International Aerospace Discussion

[brar_w]

The total program cost increase and the per unit increase compared to 2001 or 2002 estimates was bound to happen. It was a pre acquisition-reform era when no ICE of decent quality was congressionally mandated. The assumptions were WRONG and I've written about that at length here earlier.

You couldn't even buy 600+ Super Hornet's and Growlers at the APUC they claimed they could get the the JSF (this was before Lockheed was down-selected btw). This was a post spiral-development era where everyone wants to get every capability upfront for fear of getting it clipped by the Congress and all sorts of crazy assumptions were being made to justify milestones.

Acquisition reform and the new BBP have now negated that to a large extent. On the B-21 for example Bill LaPlante delayed the decision by 4 or so months because he wanted one additional ICE on top of one that was congressionally mandated. He then chose the higher amount and based his budget request on that.

As a net result, the SDD or development of the aircraft saw an increase of between $13 Billion and $15 Billion upon re-baseline. The current estimate is $13.5 Billion accounting for the 500 Million increase recently announced.

The URF price for LRIP1 through LRIP-9 is shown in the chart in my previous post. That's what each customer has paid for the 200 jets delivered and the few dozen more that are expected to be delivered to close out LRIP-9.

LRIP-10 prices will be announced with those contracts and the price will be even lower (URF).

It's getting frustrating now because we have a user that absolutely refuses to go into details even ones a few of us have explained over and over and over and the information has been on the JSF thread for many months.

Even otherwise, all one has to do is use GOOGLE and find the contract cost for LRIP-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 and track how URF has reduced over these batches. He points to ECO's and Concurrency and I've requested him to use the search feature and dig up the Concurrency chart I had provided here. Concurrency cost is now in the sub million dollar a unit since a lot of it is software since the current batches are incorporating these changes at the production line. All this has been provided here including the source of the information (mostly CAPE, GAO or JPO using this data).

Concurrency cost is also now either being carried on the whole by the OEM's or being split. The engine incident from a couple of years ago for example saw retrofit costs covered by P&W to the tune of 100%. I've posted multiple articles here elaborating that.

[Cybaru]

One of the highest priority item on our list should be an indigenous effort to recreate RNG/EC-130 jammer like capability. The incoming C295W would be a great platform to get Jamming and ISR going. 10-11 hour airtime range and decent payload. The whole idea of FA-18 in my mind is to eventually get the jamming capability, which will make a huge difference to IAF.

Something like this will negate requirements for many other different kind of birds in air when delivering packages. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_ ... mpass_Call Perhaps Brar can expand on EC-130s...

[brar_w]

EC-130 is being put on the G550 conformal aircraft the Israeli's use. They are buying empty aircraft and re-hosting the existing EC-130 sensors and jammers on that platform. They'v now begun funding Baseline 3 systems of the Compass Call. I'll do a write up on it next week but it is a very important capability that the USAF has spent a lot of money to keep up to date. The problem was the platform and they wanted to retire these aircraft and start on a new program from scratch but they've now agreed to do a simple swap of systems to a new more capable and more available platform.

EW in general now is being distributed fleet wide. It's no longer the exclusive domain of the dedicated EW/EA aircraft. As the pacific Growler fleet commander explains in the video I posted yersterday, the F-35 (and F-22) have significant capability here and so do all future aircraft including the B-21 and other manned and unmanned aircraft. Cognitive and distributed EW concepts are now being war-gamed and you'll see a big difference emerge in how the current EA assets such as the EC-130 and EA-18G are going to be used when they get new paylaods (NGJ and Baseline 3 CC).

Boeing lobbied quite hard to develop a 737 based Compass Call but the "Big Safari" won on account of a rapid program to take the EC-130 mission systems and host them on the G550 CAEW.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... tr-425173/

[Cybaru]

Good to hear, but unfortunate we haven't started to make this priority. This should be one of our sharpest sticks we put in our arsenal. It requires a complete change in war fighting doctrine though. Looking forward to your writeup.

[Viv S]

Brar,

Does IOT&E have to be a unified process? Most of the pending issues seem to pertain only to the software, which shouldn't be issue as far as the production ramp-up and multi-year procurement is concerned. Just run a firmware update whenever the 3F software is mature and you're golden.

Among the pending hardware issues only the C's launch oscillation appears critical. And that too is only a marginal safety issue rather than an operational problem). The EOTS isn't Gen 4 standard either but being a LRU that can be upgraded somewhere down the lines (Blk 4 probably).

As it is the C comprises only 30 out the 270 F-35s ordered so far (and its production has almost ceased going onto the LRIP 9 & 10). So can the IOT&E proceed for the A & B independently deferring the C for later (maybe.. 2020)?

[Viv S]

One of the highest priority item on our list should be an indigenous effort to recreate RNG/EC-130 jammer like capability. The incoming C295W would be a great platform to get Jamming and ISR going. 10-11 hour airtime range and decent payload. The whole idea of FA-18 in my mind is to eventually get the jamming capability, which will make a huge difference to IAF.

Actually I'd argue a jet aircraft would probably make a better platform than a straight wing prop type.

Where a turboprop would cruise at about 20,000 ft, the same for a jet would be 35-40kft (leading to among other things, a larger FoV). Higher cruise speed leading to a lower time-to-target as well as faster egress. In addition, it'll have far greater power reserves to feed the mission systems.

Downside is the higher cost, which should be acceptable given the limited quantities required for a niche role (just $50-60 mil flyaway for a G550 f.e.). The bulk of the expenditure will anyway be on EW equipment and ancillary customization.

The primary advantage of the C-295 is rough field/highway basing option. But if our primary bases have been rendered inoperational, then the IAF will have far more serious concerns at that point.

[brar_w]

Brar,

Does IOT&E have to be a unified process? Most of the pending issues seem to pertain only to the software, which shouldn't be issue as far as the production ramp-up and multi-year procurement is concerned. Just run a firmware update whenever the 3F software is mature and you're golden.

IOT&E delay is in part a result in the cascading effect of software delay. The JPO's first and foremost responsibility is to deliver 3F as in finish developmental testing work, weapons testing and hand the sofware and capability to the units. One aspect of the delay is the freeing up of the test birds to be sent to the depot so that they can have all the concurrency work performed on them that puts them in the same hardware and software configuration as a post SDD completion block 3F A, B or C.

The JPO asked for some IOT&E work to be done early without all the 2 dozen aircraft being delivered to Gilmore's crew but he rejected it last year. He want's all of them to be available and want's to do all OTE in one go. Then Trump happened and his office did show signs of allowing some testing to happen early when a few of those 2 dozen aircraft are made available and the rest could resume one more aircraft come in.

IOT&E is simply a Milestone-C pre-requisite and the DOTE has a lot of discretion on how he/she conducts it. The end goal here is to make sure that you provide the best value to the troops and taxpayer and get the product out faster and as desired. Gilmore is gone this week. His successor needs to look at and work with the program managers , the operators and the actual testers to develop a plan that gets OTE done with minimal delay so that they don't extent LRIP by 1 year which would have cost in terms of $$. Even otherwise, I expect the Congress to grant the program a Milestone C waiver in case there is a situation where they have to delay increasing the rate to FRP on account of a few months delay in completing IOTE.

Early last year I identified 3F and production ramp up as the biggest remaining challenges and this is still largely true although the latter is now mitigated to some extent. The quality control issues have propped up and this is a flashback of the F-16 program where they also had an agressive ramp up. 3F will come with bugs, and will require re-work and corrections of deficiencies.

There will also be new discoveries on the F-35C which has some testing still to go. This has all happened before with the Block 2 and Block 3I and F-35A and B and all of this has been corrected, and overcome despite of the DOT&E's tall claims that the USAF and USMC could not IOC in time. On the net, a 6 month, 8 month, or 12 month or more delay in IOT&E completion does not affect the program in any significant way. There are programs that have indefinitely delayed IOTE or have received complete waivers from it. It will be done here but this and other programs and the pentagon in general needs a tester as DOTE and not a bureaucrat even though it is a political apointee.

OTE is a US DOD Milestone-C pre-requisite and the rest of the world does not rely or abide by it. It is the last unified operational assessment of the fully developed product. Along the way, the developers, and operators have conducted their own operational assessments. Foreign partner nations are spending millions of their own money to conduct their own OTE including contracting out with US weapon ranges, red air and even private adversary aircraft suppliers.

[brar_w]

One of the highest priority item on our list should be an indigenous effort to recreate RNG/EC-130 jammer like capability. The incoming C295W would be a great platform to get Jamming and ISR going. 10-11 hour airtime range and decent payload. The whole idea of FA-18 in my mind is to eventually get the jamming capability, which will make a huge difference to IAF.

Actually I'd argue a jet aircraft would probably make a better platform than a straight wing prop type.

Where a turboprop would cruise at about 20,000 ft, the same for a jet would be 35-40kft (leading to among other things, a larger FoV). Higher cruise speed leading to a lower time-to-target as well as faster egress. In addition, it'll have far greater power reserves to feed the mission systems.

Downside is the higher cost, which should be acceptable given the limited quantities required for a niche role (just $50-60 mil flyaway for a G550 f.e.). The bulk of the expenditure will anyway be on EW equipment and ancillary customization.

The primary advantage of the C-295 is rough field/highway basing option. But if our primary bases have been rendered inoperational, then the IAF will have far more serious concerns at that point.

I agree. One of the reasons why the C-130 mission area is being shifted to the G550 is because the newer electronic systems are getting so advanced that the aircraft's physical performance is now an impediment to accomplishing the mission. Earlier, they had a lot of capability growth within the C-130 envelope but now they need to fly higher, and cruise faster to get the most out of their own equipment.

@Cybaru, while I'll provide the promised write up on the Compass Call later, I did provide a few articles form the Association of Old Crows, Journal on EA and EW in the current times and future possibilities. Below are the links to those posts -

Starting - viewtopic.php?t=5092&start=2480#p2020897

On distributed EW you are essentially looking at both spatial and technique distribution to multiple platforms. An F-35A doing EW work won't be any different from an F-35A doing strike or air-superiority. In fact an F-35 doing strike can pipe out geolocated RF targets for the stand off force. 100% of the aircrafts are wired and kitted to do this without requiring any new systems and these things are handled autonomously through the CNI..The pilot isn't doing anything extra. Similarly, you could add SEAD/DEAD weapons to them to make them capable of defeating these targets themselves and the AARGM ER is being developed for this role. It will be a 300+ km supersonic ARM with counter shut down capability.

So much so is the importance of the EW part on the F-35 that the USAF has one dedicated EW squadron (53rd EW group out of Eglin) comprising of around 150 engineers and technicians from the USAF, USN and USMC, committed 100% to the program and they could make use of another given that they are behind in completing their libraries for the ASQ-239. No previous legacy program has had to do this at this scale. Even compared to the ATF and F-22, the work footprint is significantly larger.

I posted this earlier but I'll post it again to put things in context -



One thing to keep in mind here is that Electronic Attack is not to be interchangeably used with Electronic Warfare. EA and particularly AEA is one component of the broader EW mission. You're not jamming a threat all the time. Below is a good description of what the broader EW mission is with EA being a subset.



Now getting to Rakesh's point about the F-35 and Growler, this explains some of the work where there is overlap. Remember, F-35 has a self-protection EA focus and not an escort or stand off jamming mission area. No strike fighter is capable of performing stand off or escort jamming using an internal self protection suite. If you designed on you would be adding hundreds of Kg's, and a lot of size to the aircraft to support this mission area. That is not happening.

The F-35 relies on its radar and its self--protection suite to protect it from RF sensors and weapons. It carries decoys to provide an additional layer of protection. Since the radar is part of how it performs Electronic Attack, if in band the radar can actually perform jamming from range given it's size and power. In fact they tried out the Electronic Attack features during Northern Edge, the largest EW exercise the US joint forces participate in, starting in 2009 using the Mission support aircraft housing the radar. The latest block F-22 gives it's APG-77 radar this capability and Raytheon demonstrated EA capability on it's F-15 radar's as well. This capability works better on the F-22 and F-35 because they are able to get a lot closer to the emitting source on account of their higher survivability and much like anything RF, the closer you are the less power you need to successfully disrupt operations on an emitter.

Another area of distributed EW effects is in the stand-in jamming mission, a domain that has increased many folds with the proliferation of the MALD-J within the US services. How you network this, and how you maneuver within the space is of ultimate importance.

__

The threat is becoming digital, smart and is showing up with a lot of processing and computing capability. This agile threat is not going to be countered using your legacy models where you have a few dedicated electronic-attack aircrafts taking care of the emitters and ensuring fleet survivability. The threat is moving the response into the adaptive and cognitive Electronic Warfare domain and here distributing your effects is a pre-requisite to successfully implementing this strategy.

Adaptive EW is essentially looking at the threat, understanding how it adapts in the presence of jamming and then modifying your techniques (both to measure and counter) to stay with the threat. The spectrum is large and the threat now plays in a very wide frequency range. Cognitive EW goes one step beyond that where you are not only adapting to the agile threat but you are using machine learning to develop, on the fly, counter techniques and then distributing the successful responses to the fleet so that when such patterns are encountered the responses are ready. This is where there is a tremendous investment is being focused on through a few DARPA and USAF/USN programs.

Notable ones (use google) being -

- Adaptive Radar Countermeasures (ARC)
- Behavioral Learning for Adaptive Electronic Warfare (BLADE)
- Precise Reference Sensing for Cognitive EW (PRESENCE)

[Neshant]

Adaptive EW is essentially looking at the threat, understanding how it adapts in the presence of jamming and then modifying your techniques (both to measure and counter) to stay with the threat. The spectrum is large and the threat now plays in a very wide frequency range. Cognitive EW goes one step beyond that where you are not only adapting to the agile threat but you are using machine learning to develop, on the fly, counter techniques and then distributing the successful responses to the fleet so that when such patterns are encountered the responses are ready. This is where there is a tremendous investment is being focused on through a few DARPA and USAF/USN programs.

The whole machine learning paradigm should have been part & parcel of 5th gen aircraft to justify the amount of money spent on it.

Using DSP to figure out emission frequencies across a wide band, combining that with opto-electronic intelligence, sticking that into machine learning algos, sending a summary of the results back to the AWACS/ELINT mothership which combines that info with other satellite based goodies and redistributes a plan of attack to all air/ground/sea friendlies.

The best initial starting point for machine learning should be in air-to-air missiles where the optical/radar sensors on the missile try to predict the next evasive maneuver of the fighter plane and where to strike. Developing a training set for that could be done almost entirely in simulation and validated in real life (with non-live missiles).

Already there exists video cameras in cars that can predict (with some margin of error) the likelyhood of an impending crash faster than a human by monitoring the driver's view and feeding that data into machine learning algos.

Nothing says that existing aircraft cannot be modified for the purposes of incorporating such technologies.

The approach to creating 5th gen aircraft should have started with some of the above and THEN evolved into the need for an aircraft rather than the other way around. Existing planes could have been modified & upgraded with the above "add-ons" until a point it no longer became practical and a new plane was needed.

This is the reason India should pursue the MK2 and add to its capabilities until 5th gen technologies are part of its makeup - rather than running out to make a sexy angle bodied AMCA airframe and calling it a day. The later does absolute zero to advance 5th generation technologies other than as a feel good factor that something that looks externally like a 5th gen plane is flying around. Likewise, China's & Russia's claim to having produced 5th gen planes must surely be bogus.

Gentlemen, 5th gen is only NOW beginning, the technologies for which (other than AESA radar) having not been adequately developed in the late 80s/early 90s when the F-35 was conceived.

[Neshant]

Did you read the report or just blindly post it.
.

So the Sputnik article is wrong. That is all that needed to be verified. The rest has been in the public domain for nearly a year, nothing of surprise.

I am glad at least Sputnik did not bold and increase font size.

Thanks.

Sputnik article is right. 139 to 160 mil was the estimated per unit cost (depending on model) 3 years ago.
It surely has not gone down since then with all the problems and delays.

Secondly, the cost for the fixes and retro-fits for hundreds of aircraft is yet to be ascertained.
The real lifecycle costs are only going to be known once these aircraft have been deployed for a few years.
Once the first major problem is discovered, the per unit cost is going to go ballistic.

So get ready to cut the check out of the shoe box.

The real unit cost of LRIP-5 topped $200 million although admittedly this is for a low volume production run.

$160 mil is a realistic estimate.... or maybe an optimistic estimate.

-----

ANALYSIS: F-35 LRIP 5 Contracts: Unit Cost Tops $200M for First Time

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articl ... 7i%3E.html

[Neshant]

Re-negotiate the contract with LM.
Cut the number of F-35 down to 1200.
Increase the requirements for incorporation of real 5th gen capabilities.
Give them a longer production timeline & relaxed delivery schedule.
If they have to increase the unit cost for that, so be it.

If they do a half ass, rush job merely to push planes out the door as is happening now, it will not end well.

----------------------

Lockheed Martin F-35 Update: Pentagon Report Reveals ‘Well-Documented Deficiencies’ In Program

Lockheed Martin’s F-35 program has been criticized in a performance evaluation report released by Pentagon. The report documented 276 “deficiencies in combat performance” and said Donald Trump’s administration should “rigorously and comprehensively review” the aircraft's effectiveness.

“Significant, well-documented deficiencies; for hundreds of these, the program has no plan to adequately fix and verify with flight test within [System Development and Demonstration]; although it is common for programs to have unresolved deficiencies after development, the program must assess and mitigate the cumulative effects of these remaining deficiencies on F-35 effectiveness and suitability,” the Pentagon’s Office of Operational Testing and Evaluation said in the recently-released report.

The F-35 program has come under fire for it high cost. With a price tag $400 billion, it is the Pentagon’s costliest program, and additional operating costs are likely to take the total to above $1 trillion.

“The current schedule-driven program plans to close out testing in 2017 do not include enough time to fix these key deficiencies, nor time to verify corrections in flight test,” the report stated. “The program currently has 17 known and acknowledged failures to meet the contract specification requirements, all of which the program is reportedly planning to get relief from the SDD [System Development and Demonstration] contract due to lack of time and funding.”

http://www.ibtimes.com/lockheed-martin- ... es-2475732

[brar_w]

From Sprey we are now going to Briganti. Great going !! I have absolutely no intention to engage if you insist on Pierre Sprey, Briganti, Sputnik et al.

You've also not understood what the scope of Cognitive and adaptive EW is. It is not generation dependent. Even 4th generation EW solutions are getting it as we speak. I would post a lot more material but I don't wan't to do homework for you. Go dig up which systems are lining up.

Regarding the cost, again USG supplied URF data is out there for all to see. The SAR is for all to see. Briganti and his anti US MIC spin won't fool anyone. Why not write a letter to the Aviation Week or Flightglobal editors to have them supply you something? If you're a US citizen you can file a FOIA request and get exact URF data. You may even be able to score more details.

Of course there is a difference between URF, APUC and PAUC. I've posted it in the previous page. Most reasonable forum members here will understand it.

[NRao]

Now we have new authors, with very old news.

Vishakha Sonawane writes on all types of topics. Defense is not one of his fields of expertise, not that he has any.

http://www.ibtimes.com/reporters/vishakha-sonawane

Running out of real issues.



.
Trump cannot be released valve, even with his silly Twitter account.

[Neshant]

The report itself is from the Pentagon. so there's no denying it.

[brar_w]

Once again, The URF, APUC and PAUC information is available for all to see. I've posted both the URF cost from LRIP 1 - LRIP 9, and the APUC and PAUC form the SAR. I've also explained what each means and why these costs differ. Go over that stuff. All the major aerospace and defense publications including IHS/IDR, AviationWeek, Flight etc have reported this information after every batch. Not sure why this is so hard to understand.

With pentagon reports, try to go over what cost they are showing about each weapons system and not blindly see a $XXX Million number and attribute "Unit Cost" to them. That may fly for a high-school project or for popular mechanics, but it's not accurate without context. As explained there are broadly 3 costs you track (as in congressionally mandated to track).

If you were to find out what the F-35 will cost this year, I'll look at the URF and the price Lockheed and P&W were given under the fixed price contract. If I want to see the latest average unit cost, in terms of total program acquisition spend divided by the total US program of record + a set amount for FMS and partners, I look at APUC. APUC is ALWAYS for the entire program i.e. it is the actual money spend acquiring the aircraft that you have acquired over the program life, and estimating what it is likely to cost to acquire the rest of the project. And this includes end item and end item acquisition cost. PAUC is the same..it is for the entire program and not production of the current batch.

If you want to see how much the program cost to design, develop, test and acquire I look at PAUC. Neither PAUC, nor APUC tell us ANYTHING about the current unit cost of aircraft comping out of FW. Similarly, URF does not tell us what the aircraft is likely to cost 5 years from now.

We can develop trend lines, in terms of how URF has decrease with each subsequent block candidate. That data is made public by the body that negotiates the firm fixed price contracts. this is the information that is known and which is not based on an estimate but hard numbers negotiated between the three negotiating parties. APUC and PAUC are far looking estimates. They require estimating out year quantity and cost. URF is based on actual money spent on acquisition and agreed upon with the vendors.

Honestly, I've really run out of ways of making this more simpler to understand.

Re-negotiate the contract with LM.
Cut the number of F-35 down to 1200.

Are you thinking out loud or reporting on something? There is no long term contract with Lockheed and LMA is not guaranteed of any production number beyond those on order or pre-order. There is no long term contract binding either parties to a production quantity. This is basic information.

Increase the requirements for incorporation of real 5th gen capabilities.

You mean the ones that are your own creation?? Those were at best 4th generation...But at all costs as JAYS suggested, get rid of the chameleon skin or you'll have a lot of lost invisible aircraft.

The irony here is that you wan't a hyper cruising, chameleon skin wearing, self healing Watson and want it to replace the JSF because you think it is unaffordable.

[NRao]

Disconnect, like the $160 million topic, again? {Bait and switch?}

Nothing new I guess. In either this discussion and that article.

BR had dedicated an entire thread to this very topic - for a whole 2 years or so. lol Just to say a brand new product has problems

May be Rip Van Winkle is real.

[Cybaru]

Actually I'd argue a jet aircraft would probably make a better platform than a straight wing prop type.

Where a turboprop would cruise at about 20,000 ft, the same for a jet would be 35-40kft (leading to among other things, a larger FoV). Higher cruise speed leading to a lower time-to-target as well as faster egress. In addition, it'll have far greater power reserves to feed the mission systems.

Downside is the higher cost, which should be acceptable given the limited quantities required for a niche role (just $50-60 mil flyaway for a G550 f.e.). The bulk of the expenditure will anyway be on EW equipment and ancillary customization.

The primary advantage of the C-295 is rough field/highway basing option. But if our primary bases have been rendered inoperational, then the IAF will have far more serious concerns at that point.

I agree. One of the reasons why the C-130 mission area is being shifted to the G550 is because the newer electronic systems are getting so advanced that the aircraft's physical performance is now an impediment to accomplishing the mission. Earlier, they had a lot of capability growth within the C-130 envelope but now they need to fly higher, and cruise faster to get the most out of their own equipment.

Agree with both of you that it would make more sense for G550 type aircraft as it will be more survivable platform as it will have more time to deploy/maneuver with incoming missiles. It will certainly be target-able from only certain ground sites due to its good ceiling. Anyways most of these HVAA will probably fly maneuvers in cleaned out boxes/zones. I only suggested C295W as it is something that is given to be made at home and will probably mean easy to order for the Airforces without drawn out tenders and redtape that cope with each selection process. The Interior kit will have to be DRDO/Israeli/Russian stuff in our case, so the real tender will be about the platform. I would rather take some platform in the next 3-4 years rather a gold plated one 5-7 years from now.

[brar_w]

The report itself is from the Pentagon. so there's no denying it.

So let's dissect the report (pdf) NRAO posted shall we? It claims (Pg. 163/F35)

Program Unit Cost $138.3 Million in $FY16$.


What did I provide you many days ago including just recently?



PAUC of $127 Million in $FY12$.


Imagine how much forum bandwidth could have been saved f only you had bothered going over some of the stuff I had shared with you.

Here is an exercise if you are up for it - Use the DOD inflation data and convert the FY12 cost (in my annotated chart) into FY16 cost.

My guess is that both the GAO and the CAPE supplied data are within 1-2% of each other. Remember, these are trying to estimate 20 years of acquisition costs that has not yet occurred. 1-2% for a 38 year program of record that has more than 20 years of acquisition still left to do is practically as close you are going to get to FULL AGREEMENT.

Even the PAUC has come down since they began estimating it DURING production and acquisition.

The program was re-baselined in 2011 (FY12). During that they made the APB and attempted to estimate the PAUC and APUC for the entire program (what had been spent till then, and was still left to be spend through 2038).

How much has this estimate changed since then??

The PAUC number for the airframe (minus the engine) has come down by 5.29%, and the APUC number (estimate for the vehicle minus the engine) has come down by 5.81%.

On the propulsion program, the PAUC has come down by 6.83% (compared to the FY14 APB for the propulsion system) ad the APUC has come down by - 9.34%.

You would have been able to easily find all this out if you only spent time going through program documents the sources for which were provided to you al along.

Now the next question would be...BUT $127 Million in FY12 is different from what you have been claiming for LRIP-9 ($102.1 Million). The answer to that is that the $102.1 Million is the URF (LRIP-9) for the F-35A. The PAUC is for the entire program and all three variants. The B and C will always be more expensive than the A driving up the overall PAUC and APUC compared to a scenario where all variants purchased were the F-35A.

Now, let's visit the URF cost for LRIP-9 shall we? For what? The 4th time??



Link - http://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/33483/

Hopefully the concept of PAUC, APUC and URF is a lot clearer now.

[Viv S]

Just for the benefit of others.

[Neshant]

Program Unit Cost $138.3 Million in $FY16$.

I believe it was for 2014. But whatever...

Here is an exercise if you are up for it - Use the DOD inflation data and convert the FY12 cost (in my annotated chart) into FY16 cost.

USD is a lot stronger today than it was in 2012, and commodity (material) costs have fallen.
The company had years to streamline & optimize its production lines.
Yet the price of this jet is up even with larger build volumes.

Hopefully the concept of PAUC, APUC and URF is a lot clearer now.

A simple question :

What will be the total per unit cost of this plane all inclusive of repairs and rework necessary to fix the faulty planes that are shot out the factory door without passing quality control? For A, for B, for C.

Finding out that number is more akin to solving a murder mystery for the F-35.

[brar_w]

I believe it was for 2014. But whatever...

Being lazy much? I cropped it, and even annotated it for you.



The reason they have a 14 date is because that was the last time they calculated it. The GAO has simply taken that data and brought it up to FY16 dollars. GAO reports..CAPE and other organizations actually do the math. These organizations do not refresh estimates every year but GAO publishes it's report at a much higher frequency. Therefore they just inflate up for the particular FY.

The SAR is by law required to post a base year cost (FY12 for the F-35 program since that was when it was re-baselined) and a TY cost across the POR.

USD is a lot stronger today than it was in 2012, and commodity (material) costs have fallen.

Again, go through the DOD inflation indices and get the cost. Or you could simply do an actual non DOD inflation calculator. What do you get? Around $134 Million. That's around 3% variance going on a non-DOD inflation calculator.

Again, there are ways to calculate the inflation adjusted FY cost from 12 to 16 using DOD supplied inflation data. They use it for budgeting purposes. I'll let you do it though because you can't be provided everything on a platter all the time.

The company had years to streamline & optimize its production lines.
Yet the price of this jet is up even with larger build volumes.

You still do not get it. What they are measuring is the PAUC - i.e. the cost to design, develop, test, certify, procure approximately 2450 aircraft. They are already factoring in planned ramp ups and production efficiency gains in their estimates. It is estimating the total program spend between 2000 and 2038 and taking that number and dividing it by the quantity.

Still confused about what PAUC and APUC means? Go over Viv's graphic. Ask specific questions and a few folks here can provide answers. But do not be lazy or argue just for the sake of argument.

And as per the estimates changing over time. If you read my last post I've posted the exact reductions in PAUC and APUC estimates since the 12APB (Air Vehicle) and the 14 APB (Propulsion system).

Here is what I wrote -

The program was re-baselined in 2011 (FY12). During that they made the APB and attempted to estimate the PAUC and APUC for the entire program (what had been spent till then, and was still left to be spend through 2038).

How much has this estimate changed since then??

The PAUC number for the airframe (minus the engine) has come down by 5.29%, and the APUC number (estimate for the vehicle minus the engine) has come down by 5.81%.

On the propulsion program, the PAUC has come down by 6.83% (compared to the FY14 APB for the propulsion system) ad the APUC has come down by - 9.34%.

You can find this information in the materials who's sources I had provided earlier.

A simple question :

What will be the total per unit cost of this plane all inclusive of repairs and rework necessary to fix the faulty planes that are shot out the factory door without passing quality control? For A, for B, for C.

I'm not going to provide you the concurrency data because I insist you dig up that chart here using the search feature on your own. I've provided it not once but multiple times. If you're truly interested you can dig it up using the search feature.

Total per unit cost for the program as in the APUC or PAUC (estimated) is given in the chart I have posted now 3-4 times. That is what it will cost. As I had told you earlier, the concurrency cost post LRIP 5 is arranged so that it is shared for new discoveries and covered fully for those that are known but that need to be worked into either the depots or into production line.

I've provided a nice chart depicting concurrency cost per production block from LRIP 1 through LRIP-11 iirc. It's here in the JSF thread. If you use the search term JSF / F-35 concurrency you should be able to look it up. It's not a secret nor hard to find (here or on the www).

The last I did the math the impact of ECO's and Concurrency on PAUC is between $600,00 and $750,000 per unit (to understand this you need to understand for PAUC means).

[NRao]

Be sure to read the right articles/docs AND no reading in between the lines.

[Neshant]

The reason they have a 14 date is because that was the last time they calculated it. The GAO has simply taken that data and brought it up to FY16 dollars.

They have not performed a cost adjustment on anything other than the US dollar's purchasing power.
It does not factor in the cost growth of the program. Not even LM seems to have a handle on that one.
That is what I mean by it is from 2014.
There is no point calculating a cost adjustment based on 2014 data when the program costs have already escalated higher in 2016.

Again, go through the DOD inflation indices and get the cost.

Just about any cooking of the books can be done to justify a number.
The fact is the entire cost escalation is due to program mismanagement on the part of LM.
Remind me again why the taxpayer should be paying for it.

My question below is a valid one.... unless you think its not reasonable for people buying stuff to know how much they have to pay for it.

A simple question :

What will be the total per unit cost of this plane all inclusive of repairs and rework necessary to fix the faulty planes that are shot out the factory door without passing quality control? For A, for B, for C.

Survey says....

[brar_w]

Another error that could come is that folks look at PAUC and assume that's how much you'll have to pay to get an F-35. PAUC is the cost that you've spent across the program. If the JPO decides to go back and request a 58th F-35 in LRIP-9 for example and that F-35 happens to be an A varient, then the cost they'll pay is going to be $102.1 Million (URF) since that is what was included in the fixed price contract with LM and P&W. Similarly, this is likely to be close to $95 Million in LRIP-10 and they are aiming for $85 Million by FRP-1.

Even APUC is program wide and not lot specific. Think of APUC as all the URF's added together over the 39 year acquisition history and then adding other non end item cost to it (refer to viv's graphic). APUC is an estimate because we only have 2000-2016 acquisition data as CERTAIN...the rest (2016-2038) is just an estimate. We already know that the APUC and PAUC estimates have come down from 12 and 14 APB's for the vehicle and engine but that isn't going to happen for long. Once they kick in higher rates of production (LRIP-10 through FRP-1) these estimates will get a lot closer to the reality because you will be able to predict stuff with more accuracy since you have hard evidence of rate production available.

They have not performed a cost adjustment on anything other than the US dollar's purchasing power.

True.

t does not factor in the cost growth of the program.

PAUC is an estimate. $500 Million increase in RDT&E results in approximately $204,000 up adjustment in PAUC. So if you look at my graph that I've now provided multiple times, that $127 Million PAUC will become $127.2 Million on account of this.

The $500 Million dollar program spend is in FY18 and FY19 so the FY16 numbers would not reflect that. There will be reductions and additions in the next SAR..and the net will be presented to us in March-April this year. That will be the SAR that is used by Trump's first budget in the FY18 planning processs.

When you read the SAR and see the % adjustment (compared to the APB) it is the net of both up adjustments, and down-adjustments to the PAUC i.e. there are some costs added to the program, and some reductions taken on a count of better quality data. What you get (as in an actual reduction in the FY16 SAR) is a net result of that.

The same will happen in FY17 when they re-visit the PAUC and APUC estimates. There will be additions in cost, one of those being $500 Million increase in SDD RTD&E spend, and there could be reductions as well. We'll know what the net impact of all these changes is when we get the SAR. I'll post it here just like I did last year, prior to the 2017 budgeting process

. It's good to see the PAUC and APUC from time to time, but in doing so one can very easily loose sight that these are still estimates. URF on the other hand is a product of fixed price contracts (All F-35 and F-135 production contracts post LRIP-5 have been Fixed Price) negotiated over an annual production lot. It is KNOWN and gives a certain $$ amount. There is no estimating done in that..it is the cost each nation pays to acquire that aircraft for that lot..nothing more (no 20 year projections) and nothing less.

That is what I mean by it is from 2014.

There was no RDT&E increase in the FY14 and FY16 program. They budgeted for what they asked for. The increase will come at the very end of the SDD program where they require $500 Million additional funds to complete development.

Just about any cooking of the books can be done to justify a number.

There is no special inflation adjustment done for ONE program. There are standard set of inflation data that you use for any program within that category. Just as there are commercially available tools to calculate US inflation in the 2012 to 2016 timeframe, DOD has a set of charts that it mandates its budget planners use to do their calculations as per most standard accounting processes and procedures in most industries where there are multi-year programs.

Inflation data is actual data that is used Pentagon-wide. If you are going to accuse the entire USG of cooking the books in regards to how inflation is calculated, provide evidence. This should really go without saying. And here you are relying on Sputnik for costing data and then throwing wild accusations that the entire DOD inflation indices materials and what they use to develop their budgets is fabricated.

There is no point calculating a cost adjustment based on 2014 data when the program costs have already escalated higher in 2016.

No they have not. The program (JPO) has come out and said that they will seek extra funds to complete development. Those funds will come mainly from the FY18 (2018) budget and some from the FY19 (2019) budgets. Those are not accounted for in 2016 or 2017. We are currently in FY17 and the FY18 budgeting process is just begining. Trump will provide the Congress his first budget in the next few months. The RDT&E higher request has only been announced in late 2016, or early 2017. The actual money will be provided to the JPO over the last 2 fiscal year SDD budgets.

Think of it this way, the increase ($500 Million) is on account of the government labs and testers taking extra months to finish their work, the software development team taking extra time to furnish to requirements and the depots taking extra time to implement all the ECO's. The $ increase shows up when it is consumed i.e. it is paid to the program during the time that extra work is performed.

If you look at the GAO report, you'll see that they also estimate what funds are required to complete SDD. Those it estimated (in 2016) to be $2.9 Billion. Those would have been split into the FY17 and FY18 budgets. In 2017 (for FY18 budget) this estimate would rise to $3.4 Billion and this will be reflected in their next report This would have an impact of roughly $200K to the PAUC assuming there is no other downwards adjustment over the same time-period, as there has been from 2014 to 2016 (See PAUC adjustment in the 16SAR).

** Actual GAO report for 2017 won't reflect $3.4 billion but [$2.9 Billion + $500 Million ] - FY17 RDT&E program spend i.e. they'll subtract the money that they spent in FY17 because it's no longer left to be spent to complete program development.

[alexis]

Neshant, i can agree that a souped up F15 SE may be a better bang for the buck but how long will it serve? it would need to be replaced by a 6th gen fighter and what is the assurance that this mythical fighter will arrive in budget? All R&D projects have an inherent risk and cost escalation; but everyone will need to engage in it nevertheless.

[Viv S]

Yet the price of this jet is up even with larger build volumes.

:groan:

F-35A - Unit Flyaway Cost

LRIP 1: $250 mil
.
.
LRIP 5: $125 mil
LRIP 6: $118 mil
LRIP 7: $112 mil
LRIP 8: $108 mil
LRIP 9: $102 mil
LRIP 10: $96 mil (forecast)

A simple question :

What will be the total per unit cost of this plane all inclusive of repairs and rework necessary to fix the faulty planes that are shot out the factory door without passing quality control? For A, for B, for C.

Finding out that number is more akin to solving a murder mystery for the F-35.

Or you could just use Google. Its the unwillingness to do the basic reading that's fraying Brar's good temper.

FYI retrofit costs - $4.8 mil/unit. ($1.69 bn ~ 350 units; LRIP 1-10)

LRIP 10 retrofit cost - <$750,000/unit.

[brar_w]

Neshant, i can agree that a souped up F15 SE may be a better bang for the buck but how long will it serve? it would need to be replaced by a 6th gen fighter and what is the assurance that this mythical fighter will arrive in budget? All R&D projects have an inherent risk and cost escalation; but everyone will need to engage in it nevertheless.

That will only be the case if you can build an F-15 Silent Eagle affordably compared to the alternative i.e. F-35A. The current cost the USAF pays to LMA and P&W is 102.1 Million and next lot that is likely to drop to $95 or so Million. If they enter a block buy/ bulk agreement starting LOTS 11 or 12 it could for the first time dip below $90 Million.

The F-15 Silent Eagle, is a hypothetical 80,000+ lb MTOW, twin engined heavy fighter that has features not yet fully developed or certified. How much cheaper can you get? As things stand with production at Boeing, you'd be lucky to get the current advanced Strike Eagle at that unit price and even if you cannibalize the F-35A order to feed into standard F-15E+ (No SE feature) you won't be able to bring it's cost down much less (and you'll end up increasing the F-35A URF in the process because you take away the economies of scale).

But that would only work if the F-15E or a variant of it actually met the requirements. Survivability alone will DQ it hence none of these variants were allowed to compete for either the ATF or the JSF. The idea of a highly modified legacy aircraft, even with signature reduction was dropped on both of these programs during the AOA stage. Heck on the ATF they even modified older aircraft to see what they get if some of these technologies are ported over. There were even F-16 variants (a more logical alternative than the SE) in the F-16 U, XL and other modified versions that were rejected.

At some point in time you must start afresh and design in the features that you desire. It was for this very reason that they cut the cord on modified F-4's and went with the F-15 and F-16. This is a requirements driven process and they take the analysis of alternatives very seriously.

The end goal at the re-baseline for the JSF program was to get the Unit cost (flyaway) of an F-35A with full mission systems and propulsion down to 4+ generation aircraft levels. That's where it is at and it is on a path to get even lower by the time the full production ramp up is completed.

As I have asked others do simply look at how much Dassault charges for each Rafale, or how much Typhoon customers are paying for their aircraft (flyaway costs). The F-35A is already competitive with that and the latter is only in Low Rate production plan given its production strategy.

[brar_w]

All R&D projects have an inherent risk and cost escalation; but everyone will need to engage in it nevertheless.

This is an important point you have made. Even relatively simple R&D programs can result in "actual cost" being significantly different from " planned cost". On the F-18E/F program which was an upgrade of an existing and , in service design (F/A-18C), Boeing ended up completing the program with a PAUC increase of 25.75% compared to its 1992 estimate, and an APUC increase of 20.46% (compared also to the 92 APB). That's quite a significant increase in cost for an upgraded variant.

A lot of this had to do with the process of setting up the programs in the 90's that has now been rectified to a very large extent. I touch on that here - viewtopic.php?f=3&t=5098&p=2102378#p2101866

The amusing bit here of course is that he thinks the F-35 is unaffordable but in the very next breath he advocates for a hypersonic-cruising, self-healing Watson that can fire directed energy weapons from long range and has visual spectrum low-observability.

I advocate pursuing such an aircraft but canceling it just as its development is about to be completed and pursuing a space fighter instead. Once we are close to that space fighter we can cancel it and pursue something that is even better. And on and on we go.

[Indranil]

Looks like a Thai Gripen has crashed during an aerial demonstration.

[ashishvikas]

^^ yeah, US$70 million (2008 cost) crashed during Children's day Airshow.

Possibly, It will be termed as Pilot's fault.

http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/general ... lot-killed

[Rakesh]

Squadron Leader Dilokrit Pattavee - the Thai pilot who was killed flying the Gripen...
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/img/new ... 23715.jpeg

[Kartik]

TAI Hurkus trainer progressing

From AW&ST, only posting some of the excerpts of the article. Interesting to note that the Hurkus has faced issues with rudder and elevator authority that required some re-design. Also note the more powerful engine for the armed Hurkus variant. We haven't yet heard any mention of a more powerful engine than the 1160 shp engine for the HTT-40 even though it too is supposedly going to have an armed variant.

...

The Hurkus-B will be fitted with an enhanced Aselsan-produced avionics suite, three 6 X 8-in. multifunction displays and a simulation suite capable of simulating weapons and sensors. It will also be the first aircraft to be equipped with BAE Systems LiteHUD head-up display, which uses optical waveguide technology.

The avionics suite is still in development and should begin ground rig testing in the coming weeks.

The Hurkus-B’s first flight is planned for December, with initial deliveries to the Turkish air force planned for June 2018; all 15 are due to be delivered by June 2019. The air force has options to buy 40 more. It is hoped that the simulation capabilities will allow the downloading of some advanced training tasks from the more costly Northrop Grumman T-38M Talon.

The air force is also planning to purchase a Hurkus simulator being developed by Havelsan, and TAI has begun work on logistics support options ranging from performance-based logistics to a lower-cost spare-parts-only contract.

“It is a pilot’s aircraft and extremely forgiving for students,” says TAI flight-test manager Serdar Cora.

A challenging area of development for the Hurkus program was to ensure hands-off-controls spin recovery. Early flight testing revealed a lack of elevator and rudder authority, which was subsequently addressed with larger control surfaces, a leading-edge root extension to the horizontal stabilizers and a small ventral fin. Also, winglets have been added to reduce induced drag, but they have had a minor impact on roll rate.

Engineers have also cut around 100 kg out of the Hurkus-B airframe to save weight.

The aircraft offers the best view of student and sky from an instructor’s view, Ozcan Ertem, TAI’s vice president for aircraft, tells Aviation Week.

But this seating alteration was a challenge to introduce. Because the instructor’s head is much closer to the canopy, the company had to certify an explosive canopy fracturing system, the first time such a system has been certified by EASA.
..

The company has always held the option of making a light-attack version of the aircraft, electing to install the more powerful 1,600-hp engine over an 1,100-hp version, and the Hurkus’s wing has been designed to accommodate three pylons per wing.
..

[NRao]

While checking out the Chinese AF:



https://theaviationist.com/2014/01/31/c ... warplanes/

BTW, since the Chinese site where the image was posted focuses on scale models, photoshop compositions etc., we can’t be sure the image whether the photo is genuine or it simply depicts a diorama.

Anyway, from left to right you can ID: Shenyang J-11, Chengdu J-10, Shenyang J-8II, Shenyang J-8, Chengdu J-7, Shenyang J-6, Shenyang JJ-2. Front row: Xian JH-7A, Nanchang A5.

[Cybaru]

That J-8 really seems like a gigantic Mig-21!

[NRao]

That J-8 really seems like a gigantic Mig-21!

With the intakes moved to the side.

something similar was proposed by an IIT -Bombay prof instead of the LCA.

[Cybaru]

No, the one I am looking at is the figure in the middle number "4" from either side. Dual engined single variable nose intake.

[Neshant]

LRIP 5: $125 mil

Learn about the numbers game being played with what you see and what you pay :
Claim is $125 million for LRIP 5. Actual cost is....

ANALYSIS: F-35 LRIP 5 Contracts: Unit Cost Tops $200M for First Time
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bi ... le=feature

Its the unwillingness to do the basic reading that's fraying Brar's good temper.

He's well paid for F-35 marketing activities...

LRIP 10 retrofit cost - <$750,000/unit.

That will be the cost of flying the aircraft to the base to get housed & ready for fixing.
Then the meter will start running.

[Neshant]

Neshant, i can agree that a souped up F15 SE may be a better bang for the buck but how long will it serve? it would need to be replaced by a 6th gen fighter and what is the assurance that this mythical fighter will arrive in budget? All R&D projects have an inherent risk and cost escalation; but everyone will need to engage in it nevertheless.

My point is that you get higher bang for the buck developing new generation technologies and adding them incrementally to existing aircraft.
It can be done at a fraction of the cost of the amount wasted on the F-35.
The point at which you actually need to develop a new aircraft is when you achieve diminishing returns trying to upgrade existing aircraft.
Diminishing returns on the performance-cost front.

Secondly, there is no real distinction as it stands between 4+ and 5th generation aircraft.
This is partly because what is 5th gen technology and how it is a leap ahead of 4+ gen technology was never clearly defined.

In some areas, the so called 5th gen aircraft ends up being worse not better in performance than the 4/4+ gen aircraft.
In some areas, adding external payloads defeats the whole concept of stealth on an all-stealth air craft.
In some areas, not adding the external payloads that inventive 3rd party companies come up with limits the capabilities of the 5th gen aircraft.
In some areas, you can add roughly the same capability for a lot less money to an existing 4/4+ gen aircraft.
In some areas, a small RCS 4th gen plane like the LCA is a better compromise trading some stealth for maneuverability/flexibility/simplicity.

[Viv S]

Learn about the numbers game being played with what you see and what you pay :
Claim is $125 million for LRIP 5. Actual cost is....

ANALYSIS: F-35 LRIP 5 Contracts: Unit Cost Tops $200M for First Time
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bi ... le=feature

For the record, we are all familiar with Briganti's work just as we're familiar with Pierre's Sprey loony ravings. And while you may be reading it for the first time, this specific article has been well discussed on the JSF thread.

And FYI the 'claim' was tracking the F-35A's flyaway cost over the LRIPs 5-10.

Your Briganti on the other hand just divided the entire LRIP contract by the order no. and tah-dah!!

If you spend some time pondering over it you'll realise why Briganti's method of calculating 'unit cost' this way is a stupid idea (hint: the full LRIP contract value isn't limited to just the aircraft acquisition). There's a reason why URF (flyaway cost) is used a standardized measure of cost.

BTW even going by this absurd methodology, try comparing the LRIP 5's unit cost with that for LRIP 10. That should settle this nonsensical idea of rising prices.

Its the unwillingness to do the basic reading that's fraying Brar's good temper.

He's well paid for F-35 marketing activities...

LRIP 10 retrofit cost - <$750,000/unit.

That will be the cost of flying the aircraft to the base to get housed & ready for fixing.
Then the meter will start running.

Those are the actual cost figures for concurrency/retrofits. They may not be what you imagined them to be but responding with empty rhetoric isn't going to change that.

[Austin]

F-35 has 276 deficiencies and counting, unfit for combat operations – Pentagon report