48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby nam » 19 Aug 2018 20:02

It is Lt kheterpal's tank.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 19 Aug 2018 20:30

ramana wrote:FamaGusta was a Centurion tank.

Karan M wrote:Likely Lt Kheterpals tank because you said 1971?

nam wrote:It is Lt kheterpal's tank.

All Correct.

His last words (before he switched off the radio, to not hear any more orders from his CO) was, "No Sir, I will not abandon my tank and I will get these basta rds!"

It takes a very special man, with very special training and despite knowing fully well that he is going to die....to say the above. IIRC, his tank could no longer move, but the tank's gun was operational. It is one thing for a man to charge a post, facing a hail of bullets and knowing that he may survive the ordeal. But it takes a very special man - knowing with full 100% certainity that he is going to die - to still charge that post. Bravery was like breathing to 2nd Lt Arun Kheterpal, PVC. He rightly deserved the Param Vir Chakra. Even the Pak Army tanker - who killed him in that battle - later wrote an article about 2nd Lt Kheterpal, chroniciling his bravery.

I still remember Field Marshal Mankeshaw's speech (on youtube) to an IMA graduating class, "There is no room for the loser. If you lose, don't come back."

And the Indian Armed Forces are filled with men and women like 2nd Lt Arun Kheterpal, PVC. They are India's Legends.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ramana » 23 Aug 2018 06:59

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 03 Sep 2018 10:29

informative write up
How naval commandos defeated Pakistan in 1971
In the early hours of August 15, ‘Operation Jackpot’ was executed: Nine ships in Chittagong harbour were blown up by commando frogmen using limpet mines. This operation nearly crippled the crucial port of Chittagong. Operation Jackpot continued, and another 36 vessels were soon sunk in other ports. This action showed the world that the resistance was alive and that Bangladesh has not been “pacified”. By November, the commandos sunk over 100,000 tons of shipping, suffering very few causalities. The fighters were now provided gunboats; two patrol boats were also loaned by the Indian Navy. This flotilla struck Pakistani and allied ships in the sub-campaign ‘Operation Hotpants’. Ports, rivers and waterways were soon clogged with damaged or sunken vessels. Around this time, Gano Bahini guerilla units entered Bangladesh from India’s North East. All lines of communications of the Pakistani forces in Bangladesh were now throttled; Pakistani control shrunk to urban areas. Consequently, the occupation crumbled when war erupted on December 3.

https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/colum ... an-2658043

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 17 Nov 2018 14:00

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ind ... 664353.cms

1971 India-Pakistan war hero Brig Chandpuri dead

on the intervening night of 5/6 Dec 1971 then Maj Chandpuri led something like a 100 men of the 23 Bn, The Punjab Regt. to force a 3000+ (51 Inf Bde) Pak Brigade and a Regt of T59 and a Squadrons worth of Shermans to retreat.
May Mother India be blessed with more such Sons.JMD

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Suresh S » 17 Nov 2018 18:29

I wake up and first thing in the morning I had a few tears . Aaj ek sher hame chhor kar chale gaye . Brigadier Chandpuri passed away. Wahe guruji ka khalsa wahe guruji ke fatah.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby SBajwa » 17 Nov 2018 19:50

Very tragic news braveheart Brigadier was only 78 years old. RIP

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 18 Nov 2018 10:46

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/punja ... 84625.html

Obituary of one of the great sons of India Brig. Chandpuri, MVC, VSM

“We were given a choice to stay put and defend the position or go in for a tactical retreat. We chose to stay put and fight,” Brig Chandpuri, once told this reporter.
he first attack by Pakistani troops at night was stalled through anti-tank weapons. Reserve fuel drums kept atop tanks were exploded, throwing enough light for our gunners positioned on high ground, while their own smoke blinded their troops.

“Though we were outnumbered and surrounded, Pakistani infantry was unable to advance. We held them till dawn when the IAF came in,” he added.

When the operation ended, 22 Pakistani tanks had been destroyed.

The citation for his award reads: “Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri was commanding a company battalion of the Punjab Regiment occupying a defended locality in the Rajasthan Sector. On December 5, 1971, in the early hours of the morning the enemy launched a massive attack on this locality with infantry and tanks. Major Chandpuri exhibited dynamic leadership in holding his command intact and steadfast. Showing exceptional courage and determination, he inspired his men moving from bunker to bunker, encouraging them in beating back the enemy till reinforcements arrived. In this heroic defence, he inflicted heavy casualities on the enemy and forced them to retreat leaving behind 12 tanks. In this action, Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri displayed conspicuous gallantry, inspiring leadership and exceptional devotion to duty in keeping with the highest traditions of the Indian Army.”

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 18 Dec 2018 12:25

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comme ... 99918.html
I fervently hope that somebody does something to get these brave Soldiers of ours home

-Indian POWs, the unfinished business of ’71 war

It was only by 1974-end, when the issue of repatriation of POWs from all three sides had been closed, that the Indian Government realised that some of its men had been detained, when information began trickling in about their presence in Pakistani prisons. It was in December 1978, seven years after the war, that the Indian Government first acknowledged that 40 Indian soldiers missing since the war ended, are actually believed to be in Pakistan's custody. The number went up to 54 when more evidence filtered in during the eighties. It includes 22 pilots of the Air Force. In 2010, the list tabled in Parliament was expanded to 74 by including the names of soldiers captured during peace time from near the LOC and the IB.

It is now known that Pakistan held these missing soldiers under the category of 'security prisoners', an euphemism for spies. Such a re-categorisation freed Pakistan from the charge of violating the Geneva Convention, according to which all POWs have to be declared and repatriated after the end of hostilities between warring countries. Pakistan has consistently denied keeping these men and India has done little more than wring its hands in helplessness. As for the military, it has given up these men as 'killed in action' and treats them as martyrs. They were given posthumous bravery awards, their units built memorials for them and everyone has moved on.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 16 Mar 2019 22:28

‘Wish I had met him in any other circumstance’: Retd Army Colonel on Pakistan Major he killed in hand combat
https://indianexpress.com/article/india ... t-5629363/

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 09 Dec 2019 12:19

https://theprint.in/pageturner/excerpt/ ... nt/164545/

Rarely told story of avoidable loss of INS Khukri in 1971: A general’s honest account
eminently readable

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Gerard » 10 Dec 2019 07:48

255. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1
Washington, December 9, 1971, 10:09–11 a.m.

South Asia
[Page 712]

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
U. Alexis Johnson
John N. Irwin, II
Joseph Sisco
Christopher Van Hollen
Samuel DePalma
Anthony Quainton
Bruce Laingen
Thomas Pickering
Armistead Selden
James H. Noyes
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Capt. Howard N. Kay
Richard Helms
John Waller
Donald MacDonald
Maurice Williams
C. Herbert Rees
NSC Staff
B/Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
R/Adm. Robert O. Welander
Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Harold H. Saunders
Samuel Hoskinson
Rosemary Neaher
Jeanne W. Davis

It was agreed that:

the JCS would prepare urgently a plan for deployment of a carrier task force for evacuation of Americans from East Pakistan, and the agencies should comment on the advisability of such a move by this afternoon;
State should draft a telegram of instruction to Ambassador Farland for a possible approach to Yahya;
State will prepare a scenario for a possible approach to the Indians to seek assurances on the maintenance of present lines of demarcation.
Mr. Kissinger: Dick (Helms), can you tell us where we are?

(Mr. Helms briefed from the attached text.)2

Mr. Kissinger: The President is astonished that American officials could appear to agree with the Indian interpretation that, since they have split off only some 60% of the country and did not actually annex the territory, this demonstrates that they are essentially peacefully inclined. This is not our position and he does not want the Indians to [Page 713]be left under any misapprehension in this regard. He wants this corrected today.

Mr. Helms: In the last few hours we have a report from Karachi that the oil tanks there have been hit again, in the 12th or 13th air raid, and that six or eight of them are burning. An ESSO representative has indicated that this means the loss of 50% of Karachiʼs oil reserves, which amounts to over 80% of the POL for all of Pakistan. He estimates that they are left with a two-weeksʼ supply, possibly less at the rate at which POL is now being consumed.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Adm. Moorer) What is your estimate of the military situation?

Adm. Moorer: In East Pakistan, in the absence of a ceasefire, itʼs just a matter of time until the Pakistan Army will be essentially ineffective. There is, however, no indication that their morale has broken down. Their supplies are cut off and they have no air left. Any serious fighting could be over in ten days or two weeks, depending on whether the Paks continue to fight to the last man or whether they begin to surrender in large numbers, which does not seem to be in the cards now. In West Pakistan, the Paks are slightly superior in numbers, (they have about 90–100,000 men), and they are trying to occupy enough of Kashmir to give them a bargaining chip if and when there is a ceasefire. They are trying to block the main lines of communication. South of the Kashmir area, the Indians outnumber the Paks two-to-one, and they may plan to move south to Lahore, although there is no indication of that now. The best Pakistan can do is to gain as much control of Kashmir as possible.

Mr. Kissinger: How much is that?

Adm. Moorer: Enough to keep the Indians out until there is enough international pressure to bring about a ceasefire.

Mr. Irwin: What are their chances of doing that?

Adm. Moorer: The Paks can operate for about three weeks or so. However, if there is a period of attrition, with no ceasefire, the Indians can hold out longer and the Paks have had it. Mrs. Gandhi has stated that her objective is to destroy the Pak military forces.

Mr. Kissinger: So if the war is prolonged, it wonʼt make any difference if the Paks take Kashmir, since they wouldnʼt be able to hold it.

Adm. Moorer: Yes, but that is their only chance.

Mr. Kissinger: Yesterday someone here said a ceasefire in West Pakistan would work to the disadvantage of the Paks. Now do I understand that you are saying that a prolonged war, even if the Paks get Kashmir, will lead to the destruction of the Pak Army?

Adm. Moorer: Exactly. When East Pakistan is gone, the Indians will transfer their divisions to West—possibly four of the six divisions [Page 714]now in the East. This will take one to three weeks, depending on how much air they use. If the war continues to the end, the outcome for Pakistan is inevitable.

Mr. Kissinger: So we have to prevent an Indian onslaught on West Pakistan, since the outcome will be the same as in East Pakistan. The Indians will then control the area to Bhutan in the East and Nepal in the West.

Mr. Irwin: The CIA paper (Implications of an Indian Victory Over Pakistan, December 9)3 predicts the possible acceleration of the breakup tendencies in West Pakistan—possibly into as many as four separate states.

Mr. Johnson: That sounds reasonable.

Adm. Moorer: I think the Indians will be slowed down somewhat by logistic problems, care of casualties, etc., but they will not slow down as fast as the Paks.

Mr. Williams: It sounds as though POL is the critical element, if they have lost 50% of 80% of the supplies for all of Pakistan. Doesnʼt this mean that their planes and tanks will come to a halt in about three weeks?

Mr. Helms: The Indians have already hit the reserves at Rawalpindi.

Mr. Williams: Then POL is the critical point. (to Adm. Moorer) Was that the basis for your estimate of three weeks?

Adm. Moorer: That and the ammo supply. The Indians will run short of ammo, too, ultimately, but not to the point that they canʼt operate.

Mr. Williams: The Indian objective is to take out the Pak tanks and planes. If they run out of POL and canʼt move, theyʼll be sitting ducks.

Mr. Irwin: Do the Paks have any capability of defending their POL?

Adm. Moorer: No.

Mr. Johnson: What is the possibility of trucking POL from Tehran?

Adm. Moorer: There is one road. We have one report that indicates that Chinese trucks are coming in but we donʼt know what they are carrying. Iran is the logical source of POL. I talked to the Turkish Chief of Staff at NATO and asked him how much assistance he thought Iran was prepared to give to Pakistan. He said he thought the Shah wanted to be helpful, but had one eye cocked on Iraq. In the end, he didnʼt believe the Shah would give significant assistance.

[Page 715]
Mr. Helms: We have a good telegram from Doug Heck4 on this today, saying the Shah is playing the situation coolly and even-handedly. He pointed out the difficulty of resupply.

Mr. Kissinger: So the critical attitude is ours. If they had any indication from us that we were favorable, they might do it. But judging by our reaction in the Jordan episode, they are getting signals from us not to do it—possibly not directly but at least by osmosis.

Mr. Helms: There are serious logistical problems in doing much of anything in the existing time frame. They donʼt have the ability, even if they went flat-out, of doing anything in any quantity.

Mr. Kissinger: Are we agreed that we should do our best to prevent an Indian attack on West Pakistan? That this is our chief objective?

Mr. Irwin: The question is how to do it. To what degree would this require involvement of the United States.

Mr. Kissinger: We are involved, no matter how often our press spokesmen say we are not. The question is the degree of our involvement.

Mr. Johnson: If the fighting in the West could be brought to a stop now, it would be to the advantage of the Paks.

Mr. Kissinger: What do you suggest?

Mr. Irwin: The question is what our policy is. We could undertake little direct support to Pakistan without increasing the degree of our involvement.

Mr. Johnson: I think we should make a maximum effort with both sides to bring the fighting to a stop. The Paks have already accepted the UN cease-fire resolution.

Mr. Kissinger: Including withdrawal.

Mr. Johnson: Yes; the Indians have not accepted it. A withdrawal by both sides to the previous boundaries is clearly in Pakistanʼs interest.

Mr. Kissinger: Pakistan would implement the resolution in the West but India would not implement it in the East.

Mr. Johnson: Iʼm talking about the West only. We would go to the Indians and press them to implement the resolution in the West.

Mr. Kissinger: But they have acquired no territory in the West.

Mr. Johnson: Each of them has some territory. The point is that continuation of the fighting in the West is not to the advantage of Pakistan under any circumstances.

Mr. Kissinger: Is that all we can do?

[Page 716]
Mr. Selden: What will be the fate of the Pak Army in East Pakistan? There will be a massacre if they keep on fighting.

Mr. Johnson: What can we do in the East?

Mr. Helms: There is nothing to do. There is no way of getting them out.

Mr. Johnson: India can afford to withdraw their troops from East Pakistan, once the Mukti Bahini are in the saddle.

Adm. Moorer: Not until the Pak Army is destroyed. Mrs. Gandhi has said also that she wants to straighten out the border.

Mr. Noyes: The more territory Pakistan takes in the West, the more provocation this is to India—the more justification India has to continue.

Adm. Moorer: India doesnʼt need any provocation or justification. They have a plan and they are carrying it out.

Mr. Johnson: And the Paks canʼt prevent it.

Mr. Helms: What leverage do we have on India?

Mr. Johnson: None. Iʼm talking about our objectives.

Mr. Irwin: We can move politically through the UN. We can take some action with regard to military assistance. Suppose we decided to move into substantial military assistance to Pakistan? How effectively could we do it in terms of enabling them to hold in the West?

Adm. Moorer: To make it effective, we would have to move very fast. The most effective material would be consumables—ammunition, POL.

Mr. Irwin: If we decided to do this, could we get enough additional supplies in within a week to make the difference? Thereʼs also the question of what third parties could do.

Mr. Kissinger: We have two separate problems: (1) the deterrent effect on India of our undertaking a supply effort for Pakistan; and (2) the actual military effect. For everything we have done after India was committed to war, we have been accused of being punitive since it was too little to affect the outcome. What if we do nothing? Noninvolvement is a lovely phrase, but it earns us no Brownie points. Our Brownie points will come from the outcome a year from now. In the larger international arena, would we be better off if we did not become involved, assuming we ignore the meaning of our bilateral treaty and subsequent assurances to the Paks. Or would we be better off if we tried to scare the Indians off and, if we do lose, of having salvaged at least the indication that, when we are pressed, we will do something. Indeed, in the Middle East or Indonesia, we might do more. No one has a bigger stake in the relaxation of tensions than the President, for personal reasons. But in a situation where non-involvement means the Soviets can pour in supplies with equanimity and we canʼt, we will be judged by the outcome and not by the theory by which we arrived at it. If this is true, we should look at the moves we could take. Someone [Page 717]said here yesterday that if we wanted to move, we could find a basis for it. Why canʼt we call in the Indian Ambassador and ask him for assurances that no demarcation line is to be changed?

Mr. Johnson: We would have a good basis for this in Kashmir since we have a UN resolution on it.

Mr. Kissinger: We could just ask for flat assurances. That wouldnʼt be too provocative and it would posture us for the future.

Mr. Johnson: I think we should do it. We should talk to the Soviets too.

Mr. Kissinger: On the question of military supply, if it is true that the Indians are willing to fight to a bloody finish, what would be most likely to deter them? What if Jordan should send planes to Pakistan? Why would this be such a horrible event?

Mr. Johnson: It wouldnʼt, but it would be the same as if the Americans did it.

Adm. Moorer: We made this problem for ourselves when we stopped aid to Pakistan in the first place.

Mr. Kissinger: But no one told us that then.

Adm. Moorer: If we asked the Indian Ambassador for assurances on boundaries and he said no, this would be very important, regardless of what action we take.

Mr. Johnson: Shouldnʼt we also talk to Yahya?

Mr. Kissinger: About what?

Mr. Johnson: To get his views on the restoration of the status quo ante in the West.

Mr. Kissinger: Wouldnʼt he say “they have taken half my country, and I canʼt talk about it”?

Mr. Johnson: What is the alternative—continued fighting in the West until his forces are destroyed?

Mr. Williams: But Yahya doesnʼt expect this to happen. He expects the fighting will be stopped by the great powers. He expects them to bring it to a halt and then to go to some form of negotiating table.

Adm. Moorer: Is there any way to get NATO into the act?

Mr. Helms: The British and French donʼt go along with us.

Mr. Kissinger: What are we telling the NATO countries?

Mr. Sisco: I sent a telegram5 to the Secretary last night suggesting he draw on your backgrounder.

[Page 718]
Mr. Kissinger: What part?

Mr. Sisco: I left that to the Secretary.

Mr. Kissinger: When the Soviets were in an equally disadvantageous situation in the Middle East in 1967 and were trying to bring the war to a conclusion, they gave the impression that they might do something serious. The question is whether another flood of notes, without actually doing something, would indicate that unless the fighting stops there will be increased danger. Unless we can settle on a strategy, speak with the same voice, and stop putting out all these conflicting stories from the various agencies and all this leaking, we donʼt deserve to succeed.

Mr. Williams: If we approach the Indians, their response will probably be that they will stop the war in the West in return for Pakistanʼs recognition of Bangla Desh.

Mr. Johnson: But with the destruction of the Pak forces in the East, they canʼt do anything anyway.

Mr. Williams: But the Indians have already said this is what they want, and we would get this response to any approach to them. Once they achieve their objective in the East, there is the possibility that they may stop.

Mr. Irwin: But they have said they intend to destroy the Pak Army and Air Force and straighten out the line on Kashmir.

Mr. Kissinger: If they destroy the army and the air force, Pakistan will be in their paws. The result would be a nation of 100 million people dismembered, their political structure changed by military attack, despite a treaty of alliance with and private assurances by the United States. And all the other countries, on whom we have considered we could rely, such as Iran, would know that this has been done by the weight of Soviet arms and with Soviet diplomatic support. What will be the effect in the Middle East, for example—could we tell Israel that she should give up something along a line from A to B, in return for something else, with any plausibility?

Mr. Sisco: I donʼt accept that view. We do have a kind of alliance with Pakistan in both the CENTO and the bilateral context, but that alliance was against communist aggression. I grant that the Russians are behind India in this, but our commitment was not in the India-Pakistan context. I donʼt believe Iran, or Israel or any other Middle Eastern country expect direct US involvement in South Asia.

Mr. Kissinger: No one is talking about that.

Mr. Sisco: We are involved, and we are talking about the nature of our involvement. I donʼt see the implication for the rest of the world that you draw. I have the impression from what Yahya told (Ambassador) Farland that he has “accepted” the inevitable result in East Pakistan. [Page 719]We canʼt do anything about that. East Pakistan is gone and we both have to face that fact. The thing that confronts Yahya and us in relation to the balance on the subcontinent is what happens in West Pakistan. It is not in our interest to have India destroy the Pak Army in West Pakistan, or otherwise effect a further radical change in the status quo, possibly resulting in the fractionalization of Pakistan. I think we have three options: (1) we can do nothing—complete noninvolvement—in which case East Pakistan would be lost, India would destroy the Pak Army and would take at least Azad Kashmir. This is clearly unacceptable. (2) That we not accept this situation, but see what we can do diplomatically or otherwise to deter the Indians from their present course. We should recognize that we are limited in the ways in which we can deter the Indians. Even if we should move rapidly on arms supply to the Paks, this would have only a marginal effect.

Mr. Kissinger: Assuming the Indians were willing to press the fighting to a conclusion.

Mr. Sisco: Yes. We should ask ourselves how we could deter the Indians so as to end with a West Pakistan based on the status quo ante, including no alteration of the boundaries of Kashmir.

Mr. Kissinger: Would you accept Bangla Desh?

Mr. Sisco: I have no problem with going to the Indians alone, as you suggest. We should also go to the Russians. I think we should also have a serious talk with Yahya.

Mr. Kissinger: What would be the point of a serious talk with Yahya?

Mr. Sisco: To see how he reads his position. I realize this is an over-simplification, but Yahya is faced with a situation involving the sure destruction of elements of his Government in East Pakistan. How does he read his capability in the West? Probably not as we do. Given the disproportionate military capability between India and Pakistan, we see the likelihood of a Pak defeat. But if Yahya doesnʼt read it that way, he may want to continue the military struggle. If he wants to do this, weʼre not in a position to second-guess him. The fundamental question is whether we should try to have some exchange along the line that the East is pretty well lost, and how do we save the rest of Pakistan?

Mr. Kissinger: So we would go to Yahya and say he should settle now?

Mr. Sisco: Yahya is faced with the necessity of cutting his losses and saving West Pakistan.

Mr. Kissinger: Suppose Yahya says yes, and the Indians say he has to recognize Bangla Desh?

Mr. Sisco: We shouldnʼt press him to do that. Iʼm stating the situation in bald terms.

[Page 720]
Mr. Johnson: India doesnʼt need Yahyaʼs recognition of Bangla Desh. Neither Yahya nor the U.S. can restore the status quo ante in Bangla Desh. There is nothing Yahya can do, even if he doesnʼt accept the loss.

Mr. Williams: We have only a limited leverage on India. In the absence of any assurance that a military supply effort would be effective and would make any difference in the military balance, weʼre in a terribly weak position. I think we need something additional if we are to extract Yahya with some shred of honor. I think we should go back to a sharpened Security Council resolution—a stand-fast of some sort which would save the army and hold to the demarcation of the present boundaries. We might add Bangla Desh to this equation in some way.

Mr. Sisco: I donʼt exclude the possibility of a deal of some sort, even now.

Mr. Williams: There are still elements of concession. Donʼt forget that the spirit of nationalism was terribly strong in East Pakistan even before the fighting broke out. This is where any talent we have needs to be applied. I think we should discuss it with Yahya. If we put some force behind it, we may even have a chance of getting the Russians behind it. Many West Pakistanis will recognize and accept the loss of East Pakistan, although it will be hard for the Army to take.

Mr. Kissinger: Assuming that this kind of option will be kept open, the President wants India to understand very clearly that we would not look with indifference on an Indian onslaught on West Pakistan. Our press spokesmen should not press the idea of neutrality or noninvolvement to the point that the Indians could misunderstand that this foretells our attitude toward an attack on West Pakistan. We should keep open the option of trying to deter the Indians, by a show of force, if necessary. We could then use that as a bridge to the sort of negotiation you (Williams) are talking about. This would also give the Soviets an excuse to try to help.

Along this line, the President has asked for the pros and cons of getting an American aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal for the purpose of evacuating Americans. (to Moorer) Can you do it?

Adm. Moorer: Sure. It will take five or six days. We have several options.

Mr. Kissinger: Can you all consider it and have your views over here by early afternoon?

Adm. Moorer: We could put in a carrier task force, including some destroyers and a cruiser and some helos.

Mr. Kissinger: Letʼs get your plan over here by 2:00 this afternoon, and any views the rest of you may have by 6:00 p.m. We may have another [Page 721]meeting with the President if he wants to move more energetically, to remove any lingering doubts any of you may have. But we should get ourselves postured, without any prejudice to the kind of solution Maury Williams has suggested. (to Irwin) Will you draft a telegram of what we might say to Yahya?

Mr. Johnson: And also what we might say to the Indians.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.↩
Not printed. According to his briefing notes, Helms reported that the defense being mounted by Pakistani forces in East Pakistan was crumbling. Indian forces suffered heavy casualties during the early stages of the fighting, but they were breaking through outmanned Pakistani positions. There were no indications that Pakistani forces were surrendering in large numbers or that discipline had broken down, but the CIA assessment was that Pakistani forces in East Pakistan would have a hard time regrouping. Indian officials were calling for a surrender of those forces to prevent further bloodshed. By contrast, the fighting in the west had produced only limited results.↩
This 12-page CIA assessment is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 170.↩
Not found.↩
Telegram 221059 to Brussels, December 8, sent the text of Kissingerʼs background briefing of the press on December 7 on the South Asian crisis to Secretary Rogers, who was attending the NATO meetings. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan Situation)↩

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 76v11/d255

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Gerard » 10 Dec 2019 08:57


1. Editorial Note
According to Henry Kissinger, “When the Nixon administration took office, our policy objective on the subcontinent was, quite simply, to avoid adding another complication to our agenda.” (Kissinger, White House Years, page 848) As events developed in South Asia, that proved to be an increasingly difficult objective to achieve. A political crisis developed in Pakistan out of Bengali demands for autonomy for East Pakistan, demands which were highlighted by the results of a general election in December 1970. The subsequent crisis, which roiled the subcontinent in conflict from March to December 1971, led to warfare between India and Pakistan, and eventuated in the transition of the east wing of Pakistan into the new nation of Bangladesh. The United States, which was using Pakistan at the time as a conduit in conducting secret negotiations with China, intervened in the crisis to try to prevent fighting between India and Pakistan. When fighting developed, the Nixon administration “tilted” toward Pakistan.

The background to the crisis in Pakistan, and the developing tensions between the United States and India are documented in a companion Internet publication, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972. This publication also documents such bilateral issues as economic and military assistance as well as the aftermath of the crisis. In 1972 the Nixon administration had to weigh the timing of recognition of the new government in Dacca, a decision that bore on relations with Pakistan, and reestablish a working relationship with India, as the dominant power on the subcontinent. Separate internet publications document relations with Afghanistan and with Bangladesh.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Sanju » 10 Dec 2019 09:50

255. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1
Washington, December 9, 1971, 10:09–11 a.m.

South Asia
[Page 712]

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 76v11/d255

Gerard ji, Thank you for that awesome read. It clearly shows their desperation in finding a solution to save their rent boy. It is a treasure trove of information, that paints the picture of Indo-US relations and the US relations with its minions like Turkey, Iran, Jordan and allies like the French and the Brits.
I remember Ramana ji, writing years ago about the US pressure on India to let the Pakis retain their fighting capability and no significant loss of land in the West.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby tandav » 10 Dec 2019 10:34

It is the 48th Anniversary not 41st...

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Gerard » 10 Dec 2019 16:07


263. Memorandum of Conversation1
Washington, December 10, 1971, 9:45–10:17 a.m.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Richard Helms, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Maurice Williams, Agency for International Development
Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
[Page 736]
Kissinger: The President read in the news summary2 that American planes were attacked by the Indians.

Johnson: This was several days ago. Itʼs been protested.

Moorer: Many are being killed in the West in ships.

Kissinger: They are asking also for withdrawal of Indiaʼs troops.3

Johnson: Not as a condition.

Kissinger: Where does this lead us?

Johnson: I talked with George Bush. The UN has received it and has asked the Security Council to decide on it. Only the Chinese havenʼt been in on it.4 Joe has the scenarios. We should send a flash message to Farland to confirm that this is Yahyaʼs view. We should bypass the Security Council. Itʼs quicker to do it by the Secretary General. We should get the UN Indian rep on the ground to talk with the Pak Generals. The Secretary General should tell his man.

Kissinger: The President feels we are obliged to call for a ceasefire in the West. We should demand a ceasefire in the West. It must be clearly understood that our policy is to get a ceasefire in the West. Weʼll make a treaty if necessary.

Sisco: Letʼs tell Yahya in a message that this is what we plan to do, and does he agree?

Kissinger: If there is a ceasefire now, we donʼt have to worry about the territorial question in the West.

Johnson: This goes right along with the UNGA resolution.5

Sisco: Add a sentence to the cable.6 Tell Yahya he can assume if this is his proposal, he can assume it is based on a ceasefire in the West. We will go all out.

[Page 737]
Kissinger: I assume they did this in the East because they are finished.

Moorer: With only 3–4 days left, there is time for the Indians to regroup.

Williams: Theyʼll fight to the death. The Indians are close now.

[omission in the source text]: The situation is hopeless.

Kissinger: We donʼt want to be the instrument pushing a Pakistani surrender, when the Chinese are on their side. Bush shouldnʼt do anything until we hear from Yahya.

Sisco: We donʼt want it in the Security Council again. Weʼll negotiate down from the resolutions.

Kissinger: Why not make Soviets put up?

Johnson: Weʼre apt to get into a long debate and lose track of whatʼs happening on the ground.

Sisco: The Paks have taken the initiative.

Kissinger: The President doesnʼt want us to move in the UN to arrange a surrender. Take a tough line with the Indians. If the Paks want it, we will help.

Helms: If we want West Pakistan tied in, we have to go to the Security Council. If there is an early agreement on what the Paks want in the East, we can move outside of the Security Council.

Kissinger: We want to stop the attack in West Pakistan. There is no objection to this proposal but we must prevent an attack in the West. Get a flash to Farland to get Yahyaʼs views. Tell him it is our judgment we should use it as a basis for a ceasefire in the West.

Sisco: Assume the Pakistani proposal is that Yahya wants a cease-fire in West. We will be helpful with the Indians to this end.

Kissinger: We must prevent the destruction of the Pak Army in the West. We donʼt want our Ambassador to press Yahya to surrender.

Sisco: There is no danger of that. Farland wouldnʼt do that.

Moorer: We should give Yahya our judgment that his army can be destroyed in three weeks. He doesnʼt see that.

Sisco: Let me make a language suggestion: We assume the Pakistani proposal was based on the assumption that Pakistan is ready for a ceasefire in the West as well. Please confirm, and indicate that we are prepared to weigh in heavily with the Indians and others to bring this about if this is Yahyaʼs desire.

Kissinger: The Indians must know our priority area and the Russians must know we are serious.

Moorer: How about the integrity of the border?

Sisco: Some mutual withdrawals will be necessary in the West but it means the Indians canʼt take any Pakistani territory.

[Page 738]
[omission in the source text]: Previous borders good.

Johnson: The Indians want to straighten out the border. We should add the status quo ante to the telegram.

Kissinger: We must be sure Yahya sees we are not turning on him.

Packard: They donʼt know where they are up there.

Johnson: He accepted the General Assembly resolution which calls for that.

Sisco: It wonʼt remove any danger. Leave it fuzzy.

[omission in the source text]: Itʼs o.k. at this time.

Kissinger: Couldnʼt we just say “Does this mean he is ready for a ceasefire in the West as well? If so, we are willing to make a major effort to bring this about to help preserve his territorial integrity and prevent the destruction of his army. Please respond FLASH.”

[All agree. Final text is attached at Tab A.]7

Kissinger: Back to the UN: Bush is to be clearly told that we should take no stance which suggests we are supporting the surrender of Pakistan. He should be one step back of what the Pakistanis say.

Sisco: Bhutto asked to see the President. We got an interesting cable from the DCM.8

Kissinger: I saw it. Bhuttoʼs comments are interesting. The DCMʼs comments suggested heʼs thinking of reconciliation with India. The President may be willing to see him—I donʼt know. It couldnʼt be sooner than Wednesday.

Sisco: Should the Secretary and Henry see him sooner? The Secretary returns tonight.

Kissinger: What is the Security Council problem?

Sisco: The document9 is circulated. I donʼt know whether the Secretary General has convened the Security Council. If we temporize— [Page 739]have Bush say we havenʼt decided whether a Security Council meeting is indicated—while we are checking the authenticity of the request. If Yahya wants it and the Secretary General then goes to the Indians, saying they are ready to talk&.

Kissinger: Suppose the President wants to go to the Security Council and insist we will cooperate only if there is a ceasefire in the West. This is like the Soviet resolution.10 If the choice is between stop in the East but not in the West or an end of action in the West, there may be no need to pursue withdrawal anymore except as a negotiating ploy.

Williams: An honorable withdrawal for Pak forces from the West [East] is a key point.

Helms: Letʼs get out the message.

[The meeting ended.]11

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–083, WSAG Meeting, Pakistan, 12/12/71. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting was held in the Situation Room at the White House.↩
The news summary prepared for the President on December 9 contained an item based on a televised report of Indian aircraft having attacked two neutral planes in Pakistan. One plane belonged to the UN, the other to the United States. Nixon penned an instruction to Kissinger in the margin that reads: “K—State immediately is to file a strong public protest on this—(India always protested our V. Nam actions even though they were not involved at all)”. (Ibid., White House Special Files, Presidentʼs Office Files, Annotated News Summaries, December 9–24, 1971)↩
The discussion at this point apparently relates to telegram 5573 from Dacca, December 10. That telegram reported that UN Special Assistant Paul Marc Henry had received from the commander of the Pakistani forces, Major General Rao Farman Ali Khan, a copy of a message Farman sent to President Yahya asking him to approve a request by Farman for the UN to arrange for an immediate cease-fire in East Pakistan. Yahya approved Farmanʼs proposal, which stipulated the repatriation of Pakistani forces to West Pakistan, and asked for a guarantee of no reprisals. It was not an offer of surrender, and Farmanʼs message indicated that if the offer was not accepted, Pakistani forces would continue to fight “to the last man.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK)↩
See Document 274.↩
Reference is to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 7; See footnote 11, Document 248.↩
For text of this telegram, as sent to Ambassador Farland, See Document 264.↩
Brackets in the source text. The attached text is identical to the final paragraph of the telegram sent to Farland; Document 264.↩
Sober met with newly designated Deputy Prime Minister Bhutto in Rawalpindi on December 7, the eve of Bhuttoʼs trip to New York to participate in the UN debate on South Asia. To help facilitate a settlement to the crisis, Bhutto said that he was prepared to seek an accommodation with Awami League leaders, including negotiations with Mujib. At the appropriate time he was also prepared to go to New Delhi to seek a reconciliation with India. Bhutto added that while he was in the United States he hoped to meet with President Nixon in Washington to discuss the crisis in South Asia. (Telegram 12205 from Islamabad, December 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 PAK)↩
Apparent reference to the December 9 letter from Pakistanʼs Permanent Representative Ambassador Shahi to the Secretary-General informing him that Pakistan had decided to accept the General Assemblyʼs call for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops, and expressing the hope that UN observers would be stationed along both sides of the border to supervise the cease-fire and withdrawals. (UN doc. S/10440)↩
Apparent reference to the draft resolution introduced in the General Assembly on December 7 by the Soviet Representative that called upon Pakistan to effect a political settlement in East Pakistan by recognizing the will of the population of East Pakistan as expressed in the elections of December 1970. The Soviet resolution called for a cease-fire, but did not address the issue of withdrawal. (UN doc. A/L.648)↩
Brackets in the source text.↩

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Gerard » 10 Dec 2019 16:09


[Page 690]
248. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1
Washington, December 8, 1971, 11:13 a.m.–12:02 p.m.

South Asia

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
U. Alexis Johnson
Joseph Sisco
Samuel DePalma
Christopher Van Hollen
David Schneider
Bruce Laingen
David Packard
Armistead Selden
James H. Noyes
Gen. John D. Ryan
Capt. Howard N. Kay
Richard Helms
John Waller
Donald MacDonald
Maurice Williams
C. Herbert Rees
NSC Staff
Harold H. Saunders
Samuel Hoskinson
R/Adm. Robert O. Welander
Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis

It was agreed that:

CIA would assess the international implications of the situation;
Defense would assess Pakistanʼs military prospects in Kashmir;
State would prepare a paper on our military supply options;
State would revise the cable to King Hussein,2 telling him we are reviewing the matter of his providing aircraft obtained from the [Page 691] U.S. to Pakistan and giving him the reasons why we want to hold up for the time being.
Dr. Kissinger: Dick (Helms), where do we stand?

(Mr. Helms briefed from the text at Tab A.)3

Dr. Kissinger: What records are the Paks destroying?4

Mr. Helms: Military records—not intelligence records.

Dr. Kissinger: The southern part of Azad Kashmir—is that the part the Paks took in 1947?

Mr. Helms: Yes.

Mr. Sisco: (to Helms) How long do you think the Paks can hold out in the East?

Mr. Helms: Forty-eight hours—if it were not for the rivers, it would be over by now.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Ryan) What is your assessment of the military situation in the West?

Gen. Ryan: We still think the Indians plan a holding action—we donʼt think they will push very hard.

Dr. Kissinger: How long would it take them to transfer their troops from East to West?

Gen. Ryan: It would take a long time for a transfer of all their divisions, but their airborne division could be transferred in five or six days.

Mr. Williams: It is 28 hours by train from Calcutta to New Delhi, to give you some idea of time. This would mean, of course, clearing the rail line and using it exclusively for troop transport.

Gen. Ryan: How much they would want to transfer to the West is debatable. The Indians already have superiority in the West.

Dr. Kissinger: We have one major problem—what stance should we take toward a possible debacle in West Pakistan as well as in the East? Before we get to that, Maury (Williams), what is the situation on refugee aid?

[Page 692]
Mr. Williams: The recommendation of the World Bank was that the total cost of the refugee relief should be compensated to India to protect the Indian development program. The total was $700 million, of which the US quota would have been $250 million. This was not done, however. Instead, we made $90 million in direct commodity contributions—PL–480 food, other commodities, and some to U.S. voluntary agencies. It was agreed to provide $22.8 million in cash to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and to UNICEF, but 3/4 of that turned out to be in terms of commodities. The Indians have complained bitterly about this, claiming that this did not compensate them for their costs, which was the purpose of the exercise.

Mr. Johnson: A very small amount of U.S. dollars have flowed to the Indian economy—about $5 or $6 million.

Mr. Williams: The net result is that the Indians have lost foreign exchange. We still have $1.8 million unallocated which we were holding for the U.S. voluntary agencies, but the whole relief effort has now been suspended.

Dr. Kissinger: For both India and Pakistan?

Mr. Williams: Both.

Dr. Kissinger: I want to make it clear that the President wants all relief to be made available in kind—no cash! I also want to be sure that nothing is done in the future—the next tranche of the development loan, PL–480, etc.—without approval here. He doesnʼt want anything to slide through.

Mr. Williams: There is no next tranche—I can assure you nothing can slide through.

Dr. Kissinger: If the situation in the West worsens, what would be the next turn of the screw?

Mr. Williams: The only thing left to do in this area is to take possession of the goods already under contract. We have done everything short of that.

Mr. Sisco: In the post-war context, these other issues—PL–480, loans, etc.,—will be very important.

Mr. Williams: I want to be sure everyone understands that the free foreign exchange proposal made by the World Bank for India was not acted on by any of the donors. India has gained no net foreign exchange.

Mr. Packard: On the contracts, do we commit funds to India in advance or at the time of the contract?

Mr. Williams: These goods go under loan agreements, and the money is paid to U.S. banks. We have to stop payment and take possession of the goods. We would have to pay the suppliers and would have to settle the claims that would arise. It would be messy.

[Page 693]
Mr. Packard: It could be done, but it would be quite a job.

Mr. Kissinger: Why do you say it would be messy?

Mr. Williams: The U.S. Government would have to take possession of the goods and would have to settle all the claims of the companies.

Mr. Packard: First we would have to locate all the stuff.

Mr. Williams: We would have to make arrangements for storage, pay warehousing charges.

Mr. Packard: We can do it, but it would be difficult.

Mr. Johnson: Have we any precedents?

Mr. Williams: Only small amounts in cases where diplomatic relations had been broken. Even those claims took years to settle.

Mr. Kissinger: How is India handling next yearʼs development program? Are they negotiating with you (AID) now?

Mr. Williams: No, nothing is under negotiation with India.

Mr. Kissinger: What about your budget for next year?

Mr. Williams: Weʼll have to look at that. Itʼs a question whether AID will survive next year. Thereʼs an important vote on the future of AID in the House at 11:00 this morning. Weʼre a hostage to the Mansfield Amendment.5

Mr. Kissinger: Youʼll survive.

Mr. Williams: Of course, what goes into the budget does not constitute a commitment to a country.

Mr. Sisco: But it has an important psychological effect.

Mr. Williams: We can mention it as a contingency.

Mr. Kissinger: We have orders to put nothing in the budget for India. (to Williams) Iʼll have to discuss this with you. A $10 or $20 million cut wonʼt satisfy the President. Nor does he want any stories that AID recommended a big budget and the wicked White House cut it out. You should put your minds to work on a much smaller budget for next year, no matter what eventually happens in the present situation.

Letʼs now turn to the key issue. If India turns on West Pakistan, takes Azad Kashmir and smashes the Pak air and tank forces, a number [Page 694]of things seems inevitable. Should we, in full conscience, allow the liberation of the same disintegrating forces in West Pakistan as in the East? Baluchistan and other comparable issues are bound to come to the fore, as Mrs. Gandhi indicated to the President and as she told a Columbia University seminar in New York, I understand. Pakistan would be left defenseless and West Pakistan would be turned into a vassal state. We have to decide some questions—the military supply question, for example. I have reviewed the cables to Jordan which enthusiastically tell Hussein he canʼt furnish planes to the Paks. We shouldnʼt decide this on such doctrinaire grounds. The question is, when an American ally is being raped, whether or not the U.S. should participate in enforcing a blockade of our ally, when the other side is getting Soviet aid. I donʼt know what the decision will be, but we have to consider this in broader terms. Thatʼs why Iʼm holding up your cables. In any event, they should be toned down.

Mr. Sisco: We should tell Hussein to keep his options open. The question of military supply in the context of East Pakistan is one thing. If the situation evolves in the West as Henry describes, and there is a serious risk to West Pakistan, thatʼs something else. Personally, I doubt that that is the Indian objective, but it may be.

Mr. Johnson: (Foreign Minister) Singh told (Ambassador) Keating that India had no intention of taking “any” territory. He was presumably referring to Kashmir.

Mr. Sisco: I wonder if theyʼre not making a distinction here—Kashmir is a disputed area. I suspect theyʼre really talking about something other than that strip of Azad Kashmir that Dick (Helms) referred to.

Mr. Helms: In this connection, Mrs. Gandhi told her cabinet that she had expected a more balanced view from the Chinese. She expressed the hope that the Chinese would not intervene physically in the north, but said that the Soviets had said the Chinese would be able to “rattle the sword.” She also said that the Soviets have promised to counterbalance any such action.

Mr. Johnson: (to Helms) Your briefing this morning said there was no Chinese buildup in the area.

Mr. Helms: They already have enough forces there to rattle the sword. They have the people there to make some motions.

(Mr. Sisco left the meeting.)

Dr. Kissinger: We have two military supply questions: 1) to get King Hussein into a holding pattern on provision of aircraft to Pakistan, while the President considers the issue; and 2) how to convey to the Indians and possibly the Soviet Union that a turn of their attention to West Pakistan would present some problems.

Mr. Packard: The basic problem is that we canʼt authorize Jordan to do anything we canʼt do ourselves. If a third country has some planes that we donʼt have, we could authorize them to supply them to Pakistan. [Page 695]In these circumstances, it might be better for us to supply the planes directly, but we canʼt authorize Jordan to do it unless we are authorized to do it ourselves.

Mr. Johnson: We would have to make a judgment that Pakistan is eligible to make such purchases and then notify the Congress.

Dr. Kissinger: If we hadnʼt cut off arms to Pakistan, this problem wouldnʼt exist.

Mr. Packard: Thatʼs right.

Dr. Kissinger: We didnʼt analyze what the real danger was at the time we took that step—we all failed there. If we had understood the implications—I was wrong too—we were all wrong.

Mr. Packard: Thereʼs another issue on Jordan—if they deliver the planes to Pakistan, we will have to replace them, since we canʼt afford to let Jordan weaken itself.

Mr. Johnson: And we donʼt have the MAP to do that.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the judgment of this group? We have a country, supported and equipped by the Soviet Union, turning one-half of another country into a satellite state and the other half into an impotent vassal. Leaving aside any American interest in the sub-continent, what conclusions will other countries draw from this in their dealings with the Soviets? Dick (Helms), would you do an analysis of this?

Mr. Helms: Donʼt we have some obligation under CENTO?

Mr. Johnson: No legal obligation.

Dr. Kissinger: We had no legal obligation to India in 1962, but we came to the conclusion that if China should overrun India, it would present us with great problems. Iʼve read the bilateral treaty,6 and itʼs not easy to escape the conclusion that some conditions which would warrant some involvement of the constitutional process are close by. If India succeeds, what would be the impact in the larger threatre of world affairs?

Mr. Packard: It would negate SEATO.

Mr. Johnson: An India attack against Pakistan is excluded from SEATO.

Mr. Packard: But as a practical matter, SEATO would be down the drain.

Dr. Kissinger: We have been talking for two years about a Security Council guarantee for the Middle East. What is the impact of the recent chain of events on other areas and expectations in other areas?

Letʼs look at the military supply question. We could say that we have done everything two weeks too late. If we wait until India takes Azad Kashmir, then take action on military supplies for Pakistan, we [Page 696]would merely infuriate the Indians and demonstrate our impotence. If we had cut off aid two weeks ago, it might have had some influence on the situation in the East, instead of being a grandstand play. Letʼs look at this whole picture.

Mr. Packard: We should consider some way that would help West Pakistan hold its own.

Dr. Kissinger: How?

Mr. Johnson: I agree this should be examined. We should consider exactly what effect military supplies could have.

Dr. Kissinger: There are two separate problems: the threat of military supply and the fact of such supply. Once a war in West Pakistan is engaged, provision of planes by Jordan might combine all the disadvantages. Iʼm more interested in the deterrent effect. If it were done as a token before the war, it would be an indication that, while we donʼt accept what has happened in East Pakistan, we canʼt do anything about it, but if they move in West Pakistan, it would be a whole new ball game.

Mr. Johnson: We might introduce this element in our comeback to (Ambassador) Keating replying to his report of his conversation with Foreign Minister Singh.7

Mr. Van Hollen: Singh said the Indians had no territorial ambitions—we could pick him up on that.

Dr. Kissinger: If they succeed in destroying the Pakistan Army, they donʼt need any territorial ambitions.

Mr. Van Hollen: We could pick up both elements—ask for specific Indian assurances on Azad Kashmir and that they do not seek to destroy Pak forces in the West.

Dr. Kissinger: We should also make it clear that if they do, they will face a new situation.

Mr. Johnson: Of course, the Paks are trying to bite off Kashmir.

Dr. Kissinger: I donʼt think they have the punch.

Mr. Helms: I agree.

Mr. Selden: We have a new report8 indicating that the Paks may have knocked out as many as 120 Indian planes on their first attacks on those four airfields.

Mr. Helms: Our 1962 assurances to Ayub made it clear that we would come to Pakistanʼs assistance in the face of aggression against Pakistan from India.

[Page 697]
Mr. Van Hollen: That was in the context of our assurances to India when China moved in. This was overtaken by the events of 1965, and our legal people donʼt think the Paks have a binding case in international law.

Mr. Johnson: If we want to assist Pakistan, we can find a basis for doing it.

Mr. Van Hollen: If we make a policy decision to assist Pakistan militarily, we donʼt have to worry about it.

Dr. Kissinger: If the word of a country has any legal meaning, it seems to me this would apply. The Paks havenʼt raised it with us yet, of course.

Mr. Packard: There is the practical problem, though—if we do anything, we should do something effective.

Mr. Helms: I agree. If we donʼt win, donʼt do it.

Mr. Packard: We should take a good look at it.

Mr. Williams: In 1965, the Paks closed our base at Peshawar and for all practical purposes left CENTO. With the fall of East Pakistan two days away, I think an attempt to get a cease-fire in West Pakistan needs to be made diplomatically.

Mr. Johnson: But that would stop the Paks in Kashmir.

Mr. Williams: But if they will be chewed up, we might be doing them a favor.

Dr. Kissinger: Dick (Helms), would you get us by tomorrow an assessment of Pakistanʼs capabilities in Kashmir.

Mr. Helms: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We need four things tomorrow:

1) the assessment of the international implications of the situation;

2) an assessment of Pakistanʼs military prospects in Kashmir;

3) our stance on the military supply question;

4) revision of the cable to Jordan to get word to King Hussein to stay in a holding pattern, that we are reviewing the situation, and that we share his concern and do not consider this a trivial issue.

If weʼre too enthusiastic about telling him not to do anything for Pakistan, he may think we would treat his country the same way in a comparable situation.

Mr. Johnson: We have done a new version of the note protesting the Indian blockade (circulated at the table and attached at Tab B),9 but [Page 698]I donʼt think we should send it. There is nothing to be gained. We have already protested the attack on our ship, and thereʼs not much purpose in doing anything more.

Dr. Kissinger: Except to show our displeasure with the Indian action.

Mr. Johnson: The Paks have also declared a blockade.

Dr. Kissinger: With what?

Mr. Johnson: On paper they have taken the same action as India.

Dr. Kissinger: We could protest to Pakistan too.

Mr. Van Hollen: We could make a paper protest to the Pakistanis.

Mr. Johnson: We donʼt have a legal case to protest the blockade as such. The two countries have declared a state of war between them and, under this declaration, they have the right of blockade. Itʼs more a question of how the blockade is carried out. Firing on an American ship is an illegal act, and we have protested that twice. We can protest that again.

Dr. Kissinger: Formally? We donʼt know how it was done—we just saw a press statement.

Mr. Van Hollen: I called in the Indian Minister, and the Secretary called in the Indian Ambassador.

Mr. Johnson: We would have no problem with a formal protest in writing on the Buckeye State incident.10 It would be difficult to protest the blockade, however. If we want to continue any even-handedness, we would have to protest to Pakistan also.

Dr. Kissinger: Weʼre not trying to be all that even-handed. The President has told all of you what he wants—do any of you have any doubts as to what he wants? He doesnʼt want to be completely evenhanded. Heʼs trying to get across to the Indians that they are running a major risk in their relations with the US. If every time we do something to the Indians, we have to do the same thing to Pakistan, we will be participating in the rape of Pakistan, given the difference in their strengths. This blockade protest is a tactical decision that doesnʼt bother me one way or the other. Am I misrepresenting what the President has said? You have all heard him. He said to look for things we can do to get the message across to India.

Mr. Johnson: We can do it.

[Page 699]
Mr. Packard: We have some reports that India may be experiencing a little concern about our attitude. Maybe we should pour it on a little.

Dr. Kissinger: Why should we do anything to ease Indiaʼs state of mind? If India is mad, they wonʼt get any less mad if we donʼt do some of these things. Mrs. Gandhi is a cold-blooded, tough customer. She wonʼt become a Soviet satellite out of pique. Weʼve had one NSC meeting on this. If anyone disagrees that this is the Presidentʼs intention, we can have another meeting. On the blockade, I donʼt care. But we shouldnʼt ease their minds about our intentions.

Mr. Helms: Have we a policy decision on the evacuation of white faces from Dacca?

Mr. Johnson: Thereʼs a meeting going on in New York now. Itʼs not a black-white issue. The evacuation is in the context of UN and third-country personnel, who happen to be white. Weʼre working with Defense on this in New York.

Dr. Kissinger: On the question of a massacre, does anyone know what is happening in the areas India has occupied? Will we know if there is a massacre?

Mr. Helms: Yes, but we wonʼt know developments minute by minute.

Mr. Johnson: We put something in the GA resolution11 on that.

Mr. Van Hollen: To recap the assignments, CIA will assess the overall implications, Defense will assess Pak capabilities in Kashmir, State will give you the options on military supply, and we will redraft the message to Hussein.

Dr. Kissinger: Let him know that we understand his problem and give him the reasons why we want to hold up for the time being.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. A briefer record of the meeting, prepared by James Noyes (OASD/ISA), is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330 76 0197, Box 74, Pakistan 381, (Dec) 1971.↩
On December 7 Executive Secretary Theodore Eliot sent a memorandum to Kissinger addressing the question raised at the December 6 WSAG meeting concerning the legal and policy problems involved in responding to the Jordanian request for U.S. consent to the transfer of F–104 fighters to Pakistan. The Department concluded that the President could not under law approve such a transfer unless he was willing to make a policy decision that the United States was willing to supply F–104s to Pakistan directly. Attached to Eliotʼs memorandum was a draft cable to Amman instructing the Ambassador to explain the prohibition to King Hussein. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 574, Indo-Pak War, South Asia Military Supply, 11/23/71–12/ 31/71)↩
Not printed. According to his notes, Helms reported that Indian forces had broken through Pakistani lines in the Comilla area of East Pakistan, and the situation was deteriorating for Pakistani forces throughout East Pakistan. In the west Pakistan claimed to have captured Poonch on the Kashmir cease-fire line, but admitted to sustaining heavy casualties in Kashmir and in a tank battle on the Sind-Rajasthan frontier. According to a CIA report ( Document 246) Prime Minister Gandhi told her Cabinet on December 6 that before accepting a UN call for a cease-fire there were three objectives that would have to be achieved: to guarantee the establishment of Bangladesh; to liberate the southern part of Azad Kashmir; and to destroy Pakistanʼs armor and air forces.↩
Helms had noted in his briefing that Pakistani forces in East Pakistan were under such heavy pressure from the Indian offensive that they had begun to destroy their records.↩
Reference is to an amendment to the foreign assistance bill first offered in June 1971 by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D–Montana), which set a date for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina. The amendment was debated repeatedly during the course of the year and a variation was adopted in September as part of a defense authorization bill. President Nixon said in signing the bill that he would ignore the amendment. The original amendment was attached in November to the Senate foreign aid bill. The inclusion of the amendment led to a deadlock in conference from November 18 to December 16 when the House voted 130–101 against instructing its conferees to agree to the amendment. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. III, 1969–1972, Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1973, p. 13)↩
See footnote 9, Document 218.↩
Keating met with Singh on December 7 at Singhʼs request to review the crisis. Keating reported on the extensive conversation in telegram 1877 from New Delhi, December 7. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, South Asia, 12/7/71–12/9/71)↩
Not found.↩
Attached at Tab B, but not printed, are a draft protest note and a related draft press statement, under cover of an undated copy of a memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger. The memorandum, as sent with the attachments indicated, was dated December 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–2 INDIA–PAK)↩
A situation report prepared by the Department of State India–Pakistan Working Group on December 4 noted that the U.S. merchant ship SS Buckeye State had been shelled by unidentified aircraft while at anchor in Chittagong Harbor. The captain and two crewmen were wounded. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 571, Indo-Pak War, South Asia, 12/1/71–12/4/71) The draft protest note, cited above, identifies the planes as belonging to the Indian Air Force.↩
On December 7 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that made reference to the need for a political solution to the crisis, called upon India and Pakistan to agree to a cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces from each otherʼs territory, and urged the creation of the conditions necessary for the return of refugees to their homes in East Pakistan. (UN doc. A/RES/2793, adopted by a vote of 104 to 11, with 10 abstentions) For the debate that led up to the vote, see UN doc. A/PV.2003.↩

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265. Backchannel Message From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland)1
Washington, December 10, 1971, 10:53 a.m.
You will be receiving flash instructions through regular channels concerning Pakistani proposal for immediate ceasefire.2 The President has directed that future scenario be within the framework of the proposal which I provided to you within this channel.3 Above all, no actions should be undertaken within regular channels that have not been previously cleared with President via this channel. There is to be no additional pressure on Yahya.

In everything we do with Yahya, we cannot have it said that we stabbed Pakistan in the back. This must be your guiding principle on each issue from this point on.

Warm regards.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 643, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan December 1–10. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.↩
See Document 264.↩
See Document 259.↩

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Gerard » 10 Dec 2019 16:11


267. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1
Washington, December 10, 1971.

Information Items
India-Pakistan Situation: The war in the East has reached its final stages. The Indian forces are encircling Dacca and preparing for the [Page 744]final assault if the Pak forces in the capital area refuse to surrender. Pak resistance elsewhere in the province appears on the verge of total collapse, although they continue to hold some isolated areas. Faced with this desperate situation, the top Pak military official in Dacca has called on the UN to arrange (a) peaceful transfer of power to the “elected representatives of East Pakistan,” (b) an immediate cease-fire, (c) repatriation of the Pak forces to West Pakistan, (d) repatriation of all other West Pak personnel who desire to leave, (e) the safety of the others settled in East Pakistan since 1947 and (f) a guarantee of no reprisals.

In the West, the Indians seem to be successfully repulsing Pak attacks in Kashmir, but show no signs yet of initiating a major offensive of their own. Repeated Indian air strikes and shellings from naval forces on Karachi have dealt a major blow to Pakistanʼs POL supply. One experienced observer on the spot judges that under optimum conditions West Pakistan may run out of key POL items in about two weeks and, under the most likely combination of circumstances, supplies will dry up even sooner. In the Lahore and other areas to the north, the Indian air attacks are concentrating more heavily on communications, the power infrastructure and more direct military targets. Some observers think that the purpose of these heavy air attacks is to soften up West Pakistan for an all-out Indian ground offensive as soon as the situation is under control in the East. There are some unconfirmed reports that the Indians may already be beginning the process of shifting aircraft and troops to the Western front.

On the sea, the Paks have apparently given up trying to contest the approaches to their ports in both the East and West. The Paks, from Yahya on down, are charging that Soviet technicians2 are aboard the OSA missile boats which have sunk a Pak destroyer and attacked the Karachi port area.

According to a reliable clandestine source, Mrs. Gandhi has said that there are “some indications” that the Chinese intend to intervene militarily. She did not reveal her evidence, but reportedly said that the Chinese may create border incidents in the East before the fall of Dacca and later take some action in the contested Ladakh area near Kashmir. So far, we have no evidence that the Chinese are actually planning such actions.

The UN could soon be seized with the Pak cease-fire request. Pakistan has also formally accepted the General Assembly resolution and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Bhutto is arriving in New York to lead the Pak delegation. Before he left Islamabad, Bhutto said he would like to see you while he is in the U.S. and Yahya has expressed his hope that you can do this. Mrs. Gandhi, at a mass student [Page 745]rally today, said that India “neither accepted nor rejected” the General Assembly resolution,3 but was giving it “serious consideration.” Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul are on their way to New York.

The Indians have announced a bombing pause over both Dacca and Karachi for evacuation purposes. Evacuation planes will be given safe conduct into Karachi for four-hour periods today and tomorrow and the Dacca airport is to be free from attacks for 24 hours so that it can be repaired. Foreign evacuation planes bound for Dacca will then be given safe conduct for 10 hours on Saturday on the condition that they land at Calcutta before and after going to Dacca. UN personnel reportedly will remain behind in Dacca for possible assistance in arranging a cease-fire or surrender.

[Omitted here are summary reports on foreign policy issues unrelated to South Asia.]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 37, Presidentʼs Daily Briefs, Dec 1–Dec 16, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. A stamp on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.↩
President Nixon circled Soviet technicians and added a handwritten marginal comment at this point which reads: “K—This must get out.”↩
The President underlined the portion of this sentence that begins with neither and concludes with resolution and added a handwritten marginal comment which reads: “K—Keep the ‘world opinion’ heat on India.”↩

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Gerard » 10 Dec 2019 16:13


273. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, December 10, 1971.

[name not declassified] called and said that the Jordanians have replied as follows. They will send four aircraft with Jordanian pilots immediately to Pakistan. The Paks asked for 12, but he will hold to four initially to see how it goes. He is prepared to go as high as 22 ultimately.

Attached is a message from Raza 2 referring to six F–5ʼs which the Turks have apparently agreed to provide if the U.S. agrees.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 643, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan, December 1–10. Top Secret; Sensitive.↩
Attached but not printed is a December 9 letter to Kissinger from Ambassador Raza.↩

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Gerard » 10 Dec 2019 16:15


[Page 751]
274. Memorandum of Conversation1
New York, December 10, 1971, 6:05–7:55 p.m.

Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to the United Nations
and Ambassador to Canada
Chʼen Chʼu, PRC Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations and
Director, Information Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tʼang Wenʼsheng, Interpreter
Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador George Bush, US Representative to the United Nations
Brig. General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, Senior NSC Staff Member
Dr. Henry Kissinger: I see you in the newspapers all the time. Youʼre a great publicity expert. And very argumentative.

Ambassador Huang: No, I always argue in self-defense.

Chʼen Chʼu: He counterattacks in self-defense.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Preemptive attack.

Mr. Ambassador, what we have is not strictly UN business, but our contact in Paris is not there.

Miss Tʼang: Mr. Walters?

Dr. Henry Kissinger: He is not in Paris right now. He is going to be with the President in the Azores.

This may turn out to become UN business, but we wanted the Prime Minister urgently to know certain things we are doing. Therefore we have taken the liberty of this slightly irregular procedure. (Ambassador Huang nods.)

The apartment is slightly improved over last time. Next time we meet we will really have a suitable place. (Looking at a Chinese scroll on the wall) There seems to be a wandering Chinese painting that we hang up every time we have an apartment. (Chinese laughter.) I hope those sentences are friendly.

Ambassador Huang: I canʼt see them from such a distance.

[Page 752]
Chʼen Chʼu: (Looking at the scroll) It is an ancient poem.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: I have some great colored pictures of you (Chʼen). I will send them to you. They were taken at the Great Wall.

Let me explain to you what we have done in various categories. Incidentally, just so everyone knows exactly what we do, we tell you about our conversations with the Soviets; we do not tell the Soviets about our conversations with you. In fact, we donʼt tell our own colleagues that I see you. George Bush is the only person outside the White House who knows I come here.

You know we have made a number of public declarations about India. I held what is known as a press backgrounder this week in which I pointed out that India is at fault. I will give you the text of it before you leave so that you can read it. And we will continue to pursue this line publicly.

You know what we have done in the United Nations so there is no point in reviewing this with you.

In addition we have taken other measures. We have canceled $87 million of loans to India and $14 million of military equipment.

Ambassador Huang: $40 million or $14 million?

Dr. Henry Kissinger: $14 million. But in addition, there is $17 million due to be purchased which fell through because we arenʼt issuing new licenses. So the net cancellation amounted to $31 million. In fact, we have canceled the entire military equipment line to India. There is no military equipment going to India. This means specifically we have canceled all radar equipment for defense in the north.

Then we have two other items due to be signed this week that we are not signing, and that we have no intention of signing. One is an agreement for $72 million worth of food, PL 480.

Miss Tʼang: PL 480?

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Thatʼs a food program, a specific program. Another is $100 million in loans. And we are working, using our influence, at the World Bank to defer loans of $75 million which are becoming due. Our Ambassador (looking toward Bush) thinks we are never doing anything.

Ambassador Huang: You mean Mr. Bush thought that you are doing nothing?

Dr. Henry Kissinger: He thinks we just sit in the White House and do nothing.

Ambassador Bush: I think I do all the work and that they do nothing.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: What he really thinks is that we are pursuing an evenhanded policy. Thatʼs what our press spokesman says.

[Page 753]
Now I want to tell the Ambassador, for the Prime Minister, about a number of communications we have had with the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Huang: You mean in the sense of the first question just discussed, i.e., the question of the India–Pakistan subcontinent?

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Yes, India–Pakistan. We have had the following contacts—the Soviet Ambassador is back in Moscow, so I have to deal with the Chargé. Last Sunday I called the Soviet Counsellor Vorontsov to the White House.

Miss Tʼang: Soviet Counsellor?

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Mr. Vorontsov. Heʼs the Chargé. And I told him that the Soviets support of Indian aggression endangers the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Incidentally, these conversations are known only in the White House and only to you.

On Monday,2 President Nixon sent a letter3 to Secretary General Brezhnev in which he said that Indian aggression with Soviet support is unacceptable to the United States, and that if pursued this would complicate for a long time the international situation and would have an adverse effect—this is a quote—on the whole range of our relationships. (Ambassador Huang checks the translation.)

Mr. Brezhnev sent a reply4—we sent the letter December 6 and we received the reply December 9th in the morning. The letter was phrased in conciliatory language and it proposes a ceasefire and “an immediate”—this is quoting again—“resumption of negotiations between the Government of Pakistan and the East Pakistan leaders concerning a political settlement.” (Miss Tʼang asks and Dr. Kissinger repeats)—this is a quote—“concerning a political settlement in East Pakistan.” The continuation of the—quote—“the negotiations should, naturally, be started from the stage at which they were discontinued.” I said this meant on the basis of a united Pakistan.

Miss Tʼang: You said … ?

Dr. Henry Kissinger: I said orally that on March 25 there was a united Pakistan, and he (Vorontsov) said yes. Incidentally, we inform the Pakistani Ambassador of everything we do. I donʼt know whether he informs you.

Yesterday, December 9, we learned that the Soviet Minister of Agriculture was in Washington and that he was a friend of Brezhnev who wanted to see the President.

Ambassador Huang: His name?

[Page 754]
Dr. Henry Kissinger: Matskevich. These gentlemen (the Chinese) have a file on everybody. Someday I must find out what they know about me; it is more than I do. (Ambassador Huang gestures in mock denial.)

During this discussion, which lasted 15 minutes and was primarily a statement by the President, the President emphasized that Pakistan is a friend of the United States and that if India were to continue its attacks and launch an attack against West Pakistan, it could lead to a US-Soviet confrontation.

Today, on December 10, we sent forward a reply to Brezhnev.5 We pointed out that—this is based on the information we have that the Pakistani commander in East Pakistan has asked for a ceasefire—we said if there is not a ceasefire in West Pakistan as well, “we would have to conclude that there is in progress an act of aggression directed at the whole of Pakistan, a friendly country, toward which we have obligations.”

In order to underline what we have said, we worked with a number of countries to provide aid to Pakistan.

Ambassador Huang: But this is not in the letter that you are quoting.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: No, I am telling you about this. This is terribly complex. We are barred by law from giving equipment to Pakistan in this situation. And we also are barred by law from permitting friendly countries which have American equipment to give their equipment to Pakistan.

So we have worked out the following arrangements with a number of countries. We have told Jordan and Iran and Saudi Arabia, and we will tell Turkey through a channel other than the ones with which Ambassador Bush is familiar. We said that if they decide that their natural security requires shipment of American arms to Pakistan, we are obliged to protest, but we will understand. We will not protest with great intensity. And we will make up to them in next yearʼs budget whatever difficulties they have.

On this basis, four planes are leaving Jordan today and 22 over the weekend. Ammunition and other equipment is going from Iran.

Ambassador Huang: You mean over the weekend?

Dr. Henry Kissinger: We donʼt know the exact time, but immediately we understand. And six planes from Turkey in the near future. This is very confidential obviously, and we are not eager for it to be known. At least not until Congress gets out of town tomorrow.

In addition, we are moving a number of naval ships in the West Pacific toward the Indian Ocean: an aircraft carrier accompanied by [Page 755]four destroyers and a tanker, and a helicopter carrier and two destroyers. I have maps here showing the location of the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean if you are interested. These are much smaller ships. They are no match for the US ships. (Showing Ambassador Huang the map) Here is a merchant tanker … a submarine …

Ambassador Huang: (laughing) Iʼm no expert.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Iʼm not either. There is no difficulty.

There is not much in the Soviet fleet. What is the total number, Al? (to Haig) Iʼve read it somewhere.

Ambassador Huang: Thereʼs a cruiser coming in now.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Their ships are not much.

I now come to a matter of some sensitivity. We have received a report that one of your personnel in a European country, in a conversation with another European, expressed uncertainty about the Soviet dispositions on your borders and a desire for information about them. We do not ourselves concentrate on tactical intelligence. We only have information about the general disposition, and we collect it at irregular intervals by satellite. But we would be prepared at your request, and through whatever sources you wish, to give you whatever information we have about the disposition of Soviet forces. I donʼt have it with me, but we can arrange it easily wherever you wish and in an absolutely secure way.

Secondly, the President wants you to know that itʼs, of course, up to the Peopleʼs Republic to decide its own course of action in this situation, but if the Peopleʼs Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a threat to its security, and if it took measures to protect its security, the US would oppose efforts of others to interfere with the Peopleʼs Republic. We are not recommending any particular steps; we are simply informing you about the actions of others.

The movement of our naval forces is still East of the Straits of Malacca and will not become obvious until Sunday6 evening when they cross the Straits.

I would like to give you our assessment of the military situation on the subcontinent. I donʼt know whether you have any assessments. I would like to give this to you and then tell you one other thing.

The Pakistani army in the East has been destroyed. The Pakistani army in the West will run out of what we call POL—gas and oil—in another two to three weeks, two weeks probably, because the oil storage capacity in Karachi has been destroyed. We think that the immediate objective must be to prevent an attack on the West Pakistan army [Page 756]by India. We are afraid that if nothing is done to stop it, East Pakistan will become a Bhutan and West Pakistan will become a Nepal. And India with Soviet help would be free to turn its energies elsewhere.

So it seems to us that through a combination of pressures and political moves it is important to keep India from attacking in the West, to gain time to get more arms into Pakistan and to restore the situation.

We sent yesterday the relevant paragraphs, the non-rhetorical paragraphs, from Brezhnevʼs letter to President Yahya for his opinion. (To Ambassador Huang and Miss Tʼang) Why donʼt you read what we told him? It is an unusual method of proceeding, but we have to understand each other. This is just a quotation, an extract. (To Miss Tʼang) Donʼt write it down word for word, Nancy.

You donʼt need a master spy. We give you everything (handing over his file). We read that you brought a master spy with you. You donʼt need him. He couldnʼt get this by himself. (Chinese laughter) Next time he (Ambassador Huang) will show me one of his dispatches, but it will do me no good at all, since I canʼt read it. (Chinese laughter)

(To Ambassador Bush) Donʼt you discuss diplomacy this way.

Ambassador Bush: Iʼm trying to understand it. Iʼm waiting for the Chinese translation.

(Miss Tʼang continues to read out the cable to Yahya.)7

Dr. Henry Kissinger: This is to our Ambassador, but it goes through a secret channel. No one in the bureaucracy sees it. (Miss Tʼang keeps reading.)

I went over this with the Pakistani Ambassador. I showed it to him to see if he thought it was alright.

Miss Tʼang: And then you sent it.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: So we are being open and we are doing it in friendship.

Miss Tʼang: (Repeating) “disassociation.”

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Let me explain, Mr. Ambassador. If the Russians advocate negotiations as they were in March, that means they cannot accept Bangla Desh. (To the Ambassador) You can read that next page.

Miss Tʼang: It says “exclusively eyes only.”

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Thereʼs a better one that says “burn before reading.”

(Dr. Kissinger confirms the translation.)

[Page 757]
(Miss Tʼang keeps reading) I wanted you to know so that you know exactly what we tell them. Now they have replied to us. Can I read it to you, which is the answer from Yahya?8

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: He said that subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of my communication—in other words these two provisions concerning negotiations being done in a united way—India and Pakistan should agree to an immediate ceasefire with the separation of armed forces standing fast; and the UN or another international organization should provide observers to see that the ceasefire is effective; and India and Pakistan at any effective level should immediately open negotiations aimed at a settlement of the war and troop withdrawal; and coincident therewith there would be negotiations looking toward the political satisfaction of Bengali aspirations, that is, a political settlement. (Miss Tʼang repeats, then interprets)

So now you know everything we know. Our judgment is if East Pakistan is to be preserved from destruction, two things are needed— maximum intimidation of the Indians and, to some extent, the Soviets. Secondly, maximum pressure for the ceasefire.

At this moment we have—I must tell you one other thing—we have an intelligence report according to which Mrs. Gandhi told her cabinet that she wants to destroy the Pakistani army9 and air force and to annex this part of Kashmir, Azad Kashmir, and then to offer a cease-fire. This is what we believe must be prevented and this is why I have taken the liberty to ask for this meeting with the Ambassador.

One other thing. The Acting Secretary of State—the Secretary of State is in Europe—called in last night the Indian Ambassador and demanded assurance that India has no designs, will not annex any territory. We do this to have a legal basis for other actions.

So this is where we are.

Ambassador Huang: We thank Dr. Kissinger very much for informing us of the situation on the subcontinent of India–Pakistan, and we certainly will convey that to Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

The position of the Chinese Government on this matter is not a secret. Everything has been made known to the world. And the basic stand we are taking in the UN is the basic stand of our government. Both in the Security Council and the plenary session of the General Assembly we have supported the draft resolutions that have included both the ceasefire and withdrawal, although we are not actually satisfied with [Page 758]that kind of resolution. But we feel that the draft resolution which had support in the Security Council and especially the one which we voted in favor of in the General Assembly, reflect the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the small and medium countries. And in the plenary session of the General Assembly this draft resolution was put forward by Algeria and Argentina and 38 more and it was adopted by a majority of 104.10 The opposition consisted in effect of only two—the Soviet Union and India. The others were either their followers or their protectorates. We feel that this reflects the aspirations, it shows where the hearts of the people in the world turn to.

Miss Tʼang: (To Dr. Kissinger) Do you understand?

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Oh, yes.

Ambassador Huang: It shows what the majority of the people in the world support and what they oppose. Because if India, with the aid of the Soviet Union, would be able to have its own way in the subcontinent then there would be no more security to speak of for a lot of other countries, and no peace to speak of. Because that would mean the dismemberment and the splitting up of a sovereign country and the creation of a new edition of Manchukuo, the Bangla Desh. It would also mean aggression by military force and the annexation of sovereign territory.

Therefore we believe that the draft resolution that was put forth in the General Assembly in the UN put forward two minimum principles, two minimum criteria. One is ceasefire; the other is withdrawal. And in his speech in the General Assembly with regard to this matter; Deputy Minister Chʼiao Kuan-hua has explained this question in a more comprehensive and fuller way. We should persist in this stand, and we hold that any action that may be taken by the UN cannot go below the resolution passed by the General Assembly. It cannot be anything that carries less than that resolution.

And on this point of view, in my personal opinion, we feel the position taken by the United States Government has been a weak one. From what I just heard in the letter to Yahya Khan and your conversation with the Indian Ambassador and also your communications with the Soviet Union, we have found that you have not put forward both the principles of ceasefire and withdrawal.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Thatʼs not correct. We put forward both principles. There are two separate problems, in all due respect. We donʼt want in the principle of withdrawal to have West Pakistan go the way of East Pakistan.

Ambassador Huang: And then thereʼs this question that the British put forward that they wanted the leaders of the Pakistan government [Page 759]to enter into political negotiations. You also mentioned that, picked up their position that negotiations should begin.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Not to Brezhnev.

Ambassador Huang: And you mention negotiations should start from where they were continuing.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Brezhnev said that. What I showed you was a question to Yahya. We have not agreed with Brezhnev.

Ambassador Huang: But Brezhnevʼs proposal is essentially the same one that Mr. Malik has been saying here.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Thatʼs true.

Ambassador Huang: In fact, it means legalizing of the new refurbishment of another Manchukuo, that is, to give it legal status through the UN, or rather through the modalities of the UN.

This goes against the desires of the people in Pakistan, against the desires of the peoples of the world that was expressed in the voting of the General Assembly on this issue. The Soviet Union and India now are progressing along on an extremely dangerous track in the subcontinent. And as we have already pointed out this is a step to encircle China.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: There is no question about that.

Ambassador Huang: And you also are clear about our activity, that is we are prepared to meet attacks coming from the east, west, north, and south.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: When we have an exchange program between our countries, I hope to send a few State Department people to China. Iʼll send you a few of our State Department people for training. I may look weak to you, Mr. Ambassador, but my colleagues in Washington think Iʼm a raving maniac.

Miss Tʼang: We didnʼt finish. Ambassador Huang: We are prepared for attacks on the east, west, north, and south. We are prepared to engage in guerrilla warfare once again with millet and rifle, and we are prepared to begin our construction over again, after that eventuality. And the private attitude adopted by Brezhnev which we see now, in which he talks about so-called political negotiations is in fact direct and obvious intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country and something we feel is completely unacceptable, is inadmissible.

Of course we have nothing here about the military situation in the India–Pakistan subcontinent except what we read in the newspapers. But from our experience of a longer period we feel that the struggle waged by the people in Pakistan is a just struggle and therefore it is bound to have the support of the Chinese people and the people of the world. Whoever upholds justice and strives to defend their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity …

[Page 760]
We have an old proverb: “If light does not come to the east it will come to the west. If the south darkens, the north must still have light.” And therefore if we meet with some defeats in certain places, we will win elsewhere. So we keep persevering. So long as we persevere in principle and a just struggle, then final victory will still be ours. I donʼt think thereʼs need for any more elaboration on that, because the history of the Chinese peopleʼs revolution itself is a good example.

Mr. Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, we agree with your analysis of the situation. What is happening in the Indian subcontinent is a threat to all people. Itʼs a more immediate threat to China, but itʼs a threat to all people. We have no agreement with the British to do anything. In fact we are talking with you to come to a common position. We know that Pakistan is being punished because it is a friend of China and because it is a friend of the United States.

But while we agree with your theory, we now have an immediate problem. I donʼt know the history of the peopleʼs revolution in China nearly as well as you do. I seem to remember that one of the great lessons is that under all circumstances the Chinese movement maintained its essence. And as an article on the Chungking negotiations makes clear, it is right to negotiate when negotiations are necessary and to fight when fighting is necessary.

We want to preserve the army in West Pakistan so that it is better able to fight if the situation rises again. We are also prepared to attempt to assemble a maximum amount of pressure in order to deter India. You read the New York Times every day, and you will see that the movement of supplies and the movement of our fleet will not have the universal admiration of the media, to put it mildly. And it will have the total opposition of our political opponents.

We want to keep the pressure on India, both militarily and politically. We have no interest in political negotiations between Pakistani leaders and East Pakistani leaders as such. The only interest that we possibly have is to get Soviet agreement to a united Pakistan. We have no interest in an agreement between Bangla Desh and Pakistan.

We are prepared also to consider simply a ceasefire. We are prepared also to follow your course in the UN which most of my colleagues would be delighted to do and then Pakistan would be destroyed. If we followed your course of insisting on ceasefire and withdrawal and do nothing then Pakistan will be destroyed, and many people in America will be delighted. If you and Pakistan want this then we will do it. That is no problem for us. That is the easiest course for us.

So we will … we agree with your analysis completely. We are looking for practical steps in this issue which happens to be a common fight for different reasons. We will not cooperate with anyone to impose anything on Pakistan. We have taken a stand against India and we will maintain [Page 761]this stand. But we have this problem. It is our judgment, with great sorrow, that the Pakistan army in two weeks will disintegrate in the West as it has disintegrated in the East. If we are wrong about this, we are wrong about everything.

What do you think of ceasefire without political negotiations? The only reason we want political negotiations at all is to preserve East Pakistan, not to weaken it.

Ambassador Huang: Are you prepared to take the step in the UN of putting forward a proposal simply for ceasefire, along this course?

Dr. Henry Kissinger: No, thatʼs why Iʼm talking to you. Letʼs be practical—by tomorrow the Pakistan Army in the East will have surrendered. Therefore should one have a resolution for a ceasefire in the West?

Ambassador Huang: Why should we not condemn India for its aggression against East Pakistan? Why should there not be a demand for the resolution already passed in the General Assembly which calls for withdrawal? And if it is … if you find it impossible to condemn India …

Dr. Henry Kissinger: We do. We donʼt mind condemning India.

Ambassador Huang: … A step should not be taken backward from the resolution already passed in the General Assembly.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: There are two separate problems. The resolution in the General Assembly is one for the whole problem—that can be maintained. We are not saying we accept the occupation of East Pakistan; we donʼt have to accept that. But this would be a resolution for a cease-fire only. And the Arabs would not accept the occupation of their territory even though there is a ceasefire. So … but we are not here to tell you … When I asked for this meeting, I did so to suggest Chinese military help, to be quite honest. Thatʼs what I had in mind, not to discuss with you how to defeat Pakistan. I didnʼt want to find a way out of it, but I did it in an indirect way.

But this is for you to decide. You have many other problems on many other borders. What is going to happen is that the Pakistani commander in East Pakistan, independent of anything we did, has asked the UN to arrange a ceasefire in East Pakistan. We will not take a stand in opposition to you on this issue. We think we are on the same side. So …

Ambassador Huang: We feel that the situation on the subcontinent is very tense and is in the process of rapid development and change. And therefore, as I expressed earlier, we will immediately report what you tell me.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: I donʼt want the Prime Minister to misunderstand. We are not looking for a way to get out of the situation. We are looking for a way to protect what is left of Pakistan. We will not recognize Bangla Desh. We will not negotiate with Bangla Desh. We will not encourage talks between Pakistan and Bangla Desh.

[Page 762]
We have the immediate practical problem—is it better to have a ceasefire or is it better to let the military events continue? In either event both of us must continue to bring pressure on India and the Soviet Union.

(There is an exchange in which Dr. Kissinger confirms to Bush that he talked to Bhutto, that he was meeting him the next morning and that Bushʼs appointment with him was confirmed for later this night.)

I shall tell him (Bhutto) he should take his direction from you on whatever resolution he wants and that we will support him. I shall tell him to disregard any American official except me and General Haig. He doesnʼt have to take his direction from you, but I will tell him to check with you. Usually you criticize us for sticking too much to our friends, so we will not in this case create the wrong impression.

Ambassador Huang: As for Bangla Desh, has Ambassador Bush recently met with anybody from Bangla Desh?

Ambassador Bush: The Ambassador is referring to a squib in the New York Times.

(Ambassador Bush then explains the incident that led to Ambassador Huangʼs query. Mr. Choudury, who used to be in the Third Committee of the UN, three weeks ago asked Ambassador Bush for an appointment in his capacity as a judge in Pakistan. Ambassador Bush had his staff check the man out. Choudury then made a personal call but brought along three men with him. When they started mentioning Bangla Desh, Ambassador Bush told them to wait a minute, pointing out that Choudury was seeing him as a judge. It was a humiliating experience for Ambassador Bush. He had not seen the men since. Ambassador Bush had told them that they should wait a minute, that he was inhibited from discussing such matters. Mr. Choudury left two to three weeks ago. Ambassador Bush repeated that Ambassador Huang was referring to a story in the New York Times. He pointed out that Mr. Choudury is around a great deal of the time including in the delegatesʼ lounge. He added that it was very embarrassing to him.)

Ambassador Huang: I am clear now.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: In any event, no matter what you read, no one is authorized to talk to the Bangla Desh. We donʼt recognize Bangla Desh and will not recognize it.

Ambassador Huang: I thank Ambassador Bush very much for his explanation.

Ambassador Bush: One of the men had defected from the Pakistan Embassy in Washington and came here. Ambassador Shahi would kill me.

[Page 763]
Dr. Henry Kissinger: My former personal assistant is now working for Senator Muskie. There are many defectors around these days.

Mr. Ambassador, I am going to the Azores on Sunday afternoon with the President for 48 hours. General Haig has my complete confidence, and we have very rapid communication. So if you have some communication for us …

But I want Peking to be clear that my seeing you was for the purpose of coordinating positive steps, not to prepare you for negative steps.

Ambassador Huang: I donʼt have anything else.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Good. I wish happier occasions would bring us together. We have particular affection for Pakistan because we feel they helped to reestablish contact between the Peopleʼs Republic and the United States.

So we are prepared to listen to any practical proposals for parallel action. We will do our best to prevent pressure against any country that takes unilateral action. I shall speak to Mr. Bhutto tomorrow in the sense that I have indicated to you.

Ambassador Huang: Of course, we will also contact Mr. Bhutto and, of course, as you later clarified yourself, we of course will give no directions. Yahya Khan is the President, and we only have friendly exchanges.

Dr. Henry Kissinger: Of course. The word “direction” was not well-chosen.

Ambassador Huang: We think that is all there is today. What we need to do is to relay this to Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

[Omitted here are closing pleasantries.]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, For the Presidentʼs File, China Trip, China Exchanges, October 20, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. According to an attached memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, December 15, Lord drafted the memorandum and Kissinger approved it as accurate. Kissingerʼs account of this conversation with Huang Hua is in The White House Years, p. 906.↩

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 76v11/d274

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Gerard » 10 Dec 2019 16:46


246. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable1
Washington, December 7, 1971.



6 December 1971


Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhiʼs Briefing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on the IndoPakistani War

[1 line of source text not declassified]


[5 lines of source text not declassified]

On 6 December 1971 Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi [1 line of source text not declassified] told [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that India is doing quite well on the diplomatic front. The Soviet Unionʼs support in the United Nations, while expected, shows the value of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty. Mrs. Gandhi also commented that she is pleased with the stand taken by France and Great Britain in the Security Council.
As far as China is concerned, said the Prime Minister, she had expected it to take a more balanced view, even though Chinese support to Pakistan in the United Nations was a foregone conclusion. The Prime Minister stated that she hopes the Chinese do not intervene physically in the North; she noted, however, that the Soviets have warned her that the Chinese are still able to “rattle the sword” in Ladakh and Chumbi areas. If they should do so, she said, the Soviets have promised to counter-balance any such action.
The Prime Minister said that the United States might attempt to bring the cease-fire issue before the General Assembly after another Soviet veto. She stated that India would not accept the advice of the General Assembly, however, until:
Bangladesh is liberated;
The southern area of Azad Kashmir is liberated; ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified] comment: This encompasses the area west of the 1965 cease-fire line between Chhamb and Punch.);
Pakistani armored and air force strength are destroyed so that Pakistan will never again be in a position to plan another invasion of India.
The Prime Minister continued by saying that it is a pity that, in spite of Indiaʼs efforts, the United States has not changed its policy toward the sub-continent. The new nation of Bangladesh is emerging; West Pakistan will be reduced to the size of other small West Asian countries. This balance of forces will be favorable to India, she said, but the United States is unable to appreciate the changes which are taking place; however, the Prime Minister added that there is still time for the United States to alter its policy toward the sub-continent.
The Prime Minister stated that she expects other socialist countries to recognize Bangladesh after some time has elapsed. The immediate concern of India, however, is to finish the war quickly.
Mrs. Gandhi concluded her briefing by reiterating Indiaʼs war objectives:
The quick liberation of Bangladesh,
The incorporation into India of the southern part of Azad Kashmir for strategic rather than territorial reasons, (because India has no desire to occupy any West Pakistan territory); and, finally,
To destroy Pakistani military striking power so that it never attempts to challenge India in the future.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 76v11/d246

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby rohitvats » 10 Dec 2019 21:15

Can we please simply give a link to these historical foreign policy documents with some excerpt? Such long texts are quite jarring if even from a simple scroll down perspective. Just a suggestion. Thanks.

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 11 Dec 2019 17:32

https://theprint.in/opinion/in-1971-ban ... er/333068/
As a young captain in 1971 Bangladesh war, I gave Pakistan’s Lt-Gen the letter to surrender

the article is by an officer who participated in the 1971 operations

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby sajaym » 12 Dec 2019 11:06


Sharing this awesome description of 'Operation Jackpot'. Got goosebumps when I was reading it because the planning, training & execution of that operation seemed almost similar to the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. In the same way we hear of regular paki officers providing support & training in terror camps, this article talks of how IN officers prepped the Operation Jackpot attackers. And here's the best part...while Pakis sent 5-6 guys for the 26/11 attacks we pumped in almost 200 for Operation Jackpot -- behind enemy lines!

So, once upon a time we were top dogs in the 'non-state attackers' game. Today, the need of the hour is to again play the same game and pump in Baluchs into Pak and Tibetians to the Chinks. We don't need expensive jets, aircraft carriers and tanks to counter the Paks & Chinks, we just need some cheap 'freedom fighters'. I end with this cute photo of members of one of the world's deadliest terrorist group being trained in India.

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby dinesh_kimar » 12 Dec 2019 11:27

^ Pic is wrong, off course.

That's Prabhakaran and the LTTE training in a camp. I think last guy on right is Pottu Amman. Guy holding Sterling SMG might be Charles Anthony.

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Aditya_V » 12 Dec 2019 12:51

Yes it was LTTE training camp in Sirumalai Hills

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby siddhu » 16 Dec 2019 12:10

Major Akshay Girish Memorial Trust family is happy and proud to have decided to Commemorate Vijay Diwas of 1971 War in Bengaluru on Sunday, 15th December 2019.

Does anyone have the video recording of this event?

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Philip » 19 Dec 2019 09:45

Calling the US's bluff in 1971.
Xcpts. from a piece in the Hindu Zorawar Daulat Singh, of yhe Centre for Policy Research.

When the US decided to send the carrier Enterprise and elements of the 7th. fleet into the Bay of Bengal,D.P.Dhar, Mrs.G's adviser asked her to leverage the INDO- Soviet Treaty of Friendship signed in Aug. P.N.Haksar her confidante cablded Dhar in Moscow to get the USSR to publicly state that " third part interference would aggravale the situation".

Soviet naval vessels had alread entered the IOR on Dec. 5th. and 7th."500 nm off Ceylon".
Kissinger on Dec.8th. admitted to Nixon that given the Russian factor," I must warn you Mr.President ,if our bluff is called, we'll be in trouble...we'll lose".

On Dec.11th. briefing Nixon again he said that 16 Soviet naval units were in the IOR, including 3 space support ships".Comint indicated that they were near Ceylon and Socotra. The vessels were armed with anti-ship cruise missiles capable of destroying US warships and had nuclear sub escorts. There was nonlonger any " ambiguity" what the Indo- Sov. Treaty stood for. The US had also been hoping for some Chinese show of force: Nixon..." a movement of even some Chinese towards that border would scare those goddamn Indians to death."

However, the Chinese never took the bait.Apart from winter snows, etc., Mao despite being told uo his man at the UN by Kissinger that a " carrier, accompanied by 4 destroyers and a tanker, and a helicopter carrier with 2 destroyers" were entering the IOR and that the US would also provide China with " tactical intelligence" of Sov. forces on its borders,plus if China took measures " to protect its security" in the subcontinent, the US " would oppose thf efforys of others to interfere with the PRC."

Beijing however never took the bait as it feared that even limited action against India would invite repercussions from Moscow.Earlier in August, Sov. Defence Min. Marshal Grechko had told Dhar that If China invited a conflict with India it would be tantamount to courting a disaster. Soviet forces were superior on their eastern borders and this had " downed their tail." Furthermore, the Sov. ambassador to India Nikolai Pegov reassured Delhi that if the Chinese intervened in Ladakh the Soviets would respond with a "diversionary action in Xinjiang."
3 days later the Pakis surrendered.

This shows how brilliantly our policy makers of that period handled the international geopolitical situ at that time.They created a partnership with the Soviets to offset the formidable US- China- Pak axis,and how seriously China and the US took
Inidian countermeasures and Moscow's resolve to ensure that its ally emerged victorious.Moscow also several times used its veto in the UN one must remember to prevent any UN force from acting against us as was done with Iraq.

We must look to the present time and analyse what would happen in we were again theeatened by a deranged Pak threatening war ad nauseum .There is no Indo- Sov. treaty or equiv. to guarantee insurance against a joint Sino-Pak move against us and the so-called " Quad", is more akin to a casual meeting of some nations, not all military allies.India will be very much alone in fighting the enemy though some intel might come our way .Both dipolmatic and military challenges will be huge.Are we prepared and how much material and diplomatic help will we get? Some intriguing Qs.

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 08 Mar 2020 18:36

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/destr ... hazi-52377

Lieutenant Commander Inder Singh, Vir Chakra

Destroyer of Pakistani submarine — Ghazi
After matriculation from Jat High School, Sonepat, Inder joined the Indian Navy as a sailor in the Royal Indian Navy in June 1944. He had his initial training at His Majesty's Indian Ship (HMIS) Akbar at Thane in present day Maharashtra. Early in service, Inder was nominated to attend anti-aircraft first class course at Portsmouth in England. He steadily rose through the ranks and was Petty Officer (equivalent to Subedar in the Army) when he was commissioned into the Navy on September 30, 1958. During operation 'Cactus Lily' (India-Pakistan war in Eastern Theatre), Lieutenant Commander Inder Singh Malik was in command of Indian Naval Ship INS Rajput.

After a pre-emptive attack on Indian air fields by Pakistani aircrafts on the evening of December 3, 1971, the Indian Navy visualised that a similar underwater attack against naval base at Vishakhapatnam might become a reality. Therefore, all naval defenses around the harbour were alerted and the ships were ordered to sail out of the harbour before midnight.

On the intervening night of December 3 and 4, 1971, a very loud explosion was heard by the coastal battery deployed near Vishakhapatnam Naval Harbour at 12:15 am. The intensity of the explosion was such that the window panes of the houses half a mile away from the coast got cracked. In the morning, some fishermen reported oil patches and some flotsam just off the harbour. And the word went around that it was PNS Ghazi that exploded and sank. Various causes of her sinking were presumed, but the cause most widely believed and officially recorded was that Ghazi was destroyed and sunk by the depth charge fired at it by INS Rajput commanded by Lieutenant Commander Inder Singh Malik. The watch retrieved from the wreckage of Submarine Ghazi showed that it had stopped ticking precisely at 12:15 am.

For successfully conducting a near-suicidal mission and destroying the most modern submarine, Lt Cdr Inder Singh Malik was awarded the Vir Chakra
Last edited by ramana on 10 Mar 2020 05:03, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: Added underline to highlight key points. ramana

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ramana » 10 Mar 2020 05:09

Philip, The Quad is a Naval Boy Scout jamboree with Australia wanting to be in to up their prestige level.

In the early 60s, RN, IN, RAN and RNZN all exercised in Indian Ocean for anti-submarine warfare.
Then after 1965 they all cried off.
Both Australia and NZ started behaving hostile since then.

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 13 Apr 2020 18:51

Lt Gen. Hanut Singh — bold commander who led from front in 1971, but was never made Army chief
Five years ago, Lt Gen. Hanut Singh passed away. But ‘Hunty’ is still one of the most revered leaders in the Army who stood up for what was right.
by Lt Gen A K Singh (Retd)
https://theprint.in/opinion/lt-gen-hanu ... ef/400625/
Without a doubt, the Battle of Basantar was Gen. Hanut Singh’s finest hour. He led his famed regiment, Poona Horse, into one of the fiercest tank battles on the sub-continent. His key decision to risk the regiment across an uncleared minefield proved to be the battle-winning factor. When Pakistan’s 13 Lancers with Patton Tanks attacked the Indian position at Jarpal, they were surprised and destroyed by the Centurions of Poona Horse. Lt Arun Khetarpal posthumously won a Param Vir Chakra, and Comdt Hanut, a Maha Vir Chakra.

His citation read: “Undeterred by enemy medium artillery tank fire, Lt. Col Hanut Singh, moved from threatened sector to another, with utter disregard for his personal safety. His presence and cool courage inspired his men to remain steadfast and perform commendable acts of gallantry”.

His heroic leadership and battlefield intuition have cemented Hunty’s place as one of our most valiant and professional battlefield tank commanders in the Indian Armoured Corps.

on op Brass Tacks
Surprisingly, those who served under Hanut in 2 Corps during Operation Brasstacks, found the general more focussed on ‘balance’ than on momentum as advocated by Gen. Krishnaswamy Sundarji. One can ascribe two reasons for that. One, of course, was his experience of 1971, where Lt Gen. K.K. Singh, then GOC 1 Corps was always apprehensive of the Pak Armoured Division cutting off his rear and reaching the Samba-Jammu road and this weighed heavily on his mind, thus impeding the speed of 1 Corp’s advance into the Shakargarh bulge.

The second reason was that the Indian Army had not fully graduated to the operational level of warfare, because the T-72 tanks and ICV-BMP’s were still being absorbed and operational commanders were still learning about them. I also suspect that Gen. Hanut Singh, a seasoned war leader, was very much a grounded soldier who was of the firm conviction that his formations would deliver what he thought was realistically possible and not what was based on grandiose schemes for which the Indian Army was not ready. Maybe he was right, for Gen. Sundarji’s plans were not put to the test, and during ‘Operation Pawan’, Gen. Hanut Singh’s apprehensions were proved right.

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby nam » 13 Apr 2020 23:36

Here is a wonderful detailed video of the famous German blitz through Arden. I so wish someone from our end create such a similar day to day (with divisional & armor details) of 65 & 71 war.

The French were constantly defending against a German moving attack. Never counter attacked. The importance of multi prong attacks and taking advantage of gaps.

Our response in 65 war is perfectly understood if you watch this video. Our counter offence across Lahore, threw in disarray, PA multi prong attack, which was to follow Ops GrandSlam.

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ArjunPandit » 13 May 2020 22:00

Just got curious who are the people in the pic..beyond niazi and js arora..who's the mohtarma jostling from behind how managed to sneak in such a historic pic...


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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Sanju » 13 May 2020 23:32

Then Maj. Gen. JFR Jacob to the left of (Paper) Tiger Niazi, Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh to Gen Jacob's right, Air Marshal Dewan to the right of Gen Sagat Singh, Adm. Krishnan behind Lt. Gen JS Aurora and I think it was either Mrs Aurora or Mrs. Krishnan in that pic peeping between the shoulders of the Air Marshal & Vice Admiral.
There was some controversy over having a lady there.

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Philip » 14 May 2020 08:32

I think it was Mrs.Aurora.Mrs.G was mighty peeved to see her in Dacca,as she wanted herself to make a dramatic entry into Dacca,which would've been her right as an historic victor .
There was a piece written years ago about Gen.A going to meet Mrs.G on his retirement ,as he expected some fitting reward for his achievements. Allegedly, Mrs. G. silently passed to him a file
which he opened and read. Without a dord he closed the fild stood up,saluted and left!

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Philip » 14 May 2020 08:33

I think it was Mrs.Aurora.Mrs.G was mighty peeved to see her in Dacca,as she wanted herself to make a dramatic entry into Dacca,which would've been her right as the first woman an historic victor .
There was a piece written years ago about Gen.A going to meet Mrs.G on his retirement ,as he expected some fitting reward for his achievements. Allegedly, Mrs. G. silently passed to him a file
which he opened and read. Without a word he closed the file ,stood up,saluted and left!

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 18 May 2020 16:52

The story of the Mandhol Raid in 1971 by the 9 th Battalion, The Parachute Regiment

http://www.indianpolitics.co.in/how-ind ... ed-poonch/

a fascinating read.please do go through the complete
apologies if this was posted earlier.
This time CHARLIES DEVILS were a determined lot. A total of 78 Indian Parachute Commandos with Major Chander Malhotra in the Centre started crawling westward towards the six Pakistani Artillery Guns, four of which had been accounted for as they were firing intermittently. By 0110h the Commandos were just about 20 m or less from the Gun Pits. He having gone to the ground Major Chander was still not sure about the position of two of the guns. Then suddenly ….hell broke loose ….it is extremely difficult to piece together the exact sequence of events in spite of having spoken to four of the Officers participants and many of the JCOs, NCOs and the men over a period of 12 years. Recently some of rhe selected were again grilled in detail and this includes the Group Commander himself. So the readers themselves have to delve into the FOG OF WAR and come to own conclusions. Here it is …….

…..to the left of his own position or the Southern side Chander had counted two guns 50 to75 m apart. Similarly two guns on his right. The Gun which should have been right in the front had not yet fired, one more gun on extreme right or northern end also had not fired till now.

…….one enemy gunner came out of his pit or bunker on the side, moved 10 odd m towards East and scanning the skyline, unbuttoned his trousers and started pissing. As the Paki Gunner started buttoning and turned his back, both Paratrooper Balwan Singh and Rajmal lunged at him and Balwan’s commando knife found the target. Unfortunately another Paki had emerged out of the pit right at that moment and seeing this he not only emptied his carbine into Rajmal but also shouted Kaaaafir —kaaafir.

………simultaneously a similar kind of scuffle seemed to have taken place towards North Western end behind the Guns where the Support Group had taken position.

………the firing sound jolted the COMMANDOS into action. Every one simply went through the drill automatically.

………..grenades were lobbed and a magazine each emptied towards the front into whatever looked like an enemy or a hiding place of the enemy, though it was pitch dark. The Support Group too fired into the Gun Area for a brief period.

………..Then Major Chander voice could be heard shouting STOP FIRE …..STOP FIRE and joined in a chorus by the JCOs and NCOs.Suddenly there was pin drop silence.

……….next Chander was shouting —-aaage baadho Dhhaawaaaa and more than three scores voices joined in and black shadows sprinted towards the pit.

……..firing commenced once more and muzzle flashes were seen here and there, as if answering back, as remembered by some of the veterans.

……..some more shouting by Zile Singh,Tusky, Major Chander, MLB, Yashwant, Roshan Lal to stop firing –taken up by dozens of NCOs.

……..someone shouting Balwan Singh has been hit

………then muted shouts of TAKE POSITION….Charge lagao, JAALDI KARO etc etc etc etc

……. About 20 minutes later suddenly there was massive blast and a super Flash towards Southern end.

……..As recalled by Colonel Roshan Lal—I had been looking towards South at the moment of the flash and thereafter for next 10 minutes I was blind and could see nothing but bright flashes only. Though I must have been more than 200 m from the flash site. This happened to all those who by chance had been facing the direction of the Flash.

…… Subedar Zile then reported to Chander that one gun had been destroyed. It seemed to have a round loaded into its breach and that was the likely reason for the blinding flash. Four of his boys and he himself had received splinter wounds.

……..sir, this seems to be a Chinese 122mm gun, markings are Chinese –yes croaked Chander, try and remove the Sights-, his throat was unable to utter a sound—- sir, Sight is welded cannot be removed said MLB

……..Sahib, bhago, fuze mein aag laga dia hai said Havildar Gulab or someone. —–nahi walk karo said Tusky. Then there was a blast.

………then General Tasker recalls— I was walking towards East away from the gun pit. Suddenly it seemed someone lifted me completely off the ground and then threw me down with a force. I was stunned. Then I got up totally dazed. Looked around. Someone was lying on ground near me moaning. I rushed to him and saw he was wounded. Shouted for help. As he was being bandaged, I felt something warm on my left thigh—-I too was bleeding.

…….Colonel Mohinder Bhagat recalls—– I ordered Havildar Bichhitar to light the fuze and then everyone walked out of the pit. Then I rushed back to get my helmet and was out of the pit in a second or so I thought. A few minutes later I was up in the air and then thrown to the ground. I got up dazed, gingerly tried move my limbs and laughed loudly on discovering that everything was fine.

……..there are only shells in this pit shouted someone. Just blow it up shouted someone else in a reply.

……..there were 8 dead pakis in the gun pit mentioned a NCO and another four next to the bunker.

……..I counted 11 of them in our gun pit and area behind.

……..I counted 7 of them in our gun pit

………around 10 to 15 had been mowed down when those fleeing from the gun area had run into Cut Off Group.


Return From Mandhol


Time now was 0200h. Withdrawal signal was given. RV was about 800 m away at the outskirts of the abandoned Mandhol Village. On their ROUTE IN to the gun position, the Commandos had found the village of more than a score of huts to be completely empty except for an 80 year old man. He had indicated the direction of the Gun Area and had led them for about 100m when one of the guns had fired, thus giving their position to the Commandos. At the RV everyone was quickly accounted for. There was one dead body that of Rajmal and five seriously wounded including Balwan Singh. Also there were 15 walking wounded which included Lt Ashok Tasker and Naib Subedar Zile Singh. Orders were given to look for charpoys in the huts.

While charpoys were being taken out and bandages of wounded adjusted wherever required, message was passed to the Brigade Major. Brigadier A V Natu himself came on the Radio and wanted to speak to the Group Commander. Chander just about managed to croak the Code Word for complete success. Natu at once congratulated Chander and also said “you deserve a Param vir Chakra for this mission”. Chander just requested that on reaching back, a doctor and evacuation facilities should be available for the casualties right on the Post itself and some hot food for the men. Finally at 0300h, Charlie Group started moving out of the RV, fully alert for any ambush along the route.

For Move back, after leaving Mandhol Village, the Commandos took a different route. Having fired about 30 % of their ammunition, each person was a bit lighter nevertheless now movement was downhill which is quite tough on the knees. Casualties were an added burden, since for each casualties four persons had to be employed as Stretcher Bearers. Then suddenly the Scouts gave a signal and the leading Team under Lt Roshan went to ground. Lt Roshan moved forward for assessing the ground situation. By the time Major Chander moved up and caught up with the Team Commander, he found Lt Roshan having a good laugh. This was no ambush site but a mule transhipment point for supply and ammunition. There were around 14 mules still standing there, with lots of ammunition and ration dumped around. The Paki muleteers and sentries if any had just vanished. Since no prisoners of war had been captured, the 14 mules were promptly declared as Prisoners. Then someone had a bright idea …..Why not place the casualties on these mules. The walking wounded too could have a ride. However next five minutes was pure chaos, the Pakistani mules proved to be tougher and more stubborn than the Indian Commandos. Lt Tasker and all the other walking wounded simply refused the Ride Offer. Seeing this Major Chander, under the powers vested in him as the highest Indian military Commander present inside Pakistan Occupied Poonch, at once granted freedom to the 14 members of Pakistan Army. The ammunition dumped around were quickly wired and activated. Within minutes the Group had moved further down, munching upon dry fruits requisitioned from the dump. By the time the Commandos had covered a km there was a loud bang, signaling the destruction of the ammunition dump.

As they neared the river, the pace picked up but crossing back was again a dangerous business. Meanwhile the Group Commander had frequently walked beside the moaning Balwan Singh, telling him all the time that, he will survive and nothing will happen to him. The Group halted when they neared the river and then a Sub Team crossed over and took position on the other bank. They were followed through by the rest of 9 TEAM. Then the others entered the icy cold water. Time now was 0530 h and the Commandos were back on own side of Poonch River. Soon they were nearing Dhip post, a full 12 hours mission. They had left Dhip Post in the evening of 13 December at 0530h after last light. By 1830h they were negotiating the icy cold, waist deep, fast flowing Poonch River in pitch darkness. The pickets on the Ridge Line on both sides along with their artillery had already started celebrating Diwali with full gusto. Commandos had to cover around another 08 kms after reaching the far bank of the river. Thereafter look for the guns. The radio crackled and Passwords exchanged. A dozen men came forward and started hugging the Commandos. Burly Sardars were eager to carry the Commandos on their back uphill all the way to the Post.


By the time Commandos reached the main defences it was daylight around 0630h. News had spread all over the Poonch Brigade. Seven prominent flash and blasts had been seen and heard towards Mandhol, the visible proof of the gun raid. History had been created, NAVORONE was fiction but MANDHOL was now a fact. After all not even during the Second World, any raid had been able to destroy a complete battery of guns and kill over 35 enemy gunners (as estimated by Major Chander) with many more certainly wounded. Even Navarone, a fiction had only two guns!! However a mystery remains regarding the total number of guns destroyed. Some say 06 guns and 01 ammunition stack/ dump, some say 04 guns and 03 ammunition stacks/dumps, men on the piquet’s say 07 blasts. A book written by a Pakistani Corps of Artillery General a few years later mentioned the destruction of a full battery without specifying the number of guns. At one of the flag meetings just a month after the war a Pakistani Officer mentioned a casualty figure of 84 dead and wounded.

The immediate effect of the raid was pulling out of all Pakistani Gun Batteries from forward deployment to gun areas further back. All this resulted in reduction of effective artillery fire on Poonch Defences. Pakistan Artillery Batteries also had to deploy manpower for the perimeter security from their internal resources and this further brought down their effectiveness for the next few days up to the declaration of Cease Fire. Later on after the War when Pakistan Artillery had a re look in to their Organizational Structure and other drills, this raid was taken into account.

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 18 May 2020 17:38

http://www.indianpolitics.co.in/how-ind ... ed-poonch/
excerpted from the above
The climb now was nearly over onto AREA FLAT which incidentally was not exactly a flat piece of ground. It was around 500m by 100m of relatively flattish area with some amount of undulating ground with a few dips and a few mounds. Tree cover was there but sparse with relatively few bushes. Naik Yashwant spotted a chap who was sitting on the sky line on a small rock with a pick axe in hand. It was a False Crest Line with a dip in the terrain thereafter. The individual was looking into the dip. Then suddenly another chap appeared, handed over a mug and disappeared downwards. The first one started sipping his tea. Captain Mohinder and party started moving forward by first spreading out. The chap having tea was so lost in his thought that he was totally startled when suddenly MLB asked him in Hindi, from about 20 m distance, “whats your name and which unit”.

L/Nk Dharam Singh a Veteran of 1965 war having fought in Ichhogil Canal Area with his earlier infantry unit was not taking any chances. He had moved up with his LMG onto the Crest Line and was deployed.

Out came the reply “Sepoy Mohammed Shabir, 9 Azad Kashmir ” and leaning on his pick axe he stood up, eyeing the two khaki clad, armed men who had suddenly startled him …..He had missed out L/ Nk Dharam Singh completely whose LMG in fact was now pointing into the dip where another 7 or 8 men were having their tea or relaxing. Their weapons, equipment and digging tools scattered around.

Captain Bhagat was equally startled with the reply received in thick Kashmiri accent. He at once brought up his Carbine and shouted …Hands Up. Then looking down, he was horrified to see that the carbine magazine was not fully pressed in. Seeing no reaction from MLB, Dharam singh cocked his LMG and fired…..there was just a loud click, the first round was a misfire. Then various things though happened simultaneously, still recollect able ‘happening in slow motion’ by MLB and Dharam Singh (when individually each had narrated the story to me):

Sepoy Mohammed Shabir dropped his mug and the pick axe, turned towards the dip poised to run down. Naik Yashwant charging upwards, shouting DHA…AA……WAA……A and firing from his rifle. Balwan Singh too rushing forward and firing from his rifle towards Shabir. On reaching the crest line both taking position and firing into the hollow below. MLB hitting hard on the magazine end, spraying bullets towards Shabir. The men in the hollow getting up and making a dash for their weapons. Dharam Singh simultaneously doing the misfire drill, shouting on top of his voice ….Number 2, 3 and Number 4 LMG F….I….R….E and then firing a full magazine into the hollow dip.

Thereafter for an eon there was stillness. Dead body of Shabir and two others were left in the dip along with mugs, some weapons and most of the equipment. Others had vanished. The three Commandos and Captain Bhagat were now deployed and breathing hard. Instantly heavy fire came on them from rest of Area Flat. MLB instantly realised that they could be in big trouble soon as their LMG had just 5 magazines and rest had only two magazines each. Therefore they answered back with just a few rounds intermittently and started planning their withdrawal. The volume of enemy fire increased and shouts could be heard, as if a patrol was moving towards them. By now five minutes must have elapsed when another very heavy volume of fire was heard coming from the Norther Side of Area Flat and simultaneously from the Western side.

On signal from MLB, the radio hand set was handed over by Balwan. Within seconds Tusky confirmed his position and 7 TEAM increased its volume of fire. Then Paratrooper Prahlad, Group Commander’s Signal Operator came on Radio and then CMM himself spoke to both MLB and Tusky. In another five minutes, the opposition just pittered out and then simply stopped. MLB was quite thankful to God for the timely arrival of both the Group Commander and Tasker on the Scene.

Malhotra himself had taken a big risk and like MLB had nearly bumped into two of the Pakis. The two Pakis had run away but those located higher up had opened up with automatic weapons. Major Malhotra and his party were badly pinned down. when Chander tried to get up, Havildar Virender virtually scolded him for his careless maneuver by saying “till the time I am alive, I shall remain in front of you, to reach you, enemy bullet has to first go through me”. Incidentally Virender of 9 TEAM had been left behind by Lt Roshan for ensuring proper administration of the Team on coming back from the forward post. For this Virender was quite upset as he wanted to be with the Team in action. So when CMM was moving up, Virender simply moved along. Finally all of them managed to crawl and get into better position but firing uphill was difficult. Then CMM himself manned the available LMG and firing single shots displayed his awesome marksmanship, taking down around 11 men of 9 POK on Area Flat in a very short span. Then quickly Chander and party had rapidly moved further up and emptied a few magazines of LMG into Area Flat, thereby completely eliminating all resistance.

However before sweeping down to Area Flat for search operation, Lt Tasker first spoke to both CMM and MLB on radio. Once their exact position was ascertained then 7 TEAM started fanning out Sub Team wise. After a while they had one wounded prisoner in the bag and counted 41 dead bodies, many weapons, two radio sets and lots of equipment. The wounded prisoner was given some medical aid; rather CMM himself wrapped boot putty over the stomach wound. A quick interrogation revealed that a Company of 9 POK Battalion had infiltrated the previous night and taken up position on Area Nagali Top. One platoon out of it had moved towards Area Flat to take defences on it. The overall task was to harass the Indian forces in the rear as much as possible.

While this interrogation was on, an inspection of prisoners ruck suck revealed that the PW could not be from 9 POK Battalion but some other unit. His accent and looks were also not of Pak Occupied Kashmir variety. Initially he was very stubborn. However a stern version of “Mutt and Jeff” tactics broke him down. Some of the paratroopers, furious due to the mutilated body of the dogra boy found in the morning, were not play acting but actually wanted to eliminate him. Realizing the situation, he revealed his true identity that he was a Special Service Group trooper. This fact was more of his Saviour than the Geneva Convention because now he was suddenly a very valuable Prisoner.


It turned out that Liyaquat Company of SSG too had infiltrated alongwith entire 9 POK battalion and taken position on ThanPir heights. A Company of 9 POK with a platoon of SSG then had come along the Nagali Ridge to AREA FLAT. Another Company had similarly come down a parallel Ridge and taken position to dominate Kalai Bridge, the life line of Poonch with rest of Jammu Division.

As per Paki plan, the rest of 2 POK Brigade with other supporting elements was to infiltrate in the early parts of night 4—5 December and link up on Thanpir heights. Then in conjunction with attack on Forward Defended Localities, 16 POK battalion would have moved down the Chandak Ridge and cut off Kalai Bridge. This would have made the defences of Poonch Infantry Brigade totally untenable and would have led to capture of Poonch by Pakistan. What the Pakis could not achieve in 1948 even after a siege from Nov47 right up to 20 Nov 1948 and in a similar siege in 1965 would have become a fact in 1971.

In 1948, paratroopers of 50 (I) Parachute Brigade had helped Brigadier Pritam Singh in saving Poonch. In 1965 Major Megh Singh with his Meghdoot Force had been a big help to Brigadier Zora Singh in saving Poonch. Now in 1971 it was the blue eyed boy of Megh Singh, Major Chander Malhotra with his Charlie Group, 9 Parachute Commando that upset all the calculations of Yaha Khan’s GHQ. Brigadier A V Natu, the Poonch Brigade Commander in 1971 may have been totally unaware that how his fellow Maharashtrian LT A V Tasker had helped saving the day not only for him but for his entire brigade and the J & K State itself. As a result India continued to have a large District called Poonch.

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Manish_P » 18 May 2020 20:31

ArjunPandit wrote:Just got curious who are the people in the pic..beyond niazi and js arora..who's the mohtarma jostling from behind how managed to sneak in such a historic pic...

Can never get enough of this famous photo

Multiple towering personalities in it.. and that cheeky smiling Sardar in the background :D

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Re: 48th Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ArjunPandit » 18 May 2020 21:34

yes manish there are multiple versions of this pic.some even b/w....this sardarji or the rightmost guy looking up in the air..looking like dilip kumar and the white hat navy guy wondering ...they are billion dollar pics

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