" warhead. yes salvo attack with shourya from the top and hypersonic brahmos2 from the bottom.

I pósted something on these lines ayear ago About modified shourya was tested to full range @ 1900km. There was a seperate project going on to take on high value ships(A/C,misión command ships and space control ships of antes enemy lurking in high seas.

Even specific seekers have been developed.navy was highly interested in having them on next batch of destroyers/cruisers..

Can dig my old post.

[SaiK]

I think when AK says the seismic instruments did not work, he means the measurements (filtering out waves coming from different test points - fission, fusion, thermo etc). So, the filtering out did not work, and hence our yield estimates [note: not measured - but estimates] are correct [muffle point #1].

Furthermore, he concludes the instruments did not work earlier, and correlates various yields from redundant methods to satisfy the yields. Now validating to which yield it is consistent.. the muffled up yield value or the estimated yield value per the simulations?

It is very evident from his replies from 1/5 video interview.

seismic measurement gurus can throw more light on filtering wave patterns originating from various sources at single event time slice.

--

chacko bhai.. simulations are not tests. schools are on different plane of thoughts. simulations are as correct as inputs. and inputs are as correct as near realistic values one configures. I can configure to simulate 10MT. But, can I build one for it, and test it? there is no relationship with these school of thoughts. /jmt

[chackojoseph]

But, no matter what, test or no test, simu or no simu, the question that remains is is China willing to take a 200 KT hit. On a major center. A single hit.

That's called deterrence. Ashwathama vadha.

chacko bhai.. simulations are not tests. schools are on different plane of thoughts. simulations are as correct as inputs. and inputs are as correct as near realistic values one configures. I can configure to simulate 10MT. But, can I build one for it, and test it? there is no relationship with these school of thoughts. /jmt

I have tried to describe the current position of the two scientists (sub vs kakodkar).

Specifically your statement that " inputs are as correct as near realistic values one configures." The problem is that. At higher levels of MT, we are blind and simulations are not correct says K Subramanian.

[NRao]

the kind of vision I see for the ASBM+MARV attack is something best seen here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lr5wpM59pqM

decepticons enter earth's atmosphere in a direct flight from deep space and make a plunge for their leader at the bottom of the sea.
the CVBG does not stand a chance....its like a hail of hypersonic stones going through a sheet of glass.

The nation that attacked the nuke facility in Syria .................. it is said .............. had total vision AND control of what the Syrians saw on their own scopes.