Again, you miss the point. I quoted media reports DELIBERATELY to point out that you are COMPLETELY ignoring the reports which don't match your POV and second, I quoted reports which ONLY talk of technical aspects. Not salacious gossip
about XYZ person being removed because he "exposed the Govt". And then I cross-checked those media reports by going back to those which directly quote the source, i.e. HAL's quote referencing serviceability & the CAS's comments as well. Third, I quoted Government reports about actual orders placed and issues resolved.
So, admit you were mistaken with grace, and move on. There is no "debate" here. Your conclusions were just flat out mistaken.
At this point, noting your jibe about quoting "media reports", whilst deliberately ignoring the difference between the kind you were referencing, and the ones I mentioned, their correlation with primary sources and the data they convey, and deliberately ignoring what the CAS himself said, I do have to wonder whether folks assessment of your motives are spot on. Are you really willing to accept information which contradicts your stated beliefs, or are you trying to push an agenda? You have so far pushed the agenda that this Govt is biased against soldiers, based on OROP, made extremely adverse remarks against a serving COAS, & now made this sort of commentary on preparedness whilst ignoring all evidence to the contrary including specific quotations by serving officials and organizations.First,
I already read the report which you quote and many other besides. I have been doing this for over a decade now!
You started with WWR. Now you are quoting modernization. That's a whole different ball game. We can get to that, but I really doubt whether I should make the effort given that you don't seem to be really interested in the topic but playing to a pre-set narrative. I hope I am mistaken.
There is also the fact
- that I don't like to talk capabilities recently inducted.
There is a good reason for that. These are capabilities that can provide the Indian Armed Forces the edge in any conflict & any effort from my side to collate all those items in one place, even if open source, has some obvious risks.
11 The Vice Chief of Army staff, in his oral deposition to the Committee, expressed
deep concern on non-allocation of projected Capital budget for Army for 2018-19:
In their Power-point presentation before the Committee, the representatives of
Navy also enunciated the impact of low allocations of Capital budget
First, Projected Budget. All Govt orgs project extremely ambitious budgets. They want to make up all deficiencies overnight. Initiate a thousand procurements, lock up a lot of funds for their specific branch. This is a game all Govt orgs play and it is rare that ANY economy, let alone a developing one will ever meet projected budgets for any period. The usual practice as inefficient as it may be, is to use emergency procurement where essential and maintain a certain level of capability. It cant be helped because we are, at the end of the day, a developing country and the overall military expenditure as a percentage of the overall budget is already huge. There is only so much "give" or buffer.
Next, Capital Budget. New capabilities. As mentioned before, the focus of the GOVT has been to get existing capabilities up to spec
using emergency procurement (when allotted revenues are not sufficient for the year), devolving power to the VCAS level etc, not just keep buying fancy new gear! This is a very rational decision. Buying T-90s when the T-72 fleet would be languishing or a fleet of MMRCA when Su-30s were at 45 percent serviceability, would be the heights of irratonality, but that is precisely what was set to occur, previously.
Even here, there is ample evidence to note enough new gear has been coming into the services, not just at the overnight rate which the services want (e.g. 200 MMRCA stuck for years to be ordered ASAP + 5G program, New A/C carrier for the Navy, Arms & Munitions for an entire new division etc etc). The Govt is well within its rights to evaluate some of these "requests" and see what is necessary and what is not. Whether the Capital Budget requirement is essentially within budgetary/economic capability or whether the Nation can do with less expensive options!
As to all "hopes being dashed for new stuff, this that", its the prerogative of every service, or govt arm to push for AS MANY FUNDS as possible. Its also the imperative of the Govt to see what to prioritize on. Making existing equipment and kit serviceable, or just induct new items willy-nilly.
Please re-read what I wrote in Point 5 regarding WWR.
The Govt is using one-time grants to allow for these purchases[/b], whereas the DCAS, VCAS etc want this to be formalized via the Regular Budget. The Armed Forces want the budget to be increased to allow for all these purchases to be formalized.
The MOF et al obviously would prefer the 1-time Grant system because once the budget is increased, it sets a precedent and hence year on year it gets maintained at that level.Second, what you don't appear to accept or understand is that historically, the [b]budget was notional
because it would NOT be spent at all, and would lapse. This money would then be returned back to the MOF, and then spent in freebies and then again re-iterated every other year.[/b]Third, so far the GOI has NOT defaulted on any of its weapons payments.
Again, payments are broken into two groups. Upfront payment & those spread out over successive periods (linked to item delivery). The recurring payments are what the VCAS, DCAS wish to be formalized. Also, their planning and acquisition teams wants significant boosts for CAPITAL BUDGET above whereas GOI has justifiably focused on making sure existing equipment is also brought up to full readiness before running after new toys which will bankrupt both the existing logistics and lock up capital expenditure.Fourth, lets have direct quotes below from key decision makers about how the IA is now spending its money.
Here is one more bit to summarize the stuff I dug up. Nitin Gokhale wrote a book on Modi's security policy, Siachen, 1965 and apart from having an inside perspective, and well connected, is usually a serious researcher as well.What's interesting is the article corroborates exactly what I had dug up.
It reiterates what Modi sarkar is good at. Which is, a) delegation of responsibilities to technocrats empowered to take decisions (first Parrikar and Nirmala ma'am) b ) Take corrective action on war footing when they discover that some big issues remain.
No Govt is perfect, but this Govt's ability to take rapid decisions in the national interest with decisiveness bears remarking.https://bharatshakti.in/dont-panic-the- ... projected/
Bharat ShaktiDon’t Panic, The Army Is Not As Badly Off As It Is Projected
March 26, 2018; By: Nitin A Gokhale;For the first time since the Kargil conflict in 1999, the Indian Army’s ammunition stock, inventory of spares and maintenance of its existing crucial equipment is up to date, thanks to a combination of emergency procurement and revamped management system.KM
Post Kargil and in 2001 as well, there were huge purchases made for the services, hence the comparision[/i]Although there are concerns about lower allotment for new acquisitions
, the reality is far more reassuring, those who manage and maintain the readiness of the armed forces say.
The MoD has already flagged the need for more funds in the coming years (and is hopeful of getting them as and when required) but it has also simultaneously began to ensure bang for every buck it spends.For nearly 12-13 years after Kargil, the management of ammunition and spares in the three forces was tardy and below par, resulting in accumulated shortages. The reality began to bite in the immediate aftermath of the Uri attack and the surgical strikes in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) in September 2016.
1.That’s why in late 2016, the Army signed 19 major contracts worth Rs 11,000 crore to replenish about 10 different types of ammunition. Deliveries in three of the bigger contracts have been completed and 13 others would complete the supply progressively by end of the current calendar year, defence sources have revealed.
Similarly, the Indian Air Force and Indian Navy too bought ammunition and spares worth over Rs 10,000 crores to make up for years of neglect and indecision.(KM: Ammo + Spares of Rs 21,000 crore already purchased post Uri)
2.Additionally, over 75 contracts to buy and stock crucial spares for different equipment worth over Rs 15,000 crore (to be spent over the next four years) have been signed by the Army in 2017-18. These two measures alone have ensured that ammunition stock is up to date and almost 95 per cent of crucial equipment and platforms like Type A vehicles (armoured personnel carriers, army air defence platforms), all guns, UAVs and LORROS–Long-Range Reconnaissance and Observation System–and even general vehicles are on road that is they are serviced and ready for use whenever required. Earlier, at least 40 per cent of these platforms used to be ‘off-road.’KM: Another tranche of ammo + spares for Rs 15000 crores at around Rs4000 crore/yr
3. Maintenance for ALHSimilarly, a decision to establish two MRO (maintenance, repair and overhaul) hubs for the Army’s fleet of Advance Light Helicopters (ALH) at Mamun and Missamari has ensured that at least 65 to 70 per cent of the fleet is now available to fly any time against just about 30 to 35 per cent before 2015 because the helicopters had to be sent to Bangalore or the maintenance staff had to travel the long distance to the bases spread across Northern and Eastern Commands.
4. Direct Quotes
Lt Gen Nimbhorkar, MGOThis has been made possible, according to Lt Gen RR Nimborkar, the Army’s Master General Ordinance (MGO), because of improved coordination and synergy between the MoD and the Army’s decision-makers. The MGO – the man in-charge of ensuring all the in-service equipment held by the entire Indian Army is in top shape – speaking to BharatShakti.in pointed out that for the first time in years, the entire annual budget of over Rs 15,000 crores that his branch handles has been spent even before the financial year has ended. “Thanks to clear directions of the Army Chief Gen Bipin Rawat and quick decision-making by the current defence secretary Mr Sanjay Mitra and his team, we have managed to retrieve the dire situation that we faced for over a decade. This has been made possible because of optimum use of resources and simplification of procedures”, Lt Gen Nimborkar said.
He pointed out to decentralization of financial powers and emphasis on sourcing more equipment and stores from indigenous sources, thanks to the decision made by former defence minister Manohar Parrikar and continued to be supported by the incumbent minister Nirmala Sitharaman, has resulted in improved efficiency.
Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman (Image Courtesy: PTI)
5. ExamplesFor example, earlier even a simple decision to buy light utility vehicles for the Army had to go to the MoD which meant the entire process used to take a minimum of two years. Now thanks to decentralization, service HQs are able to procure them in six months!
Similarly, the decision to source ‘non-core’ items from the local suppliers rather them buying them through the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) as was done earlier, is resulting in massive saving. Over 80 items like berets, caps, socks, belts, sweaters, sports shoes etc. are now being directly bought from the market. Earlier, OFB used to source these items from the market and used to sell it to the forces at a higher price. For instance, the common combat uniform worn by all the troops was costing the organization four times the market cost! Today thanks to direct sourcing, best quality light rucksacks, knives, sports shoes, track suits and uniform, is being made available to the troops at a much lesser cost. The likely saving: Nearly 1200 crores a year!
Image Courtesy: Storypedia.comDigitization of records and inventory has now allowed the top leadership, including the Army Chief, Vice Chief and the MGO, to have a 360 degree view of equipment availability, the MGO said. “This allows us to reduce dead inventory. There have been instances in the past when we had bought spares worth tens of thousands of crores of rupees and didn’t use them. In some cases, these spares were not even opened and have now become dead stock since the equipment they were meant for have been retired from service,” Lt Gen Nimborkar revealed.
Keeping these examples in view the current Army Chief has issued a directive to reduce unnecessary and excessive procurement. “We now follow a ‘just in time’ model of keeping spares which means only absolute minimum number of spares will be kept in stock,” the MGO revealed.6. The catalyst
As mentioned earlier, the beginning of the turnaround dates back to end-September 2016. A thorough stock taking then revealed that some of the critical ammunition was down to less than a day’s stock and some others were dangerously low. For instance, Anti-tank ammunition called armour-piercing, fin-stabilised, discarding sabot (APFSDS) was completely out of stock, while ammunition for Smerch system and Konkurs missiles was down to two days of supply.KM: The APFSDS saga has been chronicled on BRF by Rohit and I. Basically usual corruption sagas etc and other issues stopped the supply, Konkurs I believe is referring to the advanced variants (M) whereas Smerch, we didnt make the ammo locally and now OFB will make it in India (need to confirm, but I remember reading it)So teams were dispatched to friendly countries with authorization to sign contracts on the spot. Simultaneously, all the three vice chiefs were authorized to ensure that all ammunition and spares needed to fight ten days of intense war is always kept in stock. Called the 10i (ten days of intense war fighting) scheme, the three vice chiefs have made sure between September 2016 and now, all the procurement have been done to meet that requirement. From here on, all measures to build on the long term plan to equip the military for a 30-day war, will continue apace.While the utilization of revenue budget has been exemplary over the past three-four years, the military is still faced with huge shortfall in its funds for capital or new acquisitions, as highlighted by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence in its latest report. The government will have to find ways to augment the necessary budget if it wants to ensure that the military remains in top shape and ready for the twin challenges it faces from Pakistan and China.
Nitin A Gokhale