They have not figured it out yet
For one, please do clarify. Are you trying to imply that desh purposely ignored paki preparation so that we get an opportunity to fight, win, achieve unity, army-intel modernization and give BJP a shot at forming government ?
If so, there is no event on the ground that substantiates this claim. If you revisit 98-99 period, '96 government (Deve Gowda) fell in jan/feb 98 followed by elections in feb/march 98 and '98 government (Vajpayee) formed in March 98. Kargil was detected in Feb/March 99. There are four indications which point to the fact that we got caught with our pants down.
Go to Kargil thread in the forum and read the sequence of events. All the data is hindsight but too many events in the period was being orchestrated outside the control of Indian govt.
The info about Skardu PAF capability in March 1999 coincides with April 1999 political uncertainity of the govt. It looks as if Pak had inside information about what is happening inside Indian political circle- like imminent drop of support by one of the party. The fall of Indian govt is *after* the preparation of incursion by PA.
June 1998 - first and most important warning was a June 2, 1998 note, personally signed by the then Intelligence Bureau Director, Shyamal Datta
In June 1998 the Kargil Brigade Intelligence Team (BIT) reported that ammunition supplies were being dumped and that terrorists had been seen in Skardu, Warcha and Marol awaiting infiltration through the Kargil sector.
July 1998 - July, Intelligence Bureau informants reported the deployment of M-11 missiles on the Deosai Plains and new mine-laying activities.
Aug 1998 - In August, the BIT and the Intelligence and Field Security Unit reported the presence of terrorists preparing to cross the LoC. Pakistani artillery flowed in as winter approached, a reversal of the normal practice.
Oct 1998 - Pervez Musharaff appointed COAS
By October, RAW was sufficiently concerned about developments to issue an express warning about the prospect of a "limited swift offensive", pointing in particular to the "constant induction of more troops from peacetime locations like Mangla, Lahore, Gujranwala and Okara into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir." Its assertion that a war was possible provoked an immediate challenge by the Director-General of Military Intelligence, and an inconclusive verbal discussion followed.
Nov 1998 - Northern Command, in its own internal assessments, recorded that November 1998 saw a three-fold increase in Pakistani troop movement in the Kargil sector when compared with November 1997. Vehicular movement doubled, while pack-animal movement increased nine-fold. As late as November 1998, the Intelligence Bureau's Leh station issued warnings that Pakistan was "training Taliban troops who were undergoing military training as well as learning the Balti and Ladakhi language." These irregulars, the warning stated, were likely to be inducted into the Kargil sector during April 1999.
Feb 1999 - On February 9, 1999, troops of the 5 Para Regiment spotted movement on the top of Point 5770, a strategic height in the southern Siachen area on the Indian side of the LoC.
Feb 1999 - The Lahore Declaration was a historic declaration signed by the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee, and the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, in Lahore on February 21, 1999.
Mar 1999 - Again, on March 4, between eight and ten Pakistani soldiers were seen removing snow from a concrete bunker to the west of the summit of Point 5770. That evening, fire was exchanged over the area.
Strangely, the Siachen-based 102 Infantry Brigade removed the officer who had reported the intrusion, Major Manish Bhatnagar, not the Pakistani troops who had occupied the position. On the eve of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan, it is likely that India had no desire to initiate a bruising exchange of fire on Siachen. The 121 Brigade, which ought to have been told that Pakistan troops had demonstrated aggressive intent in an adjoining area, was not even informed of the development.
For one, despite both the flow of intelligence on possible infiltration in the Kargil sector, troops were actually pulled out from frontline positions. Soon after the loss of Point 5770, 9 Mahar Regiment was removed from its defensive positions along the Yaldor Langpa stream and stationed at a rear position near Leh. The 26 Maratha Light Infantry, which protected the crucial infiltration route from Mashkoh to Dras, was also pulled off forward duties.
Despite the summary removal of approximately a quarter of its troops, there is evidence to show that 121 Brigade did act. Troops were withdrawn from the Mashkoh area for just 80 days in the winter of 1999, down from 177 days in 1997 and 116 days in 1998. Yaldor was left undefended for 64 days from February to April, where troops had been withdrawn for 120 days in 1997 and 119 days in 1998. Kaksar, another key area, was undefended for just 38 days, where it was left open for over 200 days in previous years.
April 11 - India says it has successfully test-fired a longer-range model of its Agni ballistic missile.
April 14 - The AIADMK withdraws support from the ruling coalition. President K.R. Narayanan asks the government to seek a confidence vote in parliament.
April 17 - India's 13-month-old BJP-led government falls after losing a confidence motion by just one vote. This may have been a trigger for Pakistan to be aggressive in Kargil
April 26 - India's parliament is dissolved and early elections are called. This may be one of major reason for the Pakistan Military to start the aggressive operation in Kargil.
Why was it that commanders in Leh and Srinagar were so slow to respond not just to the intelligence warnings that were available, but to the growing worries of their own subordinates?
General Malik argued that no troops were withdrawn by XV Corps from 3 Infantry Division's area of responsibility. This is, without dispute, true, since 9 Mahar and 26 Maratha battalions remained around Leh. Yet, General Malik's letter does not explain why General Budhwar chose to pull back soldiers needed to guard the LoC to rear positions when both intelligence warnings and field commanders believed threat levels were escalating.
General Malik also pointed out that the headquarters of 70 Infantry Brigade was inducted into the Dras area in October 1998, suggesting that the Army was indeed taking the warnings it received seriously. However, he omitted to mention the critical fact that only its headquarters' staff, not the fighting force, had been deployed when fighting broke out in May 1999.
With a dissolved parliament confrontation in the border is usaully avoided.
May 1999 - Chinese moves in LAC Ladhak
"Chinese had inducted one company in the area opposite Chantze, with the rest of the battalion waiting in the wings," Malik discloses in the book. He says it was not only at Kameng, but the Chinese army enhanced its level of activity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh as well from where some of the forces had been thinned down to be redeployed in Kargil.
"This enhancement in PLA activities along the LAC coincided with the start of the conflict in Kargil" Malik says which at military level, indicated a demonstrative support to Pakistan. Malik says this ran contrary to Beijing's assertions in recent years that it was pursuing an independent foreign policy and that its relations with Pakistan would not be at the cost of India. The Chinese forces also made a show of force in Demchok, in eastern Ladakh, constructed a track from Spanggur to south end of Pangong lake and a track in Trigg heights. He says India also received intelligence reports that PLA's Director in the Department of Armament had visited Islamabad during the conflict to help Pakistan army overcome its critical deficiencies in conventional armament, ammunition and equipment.
This may be one of the reason for not sending aggressive rescue missions to bring back captured Indian battalions. With only a caretaker government in India running the show there was a serious situation of China and Pakistan together attacking India.
May 4 - Lt. Gen. Kishen Pal was on leave in Delhi on May 3 to attend to his wife's surgery. When he got word of the sighting of the intruders at Banju, he ordered 3 Inf Div. to reinforce 121 (I) Bde and returned to Srinagar. Patrols were sent out starting from May 4, but due to weather conditions, they sighted the enemy only on May 7 and made contact on May 8 and came under heavy fire. By this time, all operational commanders were at their HQ, including the much reviled (in the press) Maj. Gen. Budhwar.
May 7 - Chinese Embassy Bombing in Kosovo - China US relationship problem. This bombing and an escalation is unexplainable. This event may have kept Chinese from entering the war in Kargil looking at the international publicity given to Chinese reaction.
May 11 - By May 11, the extent of intrusions were becoming clear even in the Dras sector further south. By May 12, the number of battalions in contact with the enemy were more than 5 and casualties were already taken. Lt. Kalia's patrol went out on 14 May in the Kaksar subsector and was captured on May 15.
May 16 - 6 choopers discovered in Kargil sector
May 24 - First report of infilterators.At a meeting of the Unified Headquarters in Srinagar on May 24, 1999, General Pal insisted that there "were no concentration of troops on the Pakistani side and no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes."
May 26 - India unleashes two waves of air strikes to flush out guerrillas on its side of a Kashmir ceasefire line, sharply raising temperatures in the region. The next day India confirms it has lost two fighter jets which Pakistan says they shot down.
May 28 - In Kashmir, a stinger missile brings down an Indian helicopter killing all on board. Lt. Gen. Kishan Pal, GOC 15 Corps, had accomplished the task of inducting 3 Bde HQ, 19 Inf. Battalions, 4 Regts of Field Arty, 2 Regts of Medium Arty into the sectors within a span of 26 days.
June 12 - India and Pakistan hold "businesslike" talks over their Kashmir dispute but fail to resolve it; India says Pakistan tried to infiltrate the Turtuk Sector and puts the death toll at 267 Pakistanis and 86 Indians.
June 16, 1999 -The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh has said his visit to Beijing has led to better understanding between India and China on regional and global issues, including the security perceptions of the two countries. Speaking to newspersons in Beijing at the end of his two day visit, he said new initiatives are already on the anvil.
July 4 - India says it has recaptured the strategic Tiger Hill on its side of a military line of control in Kashmir.
July 9 - In Kashmir, the Indian army reports that it has all but ousted the infiltrators from the Batalik zone on India's side of the ceasefire line.
July 17 - India signals the end of the flare-up with Pakistan by announcing that all infiltrators have withdrawn from Indian-held Kashmir.
July 26 - India says its troops have cleared all infiltrators from their side of the Line of Control that divides Kashmir.
07 October 1999 --Results show Mr. Vajpayee's National Democratic Alliance -- led by his Bharatiya Janata Party -- has passed the majority mark of 272 seats in India's lower house.
08 October 1999 -- Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee began the process of forming his new government Friday. Mr. Vajpayee's Bharatiya Janata Party and its allies won nearly 300 seats in India's 545-seat parliament -- soundly defeating the once-dominant Congress Party, which won just over 130 seats. Mr. Vajpayee and his allies say they have enough of a majority to serve a full five-year term in office.