CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

ramana
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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 25 Nov 2013 03:40

The saga continues:


Shutting his ears to change


Shutting his ears to change

MANOJ JOSHI | MAIL TODAY | NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 22, 2013 | UPDATED 09:16 IST


In July 2011, the government of India set up a task force to examine the processes and procedures related to national security in India and come up with recommendations to fix the problems and plug any gaps that emerged. Chaired by former Cabinet Secretary Naresh Chandra, the task force's aim was to deepen the reforms in the national security system begun by the group of ministers (GOM) in 2001.

Image

In May 2012, the committee submitted its report to prime minister Manmohan Singh who turned it over to the National Security Council Secretariat for processing its recommendations and presenting them to the Cabinet Committee on Security. This writer was a member of the task force, but has had little or no official information on its status since then. But the bureaucratic grapevine suggests that the report is on its way to meet the fate of other similar endeavours: get shelved.

Power

The reason for this is plain: The Ministry of Defence thinks there is no need for change, leave alone, horror of horrors, an overhaul. At first sight this may appear to be counter-intuitive, after all the sorry state of our defence modernisation is an open secret. Last year, the serving Chief of Army Staff wrote a letter to the Prime Minister pointing to shortages of vital equipment. The Air Force chief regularly bemoans the declining numbers of his combat force and the delays in the Navy's submarine and shipbuilding programmes are no secret.

The goal of the civilian part of the ministry appears to be singularly focused on how to retain its power and privileges. For this reason, the only public information of the Chandra Committee recommendations came through a leak of a portion of the report by the MoD itself. Their grouse, according to the media leaks, was apparent - they did not want changes in the way the system is run. Inefficient, incompetent, and wasteful, yes, but the command ought to rest firmly in the inexpert hands of the IAS fraternity. The Chandra Committee, on the other hand, was suggesting reforms - first of the manner in which the armed forces were run, and secondly, of how the ministry itself was functioning. In the case of the armed forces, following the GOM report of 2001, the committee suggested a chief of defence staff (CDS) like figure, a permanent chairman to the chiefs of staff committee, to promote integrated planning and organisations in the armed forces, as well as an expert defence bureaucracy to staff the MoD by cross-posting military officers to key bureaucratic positions.

These were minimalist suggestions, but vital. Most armed forces in the world operate on an integrated principle where planning an execution of combat operations is done through joint planning and command. That is why the GOM of 2001 recommended the beginnings of tri-service organisations and a CDS to head them.

The need for joint planning is crucial given the exponential rise in the cost of weapons systems. Currently, each service puts up its own demands and the Ministry of Defence has little or no expertise to prioritise them. The Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) or five year defence plans have little integrity.

Take for example the case of the Mountain Strike Corps which has been approved by the government recently. It will require capital expenditure of Rs.90,000 crore (plus another Rs.30,000 crore for ancillary units), yet it does not figure in the 2012-2027 LTIPP which was approved with great fanfare last year. To get a perspective on this, consider that in the period 2009-10 to 2013-14, which includes the period of high economic growth the country spent something like Rs.300,000 crore in capital acquisitions.

Priority

The Army, of course, is not the only claimant here. The really capital intensive services are the Air Force and the Navy whose need for modernisation is dire. India needs new combat jets, submarines, ships, transport aircraft, artillery guns, helicopters and a host of other equipment in the next ten years. But what should be the priority? At present, there is simply no machinery to do this since each service feels its needs are the most important and the MoD lacks any expertise to pronounce on the issue.

But the MoD does not want another senior military figure because they think that the Defence Secretary and his IAS colleagues will be somehow diminished. Well, considering the current state of India's defence setup, they ought to have already been indicted for gross incompetence.

Resistance

In view of this, the National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon had pushed for the setting up of the Naresh Chandra Committee. Another group headed by Ravindra Gupta, was simultaneously asked to to look at the issue of defence manufacturing and indigenisation. But after the committees, comprised mostly of former government and military officials, had done their work they find that there are no takers within the government for their advice.

But that should not surprise. Bureaucratic resistance to reform is a given whenever there is talk of reform. What does surprise, however, is the spinelessness of the UPA II ministers who tamely allowed their bureaucrats to manipulate them into a paralysis. As long as P Chidambaram was there, the Home Ministry was supportive of reform, but with Sushilkumar Shinde at the helm, the donothing school prevails.

As for the Defence Ministry, the less said the better. AK Antony is happiest when he does not have to take any decisions whatsoever. This clearly suits his bureaucrats who have so far successfully blocked the passage of the Naresh Chandra Committee report to the Cabinet Committee on Security. Whether the CCS itself has the political gumption to tell the babus where to get off or not, remains to be seen if and when the report reaches them. But going by the record of the UPA II, there is not much hope. As for the PM, he has now given up on his political colleagues and is totally dependent on bureaucratic advice. It is not too difficult to guess what that advice is: Do nothing, there's nothing broke and there is nothing that needs fixing.

The problem is that not that the national security system is not broke, but that it is rapidly hollowing out from within.

- The writer a Contributing Editor of Mail Today was a member of the Naresh Chandra Committee and is a Distinguished Fellow at the ORF, New Delhi.





ramana
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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 25 Nov 2013 04:33

I don't understand why AKA became the Defense Minister when he does not want to do anything. He could have just sat home where ever. So far he has been a do noting or kiya nahi minister.

If he becomes the PM heaven forbid.


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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Nikhil T » 02 Dec 2013 14:54

If the Permanent Chairman, COSC is still a 3-star officer, it remains to be seen if the Service Chiefs will agree by his decisions and not contradict his advice to the Govt. Otherwise, we could be looking at a still-born child like the IDS. Wish they had put in the three newly formed Joint Commands under the same officer as well.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby member_23455 » 02 Dec 2013 16:39

Nikhil T wrote:If the Permanent Chairman, COSC is still a 3-star officer, it remains to be seen if the Service Chiefs will agree by his decisions and not contradict his advice to the Govt. Otherwise, we could be looking at a still-born child like the IDS. Wish they had put in the three newly formed Joint Commands under the same officer as well.


Read it again. It is a 4-star appointment.

Even the proposed CDS is a toothless tiger without Integrated MoD, Integrated Commands etc.

This is just one milestone that will be crossed in our long crawl to true "Jointmanship."

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Aditya G » 02 Dec 2013 16:58

So it seems we are adopting a model similar to Pakistan.

Question is whether we will fall into the same situation where the 4-star officer has no real powers. To start with, we must immediately handover the direct command of the SFC, ANC, 50 Para Bde to this post.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chairman_J ... _Committee

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby member_23455 » 02 Dec 2013 18:01

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Best known as the "Uttarakhand General.

Aditya G wrote:Question is whether we will fall into the same situation where the 4-star officer has no real powers. To start with, we must immediately handover the direct command of the SFC, ANC, 50 Para Bde to this post.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chairman_J ... _Committee
"

Even in the US model the Chairman JCS has no "real powers" based on a certain PoV. ANC has already been assigned to the Navy as have other commands to other services.

Rather than just provide random wishlists - think through the larger higher defence management transformation that needs to happen, including at the political/legislative level.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby chetak » 02 Dec 2013 18:08





Bound to be deep gloom in IAF circles

Its early days yet :)

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby member_23455 » 02 Dec 2013 18:20

:)

The IAF is happy to let Army have the CoSC as long as it is largely toothless. They too will get a chance at it soon under this new "permanent" rotation basis.

Meanwhile, as mentioned in another context in another thread, every day the ground slips beneath the IAF's feet on their institutional intransigence.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Aditya G » 03 Dec 2013 21:40

RajitO wrote: .... Even in the US model the Chairman JCS has no "real powers" based on a certain PoV. ANC has already been assigned to the Navy as have other commands to other services.

Rather than just provide random wishlists - think through the larger higher defence management transformation that needs to happen, including at the political/legislative level.


Adm Arun Prakash quotes the Task Force on Reforms (which submitted their report to NDA GoM), that ANC and SFC should report to the Permanent Chairman COSC - so it is not an individual's wishlist. Even if we leave aside the ANC, the SFC still remains a joint organization.

http://www.idsa.in/system/files/JDS1(1)2007_0.pdf

You should clearly spell out your proposals.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 03 Dec 2013 22:50

Marten, You should clean up yourself and not have the admins as bucket brigade. If there is a doubt then its most likely OT!


Move it to the Ind Army thread.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Aditya G » 04 Dec 2013 16:53

Army watch out!

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-ar ... ld-1929545

Grouping of people from a particular region in an Army regiment is unconstitutional and amounts to discrimination on caste, region and religion basis, a petitioner challenging the recruitment policy told the Supreme Court.

In an affidavit filed in the apex court countering the assertion of the Army which had justified the policy for administrative convenience and operational requirements, the petitioner pleaded that such policy should be dismantled as it is also not followed by Indian Navy and Air Force.

Earlier, the Army told the Supreme Court that it does not recruit on the basis of caste, region and religion but justified grouping of people coming from a region in a regiment for administrative convenience and operational requirements.

...

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby member_23455 » 04 Dec 2013 19:33



I am sure the Mods will have a view on this but how is this relevant to this thread?

Aditya G wrote:Adm Arun Prakash quotes the Task Force on Reforms (which submitted their report to NDA GoM), that ANC and SFC should report to the Permanent Chairman COSC - so it is not an individual's wishlist. Even if we leave aside the ANC, the SFC still remains a joint organization.

http://www.idsa.in/system/files/JDS1(1)2007_0.pdf

You should clearly spell out your proposals.


So aren't you reflecting your own bias of quoting selectively from the same article? Look at the points the author makes before arriving to the points that have captured your imagination:

the Task Force was to take into
account, inter alia, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and our
status as a nuclear weapon state, and to suggest changes for improving
the management of defence, as well as ways of bringing about closer
integration between Services and, between the MoD and the Services.


The dialogue and discussion that took place within the Task Force was
comprehensive and freewheeling. But if one had read about the intense
public debate which raged in the US, prior to passing of the Goldwater-
Nichols National Security Act of Congress 1986, one could not help
being struck by a remarkable sense of déjà vu.


...and how he ends his piece

For this reason, it is necessary in the national interest, for the
GoI to constitute a bi-partisan (or multi-party) Parliamentary
Committee, assisted by experts, for a wide ranging and
comprehensive review and re-examination of national security
issues (including reorganization of the higher defence
organization).

The findings and recommendations of this Committee should be tabled
in Parliament, and if we are really serious about the nation’s security,
any reforms or changes contemplated in the national security framework
and structures, or in the defence organization must be eventually
incorporated and enforced as an Act of Parliament.


Now, what was my comment?

RajitO wrote:Rather than just provide random wishlists - think through the larger higher defence management transformation that needs to happen, including at the political/legislative level.


Announcing new "joint" commands and roles is sexy. Re-architecting the fundamental model inside out is much more painstaking and painful. Ergo, it's not being done.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Aditya G » 04 Dec 2013 22:44

Rajit,

The article was posted here because of the reference to the recruitment practices of the Navy and Air Force in the petition.

Now coming back to COSC, I have merely stated that the view to forming joint military commands in India and placing them under the Permanent Chairman has backing from various quarters. You and others are welcome to disagree (I would still like to know where the SFC should be placed).

It does not mean that any further transformation of higher defence management should not be done. What are those changes that you are looking for?

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 05 Dec 2013 05:28

Looks like UPA is resorting to smoke and mirrors

Govt keeps CDS in cold storage and plans stop gap

Looks like its a pretend to do something.

NEW DELHI: The government is unlikely to take a call on critical and meaningful reforms needed in the country's higher defence management, including the creation of a General No.1 post, in the run-up to the general elections next year.

Sources on Wednesday said defence minister A K Antony has once again written to different political parties to seek their views on the creation of a chief of defence staff (CDS) post, as was recommended by the Group of Ministers' report on `Reforming the national security system' in 2001 after the Kargil conflict.

But, as reported by TOI earlier, both the NDA and UPA governments have used the ruse of the "need to consult various political parties" to keep the CDS post in cold storage till now. Antony, on his part, has been engaged in such consultations since March 2006 with no tangible result.

A four-star general like the Army, Navy and IAF chiefs, the CDS was to provide single-point military advice to the government, manage the country's nuclear arsenal and usher in synergy among the three Services by resolving inter-Service doctrinal, planning, procurement and operational issues.

With IAF chief Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne, who is also the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee (CoSC) as the senior-most among the three current chiefs, slated to retire on December 31, speculation on "a stop-gap arrangement" to the CDS post has once again begun to do the rounds.

The appointment of a permanent CoSC chairman, a watered-down version of the CDS post recommended by the 14-member Naresh Chandra Task Force to PM Manmohan Singh in May last year, is said to be on the cards.


"The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) will have to decide on the 10 contentious defence reforms suggested by the taskforce. The defence ministry, like other ministries, has given its views to the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) under the PMO," said a source.

"The NSCS, in turn, will put it before the CCS. But it is unlikely that the government will undertake such steps just before the elections," he added. :rotfl:

{They didn't do it the ten years they were in power and to expect them to show any urgency is delusion}


MoD itself, in its comments to the NSCS, has rejected almost all crucial recommendations of the taskforce like the post of a permanent CoSC chairman (with a fixed two-year term instead of the existing "rotational" arrangement among the three chiefs) or "cross-staffing" (posting military officers to MoD to bridge the civil-military disconnect), as was first reported by TOI in June.

MoD had taken recourse to the argument that there was lack of consensus among the three Services on the permanent CoSC chairman post. But now, as Navy chief Admiral D K Joshi declared on Tuesday, the three Services have "all concurred" on the need to have such a post.



Glad Adm Joshi declared the services position. So its the MOD babucracy and political jitters and nightmares causing the delay.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 11 Dec 2013 02:13

An idea whose time has perhaps come

An idea whose time has perhaps come
Wednesday, 11 December 2013 | Ashok K Mehta |


The creation of a permanent Chief of Defence Staff/ Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee was a political decision, given a bureaucratic and military colouring out of unfounded apprehensions

Trekking last week in the remote mountains of Pokhra, Nepal, which provides the strategic Gorkha connection, I was told by the Indian Army Pension Paying Colonel in Pokhra, Srikand Mooley, that the worthy Lt General Anil Chait, currently Chief of Integrated Defence Staff, was slated to become the new Chief of Army Staff next month when incumbent, Gen Bikram Singh would be appointed the first Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, the middle path to the feared Chief of Defence Staff. He quoted The Business Standard as the source of the story. On returning to New Delhi, I checked the veracity of the stunning news. Thereafter, I am convinced it is wishful thinking.

The idea of a CDS/ Permanent Chairman COSC — currently it is a rotating post, the senior-most service chief assuming the appointment — has been doing the rounds since the early 1970 when the victor of the 1971 War, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, was expected to be appointed CDS. Of the Kargil Group of Ministers’ 340 recommendations, all but one, the CDS, were accepted. It was said the Government required greater political consultation on CDS. Suddenly in July 2001, Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sushil Kumar was sounded out about being appointed India’s first CDS. An office was earmarked and rehearsals of Guard of Honour held under supervision of Col KK Sharma, HQ Delhi Area. NDTV carried it as ‘breaking news’ throughout that day and the next. Then suddenly the screen went blank — end of CDS story.

The Naresh Chandra Task Force established in May 2011, unlike the Kargil Review Committee and the subsequent GoM on it which carried out the country’s first ever Strategic Defence and Security Review was tasked to ‘review existing processes, procedures and practices in the National Security System and suggest measures for strengthening national security apparatus, including non conventional areas having bearing on overall security’. Further, its members were not Ministers but retired civil and military bureaucrats. It was a limited effort.

The 130-page NCTF report was submitted in June 2012 to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who directed the Ministries concerned to submit their recommendations within three months so that by end-September 2012, the National Security Council Secretariat, headed by Lt Gen Prakash Menon, could present a consolidated paper to the Prime Minister’s Office/National Security Adviser, Mr Shiv Shankar Menon. Not surprisingly, the Union Ministry of Defence first sat over the 97 issues raised in the report relating to the Defence Ministry, and when nudged, responded by rejecting the two key ones: Creation of a permanent post of Chairman COSC without undermining the autonomy of single service chiefs; and promotion of synergy in civil-military relations by cross-posting military and civilian officers up to the level of Directors over the next five years to each other’s headquarters.

Wanting to be seen as having introduced meaningful defence reforms, especially after Gen VK Singh’s pre-retirement outburst on ‘critical hollowness’ in defence preparedness, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had instituted a periodic review on the state of health of defence preparedness through 20-minute briefings by each service chief. As with most initiatives, this never took off, but had there been a fourth chief responsible and accountable for single point of advice, the Prime Minister would have interacted with one instead of three persons. The PMO and the NSA were not deterred by the Defence Ministry dragging its feet on the NCTF report. They have pressed Union Minister for Defence AK Antony to speed up further consultations and accept the two key recommendations. Mr Antony says more consultations are needed as the appointment invokes traditional fears about the knight in shining armour, mounted on a white steed, who would unleash a coup. This theory gathered traction after news reports that Gen VK Singh had ordered the movement of Special Forces into Delhi. A senior bureaucrat in the national security apparatus told me: “Gen Singh has dislocated our efforts to introduce the fourth General”.

{So this is the real reason for Shekar Gupta's bogus coup story to prevent the appointment of a CDS!!!}

Historically it was the Air Force which was the spanner in the works. The last chief, Air Chief Marshal PV Naik, said he was not opposed to CDS per se but not its present form and added that for the next five to 10 years, it was not needed. Surprisingly, Gen VK Singh had also ruled out the appointment till ‘integration is done and we move towards theatre commands’. Apparently and suddenly, a dramatic transformation has taken place in the disposition of the Air Force, the consistent conscientious objector to single point of advice. The credit for creating consensus must go to the subtle and graduated approach of the NCTF, deft handling by Mr Menon and pragmatism among the services.

Last month, at the Combined Commanders’ conference, addressing the Prime Minister, Chairman COSC, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne announced that “all three services have agreed to the appointment of Permanent Chairman COSC as an interim measure towards CDS”. This is a historic statement in unanimity of consent. The Prime Minister said that right structures for Higher Defence Management were urgently needed and if the Services were in agreement the political leadership would give the most careful consideration to their recommendation. This is a historic statement of intent. All this does not mean the fourth General will be appointed any time soon, certainly not next month.

Here are four reasons why the ‘feared idea’ will take time to fructify: The Prime Minister’s capacity to enforce any idea is highly diminished. Mr Antony is the operational Minister and will have the last word. He is status quoist, guided by babudom. He could do nothing to rein in Gen VK Singh, and that caused unprecedented damage to the image of the Army. The Government is licking the wounds of a massive electoral defeat which is the politically inappropriate environment for the landmark appointment of the fourth General. Mr Antony will not wish to disturb the chain of succession which he protected zealously recently. So, whatever has to happen will occur after Gen Bikram Singh’s superannuation in July 2014, and the decision will be taken by the new Government.

The fourth General is required for kickstarting an Integrated Defence Planning process for the next generation of reforms and carving out an institutional role for the military in decision-making and removing anomalies like ‘the defence of India is vested with the Defence Secretary’. :rotfl: The creation of a Permanent COSC/CDS was always a political decision which has been given a bureaucratic and military colouring out of unfounded apprehensions of the military doing a Musharraf. :rotfl:



Looks like Iskandar Mirza to Zia ulloo Haq are forgotten!

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby member_23455 » 11 Dec 2013 09:14

Aditya G wrote:It does not mean that any further transformation of higher defence management should not be done. What are those changes that you are looking for?


The same that Admiral Arun Prakash has stated:

1. Integrated MoD
2. Act in Parliament for CoSC/CDS role, structure, and supporting procedures.

...and as you can see from the latest developments, it is precisely because there is no "political ownership" that the netas keep weaseling out of their responsibilities.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby wig » 07 Jan 2014 14:32

Jointness is no substitute for the CDS system by Lt Gen Harwant Singh (R)


Consequent to the Kargil conflict in 1999, Arun Singh and K Subhramanyam committees were constituted. The latter was required to essentially look into the Kargil conflict in its varied aspects. This committee at one point in its lengthy report, made a preposterous observation that the Prime Minister and the Raksha Mantri did not have the benefit of getting the advice of army commanders and their equivalent in the navy and air force, meaning thereby that they must seek advise from them. The number of such commanders in the three services is more than a dozen. Obviously our expert on national security was oblivious of the imperatives of the chain of command in the military!

Arun Singh had asked this writer to give his committee a presentation on the future shape of the army, etc. Besides recommending the raising of a mountain corps for operations along the border with Tibet, the inescapable requirement of adoption of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) system was projected. To start with, two theater commands were suggested by the committee -- one for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the other for Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). To alley misgivings of the air force, the first commander of the proposed J&K theater command (the most active command) could be an air force officer.

Under the CDS system there is a single point of military advice to the government and the overall operational command rests with the CDS as well. Operational command of various theaters rest with theater commanders whose forces may be from two or all three services, depending on the geographical details of their theater. The theater commander could be from any service. The CDS would exercise overall operational command over various theater commands, as well as over intelligence directorates of the three services through the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). In this system the staff functions would rest with the service chiefs in regard to their respective service.

Later a cabinet committee on national security under former Home Minister LK Advani approved the recommendations of the Arun Singh committee with special emphasis on adopting the CDS system. However these recommendations were pushed under the carpet and later the Naresh Chandra committee was constituted. One of the recommendations of Naresh Chandra Committee is that the post of Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee should be permanent and function as a single point of advice to the Prime Minister and the Raksha Mantri. This proposal is neither here nor there and is no better than the present arrangement because the operational control of each service still rests with the respective service chief and this permanent chairman will be stumped when confronted with conflicting views from the other service chiefs.

The main opposition to the CDS system has been from the air force over the imaginary fear of being overwhelmed by its larger sister service, the army. The bureaucracy too has been against adopting this system on the ill founded fears that the CDS will become too powerful and the present position, where the defence secretary is designated as the person responsible for the defence of India, will be eroded. At some point of time even army chiefs have not favoured this system on fear of losing operational control over the army. It all boils down to narrow parochial interests and of turf tending.

Antiquated defence apparatus

No major democracy in the world has as antiquated and obsolete operational defence apparatus as that of India. The present system was bequeathed to us at the time of Independence by Lord Hastings Ismay, a British general who was Winston Churchill's chief military assistant during the Second World War and later Lord Mountbatten’s Chief of Staff in India, and has remained more or less unchanged. Subsequently defence services headquarters were designated as departments of the Ministry of Defence (MoD rather than part of it. A dysfunctional Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) was created with the senior most amongst the the three service chiefs being its chairman. The difference between “jointness” and unity of operational command has never been fully grasped or may have be purposefully ignored. More recently, the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was created as an adjunct to the MoD. Such cosmetic dressing up of the defence operational systems is of little avail. While there have been efforts to work out systems and organisations to attend to larger issues of national security, the conduct of operations as such is being glossed over.

The dysfunctional character of Indian defence apparatus first surfaced during the 1962 war against China, where due to lack of any central control in the conduct of operations, the air force stayed out when it could have played a decisive role in that conflict. In the 1965 war against Pakistan, the IAF aircraft came in to halt the enemy advance in the Chhamb Sector of J&K and instead destroyed our own vehicles carrying artillery ammunition and supplies. During the Kargil conflict, the air force’s procrastination in joining the battle is all too well known, as also its lack of training in high altitude warfare. Even so advocacy of “jointness” rather than unity of command continues to this day!

Unity of command

A battle is so much like an orchestra, where a hundred instruments of varying tone and tenor may strike their own notes and yet have to play the same tune. To coordinate and mesh the sound of varied musical instruments there is only one conductor. So also, in battle there has to be only one overall commander who must work out and coordinate the application of various instruments of fighting in all their varied forms, scale and timing to achieve the right outcome. Unity of command is an important principle of war and as such all successful battles have had only one commander who employed and controlled various components of his force. In modern times some more instruments of war have been added such as aircraft, missiles, etc.

In the military, unity of command has been an important principle of war and a historical determinant. It is with the advent of the air force that this concept of unified command saw a discordant note, more so in India. Often two and sometimes all the three services may be grouped to achieve a common goal of defeating the enemy in a particular theatre. Command of such a grouping has to devolve on a single commander, who may be from any of the three services. At higher levels advisers are available from the other service(s) to provide inputs to the overall theatre commander on technical and tactical aspects of employment of the components of their respective service.

To have large defence forces at enormous expense and not be able to optimise the potential of their combined capabilities is inexplicable and inexcusable. Modern warfare demands not only unified command but an organisation fully responsible for operational control, which should determine the range of equipping of the forces, the type of weaponry, be these of navy, army or air force and the same being in consonance with the nature of threats, type and scale of operations envisaged, tactics to be employed and future developments in weapons and equipment etc. The full potential of a unified command and collective application of forces otherwise cannot achieve the desired results.

Blame for Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) failure to deliver squarely rests with the MoD under whose control it operates, with no interaction with the army at the stage of developing equipment. This isolation from the army at this stage also leads to absence of essential inputs from the user. If the navy has done better, it is because it exercises control over that component of DRDO which works for the development of weapons and equipment for that service. Of the three DRDO laboratories dedicated to the navy, one to two of them are invariably headed by senior naval officers. In the case of the army, DRDO brings in the user only at the final stage of trials. Similarly Defence Public Sector Undertakings and the Ordinance Factories are controlled by the MoD. They regularly overcharge for the items supplied to the forces (BEML’s TATRA vehicles being one such recent example) and deliver shoddy equipment.

The possibility of a two front war haunts military planners. Such a situation will require a well thought out strategy and careful and judicious distribution of resources for each front. It is near impossible to adequately meet such a national security challenge with the existing arrangement of the Chiefs of Staff Committee system, even with “jointness” and a permanent chairman of this Committee. Centralised operational control and conduct of war by the CDS is projected as an impingement on political control and policy. Operations are invariably conducted within the framework of political direction and policy. Fears of relegation of political authority if the CDS system is adopted are ill founded and mischievously raised to scare the ignorant. “Jointness” does not work under periods of great stress and war does produce some very stressful moments. Finally “jointness” is an India innovation and one may rightly term it as a “Jugard.”

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140107/edit.htm#6

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Aditya G » 24 Jan 2014 21:48

X-Post

Must read piece by Raja Mohan on nuclear posture and policy. Quoting some bits viz the SFC:

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/a ... epage=true

...

The command and control of nuclear forces are another area of criticism, and not surprisingly so, since India is the only nuclear weapon country without a Chief of Defence Staff to act as the interface between the Prime Minister, the National Command Authority and the military who ‘own’ the weapons — at least most of it. In the guise of safety, India’s nuclear weapons are not only ‘de-mated’ and the core and ignition device separated from the warhead, but the separate components are under different departmental control. The actual reason for this bizarre arrangement is quite obvious. There is a petty turf war, and neither the Department of Atomic Energy nor the DRDO is willing to let go of the controlling part of the bomb, even if it means a cumbersome and unnecessary loss of control. Needless to say, between the military, the DAE and the DRDO, none of them has any hierarchical control over the other two.

Other critics have written to say that having opted for road or rail mobile launching arrangements, India does not have the robust transport, road and rail infrastructure to move the missiles, warheads and cores from safe storage to launch hideouts and dispersal points with confidence and alacrity.

These weaknesses have led to critics stating that India’s nuclear capability is disaggregated and with weak institutional features. In the case of China, it is conceded that India feels more threatened by Chinese nuclear delivery than vice-versa. Yet, in the absence of the Agni long-range missiles, it is vaguely surmised that the Indian retaliatory capacity is based on air delivery weapons, which could mean anything — Mirages, Jaguars, Su 30s. The absence of the CDS results in even knowledgeable Indians conjecturing that the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) will completely bypass the military chain of command and operate directly under the PMO. This, of course, raises other more serious problems.

In the case of deterrence with Pakistan, it is accepted that the doctrines of the two countries are mismatched. India intends to deter nuclear use by Pakistan while Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are meant to compensate for conventional arms asymmetry. At the same time, Pakistan relies on 20,000 LeT cadres as an extension of its armed forces to create terror strikes, to which the Indian answer is to punish the Pakistani state with conventional war. Thus arises the vague and elastic concept of a nuclear threshold. Yet, the Indian National Command Authority is ill designed to manage the inevitable South Asian transition from conventional war to a possible nuclear exchange — or the frantic strategic signalling that is bound to occur as the threshold approaches.

If, for instance, the threshold was to materialise as a result of an armoured incursion, the Indian NCA by its location, composition and infrastructure would be entirely unaware of the impending catastrophe. Hanging untethered to any commanding authority, civilian or military, would be the Integrated Defence Staff, a well-staffed organisation designed for the civilian-military interface, but currently without a head, nor with any links to the SFC.

After much persuasion, there now exists a skeleton nuclear staff under the NSA, normally headed by the retired SFC. But while its Pakistani counterpart, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), is highly active both on the domestic and international conference circuit, its Indian counterpart seems to be totally tongue tied, non-participatory and holed up at its desk.

...


Ironically, SPD is more open and accessible even though the source of their technology and weapons is dubious.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ShauryaT » 28 Mar 2014 02:41

I am sorry, but I just could not figure, where to post such defense policy type of information. What is the most appropriate thread?

Interim Defence Budget 2014-15 - Showing Signs of Strain

At `2,24,000 crore (approximately $37.333 billion, assuming exchange rate of `60 to a US dollar), the interim defence budget for 2014-15 accounts for 12.70 per cent of the total central government expenditure, up 0.47 per cent from the last year. This is as good as it gets.

There can be no prizes for guessing that this allocation must be less than the projection made by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). What makes it look worse is that for the third year running, the allocation is less than 2 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP), though it should really not matter as long as MoD gets what it actually needs, regardless of what that turns out to be in terms of percentage of the GDP....

Again, Army seems to be the worst affected. The RE 2013-14 for the ‘stores’ budget head of the Indian Army was $318 million (`1,908.0 crore) more than the actual expenditure for 2012-13. The allocation for 2014-15 is, however, a mere $78 million (`468.0 crore) more than the RE for 2013-14. In the case of the Indian Air Force, the increase in the allocation for 2014-15 over RE for 2013-14 is $15 million (`90.0 crore). It is anybody’s guess whether this increase is good enough to absorb the increase in the cost of rations, clothing, petrol, spares and ammunition. The stock of ammunition held by the Army has been a cause for concern for quite some time. The meagre increase in the stores budget may not help Army in making up the deficiencies.
The allocation for repairs and refit of ships for 2014-15 is $24 million (`144.0 crore) less than the actual expenditure of 2012-13 and a mere $11 million (`66.0 crore) more than the RE for 2013-14. Though most of the expenditure on refits is now made from the capital acquisition budget, it is doubtful if the increase in the BE 2014-15 is enough for carrying out repairs of a growing number of legacy platforms which require greater maintenance.

To a lesser extent, the expenditure on maintenance works suffers the same fate. One gets away with inadequate allocation for this purpose because the consequences of poor maintenance are not immediately visible. :(

The capital acquisition budget, which is a sub-set of the total capital outlay, also seems to be moving in the same direction. Despite being reduced by approximately $1.18 billion (`7,080 crore), the RE for 2013-14 is $1.27 billion (`7,620 crore) more than the actual expenditure for 2012-13. Since 2002-03, the increase in the actual expenditure on capital acquisition has never crossed $1.40 billion (`8,400 crore) (in 2009-10), except for the year 2004-05 when the actual expenditure was $2.10 billion (`12,600 crore) more than the previous year. If this is any indication of MoD’s capacity to spend, the increase of $1.49 billion (`8,940 crore) for 2014-15 over the RE for 2013-14 may not be a cause for worry.

However, two points need to be made. The exponential increase in the committed liabilities is choking the capital acquisition budget, leaving less and less for new schemes. The committed liabilities are believed to account for approximately 95 per cent of the capital acquisition budget for 2013-14. Using this as the standard, hardly $0.63 billion (`3,780 crore) will be available for new schemes in 2014-15. Since only an advance payment of 15 per cent is generally made in the year in which a new contract is signed, this amount will be sufficient for new schemes amounting to a mere $4.18 billion (`25,080 crore).
Obviously, therefore, the 2014-15 capital acquisition budget does not cater for projects such as the MMRCA in which the advance payment could be as much as $1.67 billion (`10,020 crore). This does not, however, imply that the MoD does not intend to conclude the MMRCA contract during 2014-15. Judging by the media reports, the conclusion of this contract is likely to take some time. The government could provide additional funds if and when it becomes due later during the year, rather than blocking such a huge amount at this stage.

As of now, there is no definite indication that any scheme had to be, or is very likely to be, put on hold because of paucity of funds, but the MoD could be moving fast in that direction.

These are disturbing scenarios but the interim budget is not the end of the road. At least, in theory, the post-general election dispensation at the centre could chart a different course. A provision was made for non-lapsable defence modernisation fund in the interim budget presented by the NDA government in 2004 but the regular budget presented after the new government came to power did not retain it. The history could repeat itself, hopefully in a different form, with the new dispensation deciding to focus more sharply on the problems besetting the defence outlays.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ShauryaT » 07 May 2014 06:25

Moving in circles, as usual - Procrastination, indecision and status quoism win the day
IF news reports are to be believed, the government after great cogitation has rejected the Chandra Committee's recommendation favouring the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff or a variant thereof and other proposals such as for amending defence procurement policy. One must await more definitive announcements but it does appear at the moment that procrastination, indecision and status quoism have once again won the day. Some of these recommendations go back over 20 years but, like issues relating to police reform, greater autonomy for the CBI and Prasar Bharati, have been not so artfully dodged.

The government's touching faith in the bureaucracy and its own ability to influence or bend it to its will for self-serving purposes has again triumphed. When will we ever learn? Hopefully, the new government will review the issue and take a bolder and more futuristic view. On procurement too, whether of defence or civil supplies, the answer is not more dilatory and frustrating regulation but less, with swift and condign punishment for breaches.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby sattili » 07 May 2014 20:29

^^^^^
Any idea why the buggers of the NDA government didn't implement these recommendations 10 years ago when they were in power?

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Yagnasri » 08 May 2014 18:04

NM will be taking decision on the matter soon.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby PratikDas » 20 Aug 2014 07:41

del.
Last edited by Rahul M on 06 Jan 2015 21:27, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: OT

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby KiranM » 06 Jan 2015 21:04

Interesting read on Jointness in Indian context:Evolution of a Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Avarachan » 07 Jan 2015 04:40

sattili wrote:^^^^^
Any idea why the buggers of the NDA government didn't implement these recommendations 10 years ago when they were in power?


When a country is relatively weak, it is not wise to have one ("joint") organization handle all aspects of national security. That one line of command can be compromised.

Keep in mind that it was the Indian Navy--not the DRDO--which took the lead for the K-15/B-05 missile project.

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... tory-k-15/

Media has reported that R & D had begun the project in 1998 by an Indian Navy-led team, since at that time the DRDO has only some 200 missile scientists & engineers, none of whom had any experience in developing solid-fuelled rockets. Mark what media reported Indian Navy-led team as only NDTV Rep was allowed access to the Naval Ship where the DRDO scientists were on the naval tracking and look out ship.

It now comes out that Bhasin was wondering in 1997 why is the Indian Navy building a nuclear submarine for over Rs 3000 crores with a 300 km nuclear missile like Dhanush. Though electrical Bhasin, known as Indian Navy’s Rickover after the legendary US Admiral Rickover who headed US Navy’s nuclear submarine programmes for years, asked Navy and DRDO to think of a Solid fuel missile from under water with longer range as K Santhanam of DRDO was also thinking on same lines. . Bhasin took the risk allocated around Rs 300 crores and a Dr Chakraborty and his team now named by media began work at DRDL Hyderabad with freedom.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ShauryaT » 07 Jan 2015 05:25

Hi Avarachan: You are talking of India here. We may not be as strong as our inherent potential and much of it self inflicted but "weak", and that too Organizationally, I did say I have to strongly disagree. Also, I think you are mistaken with what a CDS is for, based on the example you have provided. The idea of a CDS is not to subdue the initiatives of individual forces but I did say the following:

1. To provide an integrated military and NOT "force specific" advice to political authority on military options. (The airforce discrepancy during Kargil is an example of what should not happen)
2. To allow for modernization and integration through a "command" based structure practically feasible only if force specific domination ends. (I did say we are ready for this at least since COAS Sunderji's days, if not earlier)

The negative effects of not having a CDS to India have been huge, at the levels of integrated representation to political authority, discounting of strategic affairs and forces such as the needs of the Navy and quite simply the lack of progress in integrated commands. The only joint command at A&N is a joke, as it has no teeth. We will see what comes of the decision to have another 4 star officer in command as a peer and the lead of certain forces in certain types of supposedly joint commands.

I will have to dismiss your concerns on the "compromise" argument. It is our nincompoops politicians, who like general governance are masters at doing nothing. A CDS for India is long overdue, as the posts/articles in this thread will demonstrate.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Avarachan » 07 Jan 2015 06:07

Hi ShauryaT, I was in a hurry when I wrote my original post. I should have clarified that I support a CDS, at this time. Now, the benefits to having one outweigh the risks. The Indian military simply cannot develop effectively without one.

However, 15 years ago? I think it was the right decision *not* to have one, at that time. It was much easier to hide the necessary programs amidst an atmosphere of confusion, chaos, and double allocation.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Aditya G » 01 Feb 2015 11:39

KiranM wrote:LtGen Katoch's take on India's parachute deployment capability: Airborne Operations


A rather bitter article by Lt Gen Katoch who is one of the most vocal supporters of Indian SF community.

Viz a viz the topic of this thread. There are 2-3 points:

1. Lacuna in the existing para trooper training system in India.

2. Issues arising from Air Force control of air drop operations (such as reduced bayonet strength).

3. What tri-service capability needs to be achieved in air borne ops (ability to capture high altitude passes, airport at an island).

I think we need to hear the air force & navy point of view as well.

In context of IAF also having raised its own SF unit and a specialized fixed wing unit (77 sqn), we need both Army and AF to be on same page. With possible acquisition of US-2 amphibs, the Navy too will acquire integral capability to deploy SF. What structure will cater to the training and airborne deployment needs of all three services and SFF/SG?

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Aditya G » 01 Feb 2015 18:10

Nuclear C&C has to see a "sea change" soon ... once the Arihant is weaponized with nukes, can we manage without the CDS? BMD shield, cyber command and space command all scream for unified command :roll:

http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/can-indi ... s-arihant/

A massive second strike capability policy, coupled with NFU, gives India a politically neutral, operationally ready stance to project its nuclear power. The second-strike capability clause, however contains a sub clause that deals with command and control delegation. Herein lies the problem. For land based silos, or gravity bombs loaded on aircraft, the command and control hierarchy can be maintained in all but the most dire circumstances. For a sea-based asset, where deterrence is primarily achieved by long-term radio silence, and launching control is delegated to seniority on board the vessel, the existing command and control model is not applicable. Just like Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons (TnWs), New Delhi will essentially be delegating launch control to field officers on board the submarine, massively increasing the probability of incidental firing. Also, as a designated “second-strike” capacity asset, the Nuclear Command Authority cannot effectively and credibly implement fail-safe measures such as a Permissive Action Link (PAL), two-man rule, or a no-lone zone on board the vessel.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Surya » 01 Feb 2015 20:31

very good article - Katoch is right

and these parachute packers fo the IAF never have to randomly pick one and jump themselves.

the air force seems to be in a time warp of its own- unable to be part of any jointness except on its own outdated terms

and young AF officers who advocate changes get shunted into la la land

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Nikhil T » 15 Feb 2015 00:37

Premvir Das: When will India reform higher defence management

Insightful article lamenting the lack of progress on CDS and the mockery that is the "Integrated Headquarters of the MoD" designation.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ShauryaT » 10 Mar 2015 06:38

If we relabel this thread to higher defense management and integration, I think it will get more traction and the gamut of articles/views, which are defense forces related but not force specific can go here.
Union Defence Budget: Expectations and Realities
Abstract: The Article carries out a brief analysis of the Defence Budget 2015-16. The anomaly of the skewed ratio between the Revenue and Capital Expenditure has been highlighted with the requisite figures to support the same. At the end certain remedies to give impetus to the Modernisation of Defence Forces have been suggested. The emphasis has been to find solutions from within the Defence Budget allocation......

In fact the gap between the Defence Services projection and the actual allocation is widening with every passing year and has now reached a whooping figure of Rs 80,000 Crore.

Accordingly, there has been the rhetoric of pegging the Defence Budget at 3% of the National GDP. However the defence budget has remained below 2 per cent of the GDP, except for the year 2009-10 when it was 2.19 percent of the GDP. In fact, there has been a decline in the defence budget in terms of percentage of the GDP from 1.92 in 2007-08 to 1.79 in 2013-14. This year the Defence Budget accounts for 1.75% of the projected National GDP of Rs 1.41 Lakh Crore.

While the ratio of Revenue to Capital, for Air Force and Navy is still within the limits (35:65 for Air Force and 41:59 for Navy), for Army it is pegged at 86:14, which is indeed grossly inadequate for any meaningful modernization.

An increase of Rs 24,357 Crore in the Defence Budget for 2015-16, is in-fact an effective increase of just Rs 14,357 Crore, if we consider Rs 10,000 Crore going towards OROP. Hence not much relief is expected for the Indian Army already feeling the brunt of the raising of the Mountain Strike Corps as an unplanned expenditure, which did not form a part of the LTIPP. So the solution lies in correcting the anomaly between the Revenue and Capital expenditure. Consorted efforts need to be worked out to reduce the revenue expenditure.

Following remedial measures may be considered to give impetus to the modernisation of defence forces:-

Revenue budget needs to be optimized for Indian Army at the earliest. Downsizing to a lean and modern Army to reduce the burden of Pay & Allowances is one such step which needs to be considered.

The inter service priorities in defence procurement need to be planned more pragmatically. The same is possible only if the much awaited defence reforms are instituted, especially the appointment of CDS. This will ensure systematic modernisation of Defence Forces.
The push towards ‘Make in India’ will also ultimately usher us towards our goal of Modernisation of Defence Forces. However much work needs to be done before this dream can be a reality. The gaps before this capability actually comes into being need to be filled up. This could be either by going in for interim global procurements or by going in for up-gradation of already held equipment. However there is a cost involved for each of these and the same needs to be catered for.

The Government also needs to pitch in and maintain the allocation made to the Defence Forces in the Budget. The trend states that approx Rs 100,000 Crore has been surrendered by Ministry of Defence in the last decade as the amount unspent; however, it is not solely due to the inability of the Defence Forces to spend the same. Invariably it is seen that at RE stage the Finance Ministry removes a substantial allotment from the Defence Budget (Rs 12,623 Crore removed from Capital Outlay in the FY 2014-15) to keep the financial deficit under control. This blocks the fructification of a substantial capital procurement schemes and in-turn disturbs the complete planning process of the Defence Services, thus bringing in adhocism in their planning.


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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby dinesha » 13 Mar 2015 16:43

Manohar Parrikar speaks for integration of all three Defence services
http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-ma ... es-2068499
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar on Friday said integration of the three Services is a must and that he is working out a mechanism for the creation of a post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) with a fixed tenure. He said he will recommend the mechanism in the next "2-3 months", noting it is important to move away from the thinking of "we" and "they" between the Defence Ministry and the three Services.

"Integration has to be there and Chief of Defence Staff is a must. How do you work it out? Give me some time and I will work it out because the three forces' integration does not exist in the present structure," Parrikar said at the India Today conclave. He was asked if the government is in favour of a CDS and if a Major General can ever be appointed as a Joint Secretary in the Defence Ministry.

Giving an example of a situation where a helicopter is needed, the Minister said the protocol for the air force and army for the same is different.

"I am not criticising but force integration and requirement integration as well as overlapping will save us money. With overlapping, number of items will be reduced," he said. Parrikar said it has to be recommended with very clear aspects and how to do it.

"More or less, in the next 2-3 months, my recommendation will get to the right place," he said when asked about a time-line. He made it clear that he will be recommending a mechanism for creation of the post of CDS and that the final decision will be taken by the Cabinet Committee on Security.

At present, India has a Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee which Parrikar described as "virtually a figure head". He said CDS should be able to have discussion with all three Services and be able to work out specific requirements and needs.

Former Army Chief Gen Bikram Singh said that as Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, he had only a six-month tenure. The post of CDS should have fixed tenure and the government should be "sensitive" to "sensitivities" of the army, he said.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 20 Mar 2015 02:37

X-Post....

{quote="Philip"}Finally?!

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/commen ... 55441.html
At long last there will be CDS
Inder Malhotra
Also the much sought after one rank, one pension
At long last there will be CDS

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar.

AMIDST a glut of deeply depressing goings-on across the country there is good news to cheer not only the Indian military but also all those concerned about national security. It is now almost certain that there will soon be a Chief of Defence Staff like other established democracies, such as the United States and Britain, have had for ages. Here the very idea has been rejected summarily when presented to successive governments for some reason or the other. It is no secret that in the early years the fear of a military coup played its part in official thinking, especially after 1958 when Gen Ayub Khan took over as Pakistan's first military dictator and his example was followed in Burma (now Myanmar) by Ne Win two years later. This apprehension was unreal in any case. For democracy had taken roots in this country right from the first general election, and leaders of the armed forces were as divided as the Indian polity or Indian society. Indeed, those in the know used to say: “If you lock up the Army Chief, Vice-Chief and commanders of the fighting Army commands in a room they won’t be able to agree even on the time of day”. Yet the mindset on the subject remained so woolly that even in the mid-nineties an otherwise intelligent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence made the fatuous statement that a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or a CDS was needed only by those countries which had global interests; the Indian military’s role was defending Indian borders and shores, according to him.
It was only after the Kargil war in 1999 that the country woke up to the need for a CDS. The credit for this must go to the Kargil Review Committee, headed by K. Subrahmanyam, India’s pioneering guru in strategy and security. Its other members were eminent journalist George Verghese and Lt-Gen K. K. Hazari (retd). Satish Chandra of the Indian Foreign Service was its member-secretary. The committee's case for having a CDS, integrating the three services with the Ministry of Defence — at present they are only “attached offices” of the MoD — and making the chiefs of the three services part of the government and not mere commanders of the service to which they belong - was strong and persuasive. No wonder that a Group of Ministers, headed by L. K. Advani, endorsed it. It seemed that the appointment of the CDS was a done deal. But, at the last minute, the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, held up a decision on this recommendation while approving all others.
Asked privately why he had deferred the most important decision, he gave two reasons. First, there was too much bad blood over the issue, as no fewer than nine Air Chiefs had met him to demand the rejection of the CDS concept. Secondly, Mr Vajpayee said, he had consulted former President R Venkataraman and former Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, both of whom had been defence ministers during their political careers. They both had advised him to think the matter through. Atalji assured me, however, he would take a decision, one way or the other, within a year. That, alas, was not to be.
Ten years passed and the UPA-2 government, headed by Manmohan Singh, realised that a comprehensive review of national security was overdue. So it appointed a Task Force, chaired by Naresh Chandra, a former Cabinet Secretary and Ambassador to the US, for this purpose. Judging by the evidence the various ministries and other relevant official entities gave it, the task force concluded that the idea of a CDS would not pass muster even now. Therefore, it suggested a step in the right direction. It recommended that there should be a permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee with a fixed tenure of two years. At present the chairmanship of COSC is rotational and goes to the senior-most serving chief. Consequently, the term of the Chairman is usually short — in one case it was precisely 30 days — and because the Chairman has to run his own service, he has limited time to devote to the task of promoting inter-services coordination and cooperation.
The task force took care to prescribe that the permanent Chairman would leave the operational functions of the three service chiefs well alone and concentrate on the entire spectrum of inter-services matters that include determining the priorities in the acquisition of weapons by the three services. Even more important is the supervision of the Strategic Command. Several former chairmen of the COSC have confessed they seldom had enough time to confer with the head of the Strategic Command. Sadly, the UPA-2 government sat on the task force's report for two years and rejected it just before its inglorious exit.
What an irony it is therefore that in the current discussions on the subject, the civilian bureaucracy of the Defence Ministry, a bane of the national security architecture, is arguing that instead of having a CDS the country should have a permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. These “abominable no-men” are unlikely to get their way. For, instead of the do-nothing A. K. Antony a very decisive and doer Manohar Parrikar is the Defence Minister. Some of the decisions he has already taken had been hanging fire for close to a decade because to preserve his enviable image for probity, Antony did nothing throughout his eight-year tenure as Raksha Mantri.
For the same reason one can be sanguine about the welcome announcement by the Army Chief, Gen Dalbir Singh, that the “long-pending” one rank, one pension scheme would be implemented by the end of April. Over long years we have witnessed tragic scenes of gallant ex-servicemen demonstrating at Amar Jyoti at India Gate and then marching to Rashtrapati Bhavan to return their gallantry awards to the President, their Supreme Commander. Let this not be repeated ever again.


The antipathy of the IAF to a CDS has been a major factor.It is now out in the public domain. Such a dog-in-the-manger attitude must now be "put to sleep". Every service branch must be part of a team and not a maverick outfit with its own whims and fancies.The MMRCA deal controversy where the IAF reportedly has no "PLan B" has also come in for much criticism.{/quote}

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Surya » 20 Mar 2015 02:52

It permeates the IAF leadership - past and present

all these 'legends' of the IAF - you run across them and then realize they are in their own closed of world- still looking at things in 1965

Young officers who went against it or wrote anything on jointmenship which did not blame the army - go shunted to the boondocks

ramana
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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 20 Mar 2015 03:12

I first saw the opposition to CDS in ACM PC LAL's autobiography. Its in google books.
His main point is IA with its large man power will always be chosen to be CDS.
Both the other services have experience in handling quite less number of service people.

Philip
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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Philip » 20 Mar 2015 14:26

Even FM Sam Manekshaw wrote/was quoted after '71 that notwithstanding the fine show by the IAF,he did not get 100% cooperation from ACM PCL. "Manekshaw was not even on speaking terms with Air Chief P C Lall ."(Lt.Gen.Jacob in his book).The controversy about "taking Dacca",as if that was not the objective was put forth by the Gen in his book.However,it has been contested and would've been asinine to wage war with Pak,and not liberate BDesh,allowing it to remain in control in some manner ,later on beefing up its military with help from the US/West. We had to wrap up E.Pak swiftly before the Yanquis could barge in,as they attempted to do with the USS Enterprise farting in the Bay of Bengal,but allegedly followed by both IN and Soviet subs,ready to sink it if it engaged in any mil action against India.

BDesh had to be liberated
.There was a fine detailed review of the campaign in a Chathan House publication decades ago,where 3 spearheads of the IA simultaneously went for Dacca,by-passing enemy strongholds in manner reminiscent of the Japanese in Malaya in WW2. The Pakis did not know what hit them. Eventually,the least expected of the three IA formations made it to Dacca.The heliborne ops crossing the mighty rivers was devastating to Paki morale,and the incorrect news that a whole brigade,not a battalion,had been airlifted took the stuffing out of them.

A CDS is an absolute necessity for the country and we should also develop tri-service theatre commands,where the service best suited to lead must take primary responsibility and command.

vaibhav.n
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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby vaibhav.n » 20 Apr 2015 21:58

Procrastination is no longer an option-Nitin Gokhale

By August 2014, three months after the Narendra Modi government took charge in Delhi at the end of May, middle level civilian bureaucrats started chasing Service HQs to immediately send crucial proposals related to infrastructure projects along the China border for expeditious clearance. Surprised at the pro-active approach of the normally reluctant babus, the Army officer asked if there was any particular reason why the files were sought so quickly when the normal routine was not to clear any files sent in the first half of the financial year until Holi (normally close to March, the last month of the financial year). The civil servant apparently replied in all earnestness: “We want to clear the files before Navaratra and not Holi.” Navaratra, incidentally, is usually celebrated in October!

The story may well be a apocryphal but it gives a glimpse into a new vigour in processing of files (I refuse to use the generic term ‘work culture’ to describe functioning of the bureaucratic system) in many ministries and more particularly in the Defence Ministry, has speeded up since the new government took charge less than a year ago. Admittedly, governance is not just about clearing files faster; it’s just one part of the larger framework of government functioning. The schemes and plans have to reach their logical conclusion for the benefit of the people or in the case of defence ministry, the armed forces.

Since I observe the Ministry of Defence (MoD) much more closely than any other arm of the government, my own conclusions are definitely not all-encompassing. It is not as if the MoD, traditionally opaque in its functioning, has suddenly opened up to public scrutiny. Far from it. In any case, given the high stakes involved in terms of massive defence deals and
matters of national security, the MoD will perhaps be the last of the government departments that will become transparent, if at all.

However, what has changed in the staid environs of South Block is the new realisation that procrastination can no longer be a default option. First Arun Jaitley as a stop gap Raksha Mantri (RM) and now for the past four months Manohar Parrikar, have sent a clear signal that they mean business and will take decisions quickly after due diligence. If some decisions go wrong in the process, so be it, Parrikar says. As long as a decision is taken in good faith, no one can question a minister’s prerogative in this regard, he often says pointing out that in a democracy people elect leaders to take decisions and not dither. The untangling of the knotty, three-decade old, 'One Rank One Pension' issue in this short time since taking over in November last year is one such instance. Although many veterans, including my father, are impatient about its non-implemenation so far, all indications are that the scheme is in its finalisation stage and should be announced well before the Modi government completes its one year in office.

The well-entrenched bureaucracy of course does its best to resist the change but ultimately falls in line, as is now happening in the MoD. For once, strict deadlines are being set in the ministry to dispose of matters and give a decisive ruling. Review meetings and performance evaluation of critical organisations like the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) and Mazgaon Docks Ltd (MDL) is now a regular affair.

That Parrikar is an engineer from IIT Mumbai helps. His grasp of matters technical is faster than many of his predecessors, those who interact with him regularly aver. The same set of bureaucrats—civil and those in uniform—who sat on files for months on end since clear headed directives were often missing from the top, are now presenting various options in double quick time for Parrikar to decide.

But these are early days yet, In less than six months, the new Defence Minister has revitalised the functioning in the ministry but as we know from the past, sustaining the momentum for achieving maximum output is a tough ask. Parrikar, considered one of the more successful chief ministers of a small but complex state like Goa, would know that the Defence Ministry is veritable minefield. How he negotiates the visible and invisible traps will determine if can succeed in delivering tangible results in coming years.

ShauryaT
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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ShauryaT » 27 Apr 2015 08:13

Need for defence staff chief - Lt Gen Anil Chait

Avarachan: Please note, I had suggested that we were ready for a CDS since the late 80's, however this recommendation goes back even before.

Eminent diplomat, the late Ali Yavar Jang had even mooted a proposal for creation of such a post, as far back as in 1967 before the Administrative Reforms Committee in this regard, but did not succeed.


Also, even this article quotes the infamous Kargil duality of advise received to justify the CDS, however I think the issue is far deeper and India has a long way to go in this journey to a full scope understanding of the CDS position. Integrated commands such as Cyber, Strategic Forces, Space only address a part of the issue.


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