Sorry, I'm reproducing one more, I think this one is a keeper.
The New York Times, Feb 5, 1956.
by A.M. Rosenthal
A.M. Rosenthal has been the Times correspondent in India since December 1954.
India: A Case History in the 'Cold War'
Many Indian groups think we are warmongers and backers of colonialism-and look on Russia as a peaceable friend. Here is a report on why this has happened.
New Delhi.
The "peaceful competition" between Russia and the United States- to put it less fashionably, it is the "cold war" again- is producing a prime case history here. The results so far are deeply disturbing for the West. A combination of Soviet adaptability, American clumsiness and Indian shortsightedness has built up in the minds of scores of millions of people a mental image of the world that goes something like this:
"The United States, for all its talk about peace, would like to destroy the Soviet Union by war. The only thing holding it back is the fear of dying itself under Russian hydrogen bombs. Many important American leaders think the United States can destroy without being destroyed and some day may try.
"That is why the United States, in spite of talk about freedom and the American revolutionary heritage, is interested in the independence movements of the world only so far as they affect the fight against the Soviets. That is why the United States is the friend of the colonial powers.
"The Soviet Union is trying to walk the road of peace. It is a dictatorship but part of the fault lies in the fact that the Western powers have surrounded it with enemies since its birth. Give the Soviet Union a period of freedom from fear and the dictatorshiop will relax. In the meantime, Moscow supports the freedom struggles of the colonized peoples and the fights for peace."
Not everybody in India feels this way but the preceding three paragraphs are quite close to the picture of the world that is painted across the country- and in much of Asia. And the number of people who would substituted the Soviet Union for the United States in the foregoing is becoming fewer.
This is not just a lot of Communist talk either. The trend is shown in the results, just released, of India's first major public opinion poll, taken in West Bengal. Only 7 percent of the people question said that they would vote Communist. But 31 per cent said they thought the United States was preparing for an aggressive war. Only 2 per cent were afraid of the Soviet Union.
Put statistics aside. A foreigner staying any length of time in a country gets its political "feel". Sometimes that's a good deal more important than polls and figures.
In India the "feel" is not one of hatred, not even of dislike. If it were it would be simpler. Your political nerve ends tell you as you travel around India that you are not among enemies but among people who, to their own unhappiness, are beginning to distrust the motives of your country, who do not see your country as you see it.
INDOCHINA, Goa, Morocco, Quemoy, Dulles, atomic bombs, atomic bombs, atomic bombs. In every corner of India, in shops and Government offices and on campuses, the same words, the same implication that they are words your country must be ashamed of. And everywhere the same eagerness to forget about execution squads and isolator cells and the mass-produced mentality.
Speaking to Indians steadily about your country is like standing in front of one of those crazy mirrors at Coney Island that distort your reflection. And there in the next booth is Mr Khrushchev's grinning face popping up over the cardboard image of a knight.
All this adds up to the most dismal and dangerous story in India: the grotesque distortion of the roles and ambitions of the United States and the Soviet Union.
Whose fault is it?
They say sometimes in this part of the world that we Americans are an arrogant lot really, given to boasting and throwing our weight around and telling the rest of the world what's good for it. But there certainly never was a world power in history before whose people were so fond of political self-analysis, so given to self-doubt and to examining their motives and their goals so clinically, as the United States.
It is good to see yourself as others see you. To the extent that we talk too much about the big punch and bomber range and massive retaliation and the art of verging on war, it is our fault if Asians do not think of us as we think of ourselves. To the extent that we have become fuzzy about colonial issues and have raised doubts where we stand, the fault is also ours.
BUT that is not the complete answer. If you stand so long in front of the crazy mirror that you begin to believe that you are seeing a true reflection, you are lost. Some of the responsibility attaches itself to the Indian Government- its own fears, its own miscalculations and its own self-deceptions. The fault of the Government of India is that it has concentrated on American sins and Soviet virtues and not realizing the consequences, has held up to the Indian people a false image of both countries.
The poll in West Bengal showed that a shockingly large percentage of the people thought of us as warmongers. But that suspicion was just one ingredient in a compound of fears and misunderstandings. It does no good to try to isolate that one ingredient in this awful prescription for doubt and concentrate on it. The other elements in the compound act on the war-mongering fear and build it up.
The suspicion in India that does the United States the most harm is that we can no longer be counted on as friends of the independence movements. The belief is that we have abandoned the anti-colonial peoples in favor of what we take to be our military security.
In the city of Madras there is a road that runs along the beaches of the Indian Ocean. In the evening, when the breeze comes in from the sea, it is just right for pacing up and down and settling the problems of the world. A few months ago an Indian newspaper man and an American newspaper man were walking by the sea, going through the eternal what's wrong with us and what's wrong with you. This is the gist of what the Indian had to say:
"How can you ask for our trust, when you look at what's going on. Don't talk to me about world strategy. For people like us there are only two sides- those that support national independence movements and those that do not.
"I tell you that most of us feel that if India had not become free before this cold war got going we would find ourselves today being kept down by you. That's the truth and you know it. Just picture it- a cold war, Britain, your big ally, occupying India. Wouldn't your people in Washington tell us that we had to patient, that the United States, in the big global picture, had to support Britain? If it hadn't been for the Labor party victory in Britain, we Indians would be your enemies today, not just neutrals."
This reporter has heard that argument by the sea in Madras in a second-class railroad carriage clanking up the east coast, at a cocktail party in Calcutta, in a houseboat in Srinagar, and in almost every other place he has talked politics with an Indian.
THERE is not much point in trying to deny it. For one thing, the fear that Britain would have had United States backing in occupying India today is probably justified. For another, what counts is that Indians feel that way. Indians are willing to concede that the United States has no territorial ambitions. But too many of them believe that in our fear of communism we have become so tied in military alliances that the colonies or territories of our partners have come under our wing.
India is not all Asia, and in India as well as other countries of the continent we still have more goodwill that bad will. But even among some of our allies there is doubt.
LAST spring in Saigon, a young colonel of the Vietnamese army sat in a read plush chair in the Presidential Palace. He was weary to the bone with fighting against a Binh Xuyen gangster army that formerly had been a power in Saigon and that had the backing of most Frenchmen in the burning city. The colonel's army had won but still ahead was the fight against Vietnam's own Chief of State, living on the Riviera and conducting political warfare against the Government of Premier Diem.
After a while the colonel looked up and said to an American: "If it had not been for you Americans we would have kicked Bao Dai out at 3 o'clock this afternoon. Now it will take longer because you Americans held us back."
One of the tragedies of Saigon was that our Vietnamese friends, who had fought the Communists, and still were fighting them, did not believe our policy was clear and honest. They saw us wavering between support for a Government we helped install and a discredited relic of the old never-to-return days. They decided that we had helped Bao Dai cling on for a few more useless months because our French allies wanted it that way. The argument that we had responsibilities to the French as well as to the Vietnamese did not interest them.
In India, a short statement by Secretary of State Dulles about the Portuguese possession of Goa on India's west coast did the United States as much word-for-word harm as any declaration every made. All Dulles did was to speak of Goa as a Portuguese "province". To Indians that meant he was recognizing Lisbon's claim that the little colony on the Arabian Sea was an inseparable part of Portugal.
THE worst of the Dulles statement was that it cut the ground from under many Indians friendly to the United States. Suddenly they found themselves defending a country that had taken a stand invoking their own patriotism. The bitterest reaction to Dulles' statement came from our closest friends in India.
The contrast that is built up when the Russians enter the picture is obvious. Where we give explanations, they give support. Free Goa. Free North Africa. Free everybody- except of course a few hundred million people in certain parts of the world not often mentioned hereabout.
{missing line} phisticated of India know that the Soviet Union's display of affection for people of colonial areas has more behind it than uncontrollable brotherly love. But they believe, too, that because the Soviet Union's support of independence movements in public puts more pressure on the ruling powers, this brings the day of freedom that much nearer. And they think that, when the day comes, the new nations, given the right support by the West, will not turn toward Moscow.
This is part of the picture- the fact that the United States is counted so often on the wrong side of the colonial fence. And part of the rest is that so many Indians think our entire international policy, unchecked, could lead to world atomic war. India feels that our refusal to recognize Communist China is the prime cause of tension in the Far East. The idea that we would have been willing to go to war, as Dulles has indicated, to defend the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, is one that horrified Indians. They think that we have become almost insanely casual about threatening to use atomic bombs.
DULLES' celebrated interview with Life magazine was received with masochistic satisfaction by a good many Indians. It seemed to confirm the worst they had thought about Dulles and his country.
"Suppose a Russian foreign minister had said something like that- that the big thing was to know how to get to the edge of war without getting into it," said an Indian student in a New Delhi coffee house. "My God, fellow, what would have been your reaction? I tell you you are frightening us all out of our wits."
Indians read that we were prepared to use atomic bombs in the crises over Dienbeinphu, the offshore islands and the Korean Armistice talks. They read stories about how our Strategic Air Command has planes always within reach of atomic depots. The Russians have atomic bomb bases and their own strategic air command, but they just don't talk about them so much.
Our friends in India shake their heads at our tough talk. They think everybody knows by now that both sides could destroy each other. They cannot for the life of them see any advantage to the side that keeps talking about how ready it is.
IN the Indian attitude toward the United States there are two other elements. One is Pakistan. Scratch an India on foreign policy and you find deep emotional resentment at the fact that we are giving arms to India's neighbor. The Indians feel that the Pakistanis are taking United States arms to prepare themselves not against the Russians but against India.
Both nations try to avoid war, but both nations know the possibility of it always exists. A country that gives large-scale arms aid to one side must expect at least coolness from the people of the other. Whether it comes to pass or not, the Indians cannot ignore the possibility that American tanks and American artillery may some day be used against Indian troops.
THE other element is color. Old-timers among Westerners in India tell each other that that's what all the fuss is about when you get right down to it. "They're brown and you're white and don't think your best friend in India ever forgets it."
The year this reporter has spent in India has not taught him enough to know whether the color resentment is all that deep and ineradicable. But it has taught him that it exists and that in any political assessment it is best to recognize that it exists.
It exists as between Indians themselves. The matrimonial advertisements in the newspapers often specify that the bride or groom must be light. In "Waiting for the Mahatma", a new novel by India writer R.K. Narayan, young Sriram looks up at the girl on the platform and decides this is love. The light is bad and he cannot make out her complexion. He thinks: "If she were dark, without a doubt his grandmother would not approve of his marrying her."
It exists as between Indians and the foreigner. At a dinner party one of the high officials of the Indian Government was talking about books and art and how, of course, he was really a Westerner in upbringing. Then he thought a brief moment and said, "EVen though I am sure you find that hard to believe because my skin is dark."
THE sensitivity to color cannot be pinned down on statistical tables. But it is not simply a negative matter of resentment against discrimination. It has become a positive thing and so far it has benefited the Communists. There is something satisfying to Asians about the idea of a non-white country such as Communist China being powerful to the point where the Far Eastern policy of every "white" country in the world must center on her. {Rosenthal seems utterly oblivious to the fact that in 1956, it would be impossible for anyone of Indian origin to seek citizenship in the USA because of its racial laws on immigration. American color consciousness is well documented in The History of White People, by Nell Irvin Painter}
India's self-consciousness about color has not seemed to apply to the Soviet Union. One reason may be Russia's alliance with Communist China and her steady propaganda that under communism people of different races have learned to live together. But more important is the fact that resentment about color naturally turns against the West because it was the West that colonized Asia, ruled as the master and set up "European only" curbs.
As for the United States, it suffers heavily in Asia because of discrimination against the Negro. It may be logical to point out that the Indians themselves have a social color line against people of darker skins in their country or that the communal riots here take thousands more lives than all Southern lynching parties put together. It may be logical - but attitudes on color are not built on logic.
These, then, are the things that make for suspicion and coldness toward the United States - a cloudy policy on colonialism, too much big talk about the diplomatic powers of the atomic bomb, a system of military alliances that strengthens Pakistan, and color.
And then there is India's contribution.
A NATION's neutrality depends on two things: whether she considers herself neutral and whether the rest of the world considers her neutral. India considers herself neutral. But in the past few months the Indian Government has helped the Russians present such a grotesque picture of the state of the world to the Indian people that it must assume a large part of the responsibility if the West feels India is no longer entitled to be considered a neutral except for politeness' sake.
All over India where the Russians traveled there was this sign, distributed by Government officials: "Hail Bulganin and Khrushchev fighters for peace." India was taking her cue from her Prime Minister.
In Calcutta, near the end of the Soviet tour, Nehru was making a prepared speech whose sole purpose was to assure the West that India was uncommitted. He made the speech, but halfway through he wandered from the text and before hundreds of thousands of Bengalis said it was strange that while one side talked peace, other countries were thinking in terms of war and military alliances.
A lot of people in a lot of towns must get the point by now. If the Russians are fighters for peace, against whom are they fighting, and who are the enemies of peace?
BEFORE, during or after the tour, there was no talk about Soviet aggressions, never a word about Czechoslovakia or slave labor camps, never a hint of the fact that the independence of India has been guaranteed these past eight years by Western military power. There was never a hint that if it had not been for that power, the Russians would be giving India something a lot less to her liking than steel mills.
By tradition and emotional make-up Nehru is the antithesis of a totalitarian. In a Communist world he would be one of the first marked for death. At home he denounces Communists. In Bombay during the recent riots Communists were thrown into jail. He attacks the Indian Communists as slaves of the Russians. And yet he builds a handsome image of the masters for the Indian people to look at.
THE Indian people do not even get a full report on their own Government's reaction to the Russians' tour. While they were in India the Russians used the country as a platform for some of the harshest attacks made against the West since Stalin's death. Indians in the Government, including Nehru himself, did not care for that and said so-- privately. But in a speech at Agra, Nehru denied he was embarrassed by Soviet support for India on Goa and Kashmir.
There is more than one reason why Nehru seems so much more concerned with Soviet sensibilities than Western sensibilities. Nehru thinks that given a period of relaxation internationally the nature of the Soviet dictatorship will change. He thinks the Russian people are now at a point where they can keep their Communist economic system going under a government that gives them civil liberties.
And it is not surprising at all that Nehru welcomes the support of the Russians on India's two most emotional controversies- Goa and Kashmire. It seems to have become the thing to take help where you can find it. The United States counts among its allies Spain and dictatorships in Latin America and the Middle East; Washington never got perturbed about the iron-handed rule of the Afghan government until the flirtation with Moscow began.
It is also quite clear that Nehru feels that our foreign policy comes not only to the verge of war but to the verge of madness.
BUT the fact still is that what India is doing is against her own interests as well as ours. It is probable that the essential Soviet game these days is to isolate India from the West. To the extent that India cooperates by hammering us and hugging the Russians she works against her own interests. Within India, it is not to the country's interests to build up a picture of communism as peace-loving and freedom-worshipping. The Bombay riots, which Congress party politicians swear were instigated by Communists, should prove that.
The emphasis on India's responsibility is not for the sake of recrimination. India has made a place for herself in the world. It is an adult world and adults have responsibilities to one another.
There is no point in shrieking at India. She is entitled to her ways and her thoughts. But the Western powers have a right to expect one thing from India- that she makes sure her people see the world not through a distorted and clouded glass, but as it really is.