Katare wrote:I don’t want to drag this too long here but I think you are missint the forest for woods. VC himself is complaining that the enhanced power means little if additional budget is not given.
No, he is saying that instead of the supplementary grant process he wants an increased budget allocation for the Army etc to be allocated. For obvious reasons, that's not going to happen. The MOF wants to retain the budgetary discretion rather than establish a new baseline.
The quotes given for the VC etc are from *the supplementary grants* meeting between the representatives of the services & the MOD. It is the entire job of the VC to push for more funds at that stage! It will never be enough but the MOD attempts to get a midway agreement.
But why not post what the GOI's response is?
It say that the MOD will take the service proposal for "Excess Grants for the year".
What is Excess Grants, it is the difference between Planned & Actual Expenditure. In short the MOD is making the point that emergency and critical purchases will be met.
Furthermore, to reduce the impact of pensions and pay on the Revenue Budget, the MOD has routinely moved and cleared at MOF, Supplementary Grants proposals.
Rs25 k corer order signed is great but deliveries would happen over many years
No, please read the article mentioned before, a huge chunk of these orders were for short term delivery.
I quote a specific article, Oct 27, 2016 India Today, Preparing for the Worst (India Today has moved to a paywall). This is for the first set of purchases.
So, in late September, the MoD sent out empowered committees comprising a senior bureaucrat, an armed forces representative and a member of the defence finance wing with wishlists. The committees went to ammunition suppliers in Russia and Israel with indents for buying several million dollars worth of ammunition. The wishlists include rockets and gun ammunition for Mi-35 helicopter gunships and Su-30 fighter jets, 155 mm ammunition for the Bofors howitzers, and 125 mm APFSDS ammunition for the tank fleet.
The urgency was evident in the indents-the MoD was willing to buy up existing stocks as well as off production lines. Factories were asked to identify time-frames of possible delivery, from 'immediate', within 'one month', 'two months' and 'three months'. Army officials confirmed that several contracts had been finalised and deliveries of ammunition had begun. The value of the contracts is estimated to be close to Rs 5,000 crore, just for ammunition. "The purchases are easily the largest fast-track procurements since Operation Parakram in 2001," says one official.
Through FTPs, senior army officials say, they plan to push up war stocks to cater to 10 days of intense war fighting, eventually building up to 14 days worth of stock. No one is talking war just yet. Not even in the currently tense security situation following the surgical strikes. Restocking, the military says, gives it the flexibility, endurance and confidence in logistics for its operational plans should a contingency arise. "It increases the number of options available to us," one general says. The army hopes to make good its shortfalls within the next three months.
Note, this is after the post URI/CAG stock-taking.
and munitions get consumed/expire each year.
Which are but a tiny fraction of the war holdings, and even for those causing any dip in WWR (say a set of huge exercises), i.e. the 10(I) purchase, the VCAS is mandated to make quick decisions to the order of Rs500 Crore, so they can be placed well in time and these can come from the yearly revenue budget!
Obviously the yearly amount to be replaced/added will be a fraction of the huge one time spend to make up the entire gap which had developed over decades of mismanagement (the APFSDS issue for instance)! And the IA has also been asked to ramp up on simulation aids to reduce expenditure on core equipment and assets. The big reason why several Indian players in the space spend so much effort to showcase their wares at Defexpo. Even 125mm APFSDS has training rounds available.
UPA bought munitions too spending same amount of money for the years and with 100% budget utilization. Revenue budget expenditure (used for buying munitions and spare) has never been an issue, it was well utilized in the past also.
Now who is missing the forest for the trees? Don't you see how messed up the "numbers" vs reality was?
Tell me something, if things were so hunky dory and great with the revenue expenditure and everything was always well spent in time on the right things, can UPA please inform us how the Su-30s, ALH, MiGs - were all running short of spares & serviceability was so low?
Fact: Revenue budget expenditure was a BIG MESS without proper accountability at the MOD level. Same for CAPEX budget in many procurements.
This is how Revenue Budget was spent to meet "100% utilization".
This is just for APFSDS. First, lets turn to our good friends at OFB.
Pending back-loading of the ammunition to the Ordnance Factory in a phased manner, the five Army Commands were holding 1,34,986 shells valued at Rs 607.43 crore under segregated conditions. In respect of 1,23,794 of these shells valued at Rs 557.06 crore, 40 per cent of the shelf life of 10 years had expired while the shelf life of another 11,192 shells valued at Rs 50.36 crore had already been halved.
Stop for a second. Around 1.5 Lakh APFSDS shells were made without even ensuring they were ok. Once the tests showed they were a danger, they were segregated.
This is from the post-Uri audit, below. Over a decade and a half, and things remained the same.
Shockingly, the CAG has found ammunition worth nearly Rs 17000 crore had to rejected by the army because of poor quality. These are "lying rejected at different depots due manufacturing defects," the CAG has said.
If you check the OFB production and acquisition, you will find similar stories for almost all critical stores.
This is the response of the current Government, apart from pressure on OFB to fix quality & increase production rate.https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/defe ... 2017-06-11
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/20 ... ture-ammo/
Hectic moves within the defence ministry suggest the Modi government is working to end one of the government's last monopolies - ordnance factories.
In February, a letter went from the Prime Minister's Office to the secretary (defence production), asking for lists of ordnance factory board products, plant and machinery and, more significantly, the land held by each of the 41 factories operating under the MoD's department of defence production.
The letter was followed by a series of policy moves signalling that business as usual was coming to an end within the ordnance factories, long criticised by the armed forces for supplying substandard, overpriced equipment. In April, the MoD invited the private sector to participate in tenders to supply nine types of ammunition for tanks and howitzers, hitherto a preserve of the ordnance factories. On April 27, an MoD circular to the chairman of the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) identified a list of 143 'non-core' items, ranging from uniform cloth and sleeping bags to military trucks, that the army could buy from the open market. The shape-up or ship-out approach was outlined in the circular: '...the MoD can identify non-core activities that can be either closed down or put on the PPP model for optimal use of the OFB's vast infrastructure and skilled manpower'.
In September last year, NSA Ajit Doval assessed the army's dissatisfaction with OFB products in a meeting with then army vice chief Lt Gen. Bipin Rawat. This led to the series of policy decisions this year that gradually whittled away at OFB monopolies.
The powerful trade unions, which control over 88,000 employees in these factories, are aghast at the move to bring in the private sector and have warned of an agitation culminating in an indefinite strike.
Parrikar instead asked the factories to improve efficiency. "Let me see if I can paint another colour," he remarked to a 2015 media query on his plan for OFB 'white elephants'. Under Parrikar, the OFB boosted output from Rs 11,000 crore in 2014 to a record of over Rs 15,000 crore this year and cut its workforce from 96,317 to 87,707. He delegated financial powers to avoid delays in processing R&D projects at the OFB headquarters, gave factories a target to increase the expenditure on R&D activities to 3 per cent of their turnover by 2018-19.
After Parrikar's departure from the MoD in March this year, the government has stepped on the gas.
"The Indian industry was denied participation in the manufacture of ammunition, as no industrial license was issued for filling process. Thus the monopoly stayed with OFB, whose lack of capacity restricted the demand of the services, gradually leading to deficiencies over the years. It was not that the industry does not have the capability to manufacture with transfer of technology, but they have not taken any concrete action to acquire technology in this regard till now," a senior MoD official said.
Last week, a request of information (RFI) was issued for participation in a $400 million program to manufacture of variety of ammunition in the next five to eight years, including 20,000 units of 125mm ammunition for T-90 and T-72 tanks; 500,000 units of 23mm ammunition for Strella air defense systems; 300,000 units of 40mm ammunition for grenade launchers; 500,000 units of 40mm ammunition for multi-grenade launchers; 5,000 units of ammunition for Grad multi-barrel rocket launchers; 600,000 fuses for 155mm M-46 howitzers; 188,600 units of 30mm ammunition for the BMP armored vehicles; and 100,000 units of ammunition for 155mm FH77/B howitzers.
Pretty much a wide swathe of key IA programs is now available to the pvt sector.
This is not just for OFB. Almost all acquisitions had some glaring lacunae or the other. I am not going to go into the big ticket foreign munitions acquisitions for now. Let those sleeping dogs remain asleep, especially at the current juncture.
You are focusing on "more money". What I am pointing out is that just throwing money at either Revenue or Capital Expenditure did NOT produce the corresponding gains under UPA.
You have huge ORDERS for Su-30 MKI, ALH etc. Great for the CAPEX budget. Now why is it that the serviceability was so low? How many of these aircraft were even available for combat?
When the Su-30 serviceability was an eye-popping 45%, what was St. Antony doing approving the MMRCA process without first making the Su-30 serviceability rise to reasonable levels by asking the Services/HAL/OEM to fix the serviceability issues & then properly utilize the revenue budget to get 2-3 squadrons worth of aircraft on the flightline, without even purchasing new aircraft types altogether?
Now tell me, is this articulated by just looking at raw numbers?
In short, very little coordination between services & MOD, zero accountability from OFB et al, and all sorts of purchases made which did NOT result in practical improvement on the ground.
You have Gen Nimbharkar the MGO noting the huge improvement in actual conditions
, and therein is the real difference.
This government has done better in spending compared to UPA but it too have left a lot of money on table unspent.
Look at the numbers. I read through all the reports that were submitted to parliament last month. There is no getting around the uncomfortable truth.
Lets disagree and move on.
Just looking at the top line numbers is unfortunately not enough. They needed to be correlated with actual improvement and capability on the ground!
In fact throwing good money after bad would be the hallmark of bad governance! Yes, you have read through the reports but kindly understand the context.