China Military Watch

[Lalmohan]

indeed not, but even with extra long runways, the payload capacity will not be fantastic, and these a/c are not really pgm capable, so their real threat remains as air defense

on the otherhand, if we go back to the PLA doctrine discussion from about 2 years ago(?) then front line units of the PLA will keep advancing until they are spent (so no resupply anticipated) - and be replaced by the next division in line. Not sure that air will be the most effective way to hit these units, probably arty and cruise missiles will be better

its these 2nd follow up divisions that have to be interdicted by the IAF and big time if we are to stand any chance of winning

IA can concetrate on bottling up and attriting (?) the frontal units, mostly with arty

[vivek_ahuja]

Guys,

I got hold of some additional material yesterday on the Chinese aero-engine technology. After some comparative analysis, it turned out that I had been over-compensating the Chinese engine performance in their favor. As a result I have provided the updated analysis (refer charts) for the Q-5 and the J-8II in the previous page and the results do not look good for the Chinese. Nevertheless, some interesting results are now available:

CHINESE AIRPOWER IN THE HIMALAYAS:

CONCLUSIONS SO FAR: (PART-1 and PART-2)

For the Q-5, the following conclusions are made:

a) In the MAX-RANGE criterion, the Q-5 is capable of carrying only around 600Kg of weapons (30% of the structural max value) and even this allows it to reach only the sea-level LO-LO-LO range of around 400Km, when taking off from an airbase at ~11000Feet. For 600Kg, it means that the aircraft is carrying roughly 4x150Kg bombs or the equivalent.

b) In the MAX-LOAD criterion, the Q-5 struggles to reach even the basic range of around 250Km to the Arunachal border with its full design load when taking off from an airbase at ~11000Feet. Even for this, the aircraft has to fly off from a runway length approximately in the range of 11000 to 13000 feet. These are extreme values that are not commonly available in the region

c) When the airbase altitude increases beyond ~10000 Feet, the Q-5 cannot differentiate between the MAX-RANGE and the MAX-LOAD conditions and load carrying capacity and range drop off to negligible values. When this happens, the aircraft is flying only with the gun-ammo and is only useful for point airbase defense.

For the J-8II, the following conclusions are made:

a) Because of its inherent long range, the J-8II has no problem in reaching the basic criterion set down for range in both the MAX-LOAD and the MAX-RANGE conditions. To this effect, airbase runway length only affects the total load carrying capacity. In other words, the J-8II can take off from all Tibetan airbases which have suitable runway lengths and are below or around airbase altitudes of ~10000 Feet.

b) Beyond 10000 Feet altitude airbases, the J-8II begins to suffer the take-off penalty pretty severely. The MAX-LOAD range falls down to the minimum value of that required to reach the border with India and the corresponding weapons load drops down by 50%. The MAX-RANGE criterion for range is unaffected but the weapons load drops down to absolute minimum and around 11% of the structural capacity and carrying space (several pylons will be empty in this configuration)

My above analysis for the Q-5 and the J-8II concludes that the Chinese Q-5 fleet is incapable of effective CAS sorties in the Tibetan region and are highly susceptible to being grounded once the airbases come under attack. The specified Chinese fleet for this capacity is 400 Q-5s. Unfortunately for them, they will now have to replace this massive fleet with other aircraft types.

Further, the J-8II is also unable to perform CAS sorties from higher altitude airbases and is relegated only to the light interceptor role (low range and endurance). The above analysis was done assuming no in-flight refueling takes place. If this refueling were to take place, the J-8II’s limitations can be overcome at least in the air-superiority role.

Nevertheless, the CAS role remains unfilled. Possible use of the J-7 and the JH-7 is to be considered here.

-Vivek

P.S.: I will do the analysis for the J-7 and the JH-7 shortly. Let’s see what that analysis shows there.

[alokgupt]

Further, the J-8II is also unable to perform CAS sorties from higher altitude airbases and is relegated only to the light interceptor role (low range and endurance). The above analysis was done assuming no in-flight refueling takes place. If this refueling were to take place, the J-8II’s limitations can be overcome at least in the air-superiority role. Nevertheless, the CAS role remains unfilled. Possible use of the J-7 and the JH-7 is to be considered here.

Vivek,

Fair assesment. J-8II can be used in point defence. Will wait for your analysis on J-7 but on the face of it J-7 will be worse than J-8II. When you get a chance it will be interesting to see J-10 capabilities in Tibet as well.

[shyamd]

Apologies if already published:

Belated awakening
Sandeep Unnithan. About India's plans



INTERVIEW: GENERAL (RETD) J.J. SINGH

The appointment of former army chief General (retd) J.J. Singh as the Governor of the sensitive state of Arunachal Pradesh comes at a crucial juncture in Indo-China ties, particularly since the governor of this state has more powers than his counterparts in other states. In an interview with India Today Assistant Editor Sandeep Unnithan, Singh outlined his plans for one of India’s least developed states.

Q. Can your appointment be seen as the iron glove on a velvet fist?
A. For me, it is a challenging assignment. A lot has to be done to boost the standard of living of the people of the state. We have to ensure connectivity. The development of Arunachal Pradesh will be my top priority. My role will be to support and guide the state Government in an unobtrusive manner. I want to see that the projects are completed in time and there is law and order.

Q. There are concerns over the slow pace of infrastructure development on our side of the border.
A. The projects announced by the prime minister will take between five and 10 years to be completed. I will advise the state Government to initiate projects like the rail link to Itanagar without delay so that people do not feel that they were empty promises. The planned laterals and axis roads will also give us capability from the national security point of view.

J J Singh
Governor J.J. Singh
Q. Is the rapid development of infrastructure on China’s side of the border worrying?
A. Our basic aim is to improve the quality of life of the people in the border areas. This will also help national security. The other side is also embarking on projects for the development of their remote provinces. Both sides have their strengths and weaknesses.

Our roads have to ascend from 1,000 ft to 20,000 ft above sea level but our hinterland is just 150 km from our forward areas, which allows resupply. But the other side has to sustain their lines over 1,000 km away over rugged terrain, where there are bottlenecks. We are not imbalanced as of date on the border and I can assure my countrymen that there won’t be a repeat of 1962.

[JCage]

Further, the J-8II is also unable to perform CAS sorties from higher altitude airbases and is relegated only to the light interceptor role (low range and endurance). The above analysis was done assuming no in-flight refueling takes place. If this refueling were to take place, the J-8II’s limitations can be overcome at least in the air-superiority role. Nevertheless, the CAS role remains unfilled. Possible use of the J-7 and the JH-7 is to be considered here.

Vivek,

Fair assesment. J-8II can be used in point defence. Will wait for your analysis on J-7 but on the face of it J-7 will be worse than J-8II. When you get a chance it will be interesting to see J-10 capabilities in Tibet as well.

J-8 cant be used in point defence because it will hog vital infrastructure.

BTW, I might as well reveal that each of my comments about Q-5 et al comes from the horses mouth. Good that Viveks analysis is confirming the same, but even otherwise, its a Flanker threat we face and there, the current PRC build up is not as much as they could have. And there is a reason for that, its all about money. Their money is going firmly towards the ROC oriented bases. Unlike India where the IAF is considere vital to support the IA, the PRC thinks differently our greatest threat is not the PLAAF but the damn 2nd Arty. Google about the 3 missile salvo.

[Rahul Shukla]

JC,

Please give some more insight on PLA 2nd Artillery vs. IA Artillery. It's gyan for us ignorants...

Here's a nice video for starts; Clicky (metacafe)

[alokgupt]

Vivek,

Fair assesment. J-8II can be used in point defence. Will wait for your analysis on J-7 but on the face of it J-7 will be worse than J-8II. When you get a chance it will be interesting to see J-10 capabilities in Tibet as well.

J-8 cant be used in point defence because it will hog vital infrastructure.

BTW, I might as well reveal that each of my comments about Q-5 et al comes from the horses mouth. Good that Viveks analysis is confirming the same, but even otherwise, its a Flanker threat we face and there, the current PRC build up is not as much as they could have. And there is a reason for that, its all about money. Their money is going firmly towards the ROC oriented bases. Unlike India where the IAF is considere vital to support the IA, the PRC thinks differently our greatest threat is not the PLAAF but the damn 2nd Arty. Google about the 3 missile salvo.

When you talk about 2nd Arty do you mean nuclear strikes or conventional strike?

What problem do you see with the scenario in which J-8II and J-10 are deployed at forward air bases in Tibet while Flankers are deployed at air bases in Yunan and Xinjiang province?

Well PRC seems to have plenty of money to build a dozen airports when we consider that 1,140km stretch of Tibet railway cost $4.2bn. And guess what they are planning another line which is likely to be even more expensive.

[vivek_ahuja]

Will wait for your analysis on J-7 but on the face of it J-7 will be worse than J-8II.

True. But what I am aiming for here is to shed all possible light on the Chinese air power limitations in Tibet specifically since what th analysis is going to show is that despite all claims of chinese having thousands of aircraft and so on, a very small percentage of that number (the modern types having the range to be based on lower altitude airbases) are the ones posing the real threat.

If you go to Sino-defense type websites, you will see that the Q-5 is listed as the main ground-attack aircraft for the PLAAF and numbering around 400. The above analysis showed how that 400 number is simply wiped off the list as being anything but useful. Same for the J-7, BTW (I just finished the initial calculation for that bird and the results are horrific even in comparison to the Q-5)

and this particular aircraft is 500 in strength as interceptor fighters. My initial analysis (I will put it up shortly), is showing that the aircraft is barely capable of lifting itself off the ground with the Gun-Ammo and has ranges in the double digit numbers if you factor in flight time on patrol.

So what you have is around 900 Frontline aircrafts that are unable to perform even remotely decently in the Himalayan regions and are about as worthless .

Once we have this initial data, we can then start preparing a true picture of what the PLAAF threat looks like in the region.

J-8 cant be used in point defence because it will hog vital infrastructure.

Exactly. There are only a handful of decent airbases in Tibet within proper range of the border with India. each of them has only minimal airbase infrastructure. But technically it is possible for the J-8II to perform base defense missions and can be based in small numbers (maybe flights) at each of these locations, but hardly in the numbers as presented in their ORBAT.

my comments about Q-5 et al comes from the horses mouth. Good that Viveks analysis is confirming the same

So by logical extrapolation I guess the other analyses are somewhere along the right track as well, right?

[alokgupt]

True. But what I am aiming for here is to shed all possible light on the Chinese air power limitations in Tibet specifically since what th analysis is going to show is that despite all claims of chinese having thousands of aircraft and so on, a very small percentage of that number (the modern types having the range to be based on lower altitude airbases) are the ones posing the real threat.

CAF history is out in open for all to see. What about CAF's future? What kind of impact hosting J-10 and Flanker from Tibet has on the performance?

[vivek_ahuja]

What kind of impact hosting J-10 and Flanker from Tibet has on the performance?

I don't know that as of now, but I will definitely do that analysis at a later stage. However, what I am thinking is that given the range of these aircrafts (especially the Flanker; Not sure about the J-10 right now) and their endurance, why would the PLAAF consider basing them at these high-altitude airbases at all? they can easily be based lower down in airbases further north or the east on the Chinese mainland and then just kept on station using aerial refelling.

But either way, the PLAAF presence over Tibet is not going to be as dense as its made out to be.

Later on I will do an analysis on the in-flight refelling capabilities of the PLAAF and then see how many aircraft can be kept on station based on what airfield they took off from. That should be interesting...

[gandharva]

Shilpa Shetty trumps Arunachal again

Arun Shourie

Every time China advances a claim, watch how our government — and media — react in feeble, confused, and contradictory ways, writes Arun Shourie


But it was the passage that followed that was of urgent interest to us, and I sought Advani’s permission to read it. The passage is as follows — please do read it carefully:

‘Cartographic aggression takes several forms. Some overt, as in the case of Iraq, others more subtle. In 1993 I received a book titled Physical Geography of China, written by Zhao Sonqiao, published in 1986 in Beijing. On the frontispiece is a map of China. But that map, to the trained eye, looks a bit strange. Why? Because in the south, it takes from India virtually all of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, plus a piece of the state of Assam. Now this book is not a political geography of China, nor is the matter of appropriated Indian territory ever discussed in it. China’s border is simply assumed to lie deep inside India, and the mountains and valleys thus claimed are discussed as though they are routinely a part of China. Make no mistake: such a map could not, in the 1980s at least, have been published without official approval. It should put not just India but the whole international community on notice of a latent trouble spot.’

.......This weak-kneed government is a problem, of course: its nominal leaders have lifted helplessness to new heights. But the even graver problem now is that the one instrument by which it could be shaken up, the media, has become a problem of its own.

Make no mistake: China watches all this. It watches the feeble, confused, contradictory ways in which our government, and even more our society, reacts each time it advances a claim. And it pursues its policy:

• Claim;

• Repeat the claim;

• Go on repeating the claim;

• Grab;

• Hold;

• Let time pass.

And they will reconcile themselves to the new situation. Has the policy not succeeded in regard to Tibet? No Indian Prime Minister will dare mention the word ‘Tibet’ or ‘Taiwan’ — lest doing so offends China. But China will go on claiming what it wants — for reasons that we must understand!


http://www.indianexpress.com/story/271801._.html

[vivek_ahuja]

CHINESE AIRPOWER IN TIBET: PART-3 (J-7 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS)

PERFORMANCE FOR AIR SUPERIORITY MISSIONS (MINIMUM LOAD-OUT IN AIR-TO-AIR WEAPONS AND MAXIMUM RANGE REQUIREMENT LIMITS)

Typical launch airbase: Dangxiong, Tibet
Role: AIR DEFENCE/ AIR SUPERIORITY (MAX LOAD IN WEAPONS)
Runway Length: 11000 FEET (GRAPH-2)

LOAD-OUT CHART OPTIONS FOR GIVEN OPTIMIZATION:

a) MAX LOAD plots:
maximum weapons load of 2000 Kg limit and maximum possible internal fuel for given parameters.

b) MAX RANGE plots: maximum internal fuel of 2250 Kg and remainder load in weapons up to a maximum of 2000Kg on remaining pylons (airframe weight inclusive of gun ammo for all analyzes and not to be added here; i.e. a value of zero weapons load means that only gun ammo is present)

LOAD AND RANGE FOR GIVEN CASE OPTIMIZATION VERSUS AIRBASE RUNWAY LENGTH:


LOAD AND RANGE FOR CASE OPTIMIZATION VERSUS AIRBASE ALTITUDE

[alokgupt]

However, what I am thinking is that given the range of these aircrafts (especially the Flanker; Not sure about the J-10 right now) and their endurance, why would the PLAAF consider basing them at these high-altitude airbases at all? they can easily be based lower down in airbases further north or the east on the Chinese mainland and then just kept on station using aerial refelling.But either way, the PLAAF presence over Tibet is not going to be as dense as its made out to be. Later on I will do an analysis on the in-flight refelling capabilities of the PLAAF and then see how many aircraft can be kept on station based on what airfield they took off from. That should be interesting...

Well your analysis might just show us why it will make more sense to host Flankers in Yunan and Xinjiang province than in Tibet. But if Flankers are staged in Yunan wouldn't it make sense for PRC to stage as many J-10 and/ or J-8II in Tibet as possible?

[shyamd]

Chinese Air Defense Now Top Notch
[quote]Tuesday, February 12, 2008 8:51 AM

By: Charles R. Smith Article Font Size

U.S. defense analysts now consider the Chinese air defense network to be the most dangerous system in the world. The Chinese system is considered more dangerous than the formidable Russian system.

The reason for China's great leap forward into first place is due to the wholesale use of U.S. commercial products that make the Chinese air defense network flexible, easy to upgrade, and tough to exploit.

The Chinese investment into its air defense network is calculated to be one-tenth the cost of the U.S. expenditures. The low cost is attributed to what one analyst described as "Cisco in Chinese."

Chinese telecom companies run by the People's Liberation Army frequently steal U.S. industrial and military secrets which are then modified into operational systems for the military. This effort began in 1994 during the Clinton administration and was led by Chinese Gen. Ding Henggao.

Ding should receive a medal for being a hero to the Chinese Communist Party because he was able to obtain a vast array of U.S. technology through a good friend inside the Clinton administration — then Defense Secretary William Perry. The technology included secure fiber-optic communications electronics.

Ding was able to set his wife, Madam General Nie, up as head of a false corporation that obtained advanced U.S. fiber optic systems. Madam Nie's company was staffed entirely by Chinese army officers who specialized in exploiting communications and electronics.

The American side of the deal was spearheaded by a good friend and co-worker of Perry's, Dr. John Lewis from Stanford University. In fact, documents obtained from the Department of Defense using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) show that Lewis was paid by the Chinese army while also serving on the U.S. Defense Policy Board and working for DoD as a contractor.

In 1994, Dr. Lewis was officially listed on the U.S. Defense Dept. payroll as Defense Secretary William Perry’s personal “consultantâ€

[KarthikSan]

My take on the whole thing. Ban all Chinese companies especially in the tech and communications industry from doing any business in India. Almost every Chinese student or post-doc coming to US Universities is a mini spy. I have seen brand new textbooks on the most advanced topics being translated into Chinese within a few months of publication and in the hands of new Chinese students. Funny thing is they have all the exercise problems solved and these guys just copy the homeworks from it. Also whenever a new course on latest research is offered by a professor at a US university the course notes and lectures are immediately copied and sent back to their alma-mater in China. They will get the tech in whatever means possible!

[gogna]

My take on the whole thing. Ban all Chinese companies especially in the tech and communications industry from doing any business in India. Almost every Chinese student or post-doc coming to US Universities is a mini spy. I have seen brand new textbooks on the most advanced topics being translated into Chinese within a few months of publication and in the hands of new Chinese students. Funny thing is they have all the exercise problems solved and these guys just copy the homeworks from it. Also whenever a new course on latest research is offered by a professor at a US university the course notes and lectures are immediately copied and sent back to their alma-mater in China. They will get the tech in whatever means possible!

TIMELINE: Recent spy scandals involving China and U.S.
Mon Feb 11, 2008 Reuters

A former Boeing engineer was arrested on Monday on charges of stealing trade secrets for China related to several aerospace programs, including the Space Shuttle, the U.S. Justice Department said.

It also announced a separate case in which a U.S. Defense Department official and two others were arrested on Monday on espionage charges involving the passing of classified U.S. government documents to China.

Following is a chronology of some recent spy cases involving China and the United States.

1999 - Los Alamos National Laboratory, where the first U.S. nuclear bombs were developed in the 1940s, comes under fire over security after U.S. prosecutors charge scientist Wen Ho Lee with 59 counts of illegally downloading nuclear weapons data onto portable tapes and non-secure computers. Lee was never charged with espionage despite early allegations of Chinese snooping on Los Alamos, and the case against him collapsed in 2000, when all but one charge against him was dropped and a federal judge apologized for keeping him in solitary confinement for nine months.

March 2000 - China has intensified its spying operations in the United States over the past decade, collecting military and economic secrets and seeking to exert influence over policy decisions in Washington, according to a report by two U.S. intelligence services.

October 2000 - The Pentagon is hiring 450 counterintelligence specialists to protect defense secrets after learning that China obtains classified U.S. missile technology, the Washington Post reports, quoting senior defense officials.

November 2000 - China dismisses allegations in a book by a Washington Times reporter about Chinese spying on U.S. nuclear secrets as "sheer fabrication" and accuses the author of still living in the Cold War era. The book, "The China Threat" by Bill Gertz, alleges Beijing had 37 spies ferreting out U.S. nuclear secrets in the mid-1990s and includes extensive excerpts from a U.S. intelligence report.

January 2002 - Loral Space & Communications Ltd., under investigation since 1997 for allegedly leaking sensitive missile technology to China, says it reaches a settlement with the U.S. government that could let it resume long-delayed satellite exports to China. Loral said it had agreed to pay a civil fine of $14 million to the State Department over seven years without admitting or denying the government's charges.

November 2007 - China hits back at a U.S. congressional panel report, calling its claims of trade manipulation and high-tech espionage by Beijing "insulting" and "misleading." The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission's report said China presented an array of threats to Washington, including "currency manipulation," computer espionage, and murky military modernization plans

February 2008 - A former Boeing engineer is arrested on charges of stealing trade secrets for China related to several aerospace programs, including the Space Shuttle, the U.S. Justice Department says.

[vivek_ahuja]

Guys,

Here's the one that everybody seems to have been asking for:

CHINESE AIRPOWER IN TIBET: PART-4 (J-10 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS)

Typical launch airbase: Golmud, Tibet
Role: AIR DEFENCE/ AIR SUPERIORITY
Runway Length: 12000 FEET (GRAPH-2)

LOAD-OUT CHART OPTIONS FOR GIVEN OPTIMIZATION:

a) MAX LOAD plots:
maximum weapons load of 5500 Kg limit and maximum possible internal fuel for given parameters. Minimum range is limited to 800Km plus flight time over target zone.

b) MAX RANGE plots:
maximum internal fuel of 4500 Kg and remainder load in weapons up to a maximum of 5500Kg on the pylons (airframe weight inclusive of gun ammo for all analyzes and not to be added here; i.e. a value of zero weapons load means that only gun ammo is present)
Minimum weapons load restricted to 1000Kg

LOAD AND RANGE FOR GIVEN CASE OPTIMIZATION VERSUS AIRBASE RUNWAY LENGTH:


LOAD AND RANGE FOR CASE OPTIMIZATION VERSUS AIRBASE ALTITUDE


I guess I can present a summary of the results later but for the moment the graphs should be interesting viewing.

-Vivek

[alokgupt]

CHINESE AIRPOWER IN TIBET: PART-4 (J-10 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS)

So J-10 indeed can go 800 km with 3500 kg load even from airfield located at 12000 feet. For air fields under 10000 feet it can take off with about 4500 kg and go 800 km.

Alternatively it can take off from the airfields located in Yunan, Qinghai, Xinjiang, and Sichuan province it can go 1300 km and carry 5500 kg load. But such a mission with adds 1000 km-1400 km to round trip and unlikely to be undertaken without refueling.

[vivek_ahuja]

So J-10 indeed can go 800 km with 3500 kg load even from airfield located at 12000 feet.

Indeed. That is what surprised me the most. The Russian AL-31 engine is a very high performance type as compared to the other Chinese aero engines and is what allows the J-10 to carry that immense load at sea level. If you look at the weapons load from a strutural point of view, its decently close to the aircraft empty weight!

In any case, the engine compensates for any airbase altitude or runway losses and still has enough power to move the amount of load as given in the charts. The Chinese have a high performance aircraft in the J-10 by any consideration. It is a very good compliment to the Sukhoi fleet. At the moment we have little to worry, but as this aircraft replaces others in the PLAAF, we will start to feel the pinch IMHO. The LCA needs to start rolling off the production lines soon...

[alokgupt]

The Chinese have a high performance aircraft in the J-10 by any consideration. It is a very good compliment to the Sukhoi fleet. At the moment we have little to worry, but as this aircraft replaces others in the PLAAF, we will start to feel the pinch IMHO. The LCA needs to start rolling off the production lines soon...

Currently PLAAF has about 400 modern fighters i.e. 272 Flankers and 100 J-10. They add about 17 (or more) Flankers and 17 J-10 each year.

So far we know of five air fields in Xizang (Tibet) within 500 km of arunachal / sikkim border. There are over 20 air fields within 1200 km of arunachal / sikkim. There is one air field within 500 km of Ladakh. There are at most a couple more within 1200 km of Himachal. Seems like PRC will need to build additional air fields in Tibet to support its ever increasing fleet.

[alokgupt]

http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/12078/phadke.pdf

China has recently completed the construction of a 12,400-foot long runway near Mandalay in Myanmar and is re p o rtedly upgrading the airfield at Pegu on the southern coast of My a n m a r. Myanmar does not possess aircraft that need these long runways, so the obv ious conclusion is that China is extending its strategic reach into the Indian Ocean region.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/chhinaks.pdf
During the 1971 conflict with Pakistan, India insured herself against a possible Chinese intervention by having a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. Soviet military exercises close to the Chinese border provided a deterrent to China

[alokgupt]

http://www.security-risks.com/china_def.asp?rno=9

Air Power In The Neighbourhood : PLAAF
By Group Captain (Retired) T P Srivastava

Introduction

The Chinese Air Force is the largest air power segment in our neighbourhood. In terms of the number of aircraft, Chinese Air Force( Peoples Liberation Army Air Force:PLAAF), is the third largest in the world. In our context when we look at PLAAF capability, it is essentially in relation to PLAAF’s ability to operate from Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Ability of PLAAF to operate from mainland China and strike targets in India remains on paper. The discussion in the succeeding paras is confined only to conventional Air Power.

Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) - Military Regions

In order to evaluate PLAAF capability, a thorough understanding of TAR is essential with respect to terrain. Of the seven Military Regions(MR) of the Chinese Armed Forces, only two are opposite India. Lanzhou MR is opposite LADAKH sector and Chengdu MR is opposite the North-East and part of the Central Sector. The MRs are further sub-divided into Military Districts(MD). The MDs facing us are:-

Chengdu MR. The two MDs in this region are Yunnan (opposite Myanmar) and Xizang( opposite Assam, Sikkim and Arunachal)
Lanzhou MR. South Xingjian MD (opposite UP,HP and LADAKH) East Xingjian MD faces us adjoining LADAKH.

Airfields

There are 15 operational bases in these two regions from where PLAAF can launch air operations. If we consider the TBA, the number of airfields reduce to only five. These airfields are:-

Khotan - (Lanzhou MR)
Hoping
Kongka Dzong - (Chengdu MR)
Donshoon
Pangta

Except for Khotan, the other four airfields are at an average elevation of 4,000 metres. Khotan at 1400 metres is nearly at the same elevation as Srinagar. Simply put the aeroplane and human being are affected by the altitude in identical manner. Both start puffing and panting with increase in altitude. Other ten airfields in the region are Kashgar, Kunming, Paoshan, Jekundo, Chegdu, Petun, Mangshi, Nagchuka I&II and Kantse. Long range aircraft like Su-30 only can reach the TBA while operating from these bases with limited load.

Air Defence Set Up

Radar Cover. Medium and High level cover in TAR is fairly good inspite of the fact that vintage radars are still in use. However low level cover is virtually non-existent due to terrain as well as less number of Radars. VA’s and VP’s have limited low level cover as well.

AD Weapons. Vintage AD weapons comprising mostly of Ack-Ack guns are deployed. Low level SAM,s are limited in numbers and are deployed at the VA/VP.

Type of Aircraft

Theoretically PLAAF could deploy the Q5, IL – 28 and J 8 aircraft but having low loiter time and insignificant throw weight, it is only Su-27/30 which will remain effective in TAR. Employment of Tu-16,if at all, would primarily have a psychological impact.

Airlift Capability

Airlift capability of PLAAF in TAR is severely restricted due to altitude at which most of the airfields are located. To place the issue in perspective, it would be well worth noting that most of the PLAAF airfields in TAR are at a higher altitude than Leh and Thoise. Thus their performance will be much lower than that of the Indian Air Force IL-76 from Leh on a day when surface temperatures are around 25-30 degrees Celsius. To conceive of operations like a Battalion Group drop would be virtually impossible from the point of view of the success probability that such drop may have. Similarly Heliborne operations are extremely difficult to execute. A Mi-17, which can lift 2000Kg at sea level, would lift a mere few hundred Kg at altitudes in excess of 3 Km. Contingency of an Heliborne assault in this region has a remote chance of success.

Overall Capability of PLAAF In TAR

Keeping in view the facts stated above PLAAF capability in TAR can be summarized as follows:-

Strike element of PLAAF is centred around Su-27/30. Other aircraft in the inventory have extremely limited capability. Airfield infrastructure, though exists, but cannot support sustained operations due to unpredictable and inclement weather. TBA is located widely separated from the base. Strategic targets in mainland India e.g. airfields in eastern region are more than 500 km from PLAAF strike bases in TAR. Air Defence infrastructure, radar cover in particular is virtually non existent almost entirely due to terrain restrictions.

Conclusion

PLAAF capability in TAR is severely restricted and would remain so virtually for all times to come even if force multipliers from main land China join the battle, PLAAF would not be in a position to cause any significant attrition to Indian Ground or Air Force. However if the Diplomatic relations between Myanmar and China continue to improve and Myanmar allows PLAAF to operate from its bases, PLAAF shall pose a serious challenge. Thus PLAAF operating from TAR poses no significant challenge/threat.

(SAST AUGUST 2007)

[Sanku]

Welcome to the light Bro.

[JCage]

Theoretically PLAAF could deploy the Q5, IL – 28 and J 8 aircraft but having low loiter time and insignificant throw weight, it is only Su-27/30 which will remain effective in TAR. Employment of Tu-16,if at all, would primarily have a psychological impact.

[negi]

Vivek and Co excellent posts and analysis to boot, my humble request to the admins that these pages be archived .

I am amazed at the difference in performance of aircraft while operating from sea level vis a vis airfields at 15kfeet or above.

[Sanku]

Hello Folks; All this discussion gives me an idea for a unusual tactical move in case of a Air ops by China.

We have seen that the number of airfields in Tibet (or against India) are restricted; also given the operating conditions the A/C taking off from Tibet area are not very long legged either. Thus support from Airborne fuel tankers is almost a must.

Further given the Air defence on Indian side; and the usual Chinese doctrine of victory through shock and awe; the Chinese will almost certainly attempt an attack with overwhelming force of flankers/J 10s etc. Not a small flight sneaking in to hit and run; lest it get overwhelmed by Indian Su30MKIs on patrol.

Okay; given the above to assumptions -- what I propose is that India always holds a unit of cruise missiles in hand and targeted at the airfields with PGM/fragmented warheads. A lot of these could be delayed action/pressure mines. In addition the Indian side always holds a air defence unit back for deep penetration into Chinese airspace.

The above assets are not used despite overwhelming need during the attack or to pre-empt one but used ONLY after the Chinese have completely committed their assets for attack on Indian territory.

The idea is given the relative lack of choices to land in Tibet; we let them attack using point defences over Indian space to stop their effectiveness -- but make sure that the flankers are never able to get back alive.

The CMs and anti-AWACs and Anti refuller ops are done when the Chinese start turning back to deny them the infrastructure to make their way back home.

What say.

[vivek_ahuja]

Q5, IL – 28 and J 8 aircraft but having low loiter time and insignificant throw weight

I guess the analysis was right on track for those types.

To place the issue in perspective, it would be well worth noting that most of the PLAAF airfields in TAR are at a higher altitude than Leh and Thoise. Thus their performance will be much lower than that of the Indian Air Force IL-76 from Leh on a day when surface temperatures are around 25-30 degrees Celsius. To conceive of operations like a Battalion Group drop would be virtually impossible from the point of view of the success probability that such drop may have

You have to be very careful when reading these statements. While saying that the PLAAF IL-76 will suffer degradation in airlift capability worse than the Indian IL-76 is technically correct, the question from an operational point of view is that a Battalion group drop in mountainous terrain using parachutes is ludicrous. Further, the IL-76s being used could not and would never be based from the Tibetan airbases in the wildest dreams. They will all be launched from farther low altitude airbases, and there the full load can be utilized.

Similarly Heliborne operations are extremely difficult to execute. A Mi-17, which can lift 2000Kg at sea level, would lift a mere few hundred Kg at altitudes in excess of 3 Km. Contingency of an Heliborne assault in this region has a remote chance of success.

Again, you have to be very careful here. I did the analysis for a MI-17 for performance at altitude and while the above statement is correct halfway, no mention of range is present. In other words, the above statement fails to specify what the point of comparision on range is. It could mean that the sea-level range is being kept constant and hence the massive drop in load at high altitude.

However, from an operations point of view, you would not need the sea level range of a machine such as the MI-17 for SHBO in the Himalayan regions. this is a result of the fact that you have to maintain the logistics behind any such insertion you make, and the larger the insertion unit, the smaller the insertion range. If you are looking to bypass a given set of hills for tactical reasons, you can do that just fine by putting a smaller amount of fuel in the MI-17 and then carrying more load. Plus you wouldn't be launching the bird from as far back as Leh. You can do this from just behind your frontlines.

This analysis for rotary winged birds, although similar to the fixed wing type I had presented in terms of objectives, shows me that SHBO is perfectly obtainable as long as your initial objectives aren't overly ambitious in scale to begin with.

I am amazed at the difference in performance of aircraft while operating from sea level vis a vis airfields at 15kfeet or above.

Yeah. I was surprised by that myself. I mean, having read it somewhere is not nearly as good as having done the analysis from a scientific standpoint, right?

BTW, I am currently writing a decent sized report of all my analysis along with all the graphs and aircraft range circles on maps and stuff for the Chinese Airpower In Tibet Analysis. Is there any way to put up that PDF report somewhere on BRF? I mean, is there someplace where I can upload that report and just put the link here for reading purposes and stuff?

-Vivek

[Rampy]

Q5, IL – 28 and J 8 aircraft but having low loiter time and insignificant throw weight

BTW, I am currently writing a decent sized report of all my analysis along with all the graphs and aircraft range circles on maps and stuff for the Chinese Airpower In Tibet Analysis. Is there any way to put up that PDF report somewhere on BRF? I mean, is there someplace where I can upload that report and just put the link here for reading purposes and stuff?

-Vivek

that will be greatest favour to us BRFiets if that can be done

Kudos Vivek!!!

[alokgupt]

BTW, I am currently writing a decent sized report of all my analysis along with all the graphs and aircraft range circles on maps and stuff for the Chinese Airpower In Tibet Analysis. Is there any way to put up that PDF report somewhere on BRF? I mean, is there someplace where I can upload that report and just put the link here for reading purposes and stuff?

Admins any suggestions?

[alokgupt]

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-AFBs.html

The PLA has the most extensive and well developed basing infrastructure in Asia, and it competes in numbers with the former Soviet and US basing infrastructures. While many bases are legacy sites from the Cold War, a significant proportion of these have been subjected to extensive upgrades for dual civil-military use, retaining revetments and taxiways but gaining a runway rated for airliners rather than fighters, and a civil terminal facility. Most PLA-AF and PLA-N bases use extensive networks of dispersal revetments, and a 13 or more are 'superhardened' using large squadron or regiment sized underground hangars, tunnelled into hillsides.

During the Cold War period the PLA constructed much of the air base infrastructure along an arc from Mongolia across the northern provinces and down the coastal arc to the Vietnamese border. This was a byproduct of the strategic imperative to defend against the Soviet threat, and pre-Nixon, the perceived US threat in the Far East.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the PLA's imperatives have shifted, resulting in a large scale effort to construct dual use and military airfields across the Tibetan Plateau and the Western provinces, spanning the Chengdu and Lanzhou MRs [Tibet proper falls across the boundaries of these two MRs]. This effort has been paralleled by the construction of airfields in Chengdu MR, north of Burma, and inside Burma under the umbrella of military aid. The specific strategic aims are containment of India in the West, and the 'Second Island Chain' strategy in the Southern and Eastern provinces.

http://www.jamestown.org/publications_d ... id=2371161

In Sichuan, part of the Chengdu MR, a “light mechanized infantry experimental group,â€

[alokgupt]

Real reason for India's Nuclear Test of 1998

http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/nu ... istory.asp

From September 1992 to July 1996, China conducted a series of eight underground nuclear tests as part of its effort to develop smaller nuclear warheads to be carried by its new-generation solid-propellant ballistic missiles such as DF-21 and DF-31. These new warheads are believed to weight about 700kg, enabling multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) warheads to be carried by a single missile. In 1999, China claimed that it had already successfully developed the enhanced radiation nuclear weapon ("neutron bomb").

China may have carried out research on “subcriticalâ€

[sunilUpa]

Alok,

The PLA experimental light mechanized regiment is 155th Light Mechanized regiment. We had extensive discussion on the same in WAB, and Andrew Chan/Stepham Miles wrote great article on the same in China-Defence. The links for both are below.

WAB thread

PLA’s Latest Experiment With Mobility and Fire Power: A Look at the Special (Experimental) Light Mechanized Infantry Regiment, 13th Group Army, Chengdu Military Region


Now imagine the effect of Attack helicopters such as Apache/Night Havoc on the fire base of this airborne unit and club it with airborne capability given by CH-47 to our mountain division.!

[shetty]

Pair of Chinese fighter planes form PLAAF’s high-low mix By David Donald February 21, 2008

[alokgupt]

Another verification of the size of PRC Flanker fleet

http://www.ainonline.com/news/single-ne ... a552794a5e

Given that the number of Sukhois in service with the PLA is about 270, the main work for the Russians will be keeping these jets operational, as well as extending their service life, supplying spare parts and providing upgrades and repairs. To pursue the strategy, Sukhoi plans to open a service and engineering center in China.

[Vriksh]

Pair of Chinese fighter planes form PLAAF’s high-low mix
By David Donald
February 21, 2008

Gotta give it to the chinese... both the J-10 and J-11 rely on the same engine (ws-10A/Al-31) that will significantly reduce their logistical tail.

[alokgupt]

http://www.domain-b.com/defence/air_spa ... llite.html

Talking about force depletion, ACM Major said: ''We want to be a 45 combat-squadron force by the end of the 12th Plan [2017]. We are presently supposed to be thirty-nine-and-a-half squadrons. But we are slightly less now, because of phase-outs.''

[wesley]

Guys,

Here's the one that everybody seems to have been asking for:

CHINESE AIRPOWER IN TIBET: PART-4 (J-10 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS)

. . .

I am gratified to see someone who is finally trying to use engineering analysis (and not pure speculation) to form an opinion regarding the capabilities of the J-10. This airplane is particularly significant to India, not only because it will likely form the backbone of the PLAAF in another decade, but because Pakistan is expected to deploy it as well.

A question though, Vivek: would it be possible to post a summary of the aircraft weights and wing area that you have assumed for your analysis. Part of the difficulty when evaluating an airplane such as the J-10 is that so little has been officially acknowledged by China. You might need to perform a sensitivity study to judge how much that level of uncertainty affects that outcome.

Thanks again for a great post.

[wesley]

Just to elaborate on what I am referring to, with regard to the ongoing debate regarding size and weight estimates for the J-10, I have appended a segment from a debate that was posted on this same topic at another forum:

I am aware of only three published sources that most, if not all of the internet estimates projecting the size and weight of the J-10 can be traced back to:
- Jane's All the World's Aircraft
- An article in Combat Aircraft published in Nov 2006
- An article in Air Forces Monthly published in Feb 2007
http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/attach ... 1203863526

These three sources are widely divergent in their projections, reflecting just how little has been officially acknowledged regarding this airplane. The reasons for these differences, can be traced back to the different assumptions, and information available to each of the three publications.

The J-10 dimensions provided by Jane's were copied directly from the Lavi, a much smaller airplane. For some reason, Jane's has never attempted to update these values.

The weight projections provided by Jane's, however, are a different matter. I have seen no explanation for where these weight estimates came from. In reviewing various articles from Jane's Defence Weekly however, it has become apparent that Jane's has received a number of status updates surrounding the J-10 over the past decade, supplied by Russian contractors who visited the Chengdu facility. It is possible that this was the source of their weight information.

The article that appeared in Combat Aircraft in Nov 2006 (Vol 7, No 9), was a dedicated review of the J-10. The dimensions were derived from photo analyses of images that had been leaked to the West, and the weight estimates were derived from an engineering projection based on the dimensions of the airplane.

An underlying assumption behind these weight estimates, however, was that the J-10 was a product of China's "awakening" to the role of airpower in modern warfare, that occurred as a result of the 1991 Iraq War. In this conflict, it was the tactical air-to-ground capabilities of the US-led alliance, and not their air-to-air capabilities, that had a decisive impact on the outcome of the ground war. This conflict is widely credited with a renewed willingness on the part of the PLA to fund new aircraft and weapons for the PLA. Seen in this light, the J-10's empty weight is projected to be in the neighborhood of 9730 kg.

The Air Forces Monthly article on the other hand (Feb 2007), was not dedicated to reviewing the J-10 at all, but was a survey of fighter procurement trends worldwide. No explanation was given for the size and weight estimates printed in this article, although some quarters who would prefer to see the J-10 as a purely air-to-air weapon have seized upon this publication to justify a much lower empty weight estimate of 8300 kg.

In the end, none of the available sources constitute an acknowledged, official value for the size and weight of this airplane. The truth surrounding the capabilities of the J-10 will likely not be revealed until the type enters the export market, and deliveries commence to buyers such as Pakistan.

[alokgupt]

I am aware of only three published sources that most, if not all of the internet estimates projecting the size and weight of the J-10 can be traced back to:
- Jane's All the World's Aircraft
- An article in Combat Aircraft published in Nov 2006
- An article in Air Forces Monthly published in Feb 2007

In the estimates above two factors - wing loading and thrust to weight - above all others should play major part. All estimates I have seen agree in wing area for J-10 and engine thrust. Therefore empty weight is the only variable.

Given that Russian engine for J-10 weighs 800 kg more than engine used in Lavi and empty weight for Lavi was approx 7000 kg, in the best case J-10 will weigh 8300 kg. Let us confirm if that is the figure that Vivek used.

[vivek_ahuja]

Guys,

Let me share with you what these tables from these sources are coming from:

It is a known fact that the J-10 is heavily derived from the IAI Lavi. So, all these sources are using the baseline Lavi as a performance reference point. Allow me to explain with a simple hypothetical example:

Assume that the Lavi is flying at around 0.818 Mach (270m/sec). We know that the maximum takeoff weight of this aircraft is ~19277Kg. Assume that this is the weight it is taking with it at the above velocity at an altitude where the air density is 1.1815Kg/m3. Also, we know that the wing area for the Lavi is 33 square metres.

So now what you do is calculate what the lift coefficient is at this point with zero angle of attack. This comes out to be ~0.133
Note: these are extreme back hand calculations and thus assume some margin of error here. I am simply elaborating a point.

Now, for this altitude, the Lavi engine, the PW1120, produces 61KN of thrust.

************************

Okay, now let's look at the J-10.
we know that the J-10 engine produces around 76KN thrust. This is 24.5% more than the thrust value of the PW1120. However, the increase in the drag areas is increased by ~40% as a result of the increased engine diameter and overall frontal wing-fuselage attachments being bulkier

Now here is what these sources are doing: they assume that the Lavi and the J-10 have very close Lift and drag-coefficients.

and this means that the J-10 must be going slower. You can calculate this on percentage value as square root of 90%.

This comes down to 95% of the velocity of the Lavi for same conditions and hence around 256m/sec.

Then you calculate the wing area for the J-10 from pictures and use the same lift-coefficient as the Lavi to get the maximum takeoff weight for the J-10.

Now let's take the wing areas as calculated from these sources and let me tell you which values I chose and why:
Janes All the World's Aircraft
Their value is 18500Kg, my value was 17360.4Kg.
In other words, they are saying that the Chinese have kept the wing area same, used a less powerful and larger diameter engine and still perform better in the air on lesser drag coefficients or more lift coefficients.
This is absurd, and I put it down to poor quality reproduction of dimensions from the images.

An article in Combat Aircraft published in Nov 2006
Their value is 24650Kg and my value is 23673.21 Kg.
This is also absurd for the above reasons.

An article in Air Forces Monthly published in Feb 2007
Their value is 18000Kg and my value is 20516.78Kg
Now this is more like it. I am now correctly over-performing. Which means that this value is more realistic.

and there you have it.

-Vivek