China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby jaladipc » 17 Sep 2011 19:11

11. We have seen that Vietnam has not been able to counter effectively Chinese disruptions of its exploration activities. It will not be able to provide adequate protection to the Indian company. Will we be able to keep a permanent presence of the Indian Navy in the area to protect the operations of the Indian company? Will it be able to counter Chinese attempts to disrupt the operations of the Indian company?


This is the main reason why India is interested in Viet oil blocks.And Vietnamese offering of a naval base will come into equation when ONGC starts drilling.

Lol India might even get a base for free of cost ,given the current situation.

IF this provocation ends with a Naval confrontation, then there are tens of choke points to put chinese trade at stake.India will certainly emerge out as an economical winner.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby tejas » 17 Sep 2011 19:42

My concern wrt China is how long can we get outspent 5 to 1 in defense spending and hope to remain competitive? Additionally we have baboo(n)s who think 12,0000 crores is too much to spend on defending our border with China. I guess dumping that money down an open sewer called Air India is better for national security :x

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby Boreas » 17 Sep 2011 21:43

shiv wrote:
Boreas wrote: I personally feel it may end with terrible results. Its an overwhelming stand of a foreign ministry, with an under preprared defense ministry.

:rotfl: You know - this is totally OT. I would like to place you on a shrink's couch and dig into your thoughts to ask what are the various factors that make you say this and what "terrible results" you anticipate. To me it would be an interesting insight of how you perceive India and China.

couch is ok with me, if you agree to maintain constant supply of banana chips :)


Well let’s see, Say this deal goes through, ONGC & its Vietnami counterpart sends personal and instruments for the exploration.


Stage 1- A chinese naval ship comes and "directs" them to immediately leave the area.

Choice 1 - Leave (Peaceful and humiliating)
Choice 2 - Stay (which will take us to stage 2)


Stage 2 -

Scenario 1: PRC kept on giving warnings, GOI didn't gave any ear to it, and continued its exploration.
PLAN abducts personals and instruments present in its so called territory.

Choice 1 - Fight a legal battle in PRC
Choice 2 - Do diplomatic begging (i doubt they will release anyone without us agreeing to leave)
Choice 3 - Arrest few chinese present in PoK (could show tennis balls. if we can do that!)


Scenario 2: PRC kept on giving warnings, GOI sent few naval ships for protection, and continued its exploration.
PLAN sends couple of its warships, backed by subs, and shore based fighters.
Diplomatic confrontation, PLAN gives a deadline to IN to leave.

Choice 1 - Send more ships (how many? is this favorable for us? will it be affordable to us?)
Choice 2 - Mobilize army along border to put pressure on china that this will spread into a full scale war. (do we want that?)
Choice 3 - Press F1, do back door diplomacy, ask unkil/russis to diffuse it. (have to offer some bargain.)
Choice 4 - Leave unconditionally.


Scenario 3: PRC realizes although India is semi-prepared, but so is China itself. And waits for a more proper time to give a visible response. Meanwhile significantly increases its provocateur activities in Pok along with increased military aid to Pakistan.


Stage 3 -
military confrontation, diplomatic fallback or better equipped pakistan?
What will be net gain?


Action provokes response. It is easy to provoke a response in earlier stages, however an unprepared player soon runs out of actions to get favourable responses.

Had we been serious about our millitary modernization, this would have been proved to be a golden oppurtunity to "teach china the lesson they gave us". But our babus think mountain strike core is too costly!
Last edited by Boreas on 17 Sep 2011 22:56, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby rajrang » 17 Sep 2011 22:04

-
Last edited by rajrang on 17 Sep 2011 22:55, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby rajrang » 17 Sep 2011 22:07

Boreas wrote:Had we been serious about our millitary modernization, this would have been proved to be a golden oppurtunity to "teach china the lesson they gave us". But our babus think mountain strike core is too costly!


Yes this would have been a great opportunity to teach China a lesson if in addition to better military strength, the US (and its' Navy) was willing to underwrite Indian oil exploration. This might have been a possibility with a Bush administration but not likely with Mr. Obama. If S China Sea becomes China's sea, it would be a major strategic loss for the rest of the world, but especially for India and Japan. I hope an aggressive Republican president will get into the oval office. A massive naval exercise in the S China Sea including the US, India, Jaoan, Australia et. al. will be timely. For that you need an aggressive US president.
Last edited by rajrang on 17 Sep 2011 22:54, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby Thomas Kolarek » 17 Sep 2011 22:13

The answer should be this short video for this

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ItHqFny8f7k[/youtube]
Boreas wrote:Was just going through all the reports/articles on recent development in south china sea. I personally feel it may end with terrible results. Its an overwhelming stand of a foreign ministry, with an under preprared defense ministry.

By no means we are currently in a position to see china eye to eye in south china sea. I have no objection with the way MEA trying to put forward a bold face. However I can't stop myself imagining of how are we going to hold on to the stand we are taking?

The below mentioned extract from Raman's blog sums it pretty well -

Raman's strategic analysis wrote:6. The US has so far been following a policy of rejecting Chinese claims of sovereignty over the entire Sea while not getting involved in the various disputes over the claims of sovereignty over the island territories. Indian policy closely converged with that of the US. It rejected the Chinese projection of the Sea as a whole as Chinese waters. It took steps to develop its strategic relations with Vietnam. It asserted the rights of the ships of the Indian Navy to transit the South China Sea during their visits to Vietnamese ports without the need to inform China beforehand or ask for Chinese permission.


7. At the same time, India rightly observed a nuanced silence on the dispute over the island territories. Now, for the first time, India is seeking to take a position on the island territories under the de facto control of Vietnam by accepting Vietnamese claims of de jure sovereignty over them.


8. This is a position with inherent seeds of an undesirable military confrontation between India and China in the South China Sea itself and subsequently or simultaneously across the land borders between the two countries. India is still in the process of strengthening its military-related infrastructure near the Chinese border. In my assessment, it will take India from five to 10 years to bring its infrastructure on par with that of China in Tibet.


9.The reach and strength of the Indian Navy in the South China Sea is far behind that of the US. The US is in a position to engage China in a naval confrontation in the South China Sea, but it realises that such a confrontation could be counter-productive. That is why it has been observing a neutral stand on the island territories.


10. The implications of the reported Indian move to accept Vietnamese claims of sovereignty and to consider favourably the Vietnamese invitation to undertake oil and gas exploration do not appear to have been carefully considered by the Government of India. China has been opposing with determination repeated Vietnamese moves to undertake explorations for natural resources around the island territories under its de facto control. It is likely to oppose any move by the Indian company to undertake exploration in the area.


11. We have seen that Vietnam has not been able to counter effectively Chinese disruptions of its exploration activities. It will not be able to provide adequate protection to the Indian company. Will we be able to keep a permanent presence of the Indian Navy in the area to protect the operations of the Indian company? Will it be able to counter Chinese attempts to disrupt the operations of the Indian company?


12. The ultimate result may be a confrontation with China in the seas adjacent to the Chinese mainland which India cannot hope to win and an over-all deterioration in Sino-Indian relations at a time when India is not yet prepared for a full-blown confrontation with China.


13. Some analysts have projected the Indian move as a tit-for-tat response to Chinese troops moving into the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistani occupation to assist Pakistan in the development of its infrastructure in an area over which India claims sovereignty.


14. The Gilgit-Baltistan area is legitimately ours. The Chinese have no business to be there. We have many options for countering them and for making their foray into the area prohibitively costly and bloody for them. Instead of identifying those options and undertaking them, we should not try to confront the Chinese in the South China Sea, which is not India’s cup of tea.


http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com/2011/09/south-china-sea-india-should-avoid.html

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby Nihat » 18 Sep 2011 00:02

Stage 2 -

Scenario 1: PRC kept on giving warnings, GOI didn't gave any ear to it, and continued its exploration.
PLAN abducts personals and instruments present in its so called territory.

Choice 1 - Fight a legal battle in PRC
Choice 2 - Do diplomatic begging (i doubt they will release anyone without us agreeing to leave)
Choice 3 - Arrest few chinese present in PoK (could show tennis balls. if we can do that!)


Scenario 2: PRC kept on giving warnings, GOI sent few naval ships for protection, and continued its exploration.
PLAN sends couple of its warships, backed by subs, and shore based fighters.
Diplomatic confrontation, PLAN gives a deadline to IN to leave.

Choice 1 - Send more ships (how many? is this favorable for us? will it be affordable to us?)
Choice 2 - Mobilize army along border to put pressure on china that this will spread into a full scale war. (do we want that?)
Choice 3 - Press F1, do back door diplomacy, ask unkil/russis to diffuse it. (have to offer some bargain.)
Choice 4 - Leave unconditionally.


Scenario 3: PRC realizes although India is semi-prepared, but so is China itself. And waits for a more proper time to give a visible response. Meanwhile significantly increases its provocateur activities in Pok along with increased military aid to Pakistan.


One significant factor perhaps overlooked here is the Chinese vulnerability in IOR. A huge number of merchant ships have to pass right through IOR and Malacca straights and this is vitally important for them for purposes of neo-colonialism in Africa, hunger for middle eastern oil and trade with nations such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka which China has been actively pursuing as a means to pressure India into a corner.

It's a calculated risk from our side to go into the South China sea with Vietnam. If China were to try something as drastic as arresting our employees then they should expect constant harassment of their merchant vessels in the Indian Ocean region, forcing them to deploy a large number of warships far from Home waters and given their existing needs for naval assets against USA, Japan, Taiwan, SoKo , that's a near impossibility.

My guess is that we won't be too aggressive in deploying our assets in South China sea for exploration but will continue to have a presence there and China will refrain from serious provocations although they will create a lot of noise occasionally.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby manum » 18 Sep 2011 00:02

Boreas wrote:
Stage 1- A chinese naval ship comes and "directs" them to immediately leave the area.

Choice 1 - Leave (Peaceful and humiliating)
Choice 2 - Stay (which will take us to stage 2)


Stage 2 -

Scenario 1: PRC kept on giving warnings, GOI didn't gave any ear to it, and continued its exploration.
PLAN abducts personals and instruments present in its so called territory.

Choice 1 - Fight a legal battle in PRC
Choice 2 - Do diplomatic begging (i doubt they will release anyone without us agreeing to leave)
Choice 3 - Arrest few chinese present in PoK (could show tennis balls. if we can do that!)


Scenario 2: PRC kept on giving warnings, GOI sent few naval ships for protection, and continued its exploration.
PLAN sends couple of its warships, backed by subs, and shore based fighters.
Diplomatic confrontation, PLAN gives a deadline to IN to leave.

Choice 1 - Send more ships (how many? is this favorable for us? will it be affordable to us?)
Choice 2 - Mobilize army along border to put pressure on china that this will spread into a full scale war. (do we want that?)
Choice 3 - Press F1, do back door diplomacy, ask unkil/russis to diffuse it. (have to offer some bargain.)
Choice 4 - Leave unconditionally.


Scenario 3: PRC realizes although India is semi-prepared, but so is China itself. And waits for a more proper time to give a visible response. Meanwhile significantly increases its provocateur activities in Pok along with increased military aid to Pakistan.


Stage 3 -
military confrontation, diplomatic fallback or better equipped pakistan?
What will be net gain?


Action provokes response. It is easy to provoke a response in earlier stages, however an unprepared player soon runs out of actions to get favourable responses.

Had we been serious about our millitary modernization, this would have been proved to be a golden oppurtunity to "teach china the lesson they gave us". But our babus think mountain strike core is too costly!


If you dont realize ONGC had bought BP assets in 2006 only, while BP was leaving for same reasons of China claims...When ONGC bought the shares they were aware of these things...

so don't think there is noone who is thinking as far you have obviously constructed...Its very important that we generate response from China and make them shout...Its very important that we make sure they come out of so called ignorance to inferior which is a gimmick...

I think we were thinking this thing through for a long time and finally we have started to put it in actuality...the things you are saying are very obvious which draw conclusions from our last war with China...and learning lessons that we must not provoke them...

but its time we go a bit further and reassert ourselves....

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby Sabyasachi » 18 Sep 2011 00:56

Raman's strategic analysis wrote:8. This is a position with inherent seeds of an undesirable military confrontation between India and China in the South China Sea itself and subsequently or simultaneously across the land borders between the two countries. India is still in the process of strengthening its military-related infrastructure near the Chinese border. In my assessment, it will take India from five to 10 years to bring its infrastructure on par with that of China in Tibet.

9.The reach and strength of the Indian Navy in the South China Sea is far behind that of the US. The US is in a position to engage China in a naval confrontation in the South China Sea, but it realises that such a confrontation could be counter-productive. That is why it has been observing a neutral stand on the island territories.

10. The implications of the reported Indian move to accept Vietnamese claims of sovereignty and to consider favourably the Vietnamese invitation to undertake oil and gas exploration do not appear to have been carefully considered by the Government of India. China has been opposing with determination repeated Vietnamese moves to undertake explorations for natural resources around the island territories under its de facto control. It is likely to oppose any move by the Indian company to undertake exploration in the area.
11. We have seen that Vietnam has not been able to counter effectively Chinese disruptions of its exploration activities. It will not be able to provide adequate protection to the Indian company. Will we be able to keep a permanent presence of the Indian Navy in the area to protect the operations of the Indian company? Will it be able to counter Chinese attempts to disrupt the operations of the Indian company?

12. The ultimate result may be a confrontation with China in the seas adjacent to the Chinese mainland which India cannot hope to win and an over-all deterioration in Sino-Indian relations at a time when India is not yet prepared for a full-blown confrontation with China.

13. Some analysts have projected the Indian move as a tit-for-tat response to Chinese troops moving into the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistani occupation to assist Pakistan in the development of its infrastructure in an area over which India claims sovereignty.

14. The Gilgit-Baltistan area is legitimately ours. The Chinese have no business to be there. We have many options for countering them and for making their foray into the area prohibitively costly and bloody for them. Instead of identifying those options and undertaking them, we should not try to confront the Chinese in the South China Sea, which is not India’s cup of tea.


http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com/2011/09/south-china-sea-india-should-avoid.html[/quote][/quote]

Vietnam is hit and run scenario and there will be no backdoor diplomacy (F1) as India has already mentioned its intention to go ahead with the plan.

You need good excuses to disrupt their activity in Indian Ocean (your own backyard) or their net offensive posture vis a vis India. Chinese reaction is given and MEA knows it pretty well. The same Chinese disruption will serve our desire to claim back POK as well.

You lose Vietnam and they lose Indian Ocean and Karakorum Highway or net India centric misadventures. If not Indian Ocean straight away then you will gain the right to Challenge their activities at whim, POK for sure.

The most Important would be pressing the paddle for a good intelligent propaganda following any such confrontation.
Above whole assertion is suggesting/scaring a full blown war which is highly unlikely even if there are some direct confrontations on Indo-China border for any good reason.

Also how it has anything to do with infrastructure on the borders?
They confront you at South China Sea; you confront them in Indian Ocean. You back off and cry injustice, hegemony etc. If they back off they lose supplies and all other annoying activities. The border remains sterile.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby Boreas » 18 Sep 2011 02:45

manum wrote:If you dont realize ONGC had bought BP assets in 2006 only, while BP was leaving for same reasons of China claims...When ONGC bought the shares they were aware of these things...
.....


That is not correct.

In 2004 Vietnam put nine offshore exploration blocks up for bidding. OVL bid for block 127 and 128 in the Phu Khanh Basin, and was awarded both of them at the end of the competitive bidding process in 2006. It is a 7 years contract and OVL has a 100% participating interest. PetroVietnam holds an option to take upto 20% participating interest in the event of positive resource discovery. (Hence no possibility of ONGC buying BPs stake)

China has raised objection for exploration in these two blocks.


You may have confused this with the last years agreement in which ONGC agreed to buy 35% stake of BP in offshore Block 06.1, located on southern Vietnamese coast known as Nam Con Son gas project. At that time ONGC held 45% of the share with PetroVietnam holding the rest 20%. Originally this agreement was made in 1988 and was offered entirely to ONGC. But due to cash crunch of early 90s, the stakes were split with BP in 1992-93 agreement.

The reason for BPs selling there share in this project was to raise funds for clearing oil spill in gulf of Mexico. And as China's CNOOC and Sinopec were also in race to buy BPs share in the project, I doubt China has any objections for this project, which may have made BP to exit.


Plz correct me if I am wrong, else the argument you made stand nullified.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby Dharma » 18 Sep 2011 02:58

Sabyasachi wrote:
Raman's strategic analysis wrote:8. This is a position with inherent seeds of an undesirable military confrontation between India and China in the South China Sea itself and subsequently or simultaneously across the land borders between the two countries. India is still in the process of strengthening its military-related infrastructure near the Chinese border. In my assessment, it will take India from five to 10 years to bring its infrastructure on par with that of China in Tibet.

9.The reach and strength of the Indian Navy in the South China Sea is far behind that of the US. The US is in a position to engage China in a naval confrontation in the South China Sea, but it realises that such a confrontation could be counter-productive. That is why it has been observing a neutral stand on the island territories.

10. The implications of the reported Indian move to accept Vietnamese claims of sovereignty and to consider favourably the Vietnamese invitation to undertake oil and gas exploration do not appear to have been carefully considered by the Government of India. China has been opposing with determination repeated Vietnamese moves to undertake explorations for natural resources around the island territories under its de facto control. It is likely to oppose any move by the Indian company to undertake exploration in the area.
11. We have seen that Vietnam has not been able to counter effectively Chinese disruptions of its exploration activities. It will not be able to provide adequate protection to the Indian company. Will we be able to keep a permanent presence of the Indian Navy in the area to protect the operations of the Indian company? Will it be able to counter Chinese attempts to disrupt the operations of the Indian company?

12. The ultimate result may be a confrontation with China in the seas adjacent to the Chinese mainland which India cannot hope to win and an over-all deterioration in Sino-Indian relations at a time when India is not yet prepared for a full-blown confrontation with China.

13. Some analysts have projected the Indian move as a tit-for-tat response to Chinese troops moving into the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistani occupation to assist Pakistan in the development of its infrastructure in an area over which India claims sovereignty.

14. The Gilgit-Baltistan area is legitimately ours. The Chinese have no business to be there. We have many options for countering them and for making their foray into the area prohibitively costly and bloody for them. Instead of identifying those options and undertaking them, we should not try to confront the Chinese in the South China Sea, which is not India’s cup of tea.


http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com/2011/09/south-china-sea-india-should-avoid.html
[/quote]

Vietnam is hit and run scenario and there will be no backdoor diplomacy (F1) as India has already mentioned its intention to go ahead with the plan.

You need good excuses to disrupt their activity in Indian Ocean (your own backyard) or their net offensive posture vis a vis India. Chinese reaction is given and MEA knows it pretty well. The same Chinese disruption will serve our desire to claim back POK as well.

You lose Vietnam and they lose Indian Ocean and Karakorum Highway or net India centric misadventures. If not Indian Ocean straight away then you will gain the right to Challenge their activities at whim, POK for sure.

The most Important would be pressing the paddle for a good intelligent propaganda following any such confrontation.
Above whole assertion is suggesting/scaring a full blown war which is highly unlikely even if there are some direct confrontations on Indo-China border for any good reason.

Also how it has anything to do with infrastructure on the borders?
They confront you at South China Sea; you confront them in Indian Ocean. You back off and cry injustice, hegemony etc. If they back off they lose supplies and all other annoying activities. The border remains sterile.[/quote]

I would like to add that the Chinese would have been up at it with this deep sea mining in indian ocean and activities in pok whether we expand our operations in vietnam or not..So i think that this is the right move on the part of India .Also If we play by the bully's rules then we can never win....Chinese would never want to resolve the conflict with india on the border issue on reasonable terms in the near future, so there is no point in us sitting like ducks..maybe in the future we can expand the cooperation with vietnam to include "harmonious" missile defence and if all else fails we got the nukes to deter any foolishness from the chinese side...

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby rajrang » 18 Sep 2011 07:11


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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby shiv » 18 Sep 2011 08:50




Yikes! :shock:

ImageImage

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby rajrang » 18 Sep 2011 09:02

shiv wrote:


Why would India's warning consititute dhoti shivering?

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby rajrang » 18 Sep 2011 09:09

US and India have shared objectives:

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 023771.cms


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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby Gaur » 18 Sep 2011 09:24

rajrang wrote:Why would India's warning consititute dhoti shivering?

Lol! No, of course Indian warning isn't dhoti shivering but it is surely bound to induce a heavy dose of the same in some (make that most) SDREs. :lol:

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby manum » 18 Sep 2011 09:35

Boreas wrote:
manum wrote:If you dont realize ONGC had bought BP assets in 2006 only, while BP was leaving for same reasons of China claims...When ONGC bought the shares they were aware of these things...
.....


That is not correct.

In 2004 Vietnam put nine offshore exploration blocks up for bidding. OVL bid for block 127 and 128 in the Phu Khanh Basin, and was awarded both of them at the end of the competitive bidding process in 2006. It is a 7 years contract and OVL has a 100% participating interest. PetroVietnam holds an option to take upto 20% participating interest in the event of positive resource discovery. (Hence no possibility of ONGC buying BPs stake)

China has raised objection for exploration in these two blocks.


You may have confused this with the last years agreement in which ONGC agreed to buy 35% stake of BP in offshore Block 06.1, located on southern Vietnamese coast known as Nam Con Son gas project. At that time ONGC held 45% of the share with PetroVietnam holding the rest 20%. Originally this agreement was made in 1988 and was offered entirely to ONGC. But due to cash crunch of early 90s, the stakes were split with BP in 1992-93 agreement.

The reason for BPs selling there share in this project was to raise funds for clearing oil spill in gulf of Mexico. And as China's CNOOC and Sinopec were also in race to buy BPs share in the project, I doubt China has any objections for this project, which may have made BP to exit.


Plz correct me if I am wrong, else the argument you made stand nullified.


This is your source of information http://www.financialexpress.com/news/ongc-keen-to-buy-bps-stake-in-vietnam-project/649942/1

and what I am saying is http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ak.lQfnkDStU
“Starting in the summer of 2007, China told a number of U.S. and foreign oil and gas firms to stop exploration work with Vietnamese partners in the South China Sea or face unspecified consequences in their business dealings with China,” Marciel said, in prepared comments which didn’t name any companies.

In 2007, BP Plc abandoned planned exploration in an area known as Block 5-2 between the Spratlys and an existing BP- operated gas project in Vietnamese waters, because of competing ownership claims between China and Vietnam, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.


http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IL20Ad01.html

Yet the failure to resolve the South China Sea dispute has kept historical antagonisms alive. In April, Beijing complained that a BP-led gas exploration and development project off southern Vietnam was being conducted in China’s territorial waters. Hanoi denied Beijing’s claim, but BP has suspended its exploration in the area, known as block 5.2. China has recently challenged energy exploration in other offshore blocks tendered by Vietnam.

One case in particular involves India’s state-owned ONGC and the offshore blocks 127 and 128, located off Vietnam’s central coast, it was awarded in May 2006. On November 22, the Chinese embassy in New Delhi wrote to ONGC to say that the concession award of the blocks by Vietnam was not valid. To date ONGC has invested US$100 million in its exploration program in the concession areas.


See I am quoting multiple news items I read and remembered in piece...and together they construct what I said to you than one consolidated news item you simply copy pasted...

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby Boreas » 18 Sep 2011 10:27

Boreas wrote:
manum wrote:If you dont realize ONGC had bought BP assets in 2006 only, while BP was leaving for same reasons of China claims...When ONGC bought the shares they were aware of these things...
.....


That is not correct.

In 2004 Vietnam put nine offshore exploration blocks up for bidding. OVL bid for block 127 and 128 in the Phu Khanh Basin, and was awarded both of them at the end of the competitive bidding process in 2006. It is a 7 years contract and OVL has a 100% participating interest. PetroVietnam holds an option to take upto 20% participating interest in the event of positive resource discovery. (Hence no possibility of ONGC buying BPs stake)

China has raised objection for exploration in these two blocks.


You may have confused this with the last years agreement in which ONGC agreed to buy 35% stake of BP in offshore Block 06.1, located on southern Vietnamese coast known as Nam Con Son gas project. At that time ONGC held 45% of the share with PetroVietnam holding the rest 20%. Originally this agreement was made in 1988 and was offered entirely to ONGC. But due to cash crunch of early 90s, the stakes were split with BP in 1992-93 agreement.

The reason for BPs selling there share in this project was to raise funds for clearing oil spill in gulf of Mexico. And as China's CNOOC and Sinopec were also in race to buy BPs share in the project, I doubt China has any objections for this project, which may have made BP to exit.


Plz correct me if I am wrong, else the argument you made stand nullified.




Power of goolge :mrgreen: Astonishing but it is not where I referred to, as I prefer not making newspaper reports as base of my arguments.

However it do verifies what I said. (and hence saves me effort of quoting my source)

manum wrote:and what I am saying is http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ak.lQfnkDStU
“Starting in the summer of 2007, China told a number of U.S. and foreign oil and gas firms to stop exploration work with Vietnamese partners in the South China Sea or face unspecified consequences in their business dealings with China,” Marciel said, in prepared comments which didn’t name any companies.

In 2007, BP Plc abandoned planned exploration in an area known as Block 5-2 between the Spratlys and an existing BP- operated gas project in Vietnamese waters, because of competing ownership claims between China and Vietnam, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.


http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IL20Ad01.html

Yet the failure to resolve the South China Sea dispute has kept historical antagonisms alive. In April, Beijing complained that a BP-led gas exploration and development project off southern Vietnam was being conducted in China’s territorial waters. Hanoi denied Beijing’s claim, but BP has suspended its exploration in the area, known as block 5.2. China has recently challenged energy exploration in other offshore blocks tendered by Vietnam.

One case in particular involves India’s state-owned ONGC and the offshore blocks 127 and 128, located off Vietnam’s central coast, it was awarded in May 2006. On November 22, the Chinese embassy in New Delhi wrote to ONGC to say that the concession award of the blocks by Vietnam was not valid. To date ONGC has invested US$100 million in its exploration program in the concession areas.


See I am quoting multiple news items I read and remembered in piece...and together they construct what I said to you than one consolidated news item you simply copy pasted...


Sir I hope you will agree, a licensing process for which companies bid in 2004 and got blocks allocated in 2006. Won't have any insights back then that in 2007 China will raise serious objections on the matter and will lead BP to quit. Had anybody known it in 2004 then atleast BP would not have participated in the bidding.

Hence, as you said - "When ONGC bought the shares they were aware of these things" will not be a valid assumption.


Coming to the second part, I was unable to find any reference in the above articles of a possible sale of stakes from BP to ONGC in 2006. Which on principle makes the whole argument you made lose merit.
Last edited by Boreas on 18 Sep 2011 11:07, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby shiv » 18 Sep 2011 10:41

rajrang wrote:Why would India's warning consititute dhoti shivering?


Just a joke. Not meant to convey any meaning or opinion. In fact the news is exactly the opposite isn't it?

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby manum » 18 Sep 2011 10:59

http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2011/09/16/beijing-demands-india-and-vietnam-stop-oil-joint-venture-in-south-china-sea-10165.html

Sept. 16 – China, seemingly forgetting its policy of non-interference in other states’ affairs, has begun a public dialogue with India objecting to an agreement signed between India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh Limited and Vietnam’s Petro Vietnam for oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea.

Petro Vietnam has entered into a joint venture with India’s ONGC to develop Blocks 127 and 128 after ONGC bought BP’s assets in the project in 2006. However, China is claiming all of the South China Sea as its “indisputable sovereignty,” a position that would take China’s territory right up to the Vietnamese coastline.



See I am not gonna go in round circles...and keep quoting, What is power of Google is also a power of memory...where I just plainly remembered what I had read in past...which I had to search back and find...and what you said, I could retrace word by word in one single article...so I wont call it anything except copy paste job...

there are many more things which go back to 90's when India had to sell a chunk to BP due to exchange crisis...which we are vying to take back after proposed sell off of BP assets in vietnam to pay for Oil spill...

Point is We know South China sea is claimed by China and there were many incidents which were already disturbing before acquisition specially in Spartly island to call it a disputed region...which lead to BP exit.

Thirdly its time we protect our overseas oil interests even if we have to go to war with China, because now Indians are paying highest price for oil

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/For-petrol-Indians-shell-out-the-most-in-the-world/articleshow/10023345.cms


now please stop resisting...and clamp your dhoti...

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby Boreas » 18 Sep 2011 11:18

manum wrote:See I am not gonna go in round circles...and keep quoting, What is power of Google is also a power of memory...where I just plainly remembered what I had read in past...which I had to search back and find...and what you said, I could retrace word by word in one single article...so I wont call it anything except copy paste job...


Please do. This is the second time you have tried to counter by claiming I have copy pasted (which is not wrong) I would like to see on what basis are you consitently making that claim.

The link which you obtained by googling some lines of what i wrote, lacks the below mentioned highlighted information -

Boreas wrote:That is not correct.

In 2004 Vietnam put nine offshore exploration blocks up for bidding. OVL bid for block 127 and 128 in the Phu Khanh Basin, and was awarded both of them at the end of the competitive bidding process in 2006. It is a 7 years contract and OVL has a 100% participating interest. PetroVietnam holds an option to take upto 20% participating interest in the event of positive resource discovery. (Hence no possibility of ONGC buying BPs stake)

China has raised objection for exploration in these two blocks.


You may have confused this with the last years agreement in which ONGC agreed to buy 35% stake of BP in offshore Block 06.1, located on southern Vietnamese coast known as Nam Con Son gas project. At that time ONGC held 45% of the share with PetroVietnam holding the rest 20%. Originally this agreement was made in 1988 and was offered entirely to ONGC. But due to cash crunch of early 90s, the stakes were split with BP in 1992-93 agreement.

The reason for BPs selling there share in this project was to raise funds for clearing oil spill in gulf of Mexico. And as China's CNOOC and Sinopec were also in race to buy BPs share in the project, I doubt China has any objections for this project, which may have made BP to exit.


Plz correct me if I am wrong, else the argument you made stand nullified.


Now plz do tell me how in the process of copy-pasting, does the following info get added into the data of the article you mentioned above? Else plz do your homework before making "smart" claims.

There could be a little possibility that somebody apart from you too can read and possess a little information of there own.
Last edited by Boreas on 18 Sep 2011 11:23, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby manum » 18 Sep 2011 11:22

I need source...I didn't say I am right, I quoted multiple sources...

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby Boreas » 18 Sep 2011 11:30

you didn't say you need source. you said you already have my source. And i have copy pasted eveything. This is what you said.

While clearly realizing that you made a wrong statement, you kept on trying to discredit me!

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby manum » 18 Sep 2011 11:34

leave it...it was simpler for you reconstruct everything you are saying in form of references or bibliography than plain frowning...anyways I am done...

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby Craig Alpert » 20 Sep 2011 03:26

China reiterates its objection to India's role in South China Sea exploration

Let's see GOI grows some balls and goes ahead with this or 2 months down the road pisses down and says that we respect China's Sovereignty while quietly let it build up infrastructure in POK!! Hope GOI stands behind it's decision and says the hell with China and plays hardball!

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby NRao » 20 Sep 2011 03:42

^^^^^

Unless India is willing to dismantle stuff in PoK not much she can do outside of fighting it out in the China Sea. Perhaps with some help from others too.

China needs to be gang tackled.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby shiv » 20 Sep 2011 05:07

I consulted unkal Googal about how oil exploration is conducted. China may be able to do nothing more than bleat about it and stage a few incidents when the actually find a ship. The ocean is huge and dozens of ships of various nationalities will be floating around. Some will snoop for magnetic disturbances indicating oil. When those areas are mapped others may use acoustic methods to map the rock under the sea bed.

Anyone who has had a borewell placed in his property will know that drilling up to 400 meters can take place in a day. Ofshore, in shallow, calm water - I would not be surprised if drilling and sampling can be done very quickly - long before the PLAAN can actually figure out what is going on.

The reason China is protesting is because they will not be able to do much until the catch someone. Then they will have to stage an international incident and think about what will happen if another country decides to stage a similar tit for tat international incident using a Chinese ship in far away waters. Everyone needs sips. Even China. You fck with my ship in Chinese waters I will do that to a Chinese ship in my waters. So what are they going to do?
Sometimes we on BRF need to think like people with balls.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby NRao » 20 Sep 2011 06:14

IIRC India bought the share for drilling from Shell Oil. Right?

So, what is the problem that China is bringing up? IF Shell drilled, was it OK with them or did they yell and scream about it too?

Shiv,

India will be drilling in a dedicated, alloated area. I am not too sure, but that area - blocks - has to be mapped, etc. Everything pretty much has to be known.

????

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby pran » 20 Sep 2011 09:39

China knows very well that once a offshore platform plants itself, all the associated infrastructure and effects will come along.
- personnel
- security apparatus
- intel apparatus including sonar mapping and submarine listening post for advance warning.
- sea bed mapping and other cartographic information to challenge panda's lies.
- political loss of face in front of small countries.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby chackojoseph » 20 Sep 2011 10:17


member_19648
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby member_19648 » 20 Sep 2011 12:52

From the above article:
There is worse in the Eastern Sector: in 2007, it came out that China had moved 20 km into India and occupied areas including the Sumdorong Chu valley.

This piece of news, if true is very worrysome. Was digging through some data about the valley, came across this piece of news, was a good read:

http://ignca.nic.in/ks_41065.htm

Six and half years later, Deng decided to flex China’s muscles again with India. In mid-1986, it came to the notice of India that the PLA had built a helipad at Wandung in Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. India reacted swiftly and the PLA had an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the India Army in Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunchal Pradesh in August 1986. After a week of tense moments both sides mutually agreed to withdraw their forces inside their respective territories and create a no man’s land. The Chinese posture at that time clearly indicated that Beijing quickly realised that 1962 cannot be repeated. Afterwards, we saw some writings in the PLA’s official organ, Liberation Army Daily, about the professionalism the Indian armed forces.


Could someone enlighten on the real security status in the area? Will be of immense help!

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby nitinr » 20 Sep 2011 13:10

If at all land is already taken whats left to be afraid of.
Today its 20km. Tomorrow it might be 200km knowing how the chinese work. Then 1 fine day somebody will wake up and try to do things in a hurry as in 1962.
Our people have not learned from history it seems.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby prabhug » 20 Sep 2011 13:35

what is the probability there would be a border skirmish with chinese this December?in view with the earthquake in sikkim and loss of infrastructure.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby shiv » 20 Sep 2011 18:57

prabhug wrote:what is the probability there would be a border skirmish with chinese this December?in view with the earthquake in sikkim and loss of infrastructure.

Earthquakes are like China. They do not recognize boundaries. The other side would also have been shook up. But you won't hear any news. Besides - December? The place will be snowed in.

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby manum » 20 Sep 2011 23:17

A funny thought...

what making empty buildings and cities does to Chinese economy is what exactly it does to American economy when Americans start a war...It keeps wheel running...
and to cause a yin yang...I think America must bombard empty buildings and cities of China while China will keep making new ones...no causality and purpose solved for both...

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby Guddu » 21 Sep 2011 05:55

From Stratfor...

"Although competition between China and India is not terribly new, we do see a current flare-up in the relations between the two countries. India has been expanding its relations with Vietnam, focusing on oil and gas exploration and production as well as military cooperation. This has received a strong verbal response from the Chinese as well as some physical activity.

India and Vietnam have been cooperating in offshore oil and gas exploration for several years. However, they are moving to a new phase with more of the exploitation of the resources. It appears that later this year a new memorandum of understanding between the two countries is going to be signed. China has responded to this by accusing India of violating Chinese territorial waters and of interfering in Chinese territorial issues. There has been a report of an incident where Chinese maritime police have interfered with the operations of an Indian vessel in the Vietnamese waters, and we see statements coming out of Beijing warning India to back off.

India for a long time has pursued what it calls a “Look East” policy but it has not pursued it very strongly. We see India now moving back again into the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] nations, into the South China Sea, trying to expand its activity, trying to secure some of its influence, and ultimately taking a role in securing the major supply routes to the area, but also in trying to counter the Chinese. Chinese activity in Pakistan, Chinese activity in Myanmar, the expansion of Chinese port agreements throughout the Indian Ocean Basin, even the Chinese naval activity in regard to the anti-piracy operations off of Africa, have left the Indians feeling a little bit vulnerable.

Seeing the Chinese become stronger, at least theoretically, in their operations in the Indian Ocean, India is looking in some sense to flank China now. In response to the Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean, the Indians are going to become more active in the South China Sea and maybe even farther north. There is talk about creating a trilateral grouping to discuss security, economics and politics of the region between India, the United States and Japan, for example. This very obviously to the Chinese looks like an attempt to constrain Chinese operations and Chinese capabilities within in their own sphere of influence.

The South China Sea has long been the center of competition for sea lane control as well as, for the most part, theoretically for resources; though fishing is there, there has been some offshore oil and gas activity. In recent years we’ve seen an expansion of attention into not only exploring but truly exploiting the undersea resources, and not just in oil and gas but also now in mineral exploration. This is changing, in some sense, the way in which the countries interact because formerly when lots of countries claimed either all or parts of the territory, there was little to force them into confrontation. Now as countries begin to access resources, begin to explore the resources in the sea beds, they are doing so in ways that in some sense asserts their territorial claim to that area. That leaves the other countries that don’t interfere with that in some sense accepting those territorial claims.

The concreteness of this has changed, in some sense, the way in which interactions regarding the South China Sea play out. As countries expand their operations, as they put in installations, semi-permanent, permanent installations, to be able to access these resources, they find themselves needing to defend those resources. Other countries may be interfering in the operations and so we see these issues where China will send a boat to interfere with the activity of another country’s ships. The response, then, from Vietnam, or from India in this case, may be to become more robust in their own military patrols in the area. And this builds up a case where you have more military vessels in the area at the same time and the chances for accidental confrontation start to rise.

In the end, while India is becoming more involved, there are some serious limitations. The Indians certainly have very large land borders that they are much more concerned about. The country still struggles with several internal insurgencies or militancy. And their ability to forcefully push themselves into the South China Sea is very limited. The Vietnamese who are working with them know this. Vietnam is playing a lot of different options, not just working with India but also working with China, with the United States, with Japan and several other countries.

As we watch this competition play, the countries in Southeast Asia are put in an interesting position. They have the ability to exploit this competition to draw, perhaps, greater attention from each of the different players. At the same time they have the risk of being exploited by these players and finding themselves caught up in this big power confrontation."

This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby shiv » 21 Sep 2011 06:51

Guddu wrote:From Stratfor...


That is an amateur analysis. I have seen better commentaries from many BRFites.

Internet+time+enthusiast= "strategic analysis" :roll:

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby prithvi » 21 Sep 2011 07:01

shiv wrote:
Guddu wrote:From Stratfor...


That is an amateur analysis. I have seen better commentaries from many BRFites.

Internet+time+enthusiast= "strategic analysis" :roll:


lolz.. yea.. I also felt the same.. gawd who hire these folks? But if the intended audience is far away from our land.. the lack of awareness is humongous and there this article is a quality one..

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Postby chackojoseph » 21 Sep 2011 14:47

3 Indian Aircraft carriers have a psychological impact. It can be seen in former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's speech yesterday ( Japan backs India on South China sea)

with three aircraft carriers, India can assure Vietnamese, Americans, South Koreans “if not the Chinese” of the stability in the region.


Sometime back I had said that our a/c carriers are not big enough and IAC-2 should have a higher tonnage. Japs are used to seeing US aircraft carriers.
Last edited by chackojoseph on 21 Sep 2011 16:48, edited 1 time in total.


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