Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

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Philip
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Philip » 03 Jan 2012 18:00

Oh come on Rohit! Your comments are personal,vindictive and specious,hardly worth refuting.Pl. get objective.This is a free country,freedom of speech is enshrined in our Constitution,you have every right to your opinion as much as I do,but not your prejudice and bigotry.Learn some manners.

Just two links to the CAG's earlier reports giving the chronological development of Arjun.

Arjun MBT (thread II) : Arjun Mark II Poised for Trials - Page 61
21 Jul 2011 ... Too unrealistic and it will be delayed and may not even deliver. ..... However the
report filed by CAG was clear about Arjun's failing tank trials as ...

http://defenceforumindia.com/indian-arm ... ii-61.html
Arjun, Main Battle Tanked | Corruption In DRDO
11 Nov 2011 ... Over 30 years after Project Arjun was sanctioned by Indira Gandhi's Cabinet to ...
its commitment to buy 124 for two regiments, all of which are to be delivered by
2008. ... Following failed trials in summer 1997, which were criticized in a 1998
CAG report for a series of malfunctions, transmission failures and ...

http://corruptionindrdo.com/2011/11/11/ ... le-tanked/


The IA rightly rejected Arjun for years because it did not make the grade.Read the voluminous CAG reports of the same.Years of debate has been on BR on the issue.When it did,and proved itself well against the T-90, it bought it.The problem for the IA now is that the two tanks belong to two diff. schools of doctrine,4-man crew and 3-man crew.For most of its history,the last three decades,the IA has been using 3-man crewed tanks.The future is also not going to be large heavy 4-man crewed dinosaurs,but smaller,faster amd better gunned/weaponed lighter tanks,with whatever adequate armour is required.

The crux of the matter is that it is the Indian Army that is the user and not the DRDO.It is upto the IA to provide the required specs that it wants for is future MBT to the DRDO so that in the goal of indigenisation,a DRDO design can be engineered to meet the iA's requiremenents.Whether it can do it on its own or requires foreign ssistane is another matter.Even Arjun is anything but totally indigenous!.Why can't the DRDO therefore take up the challenge and prove to the IA that it can deliver the goods? The two organisations have to work together and it is upto the DM/MOD to ensure of that.

The points raised by BMallick and Austin are very valid. IN a sub-continent like India,can just one tank design do the business? Remember the supposed story posted earlier,where a Sov. general oin his cups stated when asked about the vulnerability of T-72s,that the frontal attacks would be by T-80s/T-64s ,and gaps opened would be followed by T-72s en masse.Can Arjun and the T-series complement each other or is 3-man crewed tank alone the answer for the IA? The need or a light tank with a heavy gun that is air-portable to fight in the Himalayas is a specialised one,but like the PT-76 showed its merit in the Bangladesh war.

Given the debate going on of the parameters of a future MBT for the IA,what do we on BR think it should cover? Why don't we do an exercise and work out what BRaks think the next tank for the IA should look like and be equipped with.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby chackojoseph » 03 Jan 2012 18:27

rohitvats wrote:CJ, that is not a twist.

That is an absolute and blatant lie born out of wilfull negligence of facts and refusal to accept reality. This has gone beyond funny - posts like this should be removed and posters banned for spreading such nonsense.


Ok, I rephrase, "its a twisted story."

Philip,

Nice try. :rotfl:

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Surya » 03 Jan 2012 19:04

:rotfl:

Vina we have been through this with Austin.

for every failure of the Russian tin can he will have an excuse.

its either derated export stuff, unfavourable usage, on super power going all out to help (the other decides it will only sell derated stuff so they can get knocked out - go figure) etc etc.

In his mythical world there awaits a battle where this all superb tin can will take on the Western heavies and they will see its real power



tejas

T 90 does not even have 1000 HP its actually less -

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Surya » 03 Jan 2012 19:06

Admins

Come on - I should be allowed to make a reference to Philip along the line 'what have you been smoking?'

He has provided enough evidence :)

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby SaiK » 03 Jan 2012 19:26

for top attacks the trophy system is effective right? Something [spider-kevlar mesh net] popping out and spread like an umbrella to fuse the explosion before it hits the tank, could be also effective.

for a net centric warfare, we don't need a commander on board. with advanced auto loading design, we need only two on the tank. so, a 30-40t tank is good to go for future.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby darshhan » 03 Jan 2012 19:41

rohitvats wrote:
CJ, that is not a twist.

That is an absolute and blatant lie born out of wilfull negligence of facts and refusal to accept reality. This has gone beyond funny - posts like this should be removed and posters banned for spreading such nonsense.


KGB is dead.But the propaganda remains.Long live KGB.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Bishwa » 03 Jan 2012 19:54

> Nag certainly can take out any damn tank in the world with its top attack capability , its 8Kg tandem warhead will atleast give it a CE of 1100 mm , no need to test :D

One wonders if it can match an active defense system like Trophy

The countermeasures for that seems to be a dual rocket system like the RPG-30. Tandem warhead is good for reactive armourT

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Austin » 03 Jan 2012 20:15

Surya wrote::rotfl:

In his mythical world there awaits a battle where this all superb tin can will take on the Western heavies and they will see its real power


Sure in your mythical world , A 60T tank is great ....a 50T tank is horrible why becuase its closer to T-90 weight ...The Army is a fool becuase they dont understand tanks or the virtues of 50T tanks ,so what now a few arm chair generals will write the next GSQR for FMBT :rotfl: :rotfl: :rotfl:

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby rohitvats » 03 Jan 2012 20:19

Philip wrote:Oh come on Rohit! Your comments are personal, vindictive and specious, hardly worth refuting.Pl. Get objective. This is a free country, freedom of speech is enshrined in our Constitution, you have every right to your opinion as much as I do, but not your prejudice and bigotry. Learn some manners.


The post is personal and vindictive on purpose and I stand by every word of it. Please don't preach objectivity to others when you have willfully posted lies and factually incorrect information about the Arjun. Freedom of speech gives you right to criticize but it also places upon you the responsibility to get your facts correct. It is not a license to indulge in smear campaign. So, please get down the high horse of manners.

The IA rightly rejected Arjun for years because it did not make the grade.

IA rejected Arjun for decades because of prejudice and organization inertia. Period. That tank was made as per the requirement of the Army. It simply cannot wash its hands off the tank just because someone thinks it’s unmanly to a/c in the tanks and nonsense like that.

Coming to the grade part - the very same army agreed to buy T-90 BEFORE trialing the tank in Indian conditions. Yes, please read that slowly. It was forced to trial the tank in Indian conditions where it performed far from satisfactory. Somehow, all the objectivity and logic seems to take a back seat when it comes to T-90? How come?

Read the voluminous CAG reports of the same. Years of debate have been on BR on the issue. When it did, and proved itself well against the T-90, it bought it. The problem for the IA now is that the two tanks belong to two diff. schools of doctrine, 4-man crew and 3-man crew. For most of its history, the last three decades, the IA has been using 3-man crewed tanks. The future is also not going to be large heavy 4-man crewed dinosaurs, but smaller, faster and better gunned/weapon lighter tanks, with whatever adequate armor is required.


Please don’t teach me about the CAG reports. It talks about the project management and not the tank. The same CAG report also talks about LCA and Akash and every other program this country has tried since the 80s? So, what gives?

As for proving against T-90, why should it prove itself against T-90? The proverbial trouble child which was neither built for Indian conditions, was not trialed in Indian conditions (before taking the decision to buy it) and which continues to suffer from sub-optimal utilization.

Is the army and especially DGMF branch, full of morons that they cannot asses the tank which has been built as per their own GSQR? What next? IAF to purchase Gipen to see how good LCA is? Oh! And look at the irony – Arjun better than T-90 and yet, more T-90 planned than Arjun. Simply brilliant, isn’t it?

As for 3 versus 4 man crews – well, it is the army which asked for 4-man crews. So, please ask the army to answer this question. Wasn’t it aware of the ‘doctrine’ then? And since when has manpower been an issue with IA? And how much will the number of direct and indirect requirement of manpower? 10,000? For an army of 1million plus men under colors, that is not even 1%. So, please don’t bring inanities into the argument.

If your definition smaller/faster/better weaponized tank means something sh1tcans like T-90, then please dream on. If anything, Leclerc is the way forward. Those tincans have reached the evolutionary dead-end.

The points raised by BMallick and Austin are very valid. IN a sub-continent like India, can just one tank design do the business? Remember the supposed story posted earlier, where a Soviet General oin his cups stated when asked about the vulnerability of T-72s, that the frontal attacks would be by T-80s/T-64s, and gaps opened would be followed by T-72s en masse. Can Arjun and the T-series complement each other or is 3-man crewed tank alone the answer for the IA? The need or a light tank with a heavy gun that is air-portable to fight in the Himalayas is a specialized one, but like the PT-76 showed its merit in the Bangladesh war.



By quoting the above completely unrelated point, you’ve just proved that Arjun is the superior (being equivalent of T-80) of the two tanks (T-90 being T-72). Soviet wanted numbers and hence, went for good and average (by their standards) tanks. The same does not apply to India. The number of tanks we have does not match the Soviets by yardstick nor do we have similar goals. So, thanks but no thanks.

As for use in Himalayas and portability, well, thanks to C-17, if required, the Arjun tanks can be shifted to Ladakh sector as well.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Austin » 03 Jan 2012 20:28

Wiki says K2 Black Panther has Hydropneumatic Semi Active Suspension and with PIP upgraded to Active Suspension at later stage , So there is some form of Active Suspension in use on K2

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby rohitvats » 03 Jan 2012 20:44

bmallick wrote:Question 1: Can any of the current tanks survive a top attack ATGM? If no, how heavy the armor needs are for the said protection?

No that I know off. Use of ERA on the turret roof, like our T-72 CIA program may give certain level of protection

Question 2: How proliferate is the use of Top Attack ATGM's in our immediate neighbourhood?
Quite extensive. Pakistan Army has dedicated Light and Heavy Anti-Tank Battalions. They also use a combination of manportable and heavy ATGM like Bhaktar-Shikan and TOW, respectively.

2006 Report: The Government of Pakistan has requested a possible sale of 2,769 Radio Frequency (RF) TOW 2A Missiles, 7 RF TOW 2A Fly-to-buy Missiles, 415 RF Bunker Buster Missiles, 7 RF Fly-to-buy Bunker Buster Missiles, upgrade of 121 TOW Basic/TOW-I launchers to fire TOW II configuration for wire-guided and wireless missiles, TOW Data Acquisition Systems, gunner aiming sight, testers, cameras, spare and repair parts, technical support, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, technical data and publications, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $185 million.

Question 3: How high is the chance of our tanks meeting up with enemy attack choppers & attack planes?
The gunship numbers are limited but will still play an important role. Ground support effort from PAF can be expected to concentrate on Indian Mechanized Focres

Question 4: What are the challenges to mobility in our context, viz-a-viz, desert, flat salt plains, flat plains & narrow valleys, heavy jungles. Would a single design be able to cater to all these terrains without heavy penaties?
There are three broad categories of terrain – South Kashmir and Punjab, Southern Pnjab and areas to south of it (covering Rajasthan and north Gujarat) and high altitude plains. The Arjun design by virtue of its high bhp/ton ratio and low ground pressure can take care of the first two sets of territory.

As for the last set, the problem is the logistics of getting the tank up to the theater of operation. Here again, there are two sub-sets – (a) Ladakh sector: the soon to be inducted C-17 can carry the Arjun. But the IA is known to be working on widening the Srinagar-Leh road so that T-90 trailers can be accommodated. (b) North Sikkim: Here, getting any sort of tank will be challenge. But T-xx may form the easier option.


Are tank barrel launched ATGM's like LAHAT, etc are a must for offensive operations in today's world. If they are a must, then what is the heavy 120/125mm gun going to do? You do not require high velocity heavy rounds to take out bunkers, machine gun posts, IFV & APC's. A much smaller 30-60 mm gun can deal with them. So can that gun be done away with?

ERA's are being touted as the great thing. However, need to look at its implications when operating with infantry troops around. Does the shrapnel's produced cause too much friendly damage?


There are three broad categories of terrain – South Kashmir and Punjab, Southern Pnjab and areas to south of it (covering Rajasthan and north Gujarat) and high altitude plains. The Arjun design by virtue of its high bhp/ton ratio and low ground pressure can take care of the first two sets of territory.
As for the last set, the problem is the logistics of getting the tank up to the theater of operation. Here again, there are two sub-sets – (a) Ladakh sector: the soon to be inducted C-17 can carry the Arjun. But the IA is known to be working on widening the Srinagar-Leh road so that T-90 trailers can be accommodated. (b) North Sikkim: Here, getting any sort of tank will be challenge. But T-xx may form the easier option.


Are tank barrel launched ATGM's like LAHAT, etc are a must for offensive operations in today's world. If they are a must, then what is the heavy 120/125mm gun going to do? You do not require high velocity heavy rounds to take out bunkers, machine gun posts, IFV & APC's. A much smaller 30-60 mm gun can deal with them. So can that gun be done away with?
ERA's are being touted as the great thing. However, need to look at its implications when operating with infantry troops around. Does the shrapnel's produced cause too much friendly damage?

The number of ATGM missiles to be carried as a percentage of overall rounds is going to be limited. These ATGMs, IMO, are for specialized “sniper” kind of kills over ranges where gun may not work. There is no replacement for KE Round – in a one on one combat, the opponent will kill you before you know if you try to use the missile.

One of the main reasons chosen for rifled gun on Arjun was ability to fire HESH rounds – which are considered important against bunkers and such fortifications.
On the ERA front – countries are working on Non-explosive version of it called NERA. But AFAIK, it is some distance away in time.



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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Singha » 03 Jan 2012 20:55

we have neither the masses of 1st echelon tanks, nor the soviet style fully motorized OMGs containing t72 second rung tanks, nor anywhere near the CAS aircraft, artillery and rocket density the soviets could put into breakthrough attempts. they planned to use arty enmasse to kill tanks and then the second rung tanks would move through...50,000+ tanks were in warsaw pact...probably 15,000 of these would push into west germany with 2nd and 3rd echelon convoys stretching back into poland.

I am afraid we are more aligned to the western concept of having relatively few/equal tanks to enemy forces so they have to be much better than the avg std of russian tanks both in offense and defence.

we already know due to better terrain and now logistics the PLA will find it easier to put masses of tanks in tibet and is already doing so. the pakis are producing plenty of tanks all the time. there is no theater where india can enjoy even a 2:1 overmatch in tank numbers.

we need the best, cannot afford to play around with less than top notch stuff.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Surya » 03 Jan 2012 20:58

Sure in your mythical world , A 60T tank is great ....a 50T tank is horrible why becuase its closer to T-90 weight ...The Army is a fool becuase they dont understand tanks or the virtues of 50T tanks ,so what now a few arm chair generals will write the next GSQR for FMBT



Err actually I dont care if they want a 50 ton MBT - but then do not expect Arjun specifications on it?? Thats how the Arjun drama started - because the prospect of an M1 Abrahams across the border got their pants on fire.



Hopefully it is easier for you to digest this.

Wel we know a couple of ex Army DGMFs who were fools and embarrassed themselves with comments on turret shape and Leopard analogies and talked of FMBT while supporting the crap that is the tin cans :mrgreen:
Last edited by Surya on 03 Jan 2012 21:38, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby tejas » 03 Jan 2012 21:14

There are only two possibilities when it comes to the tin can-90 purchase. Unbelievable incompetence or treason. I don't know which scares me more. The tin can-90 is inferior to the Arjun in every important parameter ( firepower, accuracy and crew protection) yet it is dwarfed in the order book, why? While the he-men in the IA refused AC in the Arjun, when the T-90 thermal imagers melted down in the Thar desret they ran crying to the Russians who told them to get ACs!!! The DRDO solved the Arjun heating problems how about the tin can-90?

How can a tank be ordered by the 1000s without first being tried out in Indian conditions. Can anyone be so incompetent as to overlook these questions by accident? I find it hard to swallow. I am left to conclude that only the more sinister possibility is the truth. :evil:

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby sum » 03 Jan 2012 21:41

While the he-men in the IA refused AC in the Arjun, when the T-90 thermal imagers melted down in the Thar desret they ran crying to the Russians who told them to get ACs!!! The DRDO solved the Arjun heating problems how about the tin can-90?

How can a tank be ordered by the 1000s without first being tried out in Indian conditions. Can anyone be so incompetent as to overlook these questions by accident? I find it hard to swallow. I am left to conclude that only the more sinister possibility is the truth. :evil:

Didnt they also renege on the T-90 gun barrel ToT which made OFB to work backwards and come up with a barrel after having paid Russia for the same?

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Austin » 03 Jan 2012 21:44

Surya wrote:Err actually I dont care if they want a 50 ton MBT - but then do not expect Arjun specifications on it?? Thats how the Arjun drama started - because the prospect of an M1 Abrahams across the border got their pants on fire.


Exactly what is Arjun specification that you cant have on FMBT.

The only specification i can see is it cant have a 4 man crew for sure ...... the rest is doable very much.

M1 Abrams failed in the test that was demonstrated to PA, if reports are to be believed it managed to hit only 1 of the 10 targets when Zia was demonstrated the tank the day he died in crash, it was just a red hearing much like the case of they were going to buy the E-3 or similar AWACS at that time .......I remember all our media was going hyper that Pakistan was buying US AWACS.

If PA wants to buy the M1 today US will still sponsor them , US has too many M1A1 in reserves ........they will just need to exchange some talibans with them ........but logistically PA will have little use other then chest thumping.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby tejas » 03 Jan 2012 22:00

Didnt they also renege on the T-90 gun barrel ToT which made OFB to work backwards and come up with a barrel after having paid Russia for the same?


They did indeed. The T-90 is a gift that keeps on giving. :evil:

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby suryag » 03 Jan 2012 22:03

^^^ JU idiots :D they gave all the tech w.r.t T-90 we couldnt understand it. Cant you guys understand this zimblee fact ?

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby SaiK » 03 Jan 2012 22:18

I think better anti-tank weapons and penetrating missile systems have overshadowed tank armor. I foresee future mbt must have a strong multi layered light weight reactive armor protection only as a backup or extra protection and the electronic/jamming/pellets firing or umbrella swinging should take on the primary role.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Pratyush » 03 Jan 2012 22:19

I have been watching the discussion with an amused eye for some time. To all those who favor and claim that the IA, has been training with 3 man tanks for decades. I will say this, nearly 50% of IA Armour fleet is 4 manned tanks.

Or I have been hiding in a cave some where and the Vijyantas and the 55s are all gone. :((

PS, I am for the pathetic Arjun. Even if it will have to be pulled by horses in the battlefileld. Or the MEN of the IA have to push it. :P

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby SaiK » 04 Jan 2012 04:09

pandyan wrote:Whoever is promoting tin cans and bashing arjuns is against the Indian soldiers

Please report to boss! how can you put your finger in unnecessary affairs how the middle-men get paid for deals.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby VinayG » 04 Jan 2012 07:52

Queschun to gurus Is it possiable to replace gunner with an auto loader and convert arjun into a 3 man crew ?

in doing above customization can the size and weight of the tank be decreased without any compromise in protection ?

how feasible it will be if we buy a multi purpose tank ammo or build our self in house ?

why cant we go for mk3 or mk 4 if needed like the mekarvas and develop arjun into more futuristic mean lean killing machine?

finally we like it or not we got the tin can so we can use them as shields just my 2 cents opinion in case anything breaks out in the western sector of course LCh with nags will hit the shit out of puki amoured coloums asses
Last edited by VinayG on 04 Jan 2012 07:55, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Virupaksha » 04 Jan 2012 07:54

it will NOT be arjun and is a full scale development as much as a completely new tank

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Singha » 04 Jan 2012 08:09

even though M1A3 reportedly has the autoloader whose detail I posted yesterday they are not even bothering to change the turret size or chassis to keep changes minimal and even retaining the loader in new role as astt tank commander to manage the sensors and help with other duties like repair and standing watch.

we should really touch base with the french to figure out if a 3 man crew and autoloader can hold up to the rigors of a big battle .... operational exp of leclerc is limited to exercises though and the T-series have made a career of getting pulped by western tanks and then claiming some mythical new version with better protection exists, they were denied this and that from the best model and so on...so not much to learn from there :)

merkava has this 10 round ready mag autoloader and manual loader for rest of rounds - thats a hybrid option we could explore. the merkava from its mk1 days has a operational track record...so lessons would have been learnt .... we should rope in IMI and general dynamics land systems(GDLS) if possible as review consultants for Mk3 arjun....merkava and abrams are the only tanks with some serious combat track record at present. leopard is like a BMW - looks good in the garage...no idea how it will hold up in heavy fighting...

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby pralay » 04 Jan 2012 10:38

Looks like that the Army is fully determined to do a Arjun with FMBT.
They will keep changing the goalpost and then will blame DRDO as they did for Arjun.

So the most probable scenario that, FMBT will be operational after 30 years at around 2040.
And to prepare for this worst case, India will have to mass produce either Arjun MK2/MK3/MK4, or import some upgraded T-2020 series which the Army will prefer most.

So while Army is TRYING to think on FMBT specs,

1. next versions of Arjun must be pursued and mass produced ( may be with better materials for reducing weight )
2. a new project for Light Tank(20tons category) must be started(More food for army brains). This is essential for eastern sector if we are not to depend on some foreign light tank.

Yes there were times when desi Military Products and tech didn't exist.
But as its much much better today and now its responsibility of the Army and DRDO as well to foresee the future of battlefields and create new product concepts instead of just looking at foreign brochures and designs.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Kailash » 04 Jan 2012 11:19

Rebirth of BHIM self-propelled howitzer

DRDO is all set to dust off and review BHIM self-propelled howitzer Project once again. After 11 years been in storage, due to ban imposed on Denel company which was accused of paying bribes and it’s SPH was dropped from consideration.DRDO had successfully had integrated 155-mm / L52 howitzer T6 turret, developed by Denel of South Africa with Indian made Arjun tank chassis . After corruption controversy which came to lime light in 2005, DRDO again send Request for proposal (RFP) in 2007 .but only Samsung Techwin responded to the proposal with their K-9 gun.
Project was left with single vendor proposal, hence another RPF was re-issued after considerable break to make sure that RPF attracts more proposal and it has been rumoured that SWS Bofors, Nextel, Samsung Techwin along with Soltham have responded to RPF issued by DRDO for the replacement gun, and DRDO after going through their proposal and technical evaluation is been done and will be integrating one of their gun with Arjun MBT chassis soon.
In 1999-2000 Indian army had conducted successful trails of the gun with Arjun chassis and Denel also had successfully demonstrated their own T-72 based howitzer in India for Indian army.Indian army had requirement of 400 mounted 155-mm / L52 howitzer, out of which 200 could be based on Arjun chassis and another 200 to be mounted on modified TATRA trucks. Decision on selection of the gun will take place this year.
Cancellation of the project had effected Production and procurement of materials for Arjun MBT, since Indian army had only placed orders for 128 tanks at that time and 200 orders for BHIM could have lead to continues production run at Avadi . This currently has been halted since CVRDE almost completed 128 tanks ordered by Indian Army. Indian army did placed further orders of 128 Arjun MK-2 variant, but the production will only start after summer user trials are completed by Indian army.


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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby krishnan » 04 Jan 2012 11:22

why not integrate one of the guns that is being produced. Those 39/45 caliber once that army will be testing soon

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Singha » 04 Jan 2012 11:43

its not just the gun, needs the automated system to store, sort and feed in shells and possibly charges also. in pzh2000 the shell loading is automatic, while loader puts the chosen charge manually per youtube videos. people sell it as a drop-in turret+gun if the customer wants his own vehicle.

nexter has been mis-spelled as nextel. its giat armament industries. their local partner is L&T defence.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Philip » 04 Jan 2012 11:51

It is beneath contempt to respond to those who accuse me of 'lies" and spreading "falsehoods'".This is something I have never done on BR ever since its inception.The vast majority of members know that.I do not wish to descend to their deplorable levels of manners of some of my critics and their infantile and juvenile discussions.However,for the seriously inclined who have an open mind here are some facts.

We from the inception of BR,well over a decade now, have been tracking the development of Arjun.Many of the issues being debated here now were debated long ago .The hard facts are that Arjun's development took 3 decades to mature mand I repeat,was not perfected when the IA had to respond to the Paki acquisition of the T-80s from Ukraine and a knee-jerk order of large qtys. of T-90s was made.There are those who say that "Arjun had no technical problems,only "managent issues".Here's just one quote from the report:

a mismatch had arisen between engine and transmission which had resulted in bulging of sidewalls of the hull.As a consequence, six transmission units failed before the stipulated life of 6000 Kms


This absurd myopic attitude refuses to look for the truth as I'm posting here,the Parmialentary PAC's reports,13th and 14th Lok Sabhas well illustrate.There are other links to articles tracing the history of Arjun and the dilemma that faced the IA.

http://164.100.24.208/ls/committeeR/PAC/5th.htm

PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE
FIFTHREPORT THIRTEENTH LOKSABHA
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF MAIN BATTLE TANK - ARJUN
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

[quote9.It is further pointed out by Audit that two PPS tanks were demonstrated in February 1993.The results of the demonstration which includedgunnery and automotive capabilities were stated to be satisfactory. Thereafter, between June 1993 and July 1996, 14PPS tanks were handed over to a Field Regiment for trials.These PPS tankswere thereafter subjected to extensive User and troop trials in the desert/semi desert terrain, plains and river ineterrain. According to Audit,the trials carried out subsequent to June 1993revealed major deficiencies and failed to meet the requirement projected in the GSQR.The weapon system’s performance was also well below the acceptable level and the mission reliability of the tank was alarmingly low and the tank was accordingly not acceptable to the User.Thereafter, in May 1994 the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) spelt out the minimum `Bottom Line’ parameters acceptable for the MBT. Following the summer 1994 trials, Army HQ. in consultation with DRDO laid down ten imperatives for acceptance of MBT, which were as follows:

·Improved accuracy of the gun at battle ranges;

·Establish accuracy in the dynamic mode to acceptable levels;

·Enhancement of overall mission reliability;

·Fielding of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) and Medium Fording Capability;

·Containerisation of ammunition bin with blow-off panel,(new requirement added for the first time in 1994);

·ergonomics needs substantial attention;

·cruising range to be enhanced;

·firing in the rear arc at zero degree is a must;

·provision of an emergency power traverse and Auxiliary Power Unit(APU) ; and

·an all electric power traverse to obviate the problem of leaks that occur in the present system in our environmental conditions (new requirement added in 1994).


10.It is learnt from Audit Paragraph that the bottom line parameters, according to Army, represented a dilution of GSQR to a point below which no parameters could be allowed to fall and were considered to be of an interim nature based on a firm belief that the final product would meet the GSQR in full.


11.According to Audit, the 14 PPS tanks with modifications/improvements were again subjected to User trials during 1995 and 1996.The User trials carried out by the Army in 1996 established that except in a few areas, the performance of the PPS tanks fell far short of even the ten bottom line imperatives. Major deficiencies pointed out by the Army were:

-the accuracy level of the main gun in all modes of firing at different battle ranges was far below the levels laid down in GSQR,
-the lethality of ammunition was neither specified nor demonstrated,
-overheating of engines in desert conditions,
-mission reliability was far below the bottom line requirement,
-firing over engine deck with zero degree elevation could not be achieved,
-arrangement for emergency traverse was not satisfactory.

12.According to the Audit Paragraph, the summer trials carried out in April 1997on PPS-15, reference tank for bulk production indicated that though there was improvement over the previous years, it was still below the acceptable standards.The major deficiencies pointed out in the summer trials of 1996 i.e. accuracy of gun at battleranges, mission reliability, lethality of ammunition bin, emergency traverse etc. continued to persist.The Army reportedly indicated in July 1997 that in its present form, the overall reliability of MBT Arjun was far from satisfactory.
[/quote]

Fire Control System
14.According to Audit, the MBT was designed around an imported Fire Control System (FCS).The firing results of the User trials carried out upto summer 1997 indicated that firing accuracy was erratic and unpredictable.The Army were of the view that the design was no longer responsive to any technical inputs and its performance was at its saturation level.The DRDO reportedly stated in November 1997 that by 1995 they had removed the causes for erratic firing accuracy and taken measures to control and improve it.However, according to Audit, the Army even in the joint approach meeting held from 20 October 1997 to 13 November 1997 reiterated their earlier stand that the imported FCS had reached its development limit.


Powerpack/Transmission system and Gun control system

19.According to the Audit Paragraph, as the indigenous efforts to develop a suitable engine and transmission system for the MBTwere be setwith problems, 42 power packs with transmission units were imported between November 1983and 1988 from Germany for use on the prototypes and PPS tanks.However, as the imported transmission system was designed to cater upto 60 tonne load as against all-up weight of 61.5 tonne for the MBT, a mismatch had arisen between engine and transmission which had resulted in bulging of sidewalls of the hull.As a consequence, six transmission units failed before the stipulated life of 6000 Kms.Frequent overheating of transmission oil, noticed during User trials, clearly indicated that the transmission was working outside its design parameters. The DRDO intimated Audit in November 1997 that the weight will not be allowed to go beyond 60 tonne and that the failures of transmission units were traced as failure of externally mounted brazed tubes for pressure sensing and the same had since been corrected.The Army, however, reportedly pointed out in November 1997 that the transmission was working at its optimum peak when the weight of MBT Arjun was 58.5 tonne.

20.On being asked as to how apower pack for 60 tonne was selected for a 61.50 tank, the Ministry in a note stated:

“The power pack delivers a range of torque necessary to prope lthe 60 tonnes tank over the terrains envisaged.Since the all up weight of MBT Arjun is only 58.5 tonnes, under 60 tonnes, fully kited up, the performance cannot be contested.The all up weight of 61.5 tonnes is a projection of one of the User’s requirement, when the tank if it gets fitted with mine trawl of vintage design weighing 3 tonnes.By its very nature the demining operation is carried out at a very slow speed, the requisite torque for which can be delivered by the transmission.This comparison is true of all tanks world over.This explains our selection.”


Foreign Exchange
41.A significant objective of MBT Project was to completely eliminate the requirement of foreign exchange in production.As per the estimatesmade in early 1987, the import content of MBT Arjun was 27 per cent and the expenditure in FE was 45per cent.Three major systems of MBT Arjun i.e. Power Pack, Gun Control and Fire Control systems are based on imported technology.According to Audit, the cost estimate made for 15 LSPs in December 1995 indicated that nearly60 per cent of the total cost estimate related to imported supplies.

In our experience, typically in a mechanical system, the import content will be of the order of min. 20% and in hydraulic electronic and Opto-electronic systems the import content will be of order of minimum 40%.This is due to infrastructure constraints in the country.The percentage of import content is therefore bound to be around 60% overall for the prototypes and for small volume production.”
[/quo

*Import content "60%",so much for 30 years of "indigenous" R&D effort!

71.The Committee note with dismay the steep increase in the estimated cost of the Project for design and development of MBT – Arjun.Theinitial cost of the MBT Project which was estimated at Rs. 15.50 crorein 1974 was revised to Rs. 56.55 crorein 1980 and to Rs. 280.80 crore in 1987.The actual expenditure was, however, Rs. 307.48 crorein March 1995, despite the fact that there was a shortfall in the production of 10 prototypes/PPS tanks. Thus, there has been an escalation of cost by twenty times compared to the initial estimated cost of the Project


74.The Committee are constrained to point out that even though 26 years elapsed since the sanction of the Project and the schedule for commercial production has already overshot the original by 16 years, the bulk production of MBT-Arjun is yet to commence. The various reasons adduced by the Ministry in this regard included, non-availability of power pack from import sources and inherent challenges in development of other technology intensive systems and modules, inadequate infrastructure for manufacture and testing, changes in GSQR etc. The Committee believe that in the case of a time taking developmental Project involving a fast developing technology, updating of requirements by the User from time to time is unavoidable to some extent and should have been aptly taken care of while planning the schedule of completion.However, such prudence on the part of the Ministry was conspicuous by its absence. In the hindsight, while the Ministry were well aware of the fact that it takes around 15 to 20 years for manufacture of an armour of MBT-Arjun class even by the industrially advanced countries,it is inconceivable that the Ministry initially set a target, hard to achieve without fully realising the technological complexities of MBT as well as the infrastructural inadequacies in our defence production units.

75.As per envisaged plan, MBT- Arjun was to be inducted into service during1985-2000 in replacement of existing tanks which were expected to be outdated beyond 1985. In this context, the Committee examined at some length the statusof Vijayanta tanks in terms of their battle worthiness. The Committee have been informed that overhauling of Vijayanta tanks was being discontinued from the production year 1999-2000 onwards as a result of approved deinduction plan. Based on repeated evaluation of Vijayanta fleet which proved that these tanks were no more an operational asset, it has been decided by the Ministry to phase them out and hold the equipment only till replacements are available. Distressingly, complete phasing out could not be carried out as scheduled, due to slippages in production/procurement of T-72 tanks.The Main Battle Tank today is stated to be T-72 or Ajay which is supposed to replace the obsolete Vijayanta. Evidently, the delay in production of MBT-Arjun has created such a precarious situation where there is no option but to retain obsolete Vijayanta tanks. While expressing their grave concern over the prevailing situation, the Committee recommend that immediate and effective measures be taken by the Ministry to ensure that obsolete Vijayanta tanks are replaced expeditiously to strengthen our tank fleet.


76.The Committee are concerned that the balance of combat equation has been disturbed in recent times with the acquisition of T-80 tanks by our adversary. What adds to the anxiety of the Committee is the fact that the Vijayanta tanks are in the process of being phased out while it would take a couple of years before MBT- Arjun is made available.The Committee were given to understand that there was a move to procure T-90 tanks in the interregnum.Theywould like to be apprised of the factualposition about the import of tanks in question as also the safeguards being taken to ensure that indigenous R&D programme is not affected adversely.On the contrary efforts should be made to absorb latest technology and to build our R&D pool.


77.The Committee regret to point out that this is a story of developmental Project, where R&D benefit has not been derived even after 26 years of its sanction.The Committee need hardly emphasise that the efficiency of any developmental Project can be judged only in terms of real and concrete achievement, which still remains to be fulfilled in the present case.It would not be without basis therefore to conclude that the delay in development and productionisation of MBT-Arjun was attributable, to a considerable extent, to deficient Project management and monitoring. Underlining the need to review the existing institutional mechanism for management and monitoring of the Project, the Committee recommend appointment of a high level Committee with the following objectives..



MOre later:

http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?225427
Main Battle Tank Arjun
MBT Arjun "Officially handed over" to the army in August 2004 after 30 years and Rs 307.48 crore. Time overrun forced army to import T-90s from Russia. Also unsuitable for prime tank country.

Two months ago, defence minister Pranab Mukherjee "officially" handed over the first set of MBT Arjuns to the army. As the minister and his retinue left the venue, the tanks were promptly rolled back into the factory at Avadi, Tamil Nadu. The army said it was not ready to deploy it in a war theatre. This is the story of one of DRDO's biggest 'successes', a project sanctioned in 1974, expected to go into production in 1984, handed over to the prime minister in 1995 and exhibited at Republic Day parades since 1996.

The director-general of quality assurance has still not given the tank the clearance, a mandatory requirement before any weapon system is inducted into the armed forces. From the initial sanctioned budget of Rs 15.5 crore, the DRDO ended up spending Rs 307.48 crore for a tank which is useless to the army. A former project manager of MBT Arjun had in 1997 said he would never take the tank to war. The DRDO's failure obviously resulted in the country importing Russian T-90s at a cost of over Rs 3,000 crore. For all practical purposes, T-90 will remain India's main tank for more than a decade.

Arjun, senior army officers say, cannot be used in classic 'tank country'. At 58.5 tonnes, it cannot be ferried across bridges which lead to Hanumangarh and Suratgarh in Rajasthan, considered prime tank battlefields by military planners. Concedes Dr V.K. Atre, who retired last month as DRDO chief and scientific advisor to the defence minister, "Sure, it is a heavy tank and we will have to reinforce the bridges." But he defends the tank stating that "it can go over terrain few tanks can because of its power-to-weight ratio". But weight alone is not the tank's failure. In listing its major deficiencies in 1998, the CAG cited the lack of "accuracy of gun at battle ranges, mission reliability, lethality of ammunition bin, emergency traverse, etc".

So much so that Parliament's public accounts committee which looked into the CAG report was categorical that no R&D benefit was derived out of the Arjun project even 26 years after it was sanctioned. In 2000, the committee had said that "the delay in development and productionisation of MBT Arjun was attributable, to a considerable extent, to deficient project management and monitoring.Underlining the need to review the existing institutional mechanism for management and monitoring of the project".Needless to say, vital components like engine, fire control system, transmission unit, tracks, thermal sight and night sight were all imported and that too in the early 1980s.

Now, the army is only prepared to use the tank to train its personnel. The limited series production of 124 tanks would thus imply a colossal waste of money. But Dr Atre believes the project has "given us the capability and the confidence to develop better tanks.We have made major strides in self-reliance in defence technology". Sure. The next-generation tanks have already been imported.


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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Singha » 04 Jan 2012 12:05

well then how did the Arjun trounce the T-90 in comparative tests and force the IA to induct it? can the CAG and other experts explain it some?

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby VinayG » 04 Jan 2012 12:10

krishnan wrote:why not integrate one of the guns that is being produced. Those 39/45 caliber once that army will be testing soon


the video is in Russian sorry couldn't find a better one in English but a nice video which show everything about a modern SPH

watch the video from 2.25


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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby sarabpal.s » 04 Jan 2012 12:12

Well Philip ji, Arjun come of the age now more than gold or 'Kundan'( in Hindi) same we cant say same about tin can.

lesson learn in Iraqi is well put it in arjun.

light tank is armys tin can love, but in real world we need heavyweight tank to survive,light tank ok in higher ground with support of few heavy but in plain light tank dont stand chance Evan with era or slate armour but if same thing applied on arjun it will became best in class .

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Sanku » 04 Jan 2012 12:19

Singha wrote:well then how did the Arjun trounce the T-90 in comparative tests and force the IA to induct it? can the CAG and other experts explain it some?


Myth making to sell more copies. Arjun was inducted when it was ready. Nothing more, nothing less. But who will Col Shukla get eyeballs for his readership if such bland news exist. :lol:

All the folks keep getting hyperventilated about nothing.

-----------------------------------------------------------

And oh yes, I told you so

120 mm smooth bore gun


:mrgreen:

DRDO + Army is doing all the things that I would expect them to do -- this is good, I dont expect miracles, like a FMBT in 2 years like some posters seem to want -- however DRDO seems to want to do all the right things.

I yam happy -- I fully expect a whole bunch of FMBT tech to come into Arjun (such as the gun) and make the Arjun, even more "usable" and effective.

Goody good.

-------------------------------------

And oh yes I told you so (I really need to keep score)

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Multatuli » 04 Jan 2012 12:24

So DRDO is still waiting for definite specifications/requirements from the Indian Army, even after all these years.

That could be because they require different tanks for different environments. If this is the case why doesn't the IA say so, and ask the DRDO to develop 2 or 3 different tanks?

It seems to me that the MoD has to step in and ask the Indian Army to have the specifications ready within a certain time frame.

If the IA fails to produce definite specifications within that time frame then the MoD has to make the decisions for the IA.

The IA wants a 50 ton (max.) tank, well give them an indigenous 50 ton tank. And since the IA is so enamoured with the T-90S, the DRDO should be ordered to use the T-90S as the baseline for armour and other performance criteria, and not the Arjun tank, which is too heavy, too high, too wide, too unmanly and in general quite useless according to the IA. This the DRDO has to do within, let's say 5 years from receiving this commission.

Now since the IA will be getting an indigenous tank comparable in performance to the T-90S, there is of course no need to continue the production of the Russian T-90S tanks beyond a total of 600 T-90's or so, as these T-90's with the T-72's are quite enough to deal with the Packees for the next few years.

And there is also no more need for further payment for TOT since the Russians renege on their obligations anyway and we will soon have an indigenous replacement for the T-72.

The important point in all this is that the Minister of Defense has to step in and use his authority to sort out this incredible mess.

A certain poster mentions that the future MBT has to be light enough to be flown to the Himalaya's, the North East, mountain valleys, etc..

Are you serious? What kind tank battle do you envisage in mountain valleys (where tanks would be sitting ducks to anyone occupying the ridges, if tanks are able to move in such terrains at all) or in hilly/mountainous area's with dense forrest (as in the North East of India)?

I don't know any thing about tanks, but common sense tells me that tanks are useless in such terrains.

It's clear that the Indian Army is playing a dirty game with the DRDO and some of the politicians in this forum support them in those games.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Sanku » 04 Jan 2012 12:30

Multatuli wrote:If this is the case why doesn't the IA say so, and ask the DRDO to develop 2 or 3 different tanks?
.


The real solution, is for MoD to empower DRDO to make 3-4 tanks on its own anyway, as technology demonstrators and generic place holder, sort of like IGMDP for tanks.

That by all accounts seem to be happening.

DRDO should be able to "make" a tank based on IA's requirement at "short" notice based on a cocktail of technology recipes or building blocks.

Sort of like the "prahaar" missile development.

And oh BTW

What kind tank battle do you envisage in mountain valley


There is indeed a requirement for light tanks in mountain terrains, and yes IA has used tanks in Himalaya before (both valley and plateu) -- there have been long discussions around it on this thread itself before.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby rohitvats » 04 Jan 2012 12:34

Philip wrote:It is beneath contempt to respond to those who accuse me of 'lies" and spreading "falsehoods'".This is something I have never done on BR ever since its inception.The vast majority of members know that.I do not wish to descend to their deplorable levels of manners of some of my critics and their infantile and juvenile discussions.However,for the seriously inclined who have an open mind here are some facts. <SNIP>


Oh! How the mighty have fallen. So, you were only refering to the delay in the Arjun program, is it? Too bad - everything you have posted is right here.

Post 1 -
Philip wrote: Arjun was never designed with the IA in the loop from the start,which is why it faced so much resistance from the Army.Nevertheless,the IA eventually ordered the Arjun and a repeat order is said to have also been made for the MK-2 version.


When I accused you of lying, you changed the stance to this:
The IA rightly rejected Arjun for years because it did not make the grade.Read the voluminous CAG reports of the same.Years of debate has been on BR on the issue.When it did,and proved itself well against the T-90, it bought it


And, it is the second statement you're trying to defend.

Do you have anything to support your first assertion i.e. IA was never in the loop? I think not. The reason - it is a blatant lie and flies in the face of facts. So, please stop ataking recourse to manners and civility and what not. If you have the humility, please accept that the first point was incorrect and delete the post or the said portion of the post. All this references to CAG and PAC or PSCD Reports does not absolve you of the nonsense you wrote. Pure and simple.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Philip » 04 Jan 2012 14:52

I am not going to indulge oneself in a diatribe with unmentionables.
What did I say? IA "not in the loop from the start".The full meaning of being "in the loop" is that one should be totally in the know at all times of what is going on,from "start to finish".To say that the IA was
so involved in the case of Arjun flies in the facts,of which there is voluminous evidence,some posted here earlier ,detailing the "technical failures" which an umnentionable brushed off as being mere "management problems"!

There is a saying that "one should not miss the wood for the trees".The "wood" being the inordinate delay in developing Arjun ,over 3 decades ,which neccessitated T-90 purchases in bulk.The PAC reports give the Army's detailed points of failure (not just "delays") of Arjun during the '90s which forced it to buy the T-90. Now that Arjun has met its parameters,from 2007 onwards, it is being accepted and ordered.There is no dispute about that.IF it now meets the IAs requirements great for indigenisation! Here is just one report about the services not being involved by the DRDO from the start.

Another,by PV Ramanna,on
"How not to run a military projet,Arjun",says:

http://www.orfonline.org/cms/export/orf ... rief_11626
3.Close coordination is required between the DRDO and the user service

The technique adopted by the DRDO inexecuting other projects viz conductingprojects in a mission mode in a consortiumapproach with concurrent engineering shouldbe applied to all major projects.



In 2009, The P Rama Rao committee, which was formed to revamp the organisation, has said that the major cause for delays and failures of indigenous defence products is DRDO’s tendency to over-estimate its capabilities. The inability of the research body to involve the Armed Forces in developmental projects from the start has been identified as a major area of concern.[7]

The committee recommended to the government that DRDO should undertake all projects in the future on a joint developmental basis and involve foreign partners to imbibe global standards. DRDO’s tendency of overstretching itself to reinvent the wheel has also been noted and the committee has said that foreign help should be taken “without any reservations” in future projects.[7]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_Re ... ganisation

Most of the time the Defence Research Development Organisation was treated as if it was a vendor and the Army Headquarters or the Air Headquarters were the customers. Because the Army and the Air Force themselves did not have any design or construction responsibility, they tended to treat the designer or Indian industry at par with their corresponding designer in the world market. If they could get a MiG 21 from the world market, they wanted a MiG 21 from DRDO.[3]

In 2010,then defence minister A.K. Antony ordered the restructing of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to give 'a major boost to defence research in the country and to ensure effective participation of the private sector in defence technology'.The key measures to make DRDO effective in its functioning include the establishment of a Defence Technology Commission with the defence minister as its chairman.[4]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_Re ... ganisation

Critcism of DRDO
Project: Arjun Main Battle Tank

•Too much time and effort spent in developing engine for tank without meeting success.

•DRDO looked at outsourcing turret control systems only in mid-’80s after failing to develop it in-house.

•DRDO did not hand over blueprints and specifications to the manufacturing facility on time.

•Tank suffered from poor product quality and sub-optimal performance during development, testing and production stage.

committee recommendations

•DRDO should immediately start work on a Mk II version of the tank to meet the Army’s requirements.

•Advanced version to be built on a joint development model and foreign collaborators should be roped in to gain expertise.

•DRDO needs to work on indigenisation of engine, turret and sight and fire control system that it has completely failed to develop.


In 1999, as Arjun was not ready, an agreementwas signed with Russia to buy off-the-shelf 124T-90 MBTs and assemble within India another186 tanks from Semi-Knocked Down (SKD) andCompletely-Knocked Down (CKD) kits, making atotal 310 tanks16. The last batch of these wassubsequently delivered at Niizni Tagil, at afunction held on April 5, 2004, on the premises ofUralvagonzavod

17.LESSONS LEARNTSome of the lessons to be learnt in the wake ofthe Arjun MBT project are:1. Underestimating the project cost should beavoided.2. Project monitoring has to be rigorous.3. Close co-ordination is essential between theDRDO and the user service.4. The technique adopted by the DRDO inexecuting other projects viz conductingprojects in a mission mode in a consortiumapproach with concurrent engineering shouldbe applied to all major projects.

Last edited by Philip on 04 Jan 2012 15:14, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby chackojoseph » 04 Jan 2012 14:59

Philip wrote:What did I say? IA "not in the loop from the start".The full meaning of being "in the loop" is that one should be totally in the know at all times of what is going on,from "start to finish". To say that the IA was
so involved in the case of Arjun flies in the facts,of which there is voluminous evidence,some posted here earlier ,detailing the "technical failures" which a critic brushed off as being mere "management problems"!


1) Maj Gen HM Singh, the army rep spent 28 years with the project.
2) The Vice Chief of Army Staff reviewed it periodically all through the development years.
3) Army had 3-4 GSQR changes in the development period.


The current order is for Arjun Mk 1, unlike your claim that it was for Mk II.

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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby Philip » 04 Jan 2012 15:32

Chacko,if the relationship was that close, why then have so many reports said that the "DRDO and end user' must have "close coordination"? Surely if the IA had been in the loop all along,the tank would've rached fruition a long time ago.I have given just two quotes in the above post.

I agree with you on the shifting of goalposts frequently.It will resylt in delays.In a long gestation period for a weapon system,it is inevitable that new developments will demand from the end user a higher capability during the stretched out developmental period.This is a fact worldwide.However,in order to prevent this from happening,cut-off dates for finall calls on crucial components must be adhered to,for instance in the case oif the LCA, its engine.Believing the tall stories from the GTRE about Kaveri delayed the project by a decade at least,says my AM friend in the know and directly involved,who warned AK about the tall claims too.It was the most crucial component upon which the success of the entire project depended.

If in such case the component cannot be produced at home,then an alternative has to be found from abroad and parallel planning for its acquisition made well in time,so as to keep the projet on schedule.As I quoted in an above post,in the case of Arjun,the foregn engine and transmission "mismatch",resulted in "bulges" in the hull,also due to the extra weight which stressed the two and it repeatedly failed the 6,000km test.This is why in one official report quoted,the recommendation is that there should be no bar to acquiring the same in a JV with a foreign supplier to keep the project on schedule and not as it said,try to "reinvent the wheel".

I stand corrected yes,the second lot ordered is for MK-1s (124 +124),but I was referring instead to reports about the IA placing orders for MK-2s.

http://worldofdefense.blogspot.com/2011 ... dable.html

"We are definitely expecting more orders, at least a minimum of 248 tanks of the Mark-II version. The Ordnance Factory Board has been instructed by the ministry of defence to initiate action for the procurement of the Mark-II version," P. Sivakumar, director, Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment, told the Economic Times.

The order, which could be placed in late-2011 itself, will come as a huge boost to the Arjun production line at the Heavy Vehicles Factory at Avadhi, on the outskirts of Chennai, as the same was expected to be terminated due to a lack of interest shown by the Indian Army.

So far, the Army has placed an order for 248 tanks of the Mark-I version.

The Mark-II version of the Arjun MBT is currently undergoing its critical summer trials in Pokhran, Rajasthan, conducted by the country's nodal defence lab, DRDO, while the winter trials are expected to take place later in the year. The defence research establishment expects to get the new orders from the end user - the Army - once the current trials conclude.


http://www.stratpost.com/india-to-make- ... ks-by-2014

News February 17, 2011 India to make Arjun Mk-II tanks by 2014
India will begin production of an upgraded version of the indigenous Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) by early 2014, an official said here Monday.I ndia will begin production of an upgraded version of the indigenous Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) by early 2014, an official said here Monday.

The Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) is already readying the Mark-II version of the Arjun for its first summer and winter trials this year. Among the upgrades, the Mark-II tank would feature an indigenous engine that would replace the existing German engines of the 58-tonne Arjun Mark-I. The developments come within a year of the government sanctioning the Arjun Mark-II project last May.

“In 24 months from now or early 2014, the Arjun Mark-II tanks will be ready for production,” the DRDO official said.

The army has already ordered 248 Arjun Mark-I tanks for induction into its armored regiments. The first lot of 124 tanks, for which the orders were placed on the Avadi-based Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) in 2004 at a cost of Rs.170 million ($4 million) each, have been handed over to the army.

The army is now operating the 124 Arjuns as part of two regiments in the western sector and last May placed an order for an additional 124 tanks, primarily to keep the production line in HVF running before the Mark-II version is ready for manufacturing.


PS:Last word from BR's own page on Arjun itself perhaps?

The Arjun has been plagued with technical problems with regards to the fire control system, which has reached its developmental limit. Engine overheating problems in desert conditions as well as poor operational mobility, due to its excessive weight and width are also some of the other pressing concerns. Transporting the Arjun has also proved to be a problem, as the 58-tonne tank protrudes 6cm beyond the permissible 3cm limit on either side of tank transporters used for India's current MBT, the T-72M1. The MoD has allocated $3.9 million to build three transporter types to move Arjun. The improved cooling pack, has limited ammunition-carrying capacity and obstructs gun depression towards the rear. The commander's periscope sight, laser warning sight and muzzle reference sight also need modification. A recent CAG (Comptroller & Auditor General) report stated that Arjun's imported content had risen from 27% to nearly 60% in the 15 pre-production series (PPS), substantially enhancing costs.


PPS: Perhaps we should as suggested look nw ot the future and determine what the parameters of a new future MBT for the IA should be,drawing upon the experience of the T-series and Arjun.3 man crew or 4 man crew still? What else?
Last edited by Philip on 04 Jan 2012 15:53, edited 2 times in total.

chackojoseph
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread

Postby chackojoseph » 04 Jan 2012 15:44

Philip wrote:Chacko,if the relationship ws that close, why then have so many repports said that the "DRDO and end user' must have "close coordination"?


The reviews have always been on DRDO and not Army. I have not stated something that is unknown. The Army rep and the VCOAS reviews are all documented facts.

The second order issue is sorted for final, isn't it? It's ok, every one gets mixed up sometime or the other.

The "last word" comment happens to be a collection from individual issues from the past at various time lines. The PPS had an calibration issue and not a "persisting issue." The weight, width etc has been criticisms and not "actual" stalling point. One should distinguish between the criticism and ground position.

The FMBT is something that is mirror of how Army manages or mis-manages its projects. can you show an example where Army managed projects did not come with high decibel bad mouthing? I can show you Naval and Air Force projects.


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