India Nuclear News And Discussion

[Sanatanan]

A thesis from TX A&M 2007:

NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ASSESSMENT OF INDIA: A TECHNICAL STUDY FOR U.S.–INDIA COOPERATION

Geek value:

On a non-detailed reading, I came across the following statements in Mr T. W. Venkat Krishna's PhD thesis quoted above, which to me, appear to be inaccurate.

In at least 4 places (pages 40, 51, 54, and 67) it has been indicated that computer simulations with ORIGEN2.2 and HELIOS-1.4 lattice code have been used, using a 37-pincell CANDU fuel bundle, [for the 220 MWe PHWRs such as RAPS1 etc] for assessment of Pu production from beginning till 1998, power production and Uranium consumed, fuel cycle analysis for future projections, and meeting the fuel needs of future fast breeder reactors.

On the contrary, India's 220 MWe reactors are based on Canada's Douglas Point Reactor which had a 19 - pencil fuel rod design. Please see here (html), here (jpg). and here (jpg). Also see Slide 44 of this presentation by NPCIL at IAEA (pdf document).

In Pages 36, while on the topic of "Assessment of Plutonium Production and Use: Beginning till 1974" and again in page 70 while discussing "Future of Weapons Program", Mr Venkat Krishna asserts, "The assumptions and conclusions have been reached on the basis of reactor operator experience and knowledge of design details." {I presume that this is applicable to his entire thesis and refers to his own experience and knowledge. If so, I imagine that he might be (or was) a DAE employee.}

Except for the two 540 Mwe reactors Tarapur 3&4, all the other unsafeguarded reactors are 220 MWe plants, and hence the assumptions cited above seem non-applicable. Modelling using a 37-pincell fuel rod assembly for the proposed Thermal Breeder might be OK since at present it is only at a preliminary conceptual design stage.

At page 35 Mr Venkat Krishna indicates that the quantity of depleted U required for RAPS 1 operation was calculated on the assumption of "92mk excess reactivity". He has indicated what would happen if it were to be lower than 92mk but has not said how his conclusions might change if the actual excess reactivity maintained during plant operations was more than 92 mk.

In "Chapter III Indian Nuclear Facilities", he states at page 36:

Quote :
. . .
Mining is followed by milling for recovering U3O8 from the ore. There is on average a 15% loss in processing activity (ore to U3O8) and 20% losses in conversion from U3O8 to UF6. The UF6 is sent to the NFC for fabricating into uranium oxide pellets for PHWR fuel bundles. UF6 is also used as a feed for the uranium enrichment plant.
Unquote

However, at NFC's web site we see the following:

Quote:
PHWR Fuel

The raw material for the production of PHWR fuel in NFC is Magnesium Di-Uranate (MDU), popularly known as yellow cake. The MDU concentrate is obtained from the uranium mine and mill at Jaduguda, Jharkhand. The impure MDU is subjected to nitric acid dissolution followed by solvent extraction and precipitation with ammonia to get Ammonium Di-Uranate (ADU). Further steps of controlled calcination and reduction form sinterable uranium dioxide (UO2) powder.

The UO2 Powder is converted to high-density cylindrical pellets by various operations like; pre compaction, granulation, binder addition, final compaction and sintering at high temperature (1700 degree centigrade) in hydrogen atmosphere. The sintered pellets are then centreless ground to desired dimensions and dried.
Unquote

In other words, UF6 is not the input material to NFC for the NatU fuel of Indian PHWRs.

Before ending I must confess that I have no idea as to how the above aspects may affect the final conclusions reached by Mr. Venkat Krishna in his Doctoral dissertation. Perhaps members of this Forum having expertise in Reactor Physics aspects of India's PHWRs may comment.

TIA.

[Tilak]

G8 blocks ‘full’ nuclear trade with India
Siddharth Varadarajan

Adopts rules making fuel cycle transfers conditional on NPT

New Delhi: Less than a year after the Nuclear Suppliers Group waived its export rules to allow the sale of nuclear equipment, fuel and technology to India, the United States has persuaded the G8 to ban the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) items to countries which have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including India.

The move, which effectively negates the promise of “full” civil nuclear cooperation lying at the heart of the 2005 India-U.S. nuclear agreement, took the Indian establishment by surprise with officials unaware that the G8 was even adopting such a measure at L’Aquila, Italy. That this was done at a summit in which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was an invited guest is likely to add insult to injury when the full implications of the latest decision fully sink in.

The ban, buried deep within a separate G8 statement on non-proliferation, commits the eight countries to implement on a “national basis” the “useful and constructive proposals” on ways of strengthening controls on ENR items and technology “contained in the NSG’s ‘clean text’ developed at the 20 November 2008 Consultative Group meeting.”

Minimum criteria

Though the “clean text” is not a public document, a senior diplomat from a G8 country confirmed to The Hindu that the eight countries had agreed to certain minimum criteria — including adherence to the main instruments of nonproliferation — as a condition for the sale of equipment and technology destined for safeguarded ENR activities in a recipient country.

In the run-up to the final NSG plenary on India last September, Washington sought to get New Delhi to agree that the nuclear cartel’s rule waiver would not cover ENR transfers. But with the Indian side sticking to its guns, the NSG finally agreed to a clean exemption allowing nuclear exports of all kinds, including sensitive fuel-cycle-related items and technologies, provided they were under safeguards.

Under pressure from the Bush administration, the NSG subsequently debated new ENR rules last November but failed to evolve a consensus because of opposition from countries like Brazil, Canada and Spain to restrictions that would go beyond what the NPT itself provided for.

With consensus proving elusive during the recent June meeting of the 45-nation club, the Obama administration decided to decouple the question of ENR sales to India from the NSG process — something the latest G8 agreement on interim implementation of a national-level ban effectively does.

India’s ability to purchase nuclear fuel and reactors from the G8 or NSG countries will be unaffected by the latest ban. Unless, of course, the new decision becomes the trigger for attempts to further dilute or qualify the core bargain contained in the ‘India exception’ last year.

G8 ban is sign India’s nuclear quest is not over

Siddharth Varadarajan

Reversal raises questions about effectiveness of Indian diplomacy

New Delhi: In diplomacy, as in football, smart players know the consequences of losing sight of the ball. The blink of an eye is all it takes to miss a goal or lose a hard-won advantage.

2008 was a signal year for Indian diplomacy when a set of international restrictions that had starved the country’s nuclear industry of fuel and equipment for two decades was lifted on terms less restrictive than what Washington — which initiated the drive to make an exception for India — had been prepared to grant New Delhi.

In the months that followed the successful campaign to lift trading restrictions on India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, however, a complacent establishment decided to rest on its laurels and forgot about the obstacles and dangers still remaining. And then, seemingly out of the blue, came the first American attempt at clawback: on Thursday, the G8 agreed to adopt new rules prohibiting the sale of ENR components and technology to countries like India which have not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Much to the consternation of U.S. legislators, last year’s NSG exemption placed American nuclear vendors at a disadvantage by making imports from the U.S. far less attractive than comparable purchases from elsewhere, especially Russia and France. The 123 agreement, which governs bilateral commerce between the U.S. and India, allowed for the sale of reactors and fuel to India but these came saddled with a risky ‘right of return’ clause in the event that Washington terminated cooperation. At India’s insistence, enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) items were not excluded but their sale was made conditional on a subsequent agreement that both sides knew would never see the light of day. Reprocessing of spent fuel was allowed but only in a new, permanently safeguarded facility and that too, under yet-to-be-negotiated arrangements and procedures.

By comparison, the NSG’s exemption made no provision for ‘right of return’ and allowed U.S. competitors to make ENR transfers so long as they were satisfied these would not be misused by India. The spent fuel could also be reprocessed in existing Indian facilities provided the reprocessing was done under safeguards. Net-net, this made non-U.S. reactors more attractive.

Somewhere along the line, the Indians assumed the game was over. The whistle blown at L’Aquila is a reminder that the U.S. has plenty of extra time in hand.

Of course, the tell-tale signs were all around: in the U.S. State Department’s answers to pointed queries from Congress about the need for a ‘level playing field’ at the NSG. And in the assurances Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gave to Capitol Hill in order to ensure the speedy ratification of the 123 agreement last October.

Getting the NSG to agree to prohibit the export of ENR equipment and technology to states such as India that are not members of the NPT would be the United States’ “highest priority,” Dr. Rice told Congressman Howard Berman at the time.

The fact that the NSG held intensive consultations on the issue last November was also well known, as was the fact that the U.S. was managing to create a consensus around NPT conditionality, even as other issues like adherence to the Additional Protocol was opposed by some NSG members like Brazil and uranium-rich countries like Canada objected to ENR sales being restricted to so-called black-box technologies which could prevent them from developing their own enrichment know-how.

Full cooperation

Although India is technologically self-sufficient in reprocessing and enrichment technology, the inclusion of ENR components in the nuclear deal was a matter of principle, positioning and ‘paisa’. That is why Indian negotiators insisted in July 2005 that they would settle for nothing less than “full civil nuclear cooperation.”

After all, if an exception was being made for India because of its status as a responsible country with advanced nuclear technology, excluding sensitive technologies made no sense. India was also aware of the role ENR services would play in the future evolution of the global nuclear industry. With attempts under way to monopolise the fuel cycle, India needed to ensure its status as a ‘supplier’ country was recognised. Finally, costs were also an issue. Why spend crores producing components for ENR plants when the parts could be imported for a fraction of the cost? When push came to shove, the U.S. reneged on “full cooperation” but allowed India to get what it wanted at the NSG. Now, that is in jeopardy too.

As part of the NSG exemption, New Delhi pledged voluntary adherence to the cartel’s present and future rules. But the NSG also said it would “consult” with India prior to new rules being adopted. If these consultations have been held, New Delhi has clearly not been effective in putting its views across. The fact that the cartel is still some distance away from reaching a final decision provides cold comfort: the G8’s endorsement of last November’s “clean text” will certainly have the effect of speeding up the deliberative process at Vienna.

India had a chance to press its case with friends and allies and also to leverage the massive expenditure it is prepared to make on Russian, French and American nuclear reactors in order to ensure it does not become the target of fresh restrictions. By failing to be proactive, however, it has allowed the U.S. to gain the first mover advantage.

If a formal consensus does not emerge in the Nuclear Suppliers Group by the time the next plenary is held, India may have a small window to undo the symbolic and substantive damage that has occurred at L’Aquila. But it needs to lobby hard to ensure the interim ban adopted on ENR sales is not carried over to next year’s G8 statement.

Otherwise it should prepare for several rounds of bruising negotiations ahead. The second U.S. target will be spent fuel reprocessing. Existing agreements with Russia and France do not stipulate a new standalone facility or more intensive safeguards. And as the Obama administration presses ahead with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, attempts could be made to get the NSG to adopt a version of the U.S. ‘right of return’ for exported items in the event that India is seen as deviating from the disarmament and non-proliferation commitments it made last September.

[Tilak]

India, US work out liability insurance issues for N-plants
Press Trust of India / Rome July 8, 2009, 13:09 IST

US nuclear companies will start cooperating with India under the bilateral Indo-US atomic deal once the issues relating to liability insurance as raised by some American companies are sorted out by the two sides.

However, this has not deterred cooperation in civil nuclear area between India and countries like France and Russia.

Official sources said American companies were insisting on liability insurance for their involvement in India and that is being sorted out.

Once that is done, US companies will be setting up reactors in India, they added.

The sources pointed out that cooperation was on between India and other countries with nuclear capability and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) have been signed with Russia and France.

New Delhi is also attaching a great deal of importance to the visit of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton later this month, officials said.

They added relations with the US were progressing very satisfactorily, pointing out that Clinton has made some positive statements on India.

Describing her visit as a building block in the bilateral relations, the officials said the relations were being taken forward and there were no major hiccups in ties.

Clinton would be meeting Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mujherjee during the visit.

"It is a very important and very crucial visit in terms of bilateral relations," they added.

"No extra legal rights" for MNCs over Indian people: Madras HC
Friday, July 10, 2009

Chennai (PTI): The Madras High Court has held that a multinational firm cannot claim any "extra legal rights over Indian people" and they are allowed to carry on their business subject to Indian laws.

The Court's observation came while rejecting a plea by US-based Dow Chemical Industries Private Ltd, formerly Union Carbide, to restrain organisations campaigning for justice for the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy victims from "obstructing the company from functioning smoothly".

Dismissing the company's application seeking various kinds of relief as "misconceived and devoid of merit", Justice K Chandru on Thursday said, "MNCs cannot claim any extra legal rights over the Indian people."

Over 2,000 people died and about two lakh people were affected after toxic gas from Union Carbide's plant in Bhopal leaked in December 1984.

The rights enshrined in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution are for only the citizens of the country and not others, the Court held. The Article relates to practising any profession or to carrying on any occupation, trade or business.

Stating that the court would have to see whether the company had a prima facie case, Justice K Chandru noted that barring a protest on February 10, the company was unable to cite any other incident.

Justice Chandru pointed out that except for the International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal (ICJIB) based here, the other six organisations listed in the petition as respondents did not have any office in Tamil Nadu.

Besides, they have also not been sued in a representative capacity, the Judge observed.

Union Carbide became a wholly owned subsidiary of The Dow Chemical Company (TDCC) in February 2001.

[Tilak]

G8 calls upon all countries to sign NPT
Diwakar, TNN 10 July 2009, 09:00am IST

L'AQUILA (Italy): The G8 countries on Thursday called upon all countries to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) while deciding to step up efforts for swift implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), in a message that seems aimed at India -- the only `outlier' country at the summit.

Insisting that countries that have not signed NPT should do so immediately, the G8 emphasised the importance of the treaty to pursue non-proliferation and disarmament. India has refused to sign NPT describing it as a discriminatory regime.

"We underscore that NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and reiterate our full commitment to the objectives and obligations of its three pillars: non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament. We will work together so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty's regime and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty's three pillars," the L'Aquila Statement on Non-Proliferation said.

Though only the latest of the reminders to India and other holdouts, the insistence is a clear indication that divergence over NPT remains a potential point of tension between India and the developed world. As NPT members move towards the RevCom of the NPT in 2010, there will be increased calls to India to sign up.

The G8 stand on non-proliferation highlighted the increasing possibility of India coming under renewed pressure also on the issue of CTBT, with member countries resolving to speed up their efforts to ensure ban on nuclear testing.

After remaining in cold storage for almost a decade, because the Bush administration did not consider it to be priority, the non-proliferation crowd received a shot in the arm with Barack Obama, who has promised to get the US Senate to ratify CTBT. He is still short of the required two-thirds majority, but experts believe that could be made to happen, overcoming doubts that US's nuclear warheads need to be updated.

"We welcome the announcement made by the President of the USA that has decided to seek ratification of Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and we will intensify our efforts towards the early entry into force and universalisation of the CTBT as one of the principal instruments of the international security architecture and a key measure of non-proliferation and disarmament," the G8 countries stated.

CTBT became major point of discord between India on the one hand and the US and other developed countries as well as NPT signatories on the other after India refused to sign the treaty calling it discriminatory and designed to serve the interests of the nuclear haves. The issue abated under the Bush administration, but has staged a comeback under Obama who has decided to make nuclear disarmament one of the defining marks of his presidency.

[NRao]

This is going to be fun:

March 9, 2009 :: Page 2 :: Cameco sees Canadian uranium going to India before US material

Canada might be able to sell uranium in India before the US does, even though Ottawa does not yet have a nuclear cooperation agreement in place with New Delhi, a top Cameco official said this month. The US-India accord came into force last December. But India is insisting on concluding an agreement on reprocessing before it seals any deals with US companies, said an internal trip report from a delegation of US nuclear companies that traveled to India January 11-16 (NF, 23 Feb., 1). That precondition applies to sales of uranium as well as reactors, according to the report and to Scott Melbye, president of Cameco, Inc., the US-based marketing subsidiary of Cameco.

Melbye was a member of the US delegation and also part of a Canadian delegation that was in India the following week. Cameco has mining operations in both the US and Canada.

At one time, the Canadian government had reservations about exporting uranium and other nuclear goods to India, in part because of the countries’ nuclear history (NF, 27 Feb. ‘06, 6). India used plutonium from the Canadian-supplied Cirus reactor for its 1974 nuclear test.

But Canada did not block the consensus decision last year by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to lift international restrictions on trade with India, and, later in the year, began discussing nuclear cooperation (NF, 6 Oct. ‘08, 14). The India-Canada pact is still being negotiated, but Canadian suppliers “could see more fruit from [India] earlier than the US” because the Indian insistence on the reprocessing agreement appears to be a “sticking point,” Melbye said in a March 2 interview.

More broadly, Melbye expressed optimism about the prospects for uranium sales in India. The Indians have an immediate need for material and also want to have supplies “locked down in the longer term,” he said. As a result, the Indians may be less price sensitive than some other customers, Melbye said. But he emphasized that, like any other buyer, they will still be “holding any deals up to the light.” Assurance of long-term fuel supplies has been a longstanding Indian concern. According to the trip report — by the US-India Business Council, the lead organizer of the January 11-16 visit — Anil Kakodkar, the head of India’s Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Atomic Energy, said India would “require all vendors to supply a lifetime stockpile of fuel to ‘prevent disruption’ in addition to alternative supplier relationships with ‘friendly countries.’” He was referring to a section of the US-Indian cooperation agreement that commits the US to supporting “an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors.” The provision adds that, if there is a disruption, “the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.” That language — which first appeared in a document submitted to the Indian Parliament in 2006 — has been controversial with nonproliferation advocates in the US Congress and elsewhere. They say that accumulating a longterm supply of fuel would soften the impact of a supply cutoff if the US took that step in response to an Indian nuclear test. {Hmmmmmmmmmmm......}

The 2006 Hyde Act — US legislation that opened the door to US-Indian cooperation agreement by granting New Delhi a needed exception from US nuclear-export law but which also included certain nonproliferation conditions — takes up the issue in its “statements of policy” section. “Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements,” the act says. That language was introduced by Barack Obama, then a Democratic senator from Illinois.—Daniel Horner, Washington

Well. The can was kicked then. India better pick up that can before the current US does.

[svinayak]

Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World
The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124726489588925407.html

By MELANIE KIRKPATRICK

Maclean, Va.

'Nuclear weapons are used every day." So says former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, speaking last month at his office in a wooded enclave of Maclean, Va. It's a serene setting for Doomsday talk, and Mr. Schlesinger's matter-of-fact tone belies the enormity of the concepts he's explaining -- concepts that were seemingly ignored in this week's Moscow summit between Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev.
[The Weekend Interview] Terry Shoffner

We use nuclear weapons every day, Mr. Schlesinger goes on to explain, "to deter our potential foes and provide reassurance to the allies to whom we offer protection."

Mr. Obama likes to talk about his vision of a nuclear-free world, and in Moscow he and Mr. Medvedev signed an agreement setting targets for sweeping reductions in the world's largest nuclear arsenals. Reflecting on the hour I spent with Mr. Schlesinger, I can't help but think: Do we really want to do this?

For nuclear strategists, Mr. Schlesinger is Yoda, the master of their universe. In addition to being a former defense secretary (Nixon and Ford), he is a former energy secretary (Carter) and former director of central intelligence (Nixon). He has been studying the U.S. nuclear posture since the early 1960s, when he was at the RAND Corporation, a California think tank that often does research for the U.S. government. He's the expert whom Defense Secretary Robert Gates called on last year to lead an investigation into the Air Force's mishandling of nuclear weapons after nuclear-armed cruise missiles were mistakenly flown across the country on a B-52 and nuclear fuses were accidently shipped to Taiwan. Most recently, he's vice chairman of a bipartisan congressional commission that in May issued an urgent warning about the need to maintain a strong U.S. deterrent.

The U.S. is the only major nuclear power that is not modernizing its weapons. "The Russians have a shelf life for their weapons of about 10 years so they are continually replacing" them. The British and the French "stay up to date." And the Chinese and the Indians "continue to add to their stockpiles." But in the U.S., Congress won't even so much as fund R&D for the Reliable Replacement Warhead. "The RRW has become a toxic term on Capitol Hill," Mr. Schlesinger says. Give it a new name, he seems to be suggesting, and try again to get Congress to fund it. "We need to be much more vigorous about life-extension programs" for the weapons.

Finally, we chat about Mr. Schlesinger's nearly half-century as a nuclear strategist. Are we living in a world where the use of nuclear weapons is more likely than it was back then? "The likelihood of a nuclear exchange has substantially gone away," he says. That's the good news. "However, the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States" is greater.

During his RAND years, in the 1960s, Mr. Schlesinger recalls that "we were working on mitigating the possible effects [of a nuclear attack] through civil defense, which, may I say parenthetically, we should be working on now with respect, certainly, to the possibility of a terrorist weapon used against the United States. . . . We should have a much more rapid response capability. . . . We're not as well organized as we should be to respond."

Mr. Schlesinger sees another difference between now and when he started in this business: "Public interest in our strategic posture has faded over the decades," he says. "In the Cold War, it was a most prominent subject. Now, much of the public is barely interested in it. And that has been true of the Congress as well," creating what he delicately refers to as "something of a stalemate in expenditures."

He's raising the alarm. Congress, the administration and Americans ignore it at their peril.

Ms. Kirkpatrick is a deputy editor of the Journal's editorial page.

[SSridhar]

G8 ban on ENR shuts Russian door on India
Excerpts

Diplomatic sources told The Hindu that Moscow had approached the Indian side several months ago for the negotiation of an agreement going beyond the one already signed for the purchase of additional reactors at Kudankulam. Such an agreement could have provided for cooperation across the full range of civil nuclear activities and technologies, including enrichment and reprocessing (ENR), and allowed Russia to buck new rules restricting international trade in these technologies by saying such cooperation with India had already been “grandfathered.”

[SSridhar]

G8 ban, a matter of concern, Kakodkar
Excerpts

It would be a matter of concern if the G8 nations insisted on curbing transfer of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technology and equipment to all the non-signatories of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), including India, Atomic Energy Commission Anil Kakodkar said here {Manuguru} on Saturday.

Dr. Kakodkar was talking to journalists after inaugurating the elemental Boron Production facility at the Manuguru Heavy Water Plant of the Department of Atomic Energy.

S. Benerjee, Director, BARC, inaugurated the boric acid enrichment plant set up at the Heavy Water Plant. In the final stage, the elemental boron was converted into boron carbide, required by the control mechanism of the prestigious Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor being set up at Kalpakkam for generating electric power.

[SSridhar]

Indian reaction
Excerpts

. . .the Ministry of External Affairs chose not to respond to a formal query . . . Instead, sources said it was important for India to see the text of what the G8 had endorsed before reaching any conclusion . . . “But as far as India is concerned, last year’s NSG waiver was a unanimous decision to which the G8 countries were party and that is the agreement we intend to go by.”

Some officials claimed the issue was not critical since India did not need ENR technologies from abroad, though they acknowledged the danger of diluting the principle of Indian eligibility for full civil nuclear commerce.

The G8 decision does not affect the sale of nuclear reactors and fuel, or the right of India to reprocess spent fuel on the basis of bilateral agreements with individual suppliers. Unless overturned, it will, however, affect the cost-effectiveness of India’s reprocessing and enrichment operations, since all components will have to be indigenously manufactured.

[p_saggu]

I can see India being pushed into a corner again by the current US administration on the NPT and reprocessing tech.
We all know what India does when pushed to a corner. India's nuclear genie is still not completely in the bottle from the US's POV for them to push the cork tight shut. Impatience to do so will be favorable to India's interests in the long run, for example, will force India's hand and will leave no option to India than to 'complete' its nuclear weapons development program, and provide it with the closure that the Indian strategic community has waited for, for so long. Soon India's missile development will achieve the desired goals with the Agni-5 and the Agni 3-SL systems, which will leave the thermonuclear weapons as the sore sticking point, something that India will seek to rectify soon.

I would recommend a round of tests, just after MRCA is announced to be awarded to the F-18 and before the contract with Boeing is signed, which is two years away. This window period has to be used to get all the uranium in, keep the contracts dangling as far and wide as can be, to keep the impact of any tests to within a 6 month period.

What say all?

[shiv]

What say all?

The US has not managed to shut the cork on even NoKo's nuclear ambitions - so I doubt if the US can do that to anyone else - leave alone India.

[negi]

^ Shiv saar NoKo is being ruled by a regime of the nature which ruled USSR until 80's ..yes from a Jingo's perspective I am very happy for all the takleef NoKo is causing for unkil but we all know sooner or later NoKo will smell the coffee ,in India's case we should keep in mind that primary aim of this deal is to secure our future in terms of meeting 'energy demand' BUM-SHUM can be managed as we continue to build on our stockpile of PU from existing reactors.It is the latest generation of LWR's which we will be importing and the ENR rights critical to indigenous 3 stage breeder programme which I am concerned about.

At a cursory glance this new development at G-8 summit (given my limited/zelo understanding of this domain) regarding refusal/cap on right to re-process will have a direct bearing on our power generation capabilities .

Perhaps the NPA's and the G-8 are planning to sell the idea that for all the civillian reactors the fuel will be supplied by the NSG and the spent fuel generated will have to be sent back to the NSG cartel for re-processing all in all trying to bring as many Indian facilities under the safeguard as possible (target being the breeder reactors) and this would keep India's intentions of testing too under a check .

[NRao]

India again is in a corner. This situation was very predictable and clearly India (MMS) did not close the loop holes that they should have.

Give it to Obama. He deserves it for foresight and action.

Perhaps the "clean waiver" from NSG could pull this out of the fire, but boy it is going to be tough this time around.

Even the fuel that has been promised is of no use - the stuff will pile up in India or India will have to spend a ton (Indian techs are very, very expensive) under IAEA supervision. Which I think (no expert) is the best route - MMS will have to provide a ton of funds to DAE, etc.

On NoKo, they are not part of the world economy, so they can make more noise and not really be impacted by their monkeying. India cannot afford to gyrate as much - in fact, I would think India has very little space to work with. I do not think Obama will go too far on constricting India - he will use all powers to constrict India on the nuclear front, but he won't try to block trade/H1/or the like. But the cost for producing clean energy will sky rocket in India - and, India will not be allowed to burn coal either.

[negi]

G8 curbs a matter of concern, says Dr. Kakodkar

Perhaps we should wait for Dr. Kakodhar's comments on this.

[NRao]

MMS has always over ridden Kakodkar. This is as massive a failure on MMS's part as it was a success a few months ago.

[Muppalla]

I can see India being pushed into a corner again by the current US administration on the NPT and reprocessing tech.
We all know what India does when pushed to a corner. India's nuclear genie is still not completely in the bottle from the US's POV for them to push the cork tight shut. Impatience to do so will be favorable to India's interests in the long run, for example, will force India's hand and will leave no option to India than to 'complete' its nuclear weapons development program, and provide it with the closure that the Indian strategic community has waited for, for so long. Soon India's missile development will achieve the desired goals with the Agni-5 and the Agni 3-SL systems, which will leave the thermonuclear weapons as the sore sticking point, something that India will seek to rectify soon.

I would recommend a round of tests, just after MRCA is announced to be awarded to the F-18 and before the contract with Boeing is signed, which is two years away. This window period has to be used to get all the uranium in, keep the contracts dangling as far and wide as can be, to keep the impact of any tests to within a 6 month period.

What say all?

The loops inside loops are again turning interesting. This thread is going to become very interesting again. Now the moles are more powerful this time around. US may have the lastword on this.

[NRao]

India to ‘study’ G8 ban on nuclear fuel cycle sales

Whatever New Delhi may choose to believe, the door for ENR sales from the G8 has been shut for now. G8 diplomatic sources told The Hindu that the adoption of the decision meant countries such as Russia and France would no longer be able to sell ENR items to India and that there was now a greater likelihood of the NSG forging a consensus along the lines of what has been agreed at L’Aquila.

I thought NSG gave India a "clean waiver". This would make them go back on it.

However, no matter which country, they ALL want to make MORE money. Simple as that.

Russia and France had sided with the Bush admin even then.

So, the options are sign and get ENR or let the crap pile up in India or pay a huge price by using Indian technologies.

[shiv]

we all know sooner or later NoKo will smell the coffee

I might be wrong - but somehow world events appear to me like unkil is smelling coffee more than anyone else on earth.

In terms of nuke issues unkil is a bumbling jerk whose left hand does not know what his right hand is doing.

[Anujan]

However, no matter which country, they ALL want to make MORE money. Simple as that.

Cheeni hand in this cannot be discounted. They hold some very powerful cards right now - might be a quid-pro-quo for bailing Unkil out.

[SSridhar]

NRao, the trick that was sprung upon India was to re-write the rules after the agreement last year. The US always used to practise this technique by citing changing US Laws in international agreements. Now, G8 is adopting the same US approach where India is being asked to obey the new set of rules. These kinds of tactics will continue and become more pronounced if we accede once. IMHO, we should not worry about costs but go ahead with our own technologies for ENR. New challenges will make our engineers and scientists to find cost-effective solutions hopefully, as they have happened in the past. Besides, when we defy, we have always found these western countries loosen their grip as well.

[csharma]

One logic that was forwarded by the proponents of the deal after Hyde act was that US has its own laws and Russia and France would act independently. Now with this G-8 agreement it is clear that France and Russia would go with US.

It would be good to hear what GoI and proponents of the deal have to say now.

[vasu_ray]

The one or two reactors being purchased from US should encompass all issues including reprocessing and see if the spirit of the original agreement is met. specification to reference implementation (paperwork only not actual construction), validate it as a template for other vendors

As a general rule any technology denied on the open market and hence forced to develop it ourselves mustn't come under the purview of IAEA

if we delay in the development of our own ENR, wouldn't the ROI for the foreign vendors involved in selling the reactor get affected, is there an economic case?

[Sanatanan]

. . . .
Indian techs are very, very expensive . . .
. . . .

NRao, . . . . IMHO, we should not worry about costs but go ahead with our own technologies for ENR.
. . .

Comparative cost data for Indian Vs Imported ENR projects and equipment might be difficult to come by since these technologies are strategic and hence held confidential.

However, in the case of nuclear power plants, I believe that India-designed reactors, built in India, are cheaper than imported plants constructed in India. According to slide 6 in Dr Kakodkar's July 2008 lecture in IASC, Bangalore ("Evolving Indian Nuclear Programme: Rationale and Perspectives") the Capital Cost for a 700 MWe Indian PHWR is about 1700 $/kWe, whereas the global range is 2000 - 2500 $/kWe.

When a good portion of the materials, components and equipment of ENR plants are made in India (as should be the case), I feel, Indian costs and performance will be quite competitive with foreign plants.

[harbans]

Some officials claimed the issue was not critical since India did not need ENR technologies from abroad, though they acknowledged the danger of diluting the principle of Indian eligibility for full civil nuclear commerce.

Hussain has chalked things for Pakistan, via India. Wheher it's taking of the pressure in Afghanistan, by appeasing Paki's by demanding concessions from India or by trying to bring in line Pakistans rogue nuclear programme by bringing in NPT. These half bright NPAs have no idea that rogue nations will make Nukes whether or not through the NPT.

However the above quote is where we have to indulge nations continuosly over chai bikut. While the plants and fuel comes and our local industry is enabled to procure all releveen componens indigenously. G8 should be bluntl told, India IS a High Technology nation already and small curbs on radiation proof gloves or components do not signify radical technology transfer.

We should be blunt with Hussain And Hillary. Make some external state affairs Minister say: Relationships with the present Democratic Party establishment in US may be in danger if they insist on what India has ALWAS rightly believed to be discriminatory. These are trying times, and if INdian diplomacy manages to succeed finally, it will be a reall big success. And we might look at out babus more respectably in the future..

[NRao]

the trick that was sprung upon India was to re-write the rules after the agreement last year.

Dr. Rice openly stated in US Congressional hearings that is what the US would do. Ensure that ENR does not reach India via NSG.

The confusion - I think - is within India, when India dis get a "clean waiver" from the NSG - which India seems to have interpreted one way and the rest of the nations another. But, this should have been expected. Russia and France have always said they would "follow the rules". India just goofed it.

However,

we should not worry about costs but go ahead with our own technologies for ENR

True. (but, India has no other option/s. Or do they?)

Sanatanan,

Thx.

Do you think "Capital Cost" included ENR? (I do not know.)

I truly hope you are 120% right.

However, that does have implications. India is not (yet) in the same league when it comes to designing really large reactors. France is offering a 1600, while India is in the 500 range (am I right?). So, it means that for every one of a French offer India will have to build 3-4 of Indian design (at least for the near term - till 2020).

harbans,

I do not think (after some more thought) this is a technical issue, it is a political issue and perhaps a financial one in the near term. My annoyance is with lack of Indian action. Everyone seems to be doing their expected parts - Pakistan and China are irritants, the US/UK/France/Russia are taking care of their own interests, even Canada and Brazil have a few things their way. India is the only one that waits, waits, waits until the BP is too high then REacts (NOT acts). The associated costs for this behaviour is bound to be very high.

India has always said, no ENR no importing of reactors. Obama has just challenged Indian planners (not technicians).

India IMHO can wriggle out of this mess. But, when it could have been avoided why did New Delhi keep quite for so long?

Kakodkar - the poor guy - will have to sit and revise his ppt - again.

[Gerard]

Move on nuclear trade surprises India

India surprised at G-8 vow to curb nuke enrichment tech

[Gerard]

India must respond effectively: Swamy

“I therefore demand that the Prime Minister put the completion of the thorium third phase development as part of the Infrastructure Plan and allocate Rs. 2,000 crore for it. India must become self-sufficient in nuclear fissile materials by 2012,” he said.

[Gerard]

Pact with France soon on 2 nuclear plants

Unlike the U.S. which wanted a standalone facility, France had indicated that reprocessing could take place in India and if that was not adequate, it could be done on its soil.

[NRao]

A little confusing:

India, France at advance stage of negotiations for Maha JV

(Nice title!!!)

On reprocessing, France has made it clear that the nuclear fuel could be reprocessed by Indian facilities but if India facilities don't have the expertise, then Paris could consider reprocessing in France.

So, per this report, France will not sell ENR to India. If India wants to use her own ENR, that is fine with France. Else France is willing to ship the waste matter back to France (at a cost to India I would think) and reprocess the waste in France.

Not much of a deal.

[Gerard]

The French reprocess spent fuel for the Japanese plant operators at la Hague. Areva built the Rokkasho facility, where the Japanese will do the job themselves.

BTW, Japan's signature on the NPT was conditional on US non-interference with Japanese acquisition of independent reprocessing and enrichment facilities

[NRao]

Out of curiosity, what happens to the content after reprocessing, in the case of Japan?

[NRao]

One more thing. There is a BIG diff between Indian need fro ENR and that of other nations - especially Japan. It is my understanding that the Japanese need for reproc and actually their attempt with FBR is to reprocess to terminate the fuel cycle. While Indian need is a step to the third stage.

Correct?

[Sanatanan]

NRao,

Here are my thoughts on the points you have indicated:

Do you think "Capital Cost" included ENR?

I am aware that nuclear power plant (npp) cost evaluation - indeed, cost evaluation of any large project, particularly if it is in the Public Sector - is a touchy subject and could have a tendecy to trigger severe debates. So without any intention to initiate or participate in such a debate, here, I only indicate what appears to me to be a logical method.

India's PHWRs use NatU and hence they do not need enrichment. Thus the "E" part of ENR would not be applicable to the capital cost of a PHWR. On the other hand, the imported LWRs do need enriched U. I believe that the cost of enrichment is built into the LWR's fuel cost. So for a LWR, in the capital cost, the "E" contribution would be limited to the first fuel charge, if at all. The cost of subsequent fuel loadings would get reflected in the running cost.

Again, I believe that in the capital cost of a PHWR, the cost of Reprocessing (the "R" portion of ENR) would not get included. The return on reprocessing plant and its operating costs would affect the fuel cost of the down stream FBR. In fact one could perhaps argue that the money generated through the of sale of Pu and other fissile species, to the downstream FBR, should be appropriately reimbursed (after taking into account the cost of reprocessing effort), to the npp that generated the "wealth" in the spent fuel.

Cost of construction of on-site spent fuel storage (a rather large pool and its appurtenances) would be reflected in the capital cost of the PHWR and cost for operating it would be included in the plant's running cost.

If and when US takes up reprocessing spent fuel, similar situation might arise, that is, cost of reprocessing would be reflected in the cost of fuel for the downstream reactor plant.

I guess that the cost of waste disposal (after reprocessing) would have to be appropriately apportioned amongst all producers of the waste whether they are indigenous PHWRs and FBRs or imported LWRs.

In essence, I believe that cost of ENR does not form a part of the capital cost of either indigenous or imported npps.

India is not (yet) in the same league when it comes to designing really large reactors.

Big is not always beautiful or desirable. The size of the electric grid capacity in the country would have a significant bearing on the size of a nuclear reactor unit. Not too long ago, even 220 MWe unit size was too big for the grids in India. Again, in the near past, the 540 MWe PHWRs at Tarapur were claimed to be the largest electricity generating single units (in comparison with thermal power plants) in India. You could have a "park" (that is, multiple units) of smaller capacity npps (such as at Rajasthan now) contributing to a large generating capacity, say in excess of 1000 MWe, with the idea that in the event of a grid instability (fault originating in the grid) not all reactors trip out and some would survive the disturbance. On the other hand, unless the grid itself is quite big - I imagine, this is not be the case in India as yet - sudden tripping of a big generating plant (due to an operational condition originating in the npp) may turn out to be difficult to handle and can cause grid collapse which in turn might take several days to recover. Single unit Vs multiple units (affording redundancy) is an interesting topic for discussion, but the bottom line would be that the cost of electricity generated, and other operational parameters such as capacity factor and availability factor etc, are acceptable.

One could also argue that in the event of an accident (such as the postulated core melt-down event), a smaller reactor would have less radioactive material in the core compared to a larger unit.

India's first 1000 MWe npps are coming up at Kudankulam and one would have to get a feel for their operational experience when they begin operating and get connected to the grid. In my view, until then, with the present state of industrial technology in India, indigenous PHWRs of 540 MWe / 700 MWe are the way to go.

Even Canada, a large developed country, is only now thinking of reactors of 1000 MWe capacity.

If the present poor EPR construction experience in France and Finland is any thing to go by, the French project in India will any way not be completed before 2020! I remember to have read that UK has backed out of Areva's EPR proposal.

[Gerard]

what happens to the content after reprocessing, in the case of Japan?

Turned into MOX fuel and shipped back to Japan.

Most of the Pu is actually still in storage in the UK and France. The Japanese have 38 tons of reactor grade Pu in Europe and about 12 tons in Japan itself. They've started to fuel LWRs with MOX so the external stockpile will slowly come down as it is converted to MOX fuel.

[Gerard]

It is my understanding that the Japanese need for reproc and actually their attempt with FBR is to reprocess to terminate the fuel cycle. While Indian need is a step to the third stage.

Yes but the Japanese are also motivated by strategic considerations. Their FBR provide potent breakout capability. The Japanese could 'launder' their huge reactor grade stocks into a superpower sized arsenal that would easily dwarf China's. The Japanese ICF research provides 'virtual' thermonuclear design capability.

Despite having an all cryogenic heavy launch vehicle, they maintain solid rocket capability. Just look at the specs of their M5 vehicle

The M5 is a 3 stage rocket, solid-fueled, 31 m (101.7 ft) tall, 2.5 m (8.2 ft) diameter. It is designed to lift 2000 kg (4410 lb) to LEO or 800 kg (1764 lb) to GTO.

From the WSJ Schlesinger article:

He reminds me of the comment of Japanese political leader Ichiro Ozawa, who said in 2002 that it would be "easy" for Japan to make nuclear warheads and that it had enough plutonium to make several thousand weapons. "When one contemplates a number like that," Mr. Schlesinger says, "one sees that a substantial role in nonproliferation has been the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Without that, some and perhaps a fair number of our allies would feel the necessity of having their own nuclear capabilities."

[NRao]

Sanatanan/Gerard,

Thx.

On Japan. Biggest hypocrites. With ALL that Pu around and the ability to weaponize in a jiffy Japan should have no say in Indian CTBT/NPT stand!!!!

Considering the position that China and Pakistan have taken. The position the US, UK, France and Russia are in. Why would India even consider signing anything - even in her dream?

Bet Japan will produce a weapon by 2020.

[Gerard]

France is offering a 1600, while India is in the 500 range (am I right?)

April 2007 report

Eight 700 mw PHWRs to be set up

The Department of Atomic Energy will be setting up eight 700 mw Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors in the 11th Plan for which the site has been identified. All the eight reactors will be launched in the next five years.
Four of the eight reactors have got clearance from the environment and forest ministry and is awaiting the Centre's nod to start groundwork. The construction design is ready.
DAE will be setting up three more Fast Breeder Reactors and one Advanced Heavy Water Reactor. It will set up two of the three FBRs alongside the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam and finalise the location for the third FBR very soon. DAE has completed design structure for AHWR and is in the process of drawing engineering design. To meet additional requirements for DAE, it has planned to set up 10 more 1,000 mw PHWRs

[NRao]

India to take up nuclear issue during Clinton visit

India is concerned over the G8 declaration "to curb transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology", which can undermine the "clean" waiver it has obtained from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and plans to take this up during US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit here later this month.

The G8 position on ENR technolgy has taken the Indian government by surpirse as such a ban negates the spirit of the NSG waiver.

The waiver was seen as a triumph of Indian diplomacy with Indian officials emphasising that New Delhi managed to get a "clean and full" waiver from the NSG amid formidable opposition from some of its members.

However, reliable sources close to the government told IANS that New Delhi is not unduly worried as it will go by the NSG waiver, which they insisted was "clean", and the teral India-US 123 agreement that governs nuclear trade between the two countries.

The 123 agreement envisages India setting up a dedicated reprocessing facility under international safeguards for which the US was ready to supply the necessary ENR technology.

India's access to ENR transfer was a major sticking point between India and the US, but a breakthoguh was achieved in the last stages of negotations with Washington agreeing to New Delhi's demand for full civil nuclear cooperation, though on condition that a separate agreement will be required to facilitate the transfer of ENR.

"We will go by the NSG waiver and the 123 agreement. Anyhthing else is extraneous," the sources said.

With India insisting on "clean and unconditional waiver", including its right of access to ENR technolgies, the NSG, while granting the waiver, had stated that "participating governments may transfer nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software and related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in IAEA safeguarded civil nuclear facilities".

[NRao]

PM leaves for 5-day visit to France & Egypt

"India and France enjoy a close and wide ranging strategic partnership. Our relations with France encompass a large number of areas and have served our national interests well," Singh said in a departure statement.

"We would like to build upon our partnership in the areas of trade and investment, high technology, space, nuclear energy, defense, education, culture, tourism and scientific research and development," Singh said.

[NRao]

India not concerned over G8 nuclear stance

NEW DELHI: Pointing to the "clean waiver" obtained from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), India Monday declared that it was "not concerned over what position the G8 takes" on not transferring nuclear technology unless India signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).


"We have a clean waiver from the NSG. We have an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). We are not concerned over what position the G8 takes (on nuclear commerce with India)," Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee declared during zero hour in the Rajya Sabha.

"Every individual country (that is a member of the NSG) can trade with us. Is G8 the right forum for discussing the terms of nuclear trade with India? It is not the relevant and appropriate authority.

"Therefore, we are not deeply concerned," Mukherjee maintained, in the first public remarks by the Indian government on the G8 declaration Friday at the conclusion of its L'Aquila summit "to curb transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology" to countries that have not signed the NPT.

"To reduce the proliferation risks associated with the spread of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, equipment and technology, we welcome the progress that continues to be made by the NSG on mechanisms to strengthen controls on transfers of such enrichment and reprocessing items and technology," the declaration said.

The declaration, however, commits these countries to implement on a "national basis" the "useful and constructive proposals" on ways of strengthening controls on ENR items and technology "contained in the NSG's 'clean text' developed at the 20 November 2008 Consultative Group meeting".

The declaration at the end of the G8 summit, which was also attended by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, called upon all countries to sign the NPT while deciding to step up efforts for a swift conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The message, according to observers, was aimed at India - the only NPT holdout at the summit.

The NSG, the global grouping that controls international nuclear trade, made an exception for India Sep 6, 2008 by rewriting its rules to allow the nuclear suppliers to resume civil nuclear business with New Delhi after a gap of 34 years.

With India insisting on "clean and unconditional waiver", including its right of access to the ENR technolgy, the NSG, while granting the waiver, had stated that "participating governments may transfer nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software and related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in IAEA safeguarded civil nuclear facilities".

Raising the G8 resolution during zero hour, Najma Heptullah (of the Bharatiya Janata Party) asked whether India had been consulted before it was passed.

"If not, then India's sensitivities are being ignored. India is being subjected to additional conditionalities that are not acceptable. The prime minister had said in this house that we would get a full waiver. Full means full.

"The matter is very serious and that is why we are raising it in the house. The government should clarify," Heptullah added.

Deputy Chairman K. Rahman Khan did not agree with her.

"It is for the government to say. I can't ask the government to react to what you have raised. It is for the government to react," Khan said while the BJP and other opposition members raised a din on the issue.

"Why is the house being kept in the dark?" demanded Brinda Karat (of the Communist Party of India-Marxist), adding: "It's not just a matter of the government. It was an assurance given to the house (that no conditions would be imposed on India)."