joey...
since there were some reference of battles and some wars in sanskrit language related article, same was posted for better understanding of ancient time/wars/battles.
cheers!
Historical Battles in Ancient & Medieval Bharat
PANIPAT---THE HUNT FOR ALLIES
The Bhau's original plan was to cross the Yamuna River at Agra and threaten Abdali's position near Aligarh. He could also then send his cavalry to ravage the Ruhela lands and starve the Abdali army of its food supply. But his most cherished hope was that by crossing the Yamuna he could prevent the Nawab of Awadh from joining the enemy, and in case he did so, could force his retreat by invading Awadh.
But the early monsoon rains had so flooded the rivers that the Yamuna could not be crossed even by boats. Still the Bhau kept alive his hope of detaching Shuja-ud-daulah, the Awadh Nawab, from the enemy's side by offering him the post of Wazir in Delhi. Awadh was then the richest kingdom in India; it had never been invaded by an outside force, and the policies of its Shia rulers had been a general understanding with the Marathas against the Sunni powers...thus far.
Ironically the position of the Hindu states, like Jaipur, Bharatpur, and Jodhpur, was entirely different. They had all been invaded and forced to pay chauth to the Marathas. (Even the proud Rajput Kingdom of Mewar, whose rulers had never submitted to the Mughals, was visited by Peshwa Baji Rao in 1736 and forced to pay an annual tribute of Rs 1.5 lakh). The Bhau now attempted to conciliate these states——when entering Bharatpur territory he issued strict instructions to his soldiers to avoid harassing villagers or inadvertently trampling their crop.
And to further reassure the Jat ruler Suraj Mal, that he would not be forced to into paying his due tribute, Malhar Holkar first paid him a visit and took the most solemn personal oaths for his safety. It was only after this that Suraj Mal met the Bhau (30th June) and went with him to examine the state of the Yamuna near Agra. Bharatpur (and Jaipur) was the only Hindu state with modern artillery and sufficient infantry. So this alliance promised to even out the balance between the Abdali and Maratha armies.
Suraj Mal's ambition was to further expand his kingdom, which he hoped to accomplish by his alliance with the Mughal Wazir Imad-ul-mulk, then living in his kingdom as a refugee. Suraj Mal and Malhar Holkar advised the Bhau to camp in Bharatpur territory, wait for the river levels to fall, and then ravage the Ruhela and Awadh lands with his cavalry. Unfortunately the Bhau did not have the financial resources to sustain his immobilized army for such a long period (at least 3 or 4 months).
The Bhau moved north and captured Delhi on 3rd August from its Abdali occupiers. The news came like a bolt of lightning to the Abdali army across the Yamuna.....for the situation in their camp was bad. The money provided by Najib Khan Ruhela had been consumed and the army was close to starvation. And now the loss of Delhi and the breaking of their communication links wrecked the morale of the Muslim army.
Shuja-ud-daulah sent a peace proposal to the Bhau, suggesting that he be made the Delhi Wazir to settle the rival Maratha and Abdali claims, upon which the two sides would return to their own homes.
The Bhau took this proposal to be a sign of weakness, but welcomed it in order to lure Shuja away from the Abdali side. This move antagonized the Jat ruler Suraj Mal since his ambitions of expanding his kingdom with Imad-ul-mulk's help were thwarted. These two abandoned the Maratha side, even though Bhau attempted to pacify them, and the result was that the Marathas had no ally. More importantly, in case of a setback, they would have no secure base to retire to.
But the capture of Delhi, and the resultant panic in the enemy camp, had filled the Bhau with confidence as he rightly boasts in his letter, "Ahmad Bangash and some Ruhelas are going away to their homes. Shuja now realises what to expect from his having joined the Abdali! Interal dissension is increasing among the Durrani sardars..."
How this position was altered by the Bhau's weak financial condition will be related in thenext post.
The Bhau's original plan was to cross the Yamuna River at Agra and threaten Abdali's position near Aligarh. He could also then send his cavalry to ravage the Ruhela lands and starve the Abdali army of its food supply. But his most cherished hope was that by crossing the Yamuna he could prevent the Nawab of Awadh from joining the enemy, and in case he did so, could force his retreat by invading Awadh.
But the early monsoon rains had so flooded the rivers that the Yamuna could not be crossed even by boats. Still the Bhau kept alive his hope of detaching Shuja-ud-daulah, the Awadh Nawab, from the enemy's side by offering him the post of Wazir in Delhi. Awadh was then the richest kingdom in India; it had never been invaded by an outside force, and the policies of its Shia rulers had been a general understanding with the Marathas against the Sunni powers...thus far.
Ironically the position of the Hindu states, like Jaipur, Bharatpur, and Jodhpur, was entirely different. They had all been invaded and forced to pay chauth to the Marathas. (Even the proud Rajput Kingdom of Mewar, whose rulers had never submitted to the Mughals, was visited by Peshwa Baji Rao in 1736 and forced to pay an annual tribute of Rs 1.5 lakh). The Bhau now attempted to conciliate these states——when entering Bharatpur territory he issued strict instructions to his soldiers to avoid harassing villagers or inadvertently trampling their crop.
And to further reassure the Jat ruler Suraj Mal, that he would not be forced to into paying his due tribute, Malhar Holkar first paid him a visit and took the most solemn personal oaths for his safety. It was only after this that Suraj Mal met the Bhau (30th June) and went with him to examine the state of the Yamuna near Agra. Bharatpur (and Jaipur) was the only Hindu state with modern artillery and sufficient infantry. So this alliance promised to even out the balance between the Abdali and Maratha armies.
Suraj Mal's ambition was to further expand his kingdom, which he hoped to accomplish by his alliance with the Mughal Wazir Imad-ul-mulk, then living in his kingdom as a refugee. Suraj Mal and Malhar Holkar advised the Bhau to camp in Bharatpur territory, wait for the river levels to fall, and then ravage the Ruhela and Awadh lands with his cavalry. Unfortunately the Bhau did not have the financial resources to sustain his immobilized army for such a long period (at least 3 or 4 months).
The Bhau moved north and captured Delhi on 3rd August from its Abdali occupiers. The news came like a bolt of lightning to the Abdali army across the Yamuna.....for the situation in their camp was bad. The money provided by Najib Khan Ruhela had been consumed and the army was close to starvation. And now the loss of Delhi and the breaking of their communication links wrecked the morale of the Muslim army.
Shuja-ud-daulah sent a peace proposal to the Bhau, suggesting that he be made the Delhi Wazir to settle the rival Maratha and Abdali claims, upon which the two sides would return to their own homes.
The Bhau took this proposal to be a sign of weakness, but welcomed it in order to lure Shuja away from the Abdali side. This move antagonized the Jat ruler Suraj Mal since his ambitions of expanding his kingdom with Imad-ul-mulk's help were thwarted. These two abandoned the Maratha side, even though Bhau attempted to pacify them, and the result was that the Marathas had no ally. More importantly, in case of a setback, they would have no secure base to retire to.
But the capture of Delhi, and the resultant panic in the enemy camp, had filled the Bhau with confidence as he rightly boasts in his letter, "Ahmad Bangash and some Ruhelas are going away to their homes. Shuja now realises what to expect from his having joined the Abdali! Interal dissension is increasing among the Durrani sardars..."
How this position was altered by the Bhau's weak financial condition will be related in thenext post.
Murugan, That post really doesn't belong to this thread. By that analogy every thread becomes free for all. So please edit your post.Murugan wrote:joey...
since there were some reference of battles and some wars in Sanskrit language related article, same was posted for better understanding of ancient time/wars/battles.
cheers!
Thanks, ramana
1. One side's zeal is one side's story. What about the bankruptcy and war fatigue of Byzantines, Persians and to a lesser extent successors of the Kushans? All three of them had been locked in ruinous stalemate for centuries (just see what happened to Soviet Union in less than 50 years between 45-91). Each one of them had also dragged smaller states into equally weakening wars.Anand K wrote:The Rashidun and Ummayid phases of Islam was characterized by zealous expansion of the Land of Islam. The post of the Caliph, the "divine mission" and fundae like convert-or-die was strong. With the Abbasid Revolution and the changing character of Islamic center of power, the expansion of the faith phase ended. Of course, there was expansion in the name of Islam but not in a way prescribed by the Quran. The first Muslims took Mohammed's words seriously... you even had self-fulfilling prophecies like the Battle of the Masts and the First Battle for Constantinople. For example thousands went to their certain deaths (including the senior companion, Abu Ansari) at the double walls of still mighty Constantinople simply because Mohammed said that the first invasion of Rome shall fail and a third of the Muslims would die (and go to heaven of course). Even Mohammed's (apparent) advice to respect India ("the winds blowing from the Hind..." speech, wasn't it?) was closely followed till the 712AD expedition. It is perhaps one explanation why the ravaging Arab hordes went north to comparatively penniless Turan instead of India once they took Persia. I believe I had made a post on the Islamic invasion of the CAR to the advent of Subutkgin.....
Note that the change, though appearing trivial, is important...... the "decline of the spirit" was an major development and you have many famous Arabic poems lamenting this (Trivia Time: IIRC the fall of Jerusalem to the Crusaders and the fact that few Muslim rulers even cared was compared to this "loss of faith". They say it was some old Mullah who broke the Ramzan fast inside a mosque.... when challenged by the faithful he replied that why should he care for rituals now that nobody's bothered about the loss of a city like Jersualem. A few weeks later the Islamic counter-attack was launched....) . Now you had Ghoris and Ghaznis conquering India and pillaging/subjugating her lands but surely not in the way Khalid Ibn Walid or Amr Al A'as or Abi Waqas or an Ibn Muslim. These guys were the real deal, and so was a Caliph like Omar..... whole populations were wiped out, whole cities turned to dust if they didn't yield right away. Didn't spare the Arab rebels, Muslim dissenters (on paying Zakat) and surely not the powerful rival prophet, Musalaima. In fact they wasted half the "true companions" in Yamama trying to get Musalaima..... the loss of so many friends-cum-secretaries to Mohammed was what set into motion the actual writing of the Quran. The zeal could be understood by the way they conquered Turkestan from the mighty Tangs..... IIRC the whole impeial Tang army was annihilated in Taraz.
OTOH Ghori nominally sent a letter in praise of the Caliphate and received a Chadr/title in return but the Caliph's control was totally absent. Powerful kings like Balban and A Khilji did away with this custom... For the most part, the conquest of Hindustan was seen as a political and not a matter of Jannat and Jahannum affair. If it was really a jihad (in the full sense of the word), you wouldn't have a Tilak commanding Ghaznavi's forces or half a dozen Deccanis in and out of alliances with Vijayanagar or the Gajapatis. Moreover, after the Khalji Revolution the Hindustani Party (comparatively better disposed to Kufr) ascended the throne and held power till the death of Akbar. The Turanis/Siddis/Arabs etc had massacred millions of Hindus on the most trifling excuses or campaigns but the Hindustanis were content to see them as Dhimmi fellow countrymen.
PS: Note the death of Akbar also heralded the rapid comeback of Turani Faction (by the time of Jahangir most Jagirdars/mansabdars above the medium Zat level were Turanis/Iranis) and this soon led to the break-up of the empire. This continued till the rise of the Hindustani faction once again under the Sayyid Brothers, but they were treacherously murdered by the other factions. And the prize they received in return, independent domains in Hyderabad, Awadh and Bengal!
2. Could you give the text of Muhammed's "the winds blowing from the Hind" speech? What was the context of the speech? Was it political, religious, or, as is often the case with Islam, equal parts of both?
3. Quite recently I read about the Battle of Rajasthan and a similar battle in Gujarat - both fought in 8th and early 9th Century. In the first case, feudatory states of the erstwhile Rashtrakutas had apparently formed a "Rajput Confederacy" and routed an Arab army after inflicting very heavy casualties (atleast for the thinly populated Arabs). In the second case it was Western Chalukyas and their leiges defeating a southern thrust. (Of course this isn't taught in Indian text-books, we are only told that Parsee refugees came around this time - no mention of who gave them refuge or how). Isn't it quite possible that these heavy losses persuaded them that India was still too strong for conquest and they turned North to lick their wounds while they "digested Persia"? I would love substantial information about this!
4. Ever heard the expression, "the conviction of the converted"? Quite a lot of truth in it - and yes, I believe early Arab Muslims were ruthless in their execution of their designated missions. I can easily understand later Arabs losing the initial zeal. But I also believe that Ghazni (a second-generation Turk Muslim) and Ghori (a second-generation Afghan Muslim), were as zealous as early Arab Muslims. If they couldn't put their zealotry to same effect as the early Arab Muslims, it was not through want of trying but the toughness and resilience of the resistance.
5. Turkic tribes at this time were desperately running from ever widening Chinese expansion into the steppes - Islam was the first and easiest rallying cry. To appreciate how desperate they were, you have to read stories of Turkish fathers and brothers selling their sons and siblings to Muslims (usually Mullahs) because then they could get food for themselves and know that the kid has better chances of survival as property than as family. No wonder those kids grew up to be tough and ruthless slave-soldiers. Here beating back the Chinese had double incentive - beating traditional enemies and non-believers at that. These Turkic boys repaid their masters handsomely against the Eastern Threats and as swords of Islam, be it Mamlukes at Ain Jalut or Balban at Lahore Gate. The practise continued - guess who owned Aibek, Balban, Khilji before selling them to the Sultans?
6. You really cannot make generalizations that Irani/Turani/Arab/Siddi/Afghan were always hostile to Hindus and other Indians, while Hindustanis were content to relegate them to a Dhimmi position. The trends depended on prevailing political winds. Mughals, atleast patrilinially Turani/Turkic, used Hindu Rajputs against Afghans quite regularly and Hindu Marathas against Shia-Irani Deccanis. When it was useful Rajputs AND Afghans were brigaded together against Iranians (usually over Kandahar). Yet Aurangzeb, who was by far the most "Hindustani" (all that Hindu Rajput blood), managed to p!ss off more Hindu military contractors than any of his more Turani ancestors. As we can see, there is no real absolute rule of thumb here - you just have to look at it on a case-by-case basis.
quote ParGha
"Hindustani" refers to the political stance taken vis-s-vis the ruled.... Moreover, quite a few rulers from this faction did not think of themselves as "foreigners doing that Manifest Destiny" thing. The tag also indicated where this faction drew it's support from. In fact, except for the Babur (who always pined for Samarkand) intermission, every Sultan (post A Khalji) did expressedly considered himself homegrown. The fall of the Ilbaris is termed the Khalji Revolution 'coz the ascent of the Hindustani faction changed the whole power structure... The powerful Turkic Chaghlatai was eliminated, the Iqtas taken by the "Hindustanis" and Hindus were appointed as lower/middle rung imperial officers.
PS: OTOH the tags "Turanis", "Iranis", "Siddis" etc did indeed mean they were of the said ethnicity.
If one notes the Governorships, the Mansabdari/jagirdari ranks granted since Jahangir's time the drift towards non-Hindus and non-Hindustanis is clear. Jahangir was turned from a dandy to a bigot by Sirhindi..... moreover, he also owed his rise to his Irani friends. The latter part of his regime saw the rise of Irani faction headed by Nur Jahan and her relatives (in the court and even in other spheres). Shah Jahan's ascent washed away this flotsam and for a time the Hindustanis came back into prominence..... still Hindus were pretty much in the doghouse. Even Things became worse with the civil war b/w Dara and Aurangazeb and the latter's reign. Aurangazeb, though quarter Rajput himself, was intent on earning the enmity of every Rajput House except Ambar (which incidentally was the first one to ally with the Mughals).... and that too till Shivaji's escape from Agra.
From this point, the Turanis and Iranis held absolute power in the court save the time of the Sayyids. Meanwhile the Hindu states/tribes once allied to the Mughals went out of the orbit and set up their independent domains, even eating into Mughal lands. Still the concept of the Mughal as the Badshah of Hindustan was quite strong even though his true domain extended only from "Palam to Old Delhi" (as a contemporary ditty put it).
"Hindustani" tag doesn't mean they had Indian blood! In fact the first Hindustani faction was the Khaljis (a Turkic tribe that had migrated to the man, to India during the upheavals of the early 13th century. Also, the last champions of this faction, the Sayyid Brothers were (atleast) of true Arab descent. Well, they aso traced their bloodline all the way back to Mohammed himself.... (Yeah right! If I had a dime for every time I heard this claim....)You really cannot make generalizations that Irani/Turani/Arab/Siddi/Afghan were always hostile to Hindus and other Indians, while Hindustanis were content to relegate them to a Dhimmi position. The trends depended on prevailing political winds. Mughals, atleast patrilinially Turani/Turkic, used Hindu Rajputs against Afghans quite regularly and Hindu Marathas against Shia-Irani Deccanis. When it was useful Rajputs AND Afghans were brigaded together against Iranians (usually over Kandahar). Yet Aurangzeb, who was by far the most "Hindustani" (all that Hindu Rajput blood), managed to p!ss off more Hindu military contractors than any of his more Turani ancestors. As we can see, there is no real absolute rule of thumb here - you just have to look at it on a case-by-case basis.
"Hindustani" refers to the political stance taken vis-s-vis the ruled.... Moreover, quite a few rulers from this faction did not think of themselves as "foreigners doing that Manifest Destiny" thing. The tag also indicated where this faction drew it's support from. In fact, except for the Babur (who always pined for Samarkand) intermission, every Sultan (post A Khalji) did expressedly considered himself homegrown. The fall of the Ilbaris is termed the Khalji Revolution 'coz the ascent of the Hindustani faction changed the whole power structure... The powerful Turkic Chaghlatai was eliminated, the Iqtas taken by the "Hindustanis" and Hindus were appointed as lower/middle rung imperial officers.
PS: OTOH the tags "Turanis", "Iranis", "Siddis" etc did indeed mean they were of the said ethnicity.
If one notes the Governorships, the Mansabdari/jagirdari ranks granted since Jahangir's time the drift towards non-Hindus and non-Hindustanis is clear. Jahangir was turned from a dandy to a bigot by Sirhindi..... moreover, he also owed his rise to his Irani friends. The latter part of his regime saw the rise of Irani faction headed by Nur Jahan and her relatives (in the court and even in other spheres). Shah Jahan's ascent washed away this flotsam and for a time the Hindustanis came back into prominence..... still Hindus were pretty much in the doghouse. Even Things became worse with the civil war b/w Dara and Aurangazeb and the latter's reign. Aurangazeb, though quarter Rajput himself, was intent on earning the enmity of every Rajput House except Ambar (which incidentally was the first one to ally with the Mughals).... and that too till Shivaji's escape from Agra.
From this point, the Turanis and Iranis held absolute power in the court save the time of the Sayyids. Meanwhile the Hindu states/tribes once allied to the Mughals went out of the orbit and set up their independent domains, even eating into Mughal lands. Still the concept of the Mughal as the Badshah of Hindustan was quite strong even though his true domain extended only from "Palam to Old Delhi" (as a contemporary ditty put it).
Last edited by Anand K on 25 Aug 2007 01:04, edited 2 times in total.
Traditionally Indian historians write that the Mughal Imperial power decline was started by the policies of Aurangazeb ~ 1685.
But wasn't the true decline during Akbar's latter years (1585) when his sons revolted and were killed. Prince Salim (Jahangir) was bigot from the get go and relied on foreigners. This is how the foreign faction got started consolidating to the exclusion of local Hindu rulers and thus became more and more isolated as a armed camp (horde) surrounded by a Hindu sea. Yes in the latter period these folks setup more encampments in Hyderabad, Oudh, Bengal etc. which got legitimized in the British period.
And Partition finally brought these encampments into premanent settlement in Pakistan and absorbed the rest into Modern India.
But wasn't the true decline during Akbar's latter years (1585) when his sons revolted and were killed. Prince Salim (Jahangir) was bigot from the get go and relied on foreigners. This is how the foreign faction got started consolidating to the exclusion of local Hindu rulers and thus became more and more isolated as a armed camp (horde) surrounded by a Hindu sea. Yes in the latter period these folks setup more encampments in Hyderabad, Oudh, Bengal etc. which got legitimized in the British period.
And Partition finally brought these encampments into premanent settlement in Pakistan and absorbed the rest into Modern India.
quote Pargha
Now there was dissent in the far-flung satrapies of the empire, but the core areas (king's territories) i.e Mesopotamia and the Iranian plateau were stable. They were always stable... even when the victorious Augustus rode into Ctesiphone and took back the standards that were lost at Carrhae. These areas didn't go haywire even during Heraclius's siege at the end of the Roman-Persian wars. This was why the Persians could favor staggering number of forces against the Arabs (outnumbering them vastly) in every single battle... though it was all in vain. It was only when the core lands were crushed underfoot the Arab and the Persian High Command moved into Turani lands (their old adversaries) that they were finally betrayed/murdered/sabotaged.
The point is, the weakness in Persia was significant, but not damaging enough to say, disband the standing armies or prevent mass mobilizations for annother twenty years. However, the eastern territories were in dissent, social problems there due to (rising) feudalism were multiplying.... but these weren't fatal. At least not yet. IIRC they even called it the 3rd golden age of Persia.
Things began to collapse quickly when news reached the populace about the Governors (and the populations) of prosperous Yemen and present-day Oman went over to the Arab side. The rumors of Arab Cavalry's prowess and ruthlessness (with oodles of black propaganda) as well as death of prominent generals also began to weaken the foundations of the empire. The fact that the main population centres, the seat of power lay close to Arab lands didn't help either. Things might have been difficult if the Arabs had to cross a thousand miles of hard, hostile territory before reaching the Persian "centres of gravity".
Coming to Byzantine Rome now,
Byzantine Rome wasn't ailing...... not even after the wars with the barbarians or with the Persians. Sure it was no Rome of JC or Augustus, but it was a strong Rome under powerful rulers like Leo, Maurice, Justinian and of course Heraclius. In fact Heraclius had modified the (now unwieldy) legions into mobile units, drawn from home territories (not drawn from Europe as in the past) and evolved them to meet the different Eastern tactics/terrain. It was in a better state than Persia was at the end of the Persian-Roman wars..... even though she lost Syria and Palestine to Islam Rome retained her position till Alp Arslan and Manzikert in 1071 AD.
Even the Rome of Heraclius could muster larger armies... even a combined army of the Persian and Roman Empires against Caliph Omar's forces. (This massive army however lost out to the Arabs whom they outnumbered 10 to 1.)
It was ill health that made a master commander like Heraclius leave Syria and Palestine..... IIRC he had his own version of the "Last Sigh" as he crossed into Anatolia; he perfectly knew what was going to happen to fair Damascus, Tyre and Jeruslaem. His successors were not so interested in winning back the territories, the many "Themes" of Anatolia yielded large revenues.... and of course they had to deal with the Bulgarians, Greeks, the occasional Muslim Emir seeking Jannat and of course, execute that odd pestering Pope.
I had made a post on these lines a cpl of years ago.... even back then i said that things would have been very different if Heraclius had lived or even if his successors looked Eastwards instead of bothering themselves with barbarian Bulgars and the like.
Finally, there's no doubt that the wars weakened these two empires but it's MO that these aren't the main factors that led to the collapse. In that post I referred to, I had suggested that a long suppressed and oppressed nation had broken out, guided by the rousing words and promises of a charismatic leader. Old tribal ruses, strategies and "total war" systems were employed against an enemy who couldn't understand what hit them. Wasn't this what happened with the Mongols under a charismatic Temuchin? Didn't we see this with a beaten Germany under Hitler? Heck, didn't Gandhiji do an improved version of this with us unwashed Indians b/w 1915-1947? Till it runs out of steam (things like this cannot last obviously...... such great initiatives have to be fuelled, controlled, subdued and cycle repeated like the INM grand strategy.), such forces are unbeatable.....
The Sassanids were indeed weakened by the warfare and their decisive defeat deep in the doab...... lost many men and wasted much resources there. However, the peace treaty signed subsequently allowed them to keep their traditional boundaries. The Romans were finally able to get Transcaucausia under their political control (it's what they always wanted) and the Persian God-King had a face saving exit (didn't do him much good either, he was knifed a few months later). This peace lasted for seven years till the Arabs invaded....One side's zeal is one side's story. What about the bankruptcy and war fatigue of Byzantines, Persians and to a lesser extent successors of the Kushans? All three of them had been locked in ruinous stalemate for centuries (just see what happened to Soviet Union in less than 50 years between 45-91). Each one of them had also dragged smaller states into equally weakening wars.
Now there was dissent in the far-flung satrapies of the empire, but the core areas (king's territories) i.e Mesopotamia and the Iranian plateau were stable. They were always stable... even when the victorious Augustus rode into Ctesiphone and took back the standards that were lost at Carrhae. These areas didn't go haywire even during Heraclius's siege at the end of the Roman-Persian wars. This was why the Persians could favor staggering number of forces against the Arabs (outnumbering them vastly) in every single battle... though it was all in vain. It was only when the core lands were crushed underfoot the Arab and the Persian High Command moved into Turani lands (their old adversaries) that they were finally betrayed/murdered/sabotaged.
The point is, the weakness in Persia was significant, but not damaging enough to say, disband the standing armies or prevent mass mobilizations for annother twenty years. However, the eastern territories were in dissent, social problems there due to (rising) feudalism were multiplying.... but these weren't fatal. At least not yet. IIRC they even called it the 3rd golden age of Persia.
Things began to collapse quickly when news reached the populace about the Governors (and the populations) of prosperous Yemen and present-day Oman went over to the Arab side. The rumors of Arab Cavalry's prowess and ruthlessness (with oodles of black propaganda) as well as death of prominent generals also began to weaken the foundations of the empire. The fact that the main population centres, the seat of power lay close to Arab lands didn't help either. Things might have been difficult if the Arabs had to cross a thousand miles of hard, hostile territory before reaching the Persian "centres of gravity".
Coming to Byzantine Rome now,
Byzantine Rome wasn't ailing...... not even after the wars with the barbarians or with the Persians. Sure it was no Rome of JC or Augustus, but it was a strong Rome under powerful rulers like Leo, Maurice, Justinian and of course Heraclius. In fact Heraclius had modified the (now unwieldy) legions into mobile units, drawn from home territories (not drawn from Europe as in the past) and evolved them to meet the different Eastern tactics/terrain. It was in a better state than Persia was at the end of the Persian-Roman wars..... even though she lost Syria and Palestine to Islam Rome retained her position till Alp Arslan and Manzikert in 1071 AD.
Even the Rome of Heraclius could muster larger armies... even a combined army of the Persian and Roman Empires against Caliph Omar's forces. (This massive army however lost out to the Arabs whom they outnumbered 10 to 1.)
It was ill health that made a master commander like Heraclius leave Syria and Palestine..... IIRC he had his own version of the "Last Sigh" as he crossed into Anatolia; he perfectly knew what was going to happen to fair Damascus, Tyre and Jeruslaem. His successors were not so interested in winning back the territories, the many "Themes" of Anatolia yielded large revenues.... and of course they had to deal with the Bulgarians, Greeks, the occasional Muslim Emir seeking Jannat and of course, execute that odd pestering Pope.
I had made a post on these lines a cpl of years ago.... even back then i said that things would have been very different if Heraclius had lived or even if his successors looked Eastwards instead of bothering themselves with barbarian Bulgars and the like.
Finally, there's no doubt that the wars weakened these two empires but it's MO that these aren't the main factors that led to the collapse. In that post I referred to, I had suggested that a long suppressed and oppressed nation had broken out, guided by the rousing words and promises of a charismatic leader. Old tribal ruses, strategies and "total war" systems were employed against an enemy who couldn't understand what hit them. Wasn't this what happened with the Mongols under a charismatic Temuchin? Didn't we see this with a beaten Germany under Hitler? Heck, didn't Gandhiji do an improved version of this with us unwashed Indians b/w 1915-1947? Till it runs out of steam (things like this cannot last obviously...... such great initiatives have to be fuelled, controlled, subdued and cycle repeated like the INM grand strategy.), such forces are unbeatable.....
PANIPAT——THE COST OF WAR
The Bhau's 45,000 strong army ran up a monthly expenditure of Rs 6 lakh. On his start from the south, the Peshwa had given him Rs 2 lakh, and expected that this large army would get the rest from tributary Rajas and from the Maratha estates in the fertile lands of southern UP. In the immediate need for allies the Bhau was forced to avoid the first tactic, but the Maratha estates of Etawa, Shukohabad, Kara, and Fathpur, all with small garrisons under the revenue collector Govind Ballal promised some return.
Ahmad Shah Abdali's money position was even worse than the Bhau's, and early in 1760 he had planned on leaving India, annexing only Punjab to his empire. But Najib Khan Ruhela had begged him to not abandon the Ruhela Afghans to Maratha vengeance——he undertook to provide provisions for the Abdali army from his estates, where the Rabi crop was then being harvested (March-April). Later that summer Najib gave the Abdali Rs 10 lakh for his army's provisions.
Govind Ballal manged to send Rs. 2.8 lakh to the Bhau even though the estates under him were worth Rs 25 lakh on paper. The Bhau's capture of Delhi was a political gain only, because that city was bankrupt——the treasures of the Mughal Empire had been squandered by Aurangzeb in his futile quarter century war against the Marathas (17th Century). What remained had been looted by Nadir Shah (1739) and by Ahmad Shah Abdali (1757).
Even the Mughal Wazir Imad-ul-mulk had stripped off a portion of the silver ceiling in the Diwan-e-khas before fleeing to Bharatpur. On 6th August the Bhau took down this remaining silver and coined it into Rs 9 lakh——this amount sustained his army for two months, and also enabled him to provide food to the starving Mughal royal family, who were useful pawns in the ongoing negotiations.
When that money ran out Sadashiv Rao appointed Naro Shankar to hold Delhi with a locally recruited garrison and moved north to attack Kunjpura, an Abdali base where grain and money was stored, but which had not been conveyed across due to the flooded rivers. Inside this fort were 8000 infantry while camped outside were 2000 Afghan horsemen.
The Maratha attack (16th October) was led by the Telugu infantry——their concentrated firing broke up the charging Afghans even before their horses could reach full gallop. The shaken Afghans fled to the fort but the Maratha cavalry galloped in behind them and captured Kunjpura after bloody fighting. Among the prisoners was one Mian Qutb Shah——nine months ago at Barari Ghat this rogue had cut off the head of Dattaji Sindhia and had paraded it on his lance. Qutb Shah was tortured and executed, his severed head being taken around the Maratha camp in the same manner.
On 19th October the Marathas celebrated Dusshera, the Bhau holding a full muster of the army with great pomp. They had secured 6.5 lakh in cash, 10 lakh in wheat and fodder, and countless property which the soldiers were allowed to keep.
On 25th October Sadashiv Rao moved north towards Kurukshetra. In the changed circumstances he had formed a new plan——before the Abdali army could cross the receding waters of the Yamuna he wished to reach the Sarhind region, sweep aside the Abdali's occupation and make an alliance with Ala Singh of Patiala and other chiefs. In this manner he would completely cut-off Ahmad Shah from his home and force him into surrendering.
On the 26th the Abdali army found a ford on the Yamuna at Bhagpat, crossed over, and reached Sonepat. The Bhau turned back midway to meet them and reached Panipat on the 29th. On the 1st of November the approaching enemy was seen 11 km south of the Maratha position.
The two armies, now separated by 5 km of plain, dug trenches around their camps, and raised earthen ramparts for their artillery——skirmishes broke out between the units of the two armies. A letter written from the Maratha camp describes the situation, "The Yavan is greatly frightened. Our troops are every day killing 50 to a 100 of his men and carrying off their camels and horses.....All our troops are confident that in 4 to 8 days Abdali, Najib, and Shuja would be destroyed.....Abdali's route to his home is blocked; he cannot fight with success, he cannot sit down idly as he has not the necessary food supply. He is bewildered."
The kharif crop harvested in the Ruhela and Awadh lands would change this situation. To prevent this and to drive home his advantage, Sadashiv Rao sent instructions to Govind Ballal in Etawah to ravage the undefended enemy lands.
Govind Ballal had a few thousand second-rate Maratha cavalry and some locally recruited (but untrained) foot-soldiers. He seized land up to Sikandrabad and Ghaziabad but dispersed his force at many different places. A compact body of 5000 horse sent by the Abdali attacked and scattered these separate forces and killed Govind Ballal (17th December).
Before his death Govind Ballal had sent Rs 4.2 lakh to the Bhau by way of Naro Shankar at Delhi. Why this money did not reach the Bhau and how the situation turned against the Marathas will be seen next.
The Bhau's 45,000 strong army ran up a monthly expenditure of Rs 6 lakh. On his start from the south, the Peshwa had given him Rs 2 lakh, and expected that this large army would get the rest from tributary Rajas and from the Maratha estates in the fertile lands of southern UP. In the immediate need for allies the Bhau was forced to avoid the first tactic, but the Maratha estates of Etawa, Shukohabad, Kara, and Fathpur, all with small garrisons under the revenue collector Govind Ballal promised some return.
Ahmad Shah Abdali's money position was even worse than the Bhau's, and early in 1760 he had planned on leaving India, annexing only Punjab to his empire. But Najib Khan Ruhela had begged him to not abandon the Ruhela Afghans to Maratha vengeance——he undertook to provide provisions for the Abdali army from his estates, where the Rabi crop was then being harvested (March-April). Later that summer Najib gave the Abdali Rs 10 lakh for his army's provisions.
Govind Ballal manged to send Rs. 2.8 lakh to the Bhau even though the estates under him were worth Rs 25 lakh on paper. The Bhau's capture of Delhi was a political gain only, because that city was bankrupt——the treasures of the Mughal Empire had been squandered by Aurangzeb in his futile quarter century war against the Marathas (17th Century). What remained had been looted by Nadir Shah (1739) and by Ahmad Shah Abdali (1757).
Even the Mughal Wazir Imad-ul-mulk had stripped off a portion of the silver ceiling in the Diwan-e-khas before fleeing to Bharatpur. On 6th August the Bhau took down this remaining silver and coined it into Rs 9 lakh——this amount sustained his army for two months, and also enabled him to provide food to the starving Mughal royal family, who were useful pawns in the ongoing negotiations.
When that money ran out Sadashiv Rao appointed Naro Shankar to hold Delhi with a locally recruited garrison and moved north to attack Kunjpura, an Abdali base where grain and money was stored, but which had not been conveyed across due to the flooded rivers. Inside this fort were 8000 infantry while camped outside were 2000 Afghan horsemen.
The Maratha attack (16th October) was led by the Telugu infantry——their concentrated firing broke up the charging Afghans even before their horses could reach full gallop. The shaken Afghans fled to the fort but the Maratha cavalry galloped in behind them and captured Kunjpura after bloody fighting. Among the prisoners was one Mian Qutb Shah——nine months ago at Barari Ghat this rogue had cut off the head of Dattaji Sindhia and had paraded it on his lance. Qutb Shah was tortured and executed, his severed head being taken around the Maratha camp in the same manner.
On 19th October the Marathas celebrated Dusshera, the Bhau holding a full muster of the army with great pomp. They had secured 6.5 lakh in cash, 10 lakh in wheat and fodder, and countless property which the soldiers were allowed to keep.
On 25th October Sadashiv Rao moved north towards Kurukshetra. In the changed circumstances he had formed a new plan——before the Abdali army could cross the receding waters of the Yamuna he wished to reach the Sarhind region, sweep aside the Abdali's occupation and make an alliance with Ala Singh of Patiala and other chiefs. In this manner he would completely cut-off Ahmad Shah from his home and force him into surrendering.
On the 26th the Abdali army found a ford on the Yamuna at Bhagpat, crossed over, and reached Sonepat. The Bhau turned back midway to meet them and reached Panipat on the 29th. On the 1st of November the approaching enemy was seen 11 km south of the Maratha position.
The two armies, now separated by 5 km of plain, dug trenches around their camps, and raised earthen ramparts for their artillery——skirmishes broke out between the units of the two armies. A letter written from the Maratha camp describes the situation, "The Yavan is greatly frightened. Our troops are every day killing 50 to a 100 of his men and carrying off their camels and horses.....All our troops are confident that in 4 to 8 days Abdali, Najib, and Shuja would be destroyed.....Abdali's route to his home is blocked; he cannot fight with success, he cannot sit down idly as he has not the necessary food supply. He is bewildered."
The kharif crop harvested in the Ruhela and Awadh lands would change this situation. To prevent this and to drive home his advantage, Sadashiv Rao sent instructions to Govind Ballal in Etawah to ravage the undefended enemy lands.
Govind Ballal had a few thousand second-rate Maratha cavalry and some locally recruited (but untrained) foot-soldiers. He seized land up to Sikandrabad and Ghaziabad but dispersed his force at many different places. A compact body of 5000 horse sent by the Abdali attacked and scattered these separate forces and killed Govind Ballal (17th December).
Before his death Govind Ballal had sent Rs 4.2 lakh to the Bhau by way of Naro Shankar at Delhi. Why this money did not reach the Bhau and how the situation turned against the Marathas will be seen next.
Last edited by Airavat on 25 Oct 2007 05:50, edited 1 time in total.
PANIPAT——THE MINOR BATTLES
Due to their victory at Kunjpura, and the money and grain taken there, the Marathas had greater confidence and took the initiative in the almost daily skirmishing. Maratha horsemen circled around the enemy camp, probing their defences, attacking enemy patrols, carrying off horses, elephants, and camels. But the Afghans had greater numbers and an overwhelming superiority in infantry firepower (almost 45,000 against 8000). The real victor would be the one who managed to starve out the other side first.
On 19th November a portion of the Telugu infantry under Fath Khan (Ibrahim's brother) made a night attack on the enemy. They moved unopposed all the way to the Ruhela trenches and fired on the bewildered Indian Pathans. The shock of the attack forced the whole of the 14,000 strong force to converge at the threatened point. After some hard fighting the Telugus retreated, leaving behind some flags, but without giving up any of their number to captivity.
On the 22nd the Abdali Wazir, Shah Wali Khan, with a small escort came to a baoli (stepped well) in front of the Maratha right wing. it was near sunset but the Sindhian soldiers recognized him and attacked——a desparate fight at close quarters consumed over 600 Afghans and about 300 Marathas. Then reinforcements came to the rescue of the beleaguered Wazir and dragged him away to safety. The Marathas returned to their lines with 100 Afghan horses.
On the evening of 7th December, as the Maratha gunners were returning to their lines, a huge body of 5000 foot-soldiers and 1000 horsemen, from the lines of Najib Khan Ruhela, followed them stealthily in the dim light of dusk. They attacked with a sharp concerted volley, routing the Maratha cavalry escorting the gunners, and sending the unarmed gunners fleeing. But as the Maratha cavalry converged from all side the Ruhela horsemen panicked and fled——their infantry held its ground and kept back the Marathas by repeated volleys. Some of them climbed on the abandoned guns and started beating their kettledrums in triumph. But the Gardi infantry made its way to the spot and fired into the dense mass of the Ruhelas. At that moment the Maratha cavalry charged the wavering enemy——3000 Ruhelas were killed and the rest fled under cover of darkness.
This victory came at a high price. The Bhau's trusted lieutenant, Balwant Rao Mehendele, was killed in the fighting. Balwant Rao was the Bhau's chief counsellor and the one who eased his commader's burden by taking important decisions and giving orders to large divisions. The other Maratha sardars were small men in charge of their own contingents only. In the words of Nana Fadnavis, "This battle was fought well, but due to Balwant's fall the enemy became triumphant."
In mid-December Govind Ballal's unchecked advance on the other side of the Yamuna, and the loss of their fertile lands, made the Ruhelas panic and appeal to Ahmad Shah to let them go in defence of their homes. But Ahmad Shah Abdali had little faith in his Indian Muslim allies; he wondered if they wouldn't treacherously abandon him to the Marathas? So he dispatched 5000 of his own horsemen, with Ruhela guides, against Govind Ballal. On 18th December his severed head was brought to the Abdali, paraded around the camp, and was finally sent to the Bhau.
The turning point
The situation had now completely altered. The Abdali army lost all fear of having its food supply stopped, or losing its base to the enemy. They recognized now that the Marathas were completely isolated, with no base to retire to, and this knowledge filled them with the wildest confidence.
The Abdali cavalry units began dominating the ground between and around the two armies. Every night 5000 horsemen would watch the Maratha front lines for any surprise attack, while two other bodies rode around the enemy camp attempting to stop supply caravans, foragers, and spies. Even Kunjpura, behind Panipat, was taken from its small Maratha garrison. Delhi, in the Afghan rear, alone held out under Naro Shankar. The food supply of the Bhau was exhausted and very little of the money taken at Kunjpura was left.
The Rs 4.2 lakh sent by Govind Ballal was with Naro Shankar and the Bhau had sent a few hundred horse to bring it safely to Panipat. On 21st December Rs 1,10,000 was brought in safety——on the 1st January 1761, a second instalment of Rs 1.5 lakh was sent under Parashar Dadaji with 300 horse. On a cold misty morning (6th January) they entered a military camp and asked, in Marathi, which general's quarter this was. It was actually the Abdali left wing and the entire contingent fell fighting, except one man who escaped to Delhi.
The Bhau was now despearate for food and fodder and offered high rewards to the Banjaras in the region for this service. Provisions came from Patiala, but these had to be paid for in cash——the Afghans threatened the Sikh Raja with invasion and he was forced to declare neutrality. Panipat town in those days was inhabited by mostly Muslims, descendants of the followers of several Muslim Sufis, whose tombs were all around the town. In desperation of hunger the Marathas plundered the town of its fruit trees and gardens, and removed wooden doors and roof planks, all for firewood in those bitter months of winter.
The draught cattle and other animals began to die of starvation and their carcasses piled up at many places——there being no firewood for cremation. All the Bhau's money was also gone. To save his army from starvation and disease the Bhau made an attempt at peace, sending a blank piece of paper with an impression of his palm dipped in saffron (kesar-panja), to Shuja-ud-daulah the Shia Nawab of Awadh. He appointed Shuja his mediatory, authorised to make terms with Ahmad Shah on any reasonable terms.
The wise and experienced Wazir, Shah Wali Khan, welcomed the chance of getting a large ransom from the Peshwa, and not antagonizing the Marathas through unnecessary bloodshed. This was also agreed to by Ahmad Shah who was almost bankrupt——his army dependant on the Ruhelas for its food supply. But in his council chambers, the mullahs and qazis loudly advocated the cause of Islam, in place of wise statesmanship.
"Let not any greed of money influence you in this matter, because the merit of jihad would be lost thereby," said their vocal spokesperson Qazi Idris. His fanatical ramblings infected the Abdali chiefs and they all cried out for holy war, or a chance to slaughter infidels (kafir kushi), which was considered a merit in Islam. Ahmad Shah Abdali, swayed by these fanatic ideas, also lost his long-term vision and declared, "Recite the prayer for battle, the idea of making peace is given up."
Due to their victory at Kunjpura, and the money and grain taken there, the Marathas had greater confidence and took the initiative in the almost daily skirmishing. Maratha horsemen circled around the enemy camp, probing their defences, attacking enemy patrols, carrying off horses, elephants, and camels. But the Afghans had greater numbers and an overwhelming superiority in infantry firepower (almost 45,000 against 8000). The real victor would be the one who managed to starve out the other side first.
On 19th November a portion of the Telugu infantry under Fath Khan (Ibrahim's brother) made a night attack on the enemy. They moved unopposed all the way to the Ruhela trenches and fired on the bewildered Indian Pathans. The shock of the attack forced the whole of the 14,000 strong force to converge at the threatened point. After some hard fighting the Telugus retreated, leaving behind some flags, but without giving up any of their number to captivity.
On the 22nd the Abdali Wazir, Shah Wali Khan, with a small escort came to a baoli (stepped well) in front of the Maratha right wing. it was near sunset but the Sindhian soldiers recognized him and attacked——a desparate fight at close quarters consumed over 600 Afghans and about 300 Marathas. Then reinforcements came to the rescue of the beleaguered Wazir and dragged him away to safety. The Marathas returned to their lines with 100 Afghan horses.
On the evening of 7th December, as the Maratha gunners were returning to their lines, a huge body of 5000 foot-soldiers and 1000 horsemen, from the lines of Najib Khan Ruhela, followed them stealthily in the dim light of dusk. They attacked with a sharp concerted volley, routing the Maratha cavalry escorting the gunners, and sending the unarmed gunners fleeing. But as the Maratha cavalry converged from all side the Ruhela horsemen panicked and fled——their infantry held its ground and kept back the Marathas by repeated volleys. Some of them climbed on the abandoned guns and started beating their kettledrums in triumph. But the Gardi infantry made its way to the spot and fired into the dense mass of the Ruhelas. At that moment the Maratha cavalry charged the wavering enemy——3000 Ruhelas were killed and the rest fled under cover of darkness.
This victory came at a high price. The Bhau's trusted lieutenant, Balwant Rao Mehendele, was killed in the fighting. Balwant Rao was the Bhau's chief counsellor and the one who eased his commader's burden by taking important decisions and giving orders to large divisions. The other Maratha sardars were small men in charge of their own contingents only. In the words of Nana Fadnavis, "This battle was fought well, but due to Balwant's fall the enemy became triumphant."
In mid-December Govind Ballal's unchecked advance on the other side of the Yamuna, and the loss of their fertile lands, made the Ruhelas panic and appeal to Ahmad Shah to let them go in defence of their homes. But Ahmad Shah Abdali had little faith in his Indian Muslim allies; he wondered if they wouldn't treacherously abandon him to the Marathas? So he dispatched 5000 of his own horsemen, with Ruhela guides, against Govind Ballal. On 18th December his severed head was brought to the Abdali, paraded around the camp, and was finally sent to the Bhau.
The turning point
The situation had now completely altered. The Abdali army lost all fear of having its food supply stopped, or losing its base to the enemy. They recognized now that the Marathas were completely isolated, with no base to retire to, and this knowledge filled them with the wildest confidence.
The Abdali cavalry units began dominating the ground between and around the two armies. Every night 5000 horsemen would watch the Maratha front lines for any surprise attack, while two other bodies rode around the enemy camp attempting to stop supply caravans, foragers, and spies. Even Kunjpura, behind Panipat, was taken from its small Maratha garrison. Delhi, in the Afghan rear, alone held out under Naro Shankar. The food supply of the Bhau was exhausted and very little of the money taken at Kunjpura was left.
The Rs 4.2 lakh sent by Govind Ballal was with Naro Shankar and the Bhau had sent a few hundred horse to bring it safely to Panipat. On 21st December Rs 1,10,000 was brought in safety——on the 1st January 1761, a second instalment of Rs 1.5 lakh was sent under Parashar Dadaji with 300 horse. On a cold misty morning (6th January) they entered a military camp and asked, in Marathi, which general's quarter this was. It was actually the Abdali left wing and the entire contingent fell fighting, except one man who escaped to Delhi.
The Bhau was now despearate for food and fodder and offered high rewards to the Banjaras in the region for this service. Provisions came from Patiala, but these had to be paid for in cash——the Afghans threatened the Sikh Raja with invasion and he was forced to declare neutrality. Panipat town in those days was inhabited by mostly Muslims, descendants of the followers of several Muslim Sufis, whose tombs were all around the town. In desperation of hunger the Marathas plundered the town of its fruit trees and gardens, and removed wooden doors and roof planks, all for firewood in those bitter months of winter.
The draught cattle and other animals began to die of starvation and their carcasses piled up at many places——there being no firewood for cremation. All the Bhau's money was also gone. To save his army from starvation and disease the Bhau made an attempt at peace, sending a blank piece of paper with an impression of his palm dipped in saffron (kesar-panja), to Shuja-ud-daulah the Shia Nawab of Awadh. He appointed Shuja his mediatory, authorised to make terms with Ahmad Shah on any reasonable terms.
The wise and experienced Wazir, Shah Wali Khan, welcomed the chance of getting a large ransom from the Peshwa, and not antagonizing the Marathas through unnecessary bloodshed. This was also agreed to by Ahmad Shah who was almost bankrupt——his army dependant on the Ruhelas for its food supply. But in his council chambers, the mullahs and qazis loudly advocated the cause of Islam, in place of wise statesmanship.
"Let not any greed of money influence you in this matter, because the merit of jihad would be lost thereby," said their vocal spokesperson Qazi Idris. His fanatical ramblings infected the Abdali chiefs and they all cried out for holy war, or a chance to slaughter infidels (kafir kushi), which was considered a merit in Islam. Ahmad Shah Abdali, swayed by these fanatic ideas, also lost his long-term vision and declared, "Recite the prayer for battle, the idea of making peace is given up."
Last edited by Airavat on 25 Oct 2007 05:53, edited 1 time in total.
silver seal from the Tamil Sangam Age
Chera king of the Sangam Age, called Makkotai, shows the king with a helmet, in a feature comparable to coins of Tiberius Julius Alexander of the first century A.D. and has the word ‘Ponko’, engraved with a stylus, in Tamil Brahmi script, on the reverse. The impression of the Chera king is perfect in this seal.
PANIPAT——A WARRIOR'S DEATH
On 13th January 1761, the Maratha soldiers and officers came to the Bhau’s tent and cried out in one voice, "It is now two days that no man among us has got a grain to eat…..Do not let us perish in this misery. Let us make one valiant struggle against the enemy; and then what fate has ordained will happen."
The discussion went on till midnight, but there really was no other option. The Bhau could have attempted a withdrawal but he was tied down by the large number of camp followers and families of the soldiers. In any case an army on the move, dragging its artillery and with little infantry to provide protection to the long column, would've been mauled by the vigilant enemy from all sides. So a decision was made to attack the enemy one hour before sunrise——none of the Maratha chiefs slept that night.
The next morning they rose very early, washed themselves, and performed puja. Then they took their weapons and went to their appointed places——the whole 45,000 strong army, each contingent preceded by its banners fluttering in the cold breeze, moving as one crossed over the trench and advanced to the plain for battle. The Afghan night patrol heard the clatter of their approaching artillery and sounded the alarm. The Marathas fired one volley from all their guns after the whole army was in place, by which time it was approximately 9:00 am.
Ahmad Shah Abdali had also advanced his army for battle as soon as the alarm was sounded, taking some more time to get his contingents in place. He made some changes for this army, keeping the center filled with his own men, and giving the wings to his Indian Muslim allies. But he had absolutely no faith in them——after the fall of Delhi and Kunjpura the Ruhelas had opened secret negotiations with the Marathas behind his back. At that time he had been unable to punish this treachery but there was no way he was going to allow it to happen on the battlefield. Accordingly he placed units of 5000 horse on the extremes of these wings, jamming the Indian Ruhelas between strong bodies of his own troops, while 3,000 reserves under his own command would guard against any Ruhela or Awadh soldier attempting to flee.
On the Maratha side there were tensions between the Telugu infantry and the Maratha cavalry——the latter resenting the preferential treatment to the former. Their commanders, Ibrahim Khan Gardi and Malhar Holkar had almost come to blows on the question of military tactics a few days earlier in the presence of the Bhau. So the Gardi infantry was placed in the Maratha left wing and Malhar Holkar's cavalry stood far away in the right wing.
The Abdali army's lines extended the Maratha lines by almost a kilometer on either wing. The field artillery on the two sides was fired after the armies had formed up and had little impact on the battle. The Abdali guns were of light caliber and their shots did not carry the distance, while the Maratha guns, due to faulty elevation and erratic aiming fired their shots over the enemy heads. Rockets were used by both sides, and were a particular favorite of the Marathas——useful in stampeding horses or when fired into a dense mass of soldiers, but ineffective at long range. The Abdali swivel guns came into play after the Maratha cavalry charge.
There was no hope for victory but the Marathas could at least save their families and other civilians through a supreme effort——but for this each wing, and each contingent, of the enemy army would have to be attacked, the bulk of its soldiers killed, and the rest put to flight. Even on the outside chance that sword and spear could overcome flintlocks and swivel guns, where would these starving men and horses find the strength to fight such a long sustained battle?
Commencement of the Battle (10:00 am)
Ibrahim Khan Gardi, mounted on a horse, with a flag in one hand and a musket in the other, led his Telugu battalions from the left wing. These were drawn up in long columns, as was the French practice. He made two of these march further to the left at an angle, to prevent the Abdali cavalry (Barkhurdar Khan) from attacking him in the left flank. With his remaining 7 battalions (6300 men) he marched within range and attacked the Ruhelas (14,000 men) directly in front with a hail of bullets.
Simultaneously from the center the gunfire ceased and the huge mass of over 10,000 horsemen, their swords and spear glittering under the hazy winter sun, charged the Abdali center under Shah Wali Khan. Breaking through the artillery and the fire of swivel guns, the momentum of their charge created a gaping hole in the front portion of the enemy center. The Marathas galloped over their fallen comrades and kept attacking the Afghans till only fifty camels and a few hundred horsemen were left around Shah Wali Khan, who was shouting and cursing at his fleeing men.
Meanwhile the disciplined firing of the Gardis in 3 hours had badly mauled the Ruhelas, killing or wounding more than 8000. The Ruhela cavalry had already fled away and their infantry was engaged at close quarters with the Telegus. The latter had also taken losses, but in their case the remaining men grouped up into smaller formations and kept on firing. A small cavalry contingent under Damaji Gaikwad (3000 men) provided valuable support to the Gardis. The two battlaions on the far left had by this time also charged Barkhurdar's cavalry and dispersed them by its firing.
The crisis of the Battle (12:00 pm)
When the decision to fight a do-or-die battle was made the depression, despair, and panic in the Maratha army was lifted. Uncertainty over their fate was replaced by the knowledge that they would at least die a warrior's death. With this conviction the soldiers' empty stomachs were steadied by sttrong hearts, their weak bodies pumped with adrenaline. This accounts for their impressive showing against the almost impossible odds (the Afghan army lines were at least 3 km deep!).
Ahmad Shah Abdali, a kilometer behind the Afghan center in his red tent, was told of the crisis to his right wing and center——he could see the fleeing soldiers in the distance. First he ordered his reserve soldiers to attack the broken troops and force them back into the battle. Next he sent 500 cavalry to find and beat out any soldier found hiding in the camp. In this manner 1500 horsemen were brought to the front and over 11,000 rallied from the fleeing.
Out of these 3000 cavalry were sent to support the Ruhelas. By this time the Gardis had almost exhausted their ammunition. The Ruhela infantry was steadily pushing back what was left of their battalions. Then the reinforcements galloped in from all sides and wiped out the remaining Maratha infantry. On the far left Barkhurdar Khan was also able to overcome the two Gardi battlaions. Only 1500 infantry survived and retreated during the confused fighting.
The Maratha ranks in the centre had also been thinned but were pushing back Wali Khan's men. At half-past-one Abdali's 10,000 reserve came galloping in. The outnumbered and exhausted Marathas fell back but were rallied by the Bhau, who delivered a counter-charge. Abdlai sent up his last reserves armed with flintlocks——the camel-swivels dispersed by the first Maratha charge were also rallied. These units fired from all sides into the remains of the Maratha centre, which now formed a knot in the middle of the field. Yet for another hour the fighting continued by the Marathas who sought a warrior's death.
The Right Wing
All through the 5 hours of fighting there was little or no activity on the Maratha right wing. Perhaps they had been ordered to stay on the defensive and escort the non-combatants to safety if things didn't go well. Or some believe that there was no officer experienced enough to to lead the separate contingents in a coordinated attack.
Strangely enough the Abdali units facing them also remained standing still through most of the battle. Only when the Maratha centre was finally surrounded, Najib Khan advanced with his Ruhelas (15,000 men) who launched 2000 rockets on the enemy (Sindhia contingent) and opened fire with their flintlocks. On his left the Abdali cavalry (5000 men) also moved forward.
At this Malhar Holkar turned away with his unit (3000 men) and was joined in flight by the bulk of Jankoji Sindhia's 7000 men. Jankoji was left with a few of his men and these were pushed towards the centre to share the fate of the Bhau's men.
By 3:30 pm the battle was over.
Details of what took place after the battle
On 13th January 1761, the Maratha soldiers and officers came to the Bhau’s tent and cried out in one voice, "It is now two days that no man among us has got a grain to eat…..Do not let us perish in this misery. Let us make one valiant struggle against the enemy; and then what fate has ordained will happen."
The discussion went on till midnight, but there really was no other option. The Bhau could have attempted a withdrawal but he was tied down by the large number of camp followers and families of the soldiers. In any case an army on the move, dragging its artillery and with little infantry to provide protection to the long column, would've been mauled by the vigilant enemy from all sides. So a decision was made to attack the enemy one hour before sunrise——none of the Maratha chiefs slept that night.
The next morning they rose very early, washed themselves, and performed puja. Then they took their weapons and went to their appointed places——the whole 45,000 strong army, each contingent preceded by its banners fluttering in the cold breeze, moving as one crossed over the trench and advanced to the plain for battle. The Afghan night patrol heard the clatter of their approaching artillery and sounded the alarm. The Marathas fired one volley from all their guns after the whole army was in place, by which time it was approximately 9:00 am.
Ahmad Shah Abdali had also advanced his army for battle as soon as the alarm was sounded, taking some more time to get his contingents in place. He made some changes for this army, keeping the center filled with his own men, and giving the wings to his Indian Muslim allies. But he had absolutely no faith in them——after the fall of Delhi and Kunjpura the Ruhelas had opened secret negotiations with the Marathas behind his back. At that time he had been unable to punish this treachery but there was no way he was going to allow it to happen on the battlefield. Accordingly he placed units of 5000 horse on the extremes of these wings, jamming the Indian Ruhelas between strong bodies of his own troops, while 3,000 reserves under his own command would guard against any Ruhela or Awadh soldier attempting to flee.
On the Maratha side there were tensions between the Telugu infantry and the Maratha cavalry——the latter resenting the preferential treatment to the former. Their commanders, Ibrahim Khan Gardi and Malhar Holkar had almost come to blows on the question of military tactics a few days earlier in the presence of the Bhau. So the Gardi infantry was placed in the Maratha left wing and Malhar Holkar's cavalry stood far away in the right wing.
The Abdali army's lines extended the Maratha lines by almost a kilometer on either wing. The field artillery on the two sides was fired after the armies had formed up and had little impact on the battle. The Abdali guns were of light caliber and their shots did not carry the distance, while the Maratha guns, due to faulty elevation and erratic aiming fired their shots over the enemy heads. Rockets were used by both sides, and were a particular favorite of the Marathas——useful in stampeding horses or when fired into a dense mass of soldiers, but ineffective at long range. The Abdali swivel guns came into play after the Maratha cavalry charge.
There was no hope for victory but the Marathas could at least save their families and other civilians through a supreme effort——but for this each wing, and each contingent, of the enemy army would have to be attacked, the bulk of its soldiers killed, and the rest put to flight. Even on the outside chance that sword and spear could overcome flintlocks and swivel guns, where would these starving men and horses find the strength to fight such a long sustained battle?
Commencement of the Battle (10:00 am)
Ibrahim Khan Gardi, mounted on a horse, with a flag in one hand and a musket in the other, led his Telugu battalions from the left wing. These were drawn up in long columns, as was the French practice. He made two of these march further to the left at an angle, to prevent the Abdali cavalry (Barkhurdar Khan) from attacking him in the left flank. With his remaining 7 battalions (6300 men) he marched within range and attacked the Ruhelas (14,000 men) directly in front with a hail of bullets.
Simultaneously from the center the gunfire ceased and the huge mass of over 10,000 horsemen, their swords and spear glittering under the hazy winter sun, charged the Abdali center under Shah Wali Khan. Breaking through the artillery and the fire of swivel guns, the momentum of their charge created a gaping hole in the front portion of the enemy center. The Marathas galloped over their fallen comrades and kept attacking the Afghans till only fifty camels and a few hundred horsemen were left around Shah Wali Khan, who was shouting and cursing at his fleeing men.
Meanwhile the disciplined firing of the Gardis in 3 hours had badly mauled the Ruhelas, killing or wounding more than 8000. The Ruhela cavalry had already fled away and their infantry was engaged at close quarters with the Telegus. The latter had also taken losses, but in their case the remaining men grouped up into smaller formations and kept on firing. A small cavalry contingent under Damaji Gaikwad (3000 men) provided valuable support to the Gardis. The two battlaions on the far left had by this time also charged Barkhurdar's cavalry and dispersed them by its firing.
The crisis of the Battle (12:00 pm)
When the decision to fight a do-or-die battle was made the depression, despair, and panic in the Maratha army was lifted. Uncertainty over their fate was replaced by the knowledge that they would at least die a warrior's death. With this conviction the soldiers' empty stomachs were steadied by sttrong hearts, their weak bodies pumped with adrenaline. This accounts for their impressive showing against the almost impossible odds (the Afghan army lines were at least 3 km deep!).
Ahmad Shah Abdali, a kilometer behind the Afghan center in his red tent, was told of the crisis to his right wing and center——he could see the fleeing soldiers in the distance. First he ordered his reserve soldiers to attack the broken troops and force them back into the battle. Next he sent 500 cavalry to find and beat out any soldier found hiding in the camp. In this manner 1500 horsemen were brought to the front and over 11,000 rallied from the fleeing.
Out of these 3000 cavalry were sent to support the Ruhelas. By this time the Gardis had almost exhausted their ammunition. The Ruhela infantry was steadily pushing back what was left of their battalions. Then the reinforcements galloped in from all sides and wiped out the remaining Maratha infantry. On the far left Barkhurdar Khan was also able to overcome the two Gardi battlaions. Only 1500 infantry survived and retreated during the confused fighting.
The Maratha ranks in the centre had also been thinned but were pushing back Wali Khan's men. At half-past-one Abdali's 10,000 reserve came galloping in. The outnumbered and exhausted Marathas fell back but were rallied by the Bhau, who delivered a counter-charge. Abdlai sent up his last reserves armed with flintlocks——the camel-swivels dispersed by the first Maratha charge were also rallied. These units fired from all sides into the remains of the Maratha centre, which now formed a knot in the middle of the field. Yet for another hour the fighting continued by the Marathas who sought a warrior's death.
The Right Wing
All through the 5 hours of fighting there was little or no activity on the Maratha right wing. Perhaps they had been ordered to stay on the defensive and escort the non-combatants to safety if things didn't go well. Or some believe that there was no officer experienced enough to to lead the separate contingents in a coordinated attack.
Strangely enough the Abdali units facing them also remained standing still through most of the battle. Only when the Maratha centre was finally surrounded, Najib Khan advanced with his Ruhelas (15,000 men) who launched 2000 rockets on the enemy (Sindhia contingent) and opened fire with their flintlocks. On his left the Abdali cavalry (5000 men) also moved forward.
At this Malhar Holkar turned away with his unit (3000 men) and was joined in flight by the bulk of Jankoji Sindhia's 7000 men. Jankoji was left with a few of his men and these were pushed towards the centre to share the fate of the Bhau's men.
By 3:30 pm the battle was over.
Details of what took place after the battle
Last edited by Airavat on 14 Nov 2007 04:45, edited 3 times in total.
Exactly!! Jahangir was bigot and drunk his wife Noorjahan was the real ruler and under her the Naqshbandis of Sarhind slowly came forward and persecuted any liberal muslims (hindus were much worse).By Rammana
Prince Salim (Jahangir) was bigot from the get go and relied on foreigners. This is how the foreign faction got started consolidating to the exclusion of local Hindu rulers and thus became more and more isolated as a armed camp (horde) surrounded by a Hindu sea.
Kashmir and Pakistan problem can be traced back to exactly this point when shaikh Ahmad Sarhindi came to forefront and started mixing his brand of Islam with politics.
Guru Gobind Singh created the order of Khalsa in 1699 30th March (1st Vaisakh) in the town of Anandpur Sahib established by his father, the great martyr guru Tegh Bahadur ji at Delhi (Same Kashmir problem that we see today). Anandpur sahib is about 30 kilometers from Chandigarh.,
Later Sirhind was the town close to Anandpur sahib in Punjab India, which had witnessed the martyrdom of the two younger sons of Guru Gobind Singh in 1704. A line on the map from Sarhind to Anandpur Sahib will run parallel from chandigarh to patiala, just little north and shorter.
Wazir Khan, the Governor of Sirhind, had vowed to finish the Sikhs root and branch. Two younger sons of Guru Gobind Singh, Baba Zorawar Singh(9 years old) and Baba Fateh Singh(6 years old), were bricked alive on his orders when they had refused to embrace Islam in 1704 at Sirhind. The Sikhs were keen to avenge the killings of such young lives by such a tyrant and oppressor of the people of India.
Four years later, a chance meeting took place between Lachman Das, later known as Banda Singh Bahadar and Guru Gobind Singh, on the banks of the Godavari. The Guru sent Banda Bahadur to Punjab to suppress the tyranny of the then rulers and punish Wazir Khan and destroy the Mughal empire, which had let loose repression on all the peace loving peoples of the continent including the Sikhs. In October, 1708, Banda marched towards Punjab along with a band of 25 Sikhs and a hukamnama, which enjoined upon the Sikhs to assemble under his banner. As Banda reached Delhi, thousands gathered under his command.
After subjugating Sonepat, Samana, Shahbad, Mustafabad, Kapuri and Banur, Banda led his troops to take on Wazir Khan, who also came out of Sirhind to confront the Sikhs. Whereas the royal army had cannons and cavalry, the Sikhs had only swords, spears and small arms. The two armies clashed at Chapar Chiri on May 12, 1710. The main battle was fought in the plain of Chappar Chiri which falls in Kharar Tahsil on Banur - Kharar Road.
Sirhind was not an easy target to capture for Banda. It was the seat of the provincial capital. It,s Nawab, Wazir Khan was one of the pillars of the Mughal empire with a huge army under his command. He had been in power for long years and had accumulated considerable wealth and position. Wazir Khan made extensive arrangements to meet the challenge of Sikhs under Banda. He proclaimed a "Jehad" - a religious war against the Sikhs, the accursed infidels or Kafirs. A Large number of Gazis or religious warriors from far and wide responded to his call. He collected his noted faujdars, zamindars and sardars. He had a large number of elephants, mounted gunnery, archers, lanxers and swordsmen. Banda had not artillery, no elephants and not even sufficient supply of good horses. He and his soldiers only possessed long spears, arrows and swords.
The organization and regrouping of troops before they are launched into battle is one of the fundamentals of war, in which Banda Bahadur was not lacking. So he organized his troops into two assaulting groups (Jathas). In the first group were the Malwais(Patiala-Ludhiana-Bhatinda) put under the command of Fateh Singh, Karam Singh, Dharam Singh and Ali Singh. The Majhel(area of Majha around Amritsar-Lahore-Gujranwala) Singhs formed the second group under the command of Baba Binod singh, Bhai Baj Singh, Ram Singh and Sham Singh.
Wazir Khan marched out in person with his large army with elephants in front to check the advance of the Sikhs. Banda ordered his commanders to advance and himself sat on a mound nearby to watch and direct the operation. The moment the battle started, the irregulars comprising robbers took to their heels. It is with regard to these people that Irvine in his book "Later Mughals" remarks, "At the first shook, the Sikhs, after a feeble resistance turned and fled." A sanguinary battle now ensued. The Sikhs shouted the war cry of 'Sat Sri Akal', whereas, the war cry of 'Ali, Ali' , was raised by the Muslims. The entire atmosphere resounded with these war cries.
First, the Muslim artillery caused a heavy destruction of lives. Realizing this disadvantage, the soldiers of Guru Gobind Singh decided to do or die for a noble cause and sallied forth en-masse towards the cannon. Though they suffered heavy casualties, they succeeded in snatching the cannon. They they started a hand-to-hand fight. Even then, the enemy was at an advantage. Then Baj Singh, Second-in-command, rushed to Banda, who had remained aloof so far, with a request to play his role. Banda then rushed forward to the forefront of his army. To quote Sohan Singh. "Then rose he (Banda) like a hungry lion from his cave and sprang upon the army like a bolt from the blue. His appearance very much encourged the Khalsa, whereas it struck a general terror among the enemy. Just as Julius Caesar, all of a sudden and with a single attack had turned the tables of fortunes against the hitherto obviously winnings Gauls, the irresistible Banda, with a single sally changed the whole scene."
Encouraged by the advent of their leader on the battlefield. the Singhs fell in a compact body upon the Muhammadans. The onslaught was so penetrating that it became difficult for the enemy to stand it. Khazan Singh holds that "when the battle was raging, a strong storm set in and with that the Singhs rushed at the enemy with drawn swords and put them to flight. "Money and baggage, horse , elephants, fell" says Khafi Khan, "into the hands of the infidels (Singhs) and not a man of the army of Islam escaped with more than his life and the clothes he stood in. Horsemen and footmen in great numbers fell under the swords of the infidels who pursued them as far as Sirhind. During that confusion, Wazir Khan fell to the sword of Fateh Singh. After a pitched battle fought for two days the Sikhs raised a victory cry and razed Sirhind to the ground. Banda formally took control of Sirhind on May 14, 1710. It is estimated that 20,000 sikhs lost their lives while over 60,000 Mughals were massacred on the battle field. Banda Singh Bahadur ordered to destroy all mosques in the city of Sarhind (including the Naqshbandi mosque which was later rebuilt and even today Muslims from Pakistan visit this mosque).
This was the first territorial conquest of the Sikhs, which placed them in possession of the entire country south of the Satluj to the neighbourhood of Delhi. And with this conquest, now included in the Patiala District became the first centre of the first independent Sikh Kingdom in the Punjab: and it fired the common people of the country with hopes of greater successes.
Banda Bahadur repaired the old imperial fort of Mukhlispur occupied by him at the time of conquest of Sadhaura, gave it the name of Lohgarh and established his capital.
Later Sirhind was the town close to Anandpur sahib in Punjab India, which had witnessed the martyrdom of the two younger sons of Guru Gobind Singh in 1704. A line on the map from Sarhind to Anandpur Sahib will run parallel from chandigarh to patiala, just little north and shorter.
Wazir Khan, the Governor of Sirhind, had vowed to finish the Sikhs root and branch. Two younger sons of Guru Gobind Singh, Baba Zorawar Singh(9 years old) and Baba Fateh Singh(6 years old), were bricked alive on his orders when they had refused to embrace Islam in 1704 at Sirhind. The Sikhs were keen to avenge the killings of such young lives by such a tyrant and oppressor of the people of India.
Four years later, a chance meeting took place between Lachman Das, later known as Banda Singh Bahadar and Guru Gobind Singh, on the banks of the Godavari. The Guru sent Banda Bahadur to Punjab to suppress the tyranny of the then rulers and punish Wazir Khan and destroy the Mughal empire, which had let loose repression on all the peace loving peoples of the continent including the Sikhs. In October, 1708, Banda marched towards Punjab along with a band of 25 Sikhs and a hukamnama, which enjoined upon the Sikhs to assemble under his banner. As Banda reached Delhi, thousands gathered under his command.
After subjugating Sonepat, Samana, Shahbad, Mustafabad, Kapuri and Banur, Banda led his troops to take on Wazir Khan, who also came out of Sirhind to confront the Sikhs. Whereas the royal army had cannons and cavalry, the Sikhs had only swords, spears and small arms. The two armies clashed at Chapar Chiri on May 12, 1710. The main battle was fought in the plain of Chappar Chiri which falls in Kharar Tahsil on Banur - Kharar Road.
Sirhind was not an easy target to capture for Banda. It was the seat of the provincial capital. It,s Nawab, Wazir Khan was one of the pillars of the Mughal empire with a huge army under his command. He had been in power for long years and had accumulated considerable wealth and position. Wazir Khan made extensive arrangements to meet the challenge of Sikhs under Banda. He proclaimed a "Jehad" - a religious war against the Sikhs, the accursed infidels or Kafirs. A Large number of Gazis or religious warriors from far and wide responded to his call. He collected his noted faujdars, zamindars and sardars. He had a large number of elephants, mounted gunnery, archers, lanxers and swordsmen. Banda had not artillery, no elephants and not even sufficient supply of good horses. He and his soldiers only possessed long spears, arrows and swords.
The organization and regrouping of troops before they are launched into battle is one of the fundamentals of war, in which Banda Bahadur was not lacking. So he organized his troops into two assaulting groups (Jathas). In the first group were the Malwais(Patiala-Ludhiana-Bhatinda) put under the command of Fateh Singh, Karam Singh, Dharam Singh and Ali Singh. The Majhel(area of Majha around Amritsar-Lahore-Gujranwala) Singhs formed the second group under the command of Baba Binod singh, Bhai Baj Singh, Ram Singh and Sham Singh.
Wazir Khan marched out in person with his large army with elephants in front to check the advance of the Sikhs. Banda ordered his commanders to advance and himself sat on a mound nearby to watch and direct the operation. The moment the battle started, the irregulars comprising robbers took to their heels. It is with regard to these people that Irvine in his book "Later Mughals" remarks, "At the first shook, the Sikhs, after a feeble resistance turned and fled." A sanguinary battle now ensued. The Sikhs shouted the war cry of 'Sat Sri Akal', whereas, the war cry of 'Ali, Ali' , was raised by the Muslims. The entire atmosphere resounded with these war cries.
First, the Muslim artillery caused a heavy destruction of lives. Realizing this disadvantage, the soldiers of Guru Gobind Singh decided to do or die for a noble cause and sallied forth en-masse towards the cannon. Though they suffered heavy casualties, they succeeded in snatching the cannon. They they started a hand-to-hand fight. Even then, the enemy was at an advantage. Then Baj Singh, Second-in-command, rushed to Banda, who had remained aloof so far, with a request to play his role. Banda then rushed forward to the forefront of his army. To quote Sohan Singh. "Then rose he (Banda) like a hungry lion from his cave and sprang upon the army like a bolt from the blue. His appearance very much encourged the Khalsa, whereas it struck a general terror among the enemy. Just as Julius Caesar, all of a sudden and with a single attack had turned the tables of fortunes against the hitherto obviously winnings Gauls, the irresistible Banda, with a single sally changed the whole scene."
Encouraged by the advent of their leader on the battlefield. the Singhs fell in a compact body upon the Muhammadans. The onslaught was so penetrating that it became difficult for the enemy to stand it. Khazan Singh holds that "when the battle was raging, a strong storm set in and with that the Singhs rushed at the enemy with drawn swords and put them to flight. "Money and baggage, horse , elephants, fell" says Khafi Khan, "into the hands of the infidels (Singhs) and not a man of the army of Islam escaped with more than his life and the clothes he stood in. Horsemen and footmen in great numbers fell under the swords of the infidels who pursued them as far as Sirhind. During that confusion, Wazir Khan fell to the sword of Fateh Singh. After a pitched battle fought for two days the Sikhs raised a victory cry and razed Sirhind to the ground. Banda formally took control of Sirhind on May 14, 1710. It is estimated that 20,000 sikhs lost their lives while over 60,000 Mughals were massacred on the battle field. Banda Singh Bahadur ordered to destroy all mosques in the city of Sarhind (including the Naqshbandi mosque which was later rebuilt and even today Muslims from Pakistan visit this mosque).
This was the first territorial conquest of the Sikhs, which placed them in possession of the entire country south of the Satluj to the neighbourhood of Delhi. And with this conquest, now included in the Patiala District became the first centre of the first independent Sikh Kingdom in the Punjab: and it fired the common people of the country with hopes of greater successes.
Banda Bahadur repaired the old imperial fort of Mukhlispur occupied by him at the time of conquest of Sadhaura, gave it the name of Lohgarh and established his capital.
SBajwa,
What was the ethnic make up of the Mughal troops garrisoning Punjab at the end of Mughal Era? Punjabi Muslims were not generally recruited into the Mughal Army (IIRC to maintain the balance between the Pathan and Rajput factions). So when these jihad calls went out, who answered? Pathan Settlements in Punjab (ex. Multan)? Ranghars and Mughals from Delhi/Agra area? Just wish to know out of curiosity.
What was the ethnic make up of the Mughal troops garrisoning Punjab at the end of Mughal Era? Punjabi Muslims were not generally recruited into the Mughal Army (IIRC to maintain the balance between the Pathan and Rajput factions). So when these jihad calls went out, who answered? Pathan Settlements in Punjab (ex. Multan)? Ranghars and Mughals from Delhi/Agra area? Just wish to know out of curiosity.
Mostly Ranghars and Mughals in Delhi, Saharanpur, Ambala, Avadh and small Pathan colonies all over punjab like MalerKotla, Bahawalpur, etc.
Mughals had two Subas North of Delhi. the current Haryana upto Ambala was part of Delhi Suba.
Ambala till Jalandhar was part of Sarhind Suba.
Jalandhar till Indus was Lahore Suba.
A Suba had a Subedar under which were Nawabs., malerkotla was a Nawab, so is Tonk, etc, a Nawab typically controlled 10-20 Zamindars., Zamindar typically owned one or more villages., Zamindars supplied troops to Nawabs who supplied to Subedars.
Subedar was appinted by the Mughal emperor, Nawab was appointed by Subedara and Zamindar was appointed by a Nawab.
Mughals.. after having severe reverses against Sikhs offered Sikhs a Nawabi in 1720s. So Jathedar Kapur Singh singhpuria (Virk) was appointed the Nawab of five villages in around Amritsar (he later returned the Nawabi).
Soldiers of mughals were almost always Muslims (Sunni) after Jahangir., with few Rajputs during war time as they were obligated as "Tribute" to supply soldiers when required. Many bands of mercenary Pathans also served in the side which they thought will win (so that they get some booty).
Mughals had two Subas North of Delhi. the current Haryana upto Ambala was part of Delhi Suba.
Ambala till Jalandhar was part of Sarhind Suba.
Jalandhar till Indus was Lahore Suba.
A Suba had a Subedar under which were Nawabs., malerkotla was a Nawab, so is Tonk, etc, a Nawab typically controlled 10-20 Zamindars., Zamindar typically owned one or more villages., Zamindars supplied troops to Nawabs who supplied to Subedars.
Subedar was appinted by the Mughal emperor, Nawab was appointed by Subedara and Zamindar was appointed by a Nawab.
Mughals.. after having severe reverses against Sikhs offered Sikhs a Nawabi in 1720s. So Jathedar Kapur Singh singhpuria (Virk) was appointed the Nawab of five villages in around Amritsar (he later returned the Nawabi).
Soldiers of mughals were almost always Muslims (Sunni) after Jahangir., with few Rajputs during war time as they were obligated as "Tribute" to supply soldiers when required. Many bands of mercenary Pathans also served in the side which they thought will win (so that they get some booty).
A few more important things connected to Banda Singh Bahadur's attack on Sirhind. The attack of Banda was strong & robust. It devastated Sirhind, a blow that Sirhind has even today not recovered from. It remains a dusty forlorn place even now. There are still some Punjabi Muslims there and I saw one mosque too. Secondly, and most importantly, many Muslims converted to Sikhism after that outstanding victory. That victory lay the foundation stone of future Sikh empire and the conquest of Delhi later on. In my opinion, Banda's victory and warfare on Sirhind is an excellent template that could be used if we want to rid ouselves with the Islamist menace.
Muslim castes
There were not three but four Muslim "upper castes" among the Ashrafi and they were all of foregin descent with large influx of Hindu blood after three-four generations.
The Sayyeds - these were the descendants of the prophet Mohmed, (PBUH)of the tribe of Quraish. Typicallly they will have names that begin with "Syed" Old mushy is one. You have Syeds even in other Muslim lands like Afghanistan. ( Nasruddin Shah is the descendant of Afghan Syeds - they are not Pathans)
The Mughals - these were the top dogs, the ruling elite, descendants of turki warriors. Typical surnames - Chugtai ( no surprise) , Baig, Mughal, Khan
Then you have Pathans, the Indian word for Pashtun. Tribal names like Afridi, Niazi Yusufzai or Khttak are rare, Khan is common, but even inspite of some mixed blood, the Pathan identity remains strong in such families (cf: Irfan Pathan)
Sheikhs - Not necessarily but typically Shias, of Persian descent.esp fm Lucknow. Hussain/Hussaini are obvious surnames.
There is an interesting Indo-Muslim tale to descibe them. A Nawab wanted to know the difference between these four. He was asked to lock up four of them with one charpoy in a room for the night.
They first locked up the Syeds. In the morning all four were sleeping crammed into the single bed. All the Syeds were too high-and-mighty to sleep on the floor.
Then they locked up the Sheikhs. In the morning they found the bed empty and all four on the floor. With their persian etiquette they had "Pehle aaped"- you first please - each other all night.
Then they locked up the Mughals. In the morning they found one Mughal on the bed elected the Great Leader by the others and the other three on the floor.
Finally it was the turn of the Pathans. All night these were loud banging noises heard from the room. In the morning the four Pathans were found unconscious in the four corners of the room, bruised, battered and bloody each with one leg of the charpoy in his hand!
This is a unqiuely UP story. It is ours and as Indian as Thayirshaadam. It does not belong to Baki-stan. I celebrate India's composite culture. However much I diss the Pakis, I humbly urge BR members as good Indians to always speak respectfully of other faiths. And peace be upon us Indians.
The Sayyeds - these were the descendants of the prophet Mohmed, (PBUH)of the tribe of Quraish. Typicallly they will have names that begin with "Syed" Old mushy is one. You have Syeds even in other Muslim lands like Afghanistan. ( Nasruddin Shah is the descendant of Afghan Syeds - they are not Pathans)
The Mughals - these were the top dogs, the ruling elite, descendants of turki warriors. Typical surnames - Chugtai ( no surprise) , Baig, Mughal, Khan
Then you have Pathans, the Indian word for Pashtun. Tribal names like Afridi, Niazi Yusufzai or Khttak are rare, Khan is common, but even inspite of some mixed blood, the Pathan identity remains strong in such families (cf: Irfan Pathan)
Sheikhs - Not necessarily but typically Shias, of Persian descent.esp fm Lucknow. Hussain/Hussaini are obvious surnames.
There is an interesting Indo-Muslim tale to descibe them. A Nawab wanted to know the difference between these four. He was asked to lock up four of them with one charpoy in a room for the night.
They first locked up the Syeds. In the morning all four were sleeping crammed into the single bed. All the Syeds were too high-and-mighty to sleep on the floor.
Then they locked up the Sheikhs. In the morning they found the bed empty and all four on the floor. With their persian etiquette they had "Pehle aaped"- you first please - each other all night.
Then they locked up the Mughals. In the morning they found one Mughal on the bed elected the Great Leader by the others and the other three on the floor.
Finally it was the turn of the Pathans. All night these were loud banging noises heard from the room. In the morning the four Pathans were found unconscious in the four corners of the room, bruised, battered and bloody each with one leg of the charpoy in his hand!
This is a unqiuely UP story. It is ours and as Indian as Thayirshaadam. It does not belong to Baki-stan. I celebrate India's composite culture. However much I diss the Pakis, I humbly urge BR members as good Indians to always speak respectfully of other faiths. And peace be upon us Indians.
Stein Burton:The Britons at the opposite ends of the nineteenth century sought to devise an historical past not for the sake of pure knowing, but for the purpose of controlling a subject people whose past was to be so constructed as to make British rule a neccessity as well as a virtue.
Vijayanagara - The New Cambridge History of India -Author Burton Stein - Page 3
The New Cambridge History Of India
Vijayanagara
Series editor: GordonJohnson
Cambridge University Press (United Kingdom), 2005
Paperback, 181 pages
Size: 225x150 mm
ISBN: 9780521619257
ISBN-10: 0521619254
The Chalukya-Pallava Wars
The Chinese pilgrim Hiuen-Tsang visited the territory of the Chalukya monarch Pulakesi II in 640 CE and describes some of his military forces:
"The country provides for a band of champions to the number of several hundreds (armed with spears)....Everytime they go forth, they beat drums before them. Moreover, hey inebriate many hundred elephants (with wine), and taking them out to fight, themselves first drink this wine, and then rushing forward in a mass, they trample everything down, so that no enemy can stand before them."
Hiuen-Tsang goes on to state, "The king in consequence of his possessing these men and elephants treats his neighbors with contempt."
The pilgrim travelled south to the lands of the Pallavas and left a description of their capital Kanchi, but little military information. This deficiency is made up by the evidence in another Chinese text, which states that the Pallava monarch Narasimha Varman II sent an embassy to China in 720 CE. In it he boasted that his war-elephants and cavalry had the ability to crush the forces of the distant Arabs, Tibetans, and others.
The horses for this cavalry must have been imported from outside South India, and would also be found in the Chalukya army.
Only two years after Hiuen-Tsang's visit the two dominant powers on the Indian Peninsula began a conflict, which would last a century.
During this time the north sees the rapid demise of Harshvardhan's power, the rise of numerous powers in different parts of North India, the Arab invasion and their defeat at the hands of the Pratihar Rajputs.
The Chinese pilgrim Hiuen-Tsang visited the territory of the Chalukya monarch Pulakesi II in 640 CE and describes some of his military forces:
"The country provides for a band of champions to the number of several hundreds (armed with spears)....Everytime they go forth, they beat drums before them. Moreover, hey inebriate many hundred elephants (with wine), and taking them out to fight, themselves first drink this wine, and then rushing forward in a mass, they trample everything down, so that no enemy can stand before them."
Hiuen-Tsang goes on to state, "The king in consequence of his possessing these men and elephants treats his neighbors with contempt."
The pilgrim travelled south to the lands of the Pallavas and left a description of their capital Kanchi, but little military information. This deficiency is made up by the evidence in another Chinese text, which states that the Pallava monarch Narasimha Varman II sent an embassy to China in 720 CE. In it he boasted that his war-elephants and cavalry had the ability to crush the forces of the distant Arabs, Tibetans, and others.
The horses for this cavalry must have been imported from outside South India, and would also be found in the Chalukya army.
Only two years after Hiuen-Tsang's visit the two dominant powers on the Indian Peninsula began a conflict, which would last a century.
During this time the north sees the rapid demise of Harshvardhan's power, the rise of numerous powers in different parts of North India, the Arab invasion and their defeat at the hands of the Pratihar Rajputs.
Last edited by Airavat on 08 Sep 2007 03:16, edited 1 time in total.
Age of three empires
The pratihars hated the rashtrakutas and accordingly, the Rashtrakutas encouraged the Arabs, their Western enemies. An Arab writer describes the Rashtrakuta king as one of the Four Great Monarchs of the world, the other three being the Caliph at bagdad, the Eastern Roman Emperor of Byzantium and the Emeperor of China.
Re: Age of three empires
Partihars and Rashtrakutas may or may not have liked each other, but they both had to beat off Arab invasions of their territories (I always thought it was mainly Partihars x Palas, with Rashtrakutas occasionally poping in for control over Kannauj). Another major engagement with the Arabs took place in Gujarat, very much in Rashtrakuta/West Chalukya area of influence at that point.parshu wrote:The pratihars hated the rashtrakutas and accordingly, the Rashtrakutas encouraged the Arabs, their Western enemies.
Again out of curiosity, where would a jagirdar figure in this hierarchy? Or is it a regional/specialized rank not official to Mughals?SBajwa wrote: A Suba had a Subedar under which were Nawabs., malerkotla was a Nawab, so is Tonk, etc, a Nawab typically controlled 10-20 Zamindars., Zamindar typically owned one or more villages., Zamindars supplied troops to Nawabs who supplied to Subedars.
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Soldiers of mughals were almost always Muslims (Sunni) after Jahangir., with few Rajputs during war time as they were obligated as "Tribute" to supply soldiers when required. Many bands of mercenary Pathans also served in the side which they thought will win (so that they get some booty).
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I would disagree with that: The biggest influx of Hindu soldiers into Mughal Armies began only during the time of Shah Jahan. The wars againt the Deccani Sultanates created a huge demand for soldiers - it lead to huge recruitment of Marathas, bringing in the single largest influx of Hindus into the Mughal Army for a brief period. The disruption caused by this act was exactly the reason earlier Mughals had studiously avoided recruiting among Punjabis Muslims.
i believe every region and state in india have seen historical battles (because of sheer number of local kings and sultans).
It would be informative to have some reference to above incidents (for example which document or website)
For example, in pune region alone there were Shivaji Bhosle's battles and later Peshwa's numerous battles which have been documented. Chhatrapati Shivaji even had a major battle with a Rajput who was working for aurangzeb.
Some research should also be commenced at battlefield sites. (In the US it is not uncommon for school children in the NY, New Jersey, Pennsylvania area to go out and scour farms and golf courses looking for Civil War battlefield artifacts).
I am sure much more worthwhile and historic goodies are to be found all over india.
It would be informative to have some reference to above incidents (for example which document or website)
For example, in pune region alone there were Shivaji Bhosle's battles and later Peshwa's numerous battles which have been documented. Chhatrapati Shivaji even had a major battle with a Rajput who was working for aurangzeb.
Some research should also be commenced at battlefield sites. (In the US it is not uncommon for school children in the NY, New Jersey, Pennsylvania area to go out and scour farms and golf courses looking for Civil War battlefield artifacts).
I am sure much more worthwhile and historic goodies are to be found all over india.
It is like zamindar, but not quite: It as some judicial obligations (and associated executive powers) as well. Just wanted to know if this was officially scantioned by the Mughals or was it a later development when central rule was lax. By the way, it was also adopted in Hindu and Sikh kingdoms as well.ramana wrote:I have seen the title jagirdar (one who has a jagir) in the Nizam's dominions. Its like a zamindar.
The kids won't find any Civil War battlefields in NY or NJ. If they try scavenging in Gettysburg, PA, they will get an earful about respecting the historic integrity of a national monument. School/University organized archeological digs are a different matter altogether.Lkawamoto wrote:Some research should also be commenced at battlefield sites. (In the US it is not uncommon for school children in the NY, New Jersey, Pennsylvania area to go out and scour farms and golf courses looking for Civil War battlefield artifacts).
I am sure much more worthwhile and historic goodies are to be found all over india.
Jagir basically means land or n number of villages. For example When mughal Akbar visited Third Guru Sri Guru Amardas ji at Goindwal, so immpressed he became by langar (where he had to sit among comoners to eat food) that he gifted a jagir of three villages to Guru's daughter Bibi Bhani ji. It was on these three villages that the Fourth Guru Sri Guru Ramdas ji created the city of Ramdaspur which later became Amritsar. The city was originally funded by the income/tax from three villages in vicinity., later Mughals (under Jahangir) took back these villages as by then Amritsar had become quite large market., even today the Mughal land records reflect all above.
So Jagir means land or "Gifted land" and Jagirdar means "Deed holder of that gifted land".
Typically A Jagir would be given after bravery or battle field of support of some type to king (even marrying off daughter, sister was also worth getting a jagir).
It could either be given by the Subedar or the emperor. and many times the Jagir was withdrawn too.
For example a simple soldier could win laurels and get a Jagir of 21 villages and then.. after a battle could loose 5-21 villages as his performance dips based all on his Emperor or Subedar. and soldier could appeal to Emperor (if Subedar had withdrawn the land).
Mirza Ghalib originally had a Jagir from emperor (meaning revenue of n number of villages) later when Mughal writ only ran from Chandani Chowk to Palam it was changed to every 6 months pension which british later stopped.
The mughal land revenue system which was originally started by Sher Shah Suri and modified by Akbar is still running.
So Jagir means land or "Gifted land" and Jagirdar means "Deed holder of that gifted land".
Typically A Jagir would be given after bravery or battle field of support of some type to king (even marrying off daughter, sister was also worth getting a jagir).
It could either be given by the Subedar or the emperor. and many times the Jagir was withdrawn too.
For example a simple soldier could win laurels and get a Jagir of 21 villages and then.. after a battle could loose 5-21 villages as his performance dips based all on his Emperor or Subedar. and soldier could appeal to Emperor (if Subedar had withdrawn the land).
Mirza Ghalib originally had a Jagir from emperor (meaning revenue of n number of villages) later when Mughal writ only ran from Chandani Chowk to Palam it was changed to every 6 months pension which british later stopped.
The mughal land revenue system which was originally started by Sher Shah Suri and modified by Akbar is still running.
A coin, depicting a tethered horse, created by Samudragupta to commemorate the Ashvamedha Yagna.
Samudragupta, ruler of the Gupta Empire (c.AD 335 – 380), and successor to Chandragupta I, is considered to be one of the greatest military geniuses in Indian history.
Samudragupta's name appear in Javanese text `Tantrikamandaka', and Chinese writer, Wang-hiuen-tse refers that a ambassador was sent to his court by King Meghvarma of Shri Lanka, who had asked his permission to build a Buddhist monastery at Bodh Gaya for the monks traveling from Shri Lanka. But the most detailed and authentic record of his reign is preserved in the rock pillar of the Allahabad, composed by Harisena. Samudragupta enlarged the Gupta Kingdom by winning a series of battles till he was a master of northern India. These included the defeat of his immediate neighbours, Achyuta, ruler of Ahichchhatra, Nagasena, and the Kushans in the northwest.
Following this Samudragupta began a campaign against the kingdoms to the south. This southern campaign took him south along the Bay of Bengal. He passed through the forest tracts of Madhya Pradesh, crossed the Orissa coast, marched through Ganjam, Vishakapatnam, Godavari, Krishna and Nellore districts and may have reached as far as Kancheepuram. Although he made no attempt to incorporate the kingdoms of south of Narmada and Mahanadi rivers (southern India) into his empire.
That entire text is from two websites: wikipedia and
http://www.med.unc.edu/~nupam/Sgupta1.html
http://www.med.unc.edu/~nupam/Sgupta1.html
Airavat, others could you give me a link/source where I can find some drawings/descriptions of ancient Indian cities like pataliputra ??
I'm talking mostly about the architechture and construction style that could be found in those cities around the time of Chandragupta.
I know such details are hard to come by but I really need this.
even educated guessworks would be much appreciated.
TIA.
I'm talking mostly about the architechture and construction style that could be found in those cities around the time of Chandragupta.
I know such details are hard to come by but I really need this.
even educated guessworks would be much appreciated.
TIA.
it struck me recently that there is a dearth of pictorial evidence of arms and armour from the early periods of Indian history. I wonder if the chinese first emperor's terracotta army arms and armour are comparable to their Indian peer group, give or take the vaguaries of temperature, etc.? it is a remarkable record of the period
ParGha,ParGha wrote:The kids won't find any Civil War battlefields in NY or NJ. If they try scavenging in Gettysburg, PA, they will get an earful about respecting the historic integrity of a national monument. School/University organized archeological digs are a different matter altogether.Lkawamoto wrote:Some research should also be commenced at battlefield sites. (In the US it is not uncommon for school children in the NY, New Jersey, Pennsylvania area to go out and scour farms and golf courses looking for Civil War battlefield artifacts).
I am sure much more worthwhile and historic goodies are to be found all over india.
I meant to say American Revolution, not civil war (anyways who cares about american history here)
Thanks for correction.
Taking the liberty to answer
may I take a shot at answering?ParGha wrote:SBajwa,
What was the ethnic make up of the Mughal troops garrisoning Punjab at the end of Mughal Era? Punjabi Muslims were not generally recruited into the Mughal Army (IIRC to maintain the balance between the Pathan and Rajput factions). So when these jihad calls went out, who answered? Pathan Settlements in Punjab (ex. Multan)? Ranghars and Mughals from Delhi/Agra area? Just wish to know out of curiosity.
1. Large number of rajputs, mostly converts,
some of their modern desecendants - Nazia Hasan's family, Mumtaz Rathore of POK, and some District Nazims like Faislabad, Rana Zahid Touseef, Hafizabad,
Mubashar Abbas Bhatti,Kasur, Rana Muhanmmad Hayat Khan,Pakpattan,
Rao Naseem Hasham Khan,Rawalpindi, Raja Javed Akhlas,Sahiwal,
Rai Hassan Nawaz Khan they also fought hard aginst the Afghans as part of the Sikh army (they were and are Punjabi Muslims under any description actually) but a higher caste even when Muslim to Punjabi Khatris and Jutts. The cricketer Vikram Rathore and the Khalistani Jagjit Singh Chohan are examples of surviving Rajput Punjabis on our side
2. Foot soilders could be anything, anybody as the Mughal kings had high legitimacy, but horsemen were either Rajputs or "Mughals" ( ranghars were both)
3. Foreign levies, mostly Pathans
4. Anybody with White Complexion and a Muslim was treated a "Mughal" and given a higher salary - afghans, Iranis, Turanis, Central asians, migrants from across Islam
At least this is the rough picture as I understand it. A coterie of nobles and their relatives of the Delhi court, and their close family friends, the Rajput chiefs would be important leadership elements
This is not related any particular battle, but about a person who fought the portugese for about 4 decades. She is not well known outside her state, so thought will share with BRF-ites. I hope it is ok with admins.
The Intrepid Queen
Rani Abbakka Devi of Ullal
Little is written about the valiant Queen of Ullal in the history books. In her infallible bravery and indefatigability she is in par with legendary Rani Laxmi Bai of Jhansi and Rani Chennamma of Kittur, who fought the British in the 19th century. Like them she fought imperial foreigners gallantly and roused her forces to do the same. People of all faiths responded to her call, with the common goal of preserving motherland and defeating the invaders. Rani Abbakka Devi was the only woman in history to confront and fight the Portuguese, handing them defeat repeatedly, thus foiling their designs for supremacy of the Western Indian coast. When the Portuguese tried to exact the tax (known as ‘kappa’), the Queen, incensed and exasperated, refused to pay. Thus began her heroic battles for freedom and honor. Yet, she is rarely mentioned in history, and her accounts of her encounters with the Portuguese are mired in ambiguity.
Read more
The Intrepid Queen
Rani Abbakka Devi of Ullal
Little is written about the valiant Queen of Ullal in the history books. In her infallible bravery and indefatigability she is in par with legendary Rani Laxmi Bai of Jhansi and Rani Chennamma of Kittur, who fought the British in the 19th century. Like them she fought imperial foreigners gallantly and roused her forces to do the same. People of all faiths responded to her call, with the common goal of preserving motherland and defeating the invaders. Rani Abbakka Devi was the only woman in history to confront and fight the Portuguese, handing them defeat repeatedly, thus foiling their designs for supremacy of the Western Indian coast. When the Portuguese tried to exact the tax (known as ‘kappa’), the Queen, incensed and exasperated, refused to pay. Thus began her heroic battles for freedom and honor. Yet, she is rarely mentioned in history, and her accounts of her encounters with the Portuguese are mired in ambiguity.
Read more