1962 Sino-Indian War: Declassified CIA Documents

svinayak
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Postby svinayak » 04 Jul 2007 05:47

ramana wrote:Some Indians are reading the de-classified papers and asking same questions. Please try to followup this series from Deccan Chronicle, 4 July 2007.
Thanks, ramana


However, the Chinese by then were in no mood to give any leeway or escape route to Nehru, which led to the military confrontation.

{Why?}



We see that America had interest in which way PRC would swing during the Cuban Missile crisis.
On October 20, 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two attacks, 1000 kilometers apart, in the Chip Chap valley in Ladakh and the Namka Chu river.

The United States and the United Kingdom supported India's response, however the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis and did not offer the support it had provided in previous years.[2]



P.B. Sinha suggests that China timed the war exactly in parallel with American actions so as to avoid any chance of American or Soviet involvement.[10] American buildup of forces in Cuba occurred on the same day as the first major clash at Dhola while China's buildup between the 10th and 20th of October coincided exactly with the United States establishment of a blockade against Cuba which began on the 20th of October.[10]



The US aim to win the standoff with SU in the Cuban Missile crisis may have made them to support tacitly Chinese aggression in the 1962 war. China badly wanted to reaffirm its control over Tibet and the war sealed the fate of Tibet.

Soviets wanted the support of PRC during the Cuban Missile crisis and US wanted to make sure that PRC does not support the SU. Mao extracted a price for not supporting SU during the missile crisis.

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Postby ShauryaT » 04 Jul 2007 05:58

Acharya wrote:Soviets wanted the support of PRC during the Cuban Missile crisis and US wanted to make sure that PRC does not support the SU. Mao extracted a price for not supporting SU during the missile crisis.
Mao, certainly took advantage of the prevailing geo-political situation. Kruschev supported Mao in his campaign. Krushchev even transferred Russion nuclear know how to China around that time. China was firmly in the Russian camp in the period 59-62. Serious consideration of PRC accomadation with the US against USSR did not happen till Nixon and the Soviet/Chinese split in 67/68.

Where is the evidence that US wanted to make sure PRC does not support the SU, further, where is the evidence that US had any tacit light to Mao for 62.

71 was different from 62. Please explain.

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Postby svinayak » 04 Jul 2007 06:29

ShauryaT wrote:
Acharya wrote:Soviets wanted the support of PRC during the Cuban Missile crisis and US wanted to make sure that PRC does not support the SU. Mao extracted a price for not supporting SU during the missile crisis.
Mao, certainly took advantage of the prevailing geo-political situation. Kruschev supported Mao in his campaign. Krushchev even transferred Russion nuclear know how to China around that time. China was firmly in the Russian camp in the period 59-62. Serious consideration of PRC accomadation with the US against USSR did not happen till Nixon and the Soviet/Chinese split in 67/68.

Where is the evidence that US wanted to make sure PRC does not support the SU, further, where is the evidence that US had any tacit light to Mao for 62.

71 was different from 62. Please explain.




What is not really told in the open source history books is the links between US and PRC top officials, US and Soviet leaders.
The links are through international power brokers. There are enough material in the internet.


Stalin's death in 1953 had created a new situation in the Communist world. When Stalin died, Mao felt that he was now the senior leader, and he became increasingly resentful when the new Soviet leaders, Malenkov and Khrushchev, did not accord him the status he desired.

But Khrushchev's policies would begin to aggravate Mao. Mao did not openly dissent when Khrushchev denounced Stalin with his Secret Speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, or when he restored relations with Tito's regime in Yugoslavia, which Stalin had renounced in 1947. But Mao had supported Stalin in many ways, both ideologically and politically, and Khrushchev had dismantled that support in a series of public and private speeches, deliberately rejecting virtually all of Stalin's leadership, announcing the end of the Cominform, and, most troublingly to Mao, also downplaying the core Marxist-Leninist thesis of inevitable armed conflict between capitalism and socialism.

Indeed, Khrushchev had attempted to dissolve the very condition which had made the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship so attractive to Mao in the first place. Mao was infuriated at these actions, and increasingly felt that the Soviet leadership were retreating not only on the ideological front, fom Marxist-Leninism and from the struggle for the worldwide triumph of communism - but on the military front by no longer appearing to guarantee support to China, should the latter ever find itself in an engagement with the United States. By 1959, the stage was set for a rupture between the two Communist powers.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Soviet_split

During 1962, international events caused a final rupture between the Soviet Union and China. Mao criticised Khrushchev for backing down in the Cuban missile crisis ("Khrushchev has moved from adventurism to capitulationism"), to which Khrushchev responded that Mao's policies would lead to a nuclear war. At the same time, the Soviets openly supported India in its brief war with China. These events were followed by formal statements of each side's ideological positions: the Chinese published The Chinese Communist Party's Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement [1] in June 1963. The Soviets responded with Open Letter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. [2] This was the last formal communication between the two parties.


US exploited the split long before 1972.
There was links between the PRC officials and US long before 1972.
The transcripts of Nixon, Kissinger talks with Chao En Lai shows as if they were in communication for a long time.

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Postby ShauryaT » 04 Jul 2007 20:33

Acharya wrote:What is not really told in the open source history books is the links between US and PRC top officials, US and Soviet leaders.
The links are through international power brokers. There are enough material in the internet.
IOW: Opinions from sources with no authority. Although there is value to such sources, they cannot be taken as the unvarnished truth and need to be shaken up and torn down to decipher for shreds of evidence and credibility around their view.

At a minimum, we should use appropriate qualifiers, when relying on such power brokers.


Stalin's death in 1953 had created a new situation in the Communist world. When Stalin died, Mao felt that he was now the senior leader, and he became increasingly resentful when the new Soviet leaders, Malenkov and Khrushchev, did not accord him the status he desired.

But Khrushchev's policies would begin to aggravate Mao. Mao did not openly dissent when Khrushchev denounced Stalin with his Secret Speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, or when he restored relations with Tito's regime in Yugoslavia, which Stalin had renounced in 1947. But Mao had supported Stalin in many ways, both ideologically and politically, and Khrushchev had dismantled that support in a series of public and private speeches, deliberately rejecting virtually all of Stalin's leadership, announcing the end of the Cominform, and, most troublingly to Mao, also downplaying the core Marxist-Leninist thesis of inevitable armed conflict between capitalism and socialism.

Indeed, Khrushchev had attempted to dissolve the very condition which had made the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship so attractive to Mao in the first place. Mao was infuriated at these actions, and increasingly felt that the Soviet leadership were retreating not only on the ideological front, fom Marxist-Leninism and from the struggle for the worldwide triumph of communism - but on the military front by no longer appearing to guarantee support to China, should the latter ever find itself in an engagement with the United States. By 1959, the stage was set for a rupture between the two Communist powers.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Soviet_split


- only for nuclear technology know how transferred in spades to China - after the rupture? does not make any sense!

During 1962, international events caused a final rupture between the Soviet Union and China. Mao criticised Khrushchev for backing down in the Cuban missile crisis ("Khrushchev has moved from adventurism to capitulationism"), to which Khrushchev responded that Mao's policies would lead to a nuclear war. At the same time, the Soviets openly supported India in its brief war with China. These events were followed by formal statements of each side's ideological positions: the Chinese published The Chinese Communist Party's Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement [1] in June 1963. The Soviets responded with Open Letter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. [2] This was the last formal communication between the two parties.


1. Mao was criticising Kruschev for backing down on Cuba in 62 and at the same time US and PRC were talking and the US was winking at PRC for the Indo-China war, is what you suggest based on the above?

I think it is far more simple. Mao criticised Krushchev not so much for the ideological non sense but for the fact that he wanted to use the deflected US attention on Cuba for his campaign with India. He had a good read of Indian capabilities and his own and the only way India could have responded to a Chinese response was in allignment with the US. Mao did not want that as that had the potential to derail his mission. The tactic of withdrawing from NEFA, once it was known that India was considering US help in the war, speaks volumes more than any chanakian theory.

2. In the indo-china war, the Soviets did not openly support anyone, while in the back ground Kruschev had given a green light to Mao for the campaign. CCP institutional links with the USSR were far stronger than Nehru's feeble fabian socialism links.
US exploited the split long before 1972.
There was links between the PRC officials and US long before 1972.

The transcripts of Nixon, Kissinger talks with Chao En Lai shows as if they were in communication for a long time.


3. I do not see how and where these so called links existed and neither do these paragraphs suggest anything of that sort, notwithstanding your assertions.

Acharya: There are two issues here.

1. It seems, you are trying to pass suggested theories as hard fact and there is an obvious problem, when you try to do that

2. I am genuinely interested in these off beat theories but they have to sound credible, but they do not, at least to me.

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Postby svinayak » 04 Jul 2007 21:24

ShauryaT wrote:Acharya: There are two issues here.

1. It seems, you are trying to pass suggested theories as hard fact and there is an obvious problem, when you try to do that

2. I am genuinely interested in these off beat theories but they have to sound credible, but they do not, at least to me.


Just like you I am also searching for answers. I am researching and the declassified files give lot of information to analyse.

If we can agree to do this then it would be easier to get the right information and also right conclusion. I am working with several groups who have spent several decades into these questions.

Regarding the post I have put; these information is to explore the different aspect of those events in those times. You can research it yourself and come to your own conclusion. Or you have the option to ignore it.

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Postby ramana » 05 Jul 2007 02:25

Important JKG interview with Col. Anil Athale in Rediff

link: http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jul/28spec.htm

The Rediff Special/Colonel Anil Athale (retd)

India-China war 'accidental:' Galbraith

July 28, 2003

Professor John Kenneth Galbraith looms large over the tumultuous period in the Indo-US relations of 1962-63 -- and not just because he is 6'11".

Professor John Kenneth GalbraithHis rapport with then President John F Kennedy was such that he regularly bypassed the State Department and sent his diplomatic cables directly. Chance also played its role, as he candidly admitted, since the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 coincided with the far graver Cuban missile crisis, and Kennedy was quite content to leave that war in his ambassador's competent hands.

In the first week of June while studying archival material on the Indo-US relations at the John F Kennedy Center in Washington, DC, the director there suggested I meet the professor emeritus. I jumped at the opportunity to meet an eyewitness to those events.

As I made my way to Roosevelt House, which is also the name of the US embassy building in New Delhi, on Francis Avenue on the Harvard University campus, I was a bit apprehensive. My guess was age would have taken its toll on the sharp intellect of the 95-year-old professor. I reconciled myself to the idea of meeting an old person with failing memory and faculties.

All my doubts vanished the moment I heard a booming voice invite me, 'Come on in, colonel.' I was already at ease after a frail but gracious Mrs Galbraith received me at the entrance. When I found the crossed khukris of the Gorkha Regiment on the front door, I could not help point out to the lady I belonged to the 9 Gorkhas.

As she took me up the stairs, Mrs Galbraith explained the friend who had presented it to her told her the khukri on top represented her, Mrs Galbraith, since she 'commanded' her husband.

Without much ado, the professor launched into his lecture. Aware I was studying the events related to the Sino-Indian war, he said it was an accidental conflict over a totally useless piece of land and pleaded I should not unnecessarily highlight the China-India differences. "Inventive journalism is a great danger to mankind," he said.

In the course of our conversation, he often repeated a phrase, "Even a bad peace is better than a good war," as he pointedly referred to the recent war on Iraq.

Remembering the 1960s, he said his involvement with India began in 1958-59, while in Switzerland working on his book -- initially titled Why The Poor Are Poor but later changed to The Affluent Society at his wife's suggestion. He met Professor P C Mahalanabis, India's chief economic planner. Professor Mahalanabis told him then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru had requested then US president Dwight D Eisenhower the services of an economic expert to help with India's planning. Mahalanabis said Eisenhower had suggested Professor Milton Friedman, the guru of free markets. Professor Galbraith laughingly recalled his response to that: "That would be like asking the Pope for consultancy on birth control!"

Nevertheless, Professor Galbraith interrupted his work and came to India for three months and worked with the Planning Commission on problems related to Indian agriculture. Professor Galbraith was essentially an agronomist by training, not an economist.

In 1960, when Kennedy won the election he offered the ambassador's job to the professor. Going over the events of the 1962 India-China war, Professor Galbraith said he virtually ran the show since JFK was fully occupied in tackling the missile crisis with the Soviet Union. "But for this I would have not been able to play such a major role," he said.

When the issue of military aid came up, Professor Galbraith said, he told Nehru the perpetual America-baiter V K Krishna Menon, then defence minister, had to go before aid could begin to flow. He narrated a story of some US senators who called on then Indian President Dr Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan during those days of active conflict.

During the course of the conversation, a senator asked Dr Radhakrishnan about the rumour then floating in Delhi that General B M Kaul, the architect of the 1962 military disaster, had been captured by the Chinese. Professor Galbraith, with obvious glee, recalled the Indian President's deadpan reply: 'Unfortunately, it is not true.'

Turning to the issues of war and peace, Professor Galbraith felt many conflicts were essentially a "recreational" activity of the professional military, bored by a long peace. "It [war] also helps employment."

He said 1963 saw the beginning of the American involvement in Vietnam and Kennedy had deliberately sent him to India knowing fully well he would not support American involvement there. But before Kennedy could act, he fell to assassin's bullets, Professor Galbraith said.

"In the old days, land was important as the giver of all things," he said. "That period is gone now. Technology and brainpower are all that matters and yet conflicts over land, specially one like on the India-China border, that yields nothing, continue. This is a burden of ancient history that we continue to carry. If tomorrow there is settlement on planet Mars, we will begin to worry if others are interested."

On being told of the food mountain of 60 million tonnes India has now, he mentioned that in the 60s itself he had predicted one day India would be Asia's breadbasket.

"Agriculture is one economic activity that does not obey the laws of demand and supply," he said.

India's advance in IT today also owes a debt to Professor Galbraith -- he began the first computer science department, at IIT Kanpur. But he regretted the current scene, where students catch the first flight to the US as soon as they qualify.

It was over an hour now and I was feeling uneasy for the strain I was causing him. His nurse came in just then, for his daily check-up. Reluctantly, the good professor bid me adieu.

As Mrs Galbraith escorted me downstairs, she proudly showed me her collection of Indian miniatures and other knick-knacks. Then pointing at the chairs in the lawn, she mentioned they hold a garden party for all Indian students at Harvard every graduation day. Just the previous day they had held one such.

As I left Roosevelt House, I remembered Professor Galbraith's dry wit, and chuckled to myself. Writing his final report to Kennedy July 9, 1963, he had written he was able to achieve much in this 'complicated part of the world' because he had the president's full backing.


Commenting on the State Department he remarked, it 'considers foreign policy something which is to be conducted for the convenience and enjoyment of people in Washington' and had pleaded for strong leadership and personal attention to India in the long-term interests of the US.

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Postby ramana » 05 Jul 2007 02:53

Did the 1962 war have more than one phase? Was it all one continuous campaign?


and

Link: India could have won 1962 war if it used its Air Force



India could have won 1962 war if it had used combat jets: expert
New Delhi, Oct 9, IRNA

India-China-1962 war
Asserting that India could have defeated China in the 1962 war had the combat power of its air force been used, a top-serving officer claimed that the then political- bureaucratic combine had sought the US Air Force's help but had not even consulted the Indian Air Force (IAF) chief on the issue.

"In the final analysis, the use of combat air power would have turned the tables on the Chinese and the 1962 war could well have been a debacle for China," Air Vice-Marshall A K Tewary said in an article in the Indian Defence Review.

Quoting top military and bureaucratic leaders of that time, he said the "costly and catastrophic omission" of not using the combat air arm of the IAF was a result of several factors that "impinged on the decision-making process at the highest level," including the "influence" on then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of Prof P M S Blackett, the then advisor for defence who was a Britisher, as well as the counsel of then US Ambassador John K Galbraith, who "overestimated the capability of the Chinese Air Force in the absence of proper air defence infrastructure in India.".

Another factor was the analysis of then Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB) B N Mullick, a close confidant of Nehru, that Chinese bombers would bomb Indian cities in response to the use of Indian Air Force (IAF) combat jets, Tewary said.

He pointed out that "since the IB did not have the firsthand knowledge (on Chinese air force capabilities), they sought help from `our good friends' (the CIA)" which exaggerated the threat perception.

Tewary quoted top defence analyst George Tanham and said that while the political-bureaucratic combine "pleaded to US President John F Kennedy for 12 squadrons of Star fighters (F-104) and four squadrons of B-47 bombers as an immediate USAF help to stem the Chinese advance, they did not deem it fit to even consult the Indian Air Force chief."
The IAF officer said the then army commander responsible for NEFA, Lt Gen B M Kaul, had conceded in his book that "we made a great mistake in not employing our air force in a close support role during these operations."
Tewary also quoted the late National Security Advisor J N Dixit, who was then undersecretary in the China division of India's External Affairs Ministry, as saying that by the time Nehru was coming round to the suggestion of using air power, the Chinese had declared a unilateral ceasefire.

Dixit, the IAF officer said, had pointed out that the Chinese logistical arrangements and supply lines were too stretched and that it did not have sufficient air power in Tibet at that point of time.

"India's air strikes would stop the Chinese advance and neutralize the military successes which they had achieved," Dixit had said, adding that this suggestion was rejected on the grounds that it had come from officers who were not military experts.

Making a comparison between the then Chinese and Indian Air Forces and the number and types of their aircraft fleet, Tewary said the IAF, which was used only to dropping supplies, could have been "employed for interdiction, battlefield air interdiction, attack on areas captured by the Chinese, attack as a retribution on deeper targets."
He also made a detailed point-by-point rebuttal of the advice and analysis of the IB at that time regarding the threat perceptions which led the government not to deploy air power.

The issues included location of Chinese airfields at the time, availability of night interceptors like the IAF's Vampire fighter squadron, the quantum of Chinese air effort and the theory of escalation of the war.

He concluded that the IAF could then carry more bomb loads than the Chinese, could attack major cities like Lhasa, Chengdu and Kunming as well as Chinese airfields and that the IAF had more modern and capable aircraft to carry out all these tasks successfully.

News sent: 11:41 Monday October 09, 2006

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Postby ramana » 05 Jul 2007 03:07

Good write-up on challenges to JFK Admin in Asia

JFK & The search for friends in Asia

Note the graphics from Time 1959.

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Postby ramana » 05 Jul 2007 03:17

Part II of Govind Talwalkar's articles in Deccan chronicle, 5 July 2007.

Peace games China played
By Govind Talwalkar

Part II

The CIA report describes China’s tactics at the negotiating table as well as in military manoeuvres. The Chinese had Tibet fully under their control. By building a highway in Aksai Chin, they had secured the territory. India was faced with a fait accompli, and was unable to send any troops to the area. The report says that the Chinese leaders thought that the Indians were not generally inclined towards a military confrontation. In fact, they never thought that India could be a military threat. They, therefore, were negotiating with India from a position of strength.

The Chinese never gave precise maps of Aksai Chin or the areas of the North East Frontier which they claimed as theirs. Zhao Enlai all the while argued that the maps were old and were being revised.

"This provided the Chinese premier with a means for concealing Peiping’s long-range intention of surfacing Chinese claims at some time in the future (when there would be no longer any necessity to be deceptive about them) while avoiding a dispute with the Indian Prime Minister in the present," says the report.

{This is called strategic deception and is a regular feature between adverssaries. The PRC had become an adversary but India did not think of it as such.}

At that point in time, the Chinese did not want to antagonise Nehru and thus lose their supporter at the UN. So they made every effort to conceal their construction of the highway in Aksai Chin. They correctly envisaged that by the time the road would be completed, India would not be able to do anything about it. In order not to alert Nehru about the wide gaps between the claims made by India and China about the border, they lied about the maps.

They even kept quiet about the posts north of the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, which India established after 1951. Zhao’s refrain was that China had no time to revise the maps, thus, avoiding giving any timetable. In 1956, Zhao gave the impression to Nehru that he would accept the McMahon Line; but added the proviso that China had to consult the Tibetan authorities. It was convenient for both to continue with the negotiations. But this equivocation about the border and maps suited Zhao more than Nehru.

A captured Chinese Communist document that is extensively quoted in the CIA report shows what, and how, the Chinese leadership wanted to achieve in the India-China dispute. This document was issued by the Tibetan Military Region Command Headquarters on November 14, 1960 and was approved by the Central Committee and Mao. It said that patrols were not permitted within a certain distance of the border. It warned that even if the neighbouring country (India) with bombast and arrogance carried out aggression, the patrols were to wait for the orders from the Central Command and not take any action on their own. However, they were allowed reconnaissance.

The document warned against allowing emotions to overtake policy. It said that if they did not retain their cool, then emotions would overwhelm them.

In such circumstances they would lose sight of the larger picture. The document pointed out that the enemy did not want to occupy a large chunk of the territory or start a war; but it wanted to stir up anti-Chinese sentiments and hurt the cause of socialism. Thus the Chinese leaders expected their troops to be politically trained and alert.

The stress on remaining cool was typical of China’s tactics. Contrast this with the Indian attitude. Emotions, not only of the people, were running high; Parliament was frequently in uproar. Whatever has so far appeared about the exchanges at the top level of the leadership does not show that cool and calculating minds were at work. One fails to understand why Nehru did not call for closed-door meetings of Parliament so that members could have been briefed properly and taken into confidence. Nehru used to make long speeches in Parliament and open his heart on various subjects. Why he followed a different course with regard to the border dispute is a puzzle nobody has solved so far.

Because of ignorance and emotions, some members asked for the bombardment of the Chinese posts beyond the border, oblivious of the state of our Air Force. More enforcement was also demanded. But it was difficult for us to strengthen our forces on the border.

They had to be trained to fight on the high altitude and equipped properly. The only course was to shift some troops from the Kashmir front; but Nehru and Krishna Menon believed that Pakistan would take advantage of the situation and invade Kashmir.

Though the Chinese leaders were steadfast in their resolve and never wavered from their main objective in dealing with the border dispute, taking stock of the international situation they changed their tactics and tone to show that they were not inflexible.

They did not want to provoke the Soviet Union beyond a certain point. They also did not want the South Asian countries alienated from them. Thus, at times they adjusted their policy statements to emphasise that they were not warmongers but a peace-loving nation. They wanted to woo the South Asian nations and hence settled their border problems with Burma and Nepal. They also used some neutral countries like Sri Lanka and Burma to mediate.

When a section of the Indian Communist leadership was annoyed by the belligerent attitude of the Chinese representatives at some international gatherings, the Chinese leadership was ready to change its tune, and even told the visiting Indian Communist leader to start a campaign to educate the Indian people, and thus, defeat the "reactionaries."

At the same time, when China found Khrushchev and the Russian leadership in a fix over their adventurist policy of placing nuclear missiles in Cuba, and thus needing China’s support, Mao refused to come out openly to endorse Soviet policy. He wanted his price. The price was full support of his border policy, and the denouncement of Nehru as US stooge. The Chinese also wanted the Russians to restrain from giving aid to India.

The Chinese leaders showed their willingness all along for a dialogue to solve the border dispute, but never budged from the stand which they had taken right from the beginning. They were prepared for war and started it at their own choosing.

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Postby Katare » 05 Jul 2007 03:39

At the end of the day we didn't have armed forces strong enough to take care of the situation of "when push comes to shove". In this situation only way Nehru should have followed was to ensure that push doesn't come to shove, he tried but it didn't work. Shove came and we got shoved.......

You have to have a large and strong stick to take care of shoves even if you want to play a peace game. This is what Nehru didn’t realize.

The million dollar question is that if Chinks can ‘teach us a lesson; with an economy that was smaller than ours in 1962, would they be able to do the same with an economy three times as large as ours in 2007?

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Postby ldev » 05 Jul 2007 07:08

Acharya wrote:Just like you I am also searching for answers. I am researching and the declassified files give lot of information to analyse.

If we can agree to do this then it would be easier to get the right information and also right conclusion. I am working with several groups who have spent several decades into these questions.

Regarding the post I have put; these information is to explore the different aspect of those events in those times. You can research it yourself and come to your own conclusion. Or you have the option to ignore it.


While there were certainly people in the US strategic community who would have been working their brains hard trying to find the wedge between the USSR and China especially given the volatile leadership in those two countries during the 1950s, their overt actions vis a vis India give a far clearer picture rather than obscure and conspiratorial internet theories.

In 1962 China was not a nuclear power. Its economy was also about 60%-66% the size of India. In fact if you remember there are certain declassified documents which show some contact between the US and the USSR just after the Cuban missile crisis was settled and after JFK's death about the possibility of a joint US-USSR preemptive strike to ensure that China never got its big bum. That overture did not work out and China exploded a bum in 1964.

The USSR was overtly neutral and covertly sympathetic towards China alll during the 1950s as well as during the 1960s. Remember their role in the Tashkent talks after the Indo-Pak war of 1965. Certainly not honorable from an Indian standpoint IMO. It was only after the border clashes on the Ussri river in 1969 that the break between the USSR and China became final and the Chinese were open to overtures from the US which resulted in Kissinger's and subsequently Nixon's trip to China in 1972. The USSR in turn turned to India as a counterweight and the resultant Indo-USSR friendship treaty of 1971. You got to hand it to IG (notwithstanding her other faults). She was a very quick study of the overall geopolitical situation and how to profit from it. She also had the ba**s to act on it as the Bangladesh war amply demonstrated something which all other Indian leaders have lacked - "aar paar ladhai" included.

Without the benefit of hindsight which we now enjoy, the USSR-China split could have been just temporary. The US had an overriding objective of containing communism. As such, India falling to communism would have been another battle lost from its standpoint. Hence, I do not buy the conspiracy theories being bandied about that the US and PRC were in cahoots to defeat India. Just does not make sense. Unless it is supported by overt and documented actions of the nations involved.

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Postby svinayak » 05 Jul 2007 20:04

ldev wrote:
The USSR was overtly neutral and covertly sympathetic towards China alll during the 1950s as well as during the 1960s. Remember their role in the Tashkent talks after the Indo-Pak war of 1965. Certainly not honorable from an Indian standpoint IMO. It was only after the border clashes on the Ussri river in 1969 that the break between the USSR and China became final and the Chinese were open to overtures from the US which resulted in Kissinger's and subsequently Nixon's trip to China in 1972.


I had posted this earlier to read where Kissinger talks about contacts with PRC Chinese long before 1972. You can get it for 1 cent or 50 cent in used book store. This perception that China had no contact with US before 1972 is no longer possible after the internet is out.

The White House Years
by Henry A. Kissinger (Author)

# Hardcover: 1521 pages
# Publisher: Little Brown & Co (T); 1st ed edition (October 1979)
# Language: English
# ISBN-10: 0316496618
# ISBN-13: 978-0316496612


http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/oct/24chin.htm
By 1962 the Sino-Soviet dispute was underway, with Beijing firmly seen as seeking to follow a much more anti-Western and harsher ideological line than Moscow. None of us realised then what I later worked out to be the key cause of the dispute, namely Khrushchev's withdrawal of the Soviet nuclear umbrella from China during the Taiwan Straits dispute.




http://www.accultured.com/page.php?id=29
By 1962, Chinese leadership had split with Moscow completely (they were denied military aid in the conflict) but this split wasn't fully recognized by the rest of the world and the timing with the cuban missile crisis was unfortunate.
Last edited by svinayak on 06 Jul 2007 00:33, edited 2 times in total.

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Postby ldev » 05 Jul 2007 20:40

Acharya wrote:
ldev wrote:
The USSR was overtly neutral and covertly sympathetic towards China alll during the 1950s as well as during the 1960s. Remember their role in the Tashkent talks after the Indo-Pak war of 1965. Certainly not honorable from an Indian standpoint IMO. It was only after the border clashes on the Ussri river in 1969 that the break between the USSR and China became final and the Chinese were open to overtures from the US which resulted in Kissinger's and subsequently Nixon's trip to China in 1972.


I had posted this earlier to read where Kissinger talks about contacts with PRC Chinese long before 1972. You can get it for 1 cent or 50 cent in used book store. This perception that China had no contact with US before 1972 is no longer possible after the internet is out.

The White House Years
by Henry A. Kissinger (Author)

# Hardcover: 1521 pages
# Publisher: Little Brown & Co (T); 1st ed edition (October 1979)
# Language: English
# ISBN-10: 0316496618
# ISBN-13: 978-0316496612


I am sure there were contacts. Just as there are contacts between all sorts of countries on a range of issues e.g. India today has contacts with Saudi Arabia whereby India is asking the Saudis to stop the blind support that they have for Pakistan. Does not mean that the Saudis have agreed to India's request. Similarly the point is whether there was any kind of agreement reached during the early 1960s between the US and China? I am sure the US was trying to drive a wedge between the two monoliths of the global communist movement during the 1950s and 1960s. Can you point out any reference to that effect or a quote or an excerpt from the Kissinger book which states that the US and China had reached an agreement by 1962 which among other things would contain India?

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Postby svinayak » 05 Jul 2007 20:44

ldev wrote: Can you point out any reference to that effect or a quote or an excerpt from the Kissinger book which states that the US and China had reached an agreement by 1962 which among other things would contain India?


Who talked about containment of Indian in 1962.
It was a Cuban Missile crisis for USA in 1962. They would do whatever to make sure that they win in the standoff aginst USSR. Borders of India do not matter to the national security of USA.



Image

http://chellaney.spaces.live.com/blog/c ... !228.entry

http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2214/ ... 807500.htm


http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers8%5Cpaper713.html
China & US

US and China have nothing in common. All that charade of friendship put up by President Nixon in 1973 and onwards by successive presidents was a marriage of convenience. China helped the US to corner Soviet Union. In return they got massive financial aid.



http://www.india-seminar.com/2006/562.htm

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Postby ramana » 06 Jul 2007 01:56

x-posted from the India-China new Directions thread with emphasis added here by me.

Acharya wrote:http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/131-3-55.shtml


--- Begin ---

X/5 ASIA THE ODDS FOR FRIENDSHIP F-82

MUNICH March 1971 (CAA). The following article by
Edward Friedman appeared in the 13 March issue, of Far Eastern
Economic Review.

WILL the new government of India make any response to
the series of recent probes by Peking which indicate
that China is ready for a rapprochement? Even without the
recent Chinese initiatives toward Indian diplomats in Cairo,
Peking and elsewhere, it would be worth reconsidering the
Indo-Chinese split for clues as to what would permit a
significant improvement in relations between them. The
leading question is how New Delhi looks from Peking.


The 1962 border war was usually explained in India and
the West as a Chinese attempt to humiliate India and to
establish China's hegemony in the struggle for Southeast
(??)n loyalty between Peking and New Delhi. This
explanation accords with the late John Kennedy's move towards India
(incontrast to the move under John Foster Dulles towards
Pakistan) as the supposed democratic alternative in Asia to a
"totalitarian" China. Although it suited the egos of American
and Indian intellectuals, politicians and reporters, there is
little evidence that the Chinese ever took it seriously.


Peking was much more concerned with the deterioration
of its relations with Moscow than with any competition with
New Delhi.
China's entire northern and western frontiers
were, swiftly transformed from friendly areas through which
communication with the Soviet Union was being improved to
isolated, hostile, armed camps.

To the north Mongolia had been supposed to serve as a
neutral unarmed buffer. But by 1962 Mongolia was
monopolistically incorporated into Russia's communist economic
community, Soviet troops moved in and Chinese personnel
were no longer so welcome. In Sinkiang to the west, minority
peoples fled to the Soviet Union and were welcomed by the
Russian army. There were minor border skirmishes. A former
Chinese general would soon be broadcasting from the Soviet
Unron, calling on minority peoples on China's western
frontic to revolt.

In Tibet the revolt of the Khamba tribesmen and some
other non-Han people had been going on for six years. By the
early Sixties they were helped by the CIA's Air America on
the northern frontiers of India and its related smaller
northern states.
China's massive response to armed dangers on its
southwest borders included the defence of the Aksai Chin
road, which China needed to supply the counter-insurgency
effort in Tibet and the closing off of southern mountain
passes used for gun running and incursions into Tibet.
Given
India's growing ties with the Soviet Union beginning in the
mid-Fifties, China's response to India in 1962 is probably
best understood in terms of the growing danger from the
Soviet Union in 1962 on the long, exposed Chinese frontier.

Chinese analysts thought India was becoming dependent
on the Soviet Union.
Peking knew from its own experience
with aid from Moscow that crucial parts of a nation's
long-range investment planning could become politically
dependent on Russian loans. The cut in loan funds from
Moscow in 1957 compared to 1956 forced a drastic
retrenchment on China which had serious political consequences.
In some significant ways the disasters of the Great Leap
Forward cannot be divorced from this need to seek
alternative sources of capital if Moscow did not foot the bill.
Otherwise powerful political forces existed in China willing
to make large concessions to Moscow to woo and win the
needed economic aid.

Similarly the Chinese noted how an increasing large part
of India's planned investment capital, came from the Soviet
Union. When the Indian economic development plans ran
into deep trouble in the Fifties it was the Russians who
bailed them out. By the early Sixties it seemed that Russia
was collecting its military dividends. (Peking knew what
effort it was making to provide capital to little Nepal to
prevent it from becoming dependent on economic forces
hostile to China; a poor China could do little to help a
mammoth India). Moscow was even providing modern
military equipment to India that it was not providing to China.
The Chinese could guess, from experience, what the Russians
had demanded and received in return. Clearly the Indian
military thrust at China seemed part of a larger conspiracy.


Increasingly western analysts have joined the Chinese in
stressing the defensive nature of the Chinese response. The
evidence - even from unfriendly American military sources -
firmly indicates that it was the Indian military which steadily
moved north over large areas of disputed territory.
But even
granting this, some political explanation for the extent of the
Chinese military response must be sought. Of course, we do
not know the nature of high level political-military relations
in Peking. It is not impossible that at a time of economic
setbacks in China when the Chinese army could not even
prevent coastal incursions by Chiang Kai-shek's remnants to
the east, American military activities in Laos on China's
southern border, and Russian military insults to the north
and west, that no one in Peking could marshal arguments
against a military riposte against India.

Here was the Indian army marching north. Could Lin Piao
take another setback? The Chinese military commander in
Tibet, Chang Kuo-hua, apparently claimed he could handle
the situation. Chang - indeed the entire southwestern
political apparatus - may have been well situated with party
leaders in Peking such as Teng Hsiao-ping with whom their
careers were intimately tied. It is even possible that Liu
Shao-chi increasingly found himself relying on this group as
he abandoned his Great Leap Forward policies for policies
which stressed relying on national institutional bureaucratic
hierarchies.

Who would oppose such a move to prevent a Munich on
the Tibetan frontier? Perhaps trade officials or diplomats tied
to a neutral third world policy. But Russians' anti-China
successes in Africa, the Middle East and India argued against a
third world Chinese diplomacy. The party and army, the
secretariat and the Minister of National Defence, wanted,
needed and predicted victory. Mao Tse-tung, it was made
known during the Cultural Revolution, then telephoned
Chang Kuo-hua and told him to take care of the situation.

Did Mao move because Lin Piao (and Liu Shaq-chi)
insisted? Or because Chou En-lai, who personally found India's
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru the most arrogant statesman
he ever had to deal with, concluded that compromise and
diplomacy could get nowhere with him in charge?


The point is that most analyses of Chinese foreign policy
relate that policy too closely to foreign policy
considerations. Whether related to ideology (the need to humiliate
India) or realism (the need to protect strategic roads into
Tibet), these views singularly ignore domestic political forces.

The international challenge is of course important.
Obviously, a military coup in India which brought its army
aggressively into America's SEATO would be a weighty factor in
China's foreign policy towards India. However, unless one
believes China's ideology and realism is monolithic or
unaccented, then one must ask which view of ideology and realism
prevails?

The supremacy of considerations of The Sino-Soviet
conflict and of domestic political factors in the decision are
confirmed by the consequences of the Chinese military
action. They were not beneficial to China. They made it
more likely that China's southern neighbors would not be
unfriendly to American or Russian or Japanese military aid
offers.


In addition, the loss of friendship with India made China
more isolated, more dependent on Pakistan. Although it is
popular to talk about China's self-isolation, such talk
underestimates the long successful American, effort to isolate
China from other actors in the international world. Thus,
quite logically Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai effusively
thanked the Burmese some years back for helping somewhat
to overcome that isolation. Chou said: "China's east faces the
great seas. This road for intercourse with the various nations
of the world is blocked by American imperialism. At present
in order to have intercourse with the nations of Europe,
Africa, Asia and the world's various nations, one must go
from New China north through Ulan Bator and Moscow and
southwest through Rangoon and New Delhi..."

With the deterioration of relations with India, Burma, the
Soviet Union and Mongolia, the single route through Pakistan
became inordinately important to the Chinese. In 1965-66,
for example, when China was worried that the US might
escalate its war in Indochina into a war with China, the
Chinese hurriedly flew gold back from London to Peking.
The only swift route was by PIA (Pakistan's airline) through
Pakistan. Yet China does not seem to enjoy this dependence
on Pakistan, nor to consider its government to be
permanently stable and friendly. Better relations with India - by

providing China again with an
alternative outlet to the Middle
East, Africa and Europe -- would
serve China's real interests.

Another question, in terms
of real international interests, is
why the years of good political
relations between India and
China did not produce largescale
economic ties?
When political
ties between China and Japan
deteriorated, strong Japanese
business interests were present
to press Tokyo to improve the
situation. Why weren't there
similar interests in India? The
Bombay journal Indian
Shipping noted in April 1951 that
India lost the lucrative trade in
yarn with China because "the
shipping conference lines did
not want the channel of trade
for this country". That is,
during the Korean War, the rich
nations bought up much of the tramp shipping trade and
decided not to further Sino-Indian economic ties. China
had to bring into play its uneconomic joint shipping line with
Poland to save part of the trade with India.
China and India
have a joint interest in opposition to these international
shipping cartels and in other similar problems.

By now it is clear that the Chinese reading of political
developments in India was not entirely correct.
The Chinese
overstressed Russo-American collusion and India's
subservience to it. They underrated the competition and conflict
between Washington and Moscow and the avenues of
manoeuvre it might permit in India. The Chinese cannot help
but be impressed by Indira Gandhi's co-operation with the
left and her group's nationalization measures. Such activities
not only may win genuine sympathy among Peking's ruling
circles, but may also provide a pretext for action for other
groups in Peking who would like to normalise relations to the
southwest in order to concentrate on greater dangers
elsewhere or who want to help reduce China's isolation by
moving closer to New Delhi. Certainly each government
might reduce military aid to minority dissidents in the other
country.

On November 5, 1970, Peking radio announced that India
has not "changed in its hostile policy towards China"
because India continues to support Tibetan dissidents and
because India is moving towards diplomatic relations with
Chiang Kai-shek. This type of statement is usually taken to
indicate China's maximum demands. That is, other issues will
not be permitted to block China's desire for improved
relations with New Delhi. That, of course, would leave in the
lurch Indian Maoist leaders who ask their followers to let
Mao Thought serve as their bible. In their difficult situation
revolutionaries eventually learn they can count only on
themselves and on no one else, even the gods or the Chinese.
One tiling should be clear: there is an opportunity to move
towards better relations with China if India so decides.


Interesting that he points to potential fears of Russian cooperation while there are actual facts of US collaboration in Tibet wrt to Khampa uprising etc. It looks like the Nehru's Forward Policy had some tacit understanding with the US. Cant explain the forward march without shoring up other cards on the table. Unfortunately the priorities changed in 1962 for the four powers- US, FSU, PRC and India. Before 1962 it is clear that US and India were together and doing something in Tibet. After 1962 US stopped doing things in Tibet and moved closer to PRC a decade later and India moved into FSU alliance.

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Postby ramana » 06 Jul 2007 03:54

Part three of the article in Deccan Chronicle, 6 july 2007
Dont get turned off by the title.

[quote]
China called Nehru two-faced
By Govind Talwalkar

The Chinese view of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru varied from time to time and depended on the status of the border dispute. But they never accepted him as a true socialist. However, his extraordinary popularity in India and his standing in the world and especially in South East Asia were recognised by them.

It was obvious that unlike the Chinese, Indians did not regard Aksai Chin as a matter of strategic importance. For them, it was a matter of prestige, and they were offended because they felt cheated by the Chinese who built a highway there without their knowledge. Indian public opinion was incensed by China’s behaviour. But China could not understand this.

Analysing the attitude of the Chinese leaders, the CIA report says, “leaders are leaders i.e., they can control and direct the opinions of the masses and party political opponents. More importantly, [b]Nehru is Nehru — i.e., his prestige is so great in India that in serious situation the masses merely follow his lead. That the masses and the political opposition could push a great leader, Nehru, into a harder China policy against his will apparently was a concept which the Chinese had considered but in late April 1959 rejected.â€

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Postby negi » 06 Jul 2007 04:01

If one logically disects the past events then I am forced to believe that Chicom was not a natural choice for the US as an ally,infact after having declared itself a republic in 49 and CPC assuming power USA did show interest in India,infact according to some sources Eisenhower infact offered the UN seat then held by Taiwan to India(perhaps wanting to make a non communist ally in Asia) but Nehru had different plans and handed over the seat to the PRC [I do not know as to how true is the above claim but then as they say there aint any smoke without fire].

Finally India moved further away from the US ,thanx to Nehru for he came up with yet another of his brilliant concept i.e. NAM.

What happened in 62 was a manifestation of Nehru's agenda of Gandootva (a collective term for Ahimsa,NAM,secularism,panchsheel etc etc) and ofcourse the evergrowing Chinese ambitions ,its a classic example of political inaction and caloussness that a large landmass like Tibet was annexed so easily and with little effort.

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Postby svinayak » 06 Jul 2007 04:06

ramana wrote:
Interesting that he points to potential fears of Russian cooperation while there are actual facts of US collaboration in Tibet wrt to Khampa uprising etc. It looks like the Nehru's Forward Policy had some tacit understanding with the US. Cant explain the forward march without shoring up other cards on the table. Unfortunately the priorities changed in 1962 for the four powers- US, FSU, PRC and India. Before 1962 it is clear that US and India were together and doing something in Tibet. After 1962 US stopped doing things in Tibet and moved closer to PRC a decade later and India moved into FSU alliance.


There is deep desire in PRC to make sure that even though it is isolated it would not like India to gain maximum from cooperation with US and FSU. It is similar to the report of Chinese comments in 2001 about Indian cooperation with Russia and US at the same time.

These deep desire is exploited by the US from 1972 for its own strategic interest. Between 1962 to 1972 US was exploring the real desire of China and its fears.

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Postby ShauryaT » 06 Jul 2007 04:37

Acharya wrote:These deep desire is exploited by the US from 1972 for its own strategic interest. Between 1962 to 1972 US was exploring the real desire of China and its fears.
It is a very pragmatic view the chinese have and, I commend them for it.

At the end of the day, India and China are competitors more than anything else. Both China and India know this. The response however, is quite different.

While China proceeds to meet its competitor head on, sometimes ruthlessly, the Indian response is always, yes, China is a competitor but we can cooperate too and cooperation will bring peace, blah, blah.

China puts itself first, India puts both of us together. No prize for guesses on who usually wins.

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Postby svinayak » 06 Jul 2007 05:22

negi wrote: its a classic example of political inaction and caloussness that a large landmass like Tibet was annexed so easily and with little effort.


When ever there is a political power vacuum in a nation state outside powers will enter.
Tibet was in such a stage in 1949 and PRC was politically more stronger than India under Nehru that it moved inside Tibet in 1950.

Once the political power is filled it will be hard to dislodge it. Tibetians have to create sufficient nationalism to create a political center that can be assisted by external powers.

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Postby rocky » 06 Jul 2007 05:54

Acharya wrote:
negi wrote: its a classic example of political inaction and caloussness that a large landmass like Tibet was annexed so easily and with little effort.


When ever there is a political power vacuum in a nation state outside powers will enter.
This has been repeated several times in our neighbourhood.

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Postby svinayak » 06 Jul 2007 21:48

rocky wrote:
Acharya wrote:
negi wrote: its a classic example of political inaction and caloussness that a large landmass like Tibet was annexed so easily and with little effort.


When ever there is a political power vacuum in a nation state outside powers will enter.
This has been repeated several times in our neighbourhood.


Creation of failed states is part of the long term plan. E.g. Afghanistan

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Postby ShauryaT » 06 Jul 2007 21:58

Acharya wrote:Creation of failed states is part of the long term plan. E.g. Afghanistan
What plan?

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Postby svinayak » 06 Jul 2007 22:17

ShauryaT wrote:
Acharya wrote:Creation of failed states is part of the long term plan. E.g. Afghanistan
What plan?




[url=http://www.amazon.com/Grand-Chessboard-American-Geostrategic-Imperatives/dp/0465027261]
The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (Paperback) by Zbigniew Brzezinski [/url]
# Paperback: 240 pages
# Publisher: Basic Books; Reissue edition (October 1998)
# Language: English
# ISBN-10: 0465027261
# ISBN-13: 978-0465027262

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Postby ShauryaT » 06 Jul 2007 22:49

Acharya wrote:
ShauryaT wrote:
Acharya wrote:Creation of failed states is part of the long term plan. E.g. Afghanistan
What plan?


[url=http://www.amazon.com/Grand-Chessboard-American-Geostrategic-Imperatives/dp/0465027261]
The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (Paperback) by Zbigniew Brzezinski [/url]
# Paperback: 240 pages
# Publisher: Basic Books; Reissue edition (October 1998)
# Language: English
# ISBN-10: 0465027261
# ISBN-13: 978-0465027262
You cannot be serious. This guy feels seriously left out in the cold, ever since he and Carter bungled on the Delta Force rescue operation.

For him, GWB is the anti thesis of everything he stands for. The guy is seriously absorbed with the idea of American dominance - without any clue of other rising powers. He is steeped into the "Atlanticist" block and has no clue that, there is such a thing called Asian Powers - Rising, who will change the way the world looks and will reduce the relative power of the US in the world.

The folks, who understand these lines are actually in power today and realize that it is far better to work along with these rising Asian powers than confront them with idiotic games. Brezezenski is no authority on the matter. He always comes across as a guy, who is wondering, why does the world or Americans do not give him the same respect as given to Kissinger. The guy cannot look beyond the immediate narrow interests of the US, does not know how the spell strategy and usually tests the political winds before opening his mouth.

Sorry Acharya, I am not buying his book and read/watch enough of him on the times and on PBS.

Added: Forgot to mention, that, if his plans are taken seriously by any President in the future, it will be most likely against Indian Interests - going by the past record.

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Postby svinayak » 06 Jul 2007 22:52

Do not write him off yet. What he did 30 years ago is what you see everywhere now. Mujahids are running around the world now.

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Postby ShauryaT » 06 Jul 2007 22:55

Acharya wrote:Do not write him off yet. What he did 30 years ago is what you see everywhere now. Mujahids are running around the world now.
Oh, come on now. As if he had the bloody foresight that the support to the Mujahideen will follow him all the way to his a** on the 94th floor of the WTC North Tower at 8.38 am. He is still wondering, how did that googly happen. The theory of unintended consequences? or weak foresight, perhaps.

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Postby svinayak » 06 Jul 2007 23:07

ShauryaT wrote:
Acharya wrote:Do not write him off yet. What he did 30 years ago is what you see everywhere now. Mujahids are running around the world now.
Oh, come on now. As if he had the bloody foresight that the support to the Mujahideen will follow him all the way to his a** on the 94th floor of the WTC North Tower at 8.38 am. He is still wondering, how did that googly happen. The theory of unintended consequences? or weak foresight, perhaps.


One may never know. He may have wanted it that way :wink:
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Postby ramana » 06 Jul 2007 23:17

Shaurya, Find out whats common to Kissinger, Zbig and Huntington.

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Postby ShauryaT » 06 Jul 2007 23:34

ramana wrote:Shaurya, Find out whats common to Kissinger, Zbig and Huntington.
Ramana - Tons of overlaps as there is no major divergence in ultimate end goals of retaining American Primacy, unlike the Indian scenario. All 3 of them are peers, Zbig a little junior than Kiss/Hunt. Huntington interestingly is a registered democrat.

All 3 of them are steeped into the idea of protecting a western centric view anchored by the European race and christian values. Though - Kissinger is a Jew. Read Who are We by Huntington - quite a master piece. There are no pretensions in the book on what is he most concerned of (The Hispanic Invasion) and being directly unrelated to politics, except for a short stint - he comes across as the most direct.

But, at its very core - GWB's Iraq venture would not have seen the light of the day, were it not for Kissinger and Zbig - thinks it is the worst foreign policy mistake of the US. So, altough there are over lapping goals there is great divergence in strategy and tactics.

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Postby svinayak » 07 Jul 2007 01:19

ShauryaT wrote:
But, at its very core - GWB's Iraq venture would not have seen the light of the day, were it not for Kissinger and Zbig - thinks it is the worst foreign policy mistake of the US. So, altough there are over lapping goals there is great divergence in strategy and tactics.


According to them it is best foriegn policy ever for US in this century.
It is for the national interest of US and does not have to satisfy any other country including India.

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Postby ramana » 07 Jul 2007 01:58

I agree that the US had to do something in Iraq. The execution and the aftermath of the Iraq policy is the one to fault and not the premise of intervening in Iraq.

After all is said and done Iraq is the center of the Middle East through the ages and it is the only place that has the potential to become a civilizatonal rallying point for fundamentalist forces. And it has to be under control of non-fundamentalist forces.

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Postby ShauryaT » 07 Jul 2007 08:46

Acharya wrote:
ShauryaT wrote:
But, at its very core - GWB's Iraq venture would not have seen the light of the day, were it not for Kissinger and Zbig - thinks it is the worst foreign policy mistake of the US. So, altough there are over lapping goals there is great divergence in strategy and tactics.


According to them it is best foriegn policy ever for US in this century.
It is for the national interest of US and does not have to satisfy any other country including India.
Ofcourse, they should have primarily American interests in mind. Anything else in the minds of the NSA director would be stupid.

What we all should remember is that these interests intersect and diverge. To what degree, the game plan and tactics adopted - all of them do matter. My view is, far from any long term based plan on how these interests and actions thereof will emerge is not the dominant way US policy decisions are taken.

The short term and the politics of the person holding office are equally important if not more important than any long term game plan. What saves the US is that there is no great divergence of US long term Interests and while the tactics and focus change the long term focus remains constant and is quite well defined.

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Postby Sanjay M » 07 Jul 2007 09:11

First of all, Zbigniew Brzezinski is an absolute hard-liner against Russia, and as the architect of the jihadi program he's very pro-Pak. While he appreciates India's democracy, he feels that China's assistance to Pak is necessary to keep it from being subjugated by India.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zbigniew_Brzezinski

During recent congressional testimony, Brzezinski explicitly warned that the Bush administration could stage a high-casualty terrorist attack on US soil, just to pin the blame on Iran as a pretext for war. I've never heard any previous critic of the Bush admin go that far in criticisms. Neither Hillary, nor Gore, nor Obama, etc have ever made such a paranoid statement. To me, statements like that really sum the guy up.

He is now loudly condemning the influence of the Jewish lobby in Washington, and is campaigning to have political contributions curtailed. It shows that this man has neither tact, nor diplomacy, nor political aplomb.
He's a very blunt speaker.

And yet his machiavellianism has not been able to foresee or account for the rise of globalization, which has helped to propel India forward. the Trilateral Commission he founded with David Rockefeller was designed to be an alliance between business and other powerful interest groups in combatting communism. But globalization's new offerings to the business community have the potential to tear the business lobbies away from the Trilateral Commission's narrow Moscow-centric containment and to make it obsolete.

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Postby svinayak » 07 Jul 2007 13:09

ShauryaT wrote:
The short term and the politics of the person holding office are equally important if not more important than any long term game plan. What saves the US is that there is no great divergence of US long term Interests and while the tactics and focus change the long term focus remains constant and is quite well defined.


Once you have come to this conclusion then your understanding becomes clear. All changes/tactics are actually different sides of the same coin.
Now do you agree with most of the discussion in this thread.

ShauryaT
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Postby ShauryaT » 07 Jul 2007 17:24

Acharya wrote:
ShauryaT wrote:
The short term and the politics of the person holding office are equally important if not more important than any long term game plan. What saves the US is that there is no great divergence of US long term Interests and while the tactics and focus change the long term focus remains constant and is quite well defined.


Once you have come to this conclusion then your understanding becomes clear. All changes/tactics are actually different sides of the same coin.
Now do you agree with most of the discussion in this thread.
Ah...That depends on the face of the coin and how far that particular face of the coin can go.

IOW: When Zbig is in charge of US interest the "plans" are more likely to be against Indian Interests - due to his particular world view. When a "reformed" Kissinger is, it is more likely to converge with the Indian world view. Now, both are serving American Interests but the tactics and strategy are different.

e.g: An American presence in the ME, smack in the center, attracting all the Jihadists of the world to it, is immensely attractive to India. How India takes advantage of this policy to further its own interests is another question. The Amercian policy of securing long term energy from the region has not changed. The tactics adopted by various administration provide varying opportunities to India.

So, they are not ALL different sides of the same coin and they cannot be termed as a "plan", a word which you use in an unqualified manner. Just becuase they have a convergence of US interests does not equate to a common plan. Also, India is not part of any such plan, except for the new found idea that India can act as a long term hedge to a future unreformed China. These ideas though are fairly new and the entrenched ideas of India remains as a place of heathens, immersed in immense inequalities and communal differences with Caste as the underpinnings of Indian society with a "democratic" system in which the people, are yet. to learn to spell the word.

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Postby svinayak » 07 Jul 2007 23:57

ShauryaT wrote: Just becuase they have a convergence of US interests does not equate to a common plan. Also, India is not part of any such plan, except for the new found idea that India can act as a long term hedge to a future unreformed China.


Probably this topic is a subject of a different thread.


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Postby ramana » 11 Jul 2007 04:43

Deccan Chronicle 11 july 2007

Curious ignorance of current history
By Inder Malhotra

Thanks primarily to the quantum leap in IT, there is a mind-boggling surfeit of information around. But, sadly, the spread of knowledge hasn’t kept pace with it at all. Witness, the surprised, even awed, reaction of many — including those who hold forth both in print and on television channels — to the "startling revelations" in the just declassified CIA papers on the India-China border war in 1962 and in the simultaneously published book of eminent American historian Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. The truth is that the so-called disclosures by the two sources are no revelations at all but a repetition — and an inadequate one at that — of something that has been in the public domain for years but is apparently unknown to our "experts." The CIA’s secret papers call for additional comment.

For one thing, the volume of the papers released is so staggering that it is impossible to access all of them. For another, there is little to write home about the content of even those documents that have already found their way into print or I have been able to access. Furthermore, whatever the CIA has said on such matters as Jawaharlal Nehru’s "naivety" or his Chinese opposite number Zhou Enlai’s cleverness is only its opinion at the given time (which it might have revised later), not the gospel truth. In any case, were the CIA as omniscient as is generally advertised, it might have prevented America’s disgraceful march of folly from Vietnam in the Sixties of the last century to Iraq in the first decade of the new millennium.

I will briefly return to the CIA documents later. It is more appropriate to deal first with Dallek’s analysis of the Nixon-Kissinger partnership, which will be remembered in this country for the duo’s notorious "tilt," during the war for the liberation of Bangladesh, towards the side that was morally in the wrong and militarily doomed to defeat.

Now, Dallek’s book is an excellent one and eminently readable. But the 1971 war in South Asia finds only a short mention in it. Consequently — notwithstanding elaborate reports published under such headlines as "US asked China to ‘menace’ India, Book reveals Kissinger called Indians ‘insufferably arrogant’ in 1971" — it discloses only a fraction of what has already been exposed to the light of day. As far back as 1999, in a seminal book, The Kissinger Transcripts — published by the Washington-based non-official, non-profit National Security Archives, a treasure-trove of declassified documents, and edited by its senior analyst, William Burr — the entire text of Kissinger’s top secret talks with the Chinese chief of mission to the UN, Huang Hua — was published in devastating detail (page 48-59). The meeting took place on December 10, 1971 in a CIA "safe house" in New York. For the benefit of those who never read or heard of this transcript, let me quote some of the operative and juicier parts of Kissinger’s remarks to Huang that underscore his malignancy towards India.

"The President wants you to know," Kissinger said to the Chinese envoy, "that it’s, of course, up to the People’s Republic to decide its own course of action … but if the People’s Republic were to consider the situation in the Indian subcontinent a threat to its security, and if it took measures to protect its security, the US would oppose efforts of others (read the Soviet Union) to interfere with the People’s Republic. We are not recommending any particular steps; we are simply informing you of the actions of others."

However, as the conversation proceeded, Kissinger shed his "it’s for the People’s Republic to decide" pretence and other reservations at least thrice within a span of few minutes. At one stage, he blurted out, "When I asked for this meeting, I did so to suggest Chinese military help, to be quite honest." Again and again he returned to the theme that India must be "deterred" at all costs. "We think that the immediate objective must be to prevent an attack on the West Pakistan Army by India. We are afraid that if nothing is done to stop it, East Pakistan will become a Bhutan and West Pakistan a Nepal. And India with Soviet help would be free to turn its energies elsewhere." According to Kissinger, a "source" of US intelligence had informed it, "Mrs (Indira) Gandhi had told her cabinet that she wanted to destroy the Pakistan Army and Air Force and annex this (sic.) part of Kashmir …" Kissinger therefore stressed the need for "maximum intimidation of the Indians."

According to William Burr’s masterly commentary on the conversation, Kissinger was perhaps carried away by Huang’s "militant rhetoric."

For example at one stage, Huang said that India and the Soviet Union were trying to "encircle China."

Kissinger: "There is no question about that."

What the great American diplomat overlooked was Huang’s repeated remark, absolutely typical of Chinese diplomats, that he would "convey" the contents of the conversation to "Prime Minister Zhoul Enlai."

As for the abusive language used by Nixon and Kissinger about Indians, especially Indira Gandhi — calling her both a "witch" and a "bitch" — it is to be found in much greater detail in the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume Eleven, South Asia Crisis 1971, published in 2005.

To revert to the CIA papers, the US agency astonishingly assessed the contrived and inconsequential visit to China of the then secretary-general, R.K. Nehru, and his talks with the Chinese leaders in Beijing and Shanghai in July 1961 as a "landmark" event. Regrettably, there isn’t enough space to reproduce what P.K. Banerjee, at first deputy chief of mission and then charge d’ affaires in Beijing, wrote in his memoirs about these "untimely" and "pointless" parleys. However, it should suffice to quote what S. Gopal, head of the historical division in the ministry of external affairs and an adviser on China policy said to the Prime Minister when asked for his comments on "R.K.’s report" on his sojourn in China: "Sir, of what Zhou Enlai said to him, R.K. (who was known to be hard of hearing) heard only half. Of what he heard, he absorbed only half. And of that he has told you only half. How can he be taken seriously?"



BTW, BRM as usual was ahead of the curve and had a scholar review the Nixon Mao & Chou tapes.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... malik.html

bala
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Postby bala » 11 Jul 2007 06:36

In retrospect, both Nixon and Kissinger guessed wrong on the policy front about Pak-China. Now the US is at odds with China. The old Soviet Union is gone. Bangladesh is not a problem anymore. The US is trying to co-opt with India against China. Pakistan is a problem and so is China. Just goes to prove that all that Harvard education must have clouded Kissinger to bad judgments and turned him & Nixon into the 20th century's most despicable criminals for the slaughter of innocent Bangladeshis at the hands of TSP leaders - Yahya Khan, Niazi et al. Murderer Kissinger that is his legacy.


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