I understand many of you need to understand how the IAF would find out what it foughtThe information is well publicized and one does not even need to ask for classified information beyond what the IAF has revealed
Reference 1. Tri-Service Press Conference, Air Vice Marshal RGK Kapoor.
1. PAF F-16s only deploy AMRAAMs. We recovered wreckage. They used F-16s and they lied about it.
2. We have electronic means to determine what we fought.https://youtu.be/6IDvuUgFnl8?t=329
The PhalconRadar, Identification Friend or Foe, Radar detection (ESM), and even voice comms (CSM)https://www.domain-b.com/defence/air_sp ... eView.html
AVM Kapoor wrote:
Air Force ke paas kafi tarah se hum pata kar sakte hain ki konsa jahaj ud raha hain, aur humari airspace ki taraf a rahan hain.
The Air Force has many ways to determine which aircraft is flying and coming towards our airspace.
Electronic signature hota hain har jahaj ka
Every aircraft has an electronic signature
Us electronic signature ko match karta hua paya jiski wajeh se keh sakte hain, ki F-16 is mission main shamil the
We found the F-16 to match the signature, hence which is why we can say the F-16s were participants in this mission
The DRDO AEW &CS
Israeli manufacturers of the system say long-range, high performance, multi-sensor Phalcon AEW introduces a new level of performance to airborne early warning, tactical surveillance of airborne and surface targets, and the gathering of signal intelligence.
This is primarily done through a unique integration of sensors. The Phalcon's four main sensors are the AESA radar, IFF, ESM/ELINT and CSM/COMINT.
A unique fusion technique continuously cross-correlates data generated by all sensors. This data is combined with an automatically initiated active search by one sensor for specific targets detected by other sensors.
also has a comprehensive range of sensors. https://www.airforce-technology.com/pro ... ol-system/
In short, both the Phalcon and DRDO Netra have a range of sensors - active (radar, IFF) and passive (ESM, CSM) to detect the enemy aircraft, track it, determine its type and keep monitoring what's going on
Mission system control (MSC) is the brain of the AEW&C system, as it incorporates all the data from sensors and other systems to control the whole system. It assesses threats using data received from the on-board sensors and other sources, and presents the Air Situation Picture (ASP).
It manages the whole communication system of the AEW&C system. The MSC can record the data and play back the same for conducting mission analysis. The Intercept Control Segment (ICS) integrated into the MSC will carry out recovery operations by guiding interceptors and vector strike aircraft.
The system mainly comprises of a primary radar and secondary surveillance radar (SSR/IFF). The SSR provides Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Communication Support Measures (CSM). It identifies and classifies the threats based on the emissions from them, and also serves as a Friend or Foe identification system.
The Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) which is integrated into the ESM system, Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS) and Counter Measures Dispensing system (CMDS) forms a Self Protection Suite (SPS). The Data Handling and Display System (DHDS) will present the Air Situation Picture on Operator Work Station (OWS) and will provide communication facilities to interact with the system.
2nd. How is Battle Assessment done?
Apart from actual visual confirmation, then wreckage, HUMINT and techint, this is what AWACS and controllers do.https://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabil ... /AWACS.pdf
In additionto providing senior leadership with time-critical information on the actions of enemy forces, E-3 controllers assisted in 38 of the 40 air-to-air kills recorded during the conflict.
Trends in Air to Air combat
John Stillonhttps://csbaonline.org/uploads/document ... eport-.pdf
So its routine for the USAF, and all other advanced AF to use AWACS to determine post event battle damage analysis and determine whether their pilots succeeded in air to air. They can keep monitoring even as the enemy aircraft crashes in enemy territory.
Watching Iraqi aircraft takeoff allowed E-3 crews to immediately identify them as hostile, while the E-3’s comprehensive communications suite and large mission crews, between thir-teen and nineteen air weapon controllers and other specialists, allowed them to communicate this information and provide dedicated support to multiple coalition fighter crews simultane-ously via ultra-high frequency (UHF) voice radio links. Coalition ROE allowed combat pilots to engage any aircraft declared hostile by an E-3 crew without the need for further identification. But if the target was not declared hostile by an AWACS, then two independent sources were required, and only the F-15Cs with both NCTR and the AN/APX-76 IFF interrogator could meet the ROE on their own. This greatly increased the tactical freedom of action and confi-dence of coalition pilots.Another important E-3 contribution, as outlined above, was providing coalition pilots with significant advanced knowledge of enemy aircraft position and heading long before the pilots’ own radars could detect their opponents.
It is beyond stupid of XYZ to magically expect the IAF to fly over enemy territory, stop the plane, have it hover like a helicopter, hop out, collect wreckage and then hop back over the LOC to keep Pakistani idiots and reporters in NYT etc happy!"A MiG-21 Bison is simply too old"
The Bison as repeatedly stated in this thread, has a HMCS + R73E missile combination, which allow a skilled pilot, aware of the systems strengths
to make quick shots!
A helmet sight which can move the radar and missile seeker to "see" what the pilot sees. The pilot has to be skilled enough to use it effectively!
Chapter 2 discussed the significant advances in short-range IR missile capabilities during the 1970s and 1980s. These advances have continued over the past two decades. The most modern IR missiles are capable of being cued by Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (HMCS) and turned toward the designated target and locked on after launch. Many also feature thrust vector con-trol, which bestows extreme maneuverability, and imaging focal plane array IR seekers that recognize and home in on target aircraft images rather than simple heat sources. These mis-siles allow pilots to launch highly lethal IR missiles at any opponent they can see, even if thatopponent is behind them.48 With an increasing number of modern combat aircraft equipped with missile-approach warning systems, it is likely that a pilot under attack will have sufficient time to target an attacker and launch a missile in return. Once both aircraft have “launch and leave” missiles in the air, prospects are good that the short-range engagement will result in “mutual kills,” with short-range combat kill ratios near 1:1. This suggests we may have reached a point in the development of short-range air combat technologies where serious, capable adversaries will attempt to avoid it and instead seek advantage in superior BVR capabilities.
- this is the most important part.A report way back on how the IAF uses its Bisons.
15 years back to be precise! http://www.dedefensa.org/forum/linde-se ... erre-vs-us
http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/exercise-co ... cle02.html
The real story behind Indian Air Force Superiority over US Air Force - USAF underestimated Indians as Iraqis or Iranians
Balaji Reddy, Special Correspondent
June 18, 2004
“Surprising sophistication of Indian fighter aircraft and skill of Indian pilots” stunned the US Air Force. A June 2 article in the magazine Inside the Air Force reported The exercise, in which US F-15Cs were said to have been defeated more than 90 per cent of the time in direct combat exercises against the IAF, is causing US Air Force officials to re-evaluate the way the service trains its fighter pilots while bolstering the case for buying the F/A-22 as a way to ensure continued air dominance for the United States.
The magazine quoted US officials who participated in the exercise as saying it should “provide a reality check for those who had assumed unquestioned US air superiority.”
On the face of it, the performance of the IAF, with its oft-reported air crashes in an aging, non-American fleet, might seem surprising. But US officials told the magazine that the Indians were much better than they had bargained for.
“What happened to us was it looks like our red air training might not be as good because the adversaries are better than we thought,” the article quoted Col. Mike Snodgrass, commander of the 3rd Wing at Elmendorf Air Force Base, as saying. “And in the case of the Indian Air Force both their training and some of their equipment was better than we anticipated.”
“Red air” refers to the way the US Air Force simulates enemy capability in air combat training. US officials emphasised that such simulation deliberately handicap US planes and pilots against the enemy because the service has assumed for years that its fighters are more capable than enemy aircraft.
In Cope Thunder, four F-15Cs were pitted against 10 or 12 of same model Indian fighters such as the Mirage 2000, MIG-27 and MIG-29s in offensive and defensive counter air scenarios. But the two most formidable IAF aircraft proved to be the MIG-21 Bison, an upgraded version of the Russian-made baseline MIG-21, and the Sukhoi SU-30K Flanker, US officials said.
“What we faced were superior numbers, and an IAF pilot who was very proficient in his aircraft and smart on tactics. That combination was tough for us to overcome,” the magazine quoted a US airman who took part in the exercise as saying.
While acknowledging the performance of their Indian colleagues, who they will meet again in another air combat exercise in Alaska next month, the US airmen also made a major pitch for the F/A-22 aircraft that the US government has been slow to embrace because of its cost and lack of a perceived threat.
“The major takeaway for the Air Force is that our prediction of needing to replace the F-15 with the F/A-22 is proving out as we get smarter and smarter about other [countries’] capabilities around the world and what technology is limited to in the F-15 airframe,” Col. Snodgrass said. “We’ve taken [the F-15] about as far as we can and it’s now time to move to the next generation.”
http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/exercise-ia ... cle01.html
3rd Wing Explains 'Cope India' Exercise
© Aviation Week & Space Technology; aviationnow.com
By David A. Fulghum, Elmendorf AFB
[April 10, 2004]
These same U.S. participants say the Indian pilots showed innovation and flexibility in their tactics. They also admit that they came into the exercise underrating the training and tactics of the pilots they faced. Instead of typical Cold War-style, ground-controlled interceptions, the Indians varied aircraft mixes, altitudes and formations. Indian air force planners never reinforced failure or repeated tactics that the U.S. easily repelled. Moreover, the IAF's airborne commanders changed tactics as opportunities arose. Nor did U.S. pilots believe they faced only India's top guns. Instead, they said that at least in some units they faced a mix of experienced and relatively new Indian fighter and strike pilots.
"The outcome of the exercise boils down to [the fact that] they ran tactics that were more advanced than we expected," Snowden says. "India had developed its own air tactics somewhat in a vacuum. They had done some training with the French that we knew about, but we did not expect them to be a very well-trained air force. That was silly.
"They could come up with a game plan, but if it wasn't working they would call an audible and change [tactics in flight]," he says. "They made good decisions about when to bring their strikers in. The MiG-21s would be embedded with a Flogger for integral protection. There was a data link between the Flankers that was used to pass information. [Using all their assets,] they built a very good [radar] picture of what we were doing and were able to make good decisions about when to roll [their aircraft] in and out."
"When we saw that they were a more professional air force, we realized that within the constraints of the exercise we were going to have a very difficult time," Snowden says. "In general, it looked like they ran a broad spectrum of tactics and they were adaptive. They would analyze what we were doing and then try something else. They weren't afraid to bring the strikers in high or low. They would move them around so that we could never anticipate from day to day what we were going to see."
USAF: Indian Exercises Showed Need For F/A-22, Changes In Training
© Inside The Air Force
By Hampton Stephens
The surprising sophistication of Indian fighter aircraft and skill of Indian pilots demonstrated at the Cope India air combat exercise Feb. 15 through 27 at Gwalior Air Force Station, India, should provide a reality check for those who had assumed unquestioned U.S. air superiority, service officials who participated in the exercise said this week. The event was the first-ever air combat exercise involving the U.S. and India and the most active bilateral military exchange in over 40 years, according to these officials.
Officials from the 3rd Wing at Elmendorf did not provide specifics about how their aircraft fared, but said the experience is causing the service to reevaluate the way it trains its pilots for air-to-air operations.
“What happened to us was it looks like our red air training might not be as good because the adversaries are better than we thought,” Snodgrass said. “And in the case of the Indian Air Force both their training and some of their equipment was better than we anticipated.”
“Red air” refers to the way the Air Force simulates enemy capability in air combat training. Because the service has assumed for years that its fighters are more capable than enemy aircraft, the U.S. pilots that simulate the enemy, known as “red” forces, in air combat training are required to operate under rules that constrain their combat capability.
“We have always believed that our technology was superior to everyone else’s technology, that we would fight a somewhat inferior adversary, so we have had to supply a simulated adversary from our own resources; we call that ‘red air,’” Snodgrass said.
One reason the Indian pilots proved so formidable is that their training regimen does not include a concept of “red air.” Instead, “they fly pretty much blue-on-blue . . . [a] full-up airplane with no restrictions against somebody else’s airplane with no restrictions, and that leads to more proficiency with your aircraft,” Neubeck said.
Bottomline. A MiG-21 FLOWN BY AN IAF PILOT CAN KILL ANY TARGET IN THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES. It has knocked down a F-16. Understand how its possible, how the IAF knows it has occurred and spread the word, and fight disinformation!