The ARDE is also working on an advanced version of the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher system (MBRLS), which will have an improved trajectory for the missile, he added.
The system will be integrated on MBT Arjun and performance evaluation trials are expected during summer 2009.
Great news.......but alas a new system may give the IA new issues to crib about.Dmurphy wrote:Shiv Aroor reports:
MBT Arjun's new Defensive Aid System ready for tests
The system will be integrated on MBT Arjun and performance evaluation trials are expected during summer 2009.
the Arjun-Tank as a system is evolving even now, proving that it could withstand all challenges , specially an rpg which blasted t90s in georgia,Dmurphy wrote:Shiv Aroor reports:
MBT Arjun's new Defensive Aid System ready for tests
The system will be integrated on MBT Arjun and performance evaluation trials are expected during summer 2009.
really? do you have figures for Arjuns and paki tanks armor protection and round penetration?for what purpose the army is rejecting Arjun as a major component of its armoured division when it is clear that it will easily protect itself and simultaneously thrash pakistani boxes ?
just few posts above, Igorr posted about LEDS-150 active defence system for T-90s. It has Mongoose-1 interceptor.namit k wrote: btw,is their any anti-RPG system being also developed for both Arjun and t90 tanks?
besides homing missiles this is also very crucial ,wrto the subcontinent.
yes, that is an awesome system, besides that anything more conventional (cheap)against rpg ?ajay_ijn wrote:just few posts above, Igorr posted about LEDS-150 active defence system for T-90s. It has Mongoose-1 interceptor.namit k wrote: btw,is their any anti-RPG system being also developed for both Arjun and t90 tanks?
besides homing missiles this is also very crucial ,wrto the subcontinent.
For arjun, we can blindly assume that DRDO will come out with something with Israeli partnership. that is becoming routine nowadays.
Yeah, i had heard in some tv show that the T-series tanks though quite potent were, really vulnerable.(esp. T-72)namit k wrote: Shiv Aroor reports:
the Arjun-Tank as a system is evolving even now, proving that it could withstand all challenges , specially an rpg which blasted t90s in georgia,
for what purpose the army is rejecting Arjun as a major component of its armoured division when it is clear that it will easily protect itself and simultaneously thrash pakistani boxes ?
what task is a tank supposed to do , to add its scrap metal on battle field or to scrap an enemy tank ?
I do not know about DRDO, but I remember long time back reading about an innovation by some European(namit k wrote: btw,is their any anti-RPG system being also developed for both Arjun and t90 tanks?
besides homing missiles this is also very crucial ,wrto the subcontinent.
) company. They had a net made of some polymer/synthetic ( ) covering the vehicle. The net would prevent the fuse circuit of the RPG from completing(the rpg would be stuck to the net) or atleast serve to trigger the RPG (non-tandem warhead) at the net, so that the armor takes care of just the blast.
What I have stated above is what I remember.Nope.. I am aware of cage / slat armor which is a mesh/ grid (whatever you can say). What I am talking about is a net (flexible as a fishing net).
First of the aforementioned M&M vehicles has just rolled off the assembly line(via a post over at Team BHP by rahulsingh007) :Raja Bose wrote:Sure hope the new M&M/Tata/etc. creations get inducted atleast in basic versions otherwise Army is stuck with a hotch-potch of vehicles and who knows may have to eventually rely on bhaade-ka-tempo (rented tempos)
The article mentions:FOR SPECIAL APPLICATIONS: Anand Mahindra, Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, Mahindra Group, with Brigadier Khutub Hai (right), Chief Executive, Mahindra Defence Systems, at the inauguration of Mahindra Special Military Vehicles facility at Prithla in Faridabad on Tuesday.
The Team BHP link below has some more pics - the vehicle seems to mount a floodlight of sorts along with an MG mounted on it.NEW DELHI: Mahindra Defence Systems (MDS), a Mahindra group company that provides special light military vehicles, on Tuesday inaugurated the Mahindra Special Military Vehicles (MSMV) facility at Prithla in Faridabad (Haryana) that has facilities for specific military manufacturing applications.
“This state-of-the-art facility, the first of its kind in the private sector, will help MDS harness the potential in the defence space,” said Mahindra Group Vice-Chairman and Managing Director Anand Mahindra after inaugurating the facility.
it would be better to have strong jv between govt def industries and private ventures, not that either is better from other but because it is an evolving process and should follow the same path our economy did in evolving, otherwise the private players will make competition so murky that we cant even imagine, keeping in mind that the defence agreements and projects are always done in disguise and less transparecymanish wrote:First of the aforementioned M&M vehicles has just rolled off the assembly line(via a post over at Team BHP by rahulsingh007) :Raja Bose wrote:Sure hope the new M&M/Tata/etc. creations get inducted atleast in basic versions otherwise Army is stuck with a hotch-potch of vehicles and who knows may have to eventually rely on bhaade-ka-tempo (rented tempos)
http://www.hindu.com/2009/03/18/stories ... 331800.htm
The article mentions:FOR SPECIAL APPLICATIONS: Anand Mahindra, Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, Mahindra Group, with Brigadier Khutub Hai (right), Chief Executive, Mahindra Defence Systems, at the inauguration of Mahindra Special Military Vehicles facility at Prithla in Faridabad on Tuesday.The Team BHP link below has some more pics - the vehicle seems to mount a floodlight of sorts along with an MG mounted on it.NEW DELHI: Mahindra Defence Systems (MDS), a Mahindra group company that provides special light military vehicles, on Tuesday inaugurated the Mahindra Special Military Vehicles (MSMV) facility at Prithla in Faridabad (Haryana) that has facilities for specific military manufacturing applications.
“This state-of-the-art facility, the first of its kind in the private sector, will help MDS harness the potential in the defence space,” said Mahindra Group Vice-Chairman and Managing Director Anand Mahindra after inaugurating the facility.
http://www.team-bhp.com/forum/indian-ca ... tream.html
I would say its good development for the nation as a whole. Lets see how well Tata do with their LSV now. Should be interesting to see the increasing competition between the desi private players in the defence arena. May be the guvment will try to accommodate both by buying the Marksman for the paramils and police forces for Urban riot control/patrol ops and keep the LSV for possible replacement of the Gypsy in the army, let us see.
However, there is still no mention of this or the AXE at the M&M Defence website, even after relatively widespread coverage these two seem to have got in the media over the last year or so.
Strong JV? Whats that? What if they wanted a weak JV, huh? How would they go about that, eh? Please advise.Namit wrote:it would be better to have strong jv between govt def industries and private ventures, not that either is better from other but because it is an evolving process and should follow the same path our economy did in evolving, otherwise the private players will make competition so murky that we cant even imagine, keeping in mind that the defence agreements and projects are always done in disguise and less transparency
Minority stakeholder holding the reins of management while the majority sit and twiddle their collective thumbs. What kind of business model do you suppose that is ? Hey look, I 'll put up a $hitload of money, you just go ahead; do as you please and don't bother about us having a say in the matter.Namit wrote:there should always be a govt(51%+ stake) and private(49%- stake) JV which is given contract if and only if govt has to give any contract to other than govt cos.
also let the private cos decide the board of directors and top management
How many govt. cos are working on armoured projects? Lets see.. umm none. Its a DRDO, HVF & OFB show and they are not govt. cos per se. Leaving this aside, let me put a question to you.. how many such projects has been supported by the target end-user i.e. the army, with feedback, inputs vide close involvement, interaction & monitoring right from the design stage. If you know something I don't, enlighten me.as per govt requirements, how many projects on armoured vehicles are completed on time by govt cos.?
Which govt of the day or for that matter any businessman in their right mind, is going to hand over its right to nominate/ appoint people to management position i.e. directors, over a plate?f u read between lines ive never said that 51%govt share co. isnt a govt company
what i m trying to say is that we need more professionalism and better project management that is available in private companies and the money that govt cos will provide,
jvs can be of so many types but the point is that private companies should not be left loose ,particularly when it comes to the terms of national security, so the management style should be of private players and the support of govt, of course private players will invest as well,on the other hand they may also have a supplier-manufacturer relation as well, whatever they do its up to them, just one or two amendments will bring upon necessary changes.
You are clearly missing the wood for the trees here, my friend. The Satyam imbroglio has nothing to do with quality of services provided by it to its client, supposedly they have one of the best SAP verticals in the industry, or its employees but everything to do with management siphoning off funds, yes, the same kind of professional private management you want to bring in. Do you see the contradiction with your statement above which goes like private sector management are way better and now private sector management are swindlers of public money?as for the transparency in private sector, we have a very good example of satyam, where a high profile auditor pwc was involved, even then things went against investors,in case case of our so called future reliance on defence industries it will cost to national security,
i m not saying that private investors be suffocated under provisions but that they should never be on their own control in defence sector,.otherwise they will turn whole process murkier,
Russian Anti-Armour Weapons and Israeli Tanks in Lebanon Marked as: Mature
Russian Anti-Armour Weapons and Israeli Tanks in Lebanon
Mikhail Barabanov
The military conflict that unfolded from 12 July – 14 August, 2006 between Israel and the Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite Islamist Resistance group, marked the first time in several years that the Israeli army has confronted a well equipped opponent in a large-scale confrontation. Military observers paid particular attention to the use of Israeli armour and the outcome of battles between Israeli main battle tanks and Hezbollah’s anti-tank weaponry.
All in all, four division headquarters and 17 Israeli Army brigades (six armoured, seven infantry and four airborne) took part in battle, though not all were up to full combat strength. Over 30,000 Israeli servicemen and up to 400 main battle tanks were directly engaged in battle on Lebanese soil, and the tanks were all Merkava models made in Israel. Of the six armoured brigades, two brigades (7th and 847th) were equipped with the Merkava Mk 2 model, three brigades (188th, 434th and 673rd) with the Merkava Mk 3 model, and one brigade (401st) with the most advanced Merkava Mk 4 model. Of the seven infantry brigades, two (1st and 609th) were equipped with Achzarit heavy armoured personnel carriers, converted from Soviet T-55 tanks seized from Arab forces in the wars of 1967 and 1973.
Since 2000, Hezbollah has turned the expanse between the Israeli border and the Litani river into a heavily fortified line of defence, known as “Nasser.” Practically every settlement was equipped with temporary or permanent fortifications (including concrete bunkers, steel doors, etc), a large number of underground tunnels and heavy camouflage. However, although Hezbollah fighters made use of these fortifications, they did not engage in positional warfare, but mounted mobile military operations. Fighters were mobilized in groups of no more than 20 people (often just five or six), based, as a rule, on detachments of anti-tank missile systems. It appears their strategy was to expose the advancing Israeli units, and tank units in particular, to guided anti-tank missiles fired at a fairly long range, often changing their positions, using a network of tunnels and bunkers.
Hezbollah deployed up to 2500 fighters, of which a core of a thousand “regular” troops were well trained and equipped to the best western standards. These zealous, professional fighters were well supplied with arms, and strictly followed orders. One could not say that Israel was fighting with “partisan” formations in the conventional sense of the term, but in reality with a well equipped and organized regular army, even if it displayed some peculiar methods of warfare.
Hezbollah made a special effort to confront Israeli armour with a huge number of anti-tank weapons, including the Soviet Malyutka anti-tank guided?missile complex (NATO code AT-3) with 9M14 series guided?missiles (including licensed Yugoslav versions and the Iranian Raad and Raad?2T tandem warhead “clones,” the Fagot (AT-5), Konkurs (AT-5, including the licensed Iranian Towsan-1 version), the French MILAN, the American TOW (including its Iranian Toophan and tandem warhead Toophan-2 copy), recoilless guns and several versions of the Soviet RPG-7 hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher. Iran and Syria were the main suppliers of these weapons, with some western systems apparently reaching the Shiites from the arsenal of the Lebanese Army.
Aside from that, Hezbollah used a small number of modern 9K115?2 Metis-M (AT-13) and 9K129 Kornet-E (AT-14) portable anti-tank guided?missile systems, and RPG-29 Vampir anti-tank rocket launchers, delivered by Russia to Syria in 1998?1999. These three new systems penetrated armour exceptionally well thanks to their tandem High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) warheads. The close-range Metis-M system have a range of up to 1500 meters and are armed with 9M131 guided?missiles weighing 13.8 kg with wire-guidance. The heavier Kornet-E fires 9M133 laser-guided missiles weighing 29 kg up to 5500 meters. Both systems are made by the Tula Instrument Design Bureau and were equipped with 1PN86V1 Mulat thermal sights. The hand-held RPG‑29 Vampir anti-tank rocket launcher is one of the latest products of Moscow-based Basalt. Weighing 11.5 kg, it fires rocket-propelled grenades that weigh 6.2 kg up to 500 metres from a telescopic pipe.
Hezbollah’s defences were structured around these anti-tank weapons, which were used in great numbers. According to Israeli estimates, the fighters launched over 500 anti-tank guided?missiles in July alone, and about 1000 through the course of the conflict. Moreover, the anti-tank guided?missiles were used not only against armoured objects, but also against Israeli infantry. The fighters sought generally to employ the weapons from the maximum possible range.
On the whole, both the scale of Hezbollah’s use of anti-tank systems, as well as their possession of modern systems with superior armour penetration capability, came as a surprise to the Israeli command. Nevertheless, measures to reduce losses of armour were taken from the very beginning. It is indicative that on Lebanese territory the Israelis used only their heavily protected APCs on main battle tank chassis: the Achazarit (on the T‑55 chassis), the Nagmahon, a few of Nemerah prototypes(on the Merkava chassis), the Puma combat engineering vehicle and the Nakpadon, all based on the old British Centurion tank chassis, while the standard M113 APCs, even those modernized with a great deal of extra protection, where hardly used at all, and then only as engineering, support and convoy vehicles.
According to various Israeli and Western sources, during the course of battle in Lebanon, between 46 and 50 Merkava main battle tanks (of the 400 deployed) and 14 APCs were hit by anti-tank weapons, including 22 incidents where tank armour and 5 cases where APC armour was penetrated. Another six tanks and at least one APC were blown up by mines and IDEs.
Of those tanks hit by anti-tank weapons, 18 were the newest Merkava Mk 4 version (from the 401st armoured brigade), and six of these had their armour penetrated. Twenty-three tank and five APC crew members were killed. A large number of anti-tank guide-missiles and RPG grenades hit the tanks, but in most cases these did little damage. It was reported that one of the Merkava Mk 4 tanks survived 23 hits from anti-tank guided?missiles before it was finally disabled and its armour penetrated. All penetrations of Merkava armour, according to Israeli statements, were achieved by the Konkurs, Metis-M and Kornet-E anti-tank guided?missiles, and the RPG-29 rocket-propelled grenades. If one considers that 22 of 50 tanks had their armour penetrated, that gives a penetration rate of 44% (and only 33% for the Merkava Mk 4). According to Israeli Army statistics, the penetration rate for tanks during the 1982 Lebanon War was 47%, and 60% during the 1973 War. The crew casualties rate was also much higher in 2006 at 0.5 crew member for each damaged tank, while the rate per disabled tank in 1973 War is one full crew member.
The number of irrecoverable tank losses among those damaged, according to recent Israeli publications, was five altogether, of which two (a Merkava Mk 2 and Mk 4) were destroyed by IDEs and three tanks were completely burned out after hits by guided anti-tank guided?missiles. This attests to the high degree of protection afforded by the most modern Merkava Mk 4 tanks, which could be damaged only by the most modern anti-tank weapons with powerful tandem HEAT warheads hitting, it would seem, weakened armoured zones.
The extremely low percentage of missile hits and the low percentage of armour penetration clearly shows that the vast majority of anti-tank guided?missiles were of the old type, most likely the completely obsolete Malyutka (and its many copies), with clumsy guidance systems (manual, on the oldest models), with no modern sights and a relatively small warhead, by modern standards.
It appears that non-modernized second generation anti-tank guided?missiles produced in the 1970s (Fagot, Konkurs, MILAN, TOW) were used in battle. The Kornet-E and Metis-M systems, with their much higher level of effectiveness, were clearly present in very small numbers, but accounted for the majority of Israeli losses. This allows one to conclude that Israel made an issue of the possession of these new systems by Hezbollah mostly for political, rather than strictly military, reasons. On the other hand, if Hezbollah had a large number of Kornet-E and Metis-M systems, the Israeli tank attack in Lebanon could have been completely repelled. Modern Russian weapons proved to be quite effective against the newest Western equipment.
The old types of anti-tank guided?missile systems have shown themselves to be extremely ineffective. And since the majority of anti-tank forces in the world are equipped with precisely this old generation of missile systems, the results of recent warfare in Lebanon should sound an alarm, and provoke considered reflection regarding the purchase of modern anti-tank weapons, such as the Kornet-E.
Nevertheless, from their experience in Lebanon the Israelis themselves concluded that armour itself cannot in principle provide full protection from anti-tank guided?missile systems, and that all of their tanks would be equipped with active protection systems such as the Rafael Trophy and the IMI Iron Fist systems.
They decided in early 2007 to equip the entire fleet of Merkava tanks and the Nemerah APCs yet to be built with Trophy active protection systems by the end of 2008. Passive electronic countermeasures are also now held in high regard. Apparently, none of the four tanks equipped with experimental electronic countermeasures system was hit by even a single anti-tank guided?missile.
However, the importance of heavy “conventional” armour (including explosive reactive armour suites) was also proven on the battlefield, and the Israelis decided to continue the production of Merkava Mk 4 main battle tanks, and to launch the serial production of heavily armoured Nemerah APCs on the chassis of these tanks. Two hundred such vehicles have been ordered.
Thus, the war in Lebanon has proven the Soviet and Russian approach to the development of protection for main battle tanks, as established in the 1970s, to be very well. In the 1980s the USSR created the first comprehensive passive (Shtora) and active (Drozd, Arena) protection systems, which are still being developed today. Israel and the West are only now catching up to Russia. Meanwhile, we can see that the newest Western tanks (included the well-protected Merkava) burn up when hit by modern anti-tank weapons in just the same way as the old Soviet T-72 tanks deployed in Chechnya and Iraq.
Russia avoided the Western fashion of dismissing heavy armour and explosive reactive armour as “unnecessary” and continued to develop a balanced configuration of armour, including detachable and built-in protection, and in this turned out to be justified. The Lebanese conflict of 2006 and the war in Iraq have once again proven allegations of the obsolescence of the main battle tank to be absurd. The modern MBT with its powerful heavy armour and large combat weight will continue for some time as the core of the land forces.
As for the tactical application of armour troops, it is clear that the Israelis used their tanks in small groups almost exclusively for immediate support of line infantry. It was precisely this well equipped and trained infantry that played the decisive role in battle. Attempts to use armour troops to achieve a breakthrough without infantry support and reconnaissance inevitably led to senseless losses, as befell the forces of the 401st Israeli armoured brigade at Vadi Saluki on 9 August.
The tank battalion of this brigade, pushing forward with no infantry, fell into a fire trap of anti-tank guided?missile systems (mostly Kornet-E, according to Israeli sources), losing eleven Mk 4 Merkava tanks damaged and eight crew killed, including the battalion commander. The Israeli armour troops were clearly not well prepared for action against modern anti-tank weapons.
On the Israeli side, it is also clear that the armoured reserve units were insufficiently prepared, especially in the use of countermeasures (smoke screens, advancing fire to disturb aiming, reverse gear withdrawal, etc). As such, the quality of the training of the armour troops and the ability of the commanders to effectively combine tanks and other forces remain the key elements for the successful use of main battle tanks on the field.
Indian Army loses battle against Arjun Tank; but will there be Arjun mark 2This brings back to mind,the COAS who reportedly said not too long ago when asked about Arjun's future with the IA,that the IA wanted a tank for the future (FMBT-turretless 155mm main gun tank?)),not just for the next decade (Arjun).Arjun-2 has been described by some sources as having a three-man crew,with an auto-loader in the turret,glacis armour similar to German Leopard tanks and a Chinese MBT (probably the "arrowhead" shape),plus other defensive measures.
Indian Army lost its battle and Arjun Tank will ride into the Indian Army regiments defeating its most hostile evaluators. This is a strange case in which Indian Army the creator of Arjun Tank turned into Frankenstein. Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley take note.
Indian Army developed cold feet (again) on the T-90 versus Arjun Tank comparative trials after witnessing the accelerated usage cum reliability trial (AUCRT) of Main Battle Tank Arjun that began in December 2007. Then we saw parliamentary reports by Indian Army on the failure of Arjun Tanks in AUCRT, that was thrashed in media as well as in parliament. To run salt of Indian army ego, DRDO will hand it over in a formal function we may witness in february end or march, when 17 - 18 tanks will be handed over to Indian Army. Atleast 50 Arjun Tanks is expected to be inducted this year.
There might not be Arjun Tank mark - 2 tanks rolling and production may cease after the current order unless there is a miracle. Indian Army had given some observations to DRDO after the AUCRT. Some points were valid on the metallurgy and life of certain parts (it was prepared by the actual evaluators unlike the parliamentary report). DRDO addressed it.
The future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) GSQR and research is shaping up. The new policy of user (Indian Army in this case) has to put its own money in the project, will put some responsibility on the user. In addition we will witness user and the research agency sharing responsibility. There will be involvement of private sector. The question is how many private sector companies will want to work with Indian Army on its projects. Some companies like MRF had lost money on the Arjun Tank Project due to Indian Army attitude. The Pinaka project may be an indicator if Indian Army is worth being associated with.
I thought that this problem was solved in the Gaza incursion.There is a report,stat details which I'll dig out later,about the controversial performance of Israeli Merkava's during the last Lebanese spat with the Hiz.A very high number of Israeli tanks suffered hits and took significant damage from RPGs and (Russian) ATGMs (Kornet-E, Metis-M and RPG-29 with tandem warheads ) used by the Hiz.
.Most information about this tank (T-95) is speculative. Although no concrete information has been released, various websites have published descriptions and illustrations of a novel design, with a tank gun in a remotely-controlled mount, variously reportedly as of 135 mm or 152 mm calibre (larger than the 120–125 mm guns in current main battle tanks). Such an arrangement is anticipated to improve crew survivability compared to existing designs, because the crew compartment is separated from the ready ammunition supply, and also because the tank would be nearly completely hidden and protected in a hull-down position. The crew would number just three, all being carried within the hull itself.
In a July 2008 article in Jane's Defence Weekly, analyst Christopher F. Foss stated that the tank is expected to have a 152 mm gun with an automatic loader in the chassis, but that it is uncertain whether it will sport a conventional turret or external gun mount.[3]
....aspects of futuristic tank development trends are also being examined in the Orient, with these trends being specifically: the transition to a two-man tank crew design concept; the housing of the tank crew within a compact crew compartment within the forward section of the vehicle chassis; the providing of an externally mounted main weapon upon the vehicle chassis roof with a large caliber tankgun, and separate-loading ammunition in the rear of the tank hull; and the providing of special-purpose protective armor to protect the crew compartment with the protective armor having a continuous extension running approximately 1,000 mm longitudinally along the frontal area.
Merakava Battle AARLebanon 2006: did Merkava challenge its match?
The so-called "second Lebanon war," which opened on 12 July 2006, actually started on 22 November 2005, when Hezbollah attacked the village of al-Ghajar in an attempt to capture Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers. The commanding general at the time, Udi Adam, noted in his after-action report, that "it was the first time Hezbollah used its entire tactical arsenal," revealing that one of his Merkava tanks received no less than seven hits from various antitank missiles, none of which penetrated its armor while the crew escaped unhurt.
, the Merkava proved to be well protected and designed to minimize risk, even when it was penetrated. The IDF employed several hundred tanks in combat. According to official reports, about 10 percent were hit by various threats, of which less than half were penetrated.
In an overall assessment, the potential risk to crewmen would have been much higher, if the tank had been more conventionally designed. Colonel Moti Kidor, commander, 401st Armored Corps Brigade, which bore the brunt of battle, mentioned in an interview that during the war, hundreds of antitank missiles were fired on his unit, and, in total, only 18 tanks were seriously damaged. Of those, missiles actually penetrated only five or six vehicles, and according to statistics, only two tanks were totally destroyed, both of them by super-heavy improvised explosive device (IED) charges One officer, Lieutenant Yotam, reported that his Metkava Mk4 tank had been simultaneously hit by two unspecified antitank missiles. Miraculously, all four crew members evacuated unscathed.
In one instance, a Merkava tank was hit by a belly charge carrying more than 330 pounds of explosives, which killed one crew member and wounded the remaining six (some traveling in the rear compartment). Despite the loss of one crew member, this incident is considered proof of the effective protection of the new Merkava Mk4.
Inadequate Trained Tank Crews
... all regular forces, including tanks crews, were retrained for small-unit infantry policing operations, mostly dismounted
Moreover, during the Intifada, which began in September 2000, the armored corps did not receive top priority from senior defense establishment officials. Shortsighted budget cuts took a heavy toll on armored units. As a result, at the beginning of the war, tanks were lacking basic countermeasures such as instantaneous smoke canisters, laser warning detectors, and infrared jammers. While some of these devices were urgently supplied later in the war, the damage was already done.
Summing up the performance of Merkava tanks, especially the latest Mk4, most tank crews agree that, despite losses sustained and some major flaws in tactical conduct, the tank proved its mettle during its first high-saturation combat operation. The overall consensus revealed that tanks with less armor would have caused much higher losses.
by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF, Retired
Retired Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, Israel Defense Forces, is a freelance journalist and serves as a defense analyst for several military journals. Following his brief service with the British Forces during World War II, he became one of the founding members if the Israeli Armoured Corps and served as a career officer with the IDF for 26 years. Educated at the French Cavalry School at Saumur, he later held various command and staff assignments and fought in all of the Arab-Israeli wars, including the 1973 conflict, when he served as the Armoured Corps' chief of signals.
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-159390665.html
http://frontierindia.net/t-90-s-is-a-du ... far-enoughSuKan wrote: Arjun MBT prepares for potentially decisive trials
http://www.idrw.org/2009/04/09/arjun_mb ... rials.html
Published in Indian Army News
27 April, 2007 (FIDSNS)
Russians T-9-0S sales brouchures boast of firing range of firing range of 100 to 5,000 meters, while T-90S deployed with Indian Army have problems hitting targets even as close as 1800 metres with Indian ammunition, as reported in Rediff,April 26, 2007. Rediff article further mentions “but there was no way to modify the tank’s fire control system to correct that. Asked to modify the FCS for Indian ammunition, the Russians pointed out that the T-90 contract had no such provision.”
In a twist of irony, T-90S is the same tank which Indian Army purchased citing problems with indigenous Main Battle Tank Arjun.
While Russians have been dragging their feet on the FCS rectification, the Ministry of Defence has threatened the Russians with not placing further orders of 347 T-90S tanks. Meanwhile the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has been prompt to rectify the problems.
Indian Army has tested Arjun Tank for almost 10 years and kept complaining while it has inducted T-90S with same problems.
In an 8 part article, in november 2006, Indian Express cited Brigadier D K Babbar, the Army’s pointsman for the Main Battle Tank (MBT) Arjun project at the Mechanised Forces directorate until he retired last year from the 94th Armoured Brigade, “The Arjun tank has no future. It still cannot fire straight. The T-90, a far superior tank, can kill the Arjun. We would not cross any border with these tanks.”
Eyebrows are being raised on the manner of inductions by Indian Army. There is no independent body to moniter and varify the Indian Army equipment trials and hence no accountability. DRDO has been complaining about Indian Army’s attitude of lowering General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR) for foreign vendors. This is not the first such incident. Krasnopol 155mm laser-guided shells bought by Indian Army proved to be defective.
T-90S is cited to be a knee jerk reaction toPakistani Army acquiring 320 T-80UD tanks from Ukraine. After securing initial contract Indian Army proposes 1000 T-90S tank strength. “The perplexing question is if Russian equipment does not performs, how can we believe that Ukrainian equipment performs better?” quipped a defence analyst. The Ukrainian factory which produced these tanks today produces tractors because of lack of order.
The same defence analyst also mentions of the hype being created on Al Khalid Tanks; “Al Khalid is a discarded design by the Chinese, reworked by Ukranians and it has a Ukranian engine. Pakistan after all the hype has failed to produce the tank in sufficient numbers. The tank has been demonstarted to Saudi Arabia with German MTU engines. In addition Bangladesh and Srilanka were offer these tanks. Nothing has materialised. Thesre is no proof that its a very potent tank.”
On being asked on Al Khalid and Arjun comparissions, the defence analyst said “there is no comparison between Al Khalid and Arjun tank. Al Khalid can be best compared to Indian T-72 latest upgrades. It will be foolist to compare the two tanks”.
On 5 April, 2007, Army Chief Gen J J Singh mentioned that the Army will soon receive 14 Arjun Main Battle Tanks and these will be put through a training exercise. But the fact that Indian Army lacks a comptetive bench mark to eveluate Arjun Tanks effectiveness.
The Hindustan Times in October 26, 2006, reported “army officers complained that the existing T-90S tanks faced “recurring” technical problems which were adversely impinging on the force’s operational preparedness.” The issues have not been ironed out yet.
Ministry of Defence has failed to secure Russian assurance on fixing the existing T-90S tanks. So the Ministry of Defence is now exploring private companies to fix the defective Russian supplied tanks wasting Indian tax payers money. co-incidently there is no private Indian company capable of taking such challenge. Even if any company does it, it will take years to fix it. The only Indian company which has experience in such issues is DRDO. Its clear that a foreign firm is expected to fix the T-90S problems.
INVITATION FOR EXPRESSION OF INTERESTCOMBAT VEHICLES RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ESTABLISHMENTDEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONGOVERNMENT OF INDIAMINISTRY OF DEFENCEAvadi, Chennai – 600054EOI NOTIFICATION No: CVRDE/MMG/2007-08/EOI-03Expression of interest:Combat Vehicles Research & Development Establishment (CVRDE) is a DRDOorganization in Chennai under Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India. CVRDE is involvedin the design & development of Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) and its associatedsub systems. It is proposed to develop “1500 hp Compact High Specific Power OutputDiesel Engine”.Proposal:Development of “1500 hp Compact High Specific Power Output DieselEngine” consisting of major subsystems like structural & dynamic systems, fuel injectionsystem, turbocharging, cooling system , lubrication system and accessory gear drivearrangement. The proposed engine shall have a power to weight ratio of 1 hp/kg and apower to volume ratio of 680 hp/m3including air cleaning system. The proposed engineshall be fuel efficient with state of art fuel injection system preferably with electroniccontrols, turbo charging, charge air cooling, safety controls along with pressurizedmultistage air cleaning system.Pre requisite for vendor:The vendor shall have a proven track record on the development and productionof compact high specific output large bore diesel engines in the range of 1000 hp andabove for mobility applications. The vendor should also possess knowledge on design &analysis of engine’s dynamic & structural components and accessories. The vendor shallhave facilities for manufacturing and testing of engine & its sub systems with moderninstrumentation. The vendor should be ISO (or) equivalent certified organization and
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should have well qualified sub vendors. The vendor should be self contained in designand should have well established production facility for major subsystems.Role of CVRDE:CVRDE has domain knowledge in AFV engines and will guide in the formulationof specification, layout preparation, general arrangement of engine and its subsystems,configuration, testing, vehicle integration and vehicle trials.CVRDE will also act as a consultant and will share its experience during detailedspecification formulation. CVRDE had developed majority of engine subsystems and willextend its expertise with the vendor depending on their requirement. CVRDE had alsoestablished sources for engine sub systems and will extend support through alreadyestablished sources.Role of vendor:Formulation of detailed specification of sub systems and drawings. Design &development of all the engine components, sub systems, sub assembly, test set up bothfor sub systems and assembly with modern instrumentations, testing of sub-systems,testing of engine, endurance testing, participation in the vehicle integration and trials,improvements / value addition based on integration, testing & vehicle trials anddocumentation.Document shall contain detailed design document for component level, subsystem, sub assembly and assembly, drawings, production drawings including processsheets, sub assembly, assembly and integration procedures, test set up, test reportincluding data recording, document on inspection inclusive of components, sub assemblyand assembly level. Vendor shall involve a third party / neutral party to carry outinspection in all stages.
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SPECIFICATION OF 1500 HP COMPACT HIGH SPECIFICOUTPUT DIESEL ENGINE1) Engine Type : Liquid cooled, 4 Stroke, TurbochargedInter cooled, Diesel Engine with Multi fuelCapability2) Cylinder Arrangement : V type arrangement3) Combustion method : Direct Injection (preferred)4) Rated power : 1500 hp at 2100 to 2800 rpmas per ISO 10000.5)Rated Torque : 4800 Nm with a torque backupof 20% (min)6) Specific Fuel Consumption : 210 gm / kW-hr at peak torque speed7) Starting : Electric start(Fly wheel starter cum generator preferred)8) Permissible inclination : 35oAxial and 17olateral9) Max over speed allowed : 10% of rated speed.10. DIMENSIONS:Total Engine volume : 2.2 m3(this includes air filtration system,intercooler, engine oil cooler &starter generator)Preferred size : 1920 (L) X1170 (B) X 980 (H) mmL and H shall not exceed these limitsL - Length of engine along crank shaft axisH - Height of engine.11. Dry weight (max) : 1560 Kgs.(including air cleaning system)12. Generator output : 20 kW (700 Amps / 28 V)13. Oil sump : Dry type14. Fuel : Diesel and shall also operate on multi fuels.
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15. Operating temperatureMinimum ambient temp. : - 20oCMaximum ambient temp. for operation : 50oCCoolant operating temp. : 115oCOil operating temp. : 120oC16. Smoke : Not to exceed 0.5 BSNSUB SYSTEM SPECIFICATION:1. Fuel System :• A spin on type of fuel filter with water separator is preferred.• High pressure injection system is preferred.• Common rail, unit injector or unit pump injection with EDC control is alsopreferred.• If inline pump with mechanical variable speed governor, fuel control based oncoolant temp., the boost air, and also torque control are to be provided.• Speed droop of 10% has to be provided.• The pump should be able to derate for lower power settings.• If DI, the VOC nozzles are preferred.• The pump shall have 24 volt DC fuel shut off arrangement interfaced withEDC.The pump shall have electronic throttle pedal.2. Lubrication system:A coolant cooled engine oil cooler has to be provided as the part of the system.An oil tank with a volume of 80 litres should be accommodated with the enginevolume mentioned at specification of engine against no: 10. The lubrication system shallhave two scavenging pumps and one delivery pump to cater for the operation at theconditions mentioned at specification of engine against point no: 8.
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3.Cooling system:The coolant pump with a flow rate of 1300 lpm with 5 bar pressure should beprovided. A coolant tank of 90 litres capacity has to be provided within the volumementioned at specification of engine against no: 10. Independent cooling circuit ispreferred to cool charge air.4. Starting system:A flywheel starter cum generator in place of conventional generator, starter motorand flywheel is preferred. The starter motor should be capable of starting the engine witha cranking rpm of 140 with operating voltage from 18 to 28 V DC and for an ambienttemperature between -20 to 50oC.5. Air Filtration system:As the system has to operate at desert conditions, air filtration system with twostage filtration shall be provided. The first stage shall be uniflow cyclone filter withpositive dust extraction system filtering coarse particles. The secondary filter is a finefilter with a filtration level up to 3 µm. The secondary filter shall be installed at the outletof turbo charger compressor.The air cleaning system has to cater for 40 hrs of operation in the field beforecleaning / replacing the filter elements. A dust concentration of 2 g/m3shall beconsidered for finalizing the configuration of air filtration system which gives 40 hrs ofoperation.Being a critical item, CVRDE will provide guidance in the configuration,selection of air filter element, clamping and sealing of the elements etc.CVRDE may also suggest vendors based on their experience.
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6. Interfacing with transmission:A provision for a volume of 0.24 m3has to be provided at the output end ofengine is order to accommodate interfacing / intermediate gear train with transmissionwithin the volume mentioned at specification of engine against no : 10.7. Special features:Warning and shutdown mechanism to be provided for the following conditions:1)Low lub. oil pressure2)No coolant flow3)High coolant temperature4)Low coolant level8.Maintenance and ServiceIf EDC controls are used then there should be a provision to use limb on to runthe engine in manual mode in emergency.GENERAL CONDITIONS1. The supplier shall have infrastructure for manufacturing, assembly, inspection andtesting.2. The 80% of the components / subsystems shall be manufactured within India.3. The engine should be provided with suitable ‘Flywheel’ with SAE flywheelhousing or any other adaptation suitable for the transmission which will bedecided during development.4. All necessary 3D models, 2D drawings will be shared with CVRDE and CVRDEmay provide approval for the same.
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5. Vendor to provide all necessary documents of test results, calibration charts toCVRDE.6. CVRDE will be involved in all stages of development to provide necessaryinformation, guidelines and vetting the design.7. Outsourcing/manufacturing by the vendor is permitted after getting approval anddirection from CVRDE8. Provision should be made for measurement of parameters with suitable sensors.9. The engine developed has to undergo 400 hrs of NATO cycle endurance test.10. The engine shall have a life of 800 hrs before overhauling.11. All he filters and filling points for coolant / oil has to be located on top for easymaintenance.12. The vendor shall assure performance guarantee for the development.13. The vendor shall assure product support during guarantee period and at least for aperiod of 5 years.14. The estimated requirement is for six no. of prototype engines15. The vendor shall supply and provide product support for a period of thirty years.
the junk's overpriced,but like it is said in the orbit white brochure,it's working!Vivek K wrote:Welcome to another two decades of foreign junk that we will be taking into war!
In some tanks there are escape-hatches from below, for example T-55 and M-60 etc., but it is highly impractical to load anything from them. Newer tanks usually don't have enough ground clearance to make it practical. Loading from the back may be easier, but I've never thought about it that way. It is not a big deal loading from the top.sivabala wrote:A question to tank gurus or those who have been into a tank before.
Do the tanks have only one door (i.e. top door)? If so, wouldn't it be difficult to load the armaments every time by lifting to tank's top. If there be a door on sides or from underneath it may not require to lift the heavy armaments to the top of the tanks.
Thanks ParGha.ParGha wrote:... Loading from the back may be easier, but I've never thought about it that way. It is not a big deal loading from the top.sivabala wrote:...