Lessons of 1962 War for a possible new Sino-India conflict

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Postby H Sen » 28 Nov 2005 04:57

Anoop, I don't think Bhutan is too vulnerable, because the government is solidly aligned with India. But the Nepal situation is very interesting. The Chinese just sent the Nepalis 18 truck-loads of arms. (Ironically, to fight the Maoists!) We know that the Gyanendra regime is somewhat unfriendly to India, especially since India had cut off arms supplies to Nepal after the king suspended whatever democracy they had. How would India respond if Gyanendra accepted Chinese military advisors? What if the Chinese tested the waters further by setting up a little military base in Nepal? Would we be prepared to give them an ultimatum, and actually go eyeball-to-eyeball? What if the Chinese begin to militarize their "listening post" in the Cocos Islands? Granted, they probably won't do the latter until they have an aircraft carrier or two, but that's just a matter of time. From this perspective, the sooner we integrate the Brahmos missile with the Su-30 MKI, the better. That will make any Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean vulnerable. The Chinese know, and we know, that it is impossible for India to defeat China, if "defeat" means driving to Beijing. But we can inflict unacceptable damage in a quick and limited war. A very clear message, similar to the Monroe Doctrine, should be sent out to China: any attempt to establish a military presence in any South Asian country will lead to an Indian attack upon that country. Pakistan will have to be exempted, of course - not much we can do about that. But the Pakistanis don't want the Chinese crawling all over them either. (They will probably give the Chinese some basing facilities in Gwadar, though, once Gwadar port becomes fully operational.)

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Postby Rishirishi » 28 Nov 2005 05:12

I have never quite understood the Indian policies towards Nepal. Why does the governemnt wan't to push democracy there? I am not saying that democract is bad, why oppose the King?

India should urgently give all possible assistance to Nepal for fighting the Maoist insurgency.

Also:
Is there any proof that ISI and our western naighbours have been supporting the maoists?

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Postby svinayak » 28 Nov 2005 05:25

Rishirishi wrote:I have never quite understood the Indian policies towards Nepal. Why does the governemnt wan't to push democracy there? I am not saying that democract is bad, why oppose the King?

India should urgently give all possible assistance to Nepal for fighting the Maoist insurgency.



Indian leftists and jholawallals have transformed Indian policies towards monarchies. Social engineering and activism have becomethe policies of these parties and the resultin the maoists and agitation in Nepal

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Postby H Sen » 28 Nov 2005 05:30

Well, you have to remember the circumstances under which Gyanendra became king: he basically organized the massacre of King Birendra (his uncle) and his whole family. Mughal style! Birendra was on very good terms with India, so Gyanendra saw India as hostile. And India (understandably) did not welcome a new king who had murdered our friend. Even then, the Indian government did not shut the door on Gyanendra, because we know that then he would simply open his back door to China. He can play the China card quite effectively. By the way, India was unhappy when Gyanendra shut down the democratic process because we had counted on democratic politicians to serve as a balance against the king, who was not friendly to us or to the politicians. I don't think we cared that much about Nepali democracy for its own sake.

I don't think the ISI is helping the Maoists, although I could be wrong on this. The Chinese don't want the Nepali Maoists to win, because they see them as troublemakers. Besides, the Chinese themselves are capitalists now! I doubt that the Pakistanis would risk angering Beijing by helping the Maoists - they need Chinese support too much. There has been considerable ISI activity in Nepal, but I don't think the Maoists are their main partners. There are probably sections within the Nepali army and government that would be more willing to help the ISI, in exchange for some baksheesh. Nepal is useful to Pakistan mainly as a point of infiltration.

Ironically, it's the Indian government that has been quietly talking to the Nepali Maoists, although officially we are still helping Gyanendra and the Nepali army. It shows that we're hedging our bets against Gyanendra and his Chinese friends.

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Postby svinayak » 28 Nov 2005 05:51

Shankar wrote:62 was all about being unprepared on the military front . About a political leadership somewhat etopic on ground reality and about a secrative ruthless regime bent to humiliate india on the world stage . The first two factors helped make the third strategic objective bear fruit .The unilateral ceasefire was part of the chinese game plan .


62 was also a consolidation extension of Tibet so that in future no one questions it is an integral part of china by pushing and claiming more than they really want .


The political objective of Chinese PRC leadership was the main goal of 1962. They had to remove the 'bada bhai' attitude of Nehru so that China can attain the dominent role and influence in Asia.
There was genuine worry among the chinese leadership about Indian influence in east asia after 1955.

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Postby Anoop » 28 Nov 2005 06:20

H Sen,

My belief is that India will not go to war with China over anything other than a Chinese attack on Indian territory. Everything else will be handled behind the scenes. The efficacy of such measures is open to question. Part of the Chinese strategy is to raise the stakes slowly, but very publicly, and guage our response. It remains to be seen how dirty a game we can play too, in defense of our interests.

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Postby Tim » 28 Nov 2005 21:48

More numbers - these are squadron estimates for the IAF in 1962 (source: Lorne Kavic's "India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies 1947-1965," which is still one of the best books on this period).

Four Mystere sqadrons, two Gnat squadrons (fighters)
Six Hunter squadrons, 2 Ouragan Ssquadrons, one Vampire squadron (FGA)
3-4 Canberra squadrons (bomber)

On the other hand, RAND says that the Mysteres were used in a ground attack role, and that the Hunters performed air defense missions in northern India.

Others may be able to help fill in some of the gaps.

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Postby H Sen » 28 Nov 2005 23:48

The numbers for Vampire and Ouragan squadrons look dubious: there's no way you can pack 200+ Vamps into one squadron, or even 100+ Ouragans into two squadrons! Does anybody else have any thoughts on Kavic's book? I think the Vampire and Ouragan squadron info in Tim's source is from the early 1950s, whereas the Hunter, Gnat and Canberra info is from the early '60s. By the way, neither Hunters nor Mysteres were used in any combat role in 1962. RAND is probably refering to the 1965 war.

Since this thread is about lessons of 1962, here are my fifty cents:

1. Be very clear about whether we want to be a major player in the world, or whether it's enough to mind our own business. If we're going to be a big player, we need to have the military power to back it up. In the 1950s, India was VERY engaged in the world, and talked the talk constantly, but did not invest adequately in defence. So while we pissed people off left and right, and acted like the bada bhai of the entire developing world, we were unable to defend ourselves when the Chinese decided to show us that THEY were the bigger brother.

2. Have a credible strategic deterrent. In 1962, Indian cities were within range of PLAAF Beagles, which is why the US was able to pressure Nehru into not starting an air war. There was no way we could have hit China proper, even if we had used the IAF. At the most, we could have bombed Tibet, which wouldn't have bothered the Chinese much. Now, the Su-30 MKIs with mid-air refuelling can go all the way, but the distance is still too great for large numbers of missions: we would start losing planes, and losing two aircrew with each downed Su. That makes it essential to test and deploy Agni III. (Which we haven't done yet, probably to avoid annoying Uncle.)

3. Develop the capability to move a carrier group and/or a missile-carrying submarine into the South China Sea. This requires actually completing the ATV project.

4. Develop a network of encirclement. The Chinese are doing this, with their bases in Cocos and Gwadar, but India should be able to counter with arrangements with Tajikistan, Singapore and Taiwan. We already have an air base in Tajikistan, and the Singaporean decision to use Kalaikunda for their air force gives us the leverage to request some reciprocity. If IAF and IN can make frequent visits to Singapore, and works with their forces, that will give us a valuable foothold right on the Straits of Malacca. Taiwan would be an obvious partner for India, both economically and strategically.

5. Don't neglect the Russians. Not only are they old and reliable friends, their new warmth towards the Chinese is probably superficial. India, not China, is their preferred partner for their 5th-gen fighter. In the final analysis, the Russians fear China, and that is as relevant for us today as it was between the 1960s and 1980s.

6. Work with the US, but without becoming dependent on them. In 1962, we suddenly discovered just how dependent we in fact were on American support, and this severely hurt our ability to respond effectively. But good relations with the US now are very much in our interest, because we can expect the US to keep certain technologies out of Chinese hands. (Esp. French and Israeli systems.)

7. There is no need to get into an overly confrontational posture with the Chinese. Avoiding a war is always the better option for the smaller power, and we have to accept that we are the smaller power. Ultimately, military power is a function of economic power, and we can't catch up economically with China in the near future (barring the unforeseen). But The Chinese must be given to understand that if they push into Nepal or Myanmar, they will get burned. Not necessarily defeated, but seriously damaged.

8. Don't trust the Chinese.

9. Don't trust the Chinese.

You get the picture.

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Postby Jagan » 29 Nov 2005 00:47

Tim wrote:More numbers - these are squadron estimates for the IAF in 1962 (source: Lorne Kavic's "India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies 1947-1965," which is still one of the best books on this period).

Four Mystere sqadrons, two Gnat squadrons (fighters)
Six Hunter squadrons, 2 Ouragan Ssquadrons, one Vampire squadron (FGA)
3-4 Canberra squadrons (bomber)

On the other hand, RAND says that the Mysteres were used in a ground attack role, and that the Hunters performed air defense missions in northern India.

Others may be able to help fill in some of the gaps.


The Actual Squadron Estimates will be as follows:

Hunters: Nos 7 14 17 20 27 37 - Six Squadrons
Mysteres: Nos 1 3 8 - Three Squadrons
Ouragons: Nos 4 29 47 Three Squadrons
Canberras: Nos 5 16 35 106SPR/JBCU - Four Squadrons
Gnats: Nos 2 23 - Two Squadrons
Vampires : 10 24 45 101PR 108PR 220 221 - Seven Squadrons (Three Regular, two PR, two Aux AF)

Thats 22 Combat capable squadrons + 3 PR/Trg Sqns.

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Postby daulat » 29 Nov 2005 01:07

at this stage PLAAF was Mig15 and Mig 17 right? No Mig19's as yet? Hunters should have been able to properly intercept Il28's

i suppose another problem would have been the lack of jet capable IAF bases in the NE and Ladakh

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Postby H Sen » 29 Nov 2005 02:13

PLAAF had nearly 200 Mig-19s at that time, plus over 1300 Mig15/17, according to an earlier post, which sounds about right. So IAF Hunters (six squadrons) would have been heavily outnumbered. Hunters and even Mysteres could have handled the IL-28s without too many problems if they attacked Indian cities, though - the Beagles and their fighter escorts would have been at extreme range, without reserve fuel for air combat maneuvers.

This still leaves us with the question: how many aircraft could each side deploy in the theater of operations? That's more relevant, I think, than total numbers of aircraft in each air force. How good was the Chinese logistical situation in Tibet in 1962 - their ability to bring up large quantities of bombs, jet fuel, spares, etc? And what about our own logistical situation in Ladakh and NEFA? Does anybody know?

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Postby daulat » 29 Nov 2005 02:19

from memory of pushpinder singh's book on the IAF, he hints that logistics on our side was not great. i doubt that even baghdogra could have handled fast jets, possibly gauhati. certainly kalaikunda/dum dum would have been too far for nefa. in ladakh, barring srinagar, not too many options

also PLAAF would not be deploying that many fast jets on our theatre, they didn't have a lot of bases in tibet and anyway, were heavily dependant on the xingjiang road through aksai chin to replenish the plateau

i remember reading on BRF recently that someone dissuaded us from using air, and besides the political mood in delhi was one of despair, so ideas would have fallen on stony ground

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Postby ShibaPJ » 29 Nov 2005 03:44

A very clear message, similar to the Monroe Doctrine, should be sent out to China: any attempt to establish a military presence in any South Asian country will lead to an Indian attack upon that country. Pakistan will have to be exempted, of course - not much we can do about that.


H Sen,
How many countries have we attacked in our neighbourhood, who have been inimical or hostile to us? Pakies have been bleeding us since 80's. Bangladesh is churning out Jehadi's faster than you can blink your eyes, and Myanmar has had operating NE terrorist camps for quite some time (though they themselves might want to get rid of the scums anyway). We have been way too tolerant of the younger siblings around us (we won't lose even if u bleed us 1000 times, so you might as well try it 1500 times).

Nehru lost it totally in '62, as he lost it in '47; power only respects power. We need to convey that we can scratch each others back till you behave properly, or else the kid gloves are off. Unfortunately, our ruling class does not bother as long as the aam aadmi and the military keeps on paying the price for their stupendous stupidity. :evil:

Sorry for digressing from the main topic though, I still daydream about reversing the string of pearls, (cultivate Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan....) and teaching the Chinkis a lesson. Start by handing these guys couple of Brahmos & Prithvis etc etc... Vietnamese can repaint and testfire one of these and say they developed it in about a week and they are ready for serial productions :wink:

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Re: What are the lessons of the 1962 Sino-Indo War?

Postby asprinzl » 29 Nov 2005 03:57

elmihiro wrote:
Raj Malhotra wrote: [b] The biggest mistake I think we made was that we did not commit our airforce.


You may be right. But was our Air Force large enough to repel the Chinese forces, even if air superiority was achieved? Did the IAF have any experiece in 1962. The Chinese had the experience of the Korean War.

Secondly, it should be remembered that Iraq had achieved almost total air superiority during the Iran-Iraq War. But this still did not neable them to repulse Iranian human-wave attacks. The same might hold true in this case. I wonder what the gurus have to say about this.


China's Korean War experience was not a militaryly worth experience. They learned how to let a thousand of their soldiers get killed to capture a machine gun post once the post ran out of ammo. What military experience was that? Almost a million Chinese soldiers lost their lives in KOREA>

Between 1957 and 1960 Mao killed between 30 to 50 million Chinese through his various political and economic policies. Among these hundreds of generals, thousands of other ranking officers and tens of thousands of other military men including combat pilots, engineers, mechanics etc were decimated.

The Chinese air power had the intimidating numbers but without good pilots, good ground crews, good mechanics (many of whom perished in the above mentioned tragedy) the numbers of bombers and fighters were just that-numbers.

Yet, they trounced India in 1962. Why? How? However tyrannical he was, we have to give it to Mao for his leadership in this regard. He was willing to gamble and play hardball. Ofcourse he sacrificed lots of lives for his gambles. BUt history will mostly remember him not for his failures but for his victories.

Nehru's may not have willingly sacrificed Indian lives but his inaction which in itself is a gamble cost indian lives nevertheless. History will remember him for his blunders.

A thousand years from now we would still be wondering what the hell was going on in Nehru's mind. This was not his first mistake.

In my understanding Nehru's come on like an arrogant aristocrat who despise those he thought lower than him. He despised the "lowly" military profession. He knew better because he is more intellectual than anybody. Thus Indian forces were ordered to reteat or halt their advance in the first Kashmir war right after freedom. Thus India lost a chance to have contiguos territory to Central Asia. Imagine what would that be in present context? He allowed the UNSC seat to be given to China. He allowed Kashmir to have a special status within the Indian Union.
AS

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Postby Tim » 29 Nov 2005 04:00

Jagan,

Thanks - I had a feeling you had more accurate data.

Tim

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Re: What are the lessons of the 1962 Sino-Indo War?

Postby ShibaPJ » 29 Nov 2005 04:32

asprinzl wrote:
elmihiro wrote:
Raj Malhotra wrote: [b] The biggest mistake I think we made was that we did not commit our airforce.


You may be right. But was our Air Force large enough to repel the Chinese forces, even if air superiority was achieved? Did the IAF have any experiece in 1962. The Chinese had the experience of the Korean War.
.......
A thousand years from now we would still be wondering what the hell was going on in Nehru's mind. This was not his first mistake.

In my understanding Nehru's come on like an arrogant aristocrat who despise those he thought lower than him. He despised the "lowly" military profession. He knew better because he is more intellectual than anybody. Thus Indian forces were ordered to reteat or halt their advance in the first Kashmir war right after freedom. Thus India lost a chance to have contiguos territory to Central Asia. Imagine what would that be in present context? He allowed the UNSC seat to be given to China. He allowed Kashmir to have a special status within the Indian Union.
AS


AS... Darn right, Nehru single-handedly lost more for India than probably anyone else in the post-independence history..

I would like to point out a major disadvantage of PLAF for '62.. For the Korea war, Chinkies had airfields in much lower altitude and probably much closer, this allowing them to go on offensive. With India, flying from Tibet over such long distances in sch a high altitude, any numerical advantages would have been severly eroded. That would have allowed IAF to hold out on defensive role as well as probably go on ground-support role, though I don't know what was the actual war-fighting doctrine of IAF then. May be the more enlightened members can throw light on this..

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Postby svinayak » 29 Nov 2005 04:59

http://in.rediff.com/news/2002/oct/19brahma.htm
The Rediff Special/Brahma Chellaney
Forty years Ago Today ...

The aims of Mao's India war were mainly political. The military objectives had largely been achieved in the earlier years through furtive Chinese encroachments on Indian territories after China's 1950 occupation of Tibet --- a historical buffer --- brought Chinese forces to India's frontiers for the first time in history. By quietly seizing Indian territory on the basis of Tibet's putative historical links, China had built a land corridor to close ally Pakistan.

Mao had been determined to cut India to size and undermine what it represented --- a pluralistic, democratic model for the developing world that seemingly threatened China's totalitarian political system. His premier, Zhou Enlai, readily admitted that the war was intended "to teach India a lesson".

In one stroke, Mao also wrecked the international stature of Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru, the key architect of the Non-Aligned Movement. Defeat transformed Nehru from a statesman into a beaten, exhausted politician, hastening his death.



TIMING OF THE WAR

Besides, extended border negotiations with India had been employed by Mao not only to feign reasonableness but, more importantly, to buy time to improve Chinese military logistics along the mighty Himalayas and to await the right opportunity to strike.

The first wave of Chinese military assaults on Indian positions in the western and eastern sectors began on October 20, five days after the CIA formally determined the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba through reconnaissance photographs. A day before the start of the attacks, Radio Moscow was citing US naval manoeuvres in the Caribbean as preparations for an invasion of Cuba. And the day the Chinese forces came pouring across the Himalayas, a US naval quarantine of Cuba was in effect. By the time the Chinese halted their weeklong incursions, the world was on the edge of a nuclear Armageddon due to the Cuban missile crisis.

Not content with the easy battlefield victories against the outnumbered and outgunned Indian forces, Mao launched a second wave of military assaults on India three weeks later before the abating Cuban missile crisis had wound up. The threat of a nuclear holocaust had eased after Khrushchev gave in on October 28 and agreed to withdraw the missiles from Cuba. But Cuban strongman Fidel Castro was still refusing UN on-site inspections and the withdrawal of Soviet Il-28 bombers.

On November 21, coinciding with Washington's formal termination of Cuba's quarantine after Castro fell in line, Beijing announced a unilateral ceasefire and its intent to withdraw from India's Northeast while keeping the military gains in Ladakh.

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Postby ramana » 29 Nov 2005 05:03

Why did Mao want to wreck NAM? In 1955 NAM was launched with great fanfare at Bandung with three founding states- India, Indonesia and Egypt. The last two states were led by two dictators- Nasser and Sukarno. Was NAM that important that it had to be undermined?

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Postby svinayak » 29 Nov 2005 05:30

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archi ... a/ch05.htm

In China, 1962 was the year when they got "over the hump" in harvests, in consumer goods and in the general economy, when people in all areas began to feel not merely recovery but the sense of a coming upsurge. Other friends will tell about it below. In the world, the main events were three at the year's end: the Cuban Crisis and the Sino-Indian Conflict and the beginning of the Great communist Debate.

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Postby appuseth » 29 Nov 2005 06:04

Yet, they trounced India in 1962. Why? How?


At the time, the Indian forces were very ill-equipped, and greatly outnumbered. Indian soldiers did not have proper boots and clothing for mountainous terrain, and had not been properly acclimatized to the high altitude. Besides that, they did not even have the ammunition needed to fight the war. It was foolish to expect a victory when the soldiers were in such condition. :x

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Postby Jagan » 29 Nov 2005 10:06

Tim, had it in my notes. .just had to filter the info and select as on date.

In addition to the above. there were fiveheli units.

104 Heli Sqn Bell 47 / Sikorsky 55
105 HU Mi-4
107 HU Bell 47 / S-62
109 HU Mi-4
110 HU (Newly Raised) Mi-4

Transports (11 Sqns on paper - but some sqns were half strength)

Dakotas
11 Sqn
12 Sqn
43 Sqn

Otters
41 Sqn
59 Sqn

C-119
48 Sqn
19 Sqn
49 Sqn

An-12
44 Sqn (Half)

Il-14
42 Sqn

Connies 6
6 Sqn

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Postby Shankar » 30 Nov 2005 15:32

During the entire build up to war -indian political leadership was paralysed bu thoughts of conflict escalation . No fighter flights were allowed within 15 miles of international border only transport flights were allowed. Only much later canbera flights were cleared for ops flying mainly recon and aerial photography to monitor chinese deploymet and each flight had to be cleared on a case to case basis .

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Postby satya » 30 Nov 2005 15:55

Hi Guys,

has any body read today's HT[hindustan times] editorial regarding indian defence forces , i am quoting a few lines from there
2002, the army was ready to launch an attack on Pakistan and would have executed their plans with their customary bravery. But given the force ratios, and the limits imposed by the nuclear dimension, it is doubtful whether our army could have achieved any significant physical or psychological objectives. With China, there is another kind of a problem. India has the capacity to make serious inroads into Tibet in any conventional war. But it’s another 3,000 km before you reach China’s heartland and so, war with our present configuration of forces is a no-win option.

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Postby Singha » 30 Nov 2005 15:57

Nehru was no less arrogant and autocratic than the chinese leadership. he had his own trusted bagcarriers like Kaul (fellow kashmiri cabal?) and decided like Hitler he was the biggest mil-strategic genius around.

such kind of leaders usually result in lost conflicts and thats what we got.

morale of story: if you arent prepared for a serious fight, dont provoke the
bull. if you provoke the bull/want to cut him down to size - be prepared first.

however he was last peacenik PM until inder gujral got the job. these two are probably the worst candlekisser PM. I am leaving out the spaced out deve gowda...he just played with his grandkids and slept on the job.

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Postby shiv » 30 Nov 2005 16:46

China is currently arming itself mainly for a Taiwan showdown. But its economy is so huge that its armed forces will be "out of reach" for India in the next decade or so.

If India can get its Air Force in order - with the required squadron strength of modern, networked, PGM armed planes - it should be a great help in thwarting any Chinese territorial push.

But late than that India needs to get enough submarines and surface ships to check a PLAAN that could mine or block Indian ports. Such a scenario is a long way away - but that is exactly why we need to plan for it now.

Indianeeds to have the Naval strength to stop oil supply to China via the Indian ocean. That would make China threaten nuclear war. So we need to be prepared with a MAD so that the Chinese elite commie-party leadership do not get away.

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Develop the infrastructure in N E

Postby b_karan » 30 Nov 2005 17:56

The most important task for India should be to rapidly modernize the infrastructure in North East , because this is the region thats gonna play a very crucial role during the event of any all out war with China.

As we all the infrastructure in Tibbet and the speed with which its coming up. as far as mainland china in concerned , I hope AGNI 3 is the most befitting reply for Beijing .

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Postby b_karan » 30 Nov 2005 18:11

satya wrote:Hi Guys,

has any body read today's HT[hindustan times] editorial regarding indian defence forces , i am quoting a few lines from there
2002, the army was ready to launch an attack on Pakistan and would have executed their plans with their customary bravery. But given the force ratios, and the limits imposed by the nuclear dimension, it is doubtful whether our army could have achieved any significant physical or psychological objectives. With China, there is another kind of a problem. India has the capacity to make serious inroads into Tibet in any conventional war. But it’s another 3,000 km before you reach China’s heartland and so, war with our present configuration of forces is a no-win option.



As far as China ia concerned , ideally every one feels that its a no-win situation for us just because the mainland China is 3000Kms away .
I hope Indian Army or IAF for that matter wont b going all the way to bomb Beijing , rather AGNI 3 or SURYA (AGNI 4) will makes it way . It would be really a befitting response to any missile strike by CHINA in an even of war , which would by any mean wiping out an INDIAN CITY. So its better to strike where it hurts most.
Probably this will also give chance to Tibbetian to raise the flag of freedom in case of any war and once their is an internal uprising that would be the right time to tackle this "RED MENANCE" .

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Postby b_karan » 30 Nov 2005 18:14

ShibaPJ wrote:
A very clear message, similar to the Monroe Doctrine, should be sent out to China: any attempt to establish a military presence in any South Asian country will lead to an Indian attack upon that country. Pakistan will have to be exempted, of course - not much we can do about that.


H Sen,
How many countries have we attacked in our neighbourhood, who have been inimical or hostile to us? Pakies have been bleeding us since 80's. Bangladesh is churning out Jehadi's faster than you can blink your eyes, and Myanmar has had operating NE terrorist camps for quite some time (though they themselves might want to get rid of the scums anyway). We have been way too tolerant of the younger siblings around us (we won't lose even if u bleed us 1000 times, so you might as well try it 1500 times).

Nehru lost it totally in '62, as he lost it in '47; power only respects power. We need to convey that we can scratch each others back till you behave properly, or else the kid gloves are off. Unfortunately, our ruling class does not bother as long as the aam aadmi and the military keeps on paying the price for their stupendous stupidity. :evil:

Sorry for digressing from the main topic though, I still daydream about reversing the string of pearls, (cultivate Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan....) and teaching the Chinkis a lesson. Start by handing these guys couple of Brahmos & Prithvis etc etc... Vietnamese can repaint and testfire one of these and say they developed it in about a week and they are ready for serial productions :wink:



Good News Boss .....today only we tested BRAHMOS

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Postby Sunil » 30 Nov 2005 19:44

Hi,

I agree with Anoop.

The PLA's numerical superiority would not have played a part due to the fact that they had maybe one or two major airfields in the region. Getting fuel and ammo up to those airfields would have been difficult and harder still to get things to subsidiary airfields once the main ones were disabled.

I am not sure how the Korean air war vets would have performed with far lesser range and ammo on their aircraft. It is unclear to me how many Korean war vets would have been pulled away from other duties in China and it is not clear what the actual competency of their pilots as a whole was. These even today are imponderables. Even today I have no answer to the question of the pilot effectiveness of the PLAAF's Su-30MKK drivers.

How would the PLAAF have operated in the Tibet environment. How would they have arranged GCI in the mountains. How accurate were Chinese GIS? There are no answers to these questions today and I feel there were no reliable answers to this stuff back then and that more than anything else dampened the PM's enthusiasm for an escalation.

You cannot escalate into complete darkness - you have to have an idea of the political costs of the situation when you militarily decide to up the ante. The Americans repeatedly told PM Nehru, that they could not guarentee political support due to the situation in Cuba and that he should not escalate. The IA's own assessments of the situation fluctuated wildly and it took someone of the caliber of Gen. Maneckshaw to sort things out.

Since Mao controlled everything inside China - he was able to ensure that the PLA did what it was told so the quality of his assessments of the situation was higher. PM Nehru suffered from a disconnect with the Armed forces, and while some blame this on his defence minister, there was a wider problem at hand which I choose not to discuss at this point.

Kudos to the Chinese for having sensed and exploited a gap in the adversary's security machinery. After having shown India who is the big-boss of Asia, the Chinese Communist thugs promptly went off and slaughtered millions of Chinese in the cultural revolution - far more than the IA could have in its wildest dreams. With so fantastically superior regional power in Asia - India could not possible hope to compete. :roll:

ps. I remain very skeptical about the ranges of the Beagles when operating from bases on the Tibetan plateau. I seriously doubt they would have been able to field a sizable force of Mig 19s from their Tibetan airbases. All this should have been obvious to the IAF people assessing the threat but as I said earlier there was a disconnect between the military and the political leadership on the Indian side.

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Postby Sunil » 30 Nov 2005 20:17

Hi,

The old deterrence equation was that the Indians would not base any airplanes capable of carrying nuclear weapons within range of China's cities and in return the Chinese would not place nuclear tipped MRBMs in the tibetan plateau.

This needs to be reworked as imo - the Chinese are building airports of size in the TAR. This will greatly enhance their ability to operate larger numbers of airplanes esp. nuclear capable ones in the TAR. The PLAAF is operating air-air refueling. This will affect the deterrence equations. Also as the PLA actually owns most of the commericial long range jet fleet in China, I see no alternative to including those in their list of nuclear delivery options.

This leaves us no choice at our end but to increase the strength of the IAF and the number of bases lining the border, improve the quality of radar coverage on eastern the LoAC, and expand the agni fleet.

There is no way for the Chinese to actually stop us from doing any of these things. In a re-run of the DANK scenario, it is possible for the Chinese to conduct low level escalations in the Arunachal area but these will only provoke India to strengthen its defences and will not yeild anything meaningful on the negotiating table.

The only way to prevent India from doing this is for the Chinese to demilitarize Tibet.

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Postby ShibaPJ » 30 Nov 2005 20:34

shiv wrote:China is currently arming itself mainly for a Taiwan showdown. But its economy is so huge that its armed forces will be "out of reach" for India in the next decade or so.

If India can get its Air Force in order - with the required squadron strength of modern, networked, PGM armed planes - it should be a great help in thwarting any Chinese territorial push.

But late than that India needs to get enough submarines and surface ships to check a PLAAN that could mine or block Indian ports. Such a scenario is a long way away - but that is exactly why we need to plan for it now.

Indianeeds to have the Naval strength to stop oil supply to China via the Indian ocean. That would make China threaten nuclear war. So we need to be prepared with a MAD so that the Chinese elite commie-party leadership do not get away.


Fully agree with you, Shiv. We should be able to hit Chinese where it hurts most. Owing to the China border terain, full-scale infantry battles can be ruled out on Tibetan side. Alongwith a blockade of fuel/ oil supplies and sea-denial to PLAAN in Indian ocean, we should also be able to hit any future supply from Central-asian republics, whenever they come up. I don't think the war would be a long-drawn one, and certainly not a nuclear one, Chinese also know the nuclear laxman-rekha. Why do you think Pakis have survived so far with such extreme provocations to India? Whether we admit it or not, Mush's N-threat was/ still is the biggest factor.

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Postby shiv » 30 Nov 2005 22:13

Sunil wrote:
This needs to be reworked as imo - the Chinese are building airports of size in the TAR. This will greatly enhance their ability to operate larger numbers of airplanes esp. nuclear capable ones in the TAR. The PLAAF is operating air-air refueling. This will affect the deterrence equations. Also as the PLA actually owns most of the commericial long range jet fleet in China, I see no alternative to including those in their list of nuclear delivery options. .


Sunil I located 3 Chinese airfields in Tibet and placemarked them on Google earth.

I am told (by a vayusena type) that China has 14 airfields in Tibet. How did I miss so many??? :shock:

But at least one of the airfields I found seems to have a 5 km long runway and none of them is less than 10000 feet up in the plateau.

The question is at those altitudes you cannot get fully loaded planes to take off or land. That necessraily restricts the loads that Chinese combat aircraft can carry in terms of munitions and fuel.

Secondly I have repeatedly heard that the PLAAF has not yet succeeded in air-air refuelling.

If India invests in its Air force sensibly - we can maintain air superiority over Tibet for decades. IF. The operative word is IF.

China has recently completed a railway line to Lhasa. Bridges on that line need to be marked for PGM therapy in case of aggravation.

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Postby daulat » 30 Nov 2005 22:23

shiv, i believe the train lines run across wide open plateaus, generally easy for air interdiction in my limited understanding of such things

the real point of the rail line is though that the tibs are screwed for good now

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Postby Anoop » 01 Dec 2005 04:33

Sunil,

Ashley Tellis' book contends that the range of even the Su-30 is insufficient to be a nuclear deterrent since it would have to fly in a lo-lo-lo profile (incidently, can anyone tell me what exactly that means? Flying low in ingress, attack and egress modes?). Even with refueling capacity, it is unlikely to be our delivery vehicle since refuelling would have to be over hostile airspace and hence risky. I can post numbers from the book later tonight if need be. Although thinking about it, there are other routes to South China over other airspaces that may not be contested....

Agni-III deployment is very necessary, I think.

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Postby JCage » 01 Dec 2005 04:40

And why does Tellis think that only a lo-lo-lo profile is necessary for a deterrent against TSP? Think about it- how many S-300's does TSP have, and can they with certainty stop a flotilla of Su-30's etc, when the IAF makes diversionary attacks elsewhere?

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Postby Anoop » 01 Dec 2005 04:59

JCage,

I forgot to mention that the deterrence talked about in the book was w.r.t China, not Pak. For the latter, range of aircraft even in the lo-lo-lo profile was not considered a problem.

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Postby Sunil » 01 Dec 2005 06:56

Hi Shiv,

I have heard the number 14 thrown around I am not sure if these are in outer tibet only or if they are including stuff in Amdo also.

The ones that I know of are

1) Damxung
2) Lhasa (Gongkar) (Ramai)
3) Xigaze
4) Qamdo Bamda
5) Nyingchi Airport
6) Shiquanhe Airport (Ngari)
7) Lhunze Airport (Linzhi)
8 ) Ali Airport,
9) Rikezhe Airport,
10) Naqu Airport (Nagchu?)
11) Lhasa No.2 Airport (???)
12) Xining Airport (Qinghai)
13) Yushu Airport (Qinghai)
14) Golmud (Qinghai)

there are allegedly others. I had asked someone to do an SRR photoessay on Chinese airfields in Tibet but the person did not deliver. The project is open if you want to pick it up.

I think twelve airports are listed in the download [url=" http://www.flight1.com/products.asp?product=TF2004"]here[/url]. I don't know how good these are, but people can practice landing a 747 there and tell me what sort of runway length they eat up. If you can land a fully loaded 747 there you can land a well equipped fighter there. Any takers?
Last edited by Sunil on 01 Dec 2005 07:18, edited 4 times in total.

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Postby shiv » 01 Dec 2005 07:07

Anoop wrote:lo-lo-lo profile
..
Agni-III deployment is very necessary, I think.


lo-lo-lo: Low altitude approach to target, Low duing attack, Low altitude getaway - at all times keeping "under the radar" Similarly hi-lo-hi, lo-lo-hi. I would have though a nuclear "bum" attack would be lo-hi-hi

I am not at all sure how an aircraft from India can make a lo lo lo attack on any part of China except by overflying sevearl SE Asian countries.

But folks - why are we talking only of nuclear retaliation. There is a huge space for maneuvering between two nations like India and China before nukes are considered.

In the case of Pakistan, Pakis have tried to reduce the space for maneuver to zero. Are we not reducing our space for maneuver with China to zero by talking nukes? Sure we need a deterrent that hits places that will hurt, but there is a lot more that can happen before anyone starts lobbing nukes at anyone else.

I am certain that China would not be interested in getting into a disastrous nuke war with India precisely because it would put China in a much weaker position vis a vis Taiwan and Japan, leave alone the US.

China has attempted in recent years to appear friendly and less threatening to its neighbors - a posture that is designed to win trust and drive the US out.

But China needs to go a long way before it earns trust with India - primarly because of its proliferation to Pakistan. We need to build up navy to hurt China in the Indian ocean and in Chinese waters - at medium distance from China. Any Chinese galata in Pakistan should start putting Chinese supply lines at risk.

We can sweeten the path for China if it plays ball. Our development can be linked with Chinese development. But we need to build up relatively foolproof nethods of hurting China for the ******** shown to India in the 20-21st centuries. China's suspicion of Japan and the West may be justified for historic reasons - but they have messed with India for nothing and should never be trusted until they back down fully from any sort of threatening posture.

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Postby shiv » 01 Dec 2005 07:13

Sunil wrote: If you can land a fully loaded 747 there you can land a well equipped fighter there. Any takers?


Sunil no "fully loaded" plane will land anywhere in the world. Even 747s jettison fuel before emergency landings in Mumbai at sea level.

You can take off a fully loaded Su 30 in an Indian airbase - fully loaded with fuel and munitions and fly it to a target in Tibet, but it is less easy to take off a fuly loaded Su 27, carrying its full load of munitions and fuel. You have to trade off on one of these - either range or warload. from Tibet - probably both. Similar restrictions will apply to transport aircraft.

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Postby Sunil » 01 Dec 2005 07:25

shiv wrote:
Sunil wrote: If you can land a fully loaded 747 there you can land a well equipped fighter there. Any takers?


Sunil no "fully loaded" plane will land anywhere in the world. Even 747s jettison fuel before emergency landings in Mumbai at sea level.

You can take off a fully loaded Su 30 in an Indian airbase - fully loaded with fuel and munitions and fly it to a target in Tibet, but it is less easy to take off a fuly loaded Su 27, carrying its full load of munitions and fuel. You have to trade off on one of these - either range or warload. from Tibet - probably both. Similar restrictions will apply to transport aircraft.


Shiv,

Sorry that is a typo on my part it should have read take off in a 747 with full load.

I worked on this stuff about four years ago when me Nitin and George J attempted a analysis of the Su-30MKK's true capabilities. At that time we didn't have Google Earth and there was little interest in our investigation elsewhere as the pilot training issue was quite difficult to ascertain. Also the J-11s produced in China were showing a number of problems so few people appeared interested in what we had to say - so the project was abandoned. At that time I had also spent some time with a formula that gives you the MTOW as a function of altitude IIRC Narayanan had pointed me to it. I also recall discussing a scheme to track the number of training hours per pilot by remote telemetry but that idea was just dismissed as "expensive fantastic nonsense". Now with the increased operational capabilities of the TAR airfields becoming apparent perhaps people will change their minds... who knows.

Also if it is the way I think it is -- then lo-lo-lo or lo-hi-hi meaningless its lo-lo or lo-hi after that its over - it will be a one way trip.


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