Is N-cooperation a myth ?
First Published : 01 Sep 2009 11:03:00 PM ISTLast Updated : 01 Sep 2009 12:50:02 AM IST
It took more than three years of hype, heated debate, twists and turns unprecedented in the history of the country to finalise the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. For India, perennially short of energy, the common perception that it should help accelerate nuclear contribution to energy demand through large-scale imports is understandable.
But there is always a danger of the nuclear programme getting hooked on to the import dependency culture, deviating from the solid base of self-reliance so painstakingly built over more than five decades.
{For many moons, and many an orbit of Mother Earth around the Sun now, I have been trying to articulate this point in this Forum.} This could slow down development of thorium technology as a result of possible diversion of available resources, including infrastructure, to an import-oriented power programme. It is also worth noting that the terms of the agreement carry as baggage a number of obnoxious and humiliating terms and conditions, implicit and explicit, for which the country may have to pay a heavy price, compromising its long-term interests both in energy independence and national security. One of the most disturbing aspects is the way the issue of full civil nuclear cooperation has been handled.
Nuclear power generation involves a host of complex, wide-ranging technologies, starting with uranium extraction and enrichment, fuel production, reactors, reprocessing of spent fuel to extract plutonium, plutonium recycle in advanced reactor systems like fast reactors, radioactive waste management, etc., each of which is a link in the full nuclear fuel cycle. It should be obvious even to a layman that cooperation cannot be called ‘full’ unless the cycle is devoid of missing links.
Denied critical technology and isolated ever since it conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, India steadfastly pursued the goal of long-term energy security and independence. Successful development of a mature uranium fuel cycle, at the same time making strides in the development of plutonium and thorium fuel cycles, bears testimony to this.
Recognising this, the Indo-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, clearly stated that India should be entitled to full civil nuclear cooperation and treated like other developed countries with advanced nuclear technology. But there has been an attempt throughout to selectively deny cooperation, particularly connected with uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing, two important links of the fuel cycle (together termed as ENR technologies), thereby rendering full cooperation a mockery.
The US seems to have deliberately indulged in double-talk to keep India believing that it has a clean and unconditional waiver from the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for full civil nuclear cooperation. That the same group which passed the waiver in September 2008 has gone into a huddle behind closed doors on a rethink reveals the motives underlying the deal. Reports emanating from the recent G-8 deliberations indicate the direction in which the issue of full civil nuclear cooperation is being steered.
The stakes are high for the United States and other prospective suppliers to make the most of the potentially huge Indian reactor market. Strangely, supplier countries which are the real beneficiaries can dictate the terms and conditions. If ENR technologies are kept out of the purview of cooperation, the focus is only on commercially attractive power reactors, whither full civil nuclear cooperation? It could as well be called ‘Power Reactor Civil Nuclear Cooperation’! To add insult to injury, even this will be in jeopardy if India carries out a nuclear test in its national interest, though our government seems to derive comfort by giving a deliberate spin on this. Let us consider the implications of the impending denial of access to ENR-related technologies by the NSG.
Though both are important for India’s nuclear programme, reprocessing is absolutely crucial in its journey towards thorium utilisation. Reprocessing is a technologically complex step in the uranium nuclear fuel cycle where highly radioactive spent fuel discharged by nuclear reactors is processed to extract plutonium, a vital ingredient for fuelling fast reactors. India possesses the reprocessing technology, for both civil and military applications. Hence there is no logic in denying this on misplaced proliferation concerns, more so as the spent fuel from designated reactors is processed under IAEA safeguards. Instead of recognising this simple fact, ridiculous pre-conditions have been attached in the terms of the agreement.
With more than four decades of experience in reprocessing, being the fifth country in the world to acquire this technology ahead of China, Japan and some European countries, should India be subjected to this humiliation, practically begging for permission to reprocess? In spite of all this, India seems to be under the delusion that it has clearance for reprocessing.
Instead of considering this a matter of serious concern infringing on the country’s honour, bizarre arguments are being advanced to the effect that since we already have the technology, should we really bother? India is committed to reprocessing safeguarded spent fuel in a plant of advanced design.
The US interprets this to be a state-of-the-art plant and expects it to be of reference design of the Rokosho Mura plant in Japan and the EURATOM plant, both built with international collaboration. Constraining India to build its plant in isolation and denying access to supplies from the international market smacks of harassment.
India is proud of its capacity to design a plant large enough to process spent fuel from a number of reactors even if import is denied.
However, the same cannot be said about the need for import of certain critical items of equipment and items not readily available within the country for a larger plant. {I believe that political will and far-sightedness of technology-managers are essential needs of the hour now and must be urgently harnessed, in resonance, to invest time, energy and funds in indigenising such of those high tech items that we do have as of now. What is urgently needed is a Nehru-Bhabha combination.}
With the expected onslaught of imported reactors, in which the Indian nuclear manufacturing industry will be fully engaged in some form or the other, they may find it economically unviable to divert resources to develop complex items for one-off reprocessing. {Cannot agree more!} Even if the industry is willing, it may not be allowed to enter into collaboration to undertake production with reprocessing on denial. Since India has been trapped into a commitment to build a reprocessing plant with advanced design features commensurate with international standards, there is every likelihood it will get stuck, not for technology, but for want of access to equipment.
The issue of full civil nuclear cooperation is being used to browbeat India. If India does not put its foot down and ensure from the NSG an unconditional waiver for full civil nuclear cooperation,
there does not seem to be any hope that this deal will benefit the country.
{I hold Dr. Prasad to be one amongst many "right thinking people"!}
